


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The History
of the
BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA
AND THE EAST.

BY DR. E. H. NOLAN.



TEMPLE OF JUGGERNAUT.

London.

THE

ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OF

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA

AND THE EAST,

FROM THE

Earliest Times to the Suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1859.

BY

E. H. NOLAN, Ph. D., LL. D.,

AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA."

ILLUSTRATED WITH STEEL ENGRAVINGS AND MAPS.

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CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. L.		CHAP. LXVI.	
Progress of the East India Company, from the Establishment of Factoria in Continental India to the First Settlement on the Hoogly	1	Establishment of a regular Navy at Bombay, and of regular Military Forces in Bombay, Madras, and Bengal	176
CHAP. LI.		CHAP. LXVII.	
Home History of the Company, from the Civil War in England to the end of the Seventeenth Century	1	Jealousies and Quarrels with the French previous to the first breaking out of War between them and the British in India	186
CHAP. LII.		CHAP. LXVIII.	
The English in India and the Eastern Archipelago, from the Settlement at Hoogly to the end of the Seventeenth Century	30	War between England and France in the East	195
CHAP. LIII.		CHAP. LXIX.	
Review of the History of British Connection with India to the Close of the Seventeenth Century	48	English Conquest of the Carnatic	203
CHAP. LIV.		CHAP. LXX.	
Review of the History of British Connection with India to the close of the Seventeenth Century (<i>Continued</i>)	62	British Conquest of the Carnatic (<i>Continued</i>)	216
CHAP. LV.		CHAP. LXXI.	
The Home Affairs of the Company during the first half of the Eighteenth Century	72	Conflicts between the English and French in Western India after the breaking out of War between the two Nations in 1744	237
CHAP. LVI.		CHAP. LXXII.	
The Ostend Company	80	Events in Bengal after the breaking out of the War with France in 1744—Massacre of Englishmen in the Black Hole of Calcutta—Expulsion of the French	243
CHAP. LVII.		CHAP. LXXIII.	
The Danes in India and Eastern Asia	88	Dethronement of Suraj-ad-Dowlah—Battle of Plassey	252
CHAP. LVIII.		CHAP. LXXIV.	
The Minor East India Companies:—Swedish, Prussian, Trieste, and Spanish	95	Opposition to the Subahdarship of Meer Jaffier—Intrigues of the Nabob of Oude, and other Native Princea, instigated by the French—Invasion of Bengal by the Dutch, and their Defeat and Destruction by Colonel Ford—Invasion of Bengal by Shah-zada—His Repulse and Flight	264
CHAP. LIX.		CHAP. LXXV.	
French Enterprise in India and the East, to the time of the formation of "The Perpetual Company of the Indies"	105	Warren Hastings prominent in the Affairs of Bengal—Governor Vansittart opposed by the Council—War with the Emperor—Defeat of the imperial army, and of the French, with the capture of M. Law, the French chief—Establishment of Meer Cossim in the Subahdarship by the English	275
CHAP. LX.		CHAP. LXXVI.	
French Enterprise in India and the East from the formation of "The Perpetual Company of the Indies" to the War with England	117	Affairs in Bengal—Violent and fraudulent conduct of the English—Disputes between the Governor and Council of Calcutta—Revenue Contests between the Officers of the Council and those of the Subahdar—Commencement of War by the British—Series of Victories—Massacre of the English at Patna—Expulsion of Meer Cossim from Bengal	283
CHAP. LXI.		CHAP. LXXVII.	
British Affairs in China during the Eighteenth Century	123	War with the Nabob of Oude—Ruin of Meer Cossim—Death of Meer Jaffier—The English place Nujum-ad-Dowlah upon the Musnid of Bengal—Humiliation of Nundoomur, the minister of Jaffier—Disorganization of English Affairs in Bengal—Corrupt practices of the Council—Appointment of Clive as Governor	292
CHAP. LXII.			
The British in Western India during the first quarter of the Eighteenth Century	132		
CHAP. LXIII.			
The British in Western India during the second quarter of the Eighteenth Century	148		
CHAP. LXIV.			
Madras from the beginning of the Eighteenth Century to the breaking out of Hostilities with the French in 1744	163		
CHAP. LXV.			
Events in Bengal from the beginning of the Eighteenth Century to the breaking out of Hostilities with France in 1744	169		

	PAGE.		PAGE.
CHAP. LXXVIII.		CHAP. XCVI.	
Affairs in Bengal during the Government of Mr. Verelst and Mr. Cartier—Arrival of Warren Hastings as Governor	303	Third Campaign against Tippoo Sultan (<i>Continued</i>)	445
CHAP. LXXX.		CHAP. XCVII.	
Bombay and Madras—Events connected with those Presidencies to 1775	308	War with Tippoo Sultan (<i>Continued</i>)	454
CHAP. LXXXI.		CHAP. XCVIII.	
War with Hyder Ali of Mysore	315	Departure of Lord Cornwallis from India—Sir John Shore becomes Governor-general—He resigns—The Earl of Mornington is appointed Governor-general—General Conspiracy against the English—Efforts of the French—Tippoo Sultan forms a French Alliance to expel the English from India	464
CHAP. LXXXII.		CHAP. XCIX.	
Home Affairs of the East India Company from 1750 to 1775	324	Final War with Tippoo Sultan—Storming of Seringapatam—Death of Tippoo	470
CHAP. LXXXIII.		CHAP. C.	
Affairs in Bengal during the Government of Warren Hastings	335	The Hon. Colonel Wellesley, as Governor of Mysore, makes War on Dhoondia Waugh—Results upon the Interests of the English in India—General Difficulties of Lord Wellesley's Government—Affairs of Oude—Disagreements with Birmah—Missionary Efforts in the Eighteenth Century	480
CHAP. LXXXIV.		CHAP. CI.	
The Government of Bengal under Warren Hastings as Governor-general of India	345	Relations of the French to India in the opening of the Nineteenth Century—Policy of the Marquis Wellesley in reference to French influence in India, and the Mahrattas—War with the Mahrattas—Operations of General Wellesley—Battles of Assaye and Argaum	490
CHAP. LXXXV.		CHAP. CII.	
Government of Warren Hastings as Governor-general (<i>Continued</i>)	355	Mahratta War (<i>Continued</i>)—Operations of General Lake—Battles and Sieges—Final Subjugation of the Mahrattas, and Treaties of Peace	500
CHAP. LXXXVI.		CHAP. CIII.	
Government of Hastings (<i>Continued</i>)	361	Resignation of the Marquis Wellesley—Marquis Cornwallis succeeds him—Policy and Death of his Lordship—Appointment and revocation of Sir G. Barlow—Nomination of Lord Minto—Affairs of Madras—Mutiny and Massere at Vellore—Arrival of Lord Minto—His Policy	507
CHAP. LXXXVII.		CHAP. CIV.	
War with Hyder Ali of Mysore—His Invasion of the Carnatic—His Devastations, Victories, Cruelty, and Death	377	Government of the Earl of Moira	514
CHAP. LXXXVIII.		CHAP. CV.	
The War with Tippoo Sahib—Withdrawal from the Carnatic—Conquests in Western India—Sieges of Mangalore and Onore—Victories of Colonel Fullarton and General Stuart—Defeat of Bussy and the French—Peace with France—Peace with Tippoo	387	Progress of British Interests in China and the Archipelago, from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the end of the Government of the Marquis Hastings	525
CHAP. LXXXIX.		CHAP. CVI.	
Naval Operations in the Indian Sea during the War with Mysore, France, Spain, and Holland—Capture of Negapatnam, Trincomalee, &c., from the Dutch—Loss of Trincomalee to the French	399	Home Events connected with the East India Company from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Renewal of the Charter in 1833-4	537
CHAP. XC.		CHAP. CVII.	
Home Affairs	404	Government of Lord Amherst	543
CHAP. XCI.		CHAP. CVIII.	
Home Affairs (<i>Continued</i>)	414	Government of Lord Amherst (<i>Continued</i>)	556
CHAP. XCII.		CHAP. CIX.	
Mr. Maephétson succeeds Hastings as Governor-general—His Financial Measures—Tippoo defeats the Mahrattas—Lord Macartney surrenders the Government of Madras and refuses that of Bengal—Ambition of Scindiah—The Sikhs become important—Earl Cornwallis assumes the Government of India—His General Measures—Tippoo invades Travancore	419	Provisional Government of Sir Charles Metcalfe—Government of Lord Auckland—Russian Intervention in the Affairs of Afghanistan—Persian Invasion of Herat—British Expedition to the Persian Gulf—Treaty of Lahore	562
CHAP. XCIII.		CHAP. CX.	
War with Tippoo Sultan	426	The Afghan War	572
CHAP. XCIV.			
Second Campaign against Tippoo Sultan	430		
CHAP. XCV.			
War with Tippoo: Third Campaign	438		

PAGE.	PAGE.
CHAP. CXI.	CHAP. CXXV.
Affghan War (<i>Continued</i>) 581	Annexation of Oude—Laws affecting the Tenure of Land in Bengal 686
CHAP. CXII.	CHAP. CXXVI.
Transactions and Battles of the British Army at Cabul, from the departure of Sir Robert Sale to the retreat of the Hon. General Elphinstone . . . 588	Peraian War—Its Causes—Invasion of Herat—Expedition to the Peraian Gulf—Capture of Bushire, Mohammerah, and Akwaz—Peace negotiated at Paria 693
CHAP. CXIII.	CHAP. CXXVII.
Retreat of the British from Cabul—Destruction of the Army 597	Departure of Lord Dalhousie—Arrival of Lord Canning as Governor-general—Breaking out of a Sepoy Mutiny—Want of foresight and decision on the part of Government—Disbanding of Regiments and Punishment of individual Officers and Soldiers—Proofs of a Mohammedan Conspiracy . . 706
CHAP. CXIV.	CHAP. CXXVIII.
Second Invasion of Afghanistan by the British . . 603	Revolt of the Sepoys at Meerut—Measures of Government preparatory to an Advance of the British Forces upon Delhi 715
CHAP. CXV.	CHAP. CXXIX.
Events in Upper Afghanistan—General Nott Marches to Scinde—Capture of Ghizni—Generals Nott and Pollock advance to Cabul—Rescue of the English Prisoners—Destruction and Evacuation of Cabul 611	Mutiny at Benares—Its suppression by Colonel Neill—Mutiny at Allahabad, also suppressed by Colonel Neill—Mutiny at Cawnpore—Treachery of Nana Sahib—Gallant Defence by General Wheeler—Capitulation of the British, and their Massacre—Murder of Fugitives from Fattyghur—Mutiny at that Place—Assumption of the Mahratta Sovereignty by Nana Sahib 723
CHAP. CXVI.	CHAP. CXXX.
The War in Scinde—Advance towards Hyderabad—The Amerra coerced into a Treaty with the English—Attack upon the English Residency at Hyderabad—Expedition of Sir Charles Napier in the Desert—Battle of Meancee—Battle of Dubba—Victories of Colonel Roberts and Captain Jacobs—Sir Charles Napier's Government of Scinde 620	The Mutiny in Oude—Defence of Lucknow by Sir Henry Lawrence—His Death—Mutiny in Rohilcund and the Doab—Mutiny in Central India—Mutiny in the Punjaub, and its Suppression—Unsuccessful attempt at Mutiny in Scinde . . . 730
CHAP. CXVII.	CHAP. CXXXI.
War with China—Naval and Military Operations—Treaty of Peace—Opening of Five Ports to European Commerce 626	Advance of a British Army against Delhi—Siege of the City 742
CHAP. CXVIII.	CHAP. CXXXII.
War with the Mahrattas of Gwalior—Battles of Maharajpore and Ponnair—Dangers on the Sikh Frontier—Lord Ellenborough recalled—Mr. Bird Governor-general, <i>pro. tem.</i> —Sir Henry Hardinge arrives as Governor-general 640	Arrangements for the relief of Cawnpore and Lucknow—March of Colonel Neill's Column upon Cawnpore—Its Success—March of Outram and Havelock upon Lucknow—Relief of the Residency—Advance of Sir Colin Campbell to Lucknow—Removal of the Garrison to Cawnpore 751
CHAP. CXIX.	CHAP. CXXXIII.
The Sikh War—Battle of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon—Advance upon Lahore—Peace 644	Operations from Cawnpore under the direction of Sir Colin Campbell—Conquest of Lucknow, Shah-jehanpore, and Bareilly—Suppression of the Mutiny in Oude, Rohilcund, and neighbouring Districts 759
CHAP. CXX.	CHAP. CXXXIV.
The Second Sikh War—Revolt of Chuttur Singh—Murder of English Envoys at Mooltan—Gallant Conduct of Lieutenant Edwardes—General Whish bombards and captures Mooltan—Sentence on Moolraj—Advance of Lord Gough—Battle of Ramnuggur 652	Various Mutinies and Insurrections, and their Suppression—Capture of Jhanai and Calpee by Sir Hugh Rose—Revolution in Gwalior—Surrender of the City to Tantia Topce—Flight of Scindiah—Capture of the City and Fortress by Sir Hugh Rose—Restoration of Scindiah—Death or Capture of the Chief Leaders of the Revolt—Dispersal of the Rebel Bands—End of the Mutiny and Insurrection 766
CHAP. CXXI.	CHAP. CXXXV.
Shere Singh retreats from Ramnuggur to Russool—Battle of Chillianwallah—Operations against Ram Singh in the Raree Doab—Storming of the Dullah Heights—Battle of Gojjerat—Defeat and surrender of the Sikh Army—Annexation of the Punjaub 659	Principal Home Events connected with India after the Enactment of the Law of 1854, to the Abolition of the Company's Political Control, 1858 773
CHAP. CXXII.	
General Affairs of India under the Government of Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge—His departure—Arrival of Lord Dalhousie—His General Policy . . 667	
CHAP. CXXIII.	
Government of the Marquis of Dalhousie from 1851 (<i>Continued</i>) 674	
CHAP. CXXIV.	
Home Events 680	

DIRECTIONS FOR THE BINDER

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VOLUME I.

	PAGE		PAGE
Portrait of Major-gen. Sir Henry Havelock	<i>Frontispiece</i>	Madras	133
Sir David Baird discovering the dead Body of Tippoo Saib	<i>Vignette</i>	Bombay	139
Map of Asia	i	Entrance to the Caves of Elephanta	150
Map of India	1	Crossing a Mountain Torrent in Bhotan	193
Calcutta: the Monsoon	13	Map of the East India Islands	199
A Suttee	37	Map of China	205
The Mohammedan Festival of the Mohurram	56	Portrait of Sir James Brooke, Bart., Rajah of Sarawak	420
Map of the Bengal Presidency	70	Sacred Temple and Tank, at Unritsir	445
Floating Lamps on the Ganges	75	Futtypore Sieri, near Agra	450
The Fortress of Chunar, on the Ganges	89	Sports of the East—the Hunting Cheetah	463
Bird's-eye View of Lucknow, and the country towards Cawnpore	91	The Churuk-puja, or Swinging Ceremony	471
Panoramic View of New and Old Delhi, and of the surrounding country	95	The Esplanade, Calcutta	512
The Walls of Lahore	108	Map of the Eastern Hemisphere	537
Map of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies	124	A Mogul Trooper	623
Durbar of the Rajah of Travancore: Reception of General Outram	125	Elephanta fighting	639
		Shah Jehanabad (New Delhi)	662
		Map of Japan	765

VOLUME II.

	PAGE		PAGE
Portrait of Viscount Canning	<i>Frontispiece</i>	The Battle of Moodkee	645
The Temple of Juggernaut	<i>Vignette</i>	Portrait of Lieutenant-general Sir Harry Smith, Bart.	646
Portrait of Lord Clive	197	The Battle of Aliwal	648
Portrait of Warren Hastings	275	Portrait of Gholab Singh	652
Benares	362	Portrait of Dost Mohammed Khan	662
Portrait of Richard, Marquis Wellesley	416	The Battle of Goojerat	663
Portrait of Charles, Marquis Cornwallis	431	Portrait of Viscount Gough	663
Portrait of the Duke of Wellington	466	Portrait of Sir Charles Napier	669
Last Effort of Tippoo Saib	476	Portrait of the Marquis of Dalhousie	674
Portrait of Lord William Bentinck	507	Portrait of Lord Metcalfe	681
Portrait of the Earl of Minto	510	Portrait of Lieutenant-general Sir James Outram	695
Portrait of Lord Amherst	529	Portrait of General Neill	724
Portrait of the Marquis of Hastings (Earl of Moira)	539	Portrait of Sir Henry Lawrence	730
Portrait of the Earl of Auckland	563	Portrait of Sir John Lawrence	733
Portrait of Ruojeet Singh	568	Portrait of General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart.	746
The British Army before Cabul	588	Portrait of General Nicholson	751
Sir Charles Napier pursuing Robber Tribes	621	Portrait of Major-general Sir J. E. W. Inglis	755
The Battle of Meanee	622	Portrait of Lord Clyde	756
The Bombardment of Canton	635	The Fort of Gwalior	772
Portrait of Sir Henry Pottinger	639	Portrait of Lord Stanley	774
Portrait of Lord Hardinge	644		

THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OF THE

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA

AND THE EAST.

CHAPTER L.

PROGRESS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTORIES IN CONTINENTAL INDIA TO THE FIRST SETTLEMENT ON THE HOOGLY.

FROM the date of the settlement of a factory at Surat, to the period of the establishment at Hoogly, and the breaking out of the civil war in England, was a time of considerable events to the company, at home and abroad. Gradually, throughout that period, the foreign agents of the company were laying the foundation of future fortune, where, and how, they suspected not. The reverses of the company subserved its ultimate greatness. The ravages and successes of the Dutch led to their ultimate humiliation, and the triumph of England and her East India Company. The states-general would have probably carried on a commerce, in the long run, successfully, rivalling that of England, had not their grasping and venal temper led them to set justice and treaty at defiance, in endeavouring to deprive the English of all share in the trade of the Eastern Archipelago; but their envidity roused the latent energy and resources of England, which soon asserted a naval ascendancy in Europe, and ultimately all over the world. The English, at the period of which we now write, were very solicitous to injure the commerce both of the Portuguese and Dutch. That they were just as ready to circumvent and damage the Dutch, as the latter were to disparage or interrupt them, is evident from the correspondence of Sir Thomas Roe. Still, the English were incapable of the cruelties of the Dutch: much more were those of the Portuguese impossible to them. In one of Sir Thomas Roe's letters he writes:—"The Dutch are arrived at Surat, from the Red Sea, with

some money and southern commodities, *I have done my best to disgrace them*; but could not turn them out without further danger. Your comfort is, here are goods enough for both."

In another letter he says, "The 10th, 11th, and 12th, I spent in giving the prince advice that a Dutch ship lay before Surat, and would not declare upon what design it came until a fleet arrived, which was expected at the first fit season. This I improved, to fill their heads with jealousies of the designs of the Dutch, and the dangers that might arise from them, which was well taken; and, being demanded, I gave my advice, to prevent coming to a rupture with them, and yet exclude them the trade of India." Here the English ambassador, so scrupulous and just in many affairs, and especially where he was personally concerned, acted towards the Dutch, as he so bitterly complained that the Portuguese acted towards his own countrymen; but it is more than probable the representative of England was obliged by his instructions to act thus, and *necessitas non habet leges*. Besides, the provocations received by the British, from both Portuguese and Dutch, were so frequent and severe, that they could not but oppose those nations, if there were any British trade to be established.

The grand occasion of quarrel with the Dutch was spice. The English enjoyed a good trade in pepper, from their connection with Sumatra and Java, but the trade in the finer spices, such as cloves, nutmegs, cinnamon, &c.,

had been exclusively in the hands of the Portuguese, and was at this period becoming a monopoly in the hands of the Hollanders. The English became intensely eager to break up this monopoly by fair trade; the Dutch to keep it by force of arms. The English sent out agents from Bantam to Amboyna, Banda, and several other islands, reputed for their production of superior spices; and finally, after much mortification and disappointment, they established a factory at Macassar, then deemed an eligible depot for spice brought from other places, and which itself produced superior rice, that might be made available as an article of exchange, and which could be procured by bartering it for the fine cloths of Central India.

The general state of affairs, and prospects of traffic, may be gathered from the reports made by the agents, soon after the company was fairly settled in factories on the coast of India. Mr. Mill thus sums up the tenour and substance of these reports:—"That Surat was the place at which the cloths of India could best be obtained, though nothing could there be disposed of in return, except China goods, spices, and money: that large quantities of Indian wove goods might be sold, and gold, camphor, and benjamin obtained, at the two factories of Acheen and Tekoo, on the Island of Sumatra: that Bantam afforded a still larger demand for the wove goods of India, and supplied pepper for the European market: that Jacatra, Jambée, and Polania, agreed with the two former places in the articles both of demand and supply, though both on a smaller scale: that Siam might afford a large vent for similar commodities, and would yield gold, silver, and deer-skins for the Japan market: that English cloth, lead, deer-skins, silks, and other goods, might be disposed of at Japan, for silver, copper and iron, though, hitherto, want of skill had rendered the adventures to that kingdom unprofitable: that, on the Island of Borneo, diamonds, bezoar stones, and gold, might be obtained at Succadania, notwithstanding the mischief occasioned by the ignorance of the first factors; but from Banjarmassin, where the same articles were found, it would be expedient, on account of the treacherous character of the natives, to withdraw the factory: that the best rice in India could be bought, and the wove goods of India sold, at Macassar: and, that at Banda, the same goods could be sold, and nutmegs and mace procured, even to a large amount, if the obstruction of European rivals were removed. Surat and Bantam were the seats of the company's principal establishments."

An attempt was made for the establishment of a Scottish East India Company, and a royal patent granted in 1618 to Sir James Cunningham, but withdrawn, in consequence of the interference of the London company, who made compensation for the expenses incurred. The king, in return for this concession, and with a view of sustaining the Russian company, which had long been in a precarious state, prevailed on the East India Company to unite with them in carrying on a joint-stock trade, each party advancing £30,000 per annum during the continuance of their respective charters; but the experiment failing after a trial of two seasons, the connection was dissolved at the termination of the year 1619; the loss of the East India Company being estimated at £40,000.*

The company was much disturbed about this time by the prospect of competition with the French and Danes. The associations for Eastern commerce, formed in these countries, were not on a scale to appear formidable to the powerful resources of the Portuguese, Dutch, and English; but nevertheless these nations were all nearly as angry at the bare prospect of any other people wishing to buy spices, where they were produced, as they were by their rivalry with one another. The English appear to have taken more alarm at the formation of the French and Danish companies than the Dutch or Portuguese did, and this alarm appears to have been more excited by the Danes than by the French, although the Gauls were earlier upon the great stage of furious and bitter rivalry. In separate chapters, the formation, progress, and foreign enterprises of the various East India Companies upon the continent,—other than the Portuguese and Dutch, which have been already related,—will be stated and described, so far as relates to the object of these volumes. In a former chapter it was mentioned, that negotiations were opened with Persia, and a treaty of trade secured, under the superintendance of Sir Thomas Roe. That acute man, however, dissuaded the enterprise, on the ground that the Portuguese already possessed the commerce between Persia and Surat, and that the expense of protecting the trade by armaments would be too great. The general policy of Sir Thomas was to avoid, as much as possible, all armed competition, and to seek avenues of trade the least exposed to the expense of numerous crews, heavy armaments, and forts. The experience of the English verified the sagacity of these councils. The trade opened in the Persian Gulf never became very profitable, in consequence of the expenses incurred.

* Milburn's *Oriental Commerce*.

In the year 1617-18, a new subscription was opened by the company in London, which reached the enormous sum of £1,600,000. This was designated "the company's second joint-stock."

In 1619 negotiations began between the courts of England and Holland, to adjust the quarrels of the respective East Indian interests of the two nations. It was agreed on all hands that it was disgraceful for allies to carry on a commercial competition which almost amounted to war. Accordingly, on the 17th of July, the terms of this treaty were in brief, according to Bruce, as follows:—"It was stipulated that there should be a mutual amnesty, and a mutual restitution of ships and property; that the pepper trade at Java should be equally divided; that the English should have a free trade at Pullicate, on the Coromandel coast, on paying half the expenses of the garrison; and that of the trade of the Moluccas and Bandas they should enjoy one-third, the Dutch two, paying the charges of the garrisons in the same proportion. Beside these conditions, which regarded their opposite pretensions, the treaty included arrangements for mutual profit and defence. Each company was to furnish ten ships of war, which were not to be sent in the European voyages, but employed in India for mutual protection; and the two nations were to unite their efforts to reduce the duties and exactions of the native governments at the different ports. To superintend the execution of this treaty a council was appointed, to be composed of four members of each company, called the *Council of Defence*."

The same author says—"In consequence of this treaty, by which the English were bound to send a fleet of ten ships to India, a larger fund was this year raised than had been provided for any preceding voyage: £62,490 in the precious metals, and £28,508 in goods, were exported with the fleet. The return was brought back in a single ship, and sold at £108,887."

The result, however, was unfortunate, as the English commissioners of the council of defence reported, that unless measures were taken in Europe to check the grasping and aggressive proceedings of Holland, the trade must be abandoned. This impression was taken up in England, but it was impossible just then to do anything for such a purpose.

The commercial proceedings, meanwhile, are described by Mr. Mill, with great brevity, in the following paragraph:—"In 1621-22, they were able to fit out only four ships, supplied with £12,900 in gold and silver, and £6253 in goods; the following year, they sent five ships, £61,600 in money, and £6430

in goods; in 1623-24, they equipped seven vessels, and furnished them with £68,720 in money, and £17,340 in goods. This last was a prosperous year to the domestic exchequer. Five ships arrived from India with cargoes, not of pepper only, but of all the finer spices, of which, notwithstanding the increasing complaints against the Dutch, the company's agents had not been prevented from procuring an assortment. The sale of this part alone of the cargoes amounted to £485,593; that of the Persian raw silk to £97,000; while £80,000, in pursuance of the treaty of 1619, was received as compensation money from the Dutch." This compensation money was, however, given with the greatest reluctance, and its concession deepened the hostility which the Dutch felt, and had so malignantly displayed. Not long after followed the massacre of Amboyna, described in the last chapter.

It may here, however, be observed, that the Dutch certainly believed the English guilty of a conspiracy at Amboyna to seize the fort, and some English writers have conceded it. Captain Hamilton* affirms it, and even palliates, and almost justifies, the severity of the Dutch, by references to alleged tortures, perjuries, and persecutions, inflicted by agents of the English company upon other Englishmen, who, not being the servants of the company, were called "interlopers," and proscribed, having been deemed fair game for the company's people to hunt down by any means they could.

Upon the allegations of Captain Hamilton, Professor Wilson, of Oxford, thus animadverts, while he concedes the probability of some English plot:—"It is not impossible that there was amongst the English on Amboyna some wild scheme for the seizure of the island. The Japanese were soldiers of the garrison, and their position rendered their co-operation of an importance more than equivalent to the smallness of their numbers. At the same time, the conspirators were punished with a severity wholly unjustifiable. It is no extenuation of the cruelty of the Dutch, to argue that the English in India, in those days, were guilty of similar atrocities; the fact is not proved, and the probability may be questioned: no instance of such savage barbarity can be quoted against any of the English factories or governments, and particular acts of severity towards deserters and pirates, are not to be confounded with the deliberate cruelties of a public body. Even with regard to individual instances, however, the evidence is defective: Hamilton wrote from recollection, according to his own

* *New Account of the East Indies*, vol. i. p. 362.

admission, and his accusations are, for the most part, general and vague. It is elsewhere noticed by our author, also, that he was an interloper, and that his testimony, when unfavourable to the company, must be received with caution. His assertions cannot be admitted as conclusive or unsuspecting. The conduct of the council of Amboyna admits of no doubt, and no plea of precedent or necessity can be justly heard in its palliation. The Dutch writers themselves acknowledge, that it would have been much better to have sent the accused to Europe for trial, even by the English courts.*

The proceedings of the company at home assumed but few features of importance up to 1629, when a new charter was obtained. The circumstances which led to it are thus recorded by Mr. Mill, on the authority of Bruce:—"As the sums in gold and silver which the company had for several years found it necessary to export, exceeded the limits to which they were confined by the terms of their charter, they had proceeded annually upon a petition to the king, and a special permission. It was now, however, deemed advisable to apply for a general license, so large as would comprehend the greatest amount which, on any occasion, it would be necessary to send. The sum for which they solicited this permission was £80,000 in silver, and £40,000 in gold; and they recommended, as the best mode of authenticating the privilege, that it should be incorporated in a fresh renewal of their charter; which was accordingly obtained."

During this period, also, the company first petitioned the English House of Commons. Upon the death of King James I., and the ascent to the throne of Charles I., the House of Commons, as is well known to the student of English history, gradually asserted more power and influence, which the company perceiving, brought its claims before it, and urged the straits to which it was reduced by the aggressions of the Dutch.

Among the incidents in the last years of the reign of James were the succession to the company of the right to punish their servants abroad, both by martial and municipal law. This right was granted by the crown without the consent of the commons, or even consulting them. Mr. Mill found among the East India papers, in the State Paper Office, the material for the following paragraph:—"In the year 1624-25 the company's fleet to India consisted of five ships; in 1625-26, it consisted of six ships; and in 1626-27, of seven. In the last of these years we gain

* *Vies des Gouverneurs Hollandois*, in the *Histoire Générale des Voyages*, xvii. 33.

the knowledge collaterally of one of those most important facts in the company's history, which it has been their sedulous care to preserve concealed, except when some interest, as now, was to be served by the disclosure. Sir Robert Shirley, who had been ambassador at the court of Persia, made application to the king and council to order the East India Company to pay him £2000 as a compensation for his exertions and services in procuring them a trade with Persia. The company, beside denying the pretended services, urged their inability to pay; stating that they had been obliged to contract so large a debt as £200,000; and that their stock had fallen to 20 per cent. discount, shares of £100 selling for no more than £80."

Judging from their own representations, their affairs, commercially, wore at this juncture an unfavourable aspect. They probably, however, presented their case in this dark aspect to elude the payment demanded by Shirley, and to create a public impression that they needed yet more the patronage and favour of government, while they were rendering great services to the nation. Probably no event of the times annoyed the company so much as the demands of King James, and his admiral, the Earl of Buckingham, for share of the prize money, won by its successful conflicts with the Portuguese. The king demanded £1000 as droits to the crown; the lord high admiral demanded the like sum as droits to the Admiralty. As the power of the king was often exercised in an unconstitutional manner in those days, the company deemed it discreet simply to raise objections to the demand, and make no farther resistance. To the admiral's claim they presented legal obstacles, and indignant remonstrance and protest. They declared that as their ships which captured prizes did not carry letters of marque from the Admiralty, it had no right to interfere, especially as the armaments by which such captures were made, were a heavy cost to the company, which had to protect its own trade, the state rendering very little assistance. These arguments were good, for if the government in any form made itself a partner in the naval and military successes of the company, it should also take its share in losses that were inflicted by the armed Portuguese and Dutch. The whole matter was brought before the Court of Admiralty, when it appeared that the prizes of the company were to the amount of £100,000 sterling, and 240,000 reals of eight. The unprincipled king, greedy to obtain money, insisted on his prerogative; the claims of the high admiral were postponed and eluded,

and probably eventually baffled, for there is no evidence of their having ever been satisfied.

The first home event of any importance after the royal concession of 1629, was the opening of a subscription for a third joint-stock. This began in 1631, and was completed in the following year. It amounted to £420,000. With the new subscription seven ships were fitted out the same year. In 1633-34 five ships were sent out. In 1634-35 mention is made of only three, but some historians doubt whether that year was not more prolific of enterprise.

The company now complained loudly of the "interlopers;" private adventurers trading to any part of the East on their own account were so considered, and such they were so long as the company held the royal charter. There was, however, a disposition to murmur at the slightest infringement of their privilege unworthy of a body which had already acquired so great an influence, and which carried on such extensive enterprises. But, in truth, the profits of the trade were far less than the public supposed. Most of the directors were ignorant of political economy, and few of their agents had any correct opinions as to the principles of trade. The censure of Mr. Mill applies too truly to the conduct and intelligence of the company at this period as a trading association:—"The company, like other unskilful, and for that reason unprosperous, traders, had always competitors, of one description or another, to whom they ascribed their own want of success. For several years they had spoken with loud condemnation of the clandestine trade carried on by their own servants, whose profit they said exceeded their own. Their alarms for their exclusive privileges had for some time been sounded; and would have been sounded much louder, but for the ascendancy gained by the sentiments of liberty." Their hope that their monopoly would escape the general wreck with which institutions at variance with the spirit of liberty were threatened, could only be entertained if its pretensions were prudently kept in the shade. The controversy whether monopolies, and among others that of the company, were injurious to the wealth and prosperity of the nation, had already employed the press.

The outcry as to the interlopers and private traders was one which troubled the public as well as the company from the beginning of the century, and during the embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, he advised the directors to allow no servant to trade, but to give them adequate salaries, and engage their entire interests. The parsimony of the company to the agents compelled them to trade for a sufficient subsistence. The advice of Sir

Thomas had only been in part followed, and hence the complaints to which Mr. Mill, with a tone of some asperity, refers.

In 1634-35 a new and remarkable episode in the history of the company is presented. A treaty was formed with Portugal for freedom of trade between the Eastern possessions of the two countries, and also between the parent states and the respective factories and possessions of each. This event was hailed in England with as much satisfaction as the arrangement with the Dutch previously had been received, and with but little more ground for the hope and confidence inspired. To the company it turned out to be a great danger, for it incited a number of enterprising persons in India to denounce the monopoly of the company, and to attempt the formation of an independent association. At the head of this party was Sir William Courten, who succeeded in engaging a gentleman of the royal bed-chamber, named Endymion Porter, to use his influence with the king on its behalf. The courtier had little difficulty in persuading a monarch so tenacious of his own rights, and so thoughtless of the rights of others, as Charles I. The king was prevailed upon to *take a share*, and then there was no difficulty in obtaining from him, on behalf of the association, licence to trade. The object of the king was personal profit, and yet he had the unfaithfulness and effrontery to set forth in the preamble of the licence, "that it was founded upon the misconduct of the East India Company, who had accomplished nothing for the good of the nation in proportion to the great privileges they had obtained, or even to the funds of which they had disposed." Charles no doubt felt emboldened in the perpetration of this treachery by the opinion of the nation, then hotly engaged in discussing monopolies, and the rights of kings. The provision of notice to the company three years before any abrogation of its charter, emboldened many to become adventurers under its guarantee; the violation of this compact was worthy of a prince who could keep no faith with his subjects, whether the matters which demanded it were religious, political, or commercial.

Courten's Association, as the newly licensed company was called, persevered, and sent out ships. In 1637-38 several ships of the new company returned home laden with Eastern produce, suitable to the English market, which brought a ready sale and great profit. In consequence of the alarm and petitions of the old company, the privy council came to the conclusion that the two companies should avoid all collision by Courten's Association seeking new ports, and the East India Com-

pany not touching at any place where Courten's people erected a factory. The East India Company prosecuted its protests against all rivalry; the king was so overwhelmed with complaints from all classes of his subjects, except the highest in birth and privilege, that he became extremely solicitous to quell this new tumult, which, like so many others in his reign, he had himself done so much to raise. The privy council were directed to form a committee to investigate and settle matters, and, if possible, conciliate conflicting parties and interests. The council, however, did none of these things—here also perpetrating the neglect, and displaying the folly, which ere long convulsed the nation, and for a time left the throne blood-stained and vacant. Charles was obliged to do something about the company, "to satisfy the noblemen and gentlemen who were adventurers in it," and, according to Bruce, the licence to Courten was withdrawn. His party complained bitterly that the king had betrayed them, entangling them in undertakings beneath the ægis of his protection, and then in the moment of hope and trial abandoning them.

The affairs of the company now assumed an aspect of confusion which it would be impossible to describe, but their affairs had been conducted with so much disorder, their accounts kept in a manner so complicated and impracticable, the agents abroad had looked so little after the company's property, being taken up with their own barter and exchanges, that it is extraordinary bankruptcy did not immediately ensue. The proprietors of "the third joint-stock" demanded that that particular adventure should be brought to a close, and that its property in India should be brought home. The difficulty of complying with this demand was greater than the aggregate capacity of the directors could accomplish. Mill, quoting Bruce, depicts the conditions of things thus:—"It might have been disputed to whom the immovable property of the company, in houses and lands, in both India and England, acquired by parts indiscriminately, of all the joint-stocks, belonged. Amid the confusion which pervaded all parts of the company's affairs, this question had not begun to be agitated; but to encourage subscription to the new joint-stock, it was laid down as a condition, 'That to prevent inconvenience and confusion, the old company or adventurers in the third joint-stock should have sufficient time allowed for bringing home their property, and should send no more stock to India, after the month of May.' It would thus appear, that the proprietors of the third joint-stock, and by the same rule the proprietors of all preceding

stocks, were, without any scruple, to be deprived of their share in what is technically called the *dead stock* of the company, though it had been wholly purchased with their money. There was another condition, to which inferences of some importance may be attached; the subscribers to the new stock were themselves, in a general court, to elect the directors to whom the management of the fund should be committed, and to renew that election annually. As this was a new court of directors, entirely belonging to the fourth joint-stock, it seems to follow that the directors in whose hands the third joint-stock had been placed, must still have remained in office, for the winding up of that concern. And, in that case, there existed, to all intents and purposes, two East India Companies, two separate bodies of proprietors, and two separate courts of directors, under one charter. So low, however, was the credit of East India adventure, under joint-stock management, now reduced, that the project of a new subscription almost totally failed. Only the small sum of £22,500 was raised. Upon this a memorial was presented to the king, but in the name of whom—whether of the new subscribers, or the old—whether of the court of directors belonging to the old joint-stock, or of a court of directors chosen for the new, does not appear. It set forth a number of unhappy circumstances, to which was ascribed the distrust which now attended joint-stock adventures in India; and it intimated, but in very general terms, the necessity of encouragement to save that branch of commerce from total destruction." The failing credit of the company, the alarming ascendancy of the Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago, and the political conflicts at home, all combined to render it impossible to raise a new joint-stock.

In this state of affairs the company incurred a new blow from the king. Having resolved to make war upon his subjects, and not possessing pecuniary resources for the task which he imposed upon himself, the king seized all the pepper of the company, offering to purchase it on credit, which he did, and then immediately sold it for ready money. The parliament was subsequently unwilling to acknowledge any responsibility for this and other acts of the king, and his majesty appears to have given himself no concern as to the repayment. Bruce represents the company as receiving back a portion by remission of customs, but Professor Wilson believes that they never received any compensation. Thus, in every form, Charles I. was perfidious and oppressive to the company. His caprice, selfishness, and

injustice nearly extinguished the existence of a body, destined however, to live for great achievements. Probably the company would not have survived the plunder of the stores of pepper by the king, had not some of the agents abroad sustained by loans its sinking credit.

The conduct of the king became more and more infatuated, until the fury of the civil war shook every institution in England to its foundation, and the East India Company suffered its full proportion of the disasters which the royal obstinacy and unconstitutional violence entailed upon all. Among the acts of this sovereign which most disturbed public confidence was the seizure of the money lodged in the Tower by the merchants. "Previous to the year 1640, the merchants of London lodged their money in the Mint at the Tower as a place of security. The king's inability to meet the Scottish army, which was then approaching the borders of England, constrained him to call the parliament together, which had not been summoned for twelve years, for the purpose of obtaining supplies. These being refused until their grievances were redressed, parliament was hastily dissolved by the king, who, upon some alleged ground that the City of London had occupied more lands in Ireland than was granted by their charter, forcibly borrowed of the merchants £200,000 of their money, then lodged in the Tower. This led the merchants to withdraw their deposits, and to place them in the hands of goldsmiths, whose business till then was to buy and sell plate and foreign coins, and to melt and cause them to coin some at the Mint, and with the rest to supply the refiners, plate-makers, and merchants, as they found the price vary. They became lenders to the king, whose wants led him to anticipate the revenue, and who gave orders or letters on the exchequer for the interest."

Such was the condition of the company's affairs at home that, *a priori*, the reader may conclude affairs abroad, so far as depended upon the management and resources of the company, did not prosper. In the earlier years of the period of which we treat, there were some successes, but these were almost entirely confined to the continent of India, and the neighbouring seas.

The foundation, at Jacatra, of a colony, upon which the Dutch people concentrated their power in that direction, had considerable influence upon the progress of affairs in the eastern Asiatic isles. The Dutch were nearly always at war with the King of Bantam, who was the ally of the English. Several times English interests there appeared upon the point of destruction, and the King of Bantam in peril of the loss of his dominions.

The English settlement was repeatedly attacked, and once burnt down, and the palace of the king partly demolished.

A few months previous to the arrangement of 1619 between the two companies, Sir Thomas Dale combined his forces, of some ships which he commanded, with the forces of the King of Bantam, for the expulsion of the Dutch from Jacatra. This expedition was successful, and the natives of the place undertook its defence. The Javanese soldiers who occupied the place were neither brave nor vigilant, and surrendered upon the next demonstration of the Dutch. This locality was chosen by the latter* for the foundation of a fortified city, which, after the ancient name of Holland, was called Batavia. That became the great seat and centre of Dutch oriental power and commerce, and continues so to this day. It was at Jacatra, or Batavia, that the council of defence already referred to fixed its quarters, but the victory of the Dutch admiral, Coen, left unfavourable influences, which caused animosity to rankle in the hearts of men of both nations. "The president and council," as the four English representatives constituting the council of defence at Batavia were called, were much dissatisfied that the ships destined for Java and the Spice Islands were detained in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, to the great detriment of the pepper export, but events proved that these ships were more profitably employed than they could have been loading pepper at Batavia or Bantam. In like manner the factories at Sumatra detained ships which were also to have brought away lading from Java, but so uncertain was the conduct of the Dutch, that the factors at Sumatra appear to have had good reason for their conduct. These discontents, however, between the company's agents abroad led to conflicting "advices" in the communications received at home, and embarrassed the directors.

The expiration of the truce between Spain and Holland, in 1621, left the Dutch cruisers once more at liberty to attack Portuguese interests, which they did with an energy that inspired still further desire for a scope to their activity, and the English, contrary to treaty, were also assailed. Dutch writers allege that the English settlers in the Bandas, Poleroon, Rosengin, and Santore, conspired with the natives against the legitimate influence of Holland, which claimed a right to the sovereignty of these isles. The admirals and merchants of the states-general were, however, always fancying conspiracies, or inventing them as pretexts for their aggressions. According to the testimony of their apologists,

* See chapter on the Dutch in India and the East.

just as the English conspiracies were ripe, the opportune arrival of the Dutch admiral, Coen, saved the settlers, and restored the interests of his nation. He inflicted severe punishment both upon the native and English conspirators, effectually protected Batavia, and established it in superior strength, and covered the designs of the English with humiliation.

The English factory at Bantam had been removed to Batavia, on the faith of the treaty of conciliation and partnership between the two companies, concluded in Europe. The English agents now desired to return to their former position, but the Dutch opposed that, on the ground, openly confessed, that it might injure their newly consolidated oriental metropolis, Batavia. Thus it became evident that the Dutch had resolved by force to put an end to the trade of all rivals, and to hold under the cannon's mouth the monopoly of trade in the Eastern Archipelago.

The English trade with Java had now been extinguished, unless carried on to a small extent under restrictions haughtily and insolently imposed. The commerce with Japan became similarly circumstanced. In a former chapter the English were described as obtaining from the emperor charters the most favourable at Firando and Jeddo. The Dutch attacked these places while peace existed between England and the states-general, and the two East India companies were in ostensible partnership. No provocation had been given, no plea of sovereignty was set up, but upon the old pretext of prior occupation, the assault was made with sanguinary violence by an overwhelming force. The English could make no effectual resistance; they had to flee into the interior, where, protected by the natives, they escaped; otherwise they would have shared the fate of their compatriots at Amboyna.

Soon after these misfortunes the company's agents retired from Java to the Island of Lagundy, in the Straits of Sunda. The persons who selected this position were as little skilled in sanitary science as English agents and commanders have generally been since; and the result was a severe mortality, which in twelve months carried off nearly two hundred men. The distress of the settlers was so great, that they could not muster men sufficient in number to work a vessel to bear themselves away to any of the English factories. The Dutch showed some mercy by bringing them away to Batavia. The "Pangram," or King of Bantam, their steady friend, again offered them the means of re-establishing the factory at his capital; this was accomplished in 1629, the Dutch being at that juncture unable to oppose, as the Emperor of Java besieged Batavia with eighty thousand men.

Notwithstanding the difficulties to which the company at home, and its agents abroad, were exposed during this period, attempts were made to open up a trade with China, where, it was believed, if a commerce could be secured, it would render especial profit. From Firando and Tywan the English made repeated attempts to create a Chinese trade, which, considering the infancy of those settlements, reflected credit upon the agents and the commanders of ships.

According to the twenty-sixth article of the treaty of defence, "the two companies were jointly to open a free trade to China." But the policy and proceedings of the rivals were precisely the same on the Chinese coasts as among the Spice Islands. They did not, however, make any pretence of justice in their conduct in the Chinese waters. They had no exclusive privileges or pre-occupation to plead, yet, "neither the treaty, nor the fear of reprisals, nor a sense of the friendship which subsisted between England and the states-general, could restrain the avidity of the Dutch company, or render them equitable to their allies."* The company established their factories at Tywan and Formosa, with every prospect of working a remunerative trade, and of securing an opening at Amoy. Formosa was an object of their ambition, because of the alleged variety of its produce; and it was reported that English goods brought thither from the Chinese province of Fo-kien, in Chinese junks, sold well. The Chinese were then busy colonizing Formosa, chiefly because of its productiveness in rice; and as Formosa gathered an industrious Chinese population, who worked as its own wild people would not do, a demand for English goods increased.

Efforts were made to procure intercourse with Canton by means of the Portuguese at Macao; but the governor would not allow any English settlers without sanction from Europe. When the English succeeded in gaining access to Canton, it was under provisions which restricted their operations exceedingly; all ships, guns, and ammunition must be sent on shore, and heavy dues and exactions submitted to, which were tantamount to plunder. The Chinese nation was also much disturbed, the minds of men were unsettled, and a predatory and contentious spirit seemed to prevail among the whole people.

As soon as the Dutch found the English seeking a trade, they not only attacked and plundered their ships, but they committed extensive piracy on Chinese junks, sinking and burning the vessels, and slaying their crews,

* Auber.

proclaiming themselves to be English, and committing these enormities under the flag of England. The result was as they expected—a prejudice against the British was spread all along the coasts of China. It became the habit of the Dutch at that time in every sea, when they wanted to perpetrate a dishonest or violent deed, to hoist English colours, and declare themselves English to their victims.

The court of directors in London had their attention called more especially to the condition and prospects of a Chinese commerce by their agents at Bantam. The following is a curious and interesting *exposé* of the opinions and hopes of the first British essayists in Chinese commerce. It is a document sent by the “presidency” at Bantam in 1622:—

“Concerning the trade of China, two things are especially made known unto the world. The one is, the abundant trade it affordeth; the second is, that they admit no stranger into their country.

“1st. *Question.* Whether the Emperor of China resides near the sea or within the land?

“*Answer.* He resideth within the land, seventy days’ journey from these seas, in a city called Pequin, situate in 48 degrees towards the Tartarian borders, &c.

“2nd. *Quest.* Whether our king might not send to visit him, and whether our king’s people and shipping might not be permitted to have trade, and to pass and repass with safety?

“*Ans.* No people may be admitted to travel within the land; neither will the Emperor admit converse or commerce with any prince or people. In some places that border on the coast or confines of other princes, there is trade tolerated by some inferior governors, yet unknown to the emperor, and those with limitation; for their vessels, if on sea voyages, are proportioned for bigness not to exceed one hundred and fifty tons, their number of men allowed, and their time of absence prescribed. The like strictness is observed in the neighbourly land; commerce being carried on by marts only, held on certain days.”

In the year 1627, the presidency of Bantam referred the court of directors to certain conferences which were opened with intelligent Chinese as to trade between their country and Japan.

In 1635 the president of the English factory of Surat, having been engaged in negotiating with the governor of the Portuguese settlement at Goa, for a treaty of peace between the two nations in India, the court of directors expressed the extreme pleasure which such a prospect afforded to them, and their desire, should such a treaty be brought to pass, that advantage should be taken of it for the purpose of facilitating the trade

between India and China. When the treaty was effected, the company renewed the expression of these wishes, and upon the arrival in India of the ratification of the treaty by the King of Spain, the viceroy at Goa proposed to the council at Surat, that a ship should be freighted, partly by each company, and sent to Canton. The British ship, *London*, was selected for this purpose. This was the first British ship that sailed from India to Macao: directions were therefore given to be exceedingly scrupulous to create no prejudice in the minds of the Chinese. The ship reached Macao in July, 1635. The governor’s conduct justified the complaints made from Firando and Bantam, that he paid no attention to his superior at Goa, and that the Portuguese in China were in revolt against the Portuguese in India. The functionary at Macao would not allow the supercargoes, either British or Portuguese, to reside on shore, and in all ways, short of direct expulsion, hindered the new trade.

At this juncture the ships of Courten’s Association arrived, and hostilities between them and the servants of the company at once began. The effect upon the Chinese was to lead them to believe that some underhand proceeding, hostile to themselves, was on foot, the spectacle of the ships of the same nation being in hostility appearing to them incomprehensible.

The Dutch, perceiving how matters stood, attacked both Portuguese and British, and for a time there appeared but little chance of the allies resisting the superior force of the ships of the states-general. The Portuguese fought badly, and their want of prowess caused the English to despise them so much that they lost all confidence in any good result from the alliance. The Dutch were, however, defeated in their attempt to conquer Macao, and retired to the Pescadores, where they built a fort, from which to annoy and plunder Chinese, Portuguese, and British indiscriminately.

Having presented to the reader a succinct account of the condition of the company’s interests, and the events which befell them in the earliest sphere of its operations in the Eastern Seas—as the Archipelago and the Chinese waters were called, in contra-distinction to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea—a new series of events remain to be related in connection with these.

The English, as has been shown in former chapters, obtained, after much difficulty in negotiations, settlements in continental India; and, as has also been shown, there was at the outset great danger to the factories, from the hostile rivalry of the Portuguese.

When the English obtained permission to establish a factory at Surat, they found that place a very considerable emporium. It was one of the most ancient in India, for it is mentioned in the *Ramagasee*, a poem of very great antiquity. After the Portuguese discovered the passage by the Cape, it became a place of large export, especially of pearls, diamonds, ambergris, civet musk, gold, silks, cottons, spices, indigo, saltpetre, and fragrant woods. It had, from the time of Mohammedan ascendancy, been a port of embarkation for pilgrims on their way to Mecca, and of debarkation for them on their return from Arabia.

In 1612, when Captain Best obtained permission to establish a factory, he left ten persons, and a stock of £4000 to purchase goods.* The Dutch, hearing of the English settlement, made arrangements to enter into the competition going on there between the British and Portuguese, but did not arrive until 1617, and then were driven thither by a storm, some of their ships having been wrecked. The English succoured them, and even assisted them in disposing of their cargoes to advantage. This kindness was not generously requited.

The English continued to trade as peaceably at Surat as the jealousies of rival nations allowed, and great hopes were entertained by the residents, that the Persian treaty (already referred to) would open up a mine of wealth. In virtue of that treaty the English were permitted to build a factory and a fort at Jask. Accordingly, two ships were sent there in 1621, and found the port blockaded by a Portuguese fleet, consisting of five large ships and fifteen small craft. The English returned to Surat, and informed the president of what he had seen. Two other ships reinforced them, and returned to Jask, where, notwithstanding the great disparity of vessels, the British forced their way in. The Portuguese retired to Ormuz, where they refitted and refreshed, that island having then been in their possession for 120 years. Sailing thence for Jask, they drew up in line of battle, and opened a cannonade upon the English with their large vessels, while the small craft, as in an earlier conflict at Surat, attempted to board; the general result was a decisive victory on the part of the English. The Persians were as pleased as the Indians were at the first English victory at Surat, and proposed to the English an allied expedition to Ormuz, to expel the Portuguese from their long-established depot. The naval portion of the

expedition was furnished by the English, the military part by the Persians, but the whole was under English direction. The naval force of the British was very disproportionate, but the military contingent of the shah was, in English hands, a formidable element of the assailing force. The English had received instructions from their own government not to molest the subjects of the King of Spain, the Stuarts always having a friendly feeling to Roman Catholic princes. The British, however, disobeyed those orders in this case, and carried the Persian forces to Ormuz. The place was assaulted and captured in 1622. The victory was complete; the Portuguese proved themselves inferior even to the Persians in arms, when the latter were well led. The shah took possession of the island, but the English received a fair proportion of the prize, and, moreover, a moiety of the customs of Gombroon was conceded to them. This was of some importance, as the English had already a factory there since 1613. Gombroon was on the mainland, nearly opposite to Ormuz, in longitude 54°45 east, and latitude 27°10 north. The Dutch had established a factory there two years before this event, and their mortification and rage were boundless that the English should be placed "over their heads."

A condition was appended to the grant of the customs at Gombroon; namely, that the English should keep the gulf free of pirates. This they did until 1680, when they failed to perform it, and the privilege was resumed by the shah.

The Dutch, so kindly fostered at Surat as guests, soon returned as competitors. They were better traders than the English, and had larger capital; their habits also were more economical, and the English accused them of carrying on their business and regulating their personal expenditure penuriously. They were, however, hospitable, and lived well; they also paid their servants much better than the London company did, which enabled their agents to give themselves more completely up to advance the interests of their employers. Nevertheless, they conducted their business at less cost; all waste was avoided, no money was "fixed" that could be "kept in hand;" their payments were prompt, and their credit therefore good, and in most of these respects they were very unlike their rivals. The English trade at Surat soon began to suffer, and the company memorialised the government at home against the Dutch, as giving a larger price for Indian commodities, and selling European goods lower than they did. The idea of the company was not that the English trader should

* The reader will find the fullest and best account of the history of this settlement in a work entitled, *The English in Western India*, being the early history of the factory at Surat, by Philip Anderson.

outbid the Dutch, and undersell them in a fair commercial competition, but that the government at home should use force or diplomacy to rid them of the competitors.

While the British were thus troubled by the Dutch at Surat, the Portuguese made another effort to snatch from the victorious English the renown of their recent achievements. In 1630 the viceroy of Goa received a reinforcement of nine ships and two thousand soldiers; and, backed by this demonstration, opened negotiations with the Mogul for the recovery of the exclusive trade of Surat. Five English ships arrived for trade at that place, and as they entered the port of Swally, the Portuguese attacked them, but were beaten off. The disparity of force was too great for the English to inflict any severe punishment upon their foes, who continued to harass the British squadron, and keep up incessant skirmishes. Finally, by a bold attempt to set fire to the English squadron, the Portuguese hoped to accomplish their purpose. This failed: the English again inflicted chastisement upon the opposing fleet, and landed their goods in safety.

Surat and its immediate vicinity were not the only spots in continental India upon which the English laid a tenacious hold at this juncture. In 1628 they purchased from the *naig*, or chief, of the district, a piece of ground on the Coromandel coast, and the year following built a factory, and fortified it by mounting twelve pieces of cannon, guarded by about a fourth of a military company of "factors and soldiers." This is the first we hear of "soldiers" in the service of the company; their employment is, by most writers, assigned to a later period. It does not, however, appear, from any information extant, whether these soldiers were natives or Europeans.

Fortified factories or forts were now considered necessary to the security of the company's trading stations. Miss Martineau says, "It was the king, Charles I., who had brought the company round to the conviction that they must have forts;" and she assigns the reasons given by the king, in 1635, for granting a licence to a rival company, as the occasion of working this change in their opinion. It may be, that the directors at home were influenced to offer their encouragement to the building of forts, in consequence of Charles making their not having done so a pretext for creating another association to trade in the East; but it is remarkable that that society from the outset protested, in the language of Sir Thomas Roe, against forts as a waste of money and incompatible with trade. The agents of the company were, however, convinced of the

importance and essential requirement of fortified positions years before Charles issued the document in question, as their proceedings at Armegon and elsewhere show. Indeed, this authoress places the matter much in this light, when she thus describes the proceedings of the company's agents at this period:—"Piece goods, then in great demand—the delicate muslins and soft cottons of the Deccan—were to be had more easily on the Coromandel coast than on the western, and the company attempted to set up several factories or depots there. We read of four, besides the Madras establishment; but European rivals were hardy, and native governments were harsh, and one after another was given up, or transferred to some safer place—to be again removed. Under these difficulties, men began to talk again of forts. It might be true that garrisons would absorb all the profits of trade; but it was clear that trade could not go on without garrisons. No help was to be had from home. During the civil war there, nobody had any attention to spare for India; and the company's agents must take care of themselves. The forts were an humble enough affair; and the native soldiers who were hired to hold them were armed with anything which came to hand, from bows and arrows to damaged muskets; but the company had now a military front to show, and was pretty sure to be soon called on for evidences of its military quality."

Miss Martineau considers that by these forts "a new institution was fairly established, which annulled the purely pacific character of British settlements in India." Although these remarks of this gifted lady were called forth by the establishment of Fort St. George, in Madras, in 1640, they are not justified by that circumstance. Fort St. George, as well as previous and minor erections of a military nature, were simply defensive. They were no more a symptom of departure from pacific principles and purposes, than would be the fact of a quiet citizen procuring a policeman to watch his house when he knew it was an object of assault by thieves. The desires of the English merchants and their agents at this time were "purely pacific."

The reinforcements of the viceroy of Goa placed Ormuz in danger, as that functionary openly boasted of his intention to reconquer it, and to destroy the English factory on the mainland. These boastings proved vain, as the purposes were never executed, the courage of the English, and the numbers of the Persians, rendering their execution impossible.

The British had established a factory at Masulipatam, but removed it. Subsequently, as they became more anxious for a trade on

the eastern shores of Bengal, negotiations were opened with the King of Golconda, who promised that former grievances should be redressed, and concessions were made of such a nature as induced the company to make Masulipatam again a port of trade. The agents of the company at Agra and Surat prevailed upon the Mogul government to grant permission to open trade at Piplee.* It was for the better government of these stations, that the station at Bantam was again raised to the rank of a presidency.

A trade in pepper with the Malabar coast was actively prosecuted when the treaty with Portugal was made. This step the company was constrained to take by the difficulty of the island trade, in consequence of the vigilance and armed power of the Dutch.

One of the most, perhaps the most, important of the proceedings of the company's foreign agents, was the occupation of Fort St. George, at Madras. This arose from the inconvenience of Armegant† for the chief articles of exportation from the coast of Coromandel—muslin and other wove goods. The Rajah of Chaudragiri granted, March 1st, 1639,‡ permission to have a factory at Madras, to the company's agent, Mr. Day, who, as the English were then trading with arms in their hands, immediately began to erect a fort, which was called St. George. The directors in London heard of these proceedings with alarm, but the directors of the factory at Surat prevented them from abandoning it; and thus was founded a place which became the capital of a great presidency, larger than the dominions of all the powers which at that time traded and quarrelled around the peninsula, upon so prominent a position of which it stood. The station was at once placed under the supervision of the president at Bantam. The force in Fort St. George was merely nominal; had an attack been made by either Portuguese or Dutch, it must have fallen. Its chief defence was the goodwill of the rajah.§ The territory granted extended five miles along the shore, and one inland.

* Montgomery Martin alleges it to be Piplee, in Orissa, twenty-seven miles from Cuttack, and in lat. 20°5 north, long. 85°58. Mr. Walter Hamilton, Professor Wilson, and others, affirm that it was Piplee, in Midnapore, twenty-eight miles E.N.E. from Balasore, lat. 21°42 north, long. 87°20 E. At this latter place the Dutch traded, exporting, according to Mr. Hamilton, two thousand tons of salt annually. This writer represents the removal of the merchants to Balasore subsequently, as in consequence of floods deluging the town, and forming a bar in the river.

† Madras was nearly seventy miles south of Armagan.

‡ Miss Martineau, Mr. Martin, and others, allege that it was in 1640.

§ In the geographical part of the work, the reader will find minute and correct descriptions of the present condition of the city and presidency of Madras.

The expenditure upon the fort was considerable for the times; in 1644 it amounted to £2294, and it was calculated that as much more would be requisite. In that year it was deemed politic to render it impregnable, and for that purpose one hundred soldiers were assigned to it, but these were from time to time reduced.

The apprehensions of the company that Madras was not suitable as a station for trade, were not altogether ill-founded. As a port it is deficient in convenience, for the reasons assigned in the geographical portion of this history when describing it. At a period long after its establishment, a writer competent to pronounce an opinion observed:—"Owing to the want of a secure port and navigable rivers, the commerce of Madras is inferior to that of the other presidencies, but all sorts of European and Asiatic commodities are procurable. Besides, the disadvantages above mentioned, the Carnatic province considered generally is sterile compared with that of Bengal, and raises none of the staple articles of that province in such quantities, and at so low a price, as to admit of competition in foreign markets. Provisions are neither of so good a quality, nor so cheap as in Bengal. The water is of a very good quality, and supplied to ships in native boats at established prices."* The same writer, describing the vicinity, thus writes:—"In the neighbourhood of Madras, the soil, when well cultivated, produces a good crop of rice, provided in the wet season the usual quantity of rain falls, and in some places the industry of the natives by irrigation creates a pleasing verdure. The fields yield two crops of rice annually. In appearance the country is almost as level as Bengal, and in general exhibits a naked, brown, dirty plain, with few villages, or any relief for the eye, except a range of abrupt detached hills towards the south."

An event of still more consequence than the concessions of "Sree Runga, Rayapatam," to Mr. Francis Day, enabling the latter to build Fort George, occurred about this time—the establishment of the settlement of Hoogly. The circumstances which led to this event are better known than the precise date of it. These circumstances were as follow. Shah Jehan, the great Mogul, had a favourite daughter, named Jehanara: on one occasion, after spending the evening with her sire, when retiring to her own apartments, she passed too closely to one of the lamps that lit a corridor of the palace, and set her dress on fire. Fearful of calling the attention of the guards—

* *Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Description of Hindostan, and the Adjacent Countries.* By Walter Hamilton. London, 1820.

oriental ladies of her rank regarding any exposure to the gaze of strangers as a calamity to be avoided at whatever cost—she rushed to the harem, her light apparel in flames, which the rapidity of her flight of course fanned. She fell insensible into the arms of her attendants, who extinguished the fire, but the princess was severely and even perilously injured. The emperor summoned the chief physicians from every part of his wide dominions, but they did not succeed in affording such succour as gave hope of her final recovery. The surgeons of the English East Indiamen were then thought of by the emperor himself, who, sending to Surat, one Gabriel Boughton hastened to obey his commands. The result of his skill and counsel was, the restoration of the royal lady, and the boundless gratitude, not only of herself, but of her sire, and of the court. The emperor offered to his benefactor any reward he might choose to name within the limits of the imperial power to bestow. The noble Englishman thought only of his country, and demanded for it freedom of trade in every part of the empire, then confined to a few places, and chiefly to Surat. The princess, charmed with the disinterestedness of the *medicus*, joined her entreaties to his request, and the emperor equally surprised, and admiring the patriotism and generosity of the man, conceded the boon. It appears that Boughton about the same time rendered valuable services to Prince Shuga, the governor of Bengal, and in this case thought also of his country rather than of himself. The practical consequences of these providential incidents were that Shuga, with the consent and pleasure of the emperor, issued a *neshan*, or order with warrants from the local governors, for the English to trade free in all ports of his imperial majesty, and to be exempt from all duties, except at Surat, with general permission to erect factories.

The English took immediate advantage of this, and settled a factory at Hoogly, which laid the foundation of their subsequent commerce and empire in Bengal. The precise dates of these events, as well as the modes of their occurrence, have been more discussed than most others in English East India history.

The Portuguese had previously had a factory at Hoogly, and were expelled thence. The date of their expulsion has been generally fixed at 1636; by some writers, however, in 1640; and by others, fewer in number, at a later period. As the English did not enter into possession of Hoogly until some time after the Portuguese had been driven out, the date of the one event is dependant upon the other. Stewart, in his *History of Bengal*,

says that Boughton was sent to the imperial camp in 1636, and that factories were founded in Balasore and Hoogly four years after. Bruce, in his *Annals of the East India Company, from 1600 to the Union of the London and English Companies in 1707-8*, affirms that the factory was not established in Hoogly for eleven or twelve years after the period assigned by Stewart, and that the visit of Surgeon Boughton to Surat was in 1645. Mr. Mill assigns to it so late a date as 1651-52. Professor Wilson leans to the opinion of Bruce, and thinks that Stewart confounded the permission given to Mr. Day to trade at Piplee, in Orissa, with the *neshan* given to Boughton for a general free trade in Bengal. The same learned historical critic observes—"An attempt was made to establish a factory at Patna in 1620. In 1624, a firman was obtained from Shah Jehan, permitting the English to trade with Bengal, but restricting them to the port of Piplee in Midnapore, but the regular connection of the company with Bengal did not commence until 1642, when a factory was established by Mr. Day, at Balasore."

According to Mr. Mill the concession of privilege to the English for a general free trade was not as gratefully imparted by the emperor and the governor of Bengal, as their professions of obligation to Mr. Boughton might have led him to suppose would be the case; for a sum of three thousand rupees was required as a bonus. This was the ostensible sum then paid, but before a firman was issued by the emperor, which was not until the reign of Aurungzebe, much more had to be expended upon the corrupt imperial officers, to remove their opposition or purchase their support.

The erection of the English factory at Hoogly was of great importance, not only to the destinies of India, but to the immediate interests of the East India Company. It appears, however, that much embarrassment was experienced from the local authorities, notwithstanding the nominal freedom conceded to the settlers. Mr. Walter Hamilton says, "The Dutch in 1625, and the English in 1640, were permitted to build factories at this place, but their trade was greatly restricted, and subjected to continual exactions."

The way in which Dr. Cook Taylor sets forth the conduct of Mr. Boughton is not so honourable to the British surgeon as all other writers depict it. Dr. Taylor seems to have been misled by the payment of the three thousand rupees, which were not paid to Mr. Boughton for his use, but which went to the governor of Bengal, and the creatures around him, or as some writers opine to the emperor himself.

The learned doctor thus puts the transaction:—"In 1636, an English physician, Dr. Boughton, accompanied the British envoy from the factory at Surat to Agra, where the emperor, Shah Jehan, was stationed. The favourite daughter of the shah was cured of a dangerous illness by the skill of Dr. Boughton; the shah, from gratitude, granted to him the right of free trade over the empire. This right the doctor sold to the company, who made use of it by establishing a new factory on the banks of the Hoogly, on a spot convenient for their shipping. This was the foundation of Calcutta."

Dr. Taylor affirms too much when he

represents the settlement at Hoogly as "the foundation" of Calcutta, which he describes as not settled for long after, Fort William having been built in 1697-98. It is true that the town of Hoogly, being on the Hoogly river, the establishment of a factory in that city led to the consolidation of a commerce upon that stream, and in that part of Bengal, otherwise Calcutta would never have been selected; but other events, and many sequences flowing from them, contributed to the causes and the occasion of a factory at Calcutta, and the erection of a great monument of English energy, power, and perseverance there—Fort William.

CHAPTER LI.

HOME HISTORY OF THE COMPANY, FROM THE CIVIL WAR IN ENGLAND TO THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

IN another chapter* a brief outline is given of the history of the East India Company as a government, describing the dates of its different charters, and the terms in which they were granted. This circumstance will enable the author to convey with more brevity the home history of the company.

When Charles I., after governing the country as long as he dared without a parliament, summoned one to Westminster, the result, as every reader of English history is aware, was violent discussion between the house and the senate, which issued in an appeal to arms, the impeachment and execution of the monarch, the protectorship of Cromwell, the incapacity of a successor, a reaction against freedom, the restoration, and the gay, flippant, and corrupt despotism of Charles II. In all these events which so rapidly and violently passed over England, there was a strange action and reaction of influence, from the ruler upon the people, and the people upon the ruler. "The leading journal," with its usual knowledge of human nature, and of English human nature more especially, sagaciously observed in an article written in 1858:—"A king must always be a great man; the personage whom millions regard with admiration, respect, or curiosity, must end by instilling something of his own temper into his subjects and his age. Servants catch the tricks of their masters, wives get the look and voice and turns of expression which belong to their husbands, young ensigns become duplicates of the major in command, and barristers of one year's standing

have already unconsciously assumed the tone and diction of the silk gown. Although the Englishman is of a stubborn and impassive nature, and may live twenty years in a foreign country without losing much of what he brought with him or acquiring much from the people he is among, yet hardly a monarch has reigned in England who has not moulded society into something like his own image. Those who come into contact with royalty have been gallant cavaliers, tasteful in dress and decoration, but bigoted and insolent withal, under Charles I., reckless and profligate under his son, wavering in their faith under James, with a return to Protestant and patriotic sentiments when William and Mary were installed. The four Georges in succession might have seen their very various characters reflected in the mirror of contemporary English life. Happy it is for this country that the power has gone no further, and that royal personages have been limited to an influence on the prevailing manners of the day."

The East India Company, in the whole course of its history, exemplified the philosophical soundness of these remarks. What writers regard as a policy unaccountably changeful and contradictory, may be explained by the influence, upon the minds of the directors and agents, of the changeful moral and political fashions of the times, created by the predominance of prominent public men. The peculiar characters of these men were, to a great extent, fashioned out of the opinions, habits and temper of the sects, and

* Chapter xiii.

parties into which a bold and free discussion necessarily divided the nation; while all schools of philosophy, political parties, and churches were passing through the ordeal to which free examination and free speech exposed them. Nevertheless, the English nation manifested its idiosyncrasies strongly amidst all the rapid vicissitudes of religion and politics, and the changeful currents of fashion, whether set by kings or enforced by sects. The geographical position of England, as well as the ethnological elements in the nation, account for this. The journal before quoted, when showing how much more the character of a German state depended upon the character of its prince, than did that of the western nations of Europe, especially Great Britain, thus clearly and cleverly put this truth:—"The British Isles, or France, or Spain may claim to be nations independently of any government or dynasty. They are marked out by the hand of nature as separate portions of the globe, and their geographical formation has tended more and more to give them unity in themselves and dissimilarity from their neighbours. No individual, or family, or class can say that he or they keep England together, and that without such help there would be no longer a country or a position in Europe for the inhabitants of these islands. The nation remains one by its own coherence and vitality; its institutions may have done much to bring about this result; the personal character of the sovereigns may have done much; but now the work is complete, and the nation is independent of any such extraneous aid."

Before the English nation reached this high state of civilization (if even yet it has altogether attained it), there was a bold independence and hardihood of thought perpetually struggling with the dominancy of fashion, and sometimes triumphing over court and aristocracy; asserting itself powerfully, and forming the spirit of the age. This explains much of the pertinacity of the company, conquering all assailants and holding its position against commercial losses, foreign rivalry, the superior naval or military resources of foreign enemies, the perfidy of kings and cabinets at home, and even unpopularity with the merchants and citizens, who were constitutionally jealous of monopolies, and of the growing power of a sort of *imperium in imperio* so far as colonies and commerce were concerned.

During the civil wars comparatively little could be undertaken either in the way of new enterprise or in the consolidation of old plans and performances. The company was itself tossed about on the great agitated sea

of revolution, as roundhead and cavalier swept over the land, and

"With fetlock deep in blood,
The fierce dragoon, through battle's flood,
Dash'd the hot war-horse on."

The affairs of the company were disturbed and endangered. Commerce fled appalled as the rude blast of the trumpet summoned citizens to arms, or proclaimed that Englishmen had conquered Englishmen on some ensanguined field, or in some city's breach choked with the slaughter of a cruel fratricide. It is not surprising, therefore, if for a long season the affairs of the company at home presented little interest, and the dealings of the company abroad little profit.

Before proceeding to the narration of particular events, it is desirable to present the general aspect of the company's oriental relations. The distractions caused by the great civil war in England, left its remote foreign commerce comparatively unprotected; and the Dutch were enabled to maintain a career of triumph in which the flag of England was insulted, and the property of her merchants, to a vast amount, destroyed. Whenever the Dutch made treaties or conventions with any native prince, it was a *sine quâ non* that such prince should stipulate never to admit any other foreigners to trade in his dominions. Even when, in 1660, the Dutch sea and land forces conquered Macassar from the native prince and allied Portuguese, the conqueror was not content with securing a treaty for the perpetual exclusion of the Portuguese and of the Jesuits, against whom the expedition was chiefly intended, but also of all other nations, European and oriental, but more especially the English. This illiberal policy was prejudicial to British interests, and made it necessary to regard the Dutch as enemies alike in peace and war, so far as the great theatre of Eastern rivalry was concerned.

During the reign of the Protector, however—for such it virtually was—the Dutch were made bitterly to feel the superior power of the British, especially when they had a man of genius, like Oliver Cromwell, at their head. The reparation demanded and compelled, to the relatives of those who perished at Amboyna, and for the losses which British merchants had undergone, was nearly two and three quarter millions sterling.* Scarcely had the Protector passed away from life, when the Dutch, encouraged by the state of England, renewed their attacks upon English merchants in the East. These, although appearing to be

* See chapter on the Dutch in India.

desultory, fitful, and capricious, were systematic; opportunities and pretences being patiently and vigilantly waited for, and promptly and cunningly used. Sometimes the Portuguese and British were sufferers together. This was especially the case during the restoration of Charles II. and the reign of James II. The Danes were also sufferers from Dutch cupidity during this period, and they were repeatedly fellow sufferers with the British. The ejection of both by the Dutch from Bantam, in the year 1683, when they pretended the authority of the king for the treachery and violence which they practised, exemplifies this.* And although both the Danes and British continued to retain factories in Bantam for about nine years longer, yet they were subjected to so many oppressions and so much insolence, that both powers were obliged to abandon their footing on the west coasts of Java.

This general outline of the company's difficulties abroad, through a long course of years, will, without introducing detail in this place, enable the reader to perceive the motives, and comprehend the spirit, of the company in many of its domestic movements, which have obtained from many historians an undeserved censure, or at all events, censure in an undeserved degree.

While yet the trade languished, the necessities of the state and the caution of the citizens checking commercial adventure, the company made desperate exertions to raise funds. Mr. Mill, who takes his statements altogether from Bruce in these descriptions, thus represents the struggle:—"An effort was made in 1642-43 to aid the weakness of the the fourth joint-stock by a new subscription. The sum produced was £105,000; but whether including or not including the previous subscription does not appear. This was deemed no more than what was requisite for a single voyage: of which the company thought the real circumstances might be concealed under a new name. They called it the 'first general voyage.' Of the amount, however, of the ships, or the distribution of the funds, there is no information on record. For several years from this date, no account whatever is preserved of the annual equipments of the company. It would appear, from instructions to the agents abroad, that, each year, funds had been supplied; but from what source is altogether unknown. The instructions sufficiently indicate that they were small; and for this the unsettled state of the country, and the distrust of Indian adventure, will sufficiently account."

* See chapter on the Dutch in India.

A new danger now arose to the company. The ever wary Dutch, perceiving that the English profited by their peaceable relations with Portugal, and by the convention with the viceroy of Goa for mutual amity and protection, exerted themselves to induce the Portuguese to come to similar terms with them. The latter had experienced so many reverses from the Hollanders, that while distrusting their intentions, they deemed it unwise to reject their overtures, and provoke so great a power. The Dutch probably never meant to keep the agreement; nor did the Portuguese, except so far as fear of the ships of the states-general might ensure their steadiness; at all events, both repeatedly violated the stipulations; and in this respect the Dutch, in very wantonness of power, often did so when by observing the agreement, their especial ends might have been honourably attained, or their general interests in the East as effectually promoted.

The Portuguese did not concede any advantages to the states-general, which had not been already conceded to the English, but the latter felt it to be very detrimental to them to be obliged to meet the Dutch on equal terms where the Portuguese had settlements. Mr. Mill condemns, or rather sneers, at this querulous disposition, and apprehension of competition on the part of the British East India Company. But it is to be remembered that the Dutch company had a large capital, was supported by the general voice of the states, and well backed and abetted by their government, which had no interests distinct from the nation; while the English company was hampered for want of capital; embarrassed by its various separate joint-stock ventures; regarded with distrust as to its constitution by political economists and roundheads; despised by the cavaliers, and regarded as a suitable object of plunder by the despicable Stuarts. Under such circumstances, the company could not afford to encounter any further competition; and hence, regarded the Dutch and Portuguese convention at Goa with intense alarm, memorialising their government, and appealing to the patriotism of the English people. Neither memorials nor appeals availed them much at that time; while the Dutch with dogged and pertinacious assiduity worked on, and still chased and plundered every English ship when the inferior force of the latter encouraged the attempt.

The success of the parliamentarians against the absolute monarchists, gave an impetus to the national ardour and self-reliance, of which the company resolved to take advantage. Bruce gives the history of their effort to do

so, and describes the complicated financial affairs of the company at this juncture with fidelity and accuracy:—"In 1647-48, when the power of the parliament was supreme, and the king a prisoner in the Isle of Wight, a new subscription was undertaken, and a pretty obvious policy was pursued. Endeavours were used to get as many as possible of the members of parliament to subscribe. If the members of the ruling body had a personal interest in the gains of the company, its privileges would not fail to be both protected and enlarged. An advertisement, which fixed the time beyond which ordinary subscribers would not be received, added, that, in deference to members of parliament, a further period would be allowed to them, to consider the subject, and make their subscriptions. It appears not that any success attended this effort; and in 1649-50, the project of completing the fourth joint-stock was renewed, partly as a foundation for an application to the council of state, partly in hopes that the favours expected from the council would induce the public to subscribe. In the memorial, presented on this occasion to the ruling powers, Courten's Association was the principal subject of complaint. The consent of the king, in 1639, to withdraw the licence granted to those rivals, had not been carried into effect; nor had the condition on which it had been accorded, that of raising a respectable joint-stock, been fulfilled. The destruction, however, to which the association of Courten saw themselves at that time condemned, deprived them of the spirit of enterprise: with the spirit of enterprise, the spirit of vigilance naturally disappeared; their proceedings, from the time of this condemnation, had been feeble and unprosperous: but their existence was a grievance in the eyes of the company; and an application which they had recently made for permission to form a settlement on the Island of Assada, near Madagascar, kindled anew the company's jealousies and fears. What the council proposed to both parties was, an agreement. But the Assada Merchants, so Courten's Association were now denominated, regarded joint-stock management with so much aversion, that, low as the condition was to which they had fallen, they preferred a separate trade on their own funds to incorporation with the company. To prove, however, their desire of accommodation, they proposed certain terms, on which they would submit to forego the separate management of their own affairs. Objections were offered on the part of the company; but, after some discussion, a union was effected, nearly on the terms which the Assada Merchants proposed. Application was then made

for an act to confirm and regulate the trade. The parliament passed a resolution, directing it to be carried on by a joint-stock, but suspending for the present all further decision on the company's affairs. A stock was formed, which, from the union recently accomplished, was denominated *the united joint-stock*; but in what manner raised, or how great the sum, is not disclosed. All we know for certain is, that two ships were fitted out in this season, and that they carried bullion with them to the amount of £60,000. The extreme inconvenience and embarrassment which arose from the management, by the same agents, in the same trade, of a number of separate capitals, belonging to separate associations, began now to make themselves seriously and formidably felt. From each of the presidencies complaints arrived of the difficulties, or rather the impossibilities, which they were required to surmount; and it was urgently recommended to obtain, if it were practicable, an act of parliament to combine the whole of these separate stocks. Under this confusion, we have hardly any information respecting the internal transactions of the company at home. We know not so much as how the courts of directors were formed; whether there was a body of directors for each separate fund, or only one body for the whole; and if only one court of directors, whether they were chosen by the voices of the contributors to all the separate stocks, or the contributors to one only; whether, when a court of proprietors was held, the owners of all the separate funds met in one body, or the owners of each separate fund met by themselves, for the regulation of their own particular concern."

The conduct of the Dutch in the East becoming intolerable, Cromwell took them in hand, and soon reduced them to the condition of suppliants. Great in his naval conceptions—as he was great in every thing—his plans, after the declaration of war against the states-general, were comprehensive, as their execution was vigorous and prompt; and the power of Holland, so recently rampant, bowed before the lion-hearted man, who made his country's name a terror to her foes all over Europe. Not only were the Dutch forced to compensate such Englishmen as suffered through their rapacity and violence, but they were compelled, on meeting any British men-of-war in the channel, to "lower their flag and yards." It must be admitted, however, that the Dutch managed the diplomatic part of the negotiations with skill, so as to evade, under one pretence or another, and by dextrously setting off one clause of the treaty against another, the payment of much that

the British believed themselves entitled to demand. These arts of the Dutch were promoted by the stern integrity with which Cromwell's commissioners examined the claims of the British East India Company. They showed no favour, but dealt with a rigid equity between the demands for compensation made by both companies. Cromwell's commissioners were prejudiced against the company; they were, like their chief, opposed to all monopolies, commercial or ecclesiastical; and they did not insist upon compliance with demands made by the company, with the correctness or principle of which they were far from being satisfied.

In 1654 the body of merchants to whom the joint-stock belonged, including the Assada Merchants, presented two petitions to the council of state, in which they prayed that the East India Company should no longer proceed upon the principle of a joint-stock trade, but that the owners of the separate funds should be empowered to employ them as they pleased. Bruce, and Mill, who follows him, commend the arguments of these proprietors of stock, and infer that the men who then opposed the proceedings and policy of the company, entertained sound views of political economy. The petitioners obtained the name of Merchant Adventurers, and their memorials and statements had great weight with the public. The petitions were remitted by the committee of the council of state to the Protector and his council, who showed their opinion in a very practical way, by issuing a decree to the Merchant Adventurers, giving them permission to fit out four ships for the India trade, under the management of a committee.

The consternation of the company at this concession to free trade was great, but it was far less than that of the Dutch East India Company, who feared the abolition of all monopolies, if once the Protector declared himself in favour of the Merchant Adventurers.

"Meanwhile the company, as well as the Merchant Adventurers, were employed in the equipment of a fleet. The petition of the company to the Protector for leave to export bullion, specified the sum of £15,000, and the fleet consisted of three ships. They continued to press the government for a decision in favour of their exclusive privileges; and in a petition which they presented in October, 1656, affirmed, that the great number of ships sent by individuals under licences, had raised the price of India goods from forty to fifty per cent., and reduced that of English commodities in the same proportion. The council resolved at last to come to a decision. After

some inquiry, they gave it as their advice to the Protector to continue the exclusive trade and the joint-stock; and a committee of the council was, in consequence, appointed to consider the terms of a charter."*

The decision of the council was generally understood to be contrary to the opinion of Cromwell himself, of Milton, and several other of the most eminent politicians of the day; but the Lord Protector deemed it constitutional to act upon the advice of his council in such a case, and the charter was granted in 1657. Much doubt has been thrown, from time to time, upon the concession of a charter by Cromwell. No record exists of it in any state papers, or in the archives of the East India Company. Mr. Mill doubts if it ever had an existence. In a work published in 1855,† edited by a competent authority, purporting to be a statement of the laws relating to India, no mention is made of this charter. Bruce, however, the careful annalist of the company, affirmed its existence in these terms:—"That the charter was granted in this season will appear from the reference made to it in the petition of the East India Company, though no copy of it can be discovered among the records of the state or of the company."‡ Professor Wilson confirms the opinion of Bruce by the following statement:—"In a letter from Fort St. George to the factory at Surat, dated 12th July, 1658, it is stated that the *Blackmoore*, which had arrived from England on the 12th of June, had 'posted away with all haste, after his highness the Lord Protector had signed the company's charter.'"§

The decision of the Protector's council left no hope of separate action to the Merchant Adventurers. Had no fresh charter been granted, it is evident from the talent and energy of these men that they would have persevered in their projects. As matters were, they deemed it discreet to coalesce with the company. A new subscription was opened, which realized £786,000. After much trouble and difficulty matters were adjusted, but not to the perfect satisfaction of all parties, and various arrangements for the factories and stations where trade was conducted were agreed upon—these will be referred to when relating the foreign transactions of the period.

Considerable spirit was now evinced in

* Anderson's *History of Commerce*; M'Pherson's *Annals*.

† *The Law relating to India and the East India Company*. London: Allen and Co., Leadenhall Street.

‡ Bruce, vol. i. pp. 329, 330.

§ Wilson's *Notes on Mill's History of British India*, lib. i. cap. iv.

fitting out expeditions. The first fleet consisted of five ships; one for Madras, carrying £15,000 in bullion, one for Bengal, one for Bantam, and the other two for Surat and Persia.

The new joint-stock did not flourish any more than its predecessors. A careful writer thus describes the company's affairs:—"The embarrassed state of the company's funds at this particular period may be inferred from the resolutions they had taken to relinquish many of their out-stations, and to limit their trade in the peninsula of India to the presidencies of Fort St. George, Surat, and their subordinate factories."* For the history of the company at home, from 1661 to 1668, almost the only authorities are Bruce, Anderson's *History of Commerce*, and M'Pherson's *Annals*. Mr. Mill quotes them, and sums up in his own way the information diffused by them over a much wider space:—"Meanwhile Cromwell had died, and Charles II. ascended the throne. Amid the arrangements which took place between England and the continental powers, the company were careful to press on the attention of government a list of grievances, which they represented themselves as still enduring at the hands of the Dutch; and an order was obtained, empowering them to take possession of the Island of Polaroon. They afterwards complained that it was delivered to them in such a state of prepared desolation as to be of no value. The truth is, it was of little value at best. On every change in the government of the country, it had been an important object with the company to obtain a confirmation of their exclusive privileges. The usual policy was not neglected on the accession of Charles II.; and a petition was presented to him for a renewal of the East India charter. As there appears not to have been, at that time, any body of opponents to make interest or importunity for a contrary measure, it was far easier to grant without inquiry, than to inquire and refuse; and Charles and his ministers had a predilection for easy rules of government. A charter, bearing date the 3rd of April, 1661, was accordingly granted, confirming the ancient privileges of the company, and vesting in them authority to make peace and war with any prince or people, not being Christians; and to seize unlicensed persons within their limits, and send them to England. The two last were important privileges; and, with the right of administering justice, consigned almost all the powers of government to the discretion of the directors and their servants. It appears not that, on this occasion, the expedient of a new subscrip-

* Bruce.

tion for obtaining a capital was attempted. A new adjustment with regard to the privileges and dead stock in India would have been required. The joint-stock was not as yet a definite and invariable sum, placed beyond the power of resumption, at the disposal of the company, the shares only transferable by purchase and sale in the market. The capital was variable and fluctuating; formed by the sums which, on the occasion of each voyage, the individuals, who were free of the company, chose to pay into the hands of the directors, receiving credit for the amount in the company's books, and proportional dividends on the profits of the voyage. Of this stock £500 entitled a proprietor to a vote in the general courts; and the shares were transferable, even to such as were not free of the company, upon paying £5 for admission. Of the amount either of the shipping or stock of the first voyage upon the renewed charter we have no account; but the instructions sent to India prescribed a reduction of the circle of trade. In the following year, 1662-63, two ships sailed for Surat, with a cargo in goods and bullion, amounting to £65,000, of which it would appear that £28,300 was consigned to Fort St. George. Next season there is no account of equipments. In 1664-65, two ships were sent out with the very limited value of £16,000. The following season, the same number only of ships was equipped; and the value in money and goods consigned to Surat was £20,600; whether any thing in addition was afforded to Fort St. George does not appear; there was no consignment to Bantam. In 1666-67, the equipment seems to have consisted but of one vessel, consigned to Surat with a value of £16,000."

In 1666 an altercation between the two houses of parliament arose out of the zeal of the company to put down all interlopers. Frederick Skinner, an agent of the Merchant Adventurers previous to their junction with the company, formed a settlement at Jambi, a district on the east coast of Sumatra. It appears he bought the Island of Barella from the Sultan of Jambi, and in those places conducted some trade. He was succeeded by his brother, Thomas Skinner, who, either supposed he had a personal right in the property, or thought he would take advantage of the troubles of the times, both in Europe and Asia, and keep unlawful possession, it does not appear which. When the Merchant Adventurers united with the company, Skinner was ordered to hand over the stock and the accounts to the company's agents, which he refused, claiming them as his own. The agents of the company in India seized his

ship, merchandize, house, and the Island of Barella; and, refusing him a passage to Europe, he was compelled to travel overland at a great cost. He presented his complaint to the government of Charles II. With the unhappy knack which that monarch's advisers possessed of turning every incident, however remote from politics, into a political embroglio unfortunate to their king, they, after much palpable neglect, handed the matter over to a committee of the council; who, indisposed to take trouble about it, it was referred to the House of Peers. The peers ordered the company to answer the charges; which denied the jurisdiction of their lordships, affirming that their lordships' house was a court of appeal, and not of trial in the first instance. The lords overruled the objection, and the company threw themselves upon the protection of the commons. The lords, angry at this slight to their authority, proceeded to adjudge by default, and awarded £5000 to Mr. Skinner. The commons imprisoned Skinner. The lords, in reprisal, incarcerated Sir S. Barnardson, and three other directors of the company. The two houses were committed to "the great Skinner controversy." The king adjourned the parliament seven times, in the hope that the contest would cool during the recess, but that result was not obtained. The "merrie monarch" found it not at all amusing to quell a parliamentary conflict. At last the king sent for both houses to Whitehall, and by personal persuasion, in which he showed more ability and address than men generally gave him credit for, he succeeded in inducing both houses to erase their resolutions and abandon the subject. The contest was thus ended, and Skinner was ruined. "The sacrifice and ruin of an individual," says Mr. Mill, "appeared, as usual, of little importance: Skinner had no redress."

A war with Holland in 1664, and a temporary quarrel with France the year following, greatly disturbed the company's affairs.

In the year 1664 the French formed an East India Company, which alarmed the English company much more than a war with France would have done. The English court, however, seemed more interested in the welfare of France than of England, and the company did not dare to appeal to the king to use his endeavours against the French, as they importuned him to be hostile to the Dutch. They, however, sent out agents to the East with instructions to oppose the French, and to show them no favour, notwithstanding the partiality of the court in their behalf.

The Danish company, which was formed

about 1650, was also active at this juncture, adding fresh fuel to the fire of anxieties and fears which tormented the British company.

Considerable discussion existed in England, both among the friends and opponents of the company, as to the necessity of the great expenses incurred by factories. These expenses pressed heavily upon the company's resources, and led many to believe that the plan of building forts and factories was bad, and that the advice of Sir Thomas Roe ought to have been followed from the first. Many historians and political economists at the present day are also of this opinion; but Dr. Wilson * answers them well in the following terms:—"It is very unlikely that any such results would have taken place, or that a trade with India would have been formed, or if formed, would have been perpetuated by any other means than those actually adopted. The Portuguese and Dutch had territorial possessions and fortified factories; and without similar support, it would have been impossible for the English to have participated in the profits of the commerce of the East. Even with these resources, the Dutch succeeded in expelling the English from the Archipelago; and it is very little probable, that they would have suffered a single English adventurer to carry on a trade with any part of India from whence they could so easily exclude him. Principles of individual adventure and free competition, would have availed but little against the power and jealousy of our rivals; and it was necessary to meet them on equal terms, or to abandon the attempt. But it was not only against European violence that it was necessary to be armed; the political state of India rendered the same precautions indispensable. What would become of 'individual adventure' at Surat, when it was pillaged by the Mahrattas? And what would have been the fate of the English commerce with Madras and Bengal, on the repeated occasions on which it was menaced with extinction, by the rapacity and vindictiveness of the native princes? Had, therefore, the anti-monopoly doctrines been more popular in those days than they were, it is very certain that the attempt to carry them into effect would have deprived England of all share in the trade with India, and cut off for ever one main source of her commercial prosperity. It is equally certain, that without the existence of such factories as were 'the natural offspring of a joint-stock;' without the ample resources of a numerous and wealthy association; and without the continuous and vigorous efforts of a corporate body animated by the

* *History of British India.* By Mill and Wilson. lib. i. cap. iv.

enjoyment of valuable privileges, and the hope of perpetuating their possession by services rendered to the state, we should never have acquired political power in India, or reared a mighty empire upon the foundations of trade."

The growing commerce of England in other directions influenced her relations to the East. Capital became more plentiful in England, and the company found it easier to raise funds. In 1667-68 Bruce informs us that the first order of the company was issued to their agents to open a trade in tea; he quotes the words of this order as follows:—"To send home by these ships 100lb. weight of the best tey that you can gett."

In 1668 Charles signed another charter. Two months after that event he married the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, and received as part of the dowry given her by the crown the Island of Bombay. The king, finding it more trouble and expense than advantage, made a virtue of necessity, and bestowed it upon the company, to whom it proved a valuable acquisition ever after. According to Bruce* the investments of the company greatly increased in 1668, and continued to do so for a number of years in an unprecedented degree. In the course of the years 1667-68, six ships sailed to Surat, with goods and bullion to the value of £130,000; five ships to Fort St. George, with a value of £75,000; and five to Bantam, with a stock of £40,000. In the next season we are informed that the consignments to Surat consisted of 1200 tons of shipping, with a stock of the value of £75,000; to Fort St. George, of five ships and a stock of £103,000; and to Bantam, of three ships and £35,000. In the year 1669-70, 1500 tons of shipping were sent to Surat, six ships to Fort St. George, and four to Bantam, and the whole amount of the stock was £281,000. The vessels sent out in 1670-71 amounted to sixteen, and their cargoes and bullion to £303,500. In the following year four ships were sent to Surat, and nearly 2000 tons of shipping to Fort St. George; the cargo and bullion to the former being £85,000, to the latter £160,000: shipping to the amount of 2800 tons was consigned to Bantam, but of the value of the bullion and goods no account seems to be preserved. In 1672-73, stock and bullion, to the amount of £157,700 were sent to Surat and Fort St. George. On account of the war, and the more exposed situation of Bantam, the consignment to that settlement was postponed. In the following year it appears that cargoes and bullion were consigned, of the value of £100,000, to Surat;

* Vol. ii. pp. 200, 469.

£87,000 to Fort St. George; and £41,000 to Bantam. The equipments, in 1674-75, were, five ships to Surat with £189,000 in goods and bullion; five to Fort St. George, with £202,000; and 2500 tons of shipping to Bantam, with £65,000. In 1675-76, to Surat, five ships and £96,500; to Fort St. George, five ships and £235,000; to Bantam, 2450 tons of shipping and £58,000. In 1676-77, three ships to Surat, and three to Fort St. George, with £97,000 to the one, and £176,600 to the other; and eight ships to Bantam with no account of the stock. The whole adventure to India in 1677-78 seems to have been seven ships and £352,000; of which a part, to the value of £10,000 or £12,000 was to be forwarded from Fort St. George to Bantam. In 1678-79, eight ships and £393,950. In 1679-80, ten ships and £461,700. In 1680-81, eleven ships and £596,000; and, in 1681-82, seventeen ships and £740,000.

Amidst these vast undertakings, for that age, the company was embarrassed by political events at home and abroad. At many of their stations trade could not have been conducted but by force of arms; violence, by European and native, endangered the factories and forts, as well as ships and cargoes, and the lives of the agents and mariners who served the company. The acquisition of Bombay by grant of Charles brought dangers and difficulties as well as advantages; and the company, in the midst of its increasing influence and power, must have sunk, had not an all-superintending Providence reserved it for the great events of which it was destined to be the author.

Among its difficulties the contentions of its agents abroad, with one another, was one of the most troublesome and dangerous. Nearly all appeared to be implicated in transactions as much at variance with the will of the company as with its interests, where its desires could not have been certainly known. Contentions for pre-eminence and authority ripened into a sort of civil war at the factories, and the company was compelled at last to seek some solution of this difficulty. It was resolved that authority should exist among its factors according to seniority, except where specific appointments were made from home, where the office of president was held, or where any special mission designated an agent to an especial and temporary service.

The interlopers increased rapidly in proportion as the ventures of the company became larger, and the profits of their returns were reputed to be of higher rate. The attempts of individuals, and of small parties or associations combined for the purpose, to force

the trade of the East, was as alarming to the company as war with Holland, or the enterprises of Danes and French. The company, however, obtained more and more authority from the crown, and dealt summary punishment upon all Englishmen who presumed, without their permission, to trade with the East. There existed an unrelenting antipathy to the settlement in India of any British subject whatever, other than the company's servants; and unless they found protection from some powerful native prince, they were seized by the company's officers and deported. The powers of the Admiralty jurisdiction were conceded by the king, so that interloping ships were seized and condemned. The powers of the company, by the year 1685, had assumed a magnitude which roused political jealousies at home. The authority which it swayed over the persons and property of British citizens in India, and in the ports where it traded, was unlimited. Against this the spirit of English liberty revolted; and many private adventurers who violated the company's charter, and made infamously false representations to native princes, of having authority from the King of England, were, when punished by the company, made objects of sympathy in England. From the year 1682 the company became more circumspect in the publication of its affairs, whether financial or commercial. This arose from the general desire which prevailed to deprive the company of its exclusive privileges—a desire which found vent in an openly-expressed purpose of forming a new East India Company. This project was urged upon the court and the country in 1682-83, and the king and council took it into consideration, but withheld their sanction; at the same time expressing themselves in a manner which kept up the hope of the promoters of the scheme, and subscriptions were actually entered into for a joint-stock.

A relation of the naval undertakings of the company throughout this period will find a more appropriate place in the pages set apart for a review of its foreign transactions. The revolution of 1688 necessarily interrupted the proceedings of the company and of its competitors, home and foreign. The war which raged in Ireland during that period, as in 1641, embarrassed the finances of the country, and drew off its resources in men and material. The Irish Roman Catholics having espoused the cause of James II., while the Protestants embraced that of William and Mary, the revolution led to a protracted civil war in that country, which was only terminated after a series of bloody battles and sieges for ever memorable to the

Protestants of that country for the heroism which their ancestors displayed. Although the proceedings of the company went on through all these troubles, it was a considerable time before the pacification of Ireland was ensured, and the care and anxiety of government ceased to be turned chiefly in that direction.

The alliance with the Dutch at the period of the Revolution was expected to check their aggressions upon English trade in the East; but the Dutch East India Company had its own peculiar interests to consult irrespective of the states-general, and therefore the alliance of the two nations did not heal the differences or stop the envenomed rivalry of the two companies.

It is remarkable that during the time which elapsed from the beginning of the civil war to the accession of William and Mary, the company experienced more favourable treatment, on the whole, from the imbecile and unpatriotic Stuarts, than from the triumphant parliament or the Lord Protector. The Stuarts were as ready to rob the company as they were to plunder any other portion of their subjects, but they were not unwilling to afford it any advantages of monopoly, if paid for by money or political service; nor reluctant to endow it with arbitrary power within the limits of its jurisdiction. The favours granted by the Stuarts were noticed on a former page,* but may here more generally be named. The Island of Bombay, given by Charles II. in 1668, and formally made over "to the governor and company" on the 27th of March, 1669. In 1674 he made a grant of the Island of St. Helena, which had previously been the property of the company, Captain Lancaster having taken possession of it on his return from his memorable voyage; but the Dutch wrested it from the company, and it was afterwards retaken, in the name of the British crown, by a naval force under Captain Mundane. The same sovereign, October 5, 1677, confirmed to the company the powers before granted in every case. On the 9th of August, 1683, Charles conferred the power of establishing courts of judicature for the repression of offences. James II., April 12th, 1688, confirmed all that his royal predecessors had conferred.

Among the various privileges imparted by the Stuarts, one has been strangely overlooked by historians, which, nevertheless, had an important bearing upon the authority and influence of the company. In 1676 Charles II. granted letters patent for the coinage of rupees and pice (a small copper coin) at Bombay. This invested the company with

* Vol. i. p. 286.

sovereign privilege, and laid a new foundation of their power.

During the Commonwealth, however, an event occurred which probably had as much influence as all the favour of the Stuarts upon the commerce of the country. In order to thwart the power of the Dutch, then in possession of the carrying trade of Europe, the act known as the "Navigation Act" was passed, which forbid the importation of foreign commodities, except in English ships, or those of the countries in which such commodities were produced. Ambassadors were sent by the Dutch to Cromwell, demanding the repeal of this act. His refusal was the chief cause of the national sentiment in Holland, which produced the war so signally humiliating to the Dutch and glorious to the Protector. As the commercial wealth and enterprise of England were at that period fast rising, and an extraordinary desire for foreign commodities sprung forth in the general taste, the Dutch were much injured as carriers; and the English merchant, although at the cost of the English consumer, was relieved from the only competition which he really feared. It was not, however, to favour any class or interest, much less the East India Company, that Cromwell favoured the Navigation Laws; but to form and consolidate an English navy, by fostering and nursing up, as it were, an English commercial marine. While this policy answered the end which the autocrat contemplated, it also removed from the British ports the trade carried on in Dutch bottoms, or transferred it to English ships, and in this way the Dutch could find no market for their spices in England; force on their part was met by force, indirectly but effectually. The Dutch ships might still plunder the English vessels or factories in the Archipelago, but they were themselves debarred from carrying their spices to a market, already more valued for such articles than any other. Thus, however the Commonwealth may be considered as unfavourable to the genius of monopoly, and to that of the company in particular, and however truly the reigns of the Stuarts may be regarded as partial to it,—although that partiality was capricious and dishonest,—still, political events, over which Oliver Cromwell had no control, forced him also into paths which made him, unintentionally, perhaps reluctantly, an abettor of the company's progress to greatness and power. A writer, possessing peculiar facilities for comprehending this subject in all its bearings, has thus reviewed the company's history during the periods thus compared. After giving an opinion in reference to the successes of Cromwell against Holland, similar to that expressed

above, he observes:—"The spirit of the Navigation Laws was further extended by Charles II., and their operation produced so great a change in the state of the shipping and commerce of the country, that in a few years a large portion of the Dutch trade was drawn from them, and we became in a great measure the carriers of Europe. Amidst the events, comprising the Civil War, the Commonwealth, the Restoration, and the Revolution, the East India Company surmounted the powerful efforts made by their opponents, both abroad and at home, to annihilate their establishment and subvert their influence, and successfully attained the objects for which they had been incorporated. In the progress of the trade, the foundation was laid of our present empire in India: in its extension and consolidation, the genius and talents of some of our most illustrious statesmen and warriors were first developed."*

The reign of James II. was, in many respects, favourable to the company, had they taken advantage of it. Some well-devised measures to induce that monarch to bestow better naval protection upon British Eastern commerce were proposed towards the end of that monarch's power; but the Revolution put an end to these, and introduced a new era in the domestic and foreign affairs of England. Mr. Capper has correctly referred to the company's disappointment in this respect when he observes—"During the reign of James II. the company might have strengthened their position with the utmost ease; for that prince, whatever were his other faults, did not possess that of inattention to the commercial interests of his subjects. He readily conceded them all the privileges they sought, and was prepared to forward their views in any manner that might have been desirable; but with all these advantages, the company suffered much from the incapacity or dishonesty of their own servants."

The establishment of the Revolution enabled the company to give more attention to their affairs, which were at that juncture in a disastrous condition in a pecuniary point of view. The want of economical management and of sound commercial principles created this state. The affairs of the company at home were also acted upon injuriously by the tyrannical conduct of their superior officers, who proved themselves in several instances unfit persons to be entrusted with such great power as the various charters of the company allowed. The languishing state of trade would probably have sunk the company at this juncture, had it not been for the aid received from the revenues of their foreign possessions. In a future chapter an account

* Peter Auber.

will be given of the progress of their affairs abroad during this period, when it will be seen that events over which the company had little control put them in possession of a revenue-yielding territory. It would seem that at this time the company began to despair of their trade, and to contemplate the settlement of various places as valuable chiefly or only for the tribute they rendered. In fact, the idea of conquest, afterwards repudiated and indeed revoked, occurred to the company and was admitted in their policy. The instructions given to their agents in 1689 were in these terms:—“The increase of our revenue is the subject of our care as much as our trade: ’tis that must maintain our force, when twenty accidents may interrupt our trade; ’tis that must make us a nation in India; without that we are but as a great number of interlopers, united by his majesty’s royal charter, fit only to trade where nobody of power thinks it their interest to prevent us; and upon this account it is that the wise Dutch, in all their general advices which we have seen, write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and military policy, warfare, and the increase of their revenue, for one paragraph they write concerning trade.”

The Dutch are hardly correctly represented in this circular. It is true, that the general advices of the Dutch company referred more frequently to civil and military government than to trade, but it was for sake of trade. Neither the East India Company nor the people of Holland contemplated an Indian empire, but they regarded naval and military forces as elements of trade, upon the principles in which in those days it was supposed an Eastern trade ought to be maintained which involved monopoly, and armed competition to sustain that monopoly. The Hollanders were willing enough to make war upon natives or Europeans, if the free course of their trade were interfered with, and their exclusive hold of such commerce as they could open up endangered; but it was by trade, not by revenue extorted from oriental princes or peoples, that the company, fostered by the states-general, hoped to grow rich.

Mr. Mill, commenting upon the new principle avowed by the British East India Company to its own agents, observes:—“It thus appears at how early a period, when trade and sovereignty were blended, the trade, as was abundantly natural, became an object of contempt, and by necessary consequence, a subject of neglect. A trade, the subject of neglect, is of course a trade without profit.”

Upon this stricture of Mr. Mill, Professor Wilson thus animadvert:—“The anxiety of the directors to maintain a trade ‘without

profit,’ would be somewhat inexplicable, if it was true, but the injuries to which that trade had been exposed from European competition and native exactions, had sufficiently proved that it could not be carried on without the means of maintaining an independent position in India.”

The tone and substance of this critique is as unfair to Mr. Mill as the animadversions of Dr. Wilson too often are, especially when he charges the historian with partiality and injustice. The object of the company, at that period, was not simply to fix independent positions upon the spots where their commerce lay, so that the native rajahs could not exact from them, drive them out, or interfere with the ordinary current of their trade. The aim of the directors in sending out the “advices” that incited the severe remarks which Mr. Mill, as a political economist, made in the above passage, was to obtain revenue from the soil of India: territory taken from its occupants by military force, if not quietly surrendered, and to which the directors were disposed, at that time, to trust as the support of a failing trade. This is the view which is taken by most writers who have paid adequate attention to the subject. Mr. Murray says:—“The voyages of the English (at first) were personal adventures, undertaken with a mingled view to discovery, commerce, and piracy, rather than to any fixed scheme of conquest or dominion. Their forts accordingly were erected as depositories for goods, or to supply commercial facilities, but not with any aim at territorial possession. It was not till 1689 that their views seem to have extended to the latter object. In the instructions issued to their agents during that year, they intimate that the increase of their revenue was henceforth to occupy as much attention as their merchandize; that they wished to be ‘a nation in India;’ and they quote with unmerited applause the conduct of the Dutch, who, they assert, in the advice sent to their governors, wrote ten paragraphs concerning tribute for one relative to trade. The means of gratifying this disposition were as yet very limited, as certain small portions of territory around Bombay and Madras comprised the whole extent of their Indian sovereignty. They held themselves ready, however, to purchase every city or district which the native princes could, by any motive, be prevailed upon to alienate.”

Mr. Murray has very properly added the words, “which the native princes could by any motive be induced to alienate,” for the negotiations carried on were not strictly commercial bargains; and previous to 1689, the feeling then avowed to their agents by the

directors was predominant, as the conduct of the Brothers Child, elsewhere to be noticed, evinced.

While the company thus resolved upon the acquisition of territory by force or purchase, or *quasi* purchase, as might be, all its great powers were put in force against interlopers with inexorable severity, leading to such indignation in England as compelled the attention of William III. and his parliament. Mr. Mill presents the aspect of affairs very briefly and completely in the following passage:—“The prosperity which the nation had enjoyed, since the death of Charles I., having rendered capital more abundant, the eagerness of the mercantile population to enter into the channel of Indian enterprise and gain had proportionably increased; and the principles of liberty being now better understood, and actuating more strongly the breasts of Englishmen, not only had private adventure, in more numerous instances, surmounted the barriers of the company’s monopoly, but the public in general at last disputed the power of a royal charter, unsupported by parliamentary sanction, to limit the rights of one part of the people in favour of another, and to debar all but the East India Company from the commerce of India. Applications were made to parliament for a new system of management in this branch of national affairs; and certain instances of severity, which were made to carry the appearance of atrocity, in the exercise of the powers of martial law assumed by the company, in St. Helena and other places, served to augment the unfavourable opinion which was now rising against them.”

The House of Commons was undoubtedly hostile to the company. They appointed a committee in 1689 to consider the best mode of procedure in legislating for the trade with India, and the relation of the company to it. On the 16th of January, 1690, this committee made its report, which was to the effect that a new company should be established by act of parliament, but that the existing company should hold the monopoly until such act was passed.

The company, instead of taking warning from the report of this committee and discerning the temper of the nation, proceeded to extremity against all independent merchants who sought, in contravention of their charter, to open any trade with the East. Mr. Bruce gives an extraordinary proof of this in certain instructions of the directors in 1691, given to their agents and captains:—“The court continued to act towards their opponents (the interlopers) in the same manner as they had done in the latter years of the two preceding reigns, and granted

commissions to all their captains, proceeding this season to India, to seize the interlopers of every description, and bring them to trial before the admiralty court of Bombay, explaining that as they attributed all the differences between the company and the Indian powers to the interlopers, if they continued their depredations on the subjects of the Mogul or King of Persia, they were to be tried for their lives as pirates, and sentence of death passed, but execution stayed till the king’s pleasure should be known.”*

The result of these proceedings was that a spirit of hostility, which amounted to resentment, rapidly spread through parliament and the public, and addresses from both were presented to the king, praying him to dissolve the company; the parliament, however, added to the prayer, that a new one should be incorporated. The king made answer that he had referred the matter to a committee of his privy council. The pertinacity of the company, however, in persecuting the interlopers, compelled King William to take some decided step, although his own policy was to temporize. The assumptions of the company became unbounded, and the discontent of the people kept pace with these pretensions. Captain Hamilton thus relates the company’s proceedings at this juncture:—“Sir Josiah Child, as chairman of the court of directors, wrote to the governor of Bombay, to spare no severity to crush their countrymen who invaded the ground of the company’s pretensions in India. The governor replied, by professing his readiness to omit nothing which lay within the sphere of his power, to satisfy the wishes of the company; but the laws of England, unhappily, would not let him proceed so far as might otherwise be desirable. Sir Josiah wrote back with anger, ‘that he expected his orders were to be his rules, and not the laws of England, which were a heap of nonsense, compiled by a few ignorant country gentlemen, who hardly knew how to make laws for the good of their own private families, much less for the regulating of companies, and foreign commerce.’†

The king and parliament were at issue as to what was best to be done. His majesty was for granting a charter in his own royal right; the parliament and committee had resolved that parliament was the proper court to determine what new regulations should be made for the trade of India. The latter, however, gave way, just as in modern times the house has often shown itself indisposed to support recommendations of its committees, of which it nevertheless approved; so it was in the

Annals of the East India Company, vol. iii. p. 103.
† Hamilton’s *New Account of India*, i. 232.

reign of William III. The crown found means of appeasing the house, and issued a charter by letters patent. The commons, however, acted upon by the exasperation which now pervaded the public mind, broke forth again into resolutions and protests, to which many assented, and loudly advocated—because they believed the matter was already settled by the charter, and they might in this manner cheaply purchase popularity by a display of patriotism, independence, and regard for justice. Towards the close of the session, the house accordingly resolved—“That it is the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies, or any part of the world, unless prohibited by act of parliament.”*

The public ferment now rose high; it was discovered that the ministers of William had been bribed before the issue of the charter; and the democratic party did not hesitate to say that £10,000 of the bribery money found its way into the king's own hands. In 1695 the excitement was at its highest. The commons ordered the books of the company to be delivered up for the inspection of their honourable house. It was by that means clearly proved that the company had been enabled to obtain so many favours during past reigns by systematic bribery, both of the sovereigns and their ministers. The evidence against the Stuarts was damning; and the suspicions against William, although not confirmed, increased: several of the great men about his court were convicted of having advocated and advised the new charter from corrupt motives. No less than £90,000 had been in the course of the year expended to obtain a renewal of the charter. Amongst the criminals, the commons selected the Duke of Leeds for impeachment, there being clear proof of his having received £5000. The House of Lords took the matter up, some of its members having heard that the principal witness had been sent out of the way, and the house demanded that the government should take measures to arrest his flight; nothing, however, was done for that object during nine days, until it was believed that the witness was beyond arrest. The king and his government acted alike scandalously. He and his ministers did their utmost to quash all inquiry; and the people and their representatives becoming, as usual, tired of agitation and discordant among themselves, the court succeeded in covering the delinquents. Whatever services William of Orange rendered to the English nation, and whatever claims his memory may have to be toasted as “glorious, pious, and immortal,” he neither acted justly, wisely, nor gratefully to the British public,

* M'Pherson's *Annals*, ii. 142.

which bestowed upon him a throne, in these transactions. It was generally believed that he favoured the company, chiefly to prevent the expansion of a national trade with the East, which he knew would soon bear down all the opposition of the Dutch, of whose interests it was suspected he was more careful than of those of his adopted country. The only act of authority the commons seems to have exercised in opposition to the king, was to consign Sir Thomas Cook to the Tower, for refusing to disclose the names of the corrupt ministers who had trafficked in the liberties of the people. He was eventually released, and when the agitation subsided, “the court of committees” bestowed upon him £12,000, as compensation for his incarceration and any losses attending upon it.

In spite of every obstacle which was presented then or in the following years, a new charter came into force, granted by William and Mary, 7th October, 1693, confirming the rights and privileges of the company, subject to its acceptance of such orders, directions, additions, alterations, restrictions, qualifications, as the king in council should think fit to make or appoint at any time before the 29th September, 1694; under which proviso supplementary charters or letters patent were issued at two different dates, viz., the 11th November, 1693, and the 28th September, 1694. By a like instrument from William III., dated the 13th April, 1698, regulations for the distribution of votes and for other purposes were made.* This “instrument” must not be confounded with the charter granted that year, it being a “charter supplementary,” or “letter patent,” dependant upon that of October, 1693.

The losses of the company by interlopers and pirates between 1693 and 1698 were very heavy, but have been too variously stated to enable any careful historian to approach an accurate estimate. For several years the company paid no dividend, and was bound down by debt from enterprises which held out reasonable prospects of success.

At this juncture a proposition for a new Scottish company was brought forward, and a charter was granted to it to trade to the East and West Indies, Africa, and America. This undertaking was brought to an end by the misfortunes of the Darien settlement. Another society, however, was more fortunate. At the termination of the French war the country was placed in great difficulties for money to pay the heavy expenses then incurred. The East India Company offered a loan of £700,000 at four per cent. interest if their charter should be confirmed, and by an

* *The Laws relating to India and the East India Company.*

act of parliament, the exclusive right to trade to the East Indies should be secured. The rival association determined to outbid them, by offering a loan of two millions on similar conditions. To this stock foreigners as well as Englishmen, bodies corporate as well as individuals, were invited to contribute. The contributions were to bear an interest of eight per cent. per annum, and the company was to be allowed liberty to trade on the principle of joint-stock, or separate ventures, as the company itself might determine. A bill was introduced to parliament, and an act passed in the interest of the new association, and a charter granted after tedious yet acrimonious discussions.*

On the 5th September, 1698, William III. incorporated a second East India Company, under the name of the "English Company trading to the East Indies." To this company the commerce with India was exclusively committed, with the exception "that the Governor and the Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies" (the old company) were to be permitted to carry on their trade until the 29th September, 1701.† Mill gives the following account of the issuing of this charter:—"In conformity with this act a charter passed the great seal, bearing date the 3rd of September, constituting the subscribers to the stock of £2,000,000 a body corporate, under the name of the 'General Society.' This charter empowered the subscribers to trade, on the terms of a regulated company, each subscriber for his own account. The greater part, however, of the subscribers desired to trade upon a joint-stock: and another charter, dated the 5th of the same month, formed this portion of the subscribers, exclusive of the small remainder, into a joint-stock company, by 'the name of the English Company trading to the East Indies.'"‡

Bruce, Anderson, and M'Pherson, all represent the two companies as fettered by certain regulations as to dividends, which the first of these writers sums up in the following terms:—"It was provided in reference to the old company that their estates should be chargeable with their debts; and that if any further dividends were made before the payments of their debts, the members who received them should be responsible for the debts with their private estates to the amount of the sums thus unduly received. This measure, of prohibiting dividends while debt is unpaid, or of rendering the proprietors responsible with their fortunes to the amount of

the dividends received, befitted the legislative justice of the nation. A clause, on the same principle, was enacted with regard to the new company, that they should not allow their debts at any time to exceed the amount of their capital stock; or, if they did, that every proprietor should be responsible for the debts with his private fortune, to the whole amount of whatever he should have received in any way of dividend or share after the debts exceeded the capital."

The formation of this new company reveals much folly and equal corruption as prevailing in parliament, and among the public. Under the pretence of zeal for national interest, the projectors of the new company succeeded in obtaining another monopoly, instead of the old one; simply transferring the real or supposed advantages of a protected and exclusive trade from the hands of one set of men to another. This must have been as obvious to the parliament which passed the act, and the king who granted the charter, and his cabinet by whose advice he acted, as it was to the merchants whose rival monopolies bid for their favour; but king, cabinet, and parliament, in the face of all this, and pretending to do as they did for the welfare of the nation, transferred the monopoly from one set of men to another, because the favoured party were willing to advance the larger loan. The only party honest in the midst of so much corruption was the old company, which had the plea of having rendered great services, acquired property under charters, and become possessed of territories yielding revenue.

The old company showed itself equal to the emergency; then, as in all future periods of its history, a critical conjuncture served to bring out its energies, and disclose talents which were often but poorly employed, until the occurrence of danger quickened them. For a number of years previously, the amount of its trade was very small, and far from profitable:—"The equipments for 1689-90 were on a reduced scale; consisting of three ships only, two for Bombay, and one for Fort St. George. They were equally small the succeeding year. We are not informed to what the number of ships or value of cargo amounted in 1691-92. In the following year, however, the number of ships was eleven; and was increased in 1693-94, to thirteen. In the following year there was a diminution, but to what extent does not appear. In each of the years 1695-96 and 1696-67, the number of ships was eight. And in 1697-98 it was only four."

The spirit evinced and the measures taken to meet the emergency of 1698, the writer above quoted thus states upon the authority of Adam Smith:—"The old, or London com-

* See chap. xiii. p. 286.

† *Charters from the Crown, and Laws relating to the East India Company.*

‡ *Wilson's continuation of Mill, lib. i. cap. v.*

pany, lost not their hopes. They were allowed to trade for three years on their own charter; and availing themselves of the clause in the act, which permitted corporations to hold stock of the new company, they resolved to subscribe into this fund as largely as possible; and under the privilege of private adventure, allowed by the charter of the English company, to trade, separately, and in their own name, after the three years of their charter should have expired. The sum which they were enabled to appropriate to this purpose was £315,000." That the company "lost not their hopes," as the writer just quoted expresses it, is very obvious from the terms in which the directors wrote to their agents at the presidencies and factories. They urged those agents to second their exertions, and they would send out increasingly large equipments, with which the new company could not compete. They represented the parliamentary triumph of "the English Company"—as the new one was styled—as temporary, arising from a party move, which time, wisdom, and management, would enable the directors to defeat. They assured their agents that no ground for alarm existed, either at home or at the settlements; that "two East India Companies in England, could no more subsist without destroying one the other, than two kings at the same time regnant in the same kingdom; that now a civil battle was to be fought between the old company and the new company; and that two or three years must end this war, as the old or the new must give way; that, being veterans, if their servants abroad would do their duty, they did not doubt of the victory; that if the world laughed at the pains the two companies took to ruin each other, they could not help it, as they were on good ground and had 'a charter.'"* Orders were also given to the agents to behave themselves circumspectly to native princes, and more especially to the Great Mogul, whom they were to take every means to conciliate. It appears as if the directors relied much upon a "voluntary humility" to the Great Mogul, as a means of ingratiating themselves, to the disparagement of their rivals. In this alone they failed, happily so for their future fortunes.

The new company proved itself no match for the old one. The loan of two millions to government was an undertaking beyond the resources and influence of the men who composed it. It was obliged to borrow money at a disadvantage, to replace that given to the government, and thus became embarrassed from the beginning. When the period came for taking up the stock of the new company,

* Documents of the company, collected by Bruce.

many of the subscribers were unable to fulfil what they had undertaken, and others who calculated upon the speedy destruction of the old company were appalled by its bold front and resolute prosecution of its plans, with a capital superior to the new company, having made no loan to government. Bruce declares that a panic ensued among the shareholders, who sold out their stock at great loss, and brought down the price in the market to a ruinous discount.

The first expedition which the new company fitted out—after having been anticipated by the old company on a much larger scale, as already quoted—consisted of three ships, with a stock of £178,000. The old company immediately followed that minor effort by one of great efficiency and vigour, amounting to thirteen sail of five hundred tons burden each, and goods considerably exceeding half a million sterling in value. At this juncture, too, they obtained various grants of territory in India, the town of Calcutta, afterwards the very seat of their glory, being among them.

While the new company was in trepidation, without capital to trade with, and its stock at a discount in the market, the old company was silently and quietly laying the foundations of Fort William at Calcutta, and making arrangements not only to possess there a fortification which they hoped to be impregnable, but also for erecting a station into a presidency. Bruce states, that besides the general moral effort of these spirited proceedings, parliament became sensible of their energy, and passed an act, entitling "the London Company"—as the old association was called—to trade, after their own charter should expire, under the charter of "the English Company," to the amount of the stock they had subscribed to its funds. This was a legal right which the London Company possessed in common with all other persons who subscribed to the stock of the new company, but to avert any injustice on the part of either that body or the government, an act especially empowering them to do so was sought and obtained. It is not improbable that "the English Company's stock" would have become utterly unsaleable in the market, had it not been for the large amount held by the London Company.

The new company availed itself of the discarded agents and officers of the old, which proved injurious in the long run of events, for these men were dismissed either for bad conduct, or, having too strong a will, for resisting the authorities above them. These persons committed their new employers to measures so imprudent and violent as to defeat their intentions, and impair their interests. Several

of these persons were sent out to India, whither they went in the character of royal ambassadors, injuring both companies by the representations which they made to the native princes, and assailing the old company in the very manner which it had been brought as a complaint against it so often that it had treated interlopers. Whatever had been the sins of the old company, those of the new surpassed them; so that before the short term allowed to the former had run out, men grew weary of hearing of the violence, arrogance, false accusations, piracies, and villainies which the agents of the new, and ostensibly reformed, company perpetrated. The English name was lowered and disgraced, not only in the opinion of other European nations trading to India, but in that of native princes, and more especially of the Mogul himself.

At home there was a strong disposition among politicians to keep up this bitterness. "The whole of this contest," says Grant,* "was only one division of the great battle that agitated the state between the Tories and the Whigs, of whom the former favoured the old company, and the latter the new." Both parties suffered intensely; the market was inundated with oriental wares. The new company made overtures for a junction with the old, but the latter held sternly off. The silk weavers of Spitalfields, Norwich, Canterbury, and Coventry, petitioned against the admission of Indian silks, which the rival importers were selling at a loss, and so underselling the home production, that the English manufacturers, employers and operatives, were in ruined circumstances. The result of this agitation was one of those acts for the protection of the silk trade which fetter commerce and repress enterprise and industry. For this act William was more desirous than his parliament, or any portion of his people, except the manufacturers of silk. The printers of muslin and calico were, however, participators in the protection.

When the king received the directors of the old company on the subject of permitting them to continue a body corporate, he strongly recommended them to coalesce with the new company. This occurred in March, 1700. The proprietors called a general court of the proprietary together, to make known the king's recommendation; but they delayed to do so for some time, and then were actuated by policy to keep up an appearance of respect to the king's counsel, with which at the time they intended no compliance.

Some months later the king sent a message to know what proceedings they had taken in virtue of his advice to them. The directors

again summoned a general court. The proprietors passed the following resolution:—"That their company as they have always been, so they are still, ready to embrace every opportunity by which they may manifest their duty to his majesty, and zeal for the public good; and that they are desirous to contribute their utmost endeavours for the preservation of the Indian trade to this kingdom, and are willing to agree with the new company upon reasonable terms." Mr. Mill calls this resolution evasive. He is sometimes, perhaps frequently, too eager to fix censure upon the old company, arising from the adverse politico-economical views entertained by him, which prevent him from making due allowance for the spirit of the age, the degree of civilization then prevalent, and the little influence it had upon seafaring matters and commercial pursuits in general. The resolution of the court of proprietors was not a hearty acquiescence with the will of his majesty, but they considered that it was not for them to take any initiatory step towards a coalition. As the stronger party, they only required time to bear down the competition of the other; they believed that they had little to fear for themselves. It was for the weaker party to offer terms, and so to press them, as to make it the interest of their opponents to accept those terms. The king and his ministers did not take this into sufficient account, and they were chiefly anxious that the two companies should coalesce, because a better prospect might be thus held out to borrow more money, or obtain the retention of what had been borrowed on easier terms. All the parties made much pretension of having the welfare of their country chiefly at heart, but none of them gave any practical proofs of being actuated by a sentiment so exalted. That "the London Company" were not evasive in the resolution condemned by Mr. Mill was soon proved, for when "the English Company" proposed formal terms, the former at once offered to have them submitted to discussion by seven delegates from each body.

As the year and the century were nearly at the close, the old company entered earnestly into negotiations with the legislature for a permanent adjustment of the questions then open. A committee of the House of Commons was appointed "to receive proposals for paying off the national debts, and advancing the credit of the nation." "The London Company" took advantage of this circumstance, and offered to pay off a million sterling which the government owed the English Company, and for which eight per cent. was paid; the London Company offering to hold it at five per cent. It was the old expedient of outbidding

* *Sketch of the History of the East India Company.*

their rivals by pecuniary favours to the government. It was partly met in the old way. The commons' committee fell in with the proposal, and every thing appeared to be on the point of adjustment, once more giving the old company the victory over all enemies, when the house ignored the proceedings of their committee, and the difficulties remained still obstructing commerce, and the enigma of the

future continued still without solution, when the seventeenth century closed upon the struggles of the old East India Company. Those struggles were intense, abroad as well as at home; and were alike successful, although often repressed by opposition and defeat. To the trials and triumphs of the company abroad, the reader's attention will be directed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER LII.

THE ENGLISH IN INDIA AND THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO, FROM THE SETTLEMENT AT HOOGLY TO THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

DIRECTING attention to that quarter in which the British, when simply in pursuit of spice, opened up their first trading operations—the Archipelago, the Islands of Java and Japan, and the Moluccas—the state of things will appear as unfavourable as could be well conceived, when, just at the time, upon the Indian continent, the English settled down at Hoogly, and were looking forward with excited prospect to a flourishing trade with the rich province of Bengal. The business of that coast, from the city of Madras to Hoogly, was superintended from the distant settlement of Bantam, in the far east. The elevation of Fort St. George into a presidency relieved the chief of the presidency of Bantam of much care, but at the same time diminished the importance of his post, which seems to have declined in relative influence from that time. It was at this place that the power of the Dutch was most severely felt, as they roamed the Eastern Sea with triumphant insolence and unchecked aggression. The company was at this time most anxious to pursue a trade with the Chinese, and notwithstanding previous failures to accomplish the like in that way, hoped still to accomplish it from Macao, through the aid of the Portuguese, upon principles that might strengthen both against the overwhelming power of the Dutch. The delicate task of achieving this much desired object was committed to the agency at Bantam. Full power was given to them, but unfortunately they received nothing else. The following communication from them to the directors in 1648 discloses a state of things extremely humiliating to the company, and makes one wonder at, as well as admire, the courage and pertinacity with which the English held on against all odds, and conquered all at last:—

“The experiment which you desire we should make with one of our small vessels

for trade into China, we are certainly informed, by those that know the present state and condition of that country very well, cannot be undertaken without the inevitable loss both of ship, men, and goods; for as the Tartars overrun and waste all the inland country, without settling any government in the places which they overcome, so some of their great men in China, with a mighty fleet at sea of upwards of a thousand sail of great ships (as is confidently reported), rob and spoil all the sea-coasts, and whatsoever vessels they can meet with; and how one of our feeble vessels would be able to defend themselves against such forces is easy to be supposed. As for the Portugals in Macao, they are little better than mere rebels against their viceroy in Goa, having lately murdered their captain-general, sent thither to them, and Macao itself so distracted amongst themselves, that they are daily spilling one another's blood. But put the case, all these things were otherwise, we must need say, we are in a very poor condition to seek out new discoveries, while you will not allow us either factors, shipping, or sailors, scarce half sufficient to maintain the trade already you have on foot; and therefore the Dutch but laugh at us, to see us meddle with new undertakings, being hardly able to support the old.”

The Dutch at this time rendered any trade with China by any other European nation difficult, as well as by themselves; they penetrated to Canton, and were expelled, but not only continued to infest the Canton River and the coasts as pirates, they assisted the Tartars against the Chinese all along the eastern shores of the empire.

Until 1664 no further efforts were made, either directly from home, or through the agency at Bantam, to make a favourable impression upon the Chinese. In that year

some vessels were sent to Canton. At first the prospects seemed favourable; the supercargoes landed at Macao, and secured a house as a temporary factory. The Chinese demanded that the ships should be measured, and in the result insisted upon "two thousand tales." The supercargoes offered an amount equal to a thousand dollars, but the reply was, "we will abate nothing." At the same time eight musketeers were placed to guard the house of the supercargoes, and prevent their leaving. After much negotiation, and the most insolent and oppressive behaviour on the part of the "celestial authorities," the supercargoes were permitted to return to Bantam, having been unable to effect a single sale.

They had scarcely left Macao, when the Tartar government took measures to repress all foreign trade within the empire, nor were the Dutch exempt from the application of this prohibitory system, notwithstanding the venal assistance which they had rendered to the Tartar oppressors.

After the severe defeat of the Dutch navy in Europe, through the genius and courage of Oliver Cromwell's commanders, and the consequent treaty, by which the Dutch engaged themselves to restore such possessions in the Archipelago as had belonged to the English, negotiations were opened by the English agents at Bantam for the execution of the stipulated terms. The restoration, or, as the Dutch called it, the cession, of the Island of Polaroon, was one of the terms of stipulation. The governor of that island pretended that he could not deliver it up without orders from the governor of Banda. On application to him, he pleaded that he must have orders from his superior, the governor of Batavia; he pleaded the want of definite instructions from the directors of the Dutch company. The fear of Oliver Cromwell alone caused the Dutch to surrender anything; and they continued to defer the surrender until 1665, and then the spice-trees had been cut down, and the inhabitants banished. Hostilities having recommenced, the English were expelled both from Polaroon and Damru, and subsequently, by the treaty of Breda, they were both ceded to the Dutch.

From 1663 to 1668 the company appears, from the correspondence carried on with its factory at Bantam, to have been anxious for an active prosecution of trade in Japan. Mr. Quarles Brown, the chief agent, replied that to accomplish such a purpose, the plans and modes of the Dutch must be imitated, who sought in Siam, Cambodia, and Ton-

Japan. The Dutch advanced money to native merchants, who procured the commodities in the interior, and brought them to the coasts.

In 1667-68 attempts were made to reopen the trade with Sumatra, which had been lost during the previous troubles with the Dutch.

It was in consequence of the recommendations of Mr. Brown, as to the foreign articles most used in Japan, and as to the way in which the Dutch procured such articles, that, in 1672, an attempt was made to found a factory in Tonquin. The kingdom thus designated is bounded on the north by the province of Yunnan, in China; on the east, by the province of Canton and Bay of Tonquin; on the south, by Cochin; and the west, by the kingdom of Laos. It is twelve hundred miles in length, and five hundred miles in breadth. Its independence was established in 1553, but it is now subject to Cochin China. The president at Bantam was led to believe that there were many commodities which the people of Tonquin and Japan would like to interchange, and the president hoped to establish a commerce between the two places, and find means to introduce British goods, and articles from continental India.

On the 25th of June a vessel from Bantam reached the river of Tonquin. After passing the bar, and ascending up the river fourteen miles, they were stopped until permission for their progress should be obtained from the mandarin. Ung-ja-Thay came on board, attended by a guard of soldiers, and gave permission for the vessel to proceed to Hien. The passage was one of curiosity to the English rather than of commerce. The supercargo having advised the agent at Bantam of the reception he met with, the communication was forwarded to the directors at home, and has remained as one of the most curious documents connected with the early commerce of the company.

"In sailing up the river the ship several times touched, and the mandarin, being this day aboard, pinioned the captain, and threatened to cut off the chief mate's head, because they would not tow the ship against a violent stream, which at last they were forced to try; but as soon as the anchor was up, the tide or current carried down the ship, in spite of all help, so he was something appeased. We cannot tell how this action of the mandarin's can consist with a good correspondence hereafter. Were it not that we have respect to the company's affairs, and that we would not be thought to impede their designs by any rashness of ours, we should have resisted any

such affront, though we saw but little hopes of escaping, being so far up the river, and our ship so full of soldiers. He told Mr. Gyfford that we must know we were come to a great country of great justice and government, and that if we would do all things that he would have us, it should be well for us; and these words he wrote down upon a paper in China characters, and bade him keep and remember it. Mr. Gyfford said we were very willing, being strangers, to be observant to their customs and laws, but such unreasonable impositions as these, of forcing a ship to go against wind and tide, and putting such dishonour upon us as to pinion the captain, seemed very strange to us, and therefore we desired no other favour from him than leave to go back again, for we believed our honourable employers would not trade here upon such terms. The mandarin answered, that while we were out, we might have kept out. The king was King of Tonquin before we came there, and would be after we departed, and that this country had no need of any foreign thing; but now we are within his power, we must be obedient thereto, comparing it to the condition of a married woman, who can blame no one but herself for being brought into bondage. So that we can perceive as yet but a very little affection they have for trade.

“Discoursing with Ung-ja-Thay of our intentions to settle a factory, he said little to it, only showed us the king’s chop, authorising him to receive us. He says, likewise, he has power over ship and goods; so it seems he is absolute, and will, as he says, take out what he pleases: to which we must submit, for it is impossible to get a ship back over the bar, by reason of the shoalness of the water and the contrary winds; we are therefore compelled to give him his way in all things. His soldiers and secretaries, always keeping on board, are a great charge to us, for he calls for wine at his pleasure, and gives it amongst them, forcing them and our seamen to drink full cups.

“Much ado we had to put off Ung-ja-Thay from making the seamen work on the Sabbath-day, for we told him beforehand that it was not our custom to work on that day, for God commanded us to the contrary, who was greater than all the kings and princes of the earth.

“The ship ran ashore again at high water, and the captain could not bring her off, so the mandarin, thinking himself wiser than him or his mate, in this extremity made the seamen work night and day till they were nearly exhausted, and would have the ship hauled off by force, which, to please him, we

tried, but to no purpose, for she presently swayed, so we fear we must of necessity stay here this spring. We now looked very solitary one upon another, and began to think that his extraordinary earnestness to get the ship further up the river was to give him a better opportunity to ransack us, which makes us esteem our condition no better than that of a prize.”

They had but a sorry prospect of commercial dealings, and as little reason to congratulate themselves on the liberality of the presents from his majesty. “About noon Ung-ja-Thay went away, and sent us word we should come up to the city, that we might know what prices the king would give us for our goods, and that we might take a starved bull of a small size, which he brought as part of the present from the king, but would not deliver it before now, nor hath not the remainder yet, which, he told us, was fifty thousand great cashies, nor the king’s chop. About two o’clock we embarked on board the galley that waited to carry us up, and went on our journey to the city, with longing expectation, to know what prices he would make upon our goods, for we were not admitted to make a price ourselves; but, about two miles off, the other mandarin, who commanded the galleys, Ung-ja-Thay, that villainous fellow, stayed for us, and invited us ashore, for he had got before us to prevent our complaint to his superior, and while we were there present he colleagued with us most abominably, now he had done us the most prejudice he could, in carrying away all the goods that would have yielded us any profit, and then would have us to be cheerful, like a conqueror, who would have his prisoner to be merry when he lost all he hath.”

The British witnessed many proofs of the stern and sanguinary despotism which reigned at Tonquin. Here also, as almost everywhere else, the English agents found the Dutch before them. The king dealt with them, receiving saltpetre and money for the products of the country. In spite of all difficulties, the agents at Bantam persevered in maintaining some traffic at Tonquin until 1697, when it was found necessary to abandon it.

In 1681 the court of directors at home especially directed attention to secure a trade with Canton. They directed questions to the chief of the factory at Bantam on this subject to the following effect:—

“1. Whether there was reason to hope that the sanction of the emperor for a free access to that port could be obtained?

“2. Whether the people at Amoy, with

whom a profitable trade was transacted, but who were at war with the Tartars, would be offended, and decline further intercourse, on learning that the company had admission to Canton?"

Before the agents could answer these questions, they received a solution not contemplated: the Tartars conquered Amoy, and excluded the English, whose ships had to go to Macao instead.

At this period the directors resolved, if possible, to carry on a trade with China direct, and not through Bantam. This resolution appears to have been taken from the inconvenience experienced by the expensive and incommodious country vessels used between Bantam and China. The company at the same time adopted the view, that in all their oriental traffic indirect trade should be abandoned as fast as circumstances allowed.

In 1682 the differences between the English and Dutch threatened to deprive the former of all safe commerce with Java; the company therefore resolved to transfer the superintendence of the China ships from Bantam to the council at Surat. It is remarkable that the letter of the court expressing this determination bears date only twenty-one days after the actual capture of Bantam, which the Dutch succeeded in effecting on the 30th of August, 1682. Dutch writers deny that the expulsion of the English was by Dutch agency, and the proofs they assign are worthy of consideration. A war raged at that juncture between the King of Bantam and his son. The English, Mr. Mill alleges, took part with the son. In this allegation he follows Dutch authorities. The son triumphed, and expelled the English; but the victories of the son were obtained mainly through the instrumentality of the Dutch, who hated the king because he favoured the English. The Dutch affected to befriend the expelled English. They allowed them to take refuge at Batavia, and even offered to remove their property thither in their ships. The Dutch allege, that as the English were banished, not by them, but by the conquering native prince, and as they offered hospitality to British sufferers, they were innocent of all evil in the case. The English maintained that the revolt of the prince was instigated and made successful by the Dutch, and that he would not have expelled the English but at the instigation of their rivals, a word from whom would have prevented such an injustice. The English declined receiving the proffered assistance, and demanded reparation for the injuries inflicted. Had Cromwell lived, it is certain that all such wrongs would have been redressed, but James was imbecile; and not-

withstanding the general fairness which the English attributed to Dutch William, it was generally believed that he regarded with great leniency the misdoings of his countrymen. The company, therefore, looked for redress in Europe from both James and William in vain. Professor Wilson says that "there is no evidence the English took any part in the dispute, nor is it likely." He also says, "They were not sufficiently strong to provoke the enmity of the Dutch." This is a strange remark, coming from a source of so much intelligence and ability; for whatever the inferiority of numbers of the English at Bantam, and however depressed their affairs at that juncture, that factory was one of the earliest, was a presidency, the centre of their trade in the Archipelago, and of such commerce as they were able to open with China, and their occupation of the position had always been a source of jealousy, and even "enmity," with the Dutch.

The English made various attempts afterwards to re-establish themselves. They sent embassies and presents of gunpowder to the King of Bantam, and received from his majesty presents of tea, but the intervention of the Dutch always prevented the English again having a factory there. If they had been too weak to provoke Dutch enmity, as Dr. Wilson affirms, how is it that Dutch influence was so strenuously used to prevent their return?

Upon the loss of Bantam, the English transactions of "the eastern coast" were transferred to Fort St. George. The charge of the ships for China was, however, as already stated, given over to the council at Surat. Soon after this event the court of directors wrote to the council of Surat concerning the trade with China, and the general business of the company in the following terms (the court wrote on the 2nd of April, 1683):—

"The loss of Bantam to the Dutch, and the *Johanna*, outward bound to your place, with her stock of £70,000, most bullion, but more especially an extraordinary and unparalleled failure of credit in all the public funds of this city, which hath caused the failure of divers of the goldsmiths in Lombard Street, whose names possibly you may have an account of in private letters: this unusual occurrence did so affright all people, that many demanded at once their money at interest from the company, to satisfy whom we were necessitated to publish these three following resolutions:—

"1. That all money arising from March sale should entirely be disposed of towards the satisfying of the company's debts.

"2. That no bullion should be sent out

upon our ships till all the company's debts due by or before the 31st of March were fully satisfied.

"3. That the company would make no dividend of any money on goods to the adventurers till all the debts now owing by them were fully paid."

Under these circumstances, undertakings in the Eastern seas, or even in connection with India, where the company had obtained so firm a hold, became impracticable, except such as, in the most ordinary course, were essential.

In 1686 the company interdicted their servants from dealing in any teas or spices.

In 1687 orders were given to send home teas well packed, which would turn to good account now that it was "a company's commodity, and not of private trade."

In 1689, notwithstanding the disconsolate letters which the directors had written to their agents at Surat, Bombay, and Fort St. George, concerning the trade with China, and other parts of Eastern Asia, continental and insular, some vigorous efforts were made to induce the reluctant and extortionate Chinese to exchange their commodities for the goods of Europe. Captain Heath arrived in the ship *Defence* at Canton, where he experienced difficulties and obstructions the most disheartening. He continued to outwit the Chinese officials through means of their own cunning, and he sometimes succeeded in conciliating them by bribes. The captain was, however, in the end unfortunate, for several of his men and his ship's doctor were killed, and he was obliged to leave Canton; British interests, on the whole, having been impaired by his visit, after success had seemed to crown his efforts.

The heavy duty upon tea in England embarrassed the transactions of the company. The directors ordered their agents to select none but the very best quality, otherwise, in consequence of this duty, "it would not defray either freight or charges."

The exportation of silver from England to India was at this early period of the company's history, as well as of late years, a subject of uneasiness, especially to those of the directors less conversant with the laws of commerce and of political economy. In 1700, in order to lessen that exportation, the court instructed their supercargoes to forward to Madras from China £20,000 in gold.

Thus, a review of the commerce of the company with China and the Eastern Archipelago, from the commencement of the Civil War in England to the close of the seventeenth century, discloses by no means a

prosperous state of things. Chinese obstinacy, and that of various Indo-Chinese nations, Dutch wars and Dutch treachery, the listlessness, laziness, and disingenuousness of the Portuguese at Macao, the wars of Tartars and Chinese, the persistent attempts of interlopers, the turmoil and discontent at home, the loss of credit sustained by the company in London,—all these causes operated to render the trade with the islands and peninsulas of Eastern Asia, and with Canton, burdensome, difficult, and dangerous. The main obstructions were, however, the piracy, perfidy, and waging of open war, by the Dutch. Notwithstanding the triumph of England over Holland in Europe, and the accession of the Prince of Orange to the English throne, the Dutch throughout Eastern Asia were never conciliatory, unless to cover a hostile purpose, and were as much enemies in peace as in war. They succeeded in depriving the English of their chief insular settlements, expelling them from Japan and the Moluccas, and in frustrating their attempts to open up trading intercourse with all the nations having a coastline east of the Malacca Straits.

Soon after the settlement at Hoogly, Madras was elevated to the dignity of a presidency, it having been found inconvenient to have the chief authority for reference in the business of the Coromandel coast so distant as Bantam. When this honour was conferred on Fort St. George, its garrison consisted of twenty-six English soldiers; in less than two years after the future metropolis of the great and extensive presidency of Madras was guarded by ten English musketeers, and the civil establishment was, for economy, reduced to two factors.

When the war with Holland was waged by Cromwell, among the many naval enterprises of the Dutch, adverse to the British, in the East, was one against the company's commerce at Surat. "A fleet of twelve Dutchmen," or, as others relate, "eight large ships," blockaded the harbour. The coasting-trade between the different English factories was suspended, in consequence of the vigilance and activity of the Batavian cruisers. The Gulf of Persia was "scoured" by the Hollanders. Three of the company's ships were captured, and one sunk. At the same time the ships of the "states-general" literally hunted down the Portuguese. They drove them entirely out of the Island of Ceylon, and held there garrisons, in dangerous proximity to the British factory of Fort St. George. A Dutch fleet blockaded Goa and the small Island of Diu. The Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf, were filled with their "rovers."

The English were reduced to great distress. At Surat the "out-factories" were abolished, and the agents withdrawn. There was not a post occupied by the English on continental India that was not in peril from the superior naval power of the states-general. The English at Surat described themselves in their letters home as fallen into as much contempt "as the Portugals in India, or the Jews in Spain."

In the early part of the year 1664 Sevajee,* the rebel chief of the Mahrattas,† already formidable to the Mogul, having captured many places, attacked the city of Surat.‡ It is probable that the main cause of Sevajee's attack upon Surat was, as stated on page 676, the conviction that the Emperor Aurungzebe had been supplied with ammunition by the Europeans settled there. This motive, attributed to him by some writers, is denied by others. There should be no doubt of the fact that the emperor had been thus enabled to make war upon the Mahratta with advantage, and that the latter must have known it, and would, if possible, avenge so great an injury, and take measures to prevent its recurrence. The following passage from Bruce§ is sufficient proof of the provocation given in this way to the Mahratta chief:—"Shortly before his death Cromwell licensed a Mr. Rolt to export three mortars and twenty thousand shells, to be disposed of to Aurungzebe, then engaged in rebellion against his father. The company directed the Surat presidency to seize on these articles as illicit; and the more effectually to frustrate the speculation, sent large quantities of ordnance, mortars, shells, &c., desiring the different presidencies to dispose of them at the best price to either of the four rival princes who should first apply for them, preserving meanwhile a strict neutrality." It is impossible that Sevajee did not hear of an event that created such a hubbub, not only at Surat, but at all the company's stations in India. It is likely, too, that no small portion of the ammunition found its way into his own hands, partly by purchase, and partly by plunder.

The defence made by the British is only glanced at in the chapter devoted to Mahratta history. Mr. Mill very briefly narrates the transaction, summing up in two sentences the facts that the English fought bravely, repelled the enemy, pleased the Mogul, and obtained in reward "new privileges of trade to the

company. Professor Wilson, as usual, at variance with Mill, complains that "scant justice is done to the company's servants in the brief notice of a conduct highly remarkable for cool and resolute courage." Mr. Mill was not concerned to notice the conduct of the English as that of "the company's servants," nor did he do scant justice to them, for he pronounces a glowing panegyric upon them. His treatment however, of an incident, admitted by himself to have had such important results, is too brief, and justifies the learned Oxford professor's complaint on that score. The account given by the latter is very full and complete; it is as follows:—"Sevajee's approach to within fifteen miles of Surat was announced on the morning of the 5th of January, upon which the governor retired into the castle, and the inhabitants fled from every part of the city except that adjacent to the factory. In the evening the Mahrattas entered, and part blockaded the castle, whilst the rest plundered and set fire to the houses. During that night and the following day repeated demands and menaces were sent to the factory, but they were all met with terms of defiance. 'We replied to Sevajee,' says the despatch to the court, dated the 26th of January, 1664, 'we were here on purpose to maintain the house to the death of the last man, and therefore not to delay his coming upon us.' It does not appear that any organized attack was made upon the factory, but the Mahrattas assembled in considerable numbers before it, and broke into an adjoining house. To prevent their establishing themselves in a situation from which they might offer serious annoyance, a sally was made from the factory, which had the effect of dislodging the assailants, and putting them to flight, with some loss and three men wounded on the part of the English. This success was followed up with spirit: the plundered house was occupied; several sorties were made, and pushed even to the gates of the castle, and the neighbourhood for near a quarter of a mile round was cleared of the enemy. No further attempts were made to molest the factory or its vicinity during the three days that Sevajee continued in possession of the town, and the inhabitants of the quarter in which the factory was situated 'were very thankful in their acknowledgments, blessing and praising the English nation,' to whose valour they ascribed their exemption from the calamities which had desolated the rest of the city. The governor presented Sir G. Oxenden with a dress of honour, and recommended the interests of the company to Aurungzebe. The emperor in the first instance remitted the customs at Surat for one

* For his history see p. 670, vol. i.

† For the origin of the Mahrattas see p. 669, vol. i.

‡ For an account of the sack of Surat by Sevajee see vol. i. p. 676, and the note on that page. For a description of the place at the present day, see vol. i. p. 145.

§ Bruce vol. i. p. 39.

year in favour of all merchants, and subsequently granted a perpetual remission of a portion of the duties to the English in particular. The despatch from Surat states the proportion to be one-half, but the translation of the *Hush-ul-hookum*, in the Records, says a half per cent.; and in the firman granted on the 26th of June, 1667, the amount is stated at one per cent. out of three, the ordinary impost. A more important provision of the firman is exemption from all transit charges on any pretext whatever."

The English factory at Rajahpore was at this time abandoned, the exactions of the Mahratta chief rendering it impossible for the English to trade there with profit. It was plain that Sevajee both feared and respected the English, but formed exaggerated ideas of their riches, and was therefore desirous to have them in his cities, in order that, under the pretext of dues and duties, he might extort money from them.

In 1670 he again attacked Surat. His aim this time was to take possession of it—partly because of its great wealth, thereby to diminish the resources of the Mogul, and partly to turn to his own advantage the sources of commercial riches that were there. Failing to capture it, his intention was to plunder it, or compel payment of a ransom. Mr. Mill is even more brief in his account of this second attack than of the first,* simply stating that "the principal part of the goods was transported to Sivally,† and placed on board the ships, the English remaining in the factory, defending themselves successfully. Some lives were lost, and some property damaged."

The testimony of Orme is directly against that of Bruce, for he asserts that neither the English nor Dutch factories were attacked, nor was any demand made upon them. Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Wilson contradict Orme. The first named represents the town as partially pillaged; the doctor expresses his surprise that Orme should have studied so negligently the documents at the India House, and sums up their contents on the matter thus:—"On this occasion, as on the former, the English factory was defended with spirit, 'the enemy,' says the letter from Surat, 'found such hot service from our house, that they left us.' Subsequently a parley was held with 'the captain of the brigade,' who agreed to refrain from further molestation, and 'the house was

quiet for two days.' On the third day they again appeared before the factory, 'threatening that they would take or burn it to the ground; but Mr. Master stood in so resolute a posture, that the captain, not willing to hazard his men, with much ado kept them back, and sent a man into the house to advise Mr. Master what was fit to be done.' In consequence of this communication, a complimentary present was sent to Sevajee by two of the company's servants; he received them kindly, 'telling them that the English and he were very good friends, and, putting his hand into their hands, told them that he could do the English no wrong, and that this giving his hand was better than any *could* to oblige him thereto.' Sevajee was, in fact, desirous to conciliate the English, in order to induce them to return to Rajahpore, where they had formerly had a factory, which they had abandoned in consequence of his exactions. The loss of their trade had injured the town of Rajahpore, and diminished the Mahratta's revenue from it. Sevajee immediately afterwards left Surat. The French had saved their factory by paying a contribution. The Dutch factory was without the town, and was not attacked; and these circumstances, with the interview between Sevajee and the English, inspired the Mogul government with considerable distrust of the Europeans at Surat."

The aim of Sevajee after the spirited repulse he met with in 1670 was to conciliate the English at Surat, who maintained a cold and distant bearing to his advances, as they were afraid to compromise themselves with the Mogul, who had hitherto been so friendly to them. In order to prevent any further attempts at negotiation on the part of the Mahratta chief, they demanded compensation for injuries inflicted at Surat and various other places by him or his hordes of wild followers. To the astonishment of the English, this was conceded, and they then entered into serious negotiations with a chief whom the Mogul not only regarded as an enemy, but as a rebel. In 1674 a treaty was actually formed between the head of the Mahrattas and the president of the English factory at Surat of mutual peace and amity. Sevajee agreed to pay ten thousand pagodas as compensation for past injuries, and relinquished his right to the wrecks of vessels cast away upon his coasts, so far as those of English, or rather of the company, were concerned. The consequence of this was an intense jealousy towards the English by the Great Mogul, and an equal difficulty on the part of the former to maintain neutrality between the Moguls and the Mahrattas. It was in conse-

* Mill's brief notice is taken, just as it stands, from Bruce.

† Sivally (*Siva Iaya*, the abode of Siva). This is the harbour of the Surat shipping, and is situated at the mouth of the river Tapti, twenty miles west of that city.

quence of a state of feeling in India thus arising rather than from events at home (as generally represented), although the latter had some influence also in the matter, that the court of committees in 1677-78 recommended a trimming policy to their servants in treating with all the conflicting native powers in India. Bruce thus describes the directions sent out:—"The court recommended temporising expedients to their servants with the Mogul, with Sevajee, and with the petty rajahs; but at the same they gave to President Augier and his council discretionary powers to employ armed vessels to enforce the observation of treaties and grants:—in this way the court shifted from themselves the responsibility of commencing hostilities, that they might be able, in any questions which might arise between the king and the company, to refer such hostilities to the errors of their servants.*"

Upon this quotation of Bruce, Professor Wilson thus very properly comments:—"There is a clause in these instructions omitted, which it is but justice to the directors to re-insert. They enjoined their servants 'to endeavour by their conduct to impress the natives with an opinion of the probity of the English in all commercial dealings.' With regard to the object of the court in giving discretionary powers to the president and council of Surat, to enforce the observation of treaties and grants, it is not very candid to limit it to leaving an opening by which they might escape responsibility. Their own distance from the scene of action rendered some such discretionary authority in their servants indispensable, as is admitted a few lines further on." Bruce, however, was rather careless than un candid in any omissions made by him, as even Dr. Wilson, with all his zeal to vindicate the ancient proceedings of the company on all occasions, is equalled in partiality by that writer.

Partly in the result of the treaty with Sevajee, partly from adopting the policy recommended by the court of committees at home, Surat escaped all attacks from native powers during the remainder of the seventeenth century, although early in the eighteenth century it was repeatedly assailed by Mahratta freebooters. This was important, for Surat was for a considerable time the commercial capital of commercial India; and although its native Hindoo population was always faithless and horribly immoral, the Parsee inhabitants clung to the English and other Europeans, so as to afford facilities of commerce not to be obtained elsewhere. The Parsees at that time were very numerous at

* Bruce, vol. ii. p. 406.

Surat,* and they were very important as agents between the other natives, whom they well understood, and the Europeans.

In 1686-87 several of the company's agents were imprisoned at Surat by the Mogul, in consequence of piratical attacks by some English upon his ships, and generally in that quarter he was less friendly than formerly.

Towards the close of the century the piracies off Surat became more common and daring. In 1695 the emperor's chief ship, consecrated to a purpose by him esteemed holy,—that of carrying pilgrims to Mocha and Jedda, the seaports of Mecca,—was attacked by an English rover, and captured. An account of the transaction is given by a Mohammedan writer, one Khafi Khan, according to whose reluctant admissions, the conduct of the English pirates was most gallant and dashing. It was in 1693 that the vessel was made a prize, while carrying eighty guns and four hundred muskets, by which is probably meant not that muskets were a part of the cargo, but of the armament. "An English vessel of small size" bore down upon the Mogul leviathan, and a battle took place. A gun having burst on board the emperor's ship was the occasion, Khafi Khan declares, of the English being able to board, which they did, in spite of all the odds of numbers and of armament; "and although," adds Khafi, "the Christians have no courage with the sword, in consequence of mismanagement the vessel was taken."

Upon this event Mohammedan India literally raged against "the sacrilegious Giaours." At Surat and Swally the emperor, unable in any other way to prevent the multitude from murdering the English, placed them, to the number of sixty-three, in irons.

The emperor, discreetly, sought redress by sending to the English president at Bombay an envoy. This person was the historian, Khafi Khan. He represents his reception to have been with great honour, but rather sneeringly refers to the display of military power which the president thought proper to make. He praises the business ability and good sense of the English council, but expresses his surprise at the spirit in which persons so grave, and on an occasion so important, laughed at the way in which the crew of the little English ship took possession of the emperor's chief man-of-war. Having received explanation that the aggressors were pirates, who would be hanged if caught, and pacific assurances having been profusely made, the envoy returned to the Mogul viceroy at Surat. The English authorities immediately

* See chapter on the Relation of the Parsees to Indian History.

offered a reward of one thousand pounds for Captain Avery, by whom it was supposed the daring exploit was performed, although some attributed it to Captain Kidd, who had been at that time off Swally. Kidd continued to cruise about, but the pursuit of Avery was so hot in consequence of the reward, that he made for the Bahamas, where his ship was sold, and the crew dispersed. Several of them were, however, arrested, and hanged. Matters were arranged with the emperor, but Kidd made so many captures of native and European vessels off the mouth of the Tapty, that peaceful relations between the chief factor at Surat and the viceroy were soon interrupted, and the English traders were exposed to the reprisals of the native government.

When these events were passing at Surat another portion of the strip of territory, afterwards known as the Bombay presidency, was the scene of transactions of great importance. That theatre of event was the Island of Bombay, its dependant islets, and the vicinity of the bay.

While the Dutch in the Archipelago were successfully evading the stipulations imposed by Cromwell when they solicited peace from that conqueror, the Portuguese were acting a similar part, but still more treacherous and dishonest, at Bombay. After the death of Cromwell the Dutch lost all hesitation about breaking the treaty; and while they were treating the authority of Charles II. with contempt, or bribing his connivance at their frauds, even the Portuguese did not think themselves too feeble to resist the prerogatives of the English king, and through him the nation he so weakly ruled. The Island of Bombay having (as related on previous pages) become the property of Charles, as the dowry of the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, whom he married, he sent the Earl of Marlborough to take possession. Five hundred soldiers were also sent to occupy the island as a garrison, with its dependencies, Salsette and Tanna. The Portuguese governor refused to deliver over these islands, as they were not named in the treaty. It was urged upon the governor that the islands in question were so situated, that the occupation of them by the troops of any other nation would render the Island of Bombay insecure to its possessors. He replied that his government could never have framed a treaty which would open Bassein to another nation. He finally refused to give up Bombay until further instructed by his own government, inasmuch as the letters or patent produced by Lord Marlborough did not comport with the usages of Portugal.

The troops brought out by the English ships were so cooped up, that disease broke

out among them, and made mortal havoc. Their commander, Sir Abraham Shipman, requested the chief of the English factory at Surat to allow them to land there. He dared not undertake such a responsibility, as it might excite the jealousy of the natives to sea so large a force landing in their country. The Earl of Marlborough returned home to report to his government. Sir Abraham Shipman landed his troops on the small island of Anjediva, twelve miles distant from Goa. This situation they found unhealthy, and fresh provisions could with difficulty be obtained. Sir Abraham offered the rights of the crown to the company through their agents at Surat. They refused to accept them, because they could not occupy the island *pro tempore* in proper force, and as a permanent possession they were not authorized to receive it, nor did they consider him authorized to bestow it. Sir Abraham and three hundred and eighty-one of his troops fell victims to "the distemper." The residue were permitted, in December, 1664, to take possession of the Island of Bombay, under the command of an officer named Cook. The eventual cession of the island to the company seems to have arisen from the fact that the king found it an expense too heavy to be borne, and "making a virtue of necessity," he bestowed it upon those by whom he desired to serve himself in other ways.* Mr. Cook, the commander of the little body of infantry, assumed the office of first governor. He found the island nearly a desert, the Portuguese having done nothing to improve so admirable a position. On the 5th of November, 1666, Sir Gervaise Lucas arrived as governor. Sir Gervaise died on the 21st of March, and was succeeded by the deputy-governor, Captain Henry Geary. Mr. Cook, the first governor, had been incensed at being superseded by a governor from England; and as soon as Sir Gervaise died, assisted by the Jesuits, Cook collected a force at Salsette, in order to re-establish himself by force. The attempt failed, through the firmness of Captain Geary, and the fidelity of a portion of the little garrison. On the 23rd of September, 1668, the island was taken possession of in the name of the East India Company by Sir George Oxenden, the company's governor at Surat. The troops were transferred from the king's to the company's service, along with the arms, ordnance, and stores. Soon after it came into possession of the company the revenue rose to £2823 per annum, and in a year after that it more than doubled. Sir George Oxenden died on the 14th of July, 1669, and was succeeded in his

* For a description of the Island of Bombay and its vicinity, see chap. vii. pp. 138—145.

office by Mr. Gerald Augier, as chief of the factory at Surat, and governor of Bombay. Under his auspices the revenue rose to £6490 per annum. In 1672 a powerful Dutch fleet appeared off Bombay, and reconnoitred; at that time the garrison did not consist of more than a hundred English soldiers, about as many friendly Portuguese, an equal number of natives, and a small party of French refugees and deserters. The Dutch did not effect any hostile purpose. Possibly they were deterred by the spirited efforts of the governor and the inhabitants, who enrolled themselves as a militia. Several of them were Germans, and received especial praise from the officials for their soldierlike bearing and good conduct. Five hundred Rajpoots were hired, and presented a gallant appearance to the reconnoitring Dutch. In 1674 the fortifications were repaired and strengthened. To the twenty-one cannons which the company found there a hundred were added. The regular troops were four hundred, "of whom the greater part were topasses,"* and there was an enrolled and disciplined militia of three hundred. The mint was established at Bombay in 1676, letters patent having arrived from the king empowering the company to coin 'rupees, pice, and budgerooks."

During the government of Mr. Augier, the Mahratta pirates infested the bay. The governor died, 1676, and was succeeded by Henry Oxenden.

Among the difficulties with which the settlement had to contend, were the menacing power of the Emperor Aurungzebe, and that of the Mahrattas then rapidly rising to importance. Nevertheless, the place prospered, so that according to Mr. Grant the revenue at this time reached more than £12,000 per annum. The Portuguese and Dutch were bitterly opposed to this settlement. The Danes and French soon became rivals also.

The rising authority of the Mahrattas gave much uneasiness at Bombay in 1679, and the jealousy of that power, and of any relations maintained by the English with it, which animated the Mogul, constituted another peril to the still comparatively new settlement. In that year Sevajee seized the Island of Henery, and the Siddee seized the Island of Kenery as a counterpoise. The English were endangered by both proceedings, but knew not well how to oppose either, because they were alike to be apprehended, and a junction with either party for any purpose must involve a war. The Siddee was considered the stronger, yet the less formidable neighbour. "Siddee, or Seedee, is a corruption of an Arabic term, signifying a lord; but in the common language

* Half-caste Portuguese and Indians.

of the Deccan, it came to be applied indiscriminately to all natives of Africa. The Siddees of Jijjeera took their name from a small fortified island in the Concan, where a colony had been formed on a jaghire, granted, it appears, in the first instance, to an Abyssinian officer, by the King of Ahmednuggur, on condition of the maintenance of a marine for the protection of trade, and the conveyance of pilgrims to the Red Sea. The hostility of Sevajee induced the Siddee, or chief, to seek favour with Aurungzebe, by whom he was made admiral of the Mogul fleet, with an annual salary of four laes of rupees (£40,000) for conveying pilgrims to Jedda and Mocha. The emperor himself sent an annual donation to Mecca of three laes."*

Sevajee died in 1680, which, for a time relieved the British very much from their uneasiness in connection with the Mahrattas. In 1681, Mr. John Child, brother of Sir Josiah Child, an influential member of the court of committees, was appointed president of Surat, with a council of eight members; one of the junior councillors, Mr. Ward, was designated deputy-governor of Bombay.

In 1683 Bombay was created an independent English settlement, and in 1684 the chief seat of the power and trade of the English in the East Indies. Before it arrived at so great a distinction, however, it was the scene of a memorable mutiny, which prevented the arrangement from being carried out for several years. Up to the time of this revolt, the East India Company had expended on Bombay, its harbour, improvements, and fortifications, £300,000.† Captain Keigwin, who commanded the garrison, assisted by Ensign Thompson, and supported by the troops, consisting of one hundred and fifty regulars, and two hundred topasses, and headed by the inhabitants, seized on the island in the name of the British crown. Captain Keigwin, not only deposed, but imprisoned the deputy-governor, and was himself chosen to the office of governor with acclamation by the troops, militia, and inhabitants. The captain issued a proclamation, in which he set forth the misdeeds of the company. Mr. Ward applied by secret agents to Mr. Child, the governor of Surat, who was unable to afford him assistance. Meanwhile, Captain Keigwin applied the revenues of the island scrupulously to the support of the troops and civil government in the name of the King of England. The new governor and the inhabitants sent home complaints to the king against Mr. Child, whose oppressions and tyranny were the alleged oc-

* Duff's *Mahrattas*.

† Hamilton's *Hindustan*. Murray, Albemarle Street. 1820.

casian of a revolt which took so loyal a form. Dr. Cook Taylor sums up the character of John Child and his brother Sir Josiah, as exemplified by their conduct from 1684 to 1688, and the consequences of their misdeeds, in the following terms:—"Unfortunately, their prosperity (that of the company) was greatly injured by one of their own servants, Sir John Child, governor of Bombay, whose fraud, ambition, and tyranny brought the settlement to the very verge of ruin. His folly led him to provoke a war with the Emperor of Delhi, who sent a considerable force to attack Bombay. Child's cowardice was as conspicuous as any of his other qualities, and the fort must have fallen, had not his seasonable death relieved the garrison from the greatest of dangers, an imbecile and treacherous commander. On Child's death, the Emperor Aurungzebe consented to make peace, and granted more favourable terms than the English had a right to expect. Child's successors were little better than himself; so great were their profligacy and rapacity, that from being a populous place, Bombay was almost rendered a desert; it would most probably have been abandoned altogether, if the company's servants could have found means of escaping from the insolence and oppression of their governors by returning to England; but this favour was refused them, and they were detained by their tyrants, without a glimmering of hope. In consequence of this misgovernment abroad, and the speculation introduced by Sir Josiah Child into the management at home, the company's affairs fell into sad confusion, and the merchants of London proposed either to throw open the trade with India and China, or to form a new commercial association on a wider basis."

Miss Martineau, commenting upon the spirit and temper of the directors and agents at this period, says—"The wisest men among them, during the reigns of the Stuarts, seem to have entertained a true royal contempt for constitutional law, and a great relish for freedom of will and hand in executive matters. In the early history of the company there are no greater names than those of the brothers Sir Josiah and John Child. These gentlemen were full of sense, information, vigour, and commercial prudence; yet Sir Josiah has left us an account of his notions which reads strangely at this day." The fair authoress then quotes, on the authority, no doubt, of Captain Hamilton,* a reply of Sir Josiah Child to Mr. Vaux, governor of Bombay, in

* Hamilton adds to the passage quoted by Miss Martineau, "I am the more particular on this account, because I saw and copied both those letters in anno, 1696, while Mr. Vaux and I were prisoners at Surat, on account of Captain Evroy's [Avery] robbing the Mogul's great ship, the *Gunswoy*."

1692, when the latter declared he would act towards interlopers according to the laws of England. Sir Josiah wrote roundly to Mr. Vaux, what amounted to an assertion of the supreme authority of the company even over the prerogatives of the crown and the laws of England. The injunctions of Sir Josiah were too faithfully carried out by his brother, whose notions of the company's privileges were still more arbitrary.

Whether the conduct of Mr. John, afterwards Sir John, Child, merited the hatred borne to him at Bombay, the feeling was general among all the company's servants and the inhabitants in 1684, so that Captain Keigwin rode triumphantly upon the storm. The king and the Duke of York looked rather favourably upon the statements of Keigwin, and the company espoused thoroughly all the doings and misdoings of Sir John Child. Dr. St. John was sent out by the king to investigate matters, and the company sent privately an agent of its own. Child also proceeded in person from Surat, but the new governor and his confederates would enter into no negotiations with him. Sir Thomas Grantham was dispatched with a naval squadron to take possession of the island, but Captain Keigwin refused to surrender it, except upon condition of free pardon and liberty to return home for himself and his followers, alleging, that what he had done was done honestly, for the king's honour, and the cause of law and justice. The admiral accepted the terms offered by the gallant and loyal insurgent, and on the 20th of November, 1684, the fort was surrendered. It was evident that the royal authorities and those of the company viewed Keigwin's conduct in a different light, but that the latter deemed it their interest to condemn his offences against them. During his government he displayed some activity, having opened negotiations with Rajah Sambajee, and finally concluded a treaty with him by which he recovered twelve thousand pagodas due to the company. This must have pleased them well, for in the year 1685 they confirmed the treaty.

In 1686 the chief government of the company in India removed from Surat, as had been previously determined, to Bombay. Sir John Child was appointed President, Captain-General, and Admiral of the East India Company's forces by land and sea, from Cape Comorin to the Gulf of Persia. Sir John began exercise of his new authority by putting down interlopers, with whom he dealt in the precise spirit of the letter of his brother, Sir Josiah, to Mr. Vaux, already mentioned. Mr. Mill vindicates the interlopers, as does Smith in his able work, but Dr. Wilson

pertinently says in reply to the former—"It would appear, from the way in which these interlopers are spoken of, that they were unconnected merchants, seeking only to carry on trade with India on the principles of individual adventure and free competition. It seems, however, that they attempted more than this, representing themselves as a new company, chartered by the king, whose purpose it was to deprive the old of their privileges. They endeavoured also to establish themselves permanently at various places in the Deccan, and offered to the King of Golconda fifteen thousand pagodas for permission to erect a fort at Armagan. It was not without cause, therefore, that the company regarded them with fear, and endeavoured to suppress their commerce." Both the Brothers Child are accused, with some appearance of probability, of having desired to inflict capital punishment upon Englishmen who "interloped;" and of a desire to create in the name of the company a pure despotism over Englishmen within the bounds of sea and land, where their charter gave them any authority. Sir Josiah laid it down, in his communications with his brother, as an essential feature of their future policy, that all injuries inflicted by native princes upon the company's property or servants should be retaliated, and that force of arms should be more relied upon in all future differences with the rajahs of territories contiguous to those of the company. These directions of Sir Josiah's influenced Sir John largely in the career, which Dr. Cooke Taylor denounces with such unqualified severity.

In 1687, Sir John Child being dead, Mr. Harriss was appointed in his place, but the new governor was then a prisoner to the Mogul at Surat, and was not liberated until the ensuing year.

The Dutch having erected Batavia and Colombo into regencies, the English conferred the same title upon the settlement of Bombay in 1687.

War broke out between the company and the Mogul, arising from the efforts of the former, in Bengal, to retaliate for injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the emperor's officers and subjects. The circumstances which led to it will be detailed elsewhere; here, for the reader's convenience, limiting the narrative of its events to Bombay, it may be observed, that Sir John Child deliberately provoked this war, with the intention, if it succeeded, of avowing himself to have done so as the agent of the court of committee, which was in effect his brother Josiah, but if he failed, his plan was to declare that he had acted on his own responsibility, so that the company might disown him, and again solicit,

on the ground of their repudiation of all his proceedings, to be restored to the Mogul's favour, and to their former position in matters of trade. This policy has been condemned by most historians as immoral, but several historical advocates of the company have defended it, as expedient and prudent, under the peculiar and exceptionable circumstances in which Sir John Child was placed; others deny, or throw doubt upon the accuracy of the representations made of Sir John's motives and policy. In consequence of that policy, "the Siddee's fleet" (the fleet of the Mogul admiral) attacked Bombay, taking possession of Mahim Mazagong and Sion, and shutting up the governor and garrison in the castle. The Siddee was on this occasion provided with a choice body of Mogul troops. In 1689 an order came from Aurungzebe to his admiral to withdraw his soldiers, but this was not done until the 22nd of June, 1690. The Siddee was very anxious to prosecute the siege, because he regarded the English as at heart the allies of his old enemies, the Mahrattas. He also tarried so long, in hopes of a certain conquest, having been inspired by the Portuguese Jesuits, who at first covertly and then openly abetted the invaders. On the withdrawal of the enemy, the lands which the Jesuits had been permitted to hold were confiscated, in punishment for their treason.

From 1691 to 1693, the plague raged at Bombay, so that at the beginning of the last-named year, only three of the company's civil servants remained alive.

In 1694 Sir John Gayer arrived as governor. The condition in which he found "the regency" led him to make a report concerning it in his despatches home, which represented it as in a deplorable condition. It had not recovered the effect of the desperate policy of Sir John Child, and since his death it had incurred new disasters. The proceedings of the English pirates were most daring, especially against the ships of the Mogul. Aurungzebe demanded that the regency should make good all the losses which those pirates inflicted upon his own navy, and upon the coasting ships of his subjects. To meet these demands the treasury was exhausted, and the council exposed to perpetual apprehension of a new declaration of war by the Mogul. Sir John Gayer was unable to provide any remedy against the evils which prevailed. In 1698 Sir Nicholas Waite was appointed resident at Surat by the new or English Company, already referred to in the narrative of the home history of the East India Company, and he immediately directed his energies against Sir John and his council. His endeavours were in-

cessant to persuade the officers of the Mogul that the agents of the old company were rebels against their own sovereign, and entertained hostile designs against the emperor. In 1700 he succeeded, by his intrigues, in procuring the imprisonment of Sir John Gayer and Mr. Colt. While these intrigues were in progress, and before they had arrived at that result, the English pirates took advantage of the collision between the two companies, and literally made war on their own account. In 1698 they appeared off Cape Comerin with two frigates and a number of swift sailing ships of smaller dimensions, manned by most daring and reckless men, under the command of Captain Kidd, who was afterwards taken and hanged. Also three other piratical frigates cruised, one of fifty guns, one of forty, and one of thirty, all English built, with English crews, and commanded by English captains. These robber ships intercepted all vessels, and made havoc of the native coasters for a considerable time with impunity. These were not the only enemies of the suffering settlement. Its old enemies, the Mahrattas, kept it in a state of constant alarm. The Portuguese, who always regarded the cession of Bombay to the English as an event injurious to their nation and their religion, were not too weak to menace and insult the feeble settlement; the Jesuits, whose property had been confiscated, the Portuguese resident on the island, and even the half-castes, were ready to rise in revolt upon the appearance of a Portuguese force, and correspondence with the Portuguese stations, stimulating an attack, was constantly carried on.

The Arabs fitted out several fast sailing ships, which entered the bay repeatedly, inflicting variety of mischief; and these also had complicity with certain Arabs residing on the island. The English had at first encouraged settlers of all creeds and nations, but the harsh government of Sir John Child had turned them all into rebels.

Even these miseries did not complete the frightful catalogue. The plague, already referred to, had scarcely passed away, when pestilence of another kind spread over the island. The uncultivated land was in a marshy state, and had for some time spread malaria to a certain extent; that extent widened, until the whole island became the sphere of its morbid influence.

The disturbance of the Deccan, during the long reign of Aurungzebe, kept large armies of the emperor's, and numerous bodies of the active and desperate Mahrattas, continually marching to and fro; and this circumstance left the English, both at Bombay and Surat,

in a state of uncertainty, from which they were favoured with few intervals of relief, as to how far the policy of the contending hosts might not involve their factories and the Island of Bombay within the whirlwind of war.

In the last decade of the seventeenth century, while the British were put to a severe trial in Bombay, the new and fearfully fatal malady, already referred to, visited the place, and the Europeans, civil and military, were all but annihilated. At this conjuncture the Parsees behaved with prudence and courage. The Seedees of Jinjeera were invading Bombay, and the island, and Fort St. George, then called Dungerry Fort, fell speedily into their hands. An eminent Parsee, a shipwright, named Rustom Dorah, contributed much to save the island to the British. He placed himself at the head of the fishermen, then a numerous caste, organized them, attacked and defeated the invaders, followed up his successes, and drove the enemy back. He, at the same time, sent despatches to the head of the British factory at Surat, who, hastening to Bombay, took upon himself the government. The loyal and intrepid Parsee was rewarded by appointments of honour and profit. Some account having been given of this transaction in the chapter on the Parsees, it is unnecessary to notice it further here, than to say that during the various trials from pestilence and war during the last ten years of the century at Bombay, the Parsees and the Armenian Christians displayed both loyalty and courage.

Having noted the history of events at Surat and Bombay, the chief stations of the company during the period now treated, the reader's attention is directed to the progress of affairs at another of the stations which had assumed importance, and was destined to occupy a powerful position in the future dominions of the company. The settlement of Fort George, at Madras, was noticed in a previous chapter. In 1653 it was raised to the rank of a presidency. In 1661 Sir Edward Winter was appointed chief agent; but in 1665 a Mr. George Fowcroft was nominated in his place, when Sir Edward Winter exemplified the spirit of discord which then prevailed among the company's agents, and the rude lawlessness so frequently evinced by them, for he seized and imprisoned the gentleman nominated to succeed him, and retained by force Fort George until the 22nd of August, 1668, when he delivered it up to commissioners from England, on condition of receiving a full pardon for all offences. Mr. Fowcroft then assumed the government, which he retained until

1671, when he was succeeded by Sir William Langhorn, in which year the sovereign of the Carnatic made over to the company his share in the customs of Madras, for a fixed rent of twelve hundred pagodas per annum. In 1680 Mr. William Gifford was appointed governor of Fort St. George; and in 1683 he was appointed president of both Madras and the company's stations in Bengal. In 1686 Mr. Yule was nominated to the presidency of Madras, the Bengal stations being no longer under its direction. On the 12th December, 1687, the population of Fort George, the city of Madras, and the villages within the territory of the company "were reported in the public letter to be three hundred thousand."*

In 1686 Madras was formed into a corporation, to consist of a mayor and ten aldermen, of whom three were to be servants of the company, and seven natives; the list of burgesses was to comprise a hundred and twenty names. According to Bruce† the aldermen were to be justices of the peace, and to wear their scarlet gowns, and the burgesses black silk gowns; much ceremony was to be observed in conducting the affairs of the corporation, and great pomp in their processions. It was found impossible, however, to constitute the corporation on the wide and liberal base intended. The Mussulman population hated the English too fiercely to be entrusted; the Portuguese were deterred by their priests, whose hostility was as great as that of "the Moors." The Jews left the place rather than have anything to do with the corporation; and the Armenians, whom the English wished chiefly to employ, declined acting. The causes of this appear to have been, a hope retained by the Mohammedans of expelling the English; and an indisposition on the part of the minor sects and parties to commit themselves, as in such case the conquerors would probably hold them accountable. Some lingering hope also pervaded the Portuguese that their nation would one day regain its ascendancy, and that in the meantime their proper task was to sow dissatisfaction in the minds of all other parties against that which was dominant. The tyranny of the English, and the self-will of the presidents, no doubt also deterred many from joining in anything English in its character. The Hindoo population, ever anxious in those days to play off any other power against the Mohammedans, were willing to co-operate.

The governor offered an alliance to the King of Golconda against the Dutch, with whom his majesty was at war. This was done with the object of ultimately obtaining

from him a firman to coin rupees, and the cession of St. Thomas.

During all this time the Dutch scoured the Coromandel coast, sometimes seizing ships as buccaneers, at other times at war with the natives. The native chiefs along that coast were then also constantly at war with one another. The Carnatic, in which Madras is situated, was especially disturbed. All these circumstances circumscribed the English trade at Madras, and caused uneasiness in Fort St. George. The Mogul made war upon the King of Golconda, and the neighbouring princes. The company's agents at Madras were desirous to resist the pretensions of the Mogul, but in the end tamely submitted, and petitioned for the same privileges as they had enjoyed under the previous ruler, which were granted. Sir John Child was so opposed to a policy of peace as to censure the agents of the Madras presidency, in bitter terms, for hesitating to believe that the English must ultimately conquer. The events brought about by Sir John himself, the utter inadequacy of his means to assert his pretensions, proved that the agents at Fort St. George knew better than he did the requisites of their peculiar situation: this will, however, appear more fully, when noticing the contest in Bengal and along the western shores of its bay, brought about by the violence and ambition of Sir John. In 1691 Governor Yule was dismissed, and Mr. Higginson succeeded him, who was replaced in 1696 by Mr. Thomas Pitt, under whose presidency Madras witnessed the end of the seventeenth century. During his government the revenue of the territory amounted to forty thousand pagodas per annum. During the whole period, from the erection of Fort St. George, gunpowder was an important item in the cargoes of the vessels "outward bound" from England to the presidency.

During the progress of the events recorded, the Madras agents were engaged in making various settlements: among these were Ten-gayapatam, or Tegnapatam, a small town in Travancore on the sea-coast, thirty-two miles west-north-west from Cape Comorin, latitude 8° 17' north, longitude 77° 22' east; and Vizagapatam, or Vizigapatam, latitude 17° 42' north, longitude 83° 24' east. The latter place was first founded, and suffered severely during the war which Sir John Child, on his own authority, carried on with the Emperor Aurungzebe. So confused are the chronicles of this period, that it is difficult to say in what year the place was settled. At Semachellum, near to it, was a Hindoo temple of great reputed sanctity. The town was the capital of a district of the same name. There

* Hamilton's *Hindustan*, vol. ii. p. 414.

† Vol. ii. 593 659; and iii. 111, 156.

is some fine elevated ground about it, a range of hills lying near it. A bay is formed by a promontory, fifteen hundred feet high; the vicinity is picturesque. It was the capital of a district of the same name, situated in the Northern Circars. The travelling distance from Madras was four hundred and eighty-three miles. Here, and in Tegnapatam, the English encouraged the settlement of Armenians, who acted as agents between them and the natives, journeying far inland and finding customers for goods, and obtaining commissions for goods and produce. Soon after the peace with Aurungzebe, Tegnapatam was settled, and a fort built there, called Fort St. David. A little to the north of it the French had formed a settlement, called Pondicherry, which gave the English some uneasiness, as the French were fiercely hostile.* The ground at Fort St. David's was purchased from the Mahratta sovereign, Rajah Ram. Aurungzebe, to testify his forgiveness of the late war made upon him, permitted the Mogul authorities of the Carnatic to favour the purchase and the erection of the fort. "The wall and bulwarks were good and strong."

The proceedings of the company's agents in Bengal involved the Madras stations in the vortex of war and suffering; the remaining items of the history of those stations are comprised in the events which succeeded each other so rapidly on the Bengal coasts and the Hoogly River.

In 1674 the trade of Bengal had grown to such importance, that a separate agency was established to conduct it; but for ten years after that event the trade suffered much from the speculation and oppression of the native authorities. In 1685 the determination was formed by the supreme English authority in India to put an end to these oppressions. The greatest force which had ever appeared in the service of the company was employed for this purpose. Ten vessels, armed with from twelve to seventy guns, sailed under the command of Captain Nicholson, who had also six companies of infantry. The first object of this officer was directed to be, the seizure and fortification of Chittagong, as a place to serve for security in case of reverse, and as a *point d'appui* in any aggressive operations against the Mogul, or petty chiefs of Bengal. In addition to this force the directors of committees made application to the king for "an entire company of regular infantry, with their officers." So badly was the expedition timed, that the ships arrived at their destination in a

desultory way; and before a sufficient force was collected, an untoward circumstance brought on a conflict, which, so far as the English were concerned, was premature and unfortunate. A quarrel occurred about some trifling matter between three English soldiers and the peons of Shaista Khan, the Mogul's *soubadar*, or governor, of Bengal. This occurred in October, 1680. The fleet, under Captain Nicholson, attacked the town of Hoogly, five hundred houses were burned, and much of the property of the citizens destroyed. This led the governor to sue for peace, to which the English assented, but on terms so preposterously exacting as to amount to a rejection of the overtures. The whole transaction and its results are thus briefly narrated by Bruce:—"Three English soldiers had quarrelled with the peons of the nawab, and had been wounded; a company of soldiers was called out in their defence, and finally the whole of the troops. The native forces collected to oppose them were routed, the town was cannonaded by the ships, and the foudjar was compelled to solicit a cessation of arms, which was granted on condition of his furnishing means of conveying the company's goods on board their vessels. Before the action took place orders had come from Shaista Khan to compromise the differences with the English, but their claims had now become so considerable, amounting to above sixty-six lacs of rupees, or nearly £700,000, that it was not likely they expected the nawab's acquiescence. They remained at Hoogly till the 20th of December, and then, 'considering that Hoogly was an open town, retired to Chutanuttee, or Calcutta, from its being a safer situation during any negotiation with the nabob or Mogul.' Negotiations were accordingly opened and terms agreed upon, when, in February, the nawab threw off the mask, and a large body of horse appeared before Hoogly."

On this occasion the factory was defended with undaunted spirit. Repeated assaults were made, but the English, headed by the agent, Job Charnock, repulsed the nawab's* forces, stormed the fort of Tanna, seized the Island of Injellee, where they strongly fortified themselves, and destroyed Balasore with fire, together with forty ships of the emperor's fleet.

On the other hand, the factories of Patna and Cossimbazar were plundered by the Mogul soldiery, and the residents carried into the interior. In September, 1687, peace was made, and the English were allowed to go back to Hoogly on their former privileges. The company was, however, dissatisfied with

* Chapters will be devoted to the rise of the French and other East India Companies formed on the continent. Separate chapters have been already given to the Portuguese and Dutch.

* From the Persian, *nawab*, a deputy (of the Mogul).

the want of success, and accused Charnock of fighting for his own interests rather than those of the company. The loss of Cossim-hazar particularly irritated the court of committees, and they ordered Sir John Child to proceed to Bengal and negotiate for its recovery. This command was so well executed that everything appeared to be on the point of adjustment, when Captain Heath arrived from England in a large ship named the *Defence*, and accompanied by a frigate. Heath arrived in October, 1688, and went up to Calcutta, where he took the company's servants on board. On the 29th of November he arrived at Balasore, and instantly attacked the place, contrary to the advice of the English authorities; he alleging that he had orders from home to make war upon the Mogul. Having plundered Balasore, he proceeded to Chittagong, but the strenuous persuasives of "the council" induced him to allow communications to be made to the nabob before commencing hostilities. He appears to have been of an impatient and hasty temperament, for he did not wait for the result of those negotiations, but sailed away to Arracan, where he made fruitless efforts to establish a settlement. He then carried the agents and property of the company to Madras, where he arrived in March, 1689.* These events exasperated the emperor, and led to the painful incidents at Surat and Bombay, already recorded in this chapter. Aurungzebe, in fact, sent orders to his deputies and commanders to drive the English out of his dominions. Muchtar Khan, the viceroy of Gujerat, ordered the goods of the company at Surat to be sold, demanded five lacs of rupees as indemnity for the burnings, destruction, and plunder in Bengal, and offered a very great sum for the capture of Sir John Child, or the production of his dead body. The English were finally obliged to sue for peace at the close of 1688. The Mogul at first seemed indisposed to accept any terms, but a due regard to his treasury, exhausted by his numerous wars, induced him to listen to the overtures of the English. The death of Sir John Child removed any animosity which the emperor retained, and he became willing to treat the English as traders, resorting to his dominions for commerce with his permission; but as territorial lords he had a repugnance to their presence. Indeed, he had no objection to any of the European peoples as traders, but he was resolved to make them all feel that he alone was lord of India. In February, 1689, a new firman was granted, after incessant and humble impurity on the part of the English, restoring to

them the imperial favour, and permission to trade, on condition that they made good the losses inflicted upon his subjects. The preamble of this document sets forth, that it is given because the English entreated pardon for the crimes they had committed, and promised amendment. The concluding paragraph stipulates for the execution of the firman "that Mr. Child, who did the disgrace, be turned out and expelled." The emperor did not then know of the illness or death of the chief offender, thus specifically condemned. Yet, whatever the faults of Sir John, and of the agents who seconded his policy, the provocations and injuries received by the English were very great. Shaista was an inexorable extortioner; and wherever the English held a station in Bengal, this man, under the pretence of service to the Mogul, robbed them by dues, duties, and imports, which had a form of legality, and were substantially unjust. Stewart depicts this man as a villain of the blackest character. Professor Wilson leans to the Mohammedan testimonies, which exalt him as "the lily of perfection." Mr. Mill admits, notwithstanding the severity of his censures upon Sir John Child and the company, that the English were in no part of India so wronged and oppressed as in Bengal.

The English now for a season became exceedingly deferential to the Mogul. No western people are more respectful to power than the English, while none so doggedly maintain the power they acquire. The directors of committees were not turned from their purpose of gaining territory. Sir Josiah Child was still the chief man among them, and he was not daunted by the defeat and death of his brother. To gain a footing upon the soil of India he believed to be essential to a profitable commerce with India, and the best means of retrieving the company's pecuniary disasters, and he resolved, *per fas et nefas*, to accomplish this resolve.

A very important acquisition was made in Bengal during the contest waged with the nabob. During the conflicts at Hoogly in 1687, the gallant and skilful Job Charnock took possession of Chutanutty, a village about twenty-four miles down the river. This position he considered less exposed than Hoogly. According to Bruce, when peace with the nabob was obtained, that functionary ordered Mr. Charnock to go back to Hoogly, and remove the agents and property of the company thither. According to this author, they were allowed to have some footing there, but were forbidden to build with brick or stone. Mill represents the first occupancy of Chutanutty to have been after the peace with the

* Bruce, vol. ii. p. 648.

nabob's great master, the Emperor Aurungzebe, and obtained by grant from him in the result of the company's "respectful behaviour and offers of service." Professor Wilson represents the matter as related above, Captain Heath having gone to Chutanutty, where the English were already settled, and taken them thence. The villages of Govindpore and Calcutta were adjacent to Chutanutty, and formed together one stragglng series of connected villages. Stewart* thus relates their occupation:—"The chief agent of the company, Job Charnock, had taken possession of Chutanutty in the contests with the nawab in 1687, and, upon the restoration of tranquillity, returned to it in 1690. The Foujdar of Hoogly sought to induce the English to return there; but they obtained leave to build a factory at Calcutta, which they preferred, as more secure and accessible to shipping. Subsequently permission was procured from Azeem-us-shan, the grandson of Aurungzebe, and governor of Bengal, to purchase the rents of the three villages named above from the zemindars who were then in charge of the collections, amounting to eleven hundred and ninety-five rupees six annas annually. The ground was, no doubt, very thinly occupied, and in great part overrun with jungle, giving to the company, therefore, lands sufficient for the erection of their factory and fort." The English prudently and by degrees erected their fort, and called it Fort William. The Emperor Aurungzebe was probably not informed of these proceedings, for while he respected the possession of forts by Europeans in any territory which he conquered, those forts having been the result of treaty, or sale, or permission to build, on the part of the monarch previously in possession of the supreme authority, yet he never himself gave permission to any Europeans to erect a fortress or fortify a position on any land of which he was sovereign. When the English first settled there, and for many years after, the place was dangerously unhealthy, from the stagnant waters and decaying vegetable matter in its vicinity, the whole district of Nuddea, of which it formed part, being both marshy and covered with jungle.

A combination of petty chiefs to overthrow the government of the nabob in 1695 gave the occasion sought by the British of insisting upon the necessity of an armed occupation of their property. The nabob on this occasion directed them to defend themselves if attacked, and they accepted the general permission as authority to fortify their position.

During the process of the insurrection the Dutch and English factories at Rajmahal

were plundered by Rehim Khan, an Affghan, one of the coalesced chiefs in arms. He also took possession of Hoogly and Moorshedabad, then also a very important place of commerce. He next attacked Chutanutty, and Tanna, a place ten miles west of Calcutta. He was repulsed at the former in a severe conflict. Tanna was covered by the guns of an English frigate, at the request of the Foujdar of Hoogly, and there also the assailants met with repulse. When, in 1698, peace was established by the enforcement of the authority of Aurungzebe, the defences erected by the Europeans were allowed to remain, as they had all been used in the emperor's interest. The English in that year obtained considerable property by purchase, and became lords paramount of a district, to the whole of which they gave the name of the village of Calcutta, which, according to Stewart, is properly *Cali-cotta*, a temple dedicated to Cally, the Hindoo goddess of Time.

In 1689 the English and Dutch (in Europe) united in hostilities against the French. The naval conflicts which followed are memorable in history, and continued until the peace of Ryswick, in 1697. The French were then far behind the English, as the latter were far behind the Dutch as political economists. In the philosophy of commerce the French were especially deficient, although several eminent Frenchmen had thrown light by their opinions upon commercial science. The French in India proceeded in a manner so unwise, that their undertakings were generally misfortunes. In Europe their privateers and men-of-war so frequently captured English and Dutch East Indiamen, that the prices of French importations from India were reduced in the markets of France. During the war more than four thousand English merchantmen, many of them East Indiamen, were captured by the royal navy of Louis XIV. and the French privateers. In India and the Indian Ocean French privateers and royal cruisers inflicted serious injuries upon both Dutch and English, but more especially upon the latter. The war with France was one of the great obstructions to the company during the whole of the time it lasted. In another chapter the proceedings of the French during this century in their Eastern enterprises will be noticed, especially where English interests were affected.

Thus closed the seventeenth century upon the struggles for European dominion, and the competitions for a European commerce with the East. The characters of the various companies and nationalities engaged afford but little scope for comparison. The English, on the whole, do not appear more grasping or

* App. xi. p. 544.

more self-willed than their competitors. Perhaps the Danes, in the comparatively small amount of business transacted by them, conducted themselves the best. They were remarkable for their concern for the religious instruction of their servants and mariners, and of the natives over whom they acquired an influence, although at first they seemed to be only intent upon gain. The Dutch were ardent Protestants as well as traders, and were almost as much opposed to the Portuguese, as upholders of the Church of Rome, as they were politically anxious to humble the Spanish and Portuguese nations, and wrest from them their trade and territory. Towards the English they were animated by a foreboding that the British nation was destined to naval pre-eminence, and they were unwilling to bow to the rising greatness of a navy, the ships of which they were so often enabled to encounter with success. The Dutch, whatever the grasping cupidity and stern hardness of their merchants and mariners as such, as a nation possessed many eminently pious and learned men, and there were great numbers of the people of Holland sincerely anxious to spread "peace on earth, and goodwill to men," and more especially to promote the proclamation of the gospel among the heathen. When the possessions of the Dutch East India Company assumed a permanent character, schools were established, churches erected, the Bible translated into the languages of the natives, and missionaries sent forth. The Portuguese were anxious to subdue by the burning fagot and the rusty pike. All peoples were, they believed, bound to render allegiance to the Roman pontiff, and they were his instruments in effecting the conquest of the East. The English paid little attention to religion. The provisions made in the charters as to chaplains and religious instruction were grossly neglected, nor could the company be induced to lay out money for such purposes. This may be accounted for partly by the objection which great numbers in England felt to the propagation of religion by state authority, public secular companies, or by any party or denomination bearing the sword. Among the company's own agents there were useful and able servants who held such views.

The relation of the English East India Company to India at the end of the century was relatively more powerful than that of any of its competitors. The Dutch were triumphant in the Archipelago, but the footing they had gained in India was comparatively feeble. Their stations were small, and, although well managed, not points likely to serve for purposes of aggression upon either the native

princes or the Europeans. It was chiefly at sea that they were strong so far as India was concerned.

The ports of chief importance occupied by the European nations in India at the end of the seventeenth century should be attentively marked by the reader, as their relative consequence formed an essential element in the changes which occurred in the century which succeeded.

The Portuguese still retained Goa, often as it had been endangered from sieges by native armies, and blockades by the Dutch. They also retained on the coasts of Western India Damaun, Choul, Bassein, and Diu, in Gujerat. Their power, however, was gone for ever. No one was so weak at the close of the seventeenth century as to fear the Portuguese. On the coasts of China they still held the Islands of Macao, Timor, and Solor.

The Dutch held many places which they had wrested from the Portuguese. On the coast of Coromandel they had Negapatam; in Bengal they had factories at Hoogly, Cosimbazar, and Patna; on the coast of Gujerat they had stations at Surat, the agents at which place superintended other agents at Agra and Ahmedabad. On the Malabar coast they occupied posts at Cochin, Quilon, Cranganore, and Cannanore. On this coast the Dutch held territory wrested from the Portuguese, and maintained military forces. Off the Madras coast the Island of Ceylon belonged to the Dutch, although the French succeeded in taking from them Trincomalee. The Hollanders were strongest in the Eastern Archipelago. Java was the location of Batavia, the most beautiful city of the Eastern world. At Malacca, Bantam, Amboyna, Banda, Ternate, Siam, Tonquin, and Macassar, they held flourishing positions, and even in Japan they alone succeeded. The Portuguese first, and afterwards the English, had been forced out of all the regions east of the Malacca Straits by the ships and troops of Holland.

The Danes held Tranquebar, the Dutch would have deprived them of it but for the assistance rendered by the English. The French held Pondicherry as their only important position. The English held many positions, the chief being Bombay, Madras, Surat, and Calcutta, then rising to importance. On the shores of Western India the British stations of importance were Bombay, Surat, the neighbouring harbour of Swally, and Baroch. The forts of Carwar, Tellicherry, and Ajengo (established within a few years of the end of the century), were situated on the Malabar coast, as was also the factory of Calicut. On the Coromandel coast there were Madras, Fort St. David, Cuddalore,

Porto Novo, Pettipolee, Masulipatam, Madapallam, Vizagapatam, and Orissa. Beyond these, eastward and northward, were Calcutta, Hoogly, Dacca, and Patna. There were various smaller positions dependant upon the larger ones which afterwards became of some importance, but it is remarkable that the positions which the English found most valuable during their history in India to the present day were in their possession at the close of the seventeenth century. West of India there was the factory at Gombroon, in the dominions of the Shah of Persia; there were trading ports at Ispahan and Shiraz. In the neighbourhood of the Malacca Straits, and in the Eastern Archipelago, the English still held a few places of some importance. The Island of Sumatra received their chief settlements. Some others there were, such as Tonquin, not yet given up, but they were sources of weakness rather than of strength; and all would have been at the mercy of the Dutch, had not European events, either by war or alliance, checked their encroachments.

Miss Martineau has graphically sketched the general aspect of affairs as bearing upon the future relations of the English to continental India in the following terms:—"Thus were the British in India transformed, in the course of one century, from a handful of 'adventurers,' landing a cargo of goods, in a tentative way, at the mouth of the Tapty, and glad to sell their commodities and buy others on the residents' own terms, to a body of

colonists, much considered for their extensive transactions, and the powers, legislative, executive, and military, which they wielded. Whence these powers were derived, who these English were, and why they came, might be more than Aurungzebe himself could distinctly explain; and to this day the relation of our Indian empire to the British seems to be a puzzle to the inhabitants, being really anomalous in English eyes as well. But there we were, acting from three centres of authority and power, and exercising whatever influence commerce put into our hands. It was not for want of enterprise that the British had as yet no territorial power. Sir Josiah Child believed the possession of more or less territory to be necessary to the security of our commerce; and in 1686 an attempt was made to obtain a footing in Bengal by force of arms. It not only failed, but would have resulted in the expulsion of every Englishman from the Mogul's dominions, but for the importance of our commerce to Aurungzebe's treasury. Our reputation suffered by this unsuccessful prank of ambition and cupidity; but not the less did the last of the great Moguls go to his grave, knowing that he left the English established in his dominions beyond the possibility of dislodgment. They were neither subjects nor rulers in India; but such a man as Aurungzebe must have been well aware that if they were really irremovable they must sooner or later become the one or the other."

CHAPTER LIII.

REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF BRITISH CONNECTION WITH INDIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

IN reviewing the events over which this history has passed, there are many things which strike the mind with great force. It will especially occur to the reader that the rise and progress of English power in India so far, bore no resemblance to the development of any other power known to history. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the English, notwithstanding recent defeat and humiliation by the Great Mogul, held various important territorial acquisitions upon the continent of India; and although the government at home had oppressed and robbed the company, alternately persecuting and petting it, now giving it exclusive privileges and anon fostering competitors, it not only survived every vicissitude, but early in the eighteenth

century assumed an attitude of strength, influence, and importance at home, which set at defiance all rivalry, and had begun to regard the revenues of its Eastern territories as more important than the prospects of its Eastern commerce. Future empire was already shadowed forth. "The narrative of an empire's rise and progress usually tells how the brook became a river, and the river became a sea; but the history of British India is peculiar and incongruous. It began without a strip of territory. A warehouse was expanded into a province; a province into an empire."* That great result had not arrived at the period to which our history is now

* *The English in Western India, being the early History of the Factory at Surat.* By Philip Anderson.

brought, the empire had not been formed, but the warehouse had in more than one direction expanded into a province.

It is difficult to gather material for an original and accurate record of the events of English enterprise in Asia, from its first efforts to the settled and regular character it assumed in the eighteenth century. The records of government furnish often but a meagre account, and what is furnished is in a form so dry, desultory, irregular, and to a great extent so irrelevant to the actual facts with which they had some official connection, that it is a tedious and difficult progress to analyze, separate, generalize, and reduce their substance to historical form. Bruce's work, already quoted, is the chief light of this period. With indefatigable industry he arranged the information which he thought proper to select from this source. Others, such as Orme, M'Pherson, Milburn, Mill, Walter Hamilton, Grant Duff, Kaye, Taylor, and Wilson, have followed in the footsteps of Bruce, but the labours of all have in this department been more or less partial. The personal narratives of Roe, Fryer, Fitch, Terry, Ovington, Alexander Hamilton, &c., furnish observations and inferences of much value; and the relations of their personal adventures throw an animation over the story, which the crude detail of government papers cannot supply. With all the aids thus furnished, there are many gaps which have not hitherto been filled up. The more the search is prosecuted, the more richly such labour is repaid, by enabling the historian to give a consecutive and clear relation of events which are obscure in themselves, or their origin, or consequences. However scant the sources of indisputable evidence, the meanness and commercial ignorance of the first English settlers are obvious to the student; and yet that they possessed a force of character adapted to ensure success is equally apparent. The Rev. Philip Anderson, the latest and most painstaking chronicler of the period of which this chapter treats, describes its records as "annals of mediocrity and weakness, sometimes of drivelling baseness. The instruments which Providence employed to create a British power in India were often of the basest metal. But such answer the same purposes as the finest in the hands of Infinite Wisdom. And though we may feel disappointed, we ought not to be surprised, when we see little to admire in the pioneers of our Eastern empire, and find that some were amongst the meanest of mankind. Yet, bad as were such agents, it will, I think, appear in this work that British power has been established by the moral force of British character. A writer of Anglo-Indian

History must indeed soil his paper with narratives, from which virtue and honesty turn with disgust. But here is a distinction. Truth and sincerity have been, in the main, characteristics of the British, and the opposite vices exceptions. With the oriental races amongst whom they have been located, fraud, chicanery and intrigue have been the usual engines of state policy; truth and sincerity have been rare as flowers in a sandy soil. When British merchants or statesmen have formed compacts, given pledges, or made promises, they have usually—though not in all instances—observed their compacts, redeemed their pledges, and fulfilled their promises, and the natives have generally acknowledged this: so that, although their confidence has been sometimes misplaced, and has received a few severe shocks, they have continued to rely upon the good faith of Englishmen. On the other hand, they have rarely placed dependance on one another, and although some have been distinguished for their virtues in private life, their rule has ever been to regard each other with suspicion and distrust."

Is it not in the characters, moral or intellectual, of the leading men in the promotion of English success, that we best discern the elements of its accomplishment, but in the general character of the English serving in India, or directing at home. The names of Drake, Hawkins, Roe, and of others which have occurred in previous chapters, stand out with peculiar prominence; but it was the general character of the English factors, servants, and soldiers, which contributed to the resources and triumphs of which the story of these chapters has been made up. The author of this history would adopt the language of the writer last quoted, when he says—"My aim is to furnish sketches of men and manners without devoting an exclusive attention to the great and illustrious. In most historical pictures, kings, statesmen and warriors stand conspicuous, whilst the multitude are grouped together, and their separate features are scarcely perceptible. But in modern ages a spirit of research has led students to inquire into the habits and characters of the many, and their minute discoveries have supplied defects in history, throwing as they do, light not only upon heroes, but on man. This work is not indeed antiquarian, but yet its design is to exhume from the graves in which they have been buried, the motives and acts of individuals. As students of antiquity, by finding a bone here, a piece of tessellated pavement there, in another place some pottery or rust-eaten weapons, have caught glimpses of the Roman's domestic life and social condition; so now it is hoped, that by

collecting heterogeneous facts from new and old books, and from mouldy records, we shall be able to form a museum, in which will be exhibited the social and moral condition, not only of the architects by whom the foundations were laid, and the building superintended; but also of those who were work-people in the construction of our Anglo-Indian Empire. And when expatiating 'free o'er all this scene of man,' it will be an object to show, that although 'a mighty maze,' it is 'not without a plan.'"

Whatever the faults of the English in India up to the date of their interests there to which we have now arrived they bear comparison with their competitors in courage, constancy, morality, and benevolence. No people ever pursued trade with more eagerness for the acquisition of wealth, *per fas et nefas*, than the Portuguese. Their blood-thirstiness was fierce and insatiable, not only against the natives, but against Europeans. They probably were guilty of no act more sanguinary than the massacre at Amboyna by the Dutch; but their whole career was merciless, and stained with gore. The English suffered much from this un pitying and vindictive spirit of the Portuguese, but never visited that nation with the heavy retribution which it deserved, although the opportunity was frequently afforded. No one can read the pages of Hakluyt's *Voyages*, Milburn's *Oriental Commerce*, Orme's *Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire*, the *Voyage de François Pyrard de Laval, &c.*, without perceiving the reluctance of the English to shed blood, except in battle, or in acts of piracy; then regarded too generally as fair and open war. The ferocity of the Portuguese, even against unarmed Englishmen and captives, is equally plain on the page of history. Philip Anderson gives a melancholy account of the incarceration, and consequent mortality, at Goa, of English sailors kidnapped by the Portuguese off Surat. He thus sums up the results of his study of the travels of Pyrard and others, early in the seventeenth century, as to the treatment received by Englishmen who happened to fall into the power of the Portuguese:—"Six months before he left Goa, Pyrard met another English prisoner, who seemed a person of some distinction, and had been surprised in the same way as the others, when he was taking soundings. He accused the Portuguese of savage ferocity, declaring that they had slaughtered his cousin in cold blood, and placed his head upon a pike as a trophy. His own life had been in great danger, for his captors, knowing that he had been surveying the coast, regarded him with peculiar suspicion. After a long

imprisonment he was suffered to depart. Four months after this gentlemen had been seized, the unlucky ship to which he belonged was wrecked on the coast. The crew, twenty-four in number, having contrived to reach the shore near Surat with their money and other property, were well treated by the native authorities. They then divided themselves into two parties; the more adventurous spirits making an attempt to return home by way of Tartary, the others remaining at Surat. The former were enabled by passports, which they procured at the Mogul's court, to pass through his dominions, but were not permitted to enter the country of the Tartars, and after a fruitless journey they returned to Surat. All the survivors repaired to Goa, and sailed from thence to England. Every Englishman on whom the Portuguese could lay their hands was treated by them as a prisoner, and when Laval was about to leave India, several Englishmen were actually brought on board in irons. Yet even when in this sad plight they appeared to him a proud set, who took every opportunity of showing their contempt for Frenchmen. Such was Portuguese hospitality! Shipwrecked mariners, instead of receiving from them generous fare and clothing, or at least protection and sympathy, were condemned to eat the bread and water of affliction in a dungeon, and if they survived such treatment, were sent to their own country with ignominy. Exclusiveness and illiberality are the sure forerunners of degeneracy, and the English are avenged. Being now the dominant party, they can return good for evil by blessing the descendants of these persecutors with religious toleration and political freedom."

When the Portuguese were unable openly to destroy the English, they did not scruple to resort to assassination. Thus, when Captain Best sent one Starkey, a factor of Surat, with intelligence to England of his success in founding the factory there, he was poisoned on the journey by two friars. Another of the factors, Canning, when sent with a king's letter to Agra, was attacked and wounded by robbers, and some of his escort killed; and this outrage was, upon such evidence as satisfied those most concerned, believed to have been instigated by the Portuguese. Canning, who was in constant dread of being poisoned by the Jesuits, met his death by the means he had foreseen. So intense was the cruelty of the Portuguese, that they in some instances plotted the destruction of the English, when the latter had actually rendered services demanding gratitude, and when peace existed in Europe between the Spanish and English nations. Mr. Anderson, relying upon the

accounts of Orme and M'Pherson, and more especially upon Colquhoun, describes, in the following manner, the ungrateful and perfidious character of the Portuguese at Surat, when, in 1615, Captain Downton arrived there with a small English squadron:—"This season Captain Nicholas Downton sustained the reputation of which Captain Best had laid the foundation. He was the chief commander, or, as such officers were then styled, 'the General' of four English ships. At Surat he found three English factors, Aldworth, Bidulph, and Richard Steele, the last of whom had lately come from Aleppo. His first step was, to demand redress for extortion in the customs; his second was to require, like a true Englishman, that a market for beef should be established at Swally. The first application was met by evasion; the second by a declaration that beef could not be had, as the Banyas, by whom the preservation of animal life was regarded in the light of a religious duty, had paid a large sum to prevent bullocks from being slaughtered. The emperor and petty princes of the Deccan were united in an attempt to drive the Portuguese out of India, and no sooner had Downton arrived, than the governor of Surat invited his co-operation. But as Portugal and her possessions were then subject to the Spanish crown, and there was peace between Spain and England, the English captain declined this invitation, which so annoyed the governor, that he in turn refused him all assistance, and on a frivolous pretext threw the English factors into prison. Downton's forbearance was but ill-requited by the Portuguese; for they falsely represented to the governor that he had consented to join them in an attack upon Surat. Their own acts, however, soon refuted this calumny. With six galleons of from four to eight hundred tons burden, three other vessels of considerable size, and sixty smaller ones, mounting in all a hundred and thirty-four pieces of ordnance, the viceroy of Goa attacked the four English ships, which could only mount eighty guns of inferior calibre. To the astonishment of the natives, the assailants were defeated as signally as in the previous year, so that their glory and renown were for ever transferred to their conquerors."

That the Portuguese were capable of such atrocity towards the English, may be judged by the testimony to their cowardice, avarice, and absence of all principle among themselves, borne by one who could have had no motive to scandalize them. Abbé Raynal lived long in India, and was well acquainted with the character of the natives, and of the European settlers. He held intimate relations with the

English, forming among them friendships which he cherished with tenacity. His profession as a Roman Catholic priest gave him opportunity of knowing at least equally well the Portuguese. But the Abbé was not such a bigot as to sacrifice truth in his estimate of either English or Portuguese, and thus he depicts the latter:—"No Portuguese pursued any other object than the advancement of his own interest; there was no zeal, no union for the common good. Their possessions in India were divided into three governments, which gave no assistance to each other, and even clashed in their projects and interests. Neither discipline, subordination, nor the love of glory, animated either the soldiers or the officers. Men-of-war no longer ventured out of the ports; or whenever they appeared, were badly equipped. Manners became more and more depraved. Not one of their commanders had power enough to restrain the torrent of vice; and the majority of these commanders were themselves corrupted. The Portuguese at length lost all their former greatness, when a free and enlightened nation, actuated with a proper spirit of toleration, appeared in India, and contended with them for the empire of that country."

That a people thus debased among themselves were capable of any injustice, ingratitude or cruelty to the men of other nations may be easily believed. That the Portuguese failed utterly to establish a moral influence in the East, that could compare with that which the English were enabled to set up, is admitted by modern Roman Catholic writers of eminence in review of the entire oriental history of Portugal, and the entire colonial history of Spain, with which Portugal was so intimately connected in so important a portion of her oriental career. M. Montalembert, the distinguished French nobleman and senator, whose zeal for Roman Catholicism is so ardent, thus notices the oriental and colonial career of the two nations of the Iberian Peninsula, seen from a religious, moral, and utilitarian point of view:—"It is not the general, but the colonial policy of England which is now in question, and it is precisely in this latter that the genius of the British people shines with all its lustre; not, certainly, that it has been at all times and in all places irreproachable, but it has ever and everywhere equalled, if it have not surpassed, in wisdom, justice, and humanity all the other European races which have undertaken similar enterprises. It must be confessed that the history of the relations of Christian Europe with the rest of the world since the Crusades is not attractive. Unfortunately, neither the virtues nor the truths of Christianity have ruled the

successive conquests won in Asia and America by the powerful nations of the West. After that first impetuous advance, so noble and so pious, of the fifteenth century, which fathered the great, the saintly Columbus, and all the champions of the maritime and colonial history of Portugal, worthy of as high a place in the too ungrateful memory of men as the heroes of ancient Greece, we see all the vices of modern civilization usurp the place of the spirit of faith and of self-denial, here exterminating the savage races, and elsewhere succumbing to the enervating influence of the corrupting civilization of the East, instead of regenerating it or taking its place. It is impossible not to recognise that England, more particularly since the period when she gloriously ransomed her participation in the kidnapping of the negroes and colonial slavery, may pride herself on having escaped from the greater part of those lamentable deviations from the path of rectitude. To the historian who requires an account from her of the result of her maritime and colonial enterprises for the last two centuries, she has a right to reply, '*Si queris monumentum, circumspice.*' Can history exhibit many spectacles of a grander or more extraordinary nature, or more calculated to honour modern civilization, than that afforded us by a company of English merchants which has endured through two centuries and a half, and which governed but yesterday, at a distance of two thousand leagues from the mother country, nearly two hundred million of men by means of eight hundred civil servants, and of an army numbering from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men? But England has done better still; she has not only founded colonies, but called nations into being. She has created the United States; she has erected them into one of the greatest powers of the present and of the future, by endowing them with those provincial and individual liberties which enabled them to victoriously emancipate themselves from the light yoke of the mother country.' 'Our free institutions' (such is the tenour of the message for the year 1852 of the President of that great Republic) 'are not the fruit of the revolution; they had been previously in existence; they had their roots in the free charters under the provisions of which the English colonies had grown up.' But what are we to think if those orthodox nations, with the advantages of such apostles and of such teaching, have depopulated half the globe? And what society did Spanish conquest substitute for the races which had been exterminated instead of having been civilized? Must we not turn away our eyes in sadness at seeing how far the first elements

of order, energy, discipline, and legality are wanting everywhere, except, perhaps, in Chili, to Spanish enterprise, so destitute is it of the strong virtues of the ancient Castilian society, without having been able to acquire any of the qualities which characterize modern progress? In Hindostan itself what remains of Portuguese conquest? What is there to show for the numberless conversions achieved by St. Francis Xavier? What remains of the vast organization of that Church which was placed under the protection of the Crown of Portugal? Go, ask that question at Goa? fathom there the depths of the moral and material decrepitude into which has fallen a rule immortalized by Albuquerque, by John de Castro, and by so many others worthy to be reckoned among the most valiant Christians who have ever existed. You will there see to what the mortal influence of absolute power can bring Catholic colonies as well as their mother countries."

It is true, that under the maladministration of some of the governors of Surat and Bombay, and especially under that of Sir John Child, corruption of manners, oppression, tyranny and fraud, were rampant among the officials, but notwithstanding that such evils reached to a great head, the general sense of the English community rebelled against misgovernment, and rose superior to it, whereas the corruption and despicable baseness of the Portuguese received no check, and was all but universal among them until their power and influence sunk to what it is now.

It is painful, however, to find that the most laborious student of this period, a devoted clergyman of Bombay, bears this unfavourable testimony of his countrymen in Western India in the earlier part of the seventeenth century:—"As the number of adventurers increased, the reputation of the English was not improved. Too many committed deeds of violence and dishonesty. We can show that even the commanders of vessels belonging to the company did not hesitate to perpetrate robberies on the high seas or on shore when they stood in no fear of retaliation. During a visit which some English ships paid to Dabhol the officers suddenly started up from a conference with the native chiefs, and attacked the town, having first secured some large guns in such a manner that they could not be turned against them. Their attempt failed, but after retreating to their ships they succeeded in making prizes of two native boats. Della Valle declares that it was customary for the English to commit such outrages. And although this last account may be suspected as dictated by the prejudices of an Italian, we can see no reason to question

Sir Thomas Herbert's veracity. Sailing along the coast with several vessels under the command of an English admiral, he descried, when off Mangalore, a heavily laden craft after which a Malabar pirate was skulking. The native merchant in his fright sought refuge with the admiral, but, writes our author with confessed grief, his condition was little better than it would have been, if he had fallen into the pirate's hands. After a short consultation, his ship was adjudged a prize by the English officers. 'For my part,' proceeds Herbert, 'I could not reach the offence: but this I could, that she had a cargo of cotton, opium, onions, and probably somewhat under the cotton of most value, which was her crime it seems. But how the prize was distributed concerns not me to inquire; I was a passenger, but no merchant, nor informer.' The whole account would be incredible if not given on such good authority; but as it is, we must regard it as a blot upon the English character, and some justification of the Mogul officers when they afterwards brought charges of piracy against the company's servants. Sixty of the native seamen, concluding from the churlish conduct of the English that mischief was intended, and that they would be sold as slaves to the people of Java, trusted rather to the merey of the waves than of such Englishmen, and threw themselves into the sea, 'which seemed sport to some there,' writes Herbert, 'but not so to me, who had compassion!' Some were picked up by canoes from the shore, and some by English boats; but the latter were so enraged with the treatment they had received, that they again endeavoured to drown themselves. A terrible storm which followed was regarded by the narrator as a token of God's severe displeasure.*

After all, these were exceptional cases, such acts were perpetrated by pirates. The company, in every possible way, discountenanced the like; and at that juncture certainly commended justice and benevolence on the part of their officials, naval and mercantile.*

The following anecdote shows strikingly that while the English were "heady" and hot, they were not unrelenting, even when labouring under the impression that a great wrong was inflicted upon them, and when its perpetrator was in their power. "When one of Van den Broeck's seamen had killed an English gunner, the enraged countrymen of the latter insisted upon having the Dutchman executed at once. In vain did Broeck beg that the forms of justice might be employed. Nothing would do but immediate execution,

until the crafty Dutchman devised a plan which showed that he relied upon English generosity. He declared that the sailor had been condemned to be drowned. No sooner had the factors heard this, than their thirst for blood was allayed. Believing that there was really an intention of putting the man to death, they relented, interceded for his life, and he was pardoned."*

The English were much inferior to the Dutch in economy, management, and knowledge of commercial philosophy; they had also less religious zeal; their morality was not better, and scarcely so good; but in one respect they were much superior to the Hollanders—they abhorred unnecessary bloodshed. It is difficult to reconcile the many good qualities of the Dutch with their avarice, their passion for making personal slaves of the natives, and readiness to shed blood. In all these respects the English favourably contrasted with them, but more especially in the last two, and most especially in the last of these particulars. The passion for gain evinced by some Englishmen was as censurable as that which marked the Hollanders, but, notwithstanding, the less sanguinary character of the latter as compared with the Portuguese, the English presented a strong contrast to their Batavian antagonists, where the sanctity of human life was concerned.

The Dutch, like other members of the Germanic family of nations, were much less refined in manners and feelings than those ethnological divisions of the human family comprising the Celts and Latins. The Hollanders and English were both deficient in gentler manners and sympathy, but the Dutch were much the ruder, justifying the satire of the poet Dryden—

"With an ill grace the Dutch their mischiefs do:
They've both ill nature, and ill manners too.
Well may they boast themselves an ancient nation,
For they were bred ere manners were in fashion.
And their new Commonwealth hath set them free,
Only from honour and civility."²

It must be admitted that Dryden bore an impassioned prejudice against the Dutch, and unscrupulously expressed himself generally where he had a prejudice; still, the stinging satire of those lines has a keen justice, which no one acquainted with the character of the Dutch in the seventeenth century can fail to see.

Taking the evidences collected in Kay's *Administration of the East India Company*, the first administrators of the company's factories on continental India were men of intelligence, integrity, and virtue. Indeed, whatever may have been the general supe-

† Van den Broeck's *Voyages*.

* Letters from the directors to the presidency.

riority of the Dutch as men of business, the early settlers at Surat were their equals, and, as men of truth and honour, were superior to the Indian representatives of the states-general. Thomas Kerridge, the first president of the factory at Surat, was probably one of the most upright and intelligent men ever sent out by the company, and some who followed him immediately were but little his inferiors. The bravery of the English seems to have had more to do with their success than any other quality.* The Rev. Mr. Anderson, writing of the increasing number of the English expeditions † as the seventeenth century advanced, observes:—"The object of all was purely commercial, but it was an ominous fact that Englishmen only obtained respect and influence among the natives by hard fighting." ‡

While the English were merciful compared with the Portuguese, and even with the Dutch, it is to be regretted that several of the national vices were very prominent in Anglo-Indian society, and none more so than drunkenness. Almost all the early records, where such references would be at all in place, bear witness to this, as does almost every writer who notices the moral and social condition of the English at "the factories." Sir Thomas Roe, § Della Valle, || the Rev. Mr. Terry, already referred to in this work, bore frequent and sorrowful testimony to the same unhappy characteristic of his countrymen. ¶ He declares that the natives at Surat were accustomed to say "Christian religion—devil religion." "Christian much drunk." "Christian much do wrong." "Christian much beat." "Christian very much abuse." These and similar expressions revealed the want of confidence of the natives towards Europeans. It is certain that the conduct of the Portuguese, and of the Dutch although in a lesser degree than the Portuguese, elicited this estimate of the professors of Christianity on the part of the natives; but the rude, coarse, and violent behaviour of the English, also drew forth these censures. The disposition to cheat the natives in trade, which was so flagrant in the Portuguese and Dutch, was possessed by the English also, to a sufficient degree to prevent reliance upon them by the native dealers, to impair their moral influence, and to leave a stain upon their name.

The English were undoubtedly quarrelsome;

* Scrafton's *Reflections on the Government of Hindostan*. London, 1673.

† Thornton's *History of the British Empire in India*.

‡ *Treaties and Alliance*. London, 1717.

§ Roe's *Journal*.

|| *The Travels of Signor Pietro Della Valle*.

¶ Terry's *Voyage*.

their drunken brawls at Surat, and afterwards at Bombay, were a scandal to the European name and to Christianity. "Drunkenness, and other exorbitances which proceeded from it, were so great in that place (Surat), that it was wonderful they (the English residents) were suffered to live."* "The manners of the young men in the factory (of Surat) were extremely dissolute, and on that account they were continually involved in trouble with the natives." †

There is, however, much to be said on behalf of the English as to their rough and contemptuous conduct towards the Indians. The latter seldom neglected an opportunity of robbing and assassinating their European visitors, when no provocation could have been pleaded in extenuation. It was impossible for any European to travel into the interior without being attacked, unless guarded by a powerful escort; and it was difficult even then to calculate upon safety, as the escort was frequently either in league with robbers and Thugs, or was composed of men ready to perpetrate the crimes against which, on the part of others, they were employed as a guard. These circumstances excited in a bold and ready-handed people like the English a warm and vigorous resentment, which the least provocation fanned. This was the true cause of many acts on the part of the English which call for modern censure. The following description of the conduct of the natives generally towards Europeans was given, after a diligent search through the pages of many early travellers, and of the letters of various officers of the English factories, by the author of *The English in Western India*:—"Canning, when on his journey to Agra, was assaulted and wounded by robbers. Starkey was poisoned. The caravan which Withington accompanied was attacked in the night at the third halting-place, and the next day they met a Mogul officer returning with the heads of two hundred and fifty coolies who had been plunderers. In Rajpootana the caravan was attacked twice in one day. Between that and Tatta the son of a Rajpoot chief professed to escort them with fifty troopers, but designedly led them out of their way into a thick wood. He there seized all the men, camels, and goods, and strangled the two Hindoo merchants to whom the caravan belonged, with their five servants. Withington and his servants having been kept for twenty days in close confinement, were dismissed, to find their way home as they best could. After this, when Edwards was travelling to Agra, the escort which he

* *Journal* of Sir Thomas Roe.

† Rev. Mr. Anderson.

took from Baroch was found to be in league with fifty mounted freebooters, who hovered about them at night, and were only deterred from attacking them by seeing their bold attitude. When Aldworth and his party were returning from Ahmedabad, their escort was increased by the orders of government, because robberies and murders had been committed two nights before close to the city. Between Baroda and Baroch they were attacked in a narrow lane, thick set on either side with hedges, by three hundred Rajpoots, who, with their lances and arrows, wounded many of them, and succeeded in rifling two of their heavily laden carts.* Gautier Schouten, a servant of the Dutch Company, who was at Surat in 1660, confirms all these accounts, and declares that when the English and Dutch went to Agra, they always joined themselves to native caravans. Even then they had frequently to defend themselves from Rajpoots, who descended from their mountains to plunder travellers. One anecdote affords us some idea of the local government at Ahmedabad. When Mandelslo was there, he was invited, together with the English and Dutch factors, by the governor, to a native entertainment. As is usual on such occasions, dancing-girls exhibited their performances. One troop having become fatigued, another was sent for. The latter, however, having been ill-requited on a former occasion, refused to attend? What measures then did the governor adopt? A very summary one indeed. He had them dragged into his presence, and then, after taunting them for their scruples, ordered them to be beheaded. These reluctant ministers of a despot's pleasure pleaded for mercy with heart-rending cries and shrieks. Their appeal was vain, and eight wretched women were actually executed before the company. The English factors were horrorstruck; but the governor merely laughed, and asked why they were troubled. This account, given by an eyewitness, whose veracity has been ordinarily admitted, is in itself a commentary upon the records of native rule.† Salbank, the pious factor of Surat, says in one of his letters home:—"The roads swarm with robbers, who would cut any man's throat for a third part of the value of a penny sterling. Howbeit, I, for my part, passed through all those hellish weapons, which those cannibal villains used to kill men witial, surely enough, through the tender mercies of my gracious God." It is not to be a matter of surprise that such men as the English should be easily excited

to deeds of force and violence among a people so cruel, treacherous, and rapacious.

It is admitted that the forms of religion were less attended to by the English in the early part of the century than by any of their rivals in India. The Portuguese, while lost in the excess of every vice, still not only observed their religious rites, but fanatically struggled to force them upon others. The Dutch, with a profound worldliness, were regular observers of the primitive forms of their worship, and zealously endeavoured to convert and educate the natives. Even when pursuing gain with greedy avidity, and in the midst of rude and stern conflict, they listened with respect to the rebukes of their ministers, and never withheld from them the means of erecting churches, establishing schools, preaching the gospel, and acquiring the native tongues. The English were alike parsimonious and extravagant. In general matters they became more and more spendthrift in the affairs of the factories, while the factors were paid stinted stipends, and while at home the English nation supported costly ecclesiastical establishments, and the company handsomely remunerated clergymen to preach to the crews of their outward-bound ships, in India they had no missionary spirit, and even infringed the terms of their charter, by neglecting to support adequately and in sufficient number chaplains for their ships and stations. Several devoted Christian ministers were in the service of the company during the seventeenth century, but rarely did they receive any encouragement from the directors of committees at home or from the principals of the factories in India.

Early in the history of the company's settlements, one Henry Lord showed much zeal for the welfare of the natives, in which he was countenanced and assisted by Kerridge, the president of Surat, already referred to. Indeed, the studious and pious undertakings of Lord seem to have been chiefly directed by Kerridge. Both these worthies felt a profound interest in the literature and religious state of the Parsees; and Lord instituted earnest inquiries into the Zend language, and into the sacred books of that strange people. The Banyans were the objects also of their benevolent and spiritual purposes. Lord has left us his first impressions of this peculiar class in the following quaint way, which is the more interesting, from being pervaded so entirely by the style of thought and language then prevailing:—"According to the busie observance of travellers, inquiring what novelty the place might produce, a people presented themselves to mine eyes, cloathed in linnen garments, somewhat low descending,

* Orme's *Fragments*.

† *Les Voyages du Sieur Albert de Mandelslo*.

of a gesture and garbe, as I may say, maydenly and well-nigh effeminate; of a countenance shy and somewhat estranged, yet smiling out a glosed and bashful familiarity, whose use in the companies affaires occasioned their presence there. Truth to say, mine eyes, unacquainted with such objects, took up their wonder and gazed, and this admiration, the badge of a fresh traveller, bred in mee the importunity of a questioner. I asked what manner of people those were, so strangely notable, and notably strange. Reply was made, They were Banians.*

The Rev. Mr. Terry, chaplain to Sir Thomas Roe, and afterwards rector of Great Greenford, left several works behind him—such as *A Memoir of Tom Coryate*, *Sermons preached before the East India Company*, and *Original Poems*. These all prove him to have been a very learned and pious man, and very desirous for the moral and spiritual welfare of the company's servants and the heathen. Copeland and a few other clergymen about the same time were zealous and devoted, and their names appear in the records of the company, and in various fragmentary works, with tokens of reverence.

It is remarkable that in several instances clergymen who became useful took their tone of piety and earnestness of labour from eminently pious laymen. Some of these laymen exercised by their letters and statements considerable influence upon the company at home, so as to induce them to more particularly in selecting clergymen for their ships who were adapted to usefulness among seamen, and at the same time learned men, who would be likely to study with success the languages of the East, the mental character of its populations, and the genius of its religions, and who would be likely to meet successfully in argument learned Brahmins. Amongst the benevolent laymen thus exercising a beneficial influence was one Joseph Salbank, who, in 1617, wrote an earnest letter to the directors of committees, intreating that clergymen of the character just described might be sent to the East.

It would appear that for a long time the presidents seldom paid visits of state and ceremony, whether to natives or Europeans, unattended by their chaplains. Pedro della Valle, the Roman, commonly called *Il Pellegrino*, was at Surat in 1623. He stated that on his arrival at that place he was visited immediately by the president, accompanied by two ministers, "as the English call their priests." Della Valle gave of these and other English gentlemen whom he met there a most flattering—or at all events most favourable—

account. Of the president he wrote, that "M. Rastel spake Italian fluently, and was very polite, showing himself in all things a person sufficiently accomplished, and of generous deportment, according as his gentle and graceful aspect bespoke him." Rastel, although a courteous, hospitable, benevolent man, and a favourer of chaplains and religious persons, was not himself pious, as appears from the odd accounts given by Della Valle of his entertainments at the presidency. The oldest despatch from the company's officers at present extant is from the pen of this President Rastel. It is dated the 26th of July, 1630, on board the ship *James*, in St. Augustin's Bay, Madagascar.*

Mr. Streynshan Master, who succeeded the pious and painstaking Aungier at the western presidency, was a man of great excellence. Of him Bruce says:—"Streynshan Master was afterwards chief at Madras, and in 1680 laid there the first stone of the first English church in India, carried on the work at his own charge, and never halted till he had brought it to a conclusion. He was dismissed the service by the court's order in 1681; but his offence is not stated. He was then knighted, and elected a director of the new company, which derived great benefit from his experience."†

The habits, manners, and customs of the English in India during the period of which we now treat, throw much light upon their national character, and reveal at once the influence of India upon them, and the sort of influence they exercised upon native communities and governments. Mr. Anderson, relying for his account chiefly on Roe, Fryer, and Della Valle, gives an amusing description of the manner of life of the British, not only in relation to the natives, but in their intercourse with other European nations. "Books and records give us but few glances of early English manners at this period (the first half of the seventeenth century). We may represent the factory as a mercantile house of agency, in which the president or chief was head partner. He and his junior partners, who were called factors, lived under the same roof, each having his own private apartments; but all assembling for meals at a public table, maintained by the company. They were also expected to meet for an hour every day for prayers. Such carriages and capital as they possessed were part of the common stock. Horses were expensive luxuries, used only by the chief and some of his friends. Bullock carts were in ordinary use. For space and furniture, the English and Dutch houses ex-

* *Outward Letter-Book of the Surat Factory.*

† *Bruce's Annals.*

* *Lord's Discovery of Two Foreign Sects.*

celled all others in the city. The president affected some style. When he went into the streets he was followed by a long train of persons, including some natives armed with bows, arrows, swords, and shields. A banner or streamer was borne, and a saddle horse led before him. His retainers were numerous, and as each only received three rupees per *mensem* for wages, the whole was but little. There were also many slaves whose clothing was white calico, their food rice with a little fish." The author of a *History of the Factories of Surat and Bombay, and the subordinate Factories on the Western Coast*, quotes an obscure book, written by the Rev. Mr. Ovington at the close of the seventeenth century, who thus describes the combination of extravagance and meanness, at that time undoubtedly characteristic of the English nation, and which during the century was evinced at Surat by the factors:—"All Europeans dined at the public table, where they took their places according to seniority. The dinner service was sumptuous—all the dishes, plates, and drinking cups, being of massive and pure silver—and the provisions were of the best quality. Arak and wine from Shiraz were ordinarily drunk at table. There were an English, a Portuguese, and an Indian cook, so that every palate might be suited. Before and after meals a peon attended with a silver basin and ewer, which he offered to each person at table that he might pour water over his hands. On Sundays and a few other days high festival was kept. The choicest of European and Persian wines were then introduced. On these festivals the factors often accompanied the president, at his invitation, to a garden which was kept for recreation and amusement. At such times they formed a procession. The president and his lady were borne in palanquins. Before him were carried two large banners, and gaily caparisoned horses of Arabian or Persian breed were led, their saddles being of richly embroidered velvet; their head-stalls, reins, and cruppers mounted with solid and wrought silver. The council followed in coaches drawn by oxen, and the other factors in country carts or on horses kept at the company's expense. There was a singular combination of pride and meanness displayed in the factors' mode of life. None of them—not even the chaplain—moved out the walls of the city without being attended by four or five peons. At the Hindoo feast of the Divali, Banyas always offered presents to the president, members of council, chaplain, surgeon, and others. To the young factors these gifts were of great importance, as by selling them again, they were enabled to procure their annual supply

of new clothes. This was beggarly enough, but not so low as another practice which was in favour with these young gentlemen, as they were now styled in courtesy. They had a clever way of enjoying practical jokes, and at the same time indulging their mercenary propensities. One of them would enter the premises of a Banya, and pretend that he was shooting doves or sparrows. The horrified believer in metempsychosis would then come out, earnestly implore him to desist, and even offer him 'ready money.' He 'drops in his hand a rupee or two to be gone,' says the narrator. There, reader, is a picture of the representatives of a high-minded nation drawn by one of themselves. Poor civilians! At least in your case necessity was the mother of invention."

The following passages from Mr. Anderson's description of the love of pomp shown by the chief factors at Surat, and the motives for the display, are characteristic:—"That an impression might be made upon the natives, the president indulged to a considerable extent in pomp and state—even more than the Dutch president. He had a standard-bearer and bodyguard composed of a sergeant and double file of English soldiers. Forty natives also attended him. At dinner each course was ushered in by the sound of trumpets, and his ears were regaled by a band of music. Whenever he left his private rooms he was preceded by attendants with silver wands. On great occasions, when he issued from the factory, he appeared on horseback, or in a palanquin, or a coach drawn by milk-white oxen—doubtless of that large and beautiful breed for which Gujerat is celebrated. Led horses with silver bridles, and an umbrella of state was carried before him. The equipages of the other merchants came behind in the procession, and corresponded in appearance with the president's." The writer of the above adds, "the pomp and splendour of the presidents were in advance of the times, and the directors strove to check them." A writer and traveller, often quoted by those who notice the early annals of the English in India, thus describes the equipages of the presidents, and of other persons of high position:—"Two large milk-white oxen are put in to draw it, with circling horns as black as a coal, each point dipped with brass, from whence come brass chains across to the head-stall, which is all of scarlet, and a scarlet collar to each, of brass bells, about their necks, their flapping ears snipped with art, and from their nostrils bridles covered with scarlet. The chariot itself is not swinging like ours, but fastened to the main axles by neat arches, which support a four-square seat, which is

inlaid with ivory, or enriched as they please; at every corner are turned pillars, which make (by twisted silk or cotton cords) the sides, and support the roof, covered with English scarlet cloth, and lined with silk, with party-coloured borders; in these they spread carpets, and lay holsters to ride cross-legged, sometimes three or four in one. It is borne on two wheels only, such little ones as our four wheels are, and pinned on with a wooden arch, which serves to mount them. The charioteer rides before, a-straddle on the beam that makes the yoke for the oxen, which is covered with scarlet, and finely carved underneath. He carries a goad instead of a whip. In winter (when they rarely stir) they have a *mumjuma*, or wax-cloth to throw over it. Those for journeying are something stronger than those for the merchants to ride about the city, or to take the air on; which with their nimble oxen they will, when they meet in the fields, run races on, and contend for the garland as much as for an Olympick prize; which is a diversion, to see a *cow gallop*, as we say in scorn; but these not only pluck up their heels apace, but are taught to amble, they often riding on them.*

"The English had not yet properly adapted their mode of dress to the climate. The costume of the seventeenth century must have been found peculiarly cumbersome and oppressive in a tropical climate. Old prints represent Europeans in India with large hose, long waisted, 'peasecod-bellied' doublets, and short cloaks or mantles with standing collars. Then there were ruffs, which Stubbs says were 'of twelve, yea sixteen lengths a piece, set three or four times double;' and he adds that the ladies had a 'liquid matter, which they call starch, wherein the devil hath learned them to wash and dive their ruffs, which being dry will then stand stiff and inflexible about their necks.' Breeches, too, were worn by gentlemen preposterously large, and their conical-crowned hats were of velvet, taffata, or sarcenet, ornamented with great bunches of feathers. Probably, however, this dress approved itself to native taste better than ours. At least Fryer, when at Junar, flattered himself that Nizam Beg, the governor of the fort, admired both the splendour and novelty of his costume. Sir Thomas Roe and his suite, as we are informed, were all clothed in English dresses, only made as light and cool as possible. His attendants wore liveries of 'red taffata cloaks, guarded with green taffata,' and the chaplain always appeared in a long black cassock. Society was of the free and jovial kind. There were

* Fryer.

no English ladies, and if the factors wished to enjoy the conversation of the gentler sex, they must resort to the Dutch factory. We have an account of a wedding party there. The bride was an Armenian; the bridegroom a Dutchman. All the Europeans of the place were invited, and every lady came; so there were present one Portuguese and one Dutch matron, a young Maronite girl, and a native woman who was engaged to marry a Dutchman. The circumstances under which the Portuguese lady was brought there are so characteristic of the times, that they should be narrated. The King of Portugal was in the habit of giving a dowry every year to a few poor but well-born orphan girls, whom he sent to assist in colonizing the settlements of India. A ship which was conveying three of these maidens had been intercepted and seized by the Dutch, who immediately carried their prizes to Surat. A supply of ladies was naturally received with avidity in that time of dearth, and the most eminent of the merchants became candidates for their hands. Two were taken, we know not where; but Donna Lucia, the third, married a rich Dutchman, and was a guest at the wedding banquet. She seems to have been contented with her lot. The affection of her Protestant husband led him to tolerate her religion in private, although she was compelled to observe in public the forms of the reformed church.*

The tombs of a people show their manner of life to after ages as faithfully as other indications more frequently referred to by the antiquary and the historian. In Western India there are many monumental tombs, which are very expressive of the habits of the English in the seventeenth century. The most recent modern historian of Bombay and Surat thus writes of the tombs of the latter place:—"Fancy may see in these sepulchral ruins the continuance of an undying rivalry between the agents of England and Holland. Van Reede, the old Dutch chief, has a brave charnel-house. His mouldering bones lie beneath a double cupola of great dimensions, formerly adorned with frescoes, escutcheons, and elegant wood-work. Its original cost may be supposed to have been enormous, when we read that to repair it cost the Dutch company six thousand rupees. It is not, indeed, to be compared with the Mohammedan tombs of Delhi, Agra, and Bejapore, but no European structures of the kind, except the tomb of Hadrian at Rome, and a few others, equal it. Doubtless the intention of its builders was to eclipse the noble mausoleum which covers the remains of Sir George and Christopher Oxenden, who died a few

* Anderson.

years earlier than Van Reede. Christopher is commemorated by a cupola within the loftier and more expansive cupola raised in honour of his more distinguished brother, the president. The height of this monument is forty feet, the diameter twenty-five. Massive pillars support the cupolas, and round their interiors are galleries, reached by a flight of many steps. The body of an Indian viceroy might have found here a worthy resting-place; it is far too superb for the chief of a factory, and his brother, who was only a subordinate." The two Oxendens here referred to were men of eminent religious worth, maintaining unsullied purity amidst prevailing corruption, and a lifeful piety when a heartless formalism characterized the religious professions of the majority.

The tombs of the English in Western India do not generally convey impressions favourable to the taste, piety, and affection of those who erected them. A writer in a recent number of the *Bombay Quarterly* observes:—"A large number of inscriptions on our tombs are mere recitals of name, age, and date of death. Where regular epitaphs are composed by Anglo-Indians, their chief character is insipidity." So little care has been taken, however, of the sepulchres of those who laid the foundations of English power in India, that the monumental inscriptions are generally effaced. The writer first quoted remarks:—"No burial-grounds in India are comparable for the interest with which they are regarded by Europeans as those of Surat and Ahmedabad—particularly of Surat. They are histories. Had they been carefully preserved, instead of being barbarously neglected, during the last century, they would have thrown light upon an obscure period. As it is, their dilapidated monuments are as a few pages of a palimpsest, from which, after much painstaking and divining, a fragmentary narrative may be gleaned. Their magnificence, their escutcheons and other heraldic insignia, their religious symbols and passages of scripture, traces only of which can now be observed, prove that the inmates of European factories affected a pomp and splendour even beyond those of their successors, and made more pretensions, at least, to religious sentiments than are generally attributed to them." "As at Surat, there are also at Ahmedabad both Dutch and English cemeteries. The tombs in the former, all of dates between the years 1641 and 1679, are built, not of stone, but brick and chunnam, the inscriptions being admirably executed in the latter; and on some the Maltese Cross, or what is called the Cross of Calvary, is traced. One epitaph is in Latin, the rest are Dutch, and none are of

especial interest. All the epitaphs are remarkable for what they *do not*, rather than for what they do relate. The Dutch merchants did not often find time to express any religious sentiment, or to bewail the departed. The English ground is chiefly occupied with what may be called mess-room monuments—chilling memorials, without Christian symbols or religious allusions, unadorned by any manifestations of reverence, hope, or reflection upon the future." Such is the evidence indirectly given from the places of the dead of the habits and character of the English and their chief competitors during the eventful century the general character of which, as it regards the British in India, this chapter reviews.

The reason why there were ladies in the Dutch and not in the English factory was, that the government of Holland encouraged the matrimonial desires of the company's servants. There was a blot upon the morals of Bombay in connection with the introduction of females to the community. One of the company's own chaplains, a man of probity and piety, following the testimony of Dr. Fryer and others, describes the condition of several "cargoes" of Englishwomen sent out by the company, and barbarously deceived by them. Having described the immorality of the factors and their servants, he says:—"Nor, we are sorry to add, were these vicious propensities indulged only by men. A great many females on the island were far from exhibiting the gentler virtues which usually adorn their sex, but in this instance the company themselves were chiefly to be blamed. As Rome in her young days sat desolate until cheered by the ravished Sabines; as the poor slaves of St. Helena would not take kindly to their toil until the company brought a cargo of sable maidens to brighten their dreary hours; so also it was thought that the exiled soldiers of England must have a similar solace in Bombay. Gerald Aungier first suggested that they ought to be encouraged and assisted in contracting marriages with their countrywomen. Consistently with his character, he took a religious view of the question, and pointed out that the men, being Protestants, were in the habit of marrying native Portuguese women, the consequence of which was that their offspring were, 'through their father's neglect, brought up in the Roman Catholic principles, to the great dishonour and weakening of the Protestant religion and interest.' He therefore recommended that a supply of women should be sent out from England. This proposal was acceded to by the court of directors, and apparently improved upon, for they not only induced such

persons as were adapted to be wives of private soldiers to come, but 'gentlewomen and other women.' Unhappily, 'the gentlewomen,' as they still continued to be styled, had not learned, before they left England, to behave themselves; therefore their countrymen at Bombay were not very forward in offering them their hearts and hands. Some, however, married; but a judicious observer, who visited the island soon after, was shocked to see how sickly their children were, in consequence of the free-and-easy way in which the mothers lived, and their inveterate habit of taking strong liquors. But what was to become of those who remained single and unnoticed? Of course they supposed that the company were their honourable guardians, and that if they could not find husbands, they would at least have the protection of government. Not so the company. To the first party, indeed, a guarantee was given that they should be supported for the first year, and if, at the expiration of that time, they were still unmarried, they should be allowed their diet for another year. This engagement was faithfully kept. But then came out a second party, fondly expecting that they would be treated like their predecessors; indeed, they affirmed 'that so much was declared to them at the East India-house, by Mr. Lewis.' Nevertheless, their claims were not recognised. After considerable agitation on their part, and reluctance on the president's part, six or eight pagodas a month were allowed to *such as were actually in distress*; the more obvious objects of charity. The poor creatures had clearly been deluded, and almost left to starve. What was the result? They must have been tempted, if not actually driven, to sell their charms to the first bidder. The small stock of virtue which they had brought with them was of course soon expended. Then,—and not until then,—when they had been led into temptation, the voice of authority and erring-mocking piety assumed a threatening tone." The author of the foregoing remarks, with much grounds for the accusation, declares that Governor Aungier, whose general excellence he commends, had "much Protestant zeal, but little Christian love." It is easy to imagine that the company encouraged these unfortunate emigrants to believe that they should receive support, when it was not intended to perform what they were led to suppose would be done for them, when we remember how frequently of late years persons embarking in undertakings, believing that they did so assured of government support, have found themselves deceived. The treatment of medical civilians during the Russian war, and of other classes, is too well known

not to be readily called up to remembrance by the reader in exemplification of this. Government and public bodies in England are too much in the habit of putting forth vaguely expressed offers and inducements to persons or bodies of persons whose services it is desirable to engage, and then taking shelter behind the vagueness and indefiniteness of the phraseology employed, although obviously tending to mislead, if it meant anything short of what the deceived and injured parties supposed it to mean.

It appears that the use of tea, at first a luxury among the English in India as well as at home, had become familiar among them at Surat before its value became known to the company in London. It is probable that the factors at the capital of the English settlements in Western India were accustomed to sip the fragrant and exhilarating beverage for a longer time than is generally supposed before the directors or the royal family in England knew anything of "the cup which cheers but not inebriates." Tea was certainly a commodity of trade between China and Surat for a considerable time before it was an article of import in Britain. The Dutch, who generally anticipated the English in the discovery of useful articles of commerce, perceived the value of this article both in India and in Holland a number of years before the English court quaffed the strange but even then esteemed, delicious, and enlivening beverage. Although the Dutch medical practitioners generally, as afterwards the English, offered opposition, champions were found in Holland among the members of the faculty from the first, who advocated it as advantageous. Tulpius, a celebrated physician of Amsterdam, acquired still higher reputation by a treatise on the virtues of "*Thee*," in the year 1641. The following extracts are taken from the records of the East India-house. At that time (1664) "some good *thea*," as it was then spelt, was deemed an acceptable present for his majesty, King Charles II.

1664, *July 1st*.—Ordered, that the master attendant do go on board the ships now arrived, and enquire what rarities of birds, beasts, or other curiosities, there are on board, fit to present to his majesty, and to desire that they may not be disposed of till the company are supplied with such as they may wish, on paying for the same.

August 22nd.—The governor acquainting the court that the factors have in every instance failed the company of such things as they writ for, to have presented his majesty with, and that his majesty may not find himself wholly neglected by the company, he was of opinion, if the court think fit, that a silver case of oil of cinnamon, which is to be had of Mr. Thomas Winter for seventy-five pounds, and some good *thea*, he provided for that end, which he hopes may be acceptable. The court approved very well thereof.

After the first half of the seventeenth century had passed away, the social rank of the English in India became much elevated. Persons of superior station in England were sent out to India, and the company at home comprised noblemen and members of parliament. The traders were no longer so anxious as formerly "to sort their trade with men only of their own quality;" they became eager for the connection of "gentlemen," a class of whose association with them they had been so much afraid, lest the traders of England should in consequence withdraw their confidence. The increased salaries of the chief persons in the factories induced "gentlemen" to use their influence to obtain these offices; and the style of *social* humility which had characterized the factors, became much modified by the infusion of a new class among them. It does not appear that the sagacity, morality, or religious zeal of the factors and agents was improved by these accessions of gentility, but the social bearing of the English was in some respects elevated. One of the influences which acted most unfavourably upon the social, and even religious condition of the English in India, during the latter portion of the first half of the seventeenth century, and throughout the second half, was the presence and conduct of "interlopers." This class committed no inconsiderable portion of the crimes committed by the English, and by which the native governments were so often enraged, overlooking the provocation which their subjects offered to all foreigners. The factories were kept in a state of incessant apprehension by these intruders, and a spirit on the part of one class of Englishmen towards another, of a resentful and vindictive kind was fostered, which sunk the moral character of the nation in the esteem of other nations, native and European, disturbed social intercourse among the English themselves, and impeded their religious efforts. It also rendered the customs and manners of the English less intelligible to the native governments, as well as peoples; for they could not comprehend how men of the same nation professing loyalty to the same throne, could be so opposed in policy. Mr. Mill, logically right as to the superior facilities which free-trade would have given for the exchange of the products of India and England, overlooks, as Professor Wilson reminds his readers, the impossibility of private adventurers providing force to encounter the armed competition of the other European companies, and the oppressions of the natives. The learned professor, however, replies to Mr. Mill in a tone more peremptory than argumentative. The following remarks on the subject, by the Rev. Philip Anderson, places

the matter ethically and logically, as well as circumstantially, in its true light:—"Yet it must be admitted, that when once a monopoly was legally established, an invasion of its privileges became an insult upon the majesty of law. The agents of the company in India, therefore, were fully justified in resenting the intrusions of 'interlopers.' Their masters had entrusted to them the defence of a monopoly, which, however objectionable to those who had no share in its advantages, was a species of property which had been obtained with all the forms of law and justice. Moreover, their establishment was maintained at a great expense, and they often disbursed large sums of money to procure and retain the favour of a corrupt court in England, and a still corrupter court in India. The factors were, as it were, keepers of a manor, for which the tenants, their masters, paid a high rent, and which they farmed at a heavy cost. Interlopers, then, were to them as poachers, who must be warned off, and if they persisted in their depredations, strenuously attacked with fire and sword, or prosecuted in courts of law as enemies not only of the East India Company, but also of the British nation."

Another of the circumstances which militated against the moral and religious life of the company's officers, was the permission given to them to trade on their own account, as well as in the interest of the company. Notice has been taken in previous chapters of the detriment to the trade of the company which thus arose, and of the resolution taken by the directors of the company to put it down. It appears that an oath was exacted from the servants and chiefs in the factories, not to trade on their own account. This was supposed by the majority of the directors to be the only security against the practice. Some of the factory agents were, however, men who objected to take an oath on any ground or for any reason. They offered to make a declaration under liability to any penalty which might be incurred by perjury. This was thought reasonable by a large party among the proprietors at home, but not by the majority, and the oath was insisted upon. This gave rise to "great heats," among the proprietors and directors in London, the opposition of the non-jurors as they may be called, having led to considerable commotion in the mercantile world. The Rev. Philip Anderson says, referring to the dishonesty which led to so much turmoil—"These scandalous proceedings led the court to require from them all an oath, that they would not engage in private trade, and this, in spite of their Anabaptist members, who pressed hard for the substitution of a mere declaration." This is

scarcely a candid way of putting the facts of the case, nor is the tone of the reverend writer liberal and just. He makes the statement upon the authority of Bruce's *Annals*, Anderson's *Colonial Church*, and Evelyn's *Diary*. Bruce merely refers to the dry and naked fact of an opposition having been made; Anderson's *Colonial Church*, is hardly an apposite authority in the case; the entry in Evelyn's *Diary* is as follows:—"1657, Nov. 26. I went to London to a court of ye East India Company on its new union, in Merchant-taylors' Hall, where was much disorder by reason of the Anabaptists, who would have the adventurers oblig'd onely by an engagement, without swearing, that they might still pursue their private trade; but it was carried against them." The word Anabaptist was at that time a term of reproach used against any sect of religionists, whose views were not well understood, and appeared eccentric, or peculiar, especially if they resisted episcopal authority, supervision, and state in ecclesiastical affairs; but the name was more especially applied to Baptists, who, of course, were not Anabaptists in their views of the ordinances of baptism: nor did their general opinions, religious or political, bear any resemblance

to those of the Anabaptists of Munster, whose wild and violent proceedings brought so much odium upon the name. Evelyn did not understand these distinctions, nor care to understand them; but Mr. Anderson, as a learned modern divine, must have been aware of them, and is censurable for copying an error which he knew to be one, so far as the class who opposed the oath-test, and their motives, were concerned. They were, no doubt conscientious persons, who took views of an oath similar to those which Quakers and Moravians now hold, and which, however others may believe to be erroneous, as does the writer of this history, yet society tolerantly respects the scruples of those who make a conscience of the matter.

Although the jurors and non-jurors in the factories were of one mind as to the undesirableness of taking any pledge against private trading, the form of the test and the acquiescence of those who had no religious scruples about it, led to social differences which left fresh impressions of the unaccountable manners of the English among the Portuguese, Banyans, Parsees, and other natives, who, although brought into less intimate contact with the British, were observant of their ways.

CHAPTER LIV.

REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF BRITISH CONNECTION WITH INDIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (*Continued*).

NOTWITHSTANDING the many drawbacks to the social and religious life of the English, there grew up gradually much outward respect to religion in the usages of the factors. Every morning at six, and every evening at eight o'clock, prayers were read or offered every Sunday; in addition to these services was one other, after which a sermon was delivered. The author of *The Early History of the Factories at Surat and Bombay*, thus writes on this subject:—"Few are the records still extant of this period, all who read them at the present time must be struck by their religious tone; they prove that it was an age of religious profession, if not of moral practice. Puritanism was dominant, or at least had not given way to that open profligacy, that ridicule of sacred things, and contempt of religion, which disgraced the reign of Charles II. In India religious men did not blush to own their fear of God, and it suited the purposes of irreligious men to imitate them. Official correspondence even was devout. Thus when Rastell had arrived

in St. Augustine's Bay on his passage to Surat, he commenced his homeward despatch with these words:—"It hath pleased Almighty God in his great goodness to protect us hither in safety, and in blessed union and concord together, the 14th day of this present month; our people generally then in reasonable good plight, and without the loss of any more than five men in our whole fleet, for the which His mercies may His Blessed Name be magnified for ever.' And he concludes by declaring, that he humbly commends his masters in his prayers, entreating God to bless them, and direct their counsels and affairs. When announcing the death of a subordinate in 1630 the chief of the factory writes thus:—"The death of Mr. Duke was very unwelcome unto us, as being sensible of the want you will find by the missing of so able an assistant in that place where he hath been long acquainted. God of His mercy so direct our hearts, who must follow him, that we may be always ready for the like sudden summons.' The same style is observable in all official letters, and

the usual formula with which they conclude is, 'Commending you to the Almighty's protection,' or 'Commending you to God's merciful guidance.' Yet these pious adventurers had notions of their own about the observance of the Lord's Day. Although they were scrupulous in attending divine service, in the disposal of the rest of their time they preferred the *Book of Sports* to the *Lesser Catechism*. After sermon on Sundays they used to repair to the suburbs, where they amused themselves in a garden by shooting at the butt; and—which was still less to be defended—they indulged to some extent in gambling. Their visitor, who has told us these little facts, was so skilful in shooting that he contrived to win a hundred mamondis or five pistoles almost every week. Each inmate of the factory had his allotted hours for work and recreation. On Fridays, after prayers, the president and a few friends met for the purpose of friendly intercourse, and of drinking the health of their wives left in England."

The respect paid at that time to clergymen, and to the externals of religion, both in England and in the colonies, is fairly depicted in this passage relating to the manners of the English at Surat and Bombay. The writer very justly takes Lord Macaulay, the brilliant historian of England, to task, for the light in which he placed the habits of Englishmen in this respect. The years during which the above description of the factors at Bombay and Surat applies, include the period to which Lord Macaulay refers, when he describes with such exaggerations the degradation of the clergy. He writes:—"The clergy were regarded as, on the whole, a plebeian class. And, indeed, for one who made the figure of a gentleman, ten were mere menial servants.' And again:—"A young Levite might be had for his board, a small garret, and ten pounds a year,' for which he was expected to live as a servant. These statements are taken from a satire of Oldham's, and given as grave history. Yet, at the same time, a German traveller noticed the great respect shown at Surat to the clergy, and it is a fact, that when Oxenden, Aungier, Streynsham Master—all men of good families—were there, the chaplain received higher pay than all the senior factors, and took precedence after the members of council. Is there any reason to suppose that the East India Company delighted more than others to honour the clergy?"

During the reign of the second Charles, and the first James, there were many of the higher gentry in England who made small account of clergymen, and in various instances there is proof of their depression being as

great as Lord Macaulay describes; but this contempt for men "in orders" did not descend to the middle and mercantile classes, from whom they received high and venerating respect. His lordship omits to make this distinction broadly, and hence life among the English in India, seems so opposed to life in England, as the records of the one, and Lord Macaulay's statements of the other, would make appear.

Among the proofs given by some writers of the low condition, morally and religiously, of the English in India during the seventeenth century, are their neglect of treaty and other engagements with the natives and rival European nations. The terms on which the Portuguese commander of Bombay surrendered the island to the officers of Charles, have, it is alleged, never been kept by the British, and this is very frequently put forward as a strong point against their honour. The truth is the treaty or agreement thus made, was never ratified by either of the courts concerned. The island was, as has been shown in a previous chapter, the property of the English monarch, in virtue of a marriage contract with the royal house of Portugal; and it was the duty of the Portuguese king, not only to see that it was absolutely ceded, but that compensation should be made for any delay in the cession created by the Portuguese officers on the spot. Indeed, the English did demand reparation from the Portuguese government for the damages sustained. The native princes frequently made agreements, suffered their subjects to violate them, and yet insisted upon the English performing their part in a covenant rendered no longer mutual, by the previous violation on the one part. At a later period (during the eighteenth century) the English in India were exposed to similar imputations from their own countrymen at home, frequently with as little justice.

The conduct of the company in violating contracts with their own countrymen was often very bad, and especially so towards their soldiers. The rise of the English military power in the seventeenth century, presents a strange example of how the day of small things may precede the day of great ones. In 1677 there was a militia corps, equal in number to a weak modern infantry battalion, at Bombay. Neither the Brahmins nor Banyans would serve, but commuted service by a money payment; the other natives offered no objection, as far as can be gathered from the documents now in existence: they were chiefly half-caste Portuguese. The regular troops were seldom of any great account as to numbers. The company's force, on taking

possession of Bombay Island, consisted of ninety-three English, and a hundred and eighty-seven French and Portuguese deserters and half-castes. This has been called the company's first European regiment, but there was a proportion of natives among them. This corps was gradually strengthened, especially by German mercenaries. These were in great favour with the English, between whom and them a better agreement existed than between any other sections of this motley battalion. A desire to hire Rajpoots existed among the directors, which was but slowly responded to by their agents; for although that class of Indians were very warlike, they were proud and vindictive, and were generally esteemed treacherous if once their fidelity was shaken. In 1676, there were forty troopers miserably mounted. The English have always been noted for mounting their cavalry inefficiently, and even at this early period of their Indian empire they showed this peculiarity. It arose from a misguided parsimony, which was coexistent with extravagance in other particulars. It was difficult to keep up regular troops at Bombay; the island was so unhealthy at that time from its marshy surface that malaria swept away Europeans, especially European soldiers, very fast. The company's factors were instructed to study military tactics in case the defence of the settlement should oblige them to hold military commissions. The ideas which the directors at home entertained of military drill is curiously shown in some of their despatches. The following order is a specimen:—"We would have the inhabitants modelled into trained bands under English or other officers as there shall be cause, and make of them one or two regiments, or more, as your number will hold out, exercising them in arms one day in every two months, or as often as you shall think may be convenient, but you need not always waste powder at such exercise, but teach them to handle their arms, their facings, wheeling, marching, and counter marching, the first ranks to present, draw their triggers together at the beat of the drum, and fall into the rear for the second ranks to advance, as is often used with learners in our artillery ground, but sometimes they must be used to firing, lest in time of action they should start at the noise or the recoil of their arms."

There was much drilling in pursuance of this order, and the more the troops were exercised, the greater the proportion of them who perished with pestilence, especially by a particular form, which, as described by the physicians of that day, exactly corresponded with the disease called *cholera morbus* in this

age. Four-fifths of the troops sent from Europe to Bombay perished within a few years, many within a few months of their arrival, until about 1685, when the drainage of the low-lying lands near the sea was, to some extent, effected.

Notwithstanding the intrepidity shown by the British in their naval contests with the Portuguese, and the individual daring of most of them when danger beset, there was no promise of future military eminence in the composition or character of the first troops raised in Bombay, or in the management of those recruits sent out from England. The officers frequently committed outrages upon the civilians of their own countrymen, and their insolence and abuse of respectable natives was disgraceful to their profession. Some of them were even convicted of acts of petty piracy and robbery in the harbour. The non-commissioned officers unfortunately followed the example so infamously set them. The opinion which the immortal Clive gave of the state of the troops in India, previous to his time and as for the most part he found them when he arrived in India, is borne out by documentary evidence at the India-house, and by the testimony of impartial travellers. "Formerly the company's troops consisted of the refuse of our jails, commanded by an officer seldom above the rank of lieutenant, and in one or two instances with that of major; without order, discipline, or military ardour.*"

The conduct of the company to its soldiers during the seventeenth century was unjust. In this respect the company only copied the royal governments of their country. To the great officers England has been generally munificent; but to the inferior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, she has never been generous. No nation was ever so heroically served by her troops; no nation ever repaid military devotion more shabbily. Until the year 1858 the poor soldier was literally plundered by certain classes of his superiors, military and civilian. "The system" of the British army was so administered, that whether in camp or barrack, at home, or on foreign service, in tent or sleeping room, in mess or in clothing, the soldier was cheated and inhumanly neglected. Even the arms and working tools supplied to him were fraudulently manufactured, and he was compelled to make good the damage from fractures, &c., out of his miserable pay. The English soldier was subjected to a discipline which forbade him to complain to the public, and was then remorselessly robbed, and

* MS. quoted by Bruce in his *Plans for the Government of British India*. Part ii. chap. i. sec. 4.

cruelly left to die in filthy or ill-ventilated barrack-rooms,* or on foreign march, and on far-off encampments, from inadequate supplies. The reader acquainted with these facts can feel no astonishment if the troops in Bombay Island were robbed, oppressed, and neglected in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Such was the case. According to a letter from the deputy-governor and council of Bombay, written the 24th of January, 1676, or, as Orme alleges, 1677, to the court of directors, captains were compelled to serve for the pay of lieutenants, and each inferior rank to serve for the pay of the rank immediately beneath it. Certain surplus sums actually given to the troops at former times were exacted from them in the form of repayments by instalments; various other oppressions at last drove the troops into revolt. There was no failing in their loyalty, but they had been goaded to madness by wrongs, and by the insolent contempt which the mercantile servants of the company showed to them. On these circumstances, an eminent clergyman of Bombay, who had studied the records of the period, and who partook of no partialities for the military, thus wrote; and the annals of Bruce, and the narratives of Fryer and others, justify fully the judgment expressed:—"Could any government expect that their troops would return such ungenerous treatment with steadfast attachment and unshaken fidelity? In 1674 the court of directors received a most solemn warning that such would not be the case. The soldiers affirmed that the court had promised them a month's pay, with a free discharge, after they should have served three years; and when this was not accorded to them, they broke out into a mutiny, which was only subdued after concessions had been made. Three of the ring-leaders were condemned to be shot, and on one—a Corporal Fake—the sentence was executed. The other two were pardoned by the president. Shaxton, the officer in command, was suspected of abetting the revolt, and was accused of remissness in checking his men's insubordination. Fryer, who was on the spot at the time, thought that a foolish rivalry divided the civil or mercantile and military branches of the service, and that Shaxton's real offence was similar to one which excited Romulus to commit fratricide, for that he had only mortified the factor's vanity by treating their engineering efforts with contempt, and ridiculing some palisades with which they had fortified Bombay. Whatever

the nature of his crime, he was obliged to give up his sword, and was placed in confinement. A court of judicature was then formed for his trial, in which a pompous attorney impeached him, and compared him to Cataline. But the soldier defended himself with ability, and the court decided that they could do nothing, but refer his case to the court of directors. He was therefore sent to England, where he died at the termination of his voyage."

The company was not warned by these events; but at a later period, by further mulcting the soldiery, and paying their native labourers part of their wages in rice, at a price fixed by the company's officer, at least ten per cent. above its market value, the troops and people were driven into revolt together. A narrative of the main features of that affair, which was led by Keigwin, have already been related in a previous chapter; it is only necessary to say here, in reviewing the events of the century, and the moral history of those transactions, that the inveterate depreciation of the military service by the mercantile community in England and in India was the true source of these evils. It is surprising to mark the courage and constancy of British soldiers under provocations of so much neglect and injustice. No other army could have maintained self-respect under so many indignities; nor could they have exhibited such greatness of soul as our poor soldiers have displayed, with so little example or encouragement from their civil masters,—

" 'Tis wonderful
That an invisible instinct should frame them
To loyalty unlearned, honour untaught,
Civility not seen from others, valour
That wildly grows in them, but yields a crop
As if it had been sowed."

Neither did the second revolt at Bombay teach the company—or at all events their civil officers—"justice to the soldier." Although (as has been shown in a previous chapter) Keigwin obeyed the mandate of the king, and delivered up the island, assured of immunity for himself and those who acted under him, the agreement was not entirely and faithfully kept by the government. It was probably not the intention of the directors to violate the terms of what may be called the capitulation, so extensively as they were violated, but they had from the first no intention of faithfully keeping it. The royal government countenanced no harsh treatment in the case. The violent and unprincipled president of Surat,—a man whom Dr. Cooke Taylor represents as having been as

* The writer of this history, accompanied by a clergyman, saw the sleeping-room of a married soldier, quartered in an English provincial town, through which a drain ran!

"cowardly as he was cruel," Sir John Child,* barbarously and perfidiously, made the revolt a pretext for the gratification of his personal enmities, under pretence of jealousy for the honour of the company, although during the revolution the company was better served by the revolters than it had been under the management of Sir John Child's deputies. One of the company's own chaplains, already quoted, thus comments upon these proceedings:—"Such was a revolt which happily began and ended without bloodshed—if we except a wound inflicted at table by Thorburn on Keigwin in a drunken quarrel. Alarming as it was, and dangerous to the existence of Anglo-Indian power, it forms an episode in our history of which we are not ashamed. Keigwin emerges from the troubled sea of rebellion with a reputation for courage, honour, and administrative capacity. His crime of treason was in a measure atoned for by his moderation and shining qualities, and found some palliation in the provocation which he received, and which the president—as we infer from his subsequent conduct—must have aggravated. On the other hand, the clemency of the crown and company is worthy of all admiration, and leads us to ask, Where is the nation that can, like the English, vindicate the authority of its government, bring down the haughty front of successful rebellion, and at the same time not suffer justice to inflict a single pang on mercy?" The reverend writer seems carried away by his love of country to contradict by anticipation his own testimony, notwithstanding his general accuracy, for he immediately afterwards admits, on the ground of documents seen by himself, that the company privately countenanced the persecution of the pardoned revolters. He also gives this picture of the horrible and heartrending barbarity and cruelty of Sir John Child:—"It is true that accounts differ as to the manner in which the terms of surrender were observed; but if it should be shown that they were infringed, an imputation could not be cast upon the English government, nor, save indirectly, upon the company, but only upon their president. Writers who were favourable to the company simply state that they acted in good faith; their opponents accuse their servants of treachery, but with such obvious malice, that we suspect their veracity. Fletcher, who had

joined the rebels, but whose conduct was, in other respects, unblemished, retained the command of his company. But Thorburn is said to have fallen a victim to Sir John Child's malignity, and there is every reason to believe that he was treated with singular harshness. It is possible that he was justly committed to prison, in consequence of his inability to satisfy the demands of his creditors; but when there, we are told, not a slave was permitted to attend upon him, nor his own wife to visit him. Hard treatment brought on a fever, and his life was in danger. The jailer conveyed this mournful intelligence to his wife, who hastened, together with her two small children, to the general's presence, and entreated that her husband might be provided with a medical attendant. The boon was denied, but she was permitted to share his sufferings. She soothed his pain one day and part of a night, after which he breathed his last. Shuddering humanity turns with distrust from the remainder of the narrative, and therefore we abridge it. On returning home she found the doors of her own house closed against her, and was obliged to take up her abode with her slaves and children in a small outhouse. Her relatives ventured to give her succour only at night, and by stealth. The widow of Thorburn was a proscribed outcast, till her beauty and sufferings attracted the love and compassion of an officer who commanded an East Indiaman, and imagined that he was independent of Sir John Child. He wedded her, and also her misfortunes. At the general's request he was deprived of his appointment. Grief soon put an end to his troubles and his life. The lady was again left a widow, with a thousand pounds of East India stock for the support of herself and family."

What the conduct of the company really was may be determined by their own despatches. In one of these letters they thus direct the president:—"As for Watson, that scandalous chaplain of Bombay, let him have no salary from us, from the time of his rebellion, nor any other officers there, as near as you can, without incurring a new hazard, until you are firmly settled in your government. And let Mr. Watson know he is no more our servant: banish him the island; and let him take care to pay for his own passage home, and provide yourselves another chaplain for Bombay out of some of our ships, if you can meet with any so much to your satisfaction as you have at Surat in the room of Mr. Badham, deceased."* The crime of Mr. Watson was that of ministering to the

* It is surprising that so just an historical critic as Miss Martineau should overlook the real character of the Brothers Child in her admiration of their ability. Even as to talent, Sir Josiah was the head, and Sir John the hand, very much to the injury of the company, for he was rash, desperate, and vindictive, without directness, steadfastness, or bravery.

* *Letters from the Court to the President and Council, 1684-85.*

revolutionary army and people, which he might in any case, as a clergyman, have felt bound to do; how much more when the revolted acted in the name of the king?

There is reason to believe that the prejudice against the soldiery,—the officers more particularly,—and persecution of them, and of all who took their side in these disputes, although finding ready acquiescence with the directors as a body, was chiefly the work of Sir Josiah Child, who ruled the company at home, by his personal address, simulation of ingenuousness, strong common sense, and extensive acquaintance with trade. Bishop Burnet thus notices him:—"This summer Sir Josiah Child died; he was a man of great notions as to merchandise, which was his education, and in which he succeeded beyond any man of his time; he applied himself chiefly to the East India trade, which by his management was raised so high, that it drew much envy and jealousy both upon himself and upon the company; he had a compass of knowledge and apprehension beyond any merchant I ever knew; he was vain and covetous, and thought too cunning, though to me he seemed always sincere."*

There is a curious and yet painful exemplification of the morals of the directors at home in their repeated attempts to open up a slave-trade with Western India. The following is a just summary of the letters from the court to the president and council of Surat, during July, 1683, and February, 1684, as they were quoted in the appendix of Colquhoun's treatise:—"Slaves were amongst the exports of the English factory at this time. The Island of St. Helena had been bestowed by the crown upon the company, and they wanted labourers for their plantations. So they desired their president at Surat to send them cargoes of negroes, with as little concern as if they had been any other kind of live or dead stock, and mentioned twenty pounds per head as the purchase-money. At first only males were exported, and these desolate beings remained at St. Helena without any of those domestic enjoyments by which even the life of a slave may be solaced. However, there is a point at which oppression defeats its own projects. Like many other animals when deprived of their mates, the slaves became troublesome. So wives were demanded for them. The honourable company do not, indeed, hint that their commercial minds were susceptible of pity, but their interests were in this case promoted by showing kindness to their human cattle. 'It may be convenient,' they wrote, 'you should send near as many female slaves as male to St. Helena, because

the male will not live so contented, except they have wives.'"

A letter from the court to the president and council at Surat was written in May, 1683, which contained a postscript, probably the most singular which has come down to our times in connection either with the East India Company or the courts of England:—

His majesty hath required of us to send to India to provide for him there one male and two female blacks, but they must be dwarfs of the least size that you can procure, the male to be about seventeen years of age, and the females about fourteen. We would have you, next to their littleness, to chuse such as may have the best features, and to send them home upon any of our ships, giving the commander great charge to take care of their accommodation, and in particular of the females, that they be in no way abused in the voyage by any of the seamen; for their provision and clothes you must take care to lay it in, and let them be set out with such ear and nose-rings, and shackles for ornaments about their legs (of false stones, and brass, but not with gold), as is usual to wear in the country, but let them not be used by them in the voyage, but sent to us apart.

Upon this extraordinary *postscriptum* in a despatch, the author of *The Early History of the Factory at Surat, of Bombay, and the Subordinate Factories on the Western Coast*, makes the following comment:—"Whether three unhappy creatures of precisely such ages, sizes, and features as were required, or whether, indeed, any were ever procured and forwarded, we are not informed. The court seemed as if they did not feel they were seeking to traffic in human beings. They write not of men and women, boys and girls, but only use the words male and female, as they might in reference to any strange animals. The reason why this order was sent is obvious. It was in the year 1683, when the company was seriously alarmed lest their exclusive privileges should be lost. A rival company were strenuously endeavouring to obtain a royal charter, and it was said that the people favoured their attempt. Even the king and council had taken the matter into consideration. The old company, therefore, strained every nerve to conciliate the monarch, and were anxious to indulge all the caprices of the royal and effete debauchee. They not only listened to his puerile request for toys with souls in them, but also would have them ornamented in such a manner as they supposed would satisfy the most fastidious taste."

British interests in India have, as already shown, been signally indebted to physicians, a class who at home have, to the present day, shown much disinterestedness and benevolence in the practice of their profession towards those whose necessities required their generosity. They have been equally distinguished for their public spirit and patriotism, in the navy, the army, and the cities of the

* *History of his own Times*, book vi.

empire, in the shipwreck, the battle, and the regions of pestilence and death. It is only when they are in competition with one another that they appear to disadvantage. In Scotland and Ireland medical men have always held a higher social place than in England; this fact, however difficult to account for, is indisputable. Fryer, a physician, already quoted as a traveller and author, passed through many strange adventures in India; and the authentic accounts of him reveal the manners of men of his profession in the English factories and settlements in the seventeenth century, and also disclose their peculiar relations to the communities in which they dwelt, and the natives beyond their own immediate sphere with whom, professionally, they were frequently brought in contact. Fryer's services as a physician began in India in 1673. He frequently attended the wealthier Portuguese and Dutch, and was called to great distances into the interior to visit rich Brahmins, Mohammedans, and even princes, when native skill failed to afford them succour. Fryer was an eminent scholar as well as a skilful *medicus*; his enterprise was energetic and courageous, his aptitude for dealing with the natives keen and prompt, and his observation of men and things clear and comprehensive. On one occasion he was sent for to Junar by the Mogul commander-in-chief, and the narrative given of his adventures there and by the way are amusing and very instructive as to the manners of the time and country, both native and European. The following abstract of his adventures has been given by the late vice-president of the Bombay branch of the Asiatic Society:—"On reaching his destination, Fryer attended the durbar, respectfully presented a letter from the English president, and met with a courteous reception; but after being told who his patients were, was desired to wait for the occurrence of a fortunate day. At length, being summoned to the baram, he found a bed hung with silk curtains, and was desired to place his hand under the curtains, in order that he might feel an invalid's pulse. At first his conductors played him a trick, and let him touch the wrist of a healthy slave; but when he declared that the owner was in robust health, there was extended to him an arm which gave signs of a weak constitution, and left him no doubt as to what should be his prescription. The following day the khan sent for him to bleed another of his wives. Across the apartment into which he was ushered a large curtain extended, through a hole of which an arm was stretched. As good luck would have it, there was behind this screen a number of inquisitive ladies,

who, as they peeped through, so pressed upon it, that suddenly it gave way, and revealed the whole bevy fluttering like so many birds over which a net has been spread. None endeavoured to escape, but there they stood, pretending to be excessively modest, and peering at the doctor through the open lattices of their fingers. As for him, he found himself holding by the arm 'a plump russet dame,' who summoned the blood to her cheeks, and commanded that the curtain should be replaced. No offence was given or taken. The doctor was rewarded with a golden shower of pagodas poured into the basin over which his patient had been bled, and his servants, to his infinite satisfaction, drew them out of the extravasated gore. As he was returning, the bearers of his palanquin must have tried to enjoy a joke at his expense. But it was in the end no joke for them. Drawing near a small grove, they saw such a blaze of light created by fireflies, that they really were, or pretended to be, terrified. The learned doctor, not being milder and gentler than the rest of his countrymen, drew his sword, and, as he said, by opening a vein or two, let out the *shaitan* who had crept into their fancies. Yet the perpetrator of such a wanton and tyrannical act could listen with the most tender compassion to tales of misery which the natives told, and which probably were at that time as harrowing themes as the people of any country have ever dilated on." It is stated by the same authority:—"Fryer had the company's interests in view as well as his own. He did his utmost to open a trade between Junar and Bombay, suggesting that the Mogul general might in this way provide his army from Bussora and Mocha, in exchange for which he could give the ordinary merchandise of his country. However, the Mahratta army, possessing the intervening districts, were an obstruction in this route which probably was not overcome."

Bombay, the events of which occupy so much space in the history of this century, was not as enticing to our countrymen when they took possession of it, or for long after, as it at last became. Lord Macaulay furnishes some amusing notices in his *History of England* of the little interest taken by the English of that age in beautiful or hold scenery, although it is certain his lordship's picture of the period in that particular is exaggerated. The first British settlers at Bombay, and their successors for some time, could see nothing in the beauty of the situation to compensate its insalubrity and other local disadvantages. Certainly the condition of the island itself gave no promise of its ever assuming the aspect which it now wears. Anderson thus

depicts its state and appearance at the time when the English were quietly settled down in it:—"Indeed, the place must have looked desolate enough. Large tracts of land, which have since been recovered from the sea, were then overflowed. At high tides the waves flowed to the part called Umerkhadi, and covered the present Bhandi Bazaar. Near where the temple of Mumbadevi stands, a place still called *Paydhuni*, or *feet-washing*, marks where a small stream of salt water was formerly left by the receding tide, and where persons might wash their feet before entering Bombay. Where Kamatapore is now there was then sufficient depth of water for the passage of boats. In fact, during one part of every day only a group of islets was to be seen. According to Fryer, forty thousand acres of good land were thus submerged. The rest of the island seemed for the most part a barren rock, not being extensively wooded, as at present, but producing only some cocoa palms, which covered the esplanade. The principal town was Mahim. On Dongari Hill, adjoining the harbour, there was a small collection of fishermen's huts, and a few houses were seen interspersed among palm-trees, where the fort now stands. On various spots were built towers with small pieces of ordnance, as a protection against Malabar pirates, who had become peculiarly insolent, plundering villages, and either murdering the inhabitants, or carrying them into slavery. The English also found, but soon removed, a government house, which was slightly fortified, defended by four brass guns, and surrounded by one of the most delightful gardens. Portuguese society was depraved and corrupt. The population did not exceed ten thousand."

This writer expresses his astonishment that the English did not recognise the advantages of the place, as the most important in India, both to their power and commerce. It appears, however, that the company did recognise its importance, by their persistent occupation of it, even through many misfortunes, and their removal thither of the presidency of Surat. They could hardly have foreseen its progress in the eighteenth century, and its ultimate greatness. The importance of a position in the transactions of commerce or war is relative: there then existed no such relative importance in the position itself to the native powers, or the rival European settlements, as afforded to either the English or other foreigners any ground of anticipating its subsequent greatness and relations. Events afterwards marked out Calcutta as a more suitable seat for English dominion in the East. The decay of the Mogul Empire, the conquest

of the Mahrattas, the vast designs and bold attempts of the French, the various internal changes and revolutions in the peninsula, all contributed to give to Bombay the relative importance it finally attained; but these were events beyond the foresight of the most sagacious merchants or statesmen, and the British were too practical to indulge in vaticinations. All the importance was attached to Bombay that it deserved in the circumstances of that age, as soon as the English were long enough there to test its value, and its commercial and political relation to India generally.

When, towards the close of the seventeenth century, Bombay was improved by drainage, increase of population, enlarged commerce, and respectable public buildings, it was worthy of being the great centre and chief settlement of the English communities in India. The neighbourhood at that time differed very much in appearance from its aspect of a century earlier or a century later, and still more from the aspect it presents at present. The following description of a portion of the vicinity carefully deduced from the authorities, English and foreign, which afford any information upon the subject, is probably as correct as it is striking:—"At the other side of the small strait which separates Salsette from Bombay were the Acquada Blockhouse, and on the hill a mile beyond Bandora the Portuguese Church, which so gracefully overlooks the sea. The Roman Catholic services were well performed. A new landing-place led to a College of Paulitines, as the Jesuits were then called. Before the college stood a large cross, and before that was a space, which when the traveller from whose work this account is chiefly taken, visited it, was 'thwack'd full of young blacks singing vespers.' The collegiate establishment was defended, like a fortress, with seven cannon, besides small arms. Great hospitality prevailed, and distinguished guests were, on their arrival and departure, saluted with a roar of artillery. The Superior possessed such extensive influence that his mandates were respectfully attended to in the surrounding country, and the traveller who had the good fortune to be provided with his letters commendatory, was met by the people, wherever he halted, with presents of fruit and wine. The town of Bandora was large, with tiled houses. A view from mid-channel, embracing the town, college, and Church of St. Andrew, was extremely picturesque. At a distance of four miles was another church, described as magnificent; and the whole neighbourhood was studded with the villas of Portuguese gentlemen, many of whom lived in considerable state. To the east of Salsette, the sail

by way of Thana to Bassein, which is now so justly admired, must in those days have been of unrivalled beauty. Trombay was adorned with a neat church and country seat. When Thana had been passed, the traveller's eye rested at every half mile on elegant mansions. Two of these deserve special mention. One, the property of John de Melos, was three miles from Thana. It stood on a sloping eminence, decorated with terraced walks and gardens, and terminating at the water side with a banqueting house, which was approached by a flight of stone steps. A mile further was Grebondel, the property of Martin Alphonso, said to be 'the richest Don on this side Goa.' Above rose his fortified mansion, and a church of stately architecture. Within Bassein were six churches, four convents, a college of Jesuits, another of Franciscans, and a library of historical, moral, and expository works. The *Hidalgos'* dwellings, with their balconies and lofty windows, presented an imposing appearance. Christians only were permitted to sleep within the walls of the town, and native tradesmen were compelled to leave at nightfall."

The termination of the seventeenth century in western India disclosed a condition of social existence in the English factories truly horrible. The older the settlement, the worse the settlers. There is scarcely any vice for which Surat and Bombay had not obtained a terrible notoriety. The number of English ladies who had during the last quarter of the seventeenth century arrived in India, with the hope of marrying rich factors or merchants, were generally successful in their speculations, but their behaviour as wives neither brought honour to themselves, nor happiness to their husbands. In all classes, high and low, the grossest immorality prevailed among both male and females, and writers of those times, such as Ovington and Alexander Hamilton, describe both Surat and Bombay as perfect hells:—"As regards the military at this period, the company had not been taught by bitter experience to treat them with liberality, and consequently they found that they themselves were treated by them with little respect. Their vexatious regulations infused a spirit of insubordination into the minds of all the troops, from the highest officer to the private soldier. Captain Carr, indeed, did not hesitate to insult the deputy governor in his council chamber. Unsummoned, he appeared before his honour to demand an inquiry into his conduct. He was told that he had not been sent for; but, as he had come of his own accord, he would perhaps be so good as to explain why he had not appeared on parade for two mornings. 'I

had business,' was his laconic answer. The deputy governor mildly suggested that his business could not have been very urgent, and that it really appeared as if the captain was not anxious to perform his duty. Upon that Carr began to swear 'good mouth-filling oaths' at his honour, and when threatened with punishment by him, shook his fist in the deputy's face. The affair was terminated by the captain being placed under arrest, and confined to his own quarters. Such an example thus set by an officer was, as might be expected, imitated by private soldiers, and at last all fell into such a disorganized state that the governor could not find a man whom he would venture to make a serjeant or corporal."*

While the state of morals among military and civilians was the lowest, there were many faithful admonitions from the chaplains, who were more successful in resisting the tyranny of the chief factors than the military were. While the company's ships were playing the part of pirates, their chief representatives acting as oppressors, the agents cheating the company and the natives, and sometimes cheated by both in turn, and while all were eager for plunder, by sea or land, the following well-expressed prayer was offered daily in the factories, it having been sent out by the directors for that purpose†:—

O Almighty and most merciful God, who art the sovereign Protector of all that trust in Thee, and the Author of all spiritual and temporal blessings, we Thy unworthy creatures do most humbly implore Thy goodness for a plentiful effusion of Thy grace upon our employers, Thy servants, the Right Honourable East India Company of England. Prosper them in all their public undertakings, and make them famous and successful in all their governments, colonies, and commerce both by sea and land; so that they may prove a public blessing by the increase of honour, wealth, and power, to our native country, as well as to themselves. Continue their favours towards us, and inspire their generals, presidents, agents, and councils in these remote parts of the world, and all others that are intrusted with any authority under them, with piety towards Thee our God, and with wisdom, fidelity, and circumspection in their several stations; that we may all discharge our respective duties faithfully, and live virtuously in due obedience to our superiors, and in love, peace, and charity one towards another, that these Indian nations among whom we dwell, seeing our sober and religious conversation, may be induced to have a just esteem for our most holy profession of the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom he honour, praise, and glory, now and for ever. Amen.

The differences between the two companies, "the London Company" and "the English Company" having been introduced to India, especially by the embassy of Sir W. Norris, to the Mogul, in the interest of "the English" or "new company," embittered extremely the social state of the English living in India at the commencement of the eighteenth century,

* Bruce; Anderson.

† Rev. Mr. Ovington.

as it had during the last years of the seventeenth century, as it were, at a glance, the vicissitudes of the English were many, their fortunes fickle, their character contradictory, their defeats signal, their progress, nevertheless, indisputable, as their habits were bold and rude, and their spirit persevering and resolute. Wars from without and revolutions within impelled them forward, as the wind which beats against the ship fills its sails and assists its progress. They were also knit to the soil of India by the rude blasts of war. As the tree was shaken it made for its roots a freer soil every time it bent to the gusts which swept through its branches and threatened its destruction. The determination to hold on without flinching, so natural to the English character, was strengthened and trained by the rude discipline of the century, and gave a tone to the Anglo-Indian mind which it has never lost; but which, from war to war, conquest to conquest, and generation to generation, has come down to the present day, and has aided the English now in India to abide and subdue a military revolution and popular insurrection, the most sudden, vast, sanguinary, and appalling, recorded in the history of the world. The words of the reverend author of *Early Notices of the Factories of Western India*, written in review of this period, and its relation to events there, has eloquently expressed what will appropriately close this chapter:—"Such were the English at their first appearance on the Western coast of India. It must be confessed that the natives had before them a strange variety of models from which to form in their minds the character of an Englishman. Roe and Herbert, the acute diplomatist and the polished gentleman; Best, Downton, and other valiant mariners; the inquiring and literary Kerridge; hard headed, ungrammatical, and religious Joseph Salbank; wine-bibbing Rastell; Mil-denhall, cheat and assassin; preachers or gossellers, half Anglican and half Zuinglian; orthodox chaplains; a few scampish, reckless travellers; and piratical, merciless captains—such a medley could scarcely leave any well-defined impressions upon the native mind. Probably opinions were decided by circumstances. The jovial Jehanghire found that

an Englishman was a well-trained courtier and good boon companion; the Banyas of Surat found that he was a clever tradesman, and a hard driver of a bargain. But doubtless at first the popular feeling was one of fear, afterwards of contempt. Hindoos and Mussulmans considered the English a set of cow-eaters and fire drinkers, vile brutes, fiercer than the mastiffs which they brought with them, who would fight like Eblis, cheat their own fathers, and exchange with the same readiness a broadside of shot and thrusts of boarding-pikes, or a bale of goods and a bag of rupees. As time wore on, the estimation in which the English had been held, declined. After a few years there were but certain illiberal merchants, struggling that they might keep the market of Surat to themselves, and exclude by fair means or foul the Portuguese and Dutch. The celebrity which their naval skill and courage had gained for them soon passed away; the glory reflected on them from a royal embassy was soon forgotten. They were only known as shrewd and vulgar adventurers who had opened warehouses in India. Their existence was scarcely heeded by the Mogul despot, whose imperial sway was one of the most extended, and his throne one of the most splendid on the face of the earth. Yet that sway was destined to fall into their grasp; that throne to depend upon the forbearance and magnanimity of the successors of those peddling traders. These English were indeed regarded as men of an insignificant country, dissolute morals, and degraded religion; yet they were the pioneers of a people who now possess territory more than four times the size of France, and seven times that of Great Britain and Ireland. Let the British empire in the East, then, be compared to Gothic architecture, which began with its wooden buildings, thatched roofs, and rush-strewn floors, but was gradually refined into the groined roofs, elaborate mouldings, stately pillars, and delicate tracery of our magnificent cathedrals. Joseph Salbank and his contemporaries were of the ruder, not to say of the baser sort; but now the empire is a noble structure, the style and order of which remain to be further developed by ingenuity and labour; nor have they, we thank God, yet reached a period of debasement and decline."

CHAPTER LV.

THE HOME AFFAIRS OF THE COMPANY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE eighteenth century, destined to be so full of great events in connection with the East India Company, found it struggling against prejudice and competition even in the place where it had its birth.* The rival company was not wiser, happier, nor more prosperous. Both these bodies became anxious as to their future position. The "committee of seven" which had been proposed (as noticed in a former chapter) in the answer given by the company to the king, was now believed to be an important instrument for effecting some practical measure. By a resolution of the General Court, April 17th, 1701, the committee of seven was empowered to receive any proposals which the rival (the English) society might make for a union. The remainder of the year was consumed in negotiations which frequently appeared likely to prove fruitless, but at the beginning of 1702, terms were mutually agreed upon, as a general basis of adjustment, to be however deferred for more mature consideration. These terms were—

"That the court of twenty-four managers or directors should be composed of twelve individuals chosen by each company; that of the annual exports, the amount of which should be fixed by the court of managers, a half should be furnished by each company; that the court of managers should have the entire direction of all matters relating to trade and settlements subsequently to this union; but that the factors of each company should manage separately the stocks which each had sent out previously to the date of that transaction; that seven years should be allowed to wind up the separate concerns of each company; and that, after that period, one great joint-stock should be formed by the final union of the funds of both. This agreement was confirmed by the general courts of both companies on the 27th April, 1702. An indenture tripartite, including the Queen and the two East India Companies, was the instrument adopted for giving legal efficacy to the transaction. For equalizing the shares of the two companies, the following scheme was devised. The London Company, it was agreed, should purchase at par as much of the capital of the English company, lent to government, as, added to the £315,000 which they had already subscribed, should render equal the portion of each. The dead stock

of the London Company was estimated at £330,000; that of the English company at £70,000; whereupon the latter paid £130,000 for equalizing the shares of this part of the common estate. On the 22nd July, 1702, the indenture passed under the great seal; and the two parties took the common name of 'The United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies.'**

On this footing of co-operation rather than union, the two companies continued to intrigue and trade, to be jealous and to jar, until towards the close of 1707. At that juncture, the government resorted to one of its old oppressive measures towards the company. The statesmen and senators of that age, as well as the court, seemed to think that the chief advantage of fostering trade was the opportunity it ultimately provided for robbing the merchants. The government, in this instance, determined to exact a forced loan from both companies, indicating a spirit of impartial injustice. Fearing that any reluctance to advance the enormous sum of £1,200,000 demanded, would cause the court to admit private adventurers into rivalry with both companies, these corporations made haste so settle their differences with one another, and meet the emergency as best as they could. They agreed to refer matters to the lord high-treasurer of his majesty for final adjudication. On this foundation the act, 6 Anne, cap. 17, was passed; enacting that a sum of £1,200,000, without interest, should be advanced by the united companies to government, which being added to a former advance of £2,000,000 at eight per cent. interest, constituted a loan of £3,200,000, yielding interest at the rate of five per cent. upon the whole; that to raise this sum of £1,200,000, the company should be empowered to borrow to the extent of £1,500,000 on their common seal, or to call in monies to that extent from the proprietors; that this sum of £1,200,000 should be added to their capital stock; that instead of terminating on three years' notice after the 29th of September, 1711, their privileges should be continued till three years' notice after the 25th of March, 1726, and till repayment of their capital; that the stock of the separate adventures of the General Society, amounting to £7200, which had never been incorporated into the joint-stock of the English company, might be paid off,

* *History and Management of the East India Company.* London, 1786.

** Mill; Bruce.

on three years' notice after the 29th of September, 1711, and merged in the joint-stock of the united company; and that the award of the Earl of Godolphin, settling the terms of the union, should be binding and conclusive on both parties. The award of Godolphin was dated and published on the 29th of September, 1708. It referred solely to the winding up of the concerns of the two companies; and the blending of their separate properties into one stock, on terms equitable to both. As the assets or effects of the London Company in India fell short of the debts of that concern, they were required to pay by instalments to the united company the sum of £96,615 4s. 9d.: and as the effects of the English Company in India exceeded their debts, they were directed to receive from the united company the sum of £66,005 4s. 2d.; a due debt by Sir Edward Littleton in Bengal, of 80,437 rupees and 8 annas, remaining to be discharged by the English Company on their own account. On these terms, the whole of the property and debts of both companies abroad became the property and debts of the united company. With regard to the debts of both companies in Britain, it was in general ordained that they should all be discharged before the 1st of March, 1709; and as those of the London Company amounted to the sum of £399,795 9s. 1d., they were empowered to call upon their proprietors, by three several instalments, for the means of liquidation.*

By indenture, *quinque partite*, dated 22nd July, 1702, made between various parties, the old company conveyed to the new (united) company, all its forts, settlements and dead stock of whatever kind. "By deed poll enrolled in Chancery, dated 22nd March, 1709, the old company, in pursuance of Lord Godolphin's award, and for the entire extinguishment of their corporate capacity, having granted, surrendered, yielded, and given up to the Queen, her heirs and successors, their corporate capacity or bodily politic, of Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies, and all their charters, capacities, powers, and rights, for acting as or continuing to be a body politic or corporate, by virtue of any acts of parliament, letters patent, or charters whatever; the Queen by letters patent, dated the 7th May in the same year, accepted the surrender; and thus, the right of trading to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, together with the government of the forts and settlements possessed by the English in India, became vested in the 'United Company of

Merchants in England trading to the East Indies.'"^{*}

The year 1708 was an important era in the company's history, the union of the two companies seemed to promise the extinction of the interlopers, and to terminate all grounds of quarrel with the court and parliament. The united company being heavy creditors of the state, had a claim upon the royal protection and favour, and for a very considerable time, independent merchants, however, energetic and enterprising, were of opinion that opposition and rivalry were hopeless. For a number of years the history of the company at home, although not barren of interest, was devoid of all exciting topics. In the meantime, even home events were gradually and quietly consolidating the company's power, and laying broad the foundation of that superstructure of greatness, which it was destined to raise.† During the reign of Queen Anne, several acts of parliament were passed, which had an important bearing upon the interests of the company; one was named—"An Act for enabling and obliging the Bank of England, for the time therein mentioned, to exchange all Exchequer Bills for ready Money upon demand, and to disable any Person to be Governor, Deputy-governor, or Director of the Bank of England, and a Director of the East India Company, at the same time." Another was entitled—"An Act for making good Deficiencies, and satisfying the public Debts; and for erecting a Corporation, to carry on a Trade to the South Seas, and for the Encouragement of the Fishery; and for Liberty to trade in unwrought Iron with the Subjects of Spain; and to repeal the Acts for registering Seamen." This act defined the limits of the charter granted to the South Sea Company, and prohibited that company from infringing the rights of the East India Company.

The 10th Anne, cap. 28, is entitled, "An Act for continuing the Trade and Corporation capacity of the United East India Company, *although their Fund should be redeemed.*" According to cap. 17, 6 Anne, it was provided that the government might redeem its debt to the company, and terminate the company's privileges thereupon, under certain conditions stated. The 10th of Anne repealed that proviso, and substituted another to the purpose expressed above.

In the reign of George I. there were two acts in which the company was interested. The first (7 George I., cap. 5) was entitled, "An Act to enable the South Sea Company

* *The Law relating to India and the East India Company*, p. 3.

† *History of the East India Company*. London, 1793.

* Bruce vol. iii. 635—639; Mill, vol. i. cap. v. 103, 104.

to engraft part of their Capital Stock and Fund into the Stock and Fund of the Bank of England, and another part thereof into the Stock and Fund of the East India Company, &c." The greater part of this act refers to the South Sea Company. Section 32 relates to the borrowing of money on bond by the East India Company; part of section 33 relates to the same subject. The remainder is as follows:—"That it shall not be lawful for the said United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies, or their successors, to discount any bills of exchange, or other bills or notes whatsoever, or to keep any bills or cash of or for any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, whatever, other than the proper monies and cash of the said united company." The other (7 George I., cap. 21) was called, "An Act for the further preventing His Majesty's Subjects from trading to the East Indies under Foreign Commissioners; and for encouraging and further securing the Lawful Trade thereto; and for further regulating the Pilots of Dover, Deal, and the Isle of Thanet." The following section remained in force till the abolition of the East India Company in 1858:—"The said united company shall be allowed to ship out stores, provisions, utensils of war, and necessaries for maintaining their garrisons and settlements, free of all duties; so as such duties, if they had been to be paid, would not have exceeded, or do not exceed, in any one year, the sum of three hundred pounds."

Having noticed the influence of legislation upon the constitution of the company during a portion of the eighteenth century, it is important to our narrative to refer to the progress of the trade for some time after the union of the London and English companies in the General Association of English Merchants trading to the East Indies. As in the previous century, so during a considerable portion of this, the exports consisted in bullion, quicksilver, lead, and small portions of other metals; hardware in considerable variety, and a large assortment of woollen cloths.* The official value of these exports for the year 1708 was only £60,915. The following year it rose to £168,357. But from this it descended gradually, till, in the year 1715, it amounted to no more than £36,997. It made a start, however, in the following year; and the medium exportation for the first twenty years, subsequent to 1708, was £92,281 per annum. The average annual exportation of bullion during the same years was £442,350. The articles of which the import trade of the East India Company

chiefly consisted were calicoes and the other woven manufactures of India; raw silk, diamonds, tea, porcelain, pepper, drugs, and saltpetre. The official value of their imports in 1708 was £493,257; and their annual average importation for this and the nineteen following years was £758,042. At that period the official value assigned to goods at the Custom House differed not greatly from the real value; and the statements which have been made by the East India Company of the actual value of their exports and imports for some of those years, though not according with the Custom House accounts from year to year, probably from their being made up to different periods in the year, yet on a sum of several years pretty nearly coincide.* In 1730 the value of the imports was £1,059,759; the exports of the same year were only of the value of £135,484. In fact, the exports did not increase from 1708 to 1730; the differences were of course paid in bullion. With regard to the rate of profit during this period, or the real advantage of the Indian trade, the company, for part of the year 1708, divided at the rate of five per cent. per annum to the proprietors upon £3,163,200 of capital; for the next year eight per cent.; for the two following years nine per cent.; and thence, to the year 1716 ten per cent. per annum. In the year 1717 they paid dividends on a capital of £3,194,080, at the same rate of ten per cent. per annum, and so on till the year 1723. That year the dividend was reduced to eight per cent. per annum, at which rate it continued till the year 1732.†

Although the independent merchants of England were, as *Englishmen*, debarred from all trade with the East, they frequently embarked their capital in foreign companies, the history of which will be given in future chapters.‡ This especially took place at the formation of the Ostend Company. The English East India Company urged the government of Great Britain to pursue English subjects thither, and make their engaging in any trade with India under any flag whatever severely penal.

In the year 1730 matters of great moment to the company transpired. The independent merchants believed that a favourable juncture had arisen for again opposing the company's exclusive claims. The circumstance of a new sovereign having ascended the throne inspired—or at all events sustained—the hopes entertained of breaking up the monopoly in the

* Mill; Whitworth.

† Mill.

‡ *The Case of the East India Company in 1707.* London, 1712.

* Macpherson's *History of European Commerce with India.* London, 1812.

Eastern trade, and petitions were presented to parliament in that year.* The debt which the government had incurred to the company was enormous, and the interest paid on it—five per cent.—was felt by the nation to be heavy. That debt, however, must be liquidated before the company could be abolished. There were yet three years before the charter would expire, under the clause of a three years' notice. The petitioners offered to raise the money due to the company by government, to pay it in five instalments within the three years, each instalment to bear four per cent. interest, until the whole was paid, when the entire subscription should only bear two per cent.† The proposers of the new scheme declared against all monopoly, alleging that the trade should be thrown open to private enterprise, the subscribers to the new fund having the control of all forts and factories, and receiving a duty of one per cent. on British imports in India, and of five per cent. on Indian imports in England. There was so much plausibility in this proposal, that many were taken with it, and a strong impression was made on the government and parliament. This company having no trade, could only make dividends to its subscribers from the interest paid by government and the duties to be levied in India and in England. The expense of the forts and factories, it was believed, would be defrayed by the territorial revenue connected with them. On the whole a dividend of six per cent. per annum was estimated as certain to be made to the subscribers.‡ The rate of interest on money was low in Europe during 1730—very low in England, and still lower in Holland. This circumstance made the merchants and capitalists of England very ready to subscribe. Many, however, conjectured that a far higher dividend than six per cent. per annum would be realized when the trade should be completely thrown open, as its increase to a vast extent was thought probable, from the large resources of the East, and the rapid development of British wealth and power. It was alleged that the duties would amount to a vast sum in a few years, and increase in a ratio promising wealth to the subscribers. The petitioners were connected with the cities of London and Bristol and the town of Liverpool, which in half a century had risen in population and importance with unexampled rapidity. Even Manchester did not afford so extraordinary an example of advancing commerce, for it had

for ages been a considerable town, numbering fifty thousand inhabitants in the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, but Liverpool at the close of the seventeenth century was a very insignificant place. The petitioners from each of these cities solicited to be heard by counsel at the bar of both houses. As the press had now assumed some importance in England, its advocacy of "the merchants' petitions" added to the effect which these documents produced both in parliament and on the country, and a very great excitement sprung up. The East India Company, and the relations of East Indian commerce to the national welfare, were discussed everywhere—on 'Change, in the senate, in the cabinet, in London coffee-houses, and in the homes of the people in the provinces. The argument which appeared to weigh most with persons generally was, that one-third of the stock of the East India Company belonged to foreigners, and it was not just that British subjects should have been laid under restriction for the benefit of such. It was also contended with much plausibility that the company, by dilatory management, extravagance, and encumbering itself with politics, wasted most of its profits, which, although very great in virtue of its monopoly, only permitted a dividend of eight per cent. per annum, in consequence of such drawbacks. The company put forth vast power in its own defence; and in the press and the parliament it found ready and able advocates. The turning point of the controversy was, as usual, a question of pecuniary advantage to the government. The company offered to reduce the interest upon the debt to four per cent., and to make a donation of £200,000 to the public exchequer, if their monopoly was renewed. The parliament, influenced by the cabinet, could not resist so tempting a bait. The opponents of the company found no favour from the moment that accommodation was offered. The old privileges were further continued to Lady Day, 1776, with the usual proviso of three years' notice, and with the additional provision that, should their exclusive privileges then determine, they should, nevertheless, be permitted to trade as a body corporate.* Matters, however, did not continue so long on that footing, as, in 1744, when the nation was engaged in a fierce war, the company opened negotiations with government, offering a million loan at three per cent., on condition of their monopoly being extended to 1780, and further by a three years' notice beyond that time. Their opponents were taken by surprise, the movement was so skilfully accom-

* Hiansard.

† Anderson's *History of Commerce*.

‡ Anderson's *Commercial History of the British Empire*. London, 1764.

* Company's statutes—3 George II., cap. 14; 17 George II., cap. 17; and 23 George II., cap. 22.

plished, and so secretly and suddenly undertaken.

From 1730 to 1744 the trade of the company was very steady. Their imports, according to the official value, approached a million sterling annually. Their exports increased to nearly half a million in value; but a large portion of these consisted in stores for the forts and factories. The imports were, in the main, paid for in bullion. Mr. Mill constantly presents this fact to his readers as a proof that the trade of the company was of little value. He did not fail to perceive that if there was a profit upon the imports, the trade was of value to the company; but he supposed it must be of little or no value to the nation, because bullion was exported for commodities received—a fallacy which had been exploded before the period when his history was written.

The year 1732 is notable as that in which the company began to make up annual accounts. In this year also the dividends were reduced from eight to seven per cent.; but in 1744 they were again raised to eight. The Dutch, during this century, were obliged gradually to lower their dividends from twenty-five per cent to twelve, although for a time they rose again to fifteen. The English company was much embarrassed by the conflicts with France; and the operations in India of Dupleix and Labourdonnais tended to lower the company's credit, and to depress its hopes.* The general impression among the directors, at the close of the first half of the eighteenth century, was desponding, and well it might be, in view of war in Europe and in India, the progress of the French there, and the disasters and humiliation of the British. Nevertheless, the trade maintained with India and the East was vast. Mill, relying upon Orme and the reports of the committee of secrecy, thus exhibits it in figures:—

	Gold and Stores exported.	Bullion do.	Total.
1744	£231,318	£458,544	£689,862
1745	91,864	476,553	568,217
1746	265,818	500,020	825,838
1747	107,979	779,256	887,235
1748	127,224	706,590	834,114

The bills of exchange for which the company paid during those years were:—

1744	£103,849	1747	£441,651
1745	98,213	1748	178,419
1746	417,647		

The amount of sales for the same years (including thirty per cent. of duties, which remain to be deducted) was:

1744	£1,997,506	1747	£1,739,159
1745	2,480,966	1748	1,768,041
1746	1,602,388		

* *History of the British Empire in India.*

The official value at the custom-house of the imports and exports of the company, during that period, was as follows:—

	Imports.	Exports.
1744	£743,508	£476,274
1745	973,705	293,113
1746	646,697	893,540
1747	128,733	345,526
1748	1,098,712	306,357

The dividend was eight per cent. per annum, during the whole of the time. During the same period, the trade of the nation, notwithstanding the war, had considerably increased. The imports had risen from £6,362,971 official value, to £8,136,408; and the exports from £11,429,628 to £12,351,433; and, in the two following years, to £14,099,366 and £15,132,004.

The first half of the eighteenth century was comparatively one of quietness for the East India Company at home; though the possessors of its stock were frequently much alarmed by the threatened or actual reduction of dividends, the large loans which it was necessary to give the government, the contests prior to the union of the London and English companies, and the final arrangements which left it in the condition in which it existed at the close of the half century; yet, as compared with its anxieties and troubles in previous periods of equal extent, it was not unprosperous. A time, however, was now arriving pregnant with the mightiest issues. War between the English and French in India was already raging, and out of this turmoil it was destined, after much misfortune and shame, that the company should arise great and triumphant.

The events about to take place in India, and those which had already transpired there, were singularly influenced by men of remarkable character; and by incidents connected with them, which, independent of the control of the company, were ripening to effect its fortunes and its glory. Three men were born in Europe during this period, by whom the future of India was to be influenced more than by any other men who were destined to take part in its affairs during the continued existence of the East India Company. These three men were Dupleix, Clive, and Hastings. Dupleix was born at the beginning of the century, and had arrived in India and laid the foundation of a policy, while yet Clive was a schoolboy, and Hastings was a child. Their ages were different, and their successive irruption, as it may be called, upon the soil of India marvellously combined to alter its whole relations politically, and its ultimate destinies in every way. Dupleix, a Frenchman, sought the

glory of his country, and devised a scheme by which he believed India would be subjected to France. His genius was lofty, and his adaptation to the task complete. Different in his intellectual constitution from Clive, he was fitted to originate what the latter could not. It may be doubted whether the peculiar genius of Clive would have had scope in India, had not Dupleix created a state of things peculiarly his own. Finding that condition of affairs in existence, Clive was, of all others, the man to enter upon the field already thus occupied, and to find in all around him the essential elements for promoting his own glory and the glory of his country. It was necessary for England not only to have her own Clive, but that such a man as the French Dupleix should precede him, and clear the path upon which he was to tread. Hastings was not adapted by nature to be the predecessor of Clive in the work which was providentially opened for the performance of the latter. As the contemporary, but more especially as the successor of Clive, Hastings could find his sphere, and in that sphere he was potential. There are few pages in history which more strikingly exemplify the prescient wisdom of Providence, than that which discloses the consecutive relationship of these three men in their destined work. This is not the place in which to give the history and character of Clive and Hastings; but the following notice of the position of them and of Dupleix, individually and relatively, by Miss Martineau, presents a picture as striking and instructive as it is well drawn. Selecting the year 1732 as an epoch, both in India and England, the gifted lady referred to briefly points out the state of things in Bengal, and shows how the arrival of Dupleix changed matters in French interests, small as were the positions and opportunities which he found there:—"The hour and the man had arrived for the French; and the hour and the man were approaching for the English. While the great Dupleix was beginning his reforms there in the prime vigour of his years, a child in England was giving almost as much annoyance to his relations as he was hereafter to cause to Dupleix. The Spaniards say that 'the thorn comes into the world point foremost.' It was so in this case. The uncle of little Robert Clive, then in his seventh year, wrote a sad character of him. 'Fighting, to which he is out of measure addicted,' said his uncle, 'gives his temper such a fierceness and imperiousness that he flies out on every trifling occasion.' At the same date, there was born in a poor parsonage in Worcestershire a forlorn infant, the son of

a father married at sixteen, and soon after dead, and of a mother who died a few days after the orphan's birth, leaving him to the care of a grandfather, sunk in trouble and poverty. No one living could then have divined what connection could exist among the destinies of these three. Nor would it have been easier to guess seven years later. At that later date, Dupleix had purchased no less than seventy vessels, to carry his commodities to all parts of the known world, extinguishing in Bengal the English reputation for commercial ability, and bringing splendid returns to his own coffers. Robert Clive was then full of mischief—sitting on a spout at the top of the lofty steeple of Market Drayton church, and levying a blackmail of apples and halfpence, with his rabble rout of naughty boys at his heels, on the tradesmen who feared for their windows. As for little Warren, the orphan, then seven years old, he was lying beside the brook which flows through the lands of his ancestry, and, as he himself told afterwards, making up his mind to the personal ambition of his life—to be, like his forefathers of several generations, Hastings of Daylesford. On these three—the ambitious and unscrupulous French manager, already at his work, the turbulent English schoolboy, and the romantic child, dreaming under the great ancestral oaks, while living and learning among ploughboys—the destinies of British India were to hang. Through them we were to hold India as a territory, and by a military tenure; and to have a policy there, perhaps as important to the human race in the long run as that of the mother country—however much may be comprehended in that abstraction."*

While the men and the home affairs of the company were maturing, by which the second half of the eighteenth century was to be influenced, and England to win an empire, many things were occurring in India which drifted in the same direction. Of these the company were not ignorant, and it is obvious that the directors were more observant of the political tendency of affairs in the Mogul empire, and the true policy to be observed in consequence, than historians generally give them credit for.†

Early in the eighteenth century the directors sent out specific orders to Bengal for their servants to *attend to the revenues*, and avoid all complications with the natives, and all attempts to extend the company's terri-

* *British Rule in India: a Historical Sketch.* By Harriet Martineau.

† *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.* By Peter Auber, M.R.A.S. London, 1837.

tory.* The following passage from their instructions shows the prudence which prevailed among the directors:—"Notwithstanding the doubts we had, whether it would be our interest to have the thirty-eight towns if granted, or whether they might not engage us in quarrels with the Moors,† if hereafter they should be resolved to take them away when they found them to flourish, of which, we find, by paragraph 85, you say, it would be of great use to us to have them. Having well weighed the profit on one side, and the trouble that may at one time or other be calculated upon the other, we think it best for us to have only so many of them (when you can purchase them) as lie contiguous to our three towns above and below them, and those on the other side of the river within the same extent of ground as the towns, when purchased, reach on your side. . . . We suppose, too, that when Jaffer Khan, or any other governor, finds you desire only part of what you might insist on, he or they may be the easier to give their consent, and not pick future quarrels; *for as our business is trade, it is not political (politic) for us to be encumbered with much territory.*" In another communication a few years later similar opinions were expressed:—"Remember, we are not fond of much territory, especially if it lies at a distance from you, or is not pretty near the water side, nor, indeed, of any, unless you have a moral assurance it will contribute, directly or in consequence, to our real benefit."‡

The making of roads in a country where military operations may be necessary to preserve it, is recognised as a feature of military management which should always characterize the policy of occupying forces. The directors appear during the first quarter of the eighteenth century to have directed the attention of their servants to this important matter in the neighbourhood of their chief settlements, "as well to see through your bounds into the country of the zemindars, who attacked you some time before, as to facilitate the march of your soldiers when necessary to support your utmost outguards."§ Sanitary as well as military advantage from the foregoing expedient was anticipated by the directors, for they add, "thereby the wind hath a free passage into the town, and likewise contributes to its healthiness."||

The acquisition of the native languages on the part of their agents also engaged the

* Letter to Bengal, 3rd of February, 1719.

† The name then given commonly in England to all black races.

‡ General letter to Bengal, 16th of February, 1721.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

attention of the directors. During the discussions which pervaded the London daily press in 1857-8 about the government of India it was frequently asserted that the company had discreditably neglected the encouragement of their agents in this particular. There is abundant documentary proof at the India-house to the contrary. Minute instructions are given in several of the letters of the directors concerning "the writers"—such as "encourage them all to learn the country languages, which are sooner attained by youth than by men grown."*

In 1725 the letters of the directors were chiefly designed to check extravagance, and insure more implicit obedience on the part of their servants.

Frequently the communications of the committee in London show a statesmanlike recognition of the events which were passing around their settlements and factories as the Mogul empire fell to pieces, like a building sapped at its foundations. Thus, at the close of the first quarter of the century, they write to their chief agent at Calcutta:—"The battle you mentioned to be fought by the vizier, wherein he was successful against the king's army, and killed the general, Mombarras Cawn, his sons, and several Omrahs, does, in our opinion, show that affairs in the Mogul's dominions are in the utmost confusion, and tend towards some extraordinary crisis. Our advices from Fort St. George say that the said vizier, Chicklis Cawn, was in the Metchlepatam country, and from thence intended to march to Bengal to enlarge his power. Time only must discover the event of these troubles; in the interim keep a watchful eye to preserve yourselves from danger, and keep up your friendship with the Hoogly government, which may be the more necessary in this critical juncture."†

The communications of the directors with their Bengal agents during 1731-2 explain the state of feeling in England towards the company, throw some light upon the origin of the public dissatisfaction, and reveal the fact, in contradiction of most modern writers who relate the home affairs of the company at that period, that the secret transactions of the directors were conducted with decision and energy:—"The badness of the goods sent us for two years past having not only raised a general clamour among the buyers, but also great uneasiness in the proprietors of the company's stock, and we being convinced that there has been a culpable neglect in the management of our affairs by the unequal

* General letter to Bengal, 16th of February, 1721, and 14th of February, 1722.

† Letter to Bengal, the 1st of December, 1725.

sortment of the goods, deficiencies in their lengths and breadths, and excessive high prices, together with the vast quantities of fine unvendable articles sent us, contrary to our orders, and having kept back great quantities of goods we wanted and ordered, and have been employed for their private trade; by the first we are great sufferers, and by the last we are deprived of great profits that we might naturally have expected, those goods being greatly in demand; for these reasons, and to strike terror to those that succeed, we have thought fit to dismiss from our service six members. This extraordinary step we have been obliged to take, in order to remedy these and any such like evils, and to clear our reputations from the censure the world would otherwise throw upon us, that we connived at the bad actions of our servants, hereby convincing mankind that we are not biassed with favour or affection to any particular person whatsoever."*

The sagacity of the directors as to the effects upon themselves, as well as their servants, of any extravagance in the latter, is shown in their correspondence a little later, in reply to some favourable communications as to the improved habits of "the writers" which had been received from Calcutta:—"We are highly pleased that the extravagant way of living which had obtained such deep rooting among you is entirely laid aside. Whenever such a practice prevails in any of our servants, we shall always suspect that we are the paymasters in some shape or other, and it seldom fails of bringing them to penury and want; we must, therefore, both for your sakes and our own, earnestly recommend frugality as a cardinal virtue, and by a due regard to the said advice, we do not doubt but the diet and other allowances from us will be amply sufficient to defray all necessary expenses, as Bengal is not only the cheapest part of India to live in, but perhaps the most plentiful country in the whole world."†

The year following directions were sent out to regulate the conduct of the agents towards the company's tenants, which are full of justice, wisdom, and foresight.‡

At the close of the year 1735 the company were fully cognisant of the progress of the French in India, and warned their agents of the coming peril—a peril so soon realized, so painfully experienced, so gloriously surmounted, and so efficiently turned to the interests of the company, and the welfare, honour, and glory of their nation:—"Now the French are settled at Patna, our chief

and council must double their diligence, and keep all the Assamys they can true to our interest, and advance such of them as comply with their contracts sufficient sums of money to carry on their business, being cautious to make as few bad debts as possible. We should esteem it an agreeable piece of service if a year's stock of petre beforehand always lay at Calcutta, and as such recommend it to you, to use your utmost endeavours to accomplish it, provided it can be done without advancing the price, which, when obtained, will answer very valuable purposes."*

The council referred to in this paragraph of the letter of the directory was "a council of nine," appointed a few years previously, and which had its origin in the dissatisfaction felt by the directors with the assortment of piece goods sent them from Bengal, and the losses or low profits derived in consequence in the English market.

The growing energy of the Mahrattas drew the attention of the company to the necessity of superior defences for their stations, and for the first time, in their letter to Bengal, dated the 21st of March, 1743, the hiring of Lascars is referred to as desirable for the defence of Calcutta, a class often brought into requisition afterwards, and who proved generally useful in the service of the coasting trade, from the first acquisitions of the company in Bengal until its political extinction in 1858.

The administration of justice in India engaged the company's attention at home.†

The above proofs of the sedulous care of the directors are taken from their correspondence to their chief at Calcutta. Their letters to the other presidencies disclose the same industry and anxiety for the interests of the proprietary, and the welfare of such of the people of India as were committed to the company's charge. The correspondence with Fort St. George discloses such a multiplicity of subjects calling for the attention of the directors, and reveals so much acquaintance with Indian affairs, as to corroborate the allegation of industry and ability ascribed to them, and confute the assertion of Mr. Mill, that the company at this period knew little about India, and left the guidance of affairs there to their agents, being to a great extent merely passive spectators.

In the letters to Madras, municipal institutions, local duties, the introduction of native weavers to that place, relief to the distressed during a period of famine, the incursions of the Mahrattas, as well as all the varied topics

* Letter to Bengal, the 3rd of December, 1731.

† Letter to Bengal, the 31st of January, 1734.

‡ Letter to Bengal, January, 1735.

* Letter to Bengal, the 12th of December, 1735.

† Letter to Bengal, the 9th of March, 1747.

of trade are discussed in the most minute and ample manner.

In the correspondence with this presidency the same vigilance was shown as in the Bengal letters, concerning the progress of the French, so soon to be the great topic of interest in India and Europe. Thus the directors write:—"The most particular intelligence procurable concerning those powerful competitors, the French, and their commerce, must be annually communicated to us, inserting the number of ships, tonnage, imports, and exports, with the situation of their affairs, and our other rivals in trade upon the coast of Ceromandel."*

The communications made to the Bombay presidency involved as many subjects, and as intricate; and it is impossible to pursue the maze trodden by the thoughts of the directors without admiring their dexterity and capacity for transacting business on a large scale, and involving vast social and political interests. Who can refuse the meed of approbation to such sentiments as these, designed to guide the Bombay president in his relations to the native powers:—"So far, indeed, we will grant that it is prudent to suspect them, and to be upon your guard, but there is a great deal of difference in point of charges betwixt a defensive and offensive state of war, which latter must always be the case while we live in open war; besides, the continuing in such a state compels our enemies to increase their forces, and makes them by degrees to become

formidable. And what is the end of all? Why, we have a great deal to lose, and they have nothing of any value that you can take from them."*

The president at Bombay was put upon his guard against the French, but not in terms so frequent or urgent as those of Madras and Calcutta.

It is impossible to peruse such documents without the conviction that much that has been culled by modern writers, to whom the archives of the India-house have been accessible, has been selected for a partial purpose, and unfairly represents the general tenor and full scope of the motives, policy, and procedure of the company at home.

The interests of the company in the Eastern Archipelago were not of that importance during the first half of the eighteenth century which they ultimately became, and which, in the earlier expeditions of the company's captains, they bid fair to become. But the directors were hardly the less exempt from trouble and anxiety on their account. If the rising star of the French threw a blighting ray upon their prospects in continental India, the withering avarice and tenacious power of the Dutch were calculated to check enterprise beyond the Straits, and to render it, when undertaken, a source of the deepest concern to the directors.

To the company's interests as involving competition with various European societies attention must now be turned.

CHAPTER LVI.

THE OSTEND COMPANY.

WHEN the political and religious despotism of Spain had forced the best of her maritime provinces in Europe to appeal to the sword—the final arbiter between the oppressor and the oppressed—and they had nobly, after a fierce and dubious struggle, achieved their independence, the seven united provinces of the Netherlands were received into the rank of nations, and by the rapid development of those powers which they had displayed in the struggle, applied to the cultivation of their resources, they acquired wealth, power, and dominion, chiefly at sea.

His catholic majesty, who had been the legal sovereign of the Austrian or Spanish dominions, and of the United or Dutch

* Letter to Fort St. George, the 30th of December, 1737.

Netherlands, ceded to Albert and Isabella the ten provinces that continued faithful to him when the seven others had thrown off the yoke. This happened in 1598; and in the deed of conveyance it was declared, that none of their subjects should be at liberty to send any ships, or to traffic in either the East or West Indies, upon any pretence whatever. In vain they remonstrated. Philip, considering that the removal of the prohibition would be prejudicial to Spain, rejected peremptorily all these appeals. The trade of the united provinces was consequently ruined; their cities, formerly hives of industry, were stripped of their populations; and even Antwerp, renowned through the commercial world as its capital, the emporium of

* Letter to Bombay, 1741.

Europe, was reduced almost to a solitude, its harbour without shipping, and its marts deserted.

By the demise of the Archduchess Isabella her dominions reverted to Spain; and the king, to ingratiate the Cardinal Infanta with his new subjects, granted the Netherlanders liberty to trade to those parts of India open to the Portuguese then subject to the crown of Spain. But of this favour they did not reap the advantage; for in the very year it was granted (1640) Portugal asserted her independence, and obtained entire sway over such Indian possessions as the Dutch had not yet wrested from them.* Unfortunately, as it subsequently transpired, no evidence remained of this concession except a letter from the Infanta, which merely asserts that his majesty had such an intention.

The year 1698 arrived before any further effort was made to open the trade with the East. Charles II. of Spain granted his subjects a charter to trade to such parts of India and the coasts of Guinea as were not occupied by other European states. His death deprived them of the opportunity of availing themselves of the privilege, for on his demise, in 1700, the succession to the throne was contested, as already observed, and the war which ensued convulsed Europe for the space of thirteen years. When peace was concluded, the Netherlands fell under the dominion of Austria, and remained subject to the same restrictions which affected them under the Spanish sceptre, and they were thus excluded from the trade of the East, as they had been for several years. Thus they continued until Prince Eugene of Savoy was placed over them as governor-general, when another attempt was made to open a correspondence for them with the East. The emperor was favourable to this movement; and the fact is, that the narrow-minded policy of Philip had reduced to poverty these once industrious and prosperous provinces. They were at this time actually a burthen on the empire. There was an obstacle, however, in the way, and that was the jealousy with which the European monopolists of the Asiatic trade looked upon any new comer. Preparations were privately made, and two ships were dispatched, equipped by private individuals, and furnished with royal passports. After a long delay, they started on their voyage in 1717. Having been successful, several other merchants resolved to make a venture. The trade continued to be prosecuted for some time in the same unostentatious manner. Some foreign merchants, who were aware

of this auspicious commencement, made proposals to the court of Vienna for the formation of an East India Company, with the emperor's charter for a certain number of years. Their proposals were received, and every disposition to favour the scheme manifested.

In the meantime—in October, 1719—advices reached Vienna that one of the passported vessels had been seized by a Dutchman in the service of the West India Company on the coast of Guinea, and confiscated, with her whole cargo, in the most summary and questionable manner.* The emperor made an immediate demand for satisfaction and compensation for the sufferers. So little regard was paid to the imperial demand that another ship, belonging to Ostend, was soon after captured by the Dutch East India Company. The merchants of Ostend, with a spirit worthy of a happy result, declining further negotiations, with all possible expedition fitted out some vessels of war, with which they meant to make reprisals. They put to sea with the emperor's commission; Captain Winter, the master of the ship that had been captured on the coast of Guinea, commanded one of them. Conceiving that he was justified by his commission, he proceeded to the Downs, and there meeting with his own ship, he seized her, with a cargo of ivory and gold-dust, the property of the West India Company. That company complained to the states-general, whose ministers at Brussels and Vienna energetically remonstrated, and were warmly supported by the influence of Great Britain; but after the recent refusal of the Dutch to satisfy the imperial government, it could scarcely be expected that Austria would hearken to these demands, unless under the influence of fear. Austria on this occasion maintained her dignity; the ministers at Vienna remained firm, and insisted that the subjects of the emperor having first suffered, it was but reasonable they should be the first redressed. This reply was no small evidence of independence, considering the great naval strength of the remonstrant powers, who it was evident had agreed to make common cause. The firmness of the Austrian ministers gave confidence to the empire; and such a popular fervour was created in favour of the projected company that, in the year 1720, five large ships were fitted out, and in the year following six more—three for China, one for Mocha, one for Surat and the coast of Malabar, and the sixth for Bengal.

This independent spirit roused the ire of the Dutch to such a degree, that they seized on a vessel richly laden by the merchants of

* Macpherson's *History of European Commerce with India*, p. 294.

* *La Verité du Droit*, &c. Bruxelles, quarto, 1723.

Bruges, and sold her cargo, notwithstanding the interference of his imperial majesty. The English were not inactive; they also captured an Ostend homeward-bound vessel on the shores of Malabar, very richly laden. These misfortunes so disheartened the new company that orders were issued to lay up a new vessel just completed. However, this despondency was of brief duration. In the months of May and June, 1721, two of their ships arrived from the Indies, and in the following December two more. Their cargoes were sold at a price which amply indemnified them for their recent losses, and left them a balance which enabled them to pursue their commerce with greater vigour than ever. All that appeared to them necessary to their permanent success was a legal establishment; but though the emperor had authorized the associated merchants in 1719 to take in subscriptions for a joint-stock company, and even specified some of the privileges he was disposed to grant to them as a corporation, yet being unwilling to come to an open rupture with the Dutch, he would much preferred to have them continue to trade under the authority of his passports, which they might receive as individuals. The merchants, elevated by prosperity, both present and prospective, and regardless, even if of observant, of the inconvenience* it would be, particularly at that juncture, to quarrel with the maritime powers having money at their disposal, resolved to use their utmost efforts to command the best possible position; and with this object they commissioned some of their directors to proceed to Vienna, where they had friends of great court influence. These directors were liberally supplied with instructions, and, what is often more effective, good bills for a large amount of money. Their mission was successful; and they succeeded in obtaining a charter, the privileges conceded by which were co-extensive with their demands, and as liberal as that of any company in Europe.† It comprised several articles, the principal of which were—that the capital was to consist of ten million florins, in shares of one thousand each; the prizes which their vessels might make in time of war were to be entirely their own, and to be sold for their profit; all the ammunition, provisions, artillery, and naval stores, requisite for the forts and factories of the company were exempted from duties and impositions in their passage through the territories of the emperor, or any of the lordships or ecclesiastical communities in the Low Countries; and, lastly, all the goods transported

by the company's ships were to pay for all customs and duties, inwards and outwards, four per cent. and no more, till the expiration of the month of September, 1724, and from that six per cent. for ever. An ambassador, invested with the necessary powers, was also sent to the court of Delhi to settle an alliance with the emperor, and to thank him in his imperial majesty's name for the permission he had granted the company, not only to erect a factory, but a fort, to protect their commerce in his dominions. The great expectation which his imperial majesty had formed of the future of this undertaking, of the addition it would bring to the wealth of his subjects and to the public revenues, influenced him to hold out still further encouragement than he had hitherto done. He intimated that he would remit all duties and customs for the period of three years, and would make the proprietors a present of three hundred thousand florins in ready money, to indemnify them against any losses they might sustain in the first stages of their operations.

The liberality and munificence of the sovereign found an echo amongst, not only his own subjects, who all—merchants, bankers, nobles, and gentlemen—displayed the utmost zeal, but also English, French, and Dutch, concerned in naval and mercantile affairs, united in support of the undertaking.

The widely-spread fame which the company had already acquired, the enthusiasm excited in its favour, the patronage with which it was supported, the resources at its command, the preparations it had initiated, the great and comprehensive objects at which it aimed, startled all the maritime nations of Europe; a common fear for their commerce pervaded them, one and all, and an identity of interests bound them to combine for mutual protection. In these days of more enlightened views, when exclusiveness in trade is practically shown to be as prejudicial as most monopolies, the feverish anxiety manifested by our forefathers at the exhibition of a strong competitor in the market, can be scarcely appreciated, unless by a few antiquated protectionists. "We need not wonder," says an able historian of the middle of the last century, "that this new company at Ostend should occasion such noise throughout all Europe, or excite great discord and disturbance, so as to render the chapter that treats of the Ostend Company as remarkable a part of general history as any that find a place therein."* The warmest allies and most

* *Memoires Historique et Politique*, tom. lxx. pp. 676—781.

† *Dictionnaire de Commerce*, tom. ii. col. 1165.

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, tom. iii. p. 66; Macpherson's *Commercial Dictionary*; Postlethwaite's *Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*.

faithful friends of the emperor were the most violent in their opposition.

On the 5th of April, 1723, Pestors, the Dutch minister at Brussels, presented to the Marquis de Prie, the Austrian governor of the Netherlands, a memorial setting forth that by a treaty of Munster, in the year 1648, the Spaniards and the Dutch had agreed that each nation should preserve its trade and navigation within the East Indies, as it was then conducted. He observed that the Dutch had assisted the emperor to obtain the dominion of the Netherlands, and that they could not expect so had a return as the establishment of a trade in direct violation of that treaty, and of the confirmation of that treaty by the twenty-sixth article of the barrier treaty, wherein it was expressly stipulated, that commerce and all that depends upon it, in whole, and in part, should remain on the footing established, and in the manner appointed, by the articles of the treaty of Munster; that the barrier treaty was guaranteed by the King of Great Britain, at a time when his imperial majesty was actually King of the Netherlands, the inhabitants of which could claim no other rights by passing from the dominion of Spain to that of the emperor, than those they enjoyed by the treaty of Munster as subjects of Spain. He concluded by requesting that the patent *said* to have been granted, should not be published or should be revoked, and that no ships should be allowed to sail from the Netherlands to India, either by virtue of a patent or any other kind of authority.

The Marquis de Prie, who had a personal interest besides the national one, in the success of the company, as he was deriving great emolument from the temporary licenses to the ships, and would derive a far greater from an increasing trade, advised his sovereign against granting the charter. Prince Eugene and his other ministers also represented to him that the establishment of the proposed company could not fail to give offence to the maritime powers by whose means he had become the monarch of the Netherlands, and that on these grounds the measure was equally inconsistent with his interest and with his dignity.*

The English East India Company also entered their protest, and expressed their uneasiness at seeing the progress of the Netherlands; and they complained that much of the capital invested was by British subjects, that the trade was conducted by men brought up in their service, who were seduced, by extravagant pay and promises, to employ

their talent, and extensive knowledge of the Indian trade, to the prejudice of their native land. This last seems to be the only feasible plea they had.

In the year 1721, the British parliament had passed an act (7th George I., cap. 21), for a rigorous enforcement of the penalties formerly enacted against British subjects going to India in the service of foreigners, and against smugglers of Indian goods into any part of the British dominions. This act, however, had little effect: another (9th George I., cap. 26) was passed in 1723, more expressly prohibiting English subjects from being concerned in the proposed company for carrying on the East India trade from the Austrian Netherlands, on penalty of triple the value of their subscriptions to the capital of that company, or imprisonment. British subjects found in any part of India, and not in the service of the East India Company, are declared to be guilty of high misdemeanour, and are to be seized and sent to England, in order to be punished. The minister of his Britannic majesty at Vienna, also protested; yet the emperor, strong in what he believed to be the justice of his case, resolved not to submit to dictation, and, abandoning the cautious line of policy he had hitherto prudently pursued, in August, 1723, published the charter which had been prepared in December, 1722, and postponed in deference to the protestations of the English and Dutch.

In the preamble to the charter,* the emperor not only took all the titles of the house of Austria, he also added to them that of King of Spain, and styled himself King of the East and West Indies, the Canary Islands, the Islands of the Ocean, &c. He granted to the company for thirty years the right of trading to the East and West Indies, and to both sides of Africa.

Satisfied that they would procure their charter, the company had, in January previously, dispatched a vessel for Bengal, in order to take possession of the fort there, which the Emperor of Delhi had some time before permitted them to build for the security of their factory.

No sooner had the company opened subscription books, than their head offices at Antwerp were crowded and encircled with applicants for shares. At noon next day the subscriptions were filled, and before the month closed, the shares sold at a premium of from twelve to fifteen per cent.

The Dutch companies, both East and West Indian, demanded permission to oppose the Ostend Company by force of arms. The

* Macpherson *History of European Commerce with India*, p. 296.

* The charter was published at Brussels, in Latin, German, Flemish, English, and French.

French king, chagrined to find that after repeated attempts he could not achieve what at Antwerp was accomplished in a day, issued an *arrêt*, by which he strictly forbade his subjects taking shares in it, entering into its service, or selling them any ships, and threatening the offenders with confiscation and imprisonment. In the year following, the King of Spain pursued a like course.

These jealous precautions, and those of the nations more immediately interested, did not impede the successful prosecution of the enterprise. The speculations of the new company progressed prosperously at home and abroad. Most of their officers, who had served under the foreign companies, perfectly understood their duties; and, from their local knowledge, had very little difficulty in convincing the Indian princes and chief men, that it was their interest to encourage in their markets as many competitors as possible, and thus they counteracted the strenuous efforts made by the active agents of their rivals to acerbate the nations of India against them. With extraordinary rapidity several factories were established, and a far-spreading and profitable intercourse with the rajahs of the district cultivated. They made two settlements, that of Coblom, between Madras and Sadras—Patnam, on the coast of Coromandel, and that of Bankisabar on the Ganges, and were in search of a place in the Island of Madagascar, where their ships might touch for refreshments.*

An unexpected event occurred about this time, which promised to secure the future of the company. Philip of Spain entered into close alliance with the emperor, his late rival for the throne of Spain, and whose pretensions, supported by the arms of Great Britain and the United Provinces, had devastated that kingdom, and produced a long and ruinous conflict amongst the powers of Europe. By one of the treaties—that which is dated May, 1725, and particularly relates to commercial matters—it was provided that the ships of the contracting parties should be received in a friendly manner into each other's ports, "which same proviso is also to take place in the East Indies, on condition that they do not carry on any trade there, nor be suffered to buy anything besides victuals, and such materials as they want for repairing and fitting out their vessels." By this article the liberty was conceded to the company's ships, of obtaining refreshments, and of repairing in Spanish ports which are conveniently placed for those sailing to or from China. A market in Europe, and seemingly also in the Spanish colonies, was pro-

* Raynal's *History of Settlements and Trade in the East and West Indies*, vol. iii. p. 31.

vided for them by the thirty-sixth article, which engages that "his imperial majesty's subjects and ships, shall be allowed to import all sorts of produce and merchandise from the East Indies, into any of the states and dominions of the King of Spain, provided it appears from the certificates of the East India Company erected in the Austrian Netherlands, that they are the produce of the places conquered, the colonies or factories of the said company, or that they came there; and in this respect they shall enjoy the same privileges which were granted to the subjects of the United Provinces, by the royal cedulas of the 27th of June, and 3rd of July, 1663."

The publication of this treaty impressed friends and foes with the conviction that the company rested on a firm and secure basis; but the more profoundly observant detected the seeds of future trouble in this apparently desirable arrangement, and a few of the partners availed themselves of the opportunity of selling out, while prospects seemed so fair and promising.

Considering the alarming sensation created by the incorporation of the Ostend Company, it will not appear to be a matter of surprise that all the nations whose interests were thought to be at stake by it, were struck with consternation. A large party for a long period existed in Spain, who looked upon the exclusive possession of its colonial trade as the highest and most valuable prerogative of the crown;* by which, indeed, they were particularly distinguished from the rest of the subjects of that monarchy, who were all prohibited from a participation in it—and were as hostile to the late opening of it as any of the English, French, and Dutch. To such an extent was this dissatisfaction carried, that a proclamation was affixed to the gate of the Spanish ambassador in Rome, containing these words:—"The Spanish nation do hereby promise a reward of a hundred pistoles to any ingenious person who shall point out a single article in the three treaties lately concluded at Vienna, by which they are to be gainers."†

To counterbalance this alliance between Austria and Spain, the sovereigns of Great Britain, France, and Prussia formed a treaty in the September following, by which they guaranteed the integrity of the territories belonging to each "in and out of Europe;" and also "all the rights, immunities, and advan-

* See on this subject *Universal Modern History*, vol. ii. p. 198, in which it is stated, and truly, that it was in submission to this feeling, that Philip, in 1638, rejected the petition of the Netherlanders for permission to trade to the Spanish settlements.

† *Recueil Historique d'Actes, Negotiations, Memoires et Traitez*. Par M. Rousset, tom. ii. p. 214.

tages—particularly those relating to trade—which the said allies enjoy, or ought to enjoy, respectively.”*

The states-general hesitated and deliberated for a considerable time before they consented to be a subscribing party to this compact, and did not officially become so till August, 1726.

In the interval, while these machinations were being perfected, the company was advancing with rapid strides. Several ships had arrived from India and China, freighted with valuable cargoes, the sales of which amounted to above five million florins. In September, 1726, a meeting of the proprietors was held, and the directors had the agreeable duty of placing to the account of each two hundred and fifty florins, the complement due on each, seven hundred and fifty only having been paid out of the thousand. This addition was equal to a dividend of thirty-three and a half per cent. on the capital paid up and employed in the trade.

The alliance formed between Austria and Spain being based on personal and selfish motives, was sacrificed for still more selfish ones. The royal confederates, with whom were united the Dutch republic, having guaranteed to support the pragmatic sanction—the object of which was to secure the succession of Maria Theresa to her father's, the emperor's, dominions—the object dearest to his heart, the interests of the Ostend Company, were sacrificed as a matter of minor consideration. By a treaty concluded in May, 1727, it was agreed that their privileges should be suspended for seven years, during which no ship was to sail from Ostend for India, but those which were on the voyage were insured an unmolested return; and should any of them, in ignorance of the treaty, be taken, they were to be freely restored.

In a treaty between England and Austria, which was signed March 16, 1731, the succession of Maria Theresa was formally guaranteed by Great Britain; and the emperor, on his part, bound himself to the total suppression of the company, and never to permit any vessels to sail to India from the Austrian Netherlands, nor any other country which was subject to the crown of Spain, in the time of King Carlos II., reserving to the Ostend Company a right to send two ships, each only for one voyage to India, to receive the merchandise imported by them, and to sell the same, as they should think proper, at Ostend.

The suppression of the company did not

* The Ostend Company is not mentioned in this treaty, but obviously the words “particularly those relating to trade,” allude to the right claimed of opposing that company.—MACPHERSON.

eradicate from the minds of the proprietors nor that of the emperor, the wish and determination to pursue the trade they had so auspiciously commenced, provided it could be persevered in without violation of the recent treaty. They had only two ways left, and neither of them promising, by which that could be done—the first to make use of some port in the Austrian dominions which never owed allegiance to Spain; the second, to make a convenience of a port belonging to a foreign prince. From either of these they thought they could trade under the authority of passports as before.

The only ports belonging to Austria, besides those of the Netherlands, were Trieste and Fiume, both at the head of the Gulf of Venice, but neither fit by art or nature for the purpose. There was no readstead for large vessels. The emperor, who was as desirous as any one interested for the establishment of an East India trade, did everything in his power to improve them, and paid a visit in the year 1728 to Trieste, and was present at the launching of a small ship-of-war, and personally encouraged the men who were engaged in making the projected improvements. At length these undertakings were abandoned as fruitless; and the emperor and his subjects, with regrets the more bitter from the promise of their former efforts, were obliged to relinquish all share in the advantages of Indian commerce.

Expelled from their native land, the company sought in foreign countries that asylum which at home they were obliged to abandon. They applied to the Kings of Poland and Prussia, and from both they received assurances of protection and passports. But those feeble powers could not shield them from the enmity of the great nations who sought their utter annihilation. The *Saint Theresa*, while sailing under Polish colours, was seized in the Ganges, and confiscated. It is true the Polish minister remonstrated; but what chance had he against governments who braved, in the same cause, the formidable union of Austria and Spain. The *Apollo*, with a Prussian passport, entered the Elbe and reached Stade, a town then belonging to England. Here she was received as a Prussian craft, and also at Hamburg, where she arrived September, 1731. But when it was ascertained that she belonged to the Ostend Company, and had landed the greater portion of her cargo, and the latter had been advertised for sale, the British and Dutch ministers presented a strong memorial to the magistrates of Hamburg, requiring them to sequester the ship and cargo. A general meeting of the inhabitants was convened to

consider the demand, and, much to their credit and independence, their deliberate reply was that the Elbe was free to the entire German empire; and all vessels, except those of the enemies of the empire and pirates, had a right to come into it; that they could not refuse to admit a vessel bearing the Prussian colours, more especially as she had been received as a Prussian ship in Stade, a port belonging to his Britannic majesty, and also at a port in Ireland, where she had called for refreshments; that they could not be justified in interfering with any ship in their port beyond demanding and receiving the customary duties. They therefore begged the King of England and the states-general not to insist upon what they had neither right nor power to do, nor to involve them in disputes between the higher powers of Europe. This reasonable and creditable remonstrance was ineffectual, and a second memorial was presented, the tone of which was menacing; but on further reflection, it was considered advisable not to push the matter to extremities, which might stimulate the emperor to vindicate the freedom of the Elbe, and the King of Prussia to support the honour of his flag. Ultimately the sale was completed, and at length the company consoled itself with, as they thought, having secured the means of carrying on their trade without interruption and with success.

While this matter was in debate, one of their vessels was homeward bound and daily expected: an advice boat was sent to meet it, with instructions to put into Cadiz, and there to await further instructions. At Cadiz, the cargo was transported on board a French vessel, the commander of which signed bills of lading for the delivery of the goods as the property of a Spaniard at Cadiz, to a merchant at Hamburg. As soon as these transactions were communicated to the British and Dutch governments, a formal application was made to the emperor, soliciting him to put a stop to these infractions of the late treaties. To avoid a rupture, the emperor was advised to order his minister at Hamburg to request the senate to sequester the merchandise, as the property of a company whom he had suppressed, and who were prosecuting their trade in defiance of his orders. Though the senate, in reply, informed him that it was found by the ship's papers, that the cargo was Spanish property, the emperor insisted, the goods were sequestered, and at length the senate was coerced to prohibit the citizens from having any concern with vessels or cargoes so circumstanced; but the proprietors were allowed to withdraw, privately, their goods. The decree by which this prohibition was proclaimed, is dated the 15th of January, 1734.

The two ships which the company had a right to send according to the terms of the treaty of March, 1731, sailed from Ostend in April, 1732, and returned in the end of the year 1734.

The apparent facility with which the emperor abandoned a company in whose success he was so truly interested, and even contributed to their dissolution when he apparently might, with effect, have protested against the violation of the rights of such a city as Hamburg, and the flags of Poland and Prussia, when, as he was perfectly aware, it was his own interest and those of his subjects that were chiefly at stake, is no puzzle to the student of the history of that period, who is aware of the rapid fluctuation of politics which had characterized the relations of the European powers. At this very juncture, the emperor was engaged in a war with the combined powers of France, Spain, and Sardinia, and the neutrality, if not the active adhesion, of the Protestant states was to be purchased at any price.

Before closing the chapter it may be well to say, that in the hostility so determinedly shown to the establishment of the Ostend Company, the opponents to it were actuated by a motive as equally strong as commercial jealousy. In England and also in Holland it was argued "that the trade of the latter, if lost to her, would remove into the Austrian Netherlands, and that thereby the balance of power in Europe would be vested in the house of Austria, and the popish interest would be strengthened." And this consideration is the one which so firmly united England and Holland—whose mutual jealousies and rivalries were no secret—in their combined and persevering exertions to effect the ruin they so completely accomplished. In a pamphlet entitled, "Importance of the Ostend Company Considered," which appeared in 1726, the question is thus effectively argued:—"That by the ruin of the trade of Holland, the power of Europe would be broken, and the Protestant interest weakened, is undeniable; for the United Provinces, with Great Britain, hold the balance, and are the supporters of the Protestant interest. Of the truth of this assertion the two last wars are an undeniable proof. For without the numerous and well paid troops of these two nations, what could the rest of the allies have done? Could they alone have obliged France to make such a peace as was concluded in 1697? Could they alone have driven the French troops out of the empire, or out of the Netherlands during the last war? Could they alone have maintained in Flanders forces superior in number to those of France? Could they alone have carried on the war in

Portugal and Spain? Could they alone have been powerful enough to force King Philip to abandon Spain, as would have certainly happened, humanly speaking, if the fatal change of our ministry had not interposed and prevented it? No, certainly no. It was the wealth and the riches of Great Britain, and of the United Provinces, that enabled them to maintain so many troops as put the allies into a condition, not only of making head against France, but gave them a superiority in number to the forces of that crown, and enabled them to fit out such large fleets, as kept the naval power of France in awe, and thereby preserved the liberties of Europe from becoming a prey to the boundless ambition of Louis XIV.; and therefore, by their wealth and riches, they are equally powerful to protect, support, and defend the Protestant interest from being oppressed by the popish powers of Europe." And it proceeds to show, had not these Protestant powers acted in union during the struggle, the Protestant interest in Europe, in all human probability, would have been sacrificed. It then proceeds: "Thus it plainly appears that when the powers of Great Britain and the United Provinces are the supporters of their liberties, that it is a maxim among the powers of this part of the world, not to suffer either of these nations to become a prey to the House of Austria or Bourbon. . . . But suppose the United Provinces should sit still and not join its forces in favour* of the liberties of Europe, or the Protestant interest, Great Britain could not be powerful enough to give such an additional assistance as would equal what the United States would or could do, and *vice versa*. Consequently Great Britain or the United Provinces cannot support the liberties of Europe or the Protestant interest without the assistance of the other."† "That the balance of power would be turned to the side of the house of Austria, and the popish in-

terest strengthened thereby, are the necessary and unavoidable consequences. For since by the ruin of Holland, one of the supporters of the balance of power of Europe would be destroyed, and no other nation would rise up in its stead,—for the Hollanders would be so dispersed, as not to make any nation become powerful enough to undertake with Great Britain so great a charge,—and we could not alone be able to maintain it;—and since most of the popish merchants of Holland would retire to Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges in the Austrian Netherlands, and consequently draw to those towns all the trade they carried on in Holland,—it is manifest that the Austrian Netherlands would soon become the staple of all Europe as formerly, and soon grow as rich and powerful as Holland now is. Whereby the mighty power of the House of Austria, supported and strengthened by the riches and wealth of the Netherlands, would so inevitably be threatening ruin to the rest of Europe, as it would now endanger its liberties, if backed by all the force and wealth of Holland. And that the popish interest would be strengthened by the ruin of Holland is a consequence thereof. Because no new Protestant state could arise in the room of Holland to join with Great Britain in supporting the Protestant interest. And we alone could not be the defenders of it, and therefore the popish interest would of course become too strong for the Protestant cause."*

* In a search made among the popular English literature of the time, the only pamphlets which were met with, was one entitled, Mr. Forman's Letter to the Right Hon. W. Pultney, showing how pernicious the Imperial Company of Commerce and Navigation lately established in the Austrian Netherlands, is likely to prove to Great Britain, as well as to Holland, printed in 1725, and the pamphlet quoted in the text, with the title there given. In the opening paragraph, the anonymous writer refers to Forman, whose letter, it appears, was published the year previous. Both pamphlets are seemingly the productions of Forman, and are so ranked in Watts's catalogue; we have quoted so freely from it in order to show that the popular feeling in England against the company was not one merely of commercial rivalry. Indeed such could have been scarcely the case in that day, when the English merchants, and nation at least, were opposed to the monopoly of the East India Company.

* The author uses "against the liberties," it was a phrase of the time, the words, "the enemies of," being understood, p. 30.

† Pp. 6, 7, 8.

CHAPTER LVII.

THE DANES IN INDIA AND EASTERN ASIA.

As early as the eighth and ninth centuries the Danes had become the terror of northern nations; and from their piratical incursions England, Ireland, and Scotland, suffered long and severely. The two former they succeeded in subjecting to their iron rule; and the last-mentioned, although injured by their descents, held out no temptation, as did the sister kingdoms, to the establishment of a permanent settlement. Normandy they also overran, and in it they succeeded in permanently settling. Their expeditions were in general maritime. To hazard the perils of crossing a stormy sea, three or four hundred miles in breadth, without the guidance of a compass, required no ordinary spirit of enterprise. The many islands with which the seas that break upon the shores of Denmark are studded made them familiar with the deep, and stimulated them to face more distant dangers. Thus to their maritime position they owed that superiority at sea which then neither England nor France, nor any other European state, had the means to dispute.

Few indeed of the kings of that country during the middle ages, until we descend to the reign of Valdemar II., displayed any eminent ability. This prince ascended the throne in 1203. Animated chiefly by religious zeal, he subdued the province of Livonia; but here his conquests in that direction ended, as the country held forth no inducements, commercially or politically, to extend his territories on the southern shores of the Baltic.

In these days the commerce of the Danes extended to Lubeck, the earliest commercial town of consequence, appropriately termed by modern writers the Venice of the Baltic; to the mouths of the Vistula, where they established a town—Dantzic*—called after themselves; to the more remote provinces of Courland and Esthonia; and to Holstein. The Danes also fixed themselves in Naples, which they subdued, and thence sent their vessels to cruise upon the coast of Asia.†

At this time—the fourteenth century—the association of the Hanse Towns had risen to considerable power and greatness, and actively struggled for the freedom of commerce in the north of Europe. Denmark, commanding the great entrance to the Baltic, was frequently involved in conflict with them in its efforts to

enforce a toll upon all vessels trading to its waters; and to this imposition England, by treaty, submitted in the reign of Henry VII. (1490), but in return the English were allowed to appoint consuls in the chief seaports of Denmark and Norway.

It is not a matter of surprise that a people of the habits and pursuits of the Danes should share in the newly-evolved enthusiasm and enterprise which had then startled Europe into activity.* Christian IV., who then held the sceptre, was a prince possessed of the qualities the time and occasion demanded. With a praiseworthy zeal for the improvement of his subjects, he stimulated their industrial aspirations. Manufactures were encouraged, and commercial pursuits promoted. A proposal which was made to him of opening a trade with the East Indies was received with avidity. Of the successes of the Portuguese, and of their immediate successors, the Dutch and English, he was fully apprised, and was desirous that his people should share the honours, experiences, and emoluments of such distant explorations. In the year 1612 he extended his sanction and encouragement to a body of enlightened and adventurous merchants in Copenhagen, who had associated for the purpose. A capital was raised by the issue of two hundred and fifty shares of a thousand rix-dollars† each, for sending a squadron to the East Indies.‡ The officers in command were recommended to obtain a settlement on equitable terms, to preserve faith with the natives, and to avoid, as far as possible, any disputes with any of the European states there represented. With these prudent and politic instructions, and

* The Portuguese and Spaniards had possession of the commerce of the East, and, it may be added, also of the West, for almost a century, which brought to them not merely the vast treasures of those rich and extensive quarters, but also the great portion of the wealth of Europe; but as soon as an opening was made for other European powers to that commerce, it is remarkable with what avidity the most of them entered into it. Elizabeth granted a charter to the first English East India Company on the 31st of December, 1600. The united states of Holland incorporated theirs by an *oetroy*, dated the 20th of March, 1602; the French king, Henry IV., by his *arrêt*, dated the 1st of June, 1604, gave his approval to a similar association; and, as has been stated in the text, Christian IV., King of Denmark, granted his charter in 1612.

† A rix-dollar is equivalent to about three shillings of English money.

‡ *Dictionnaire de Commerce*, tom. iv. col. 754.

* *Dantzic*, or *Dansvik*, signifies a Danish town or port.

† *Universal Modern History*, vol. xi. p. 2.

fortified with their sovereign's commission, the company's ships bore away to their remote destination from the Island of Zealand, and reached, in 1616, the coast of Coromandel.

In all probability the kind reception of the adventurers by the natives resulted from the observance of the judicious instructions given them at home. Having stipulated with the prince of the district in which they landed, the port of Tranquebar* was conceded to them, and, to the credit of the Portuguese, few of whose good deeds are recorded by our historians, they exhibited no selfish rivalry; on the contrary, they assisted them in their negotiations for a settlement. In 1621, a fortress in the European style was erected for the protection of the harbour and the town.

The Danes had not been long in possession of this settlement, when a circumstance, both unforeseen and important, occurred which presented to them an opportunity of making a conspicuous figure in the East. To place this in full light, it is necessary to go back a few years from the period arrived at. In 1609 a truce, previously noticed, was made between the Spaniards and Dutch, who had been engaged in a long and tedious war. The states and the Prince of Orange thought it expedient to communicate the event to the King of Ceylon. This office was entrusted to Peter Both, who was sent to India as governor-general. On his reaching Bantam, a man in a very subordinate position, Van Boschower, was dispatched, invested with full powers. He was received at the court of Ceylon with the highest respect, and concluded a treaty, which was ratified by the Dutch governor and his council. He had, during his stay, ingratiated himself with the sovereign and his queen, and such were the inducements held out to him by them, that he consented to remain at their court. His was not the general fate of foreign favourites. He cultivated the good opinions of the natives, married a native lady of the first rank, was presented with a principality, and became the sovereign of some thousands of subjects, and the master of a considerable revenue. Displeased by the want of faith of the Dutch, and the violation of some terms of the treaty lately concluded through his agency, and hoping to be able to obtain redress from the states-general, he prevailed on the sovereign

to send him to Europe with the title of ambassador. He also was empowered, in case of failure with the united states, to treat with any European potentate. He started on his mission in May, 1615, accompanied by his wife. The man whom they had recently sent out in a very inferior capacity, the Dutch authorities would not recognise as a prince. This insult occasioned an interruption of the negotiations. After deliberation he proceeded to the court of Denmark, and arrived there in July, 1617. He was gratified with his reception. His proposals were eagerly received, and a treaty concluded with the company and Christian IV. A man-of-war was fitted out, and placed at his service, to convey him and his retinue to Ceylon. The company also sent some ships of theirs to accompany him. Their departure took place in 1619. On the voyage the ambassador died, and, through the impatience and offensive behaviour of the commander of the squadron on his arrival at Ceylon, an opportunity was lost to the Danes of establishing themselves on very favourable terms there, which seemed to have been providentially presented.

The settlement at Tranquebar was progressing in the meantime with a success truly astonishing, and far exceeding the realization of their most sanguine hopes. This prosperity induced them to undertake the establishment of factories upon the opposite coast of Malabar, where the pepper trade abounded, and of sending their ships to the most distant parts of India. In the short period of twenty years they had opened a trade with the Moluccas, and were by its proceeds enabled to send home large and rich cargoes from all parts of the peninsula; and Denmark could boast a trade inferior only to that of the Portuguese and Dutch.

This rapid and uninterrupted progress did not fail to incur the jealous notice of their European rivals; but a fortunate concurrence of circumstances restrained them one and all from overt acts of hostility. The Portuguese, subjected to the yoke of Spain, were manfully battling for their independence. The Spaniards very seldom sent their merchantmen beyond the Straits of Malacca. The Dutch had their attention engrossed by grasping at a monopoly of the spice trade; and the distractions by which England was rent limited her power in those distant seas. To this necessitated neutrality the Danes owed, in a very great measure, their rapid and uninterrupted growth; and furthermore, they derived from the distractions of the other European settlers elements of strength. On terms of amity with all, they extended their sympathies and aid in common, and furnished to all

* Tranquebar is surrounded by the British district of Tanjore, and situated between two arms of the Cavery, a hundred and forty miles south-west of Madras. It is defended by bastion ramparts, faced with masonry, and at its south-east angle is the citadel of Dansburgh. The population numbers twenty thousand.—MACCULLOCH'S *Geographical Dictionary*.

applicants arms, ammunition, and provisions, and reaped enormous profits from this extensive trade.

The ultimate success, as already recorded, of the Dutch in the East, disturbed this commercial prosperity; and the Danes, in common with other European nations, found themselves excluded from several branches of trade, a considerable share of which they had previously possessed undisturbed, and which, if they had succeeded in retaining, would have enabled them to realize the brilliant hopes their short and successful career had justified them in entertaining.

The experience of the simple peasant has vulgarized the proverb, that "trouble never comes alone;" the philosophy of history enforces its truth by multiplied examples, and this period of Danish history supplies an instance. That good and wise prince, who cheered by his patronage into activity the awakening enterprise of his subjects, and who had been favoured with a life sufficiently long to witness the magnificent development of his infant project, at the crisis when the Danish adventurers of the East encountered the formidable rivalry of the Dutch, and were threatened with being swept from the path of their commercial speculations, became involved in the northern wars, and was thus incapacitated from forwarding from home those supplies of men and ships which the exigency so urgently demanded.

In fact, in consequence of the non-arrival of supplies from Europe, the regular communication with Tranquebar was interrupted, and with results which might be expected. The colonists were prevented from sending home their ships as they previously had done. Deprived of that market, their means were crippled, their commerce dwindled to an insignificant degree, and contrasted humiliatingly with the apparent splendour of their town and fort, which they had magnificently embellished in the days of their prosperity; and so low had they sunk in a brief space, that they became contemptible, not alone to the Europeans, but to the natives.

In 1661 Gautier Schouten, the celebrated Dutch traveller, visited Tranquebar; and the statement which he has given of its condition may be relied on. He observes, as if it were something remarkable, that there were two Danish vessels in the harbour; and he adds, that their flags were but rarely visible in any other Indian port. He also records that they were on bad terms with the Moors, and in constant apprehension of their hostilities. In the midst of these dangers, and thrown upon their own unaided resources, the Danish settlers deserve the highest credit for the

determination with which they braved all, and succeeded in maintaining their position. In the height of their distress they prudently discharged with regularity, from the revenues of their town, their liabilities to their garrison, which they maintained in full strength. Their outposts, or rather dependent factories, on the Malabar coast, in Bengal, and a more considerable settlement at Bantam, supplied them with several kinds of commodities and manufactures, which were embarked on board the vessels they sent to Surat, into the Bay of Bengal, to the Straits of Malacca, and to the Island of Celebes.* For want of sufficient capital, they were compelled to surrender this trade into the hands of the Moors and Hindoos, to whom they hired their ships. Their condition may be comprehended from the fact that during this time they were enabled to send to Europe only one vessel in the space of two or three years. †

The diminution of their consequence exposed them to more imminent danger; and the Rajah of Tanjore, within whose territories Tranquebar was situated, thought it was in his power to expel the Danes, and rid himself of their proximity. The splendid town and fortress which they had erected were temptations too strong for his sense of morality. On the slightest pretexts, and without just pretence, he sought cause of quarrel, and was in the constant practice of interrupting their land communications. This he was the more easily enabled to do, as the territory of Tranquebar extends only six miles from north to south, and three miles inland, constituting in all only fifteen square miles. ‡ His daring soared so high, that he sometimes ventured to lay siege to the town and fortress; and it is related by an English traveller§ that on one occasion (1684) the Danes were reduced to such extremities, as to be compelled to pawn three of their bastions to the Dutch for such a sum of money as would enable them to keep their garrison and the people of the town from dying by starvation. This aid they discharged the following year; but their having been enabled to do so strengthened some suspicions previously circulated, that in their distresses they sometimes had recourse to very questionable means for the replenishment of their exchequer. On this occasion these vague rumours assumed a more palpable form, and it was said that an English ship, called the

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, par Guyon, tom. iii. p. 77; *Dictionnaire de Commerce*, tom. ii. col. 754.

† *Commerce des Danois aux Indes*, p. 51.

‡ *Thornton's Gazetteer of the Territories under the East India Company*.

§ *Hamilton's Account of the East Indies*, book 1. p. 352.

Formosa, bound to Surat, and which had called at Calicut for supplies, and had never reached its destination, had met with foul treatment. This charge was sustained by the fact that continued discharges of cannon had been heard not long after she had sailed from Calicut, and at the same time two Danish vessels were cruising from Cape Comorin to Surat. Whatever degree of credibility may be placed in the charge against the Danes, it is a fact that the doubts were never satisfied.*

Some bad feeling may have been engendered by the suspicions thus stated, but the English were not prevented by them from extending their assistance shortly after to the Danes in their utmost need. A large sum of ready money† was offered to their inveterate enemy, the Rajah of Tanjore, for the purchase of Tranquebar, when it should be in his power to deliver it. When this profligate bargain had come to the knowledge of the party most deeply concerned, they applied to Mr. Pitt, the English governor at Fort St. George, and were generously assured of succour should the exigency require it.

The rajah was fully resolved to complete his part of the contract, and made preparations to do so. He, with all the expedition he could command, assembled an army of between thirty and forty thousand, marched on Tranquebar, and cautiously commenced his offensive operations by opening trenches about a mile from the town. The soil being sandy and shifting, he began his work by planting two rows of cocoa-nut trees in close order, and at the requisite distance, and filled up the intervening space between the rows with sand. These trenches were nearly as thick as a town wall, and so high that the besiegers were covered from the fire of the Danes. They worked with such zeal and perseverance that in the space of five months, they had pushed forward their trenches to within pistol-shot of the defences, and had with their batteries nearly destroyed one of the bastions, when the promised and eagerly expected English reinforcement arrived. It was much needed, for the Danish garrison was composed of two hundred Europeans only; an unequal number of Indian Portuguese, and

about one thousand natives, a force totally inadequate to defend a wall one mile and a half in circumference.

With the characteristic bravery of their countrymen, the English, though distrusting their raw levies, Hindoo and Portuguese, on the second day after their arrival, resolved on taking the field and provoking their enemies to a contest. As the sun rose, the small army of the besieged emerged from the gates, the native contingent leading the way, and the English in close order in their rear. The Hindoos had no sooner reached the plain than they treacherously divided to the right and left, leaving the small body of Europeans exposed to the numerous force of the enemy, who, with apparent resolution, emerged from their trenches in good order, armed with swords and shields, and seemingly prepared to engage hand to hand. The English and Danes, few in number, abandoned by the greater body of their little army, became apprehensive of the issue; but their confidence was soon restored, the first peal of the guns from their batteries struck terror into their timid foes. They fled in the utmost confusion, and their trenches would have been levelled, had the victors come prepared with implements for that purpose. In a few days after, a second sally was made with better preparations and greater success, which was entirely owing to the English, who, though left unsupported by the Danes, and deprived of the services of their commander—who had to retire at an early hour, severely wounded—charged and routed a body of musketeers and pikemen; and, subsequently, the Moorish horse, reached the trenches, and returned triumphantly with the loss of half their men to the town. This successful affair, so gallantly achieved, compelled the rajah to abandon the siege, and to leave the Danes in the enjoyment of their town, to recruit their impaired resources, and prosecute their commerce in peace.

As the consequence of the state of things here slightly sketched, but sufficiently ample for their relation to the principal objects of this history, the trade of the Danes in the East was reduced to a very low ebb at the opening of the eighteenth century. An effort was then made to give a new impulse to enterprise. The first movement was to enlarge the town, to increase the number of residents, in the hope that their revenues would improve and be better and more advantageously regulated. Application was accordingly made by the company to Frederick IV. a prince not unworthy to be a successor to Christian IV. Much of the depression and gloomy prospects of the Danish colonies, he attributed to the neglect of religion, and the consequent laxity

* The publicity given to this rumour at the period, and subsequently the confidence with which it has been asserted, and the credit given to it in Indian records and traditions, appear to be sufficient justification for the repetition of an accusation so grievous to a nation professing Christianity, boasting a civilization, and in friendly relations with this empire. However reluctant to reiterate it, the historian has a stern duty, and paramount to such considerations. In justice it is added that similar offences are alleged against other European adventurers in the Indian waters.

† Fifty thousand pardoes.

of morals, and with a resolution worthy of the Christian, and creditable to the statesman, he determined to send missionaries thither. Dr. Francke, divinity professor of the University of Halle, in Saxony, was consulted, and he judiciously selected Zeigenbalg and Plutschau, names now immortalized. They landed on the coast of Coromandel, in July, 1706. Their reception was far from being encouraging. Their mission was treated as chimerical and unpracticable. The results of their labours in the missionary field have been previously related, and the notice of them here is for the purpose of elucidating the effects they produced on the polity of those amongst whom they were destined to labour. It must be confessed that those who anticipated—and many did at the time—that the conversion of the natives would add so many loyal and useful subjects to the Danish government, that disciplined they would become better soldiers than any of their countrymen, that the acquisition of the numbers calculated upon would add both to the wealth and the strength of the Europeans, promote an improved agriculture, and the introduction of new manufacturers, have been disappointed. Contrary to the calculations then made, the trade of Denmark in the East has gradually declined, until Tranquebar itself was sold, in 1845, to the English crown. Nevertheless, it must be confessed the colonists improved, their villages as a consequence augmented, the people lived better, and the government of Tranquebar found itself more secure than it had been previously.

A proposal was made about this time to Frederick, which promised to accelerate his projected improvements in Asia, by Joseph Van Asperen, a shareholder in the Ostend Company, which had recently failed. His scheme seemed feasible, and held out great prospects. He represented to the king that there generally prevailed an active spirit of speculation, and that men's minds were naturally directed to the East Indies, a field which had yielded a rich harvest to preceding adventurers, which hitherto had been only partially explored; that the failure of the Ostend Company, was entirely attributable to the disproportion of the means to the end, the causes such as could not attend that undertaking in any other country, least of all in Denmark, whose commercial pursuits had been uninterruptedly persevered in for more than a century; that all that was required was an adequate increasing capital, which could be easily raised by opening a new subscription upon favourable terms; that men of experience in the trade were not wanting, as naval and mercantile agents were to be had in sufficient

supply amongst those who had been just discharged from the service of the bankrupt company. Influenced by these plausible representations, the king was induced to sanction the proposal; and, to facilitate its adoption, the Danish East India Company was transferred from the city of Copenhagen, to the borough of Altena, a place belonging to the crown of Denmark, and contiguous to the free city of Hamburg. This translation of the company, though seemingly well contrived, as will be seen, somewhat marred its success.

In order to draw support from speculators in other nations, his majesty granted a new charter, dated in April, 1728, for promoting the commerce of the said company to the Indies, China, and Bengal. The following summary of the contents of this charter may not be considered alien to the character of this history:—To the new subscribers was conceded an equal participation in the grants, octroys, and privileges secured to the said company by his majesty and his predecessor, and likewise in all the forts, settlements, revenues, houses, magazines, ships, and effects, and in short in all the possessions of the company and future acquisitions. The old shares which, as has been stated, numbered two hundred and fifty, of one thousand rix dollars each, were to remain as they were, with all the rights of the new shares, and the directors were bound to declare and affirm that the liabilities of the company did not exceed one hundred and sixty thousand rix dollars in specie. The united company was obligated to discharge those claims, upon condition that the old shares were entitled to no dividend till the year 1733; it was stipulated, that if the debts exceeded that sum—of which no suspicion beyond this proviso appears to have been entertained—the old shares were answerable for the overplus, and the new shares protected from any demand to meet such a contingency. The value of each new share was settled at one thousand rix-dollars in bank or specie, whereof twenty was to be paid upon account of Mr. Alexander Bruguier, banker, at Hamburg, or in the manner prescribed by the company at Copenhagen in 1727. All future calls in that year were not to exceed five per cent.; the call for the next year not to exceed twenty-five per cent.; the balance of the capital not to be called upon without the resolution of a general court of the company. If the entire sum of the said one thousand rix dollars for the new share were not paid on or before the year 1738, the proprietors of the old shares were to have an interest at the rate of five per cent. allowed them for the sum they had paid over and above the new subscribers; every

subscriber was allowed to take shares for the bearer, signed by the company, and those who so preferred it, might have them inscribed in the company's books. There was to be paid for each transfer two rix dollars to the company, and half a rix-dollar to the poor. The creditors of the company were allowed to take new shares for the sums due to them, provided they discounted on the said debts thirty per cent. for that year for each share, and twenty-five per cent. for the next year. The shares purchased under these conditions were entitled to the same dividends as the others. The said shares were released from liability of seizure, or stop upon any account whatsoever, as was declared in his majesty's edict. The directors were to communicate yearly to the shareholders an account of the affairs of the company, and that account was to be taken as the data for appropriating the dividend to be specified in a general court of the company by the majority of voices. The directors were not allowed to undertake any trade or commerce in the East Indies upon the company's account, without the consent of the members thereof, and still less were they allowed to dispose of or lend the company's money to any person whatever, for which they were to be answerable *in solido* in their own names and estates. They were to be bound by oath to the exact observance of this article, and for a faithful administration of the affairs of the company for the common benefit and advantage of the members thereof. All the merchandise sold in any place but Copenhagen, was to be paid for in the bank of Hamburg to the account of one or more merchants, and most substantial tradesmen, for the company's account. These merchants were to be chosen, and appointed in a general court of the company by a majority of voices, and in no other way upon any pretence whatever. The said merchants or cashiers were to be paid money, but upon orders signed by three directors at least. The money paid the first year was to be placed at the disposal of the directors, till new ones to be added to them were chosen. The capital arising from the new subscriptions was to be laid out in sending ships to Tranquebar, Bengal, and China, and for no other use whatever. No more money was to be kept in cash than what would be deemed necessary for repairing, fitting and sending out ships, as in the preceding article. A general court of the company was to be summoned as soon as possible, in order to choose four new directors out of the new subscribers who might be all foreigners.

The first announcement of this association

was hailed with demonstrations of approval and confidence, and the Dutch, the countrymen and friends of the projector, Van Asperen, expressed a great inclination to embark in it; but this disposition was soon repressed. The support of a foreign undertaking was denounced in Holland, as a high offence against the mother country; and the directors and shareholders generally of the East India Company did not fail, in their jealousy for their own interest, to denounce most vehemently the Dutch approvers of the scheme. In a short time after active means were employed to deter Van Asperen, and to nullify the impression he had so extensively made. This movement amongst his own countrymen prejudiced other countries likewise, and a check was given to those favourable demonstrations which shortly before had promised support, security, and success to the enterprise. The removal of the company from Copenhagen to Altena, which, in the beginning of the operations of the company, appeared to be a master-stroke of policy, was now used against it with great success. On the edifice erected for the accommodation of the directors and employes of the company, the following inscription had been placed in conspicuous characters:—"Here is the new India-house for carrying on the commerce of Tranquebar, China, and other places." Although intended merely to attract the attention of the public, it subjected the project to very grave suspicions. Its opponents insisted that this was avowedly a new company, to which the maritime powers had an unquestionable right to object; whereas the old company of Copenhagen was, even in their opinions, established in its legal right to that trade by prescription. Again it was argued that the East India Company at Altena, was only an invention to revive the mysteries of stock-jobbing, and enable those who were in the secret to realize immense fortunes, under the colour of a trade with India, when in reality no such trade was seriously speculated on. It was further added that the royal concessions, in their character, were so very extensive and so highly disinterested, that it was extremely difficult to apprehend that an absolute prince such as was the King of Denmark, would, by the voluntary surrender of the liberties of his subjects, bind them any longer than till they could have answered the concealed purposes of this plausible proposal.* Notwithstanding this serious and unexpected check, the project met with such success, that the managers were encouraged to commence preparations for such an expedition as would be creditable

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. ii.; p. 51; Raynal's *History*, vol. xiii. p. 204—206.

to them. Several experienced adventurers hastened to Copenhagen, and proffered their experience and services, and all the country became soon acquainted with the character of the undertaking, and its great national importance. High expectations were entertained of its success, the popular feeling was enlisted in its favour; men of all grades promoted it with a patriotic zeal, feeling that whatever conduced to the public advantage, ramified to the benefit of every, even the most insignificant, individual in the commonwealth. In this state of public excitement it may be assumed that the utmost vigour was directed to the preparations. In this forward stage of progress, opposition to the company became a matter of state policy with foreign nations, and was prosecuted as such by the ministers of Great Britain and Holland at the court of Denmark. Lord Glenorchy and Mr. Dassenfeldt, the representatives of their respective courts, were instructed to act conjointly in this affair, and to exercise all their influence to procure the abrogation of the powers bestowed on the company. In obedience to these instructions, the following protest was drawn up and presented by them to the court of Denmark:—

“His majesty the King of Great Britain and their mightinesses the states-general of the United Provinces, foreseeing the injury the transferring of the East Company from Copenhagen to Altena, will do to the commerce of their subjects, and perceiving with concern that almost at the same instant they are making so great efforts to stop the progress of the Ostend Company, the King of Denmark, their good old friend and ally, is setting up another, equally prejudicial to their subjects, have ordered the subscribing ministers to make most humble representations to his Danish Majesty, hoping from his majesty's friendship, that as soon as he shall be informed of an uneasiness this novelty gives them, he will withdraw the privileges lately granted to that company, and leave it on the ancient footing as always has subsisted at Copenhagen. Accordingly, the subscribing ministers desire your excellency to make a report thereof to the king, and to procure them a favourable answer. Done at Copenhagen, July 31, 1728.

“GLENORCHY AND DASSENFELDT.”

The courteous phraseology in which this extraordinary interference and demand were couched, did not recommend the pill to the relish of his Danish majesty and his advisers. However, he deemed it advisable to reply, and he assured the maritime powers that “they had totally mistaken him in the matter, because it was never the intention to erect a new company, or to transfer that which had now existed above one hundred and ten years from Copenhagen to Altena; that this was manifest from the copy of the incorporation, which granted no new powers to the company, but barely confirmed the old ones; that the voyages proposed directly for China, could

not be esteemed an infraction of treaties, not more than the voyages formerly made by the company's ships from Tranquebar; that, further still, his majesty was not restrained, by any treaty whatever, from maintaining and supporting the commerce of his subjects to the Indies, either from their establishments in that part of the world, or from Copenhagen; that the law of nature and nations, not only gave him a right, but made it his duty to promote the welfare of his subjects, and to extend their trade as far as was in his power; and, finally, that as he did not encourage this commerce with the view of injuring the East India Company in England or Holland, but purely with a design to benefit his own subjects, he could not discern how this should expose him to the resentment of any power whatever.” Whatever may be said in favour of the justice and cogency of these arguments, they did not satisfy the courts to which they were addressed. A protest was prepared to show the insufficiency of them, and the right which the maritime powers had to expect that his majesty should comply with their demands, and withdraw his protection from the company. This memorial was delivered by the Earl of Chesterfield, and the deputies of the United Provinces to Mr. Greys, his Danish majesty's minister at the Hague, in the summer of 1729, from which time it does not appear that any further applications were made on the subject.*

Though the early progress of the company was retarded by this vigorous opposition, it eventually proved favourable to it. Frederick, now verging to the grave, and equally reluctant to be involved in fresh troubles, and unwilling to compromise the interests and rights of his subjects, withdrew his support from the Altena Company, but at the same time he recommended it to the patronage of his son, who shortly after succeeded him on the throne by the title of Christian VI. The withdrawal of the king had the salutary effect of weeding the company of all the speculators who were merely interested in the traffic in shares, and stimulated several to engage in an enterprise the promising nature of which was demonstrated by the powerful jealousy which it had provoked. The dreadful conflagration with which Copenhagen was visited and laid in ashes towards the end of Frederick's reign, retarded the operations of the company; but the revival of commercial confidence, and the liberal and well-directed encouragement of his suc-

* See *Historical Register*; *Recueil Historique d'Actes, Négociations, Mémoires et Traités*. Par M. Rousset, tom. v. p. 35; *Universal History*, vol. xi.

cessor, shortly after gave it an impulse which was attended with felicitous results.

In a very short space of time order was restored; the East India house at Copenhagen, the dockyards, and magazines, were put into repair, the direct commerce with China established, and so judiciously conducted that it continued steadily to increase for several years after, and the trade to Tranquebar was

better regulated, and yielded a more profitable return than it had done at any previous period.

The details connected with the after history of the Danish Company necessarily become involved in the history of the progress of the *British Empire in the East*, and shall receive such passing notice as may comport with their importance.

CHAPTER LVIII.

THE MINOR EAST INDIA COMPANIES:—SWEDISH, PRUSSIAN, TRIESTE, AND SPANISH.

THE SWEDISH COMPANY.

It was to the ruin of the Ostend Company, that Sweden, as well as Denmark, owed the establishment in its dominions, of an East India Company. Though a brave and hardy race, and celebrated in the earliest accounts we possess of the northern parts of the world, for the boldness of their ocean enterprises, the Swedes were among the last of the European nations to engage in maritime speculations. Their passion was war, and in its pursuit they left to the merchants of the Hanse Towns whatever little commerce their country supplied, and this was almost exclusively confined to the fisheries on their coasts.

The famous Gustavus Adolphus, while engaged in the war with Poland, entertained the design of opening a trade to the East for his subjects, and such as were desirous of co-operating with them, and for that purpose issued letters patent, dated at Stockholm, June 14, 1626; but the wars which shortly after broke out in Germany, so engrossed his attention, that for the remainder of his life he had no opportunity of paying the attention it deserved to his enlightened and patriotic project.

In the reign of Christina, the learned daughter of Gustavus, though some of the Swedes had planted a colony in North America, none of them made any effort to share the wealth which abounded in eastern realms.

The desolation which the wars of Charles XII. inflicted on his country was not redeemed by the splendour of his barren victories. The little commerce that had previously struggled for existence, during his turbulent and ungenial rule was exhausted. Perhaps the only beneficial result of his adventurous reign was, that many of his subjects who had fled to foreign countries to escape the miseries war had inflicted, having gleaned knowledge and the fruits of their

industry, in the following reign—when Sweden began to recover—returned to enrich it, and every encouragement was held out to induce enterprising foreigners to visit Sweden and settle there. Encouraged by these favourable indications, and other concomitant circumstances, one Mr. Henry König, an eminent merchant at Stockholm, proposed to form an East India Company. He submitted his scheme to the king and his ministers, and proved to their satisfaction that there were various parts of Asia and Africa, with which a trade might be remuneratively established, without infringing on existing treaties, or impinging on the possessions or interests of other states. He argued that Sweden at all times was entitled to the common right of nations, of which in times past, had she thought it expedient, she might have availed herself; that never was offered so favourable an opportunity as the present. To ensure success, he argued that the assistance of skilled and wealthy foreigners should be enlisted—the former to conduct a commerce which the latter would essentially serve to initiate and to sustain. He assured them that he knew, from his own commercial acquaintance, that there were several capitalists who had withdrawn from the Ostend Company, anxiously on the look out for a profitable and safe investment, who, if judiciously encouraged, would lend their zealous and efficient co-operation.* He succeeded in seriously impressing both the sovereign and his advisers with the assurance that there would be no great difficulty in finding both men and money in prosecuting this commerce with success; and in such a manner, as to hazard no risk of loss by trade, or by opposition from other powers. All his statements having been carefully examined, it was resolved to authorise König

* *Universal History*, vol. ii. p. 252; Macpherson's *Commercial Dictionary*.

to associate together as many as he could find willing to enter into the speculation, and, with the advice and consent of the senate, the king granted him a charter, dated June 14, 1731,* precisely one hundred and five years after letters patent, for the like purpose, were signed by Gustavus. This charter has been pronounced to be one of the best digested instruments of its kind extant. A summary at least of it here is essential to the comprehension of what remains to be said upon the subject:—The king hereby concedes to Henry Konig and his associates, the liberty of navigating and trading to the East Indies for fifteen years, and with the inhabitants of all countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, with the Island of Japan, wherever they shall think proper or convenient, with this single restriction—that they shall not trade in any port belonging to any prince or state in Europe without free leave first had and obtained. The ships engaged in this traffic shall constantly take in their lading at Gottenburg, to which port they shall return with all the merchandise they shall bring with them from the East Indies, and cause the same to be publicly sold as soon as they can. The said Henry Konig shall pay to the King of Sweden, during the said fifteen years, one hundred thalers for every *last* employed in their trade, within six months after the return of each ship. The company's ships must be built in Sweden, and be rigged and equipped with Swedish materials; and no foreign ships or materials must be employed, unless it be found impracticable to procure such in Sweden. The ships may be armed as the company think proper, and carry the Swedish flag. The company may make their capital any sum they think proper. They may export silver, bullion of all kinds, except Swedish coins; and they may import all kinds of merchandise from India. Their seamen and soldiers are exempted from being pressed into the king's service; these ships are never to be hindered from sailing, under any pretence whatever; their commanders are invested with the same power of maintaining discipline on board ship, which the commanders of the king's ships possess; and they are authorised to oppose, by force of arms, all pirates and others who may attempt to molest them in any part of the world. The goods imported by the company are exempted from paying duties, except a very trifling acknowledgment upon removing them. The company's business is to be conducted by three directors, who must all be Protestants, native or naturalized subjects of Sweden, and residing in

* *Supplement au Corps*, tom. ii. p. 2, and p. 305; *Potheval's Commercial Dictionary*.

the kingdom, and Henry Konig is named the first of them. If any director betrays his trust, or acts in any respect improperly, the proprietors may apply to the college of commerce, who are empowered to suspend him, in which case the proprietors are to elect another in his stead. All foreigners who are proprietors of the company's stock, or are employed in their service, shall be naturalized on making application to the king; and their property shall be, on no account, liable to arrest. All other subjects of Sweden are forbidden from trading within the company's limits, on pain of forfeiting their vessels and cargoes. The king promises to renew, alter, or enlarge the company's privileges, if it shall be found necessary for promoting the prosperity of their trade.

The reason why the charter was of such limited duration—fifteen years—is, that it was thought it would be the best expedient either to afford an earlier opportunity of rectifying any imperfections incident to new undertakings, or to satisfy, in some degree, the denouncers of the scheme, many of whom strenuously opposed it.* Being restricted from interfering with the settlements of other nations, the company was guarded against any reasonable grounds of complaint, or even jealousies on the part of any of them, and the effects of this precaution was seen in the very first stage of proceedings. Their preparations were made without remonstrance or molestation. Two large ships were built and soon got ready for sea, furnished and armed in the most efficient manner. Men were scrupulously selected for supercargoes. Their abilities, moral worth, and intimate acquaintance with the duties of their office were the qualifications. The officers and sailors were selected with similar discretion. In fact, everything was regulated with judgment and caution, and in two years after the charter was granted, the *Frederick* and *Ulrica*, so named from the king and queen, put out from the harbour of Gottenburg, to encounter the perils of the ocean in search of the productions of Indian climes.

The king had officially notified to the states-general the establishment of the company, adding, at the same time, his earnest resolve to rigidly enforce the restrictions which forbade their interference with the trade of other European nations, and an assurance was given that he would pay ready money for whatever refreshments or repairs might be wanted in the ports of any of his allies. He expressed his hopes that those moderate demands would be readily granted. He had to make a second application to elicit a reply, which was indeed

* *Raynal*, vol. iii. p. 40.

a very qualified one. Their mightinesses said, that though they could not be expected to favour the new company, they would give every necessary succour to his majesty's subjects. As further evidence of the interest with which the king watched the development of the company, and to mark their appearance in China with a special token of his royal favour, he invested Mr. Colin Campbell, the supercargo of the *Frederick*, with the character of his ambassador to the Emperor of China, and some other oriental princes.

At the starting of the company their stock varied from one voyage to another. It was said to have amounted to a quarter of a million of our money in 1753, and about two hundred thousand only at the last convention. However, there were no data accessible to the public by which they could accurately estimate it, for the accounts were never publicly exposed. The Swedes had in the first stages much less interest in the stock than they subsequently acquired, and in consequence of this the government deemed it politic to throw some mystery about it. With this object it was enacted that any director who should divulge the name of a proprietor, or the sum he had subscribed, should be suspended or even removed, and forfeit all the money which he had invested in the speculation. This policy of concealment, which seems so inconceivable in a free country, was persevered in for thirty-five years. It was, however, provided that twelve of the proprietors should investigate the accounts of the directors once in four years, but the auditors were nominated by themselves; and in England it is known by unpleasant experience what little security such provision yields. In subsequent years the power of appointments was conveyed to the proprietors, and, as a matter of course, with the beneficial effects that usually attend honest inquiry and unrestricted publicity. As Raynal tersely observes,* "Secrecy in politics is like lying; it may preserve a state for the moment, but must certainly ruin it in the end. Both are only serviceable to evil-minded persons."

The first vessels sent out were well received by the Chinese, and permission was granted to them to establish a factory at Canton, on the same terms as were enjoyed by the other European powers having establishments in that city.

At the time when the arrival of the ships was eagerly expected in Sweden, a letter was received from Mr. Campbell, conveying the dis-

agreeable intelligence that on the return of the *Frederick*, as she was at the entrance of the Straits of Sunda, she was fired upon by seven Dutch vessels, captured, and led into Batavia. The Dutch commodore alleged that he was acting under the orders of his government, and would have captured the vessel even if the King of Sweden were aboard. On complaint being made by the Swedish minister to the states-general, they, and also the directors of the Dutch East India Company, protested that they had never issued such orders. The ship was soon liberated, and an insult to the Swedish flag was never after offered by the ships of the Dutch company. The *Ulrica* reached Gottenburg without any accident, and the voyage proved moderately profitable. This good commencement spirited on the directors to renewed exertions, and to hope that succeeding expeditions would prove still more satisfactory.* They were not disappointed. The way in which the servants of the company conducted themselves, won for them the esteem and favour of the native authorities, and inhabitants generally, of Canton; and they showed themselves disposed to favour them in every possible way. Their trade, notwithstanding the loss of some of their vessels, proved exceedingly remunerative to the shareholders and the nation at large, for by it they were enabled to export a considerable quantity of Swedish merchandise, and but a very inconsiderable portion of their oriental importations was consumed in the country. The money obtained from foreigners for what they exported, far exceeded the amount of bullion transmitted to the Indian markets. Thus, the exchange was greatly in favour of Sweden, and the inevitable result of such a state of things was soon made visible by the increase of the precious metals, and the improved habits, social comforts, and increasing demand for labour.

At home the company met with some impediments. They were obliged to take foreigners principally into their service, and there being no nation in Europe more jealous than the Swedes, this generated a great deal of discontent. The populace murmured that the bread was being taken out of their mouths. These complaints were as unjust as they were illiberal; those whom they directed their wrath against were spending their earnings, as a matter of course, amongst them; and those against whom a plausible charge could be brought—the non-resident shareholders—were overlooked and escaped the popular indignation. To subdue this irrational ferment, an order was published an-

* Macpherson's *History of European Commerce with India*.

* Le secret dans la politique est comme le mesonge: il saave pour un moment les etats, et les perd a la longue. L'un et l'autre n'est utile qu'aux mechans.—*Hist. Philos. et Polit.* tom. iii. p. 215. Imprimé a La Haye, 1774.

nouncing that at least two-thirds of the seamen on board their ships should be native Swedes. As this order could not be executed in consequence of the paucity of native mariners, the common people, who were the great bulk of the malcontents, quickly discovered the silliness of their clamour, and were at length convinced that the company had done no more than what circumstances justified and their charter privileged, and that no undue partiality existed for the foreigners.

In the year 1746 the company's charter was renewed, and the term of their exclusive trade prolonged to the year 1766.

From the first establishment of the Swedish company, every partner was at liberty to withdraw his capital upon the termination of the particular voyage for which it was invested, and hence arose the fluctuations already noticed. Experiencing the injurious effects of this precarious state of their stock, it was agreed, in the year 1753, that from that time forward it should be fixed and permanent, and that any proprietor wishing to withdraw should, as in other joint-stock companies in Europe, find a purchaser. At the same time the king, to enable the company to maintain its position against the rivalry of the Prussian trade recently established at Embden, agreed to a commutation duty of twenty per cent. upon the value of the East India goods consumed within the kingdom, instead of the lastage duty, hitherto paid by every ship for each voyage. But in the year 1765, when the charter was nearly expired, the government not only resumed the lastage duty, but also demanded the arrears alleged to be due since 1753. This was not the only attempt made by the government to obtain a participation in the profits. A renewal of the charter was granted in 1766 for a term of twenty years, and as a consideration for this favour the company were obliged to lend to the state above one hundred thousand pounds sterling, at six per cent. interest. As a security for this, they were allowed to retain in their hands the duty payable upon every ship, till the whole of that debt was liquidated.

The chief trade was with China, and the commerce of that vast kingdom and those to the east of it, being looked upon by the other European nations, as merely incidental to their Indian trade, was the cause why the Swedes were permitted to pursue it without interruption and jealousy. Four-fifths of imports were teas, the consumption of which was very small indeed in Sweden, owing to the check it received by the imposition of a tax of not less than twenty-five per cent. All the rest of their imports were exported on paying to the state eight per cent. on the

produce of the sales. By far the largest quantity of teas thus sold fell into the hands of foreigners—and realized ready money—chiefly for the purpose of being smuggled into Great Britain. This clandestine trade was carried on with very great success for years, till it received its death-blow in the year 1784 by the passing of an act for lowering the duties on teas. The produce of these public sales was variable, of course influenced by the number and tonnage of the vessels engaged in it, and by the demand. Raynal says it may be affirmed that it has scarcely ever fallen below two millions of livres,* and has never risen higher than five millions.†

THE PRUSSIANS IN INDIA.

The name of Frederick the Great of Prussia will live—with his faults and his virtues—in the grateful remembrance of a people, it may be said peoples, whom he raised from a state of depression to be a kingdom, great in its victories, great in its intellectual progress, great in the councils of the greatest nations, and great in its alliances, political and matrimonial.

Having enlarged and secured his dominion, he was deliberating on the best means of enriching it, when a fortunate event put him in possession of East Friesland, in 1744. This province contains the city and port of Embden, the only one he possessed in his dominions, and this he proposed to make the seat of a flourishing trade with India. Embden is the capital of the little province of East Friesland. It is a considerable seaport, now belonging to Hanover, situated on the river Ems, or Embs, at its influx into the North Sea, at the Bay of Dollart. About three centuries ago it was reckoned one of the best ports in Europe. The English, compelled to abandon Antwerp, had made it the centre of their relations with the continent. The Dutch had for a long time endeavoured to appropriate it, but in vain. At length it excited their jealousy to such a degree, that they attempted to fill up the port. It commands all the essentials to entitle it to be the emporium of a great trade. The only inconvenience it seemed to labour under as the seat of Prussian commerce was its distance from the bulk of the Prussian dominions, and the delay which would be incurred in succouring it in an emergency; but Frederick was of opinion that the terror of his name would be its protection, and in this persuasion he established there the East India Company.

To further his views, he decided on the incorporation of an East India Company, and for the accomplishment of this he held out

* £83,333 6s. 8d.

† £20,833 6s. 8d.

hopes of encouragement to foreigners. The expectation of royal patronage, particularly from a prince of his great reputation, speedily brought around him several ready to co-operate with him in the maturing of his project. These were mostly composed of Englishmen, Dutchmen, and Frenchmen, who set at defiance the restrictions which their respective governments had framed to prevent their subjects from joining any such alien speculations.

The new Prussian company was incorporated under the title of the Asiatic or China Company, on the 11th of September, 1750, for the term of fifty years. The charter states that during that period they were privileged to send two ships every year to China. All goods imported by them, and sold to foreigners, might be exported without being subject to dues; and the company might export any article manufactured in the king's dominions without paying any duty. Foreigners subscribing to the company's capital acquired all the privileges of Prussian subjects. Noblemen might subscribe without derogating from their dignity. All countries to be conquered by them were to be their own property. They were also invested with the privilege of carrying on several manufactures, and the herring, cod, and whale fisheries, and to trade in all places where their vessels could have free access, &c. &c.

In the course of four or five years the company dispatched six ships to China; but it is asserted—and there are very strong grounds for adopting the statement—that very inefficient, if not improper agents, were entrusted with the management, for of all the European adventures in those days of profit and plunder in the East the Prussian company alone were unfortunate. On winding up their accounts, when the war put an end to their commerce, in 1756, they discovered that their profits amounted to one-half per cent. in the year.

On the 1st of January, 1753, the king established a second company, also at Embden, for trading to Bengal, and the countries adjacent thereto, during the space of twenty years, and with permission to send as many vessels as they pleased. The usual privileges of joint-stock companies were granted to them, including the power to make their own laws, to choose their directors, subject, however, to his majesty's approval.

The capital was limited to one million Brandenburg crowns, in shares of five hundred crowns each. The formation of the original company could not be completed; and some other persons, with the king's permission, obtained the charter, and opened

subscriptions at Embden, Breslau, Königsberg, Magdeburg, Antwerp, and Hamburg. They proposed to send one or two ships on experimental trips to Bengal as soon as the funds subscribed would admit.

After several delays a ship was dispatched to Bengal, and a factory established there. It was cast away in the Ganges in the year 1756. In the year 1761 the second was sent out by the company to look for the remains of the first. This was not attended with success; no profits were realized, and all hopes of establishing a trade with that part of India abandoned. The Asiatic or China Company, however, continued to carry on some kind of trade with China; but eventually Embden itself reverted to the possession of Hanover, and Prussia ceased to have any interest in it.

THE IMPERIAL COMPANY OF TRIESTE.

This company owes its existence to one William Bolts,* an Englishman, who, having served in India, and being dismissed the service of the English East India Company, transferred his allegiance to Maria Theresa, the Empress of Austria, and was received by her as one of her subjects. In testimony of his gratitude, he laid before her a proposal for establishing a trade with Africa and the East Indies, and to make one of her ports at the head of the Adriatic the seat of it, and thus obviate any objection, on the score of treaties, which might be started against such an establishment in the Netherlands. To enable him to carry his project into effect, he solicited the empress to let him have an assortment of metals, cannon, and small arms, from the imperial mines and manufactories, to the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand florins, and to allow him two years for the payment.†

The scheme was received with royal favour, and a charter conceded, dated the 5th of June, 1775, whereby he was authorized, during the space of ten years, to carry on a trade, with vessels under the imperial flag, from the Austrian ports in the Adriatic to Persia, India, China, and Africa; to transport negro slaves from Africa to America; to take goods upon freight either for the imperial ports or any others for account of foreigners, whose properties shall not be liable to confiscation, even if they should belong to nations

* Mr. Bolts arrived in Bengal in the year 1760; he resigned his appointment in the company's service in 1766. Finding that he proposed remaining in India in defiance of their regulations, they were obliged to make use of the powers vested in them by parliament, to send him home.

† This was condoned by the empress's successor.

at war with her; to take possession in the queen's name of any territories which he might obtain from the princes of India: and the charter declared that the vessels belonging to him should be exempted from arrest or detention at all times, whether of peace or war; and that he should be provided with necessary passports, and care taken to obtain redress for him if attacked or molested.

Bolts took into partnership Charles Proli and Company, of Antwerp, merchants, to the extent of one-third of the business. It was agreed that two ships were to be got ready, loaded at Leghorn and Trieste, and that Bolts was to accompany them, for the purpose of establishing factories and commercial relations in India, leaving the charter in the hands of his partners, who were to open a house of India trade in Trieste. Bolts proceeded to London, and there bought a ship. When he got to sea he superseded the English captain, hoisted the imperial colours, and sailed into Lisbon. There his crew was seized upon, and carried off by an English frigate. Nothing daunted, he soon collected another, composed of Italians, arrived in Leghorn, and thence steered for India. Having founded three factories on the coast of Malabar, one on the Nicobar Island, and one at Delagoa, on the coast of Africa, he returned with three ships to Leghorn, in May, 1781.

The success of this adventure so pleased the Grand-duke of Tuscany, that he granted a charter to Bolts, which secured to him the exclusive trade between Tuscany and all the islands beyond the Cape Verde Islands, to be conducted with two ships under Tuscan colours.

So far successful, and favoured by two princes, his fortune seemed to be guaranteed; but such was not the case. On the contrary, he found himself much embarrassed. This, as he represents the matter, was entirely owing to the want of faith on the side of his partners. Whoever was to blame, as soon as his creditors heard of his success, they crowded to Leghorn, and seized on his three ships and cargoes. To release himself from this position, he was obliged to involve himself still further with the firm, and ceded to M. Proli and Company the imperial charter, and also the Tuscan charter, in order to raise a joint-stock of two million florins; he further renounced any right he might have in the profits made by the ships they had sent to China, except a commission of two per cent. upon the gross sales of the cargoes; and he took upon himself the liabilities of a ship called the *Grand-duke of Tuscany*, with her cargo, which had been seized at the Cape of Good Hope by the French and Dutch in 1781,

and also of another vessel expected from Malabar. For these advantageous concessions the firm, "in friendship," lent him £6280 16s. 8d., at five per cent. interest, to pay off a debt contracted on the joint account, and agreed that he should be at liberty to send two ships to India or China on his own sole account, only paying to them a rate of commission of six per cent. on the gross amount of the cargoes in Europe. This agreement was confirmed by Joseph II., who also authorized them to raise the sum of two millions of florins, the proposed amount of the capital of the new IMPERIAL COMPANY OF TRIESTE FOR THE COMMERCE OF ASIA.

Proli and Company immediately opened subscriptions to raise this capital. The existing stock they valued at one million of florins, and for the remaining million they offered shares at one thousand florins each. They declared themselves directors at Antwerp, and Bolts, and another not yet elected, directors at Trieste.

At a meeting of the partners—the only one ever held—in September, 1781, it was proposed to send out six ships for China and India, two for the east coast of Africa, and three for the Northern Whale Fishery, and Proli and Co. engaged to procure the money, and were authorized to do so.

In November, 1786, Bolts, on his own account, fitted out a large vessel for the north-west coast of America, to take advantages of the fur trade, there newly opened, and to convey the cargo to China. He proposed that the ship should pass round Cape Horn, and after loading at Nootka, and selling the furs in China, return to Europe by the Cape of Good Hope, and thus have the honour of accomplishing the first Austrian circumnavigation of the world. The measures which he adopted promised an assurance of success.

To superintend the voyage Bolts had engaged four officers, the companions of Cook in his perilous wanderings; five naturalists were also engaged to extend the demesne of science; and a Bermudian sloop was purchased to serve as a tender, but these preparations were all frustrated, as Bolts asserts, by the malicious intrigues of his brother directors, whereby he sustained an enormous loss, and was obliged to engage the ship in another way.

The other directors were not inactive in April, 1782. They boasted they had six million florins at command, and six ships under the Austrian flag in active service; but their ardour was somewhat moderated by the intelligence which about this time reached them, that their factory at Delagoa had been destroyed by the Portuguese, who claimed a right to that territory. Five of the company's

vessels arrived from China, at Ostend in 1784, which had been made a free port by the emperor on his visit there in 1781. But the fortunate arrival of so many ships, with nearly three millions and a half pounds of tea, besides other goods, was counterbalanced by the loss of the *Imperial Eagle*, which was arrested by the creditors, and involved the loss of three hundred thousand florins. This disheartened several of the shareholders, and induced them to withdraw. Their stock was sold at thirty-five per cent. below par, and afterwards the holders were more unfortunate still, for in the year following the company was declared bankrupt to the amount of ten million florins.

This company encountered no opposition from the jealousy of the other nations of Europe with the exception of the petty kingdom of Portugal; and, in all human probability, its success had been brilliant, were it not for the jealousy and differences of Bolts, and the co-partners

THE SPANIARDS IN INDIA.

The latest of the nations in Europe which established commercial intercourse with India was Spain, though the Spaniards were the first after the Portuguese who crossed the Pacific, and navigated the Indian Ocean.

In the fifteenth century, while the Portuguese were energetically prosecuting their discoveries, extending their trade, and establishing their power in the East, their neighbours, the Spaniards, were, with equal activity and success, securing boundless treasures in the West.* Columbus having added the newly discovered western continent to its dominions. There was no state to dispute the sovereignty of the vast extent of sea and land to which they claimed a right, nor did either power then apprehend that—by the giant strength of the sluggish denizens of the swamps of the Lowlands or the isolated inhabitants of the isles of the West—those splendid demesnes would be rudely torn from their grasp; and confidently they calculated when the sovereign pontiff, in the plenitude of his assumed temporal dictatorship, had decided that a meridian drawn from the north to the south, three hundred and seventy leagues westward of Cape de Verde, should bound the mutual possessions and right of maritime discovery of the two kingdoms, † that no son of mother church would impiously dispute so venerable an adjustment.

Several years elapsed after the discovery

* Raynal's *Histoire des Etablissements dans les Indes*, tom. ii. p. 236.

† Dunham's *History of Spain and Portugal*, vol. ii. p. 280.

by Columbus of America, before an attempt was made to explore the ocean which it was conjectured extended far away to the west of it. Vasco Nunez de Balboa, a Spanish adventurer, guided by some Indians, was the first European who was gratified by beholding its broad expanse. This occurred in 1513. The court of Spain, in 1515, dispatched Juan Diaz de Solis, who had previously sailed along the coast of Brazil, to attempt a passage to the South Sea and to India along the southern shore, part of the recently discovered continent.* This expedition proved disastrous: in an encounter with the Indians on the banks of the Rio de la Plata many of his followers were slain, and the survivors returned to Spain.

A second attempt was made to reach India from a Spanish settlement on the southern coast of Mexico. Vessels were fitted out for the voyage; but unfortunately the timber made use of in their construction was so subject to be wormeaten, that in a few weeks they ceased to be seaworthy, and thus terminated these preparations.

It was reserved for Fernando de Magalhães (Magellan) to attempt this with success. Notwithstanding the recent arbitration of the pope, the line of demarcation was not so definitely drawn as to obviate the origin of disputes. The splendid empire secured in Asia to Manuel of Portugal excited the jealousy of his brother Fernando, King of Castile, and he made several fruitless attempts to be allowed to participate in its advantages. After the death of that prince a disaffected Portuguese, who had served Manuel with distinction both in Ethiopia and India, and complained—perhaps not without cause—that royalty's rewards were not commensurate with the perils encountered and the results realized, fled to the court of Castile, and there succeeded, perhaps with little effort, in impressing on the new king, Charles V. of Austria, that, by the division made with the papal line, the Molucca Islands geographically belonged to Spain. To these he also proposed a shorter route than that by the Cape of Good Hope—namely, by the Brazils. In August, 1519, he set out with five ships, with absolute power over the crews. Steering towards the Canaries, he doubled the Cape de Verde, passed the islands of that name, and boldly steered into the limitless waste of the Western Ocean. He coasted along the shores of Brazil, daunted by no dangers of unknown waters, warring elements, mutinous crews, or fierce gigantic Patagonians, whose naturally large physical

* Maepheron's *History of European Commerce in the East*, p. 319.

proportions were extravagantly exaggerated by the nervous fears of his apprehensive followers. He passed the *land of giants*; and in September, 1520, arrived at a cape which he called after the eleven thousand virgins, and then entered the fearful straits which immortalise his name and his toils. Passing through a series of perils of more than romantic interest, he at length reached the Philippine Islands, after a passage of fifteen hundred leagues. Here he lost his valuable life in a conflict between two native chiefs, the quarrel of one of whom he was imprudently induced to espouse. Only one—the *Victoria*—of his six vessels returned to Spain; she arrived there in September, 1522,* bringing home a cargo of spices taken in at the Molucca Islands, and with only eighteen men, survivors of the battles and voyages, who, having returned by the Cape of Good Hope, had the honour of being the first circumnavigators of the globe. Had Magalhães returned, he was to have a patent for exclusive trading, for the period of ten years, with the countries which he should have discovered. "If," says Dunham,—and he is perfectly justified in making the observation,—“the object of the expedition failed through the catastrophe of its leader, he will be considered by posterity as by far the most undaunted, and in many respects the most extraordinary man, that ever traversed an unknown sea.”

The Portuguese were startled by the discovery of this new route to Asia, the claims laid to the Moluccas, and the endless pretensions which, by possibility, might arise out of them; but Charles, who was now not only King of Spain, and sovereign of the seventeen rich provinces of the Netherlands, but also Emperor of Germany, was too powerful to be influenced by threats or aggressions. Three hundred and fifty thousand ducats of gold, were paid to Spain in consideration of its desisting from further trading in those oriental regions; however, the right was reserved of resuming that trade on the repayment of the money advanced. The bargain was concluded by a treaty executed at Saragossa, on the 22nd of April, 1529.

By this treaty the commerce of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, was secured to Portugal as long as it continued independent of Spain. On the union of these kingdoms some time after, the Portuguese settlements, as dependencies on Spain, were exposed to the hostilities of the English and Dutch, who were engaged in war against the latter power. The Portuguese, however, were expelled from

* Dunham's *History of Spain and Portugal*, vol. iii. p. 312.

the Moluccas at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Several subsequent efforts were made to find out a shorter route than by the Straits of Magellan, but without success. The Spaniards were, therefore, confined to carrying on the trade with the Spice Islands from their lately established settlements on the western shores of America. The commodities of the East and West were transported by land carriage across the narrow Isthmus of Panama.

In 1564 the Philippine Islands were brought under the dominion of Spain by Miguel Lopez de Legaspi. In the island of Zebu he founded a town called San Miguel; and in the island of Leuconia he erected Manilla, destined to become the capital of the Spanish dominions in the Eastern seas, and was greatly enriched by the commerce with America, China, and other rich countries and islands. It is called by the Spaniards the pearl of the East.

The branch of commerce which is most cultivated at Manilla is with Acapulco, in Mexico. Thither ships are sent annually, called galleons. The origin of this trade is rather curious, and is sufficiently important to justify a passing notice. It is thus told by Macpherson:—"The missionaries whom Philip II., in his zeal for the propagation of the Catholic religion, had sent to convert the natives of the Philippine Islands, represented to him that they could not perform the sacrifice of the mass for want of flour and wine, and they proposed and requested that those necessary articles should be brought to them from Acapulco, the nearest Spanish port on the continent of America. The king, notwithstanding a strenuous opposition made by the council of the Indies, acceded to the proposal of the missionaries, and licensed the viceroy of Mexico to send every year a vessel to Manilla loaded with flour and wine, and gave strict orders that no other merchandise whatever should be carried to or from Manilla. After the importation of the flour and wine had gone on for some years in strict observance of the royal mandate, the viceroys of Mexico and Manilla agreed among themselves that the annual vessel, instead of returning quite empty to Acapulco, should carry a parcel of Chinese and Indian silks and cotton piece goods to be sold for their joint account. When the energy of the Spanish government declined, the vigilance of the council of India relaxed, or perhaps their complaisance to the viceroys increased; in consequence of this, the trade of carrying oriental merchandise to Acapulco was pursued to such an extent as to require two ships of from fifteen to eighteen hundred tons burthen, which arrived annually at Acapulco, heavily

freighted with rich stuffs of every kind, and also linens made in China, in imitation of the French fabrics; diamonds, pearls, spiceries, drugs, tea, porcelain, &c., sufficient for the consumption of the great province of Mexico. The returns consisted of cochineal, confections, mercery goods, some European trinkets, and the original articles, flour and wine; but the chief part of the return cargo was uniformly silver, to the amount of five or six million dollars. This trade, begun by the two viceroys for their own emolument, appears, upon the subsequent augmentation of it, to have been shared by the inhabitants, and became very prejudicial to the trade between Spain and Mexico by supplying the colonists with an innumerable variety of articles of Indian and Chinese manufacture, which, by their superior cheapness, and most of them also by their superior beauty, rendered the rival European fabrics in a great measure unsaleable, and very much impaired the king's revenue—not only by the deficiency of the duty upon merchandise exported from the kingdom, but also by depriving him of his share of the silver, which would be imported into Spain if not diverted to Manilla, whence it was carried to India and China.*

In consequence of this state of things, it was often a subject of serious consideration to Spanish governments whether it would not be to the interest of the mother country to abandon the Philippine Islands.

To this predisposition is to be attributed the policy adopted by the Spanish monarchy in 1720, which, reluctant to relinquish the sovereignty of so many islands, yielded to the remonstrance of the council, and the persevering clamours of the merchants, and imposed a strict prohibition of the use of Chinese and Indian manufactures. This arbitrary measure produced great dissatisfaction; and after a long controversy the colonists at length succeeded in procuring its reversal in the year 1734.

Up to this date there was no direct trade with India, if we overlook the interval from 1580 to 1640, during which Portugal was a portion of the Spanish dominions. Indeed, a direct trade was forbidden by the treaty of Munster, concluded in the year 1648, whereby it was agreed between the King of Spain and the states-general that neither of them should use the East India trade in any other manner than was then practised—that is to say, that the Dutch should only sail by the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spaniards only from their settlements in America. Spain faithfully abided by this arrangement, and never

made an attempt to infringe upon it till the year 1733, when a royal charter was granted to Don Emanuel de Arriaga and his associates, under the name of THE ROYAL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vesting in them during a period of twenty years the exclusive privilege of sailing to both sides of Africa, and to all the countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope. They were empowered to carry the royal colours upon their ships, which were exempted from all duties, in the same manner as if they actually belonged to the royal navy, their officers also being on a footing of equality with those of that service. They were allowed to export bullion without paying any duty. The company were to pay at Cadiz a duty of eight per cent. on spices, and five per cent. on all other descriptions of goods imported by them. The capital was fixed at four thousand shares of one thousand dollars each, to be subscribed at Cadiz. The business of the company was confined to nine directors, appointed by the king, each of them possessing twenty-five shares in the company. The king subscribed for four hundred shares, constituting a tenth of the capital.

It has been alleged that there never existed a *bona fide* intention of engaging in commerce, but that that company was concocted for mere stock-jobbing projects. There is no evidence to sustain this condemnatory accusation. It is far more probable that its progress was stopped by the failure of the galleons, and the intrigues of the Chinese merchants in the Philippines.

Another interval of thirty years elapsed without an effort, but in the end of the year 1764, the *Buen Consejo*, a king's ship sailed from Cadiz, and passing the forbidden Cape,* arrived at Manilla, and returned in 1766, with a cargo of eastern produce. Thirteen more voyages followed in the same route, the last of which was completed in 1784.

At this time the charter of the royal Guispucoan Company of Caraccas expired, and it was deemed a favourable opportunity, with the aid of their disengaged capital, of establishing a company which would embrace the commerce of both continents. The scheme was sanctioned by the king, and a very liberal charter granted, dated March 10, 1785, consisting of one hundred articles, of which the following are the most important:—"THE ROYAL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES is established for twenty-five years.—The capital is to consist of eight millions of 'pesos sencillos'† divided into thirty-two thousand shares of two hundred and fifty pesos each, to which all persons, of whatever description, not excepting

* Macpherson's *History of European Commerce with India*, p. 321.

* Macpherson, p. 324.

† A *peso sencillo*, 3s. 4½d.

ecclesiastics, either individually, or corporately may be admitted to subscribe.—The king subscribes a million of dollars for himself and his sons, besides his stock in the Caraccas Company, and he hopes that the National Bank of San Carlos, and the other bank in Spain and the Havannas, will show their zeal for the prosperity of the nation, and the advancement of its commerce, by subscribing largely.—The Caraccas Company shall be incorporated into the Philippine Company, and all their stock be brought into the capital at a fair valuation.—The prosperity of the Philippine Islands being one of the principal motives which induced the king, in his paternal love for his subjects, to establish the company, three thousand shares, shall be reserved for the inhabitants of those islands of every description, whether Spaniards or Indians, whether individuals or communities, to subscribe for them at any time within two years after the publication of the company's charter within the islands.—The shares may be transferred by indorsements, as is practised in those of the National Bank, and at such prices as the parties may agree for." The company were prohibited from raising money upon interest; but if a greater capital were required, they, with the king's permission, might raise an additional sum by a subscription among themselves. A statement of the company's affairs was ordered to be published for the information of all concerned, and copies to be forwarded to the agents in the Indies and the Philippines. During the term of the charter no Spanish vessel, except of the royal navy, or of the company, had permission to go to the Philippine Islands or to India, and no ships but those of the company were privileged to sail direct from Spain to the ports of South America, the Philippines, or India. The company's ships might trade to the other Spanish dominions in America, as other Spanish subjects do, without any exclusive privilege. The company might carry silver or merchandise to the ports of Asia, paying two per cent. on foreign goods, and nothing on Spanish goods or money. They might ship every kind of oriental goods, not excepting piece goods of silk and cotton of every description, at the port of Manilla for Spain, without paying any duty. On

their arrival in Spain, they should pay four per cent. rated on the current prices, and a drawback of three and a half per cent. was allowed on re-exportation. The laws formerly promulgated for prohibiting the admission of muslins and other cotton goods, were repealed with respect to those imported by the company. For the encouragement of the Philippines, their products were exempted from duty, when borne directly to Spain. The business was to be conducted by a junta of government, or direction authorised by the king, and consisting of three directors chosen by the king, three by the company, two by the National Bank, two by the Bank "de los Gremios" two by the Bank of Havanna, and one by the Bank of Seville (if those bodies should hold a sufficient amount of stock), and also two stockholders, being in all twelve directors. The king's secretary was empowered to summon a meeting of the junta, when he saw fit, and to act as president.

The project was far from being approved of by the people of Manilla. They did all in their power to injure and bring it into discredit. The discouraging reception which they experienced, however, did not daunt the agents who arrived. They applied themselves to direct the industry of the aborigines to the cultivation of indigo, cotton, pepper, and silk, which they intended to make the staples of the trade of the Philippines.

In 1789, permission was extended to all European vessels to import into Manilla every kind of Asiatic goods, but by no means European, and to receive in return the merchandise of Spain, Spanish America, and the Philippines, and any foreign merchandise imported by the company. This permission was to extend to three years.

With royal favour, large contributions by the king, the extensive privileges conceded, and its wide range of commercial operations, this company did nothing worthy of its inauguration. It is true, commerce was very much deranged by the war which was occasioned by the memorable French revolution; but it must be said to their credit, that with the proceeds of the few cargoes which arrived, and the sale of their stored merchandise, they paid off the money they had borrowed, and some dividends of from five to seven per cent.

CHAPTER LIX.

FRENCH ENTERPRISE IN INDIA AND THE EAST, TO THE TIME OF THE FORMATION OF
"THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES."

OF all the European nations attracted to the East, there is not one whose history is so interwoven with that of the English in their Asiatic transactions as our gallant neighbours the French. In Europe the two nations have been always rivals, and, with very brief intervals, belligerents. There were many interests purely Asiatic, which aggravated the causes of quarrel, involved hostilities at home, and embittered national antipathies. The dire consequences of these rivalries are to be read in the jealousies, intrigues, and fierce, and for some time dubious, conflicts that were maintained for supremacy in India. The narration of these will necessarily form an interesting and considerable portion of this work. It is not consistent with the plan proposed to do more in this chapter than to epitomise the history of the pertinent events which attended the arrival of the French in India, and briefly to trace their progress, until they are placed face to face with their great, persistent, and victorious opponents, whence the records of their deeds commingle.

Though the French were amongst the latest of the European maritime powers to avail themselves of the immense field of wealth thrown open by the discovery of the ocean passage to India, it is a singular fact, not generally known, that they were nearly as early in their discoveries as any nation of the West. In the reign of Louis XII., and in the month of July, 1503, Sieur de Gonnevillle, doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and discovered a great country to which he gave the name of the Southern Indies. He remained there for six months, and brought home with him a young noble of that country.* The extraordinary tales which were circulated of the luxuriant productions of the Portuguese and Spanish discoveries, the rich cargoes arriving from them, the amount of wealth which they drew from the eager purchasers of every part of Europe, and the consequence to which the fortunate kingdom above mentioned had reached, did not affect the excitable inhabitants of France. The cause of this apparent indifference is to be sought in the facts, that the French people, warlike

in temperament, were absorbed by the conflict in which they were then engaged, and had neither inclination nor time for the cultivation of commerce, and many of the other arts of peace. The period referred to was one chequered with civil discord, and in addition to this, some of its writers say, that France, with its rich, salubrious, and extensive territories, had not the same incentives as the inhabitants of the limited domains of England and Holland. But a better reason still is that France was not a maritime power, nor had it the facilities to become so in an equal degree. The British, Dutch, and Danes were inured to the dangers of a rough sea, and prepared to seek fortune in the teeth of billow and gale.

One of the ablest princes that have ruled France, was Francis I. His comprehensive mind perceived the advantages which would result from the cultivation of foreign commerce. He proposed to his subjects the benefits which would flow from it, and exhorted them to undertake long voyages. The last of his immediate descendants, Henry III., was equally alive to its importance. In 1578, he issued an edict in which he pressed the same views, but with little success. In the reign of Henry IV., an adventurer, Gerard Leroi,* a native of Flanders, who had been several times to India in the service of Holland, presented himself in France, and offered his services as a pilot, in the event that an East India Company should be formed. This offer was accepted, and the company accordingly incorporated under the king's letters patent granting an exclusive right of trade for fifteen years, on the setting out of their first ship. The enthusiasm with which the proposal of Leroi was first greeted soon cooled, as is unfortunately too often the case; and the company was dissolved without realizing any of those brilliant expectations which had been promised and were anticipated: indeed it did not even initiate a promising movement. Leroi, who fully understood the benefits which France, and he as the projector, would derive from the success of his scheme, did not relinquish his hopes. In the following reign he again came before the public, and, by the patronage of some friends at court, was enabled to enrol his company. The letters patent from Louis

* *Mémoires touchant l'Établissement d'une Mission Chrétienne dans le Troisième Monde, présentée à N. S. P. le Pape Alexandre VIII. par une Ecclesiastique Originnaire de cette même Terre*: 1663, 8vo. *Déclaration du Capitaine Gonnevillle, datée Juillet 19, 1505.*

* Merle's *Histoire de l'Inde*, tom. v. p. 211.

XIII., bear date, March 2, 1611. This much having been accomplished, operations were suspended for some years, owing to disputes amongst the proprietors, and consequent want of funds. At the end of that period of inaction Muisson and Canis, both merchants of Rouen, petitioned the king. They requested that the privileges granted to the company should be transferred to them, pledging themselves that if their prayer were granted, they would in that very year dispatch ships to India. This proposal was of course strenuously opposed by all who had an interest in the existing company: At the suggestion and recommendation of the court, the matter was satisfactorily adjusted: a coalition of both parties was the prudent consequence, and an exclusive power was granted them of trading to the Indies for twelve years, and many other privileges. The letters patent were dated July 2, 1615, and were registered in parliament, September 2.

In the following year, two ships were fitted out. The officers selected for the command possessed the necessary qualifications—for the voyage in those days was looked upon as very extraordinary. They reached India in safety, but here they found they had a difficulty to encounter which had never been thought of. The great portion of the sailors were Dutchmen. On their arrival, the Dutch president of the Indies, published an order commanding all the subjects of the states-general who were on board these vessels to quit them immediately. This order was obeyed, and both the French captains were abandoned by their men, and thus rendered incapable of returning to Europe. One of the ships was sold for a mere trifle; the largest vessel returned safely to France, and, although the company had the misfortune of being reduced to one vessel, the proceeds of the voyage yielded a balance in their favour.

A second expedition was decided on, and prepared with creditable speed. Commodore Beaulieu who commanded one of the former vessels, sailed October 2, 1619, from Honfleur road with three ships. The commodore has left a curious and instructive narrative of this voyage, from which it appears that the vessels were well built and provided with every essential requisite, and the voyage conducted with skill and address. Two of the ships obtained their cargoes at Achen, in the Island of Sumatra, but the third was lost on the coast of Java, having on board goods to the value of eighty thousand pounds. The commodore charged the Dutch with having sunk her and all the men aboard. The two surviving ships returned to Havre, in December, 1620.

Disheartened by the prospective recurrence

of such disasters, the company abandoned the intention of proceeding to India, and confined themselves for the time to the establishment of a colony in the Island of Madagascar, from which they calculated, at no distant day, to be able to prosecute their voyages to the original destination. But these hopes were also doomed to disappointment. By a series of misfortunes and a continuance of misgovernment, all their returns thence fell far short of the expenses incurred in the maintenance of their settlement. The consequence was the dissolution of the company, and for several years no effort was made towards pushing a trade with the East Indies, and no beneficial result remained to mark the existence of previous expeditions.

The next attempt made by the French to share in a commerce which was enriching all the nations engaged in it, was under the patronage and guidance of one of the ablest and perhaps most unscrupulous statesmen that France, fertile in such productions, has ever given birth to—the celebrated Cardinal Duke de Richelieu. He fully appreciated the great national benefit which would flow from diverting French speculation into commercial channels. In his views upon this subject,* he shows that he grasped it with a master mind. He saw that France, the greatest nation on the continent, had, during preceding centuries, concerned itself with wars, which were, and had been, expending its vast resources in barren operations; whilst the neighbouring states of Holland—an insignificant corner of the earth, consisting of stagnant pools and marshes, producing beer and cheese merely—by its commercial enterprise, had not only been enriched and elevated, but had become the factor of Europe, and supplied it with many necessaries, and a great portion of its luxuries. He reflected how in England, a comparatively small island, by its commerce in cloths, lead, iron, and coal, had penetrated to all parts of the world with—he remarked—the exception of China. Genoa, he also adduces as an illustration; and then proceeds to show the advantages which France had over them all. The fleets of other nations were manned by her sailors; the fisheries on her coasts were abundant and prolific; and the abstinence from flesh meat of the Roman Catholics during the third of the year, threw open a market for the sale of their produce. It was fertile in corn, wine, flax, and hemp; and everything essential for naval purposes was to be had there in greater abundance than in Spain, England, or Holland; the chief commodities imported into France were articles of luxury, and could be

* *Testament Politique*, p. 133, &c.

manufactured with greater profit there than in those countries in which they were wrought, as the materials were the productions of the French soil. The entire chapter from which these few observations are extracted is worthy even now of perusal. The Cardinal did not rest satisfied with speculating on this subject. He resolved to give an impulse and an aim to French enterprise, and undertook to do it, as was his habit, with earnestness and energy. In June, 1642, while England was in the throes of civil convulsion, liberal privileges were granted to a company under his own immediate patronage. He did not live to guide or observe its proceedings, and his loss must have been a serious impediment to the infant project. Enough, however, had been done to secure it royal patronage; the privileges were confirmed to it by Louis XIV., or rather by the regency, as that great prince was still in his minority. Though in the undisturbed enjoyment of these exclusive favours during the twenty years following, the result by no means responded to the patronage bestowed, or the hopes indulged in. Every year a vessel was dispatched to Madagascar and no farther; but many of them were lost on the passage, and those which escaped lost several of their crews by scurvy. So that all that France enjoyed of the East India trade was, a company without revenue, whose utmost ambition was to establish and maintain a colony in Madagascar, and in this they were equally unsuccessful.*

On the expiration of their privileges, a private speculator, the Duke de la Meillerai, resolved to make a venture to India on his own account. He actually dispatched two ships which reached the French settlement in Madagascar, the possession of which was yielded to him, but which he discovered was not worth keeping. It was insinuated at the time in Paris, and spread to the other places, that this adventure of the duke involved no personal risk, and that being master of the ordnance, he had made free with the king's stores. After his death the Island of Madagascar was sold by his son for about twenty thousand livres, a sum, it was asserted, far above its value.

It is a subject for reflection to what cause or causes can be attributed the fact, that up to this period the French were the most unsuccessful of European adventurers, especially as their failure was not the consequence of the hostility of their competitors. These pages is not the place to discuss the question. Yet it may be pertinent to observe that there were some circumstances of an external character

which contributed to frustrate the efforts of the company. One of these was the murder of Fouquembourg, who, on his return from Madagascar, in 1646, was assassinated on his road to Paris, it having been falsely suspected that he had a quantity of valuable jewels concealed upon his person. This blow was prejudicial to the interests of the young company, having been by it deprived of the opportunity of consulting him on the affairs of the East, losing also his memorials and other papers, which would have been of singular use to them. Another misfortune was the death of M. Flacourt, who, on his returning to Madagascar with the king's commission as governor and commander-in-chief of that settlement, was attacked by Barbary rovers, his ship blown up (1660), and he with two hundred others perished.* The third great calamity was the death of the Duke de la Meillerai,† after he had satisfactorily compromised with the company, and had assured them of all the assistance in his power. This last disappointment led to the dissolution of the company, which surrendered its privileges in order to make room for a projected association.

In addition to the external prejudicial influences already mentioned, it must be said that the very patronage so much valued and so much sought after, constituted a more serious obstacle because its many latent evils were inherent and inseparable. When Richelieu determined on the formation of his company, he induced the chief men of rank and wealth to embark in it. The consequence was that there was always some great nobleman at the head of it. His creatures were appointed to every employment, and sycophancy, and not merit, capacity, or services, was the most effective recommendation. This favouritism, and the obvious imbecility of the management, repelled the best judges of the means of successfully carrying on the commerce of the Indies. By the English and Dutch these abortive efforts were treated with contempt, and all Europe passively permitted a monopoly of that trade to the maritime powers previously in possession of it.

The reign of *Le Grand Monarque*, rich in so many historic souvenirs, was fated to mark with its indelible impress the commercial as well as other departments of the commonwealth. As soon as Louis XIV. attained his majority, and took into his powerful hands the rudder of the state, he almost instinctively selected for his ministers men whose transcendent abilities and ample expanse of mind justified the accurate perception that singled

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. ii. p. 67.

† *Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes*, p. 22.

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, tom. iii. pp. 86, 87.

them from the crowd that thrust themselves upon royal observation.

Amongst these was the famous Colbert, of Scotch descent, whose brilliant services contributed in no small degree to make his sovereign the greatest in Europe. Well versed in public affairs, and having given his master, Mazarin, repeated proofs of his ability and sagacity, he was recommended by that minister to Louis XIV. as the person most competent to reform the deranged finances of France. He not only applied himself to remedy the abuses which time and the dishonesty of public servants had created; but he also determined on developing fresh supplies of revenue, and, amongst other measures, he conceived the design of reviving the defunct French East India Company; nor was he disheartened by the repeated failures which had attended previous undertakings.*

Warned by past failures, he resolved to act with caution and foresight. He accordingly summoned to his councils several merchants and seamen, whose Indian experiences could furnish him with such information as would enable him to steer clear of the rocks and shoals on which his predecessors foundered. The consequence of his inquiries was that he ascertained that there were three principal difficulties in his path. The first was the raising of the capital. The French merchants were ready enough to take shares, but not so ready to meet the calls. The second was the necessity of excluding foreigners, in order to make it national. Though this he looked upon as essential to its success, he was aware that by this exclusion he rendered more difficult the realization of the requisite funds. The third and greatest difficulty was the securing to the company such privileges and powers as might satisfy strangers and natives as to the security of their properties, and place the management in the hands of directors in whom unlimited confidence could be reposed. Having maturely considered the project in all its bearings, and formed his own conclusions, he then communicated the details of his scheme to M. Charpentier, of the French Academy, a man of deservedly great literary reputation.

The document† thus prepared is a masterpiece in its way; and as reference must necessarily be made to it, a few explanatory extracts may be here appropriately introduced. It pre-faced with stating that, as former plans had failed for want of funds, that danger was here provided against, since, in addition to the con-

stant protection which the government was determined to give, the king himself, and the greatest and the wealthiest persons in the nation, were determined to supply funds in abundance to place it on an equally sound pecuniary basis, to say the least, as was the Dutch East India Company at the period of its institution. The disappointment which had attended the previous companies afforded no substantial grounds of apprehending a similar fate. Few such undertakings were successful in their first stage. The Spaniards had suffered severely in their early expeditions to America, yet they persevered, and were eventually successful. The English colony in Virginia had failed four or five times, and at length accomplished its objects; and even their neighbours, the Dutch, then in so flourishing a state, were unfortunate in the commencement.

The paper then proceeds to show that the island of Madagascar, a considerable portion of which was in their possession, was a country capable of vast improvements, and of becoming of far more consequence than any settlement possessed by the Dutch in the East Indies; incomparably more commodious and secure than Batavia, which they had made their capital residence.

As to the security of the company, it was a well-known fact that only a very small part indeed of the island of Java was in the possession of the Dutch, and that the rest of that large and populous country was occupied by a variety of fierce and turbulent nations, animated with a bigoted zeal for the Mohammedan religion, and detesting bitterly all who professed the faith of Christ; and, in fact, that every one of their colonies in the East was beset with enemies, whom their perfidy and cupidity had provoked: that by fixing their principal post in Madagascar, the French company would enjoy advantages never held by the Dutch in Batavia, because the island was equally convenient for carrying on the commerce of the Red Sea or the Bay of Bengal, and was eligibly situated for the dispatch of ships to China and Japan, affording a desirable station for refitting and provisioning on their return.

Having shown these grounds for the anticipation of success, the memorial then proceeded to explain the means by which the project was to be carried into execution. It stated that six million livres—about three hundred thousand pounds English—was demanded for the equipment of twelve or fourteen large ships, from eight hundred to fourteen hundred tons burthen. That a squadron of this force was necessary to convey such a number of emigrants to Madagascar as would

* *Testament Politique de M. Colbert*, p. 182.

† *Discours d'un Fidèle Sujet du Roi, touchant l'Établissement d'une Compagnie Française pour le Commerce des Indes Orientales*. Paris, 1664, quarto.

suffice for its occupation and defence, and form such a colony as would realise the objects of the company. An assurance was given that his majesty would advance one-tenth of the capital, and that the nobility and monied men of the kingdom would come liberally forward to contribute in proportion to their means, and to the national importance of the undertaking. The personal interest which his share in the funds would give to his majesty was adduced as a guarantee of his deep interest in the enterprise, and as a further encouragement he was willing to secure to the company an exemption from half their duties on all exports and imports to and from India, and, in addition to these marks of his favour, he undertook the responsibility of all the losses which would be incurred for the first ten years. Private persons were allowed to contribute in what instalments they pleased, till the entire capital subscribed was paid up.

The king not only permitted foreigners to take whatever shares they pleased, but to encourage them thereto, he likewise consented that such as subscribed ten thousand livres—afterwards changed to twenty thousand or upwards—should thereby acquire the right of naturalization, without any other trouble. This was a great boon, for by it the heirs of any alien shareholders were entitled to inherit their properties and effects, and, moreover, in case of hostilities with their fatherland, they escaped the liability to confiscation. It was also declared that the affairs of the company should be managed by their own directors, chosen from amongst themselves, and in their hands the funds of the company were to be deposited; that foreigners should be eligible to the direction, provided they had an adequate interest in the stock of the company, and resided in France. To save them as much as possible from the delays and other annoyances of protracted litigation, the directors were privileged, after being heard in the inferior court, nearest to the place where the cause of action arose, to appeal directly to the parliament.*

Thus did the celebrated Colbert, by a lucid statement stamped with the authority of his name, clearly demonstrate that the accidental mishaps of the past should not deter the French nation from making another effort to secure that share in the world's commerce to which its position fairly entitled it. He convinced the public that all former disappointments were justly attributable to the want of capital, and the absence of judicious direction, and that repeated failures did not destroy the great natural advantages which

* *Vie de Jean Baptiste de Colbert.*

Madagascar possessed in its soil, productions, and above all in its geographical position; and thus he succeeded in convincing all, that in the new undertaking, success was imminent,—that the whole design would be soon a fact.

On this firm basis, and hailed with such hopes, was established the new and the fourth French East India Company, by an edict worthy of the object,—comprehensive, liberal, and ably drawn up, dated August, 1664, and soon after registered in parliament—containing forty-seven articles and fixing the shares—or as they were first called actions—at one thousand livres each. It reserved to the company a power of making further calls upon the proprietors, but not to exceed half the amount of each share. The charter was granted for fifty years, to afford an ample opportunity of forming great settlements, and the prospect of reaping the advantages of them.

The terms were faithfully observed, and every laudable means employed to impress upon the public mind the favour with which the government watched every proceeding; but the government did not limit itself to watchful observation, it used active measures. Officers, whatever corps they belonged to, were granted leave of absence without the forfeiture of pay or promotion; from the public arsenals was supplied whatever was requisite for the building, equipment or victualling of the ships, and exempted from all duties; the government engaged to pay fifty livres per ton for all goods exported from France to India, and seventy-five livres for every ton thence imported; it was agreed that the settlements of the company should be defended with a sufficient military force, and that the outward and homeward-bound ships should be furnished with as strong a convoy as the exigencies should demand. Even hereditary titles and honours were promised to such as should distinguish themselves in the service of the company.*

M. Colbert reasonably calculated that the new company would do honour to that reign, and to his administration; he consequently gave it an undeviating support to the last.

The favour in which the project was held at court, made it popular through the country.† Numbers volunteered to proceed to Madagascar,‡ and regulations were prepared for the government of the colony there, which deservedly won public approbation, though in many respects very strict. In March, 1665, four large ships equipped for war as well as

* Abbé Raynal's *History of India*, vol. ii. book iv. p. 222. London—Strahan, 1783.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. book iv. p. 222.

‡ *Universal Modern History*, vol. ii. p. 74.

for trade, carrying five hundred and twenty men, sailed from Brest, and arrived safely in Madagascar, the July following. This voyage was conducted with such spirit, diligence, and success, as to gratify not only the proprietary, but the nation at large, and every one was now inclined to speculate upon the visions of oriental wealth and national greatness which the enthusiastic had imagined.

The new colonists, as if they considered the old appellation one of sinister omen, changed the name of Madagascar, and called it *Isle Dauphine*. Shortly after the return of this expedition, a great reinforcement was forwarded, a regular form of government established, and also the company's first and chief residence, as M. Colbert originally contemplated, was erected in imitation of the establishment which the Dutch had raised in Batavia.

Although the coast of Madagascar is bordered with an unrefreshing fringe of barren sands, this sterility terminates at the distance of a league or two inward. The interior of the island is in perpetual vegetation, producing spontaneously, both in the forests and open grounds, cotton, indigo, hemp, honey, white pepper, sago, bananas, spices, and a variety of nutritious plants, foreign to other climates. Oxen, sheep, hogs, and goats feed day and night in the plains; there are copper mines, and it was reported that gold and silver abounded there.* Nothing was more easy than for the French to appropriate to their purposes all these advantages, and to establish a more solid and productive colony than any at that time possessed by the Europeans in Asia. "It was impossible" says Raynal,† "that so fortunate a revolution could have been effected by violence. A numerous, brave, and uncivilized people would never have submitted to the chains with which a few foreigners might have wished to load them. It was by the soft mode of persuasion, it was by the seducing prospects of happiness, it was by the allurements of a quiet life, it was by the advantages of our police, by the enjoyments attending our industry, and by the superiority of our talents, that the whole island was to be brought to concur in a plan equally advantageous to both nations. The system of legislation which it would have been proper to give to these people, should have been adapted to their manners, their character, and their climate."‡ Such were the advantages which the French company might have

seized on and enjoyed in Madagascar, but these were sacrificed through the misconduct of their agents, "who were lost to every sense of shame: they secreted a part of the funds entrusted to their management, they wasted still more considerable sums in useless and ridiculous expenses, they made themselves equally odious to the Europeans, whose labours they ought to have encouraged, as to the natives of the country, whom they ought to have gained over by gentleness and by favour. Acts of iniquity and misfortune were multiplied to such a degree, that in 1670, the members of the company thought proper to resign into the hands of government, a possession which they held from its gift. This change of administration did not bring about a better state of things. The French settlers on the island in about two years after were massacred, and the few survivors of this memorable butchery withdrew from a soil stained with their crimes and reddened with their blood."

In 1667, it was resolved that some ships should proceed from Madagascar to the Indies with instructions for fixing an introductory establishment there. The two gentlemen selected to superintend this expedition were judiciously chosen, and possessed the requisite experience and judgment. The first of these was a M. Caron, who had spent several years in the Dutch service, and had risen to be the president of the factory of Japan, where he suffered severely, and having sought for an indemnification from the authority of the states-general in vain, retired in disgust and returned to France, at a crisis, too, when such a man was wanted. He was soon introduced to the minister, treated with distinction and favour, and consulted on every subject in which the interests of the new company were involved. The other was M. Marcara Avanchinz, a Persian; and native of Ispahan, the capital of Persia, a man of high birth and great influence at home, and from whom the company expected great things.

The squadron arrived on the 24th of December, 1667, at Cochin, and was courteously received by the Dutch governor, and thence proceeded to Surat, where it had been decided the first French factory was to be erected. In 1669, Avanchinz was dispatched to the court of the sovereign of Golconda, where he had several powerful and personal friends, by whose favour he expected to be able to secure the privilege of trading through that kingdom, of purchasing whatever merchandise was required, of employing manufacturers, and of obtaining licence to establish a factory at Masulipatam. This was a delicate mission, and his objects difficult of acquisition. It

* Raynal, vol. ii. book iv. p. 224.

† *Ibid.* p. 233.

‡ Raynal's *History of the Settlement and Trade of the Europeans in the East Indies*, vol. ii. book iv. p. 235.

was a well-known fact that the Dutch and English, whose influence was very great at the court of Golconda, had failed in obtaining concessions not nearly so important, and that the representatives of these two nations had instructions to use all their influence to frustrate the efforts of the French; at the same time he was scantily supplied with money, an article as indispensable to an oriental, as to a European, diplomatist. Not disheartened by these untoward circumstances, he proceeded to Golconda, there successfully accomplished this important negotiation, and on the 5th of December, obtained a firman from his majesty, by which the French company was privileged to trade to all parts of his territory, without paying export or import duties—a favour the Dutch were never able to obtain, and which the English had secured at very great expense in 1665. The successful agent thence proceeded to Masulipatam, where he had his firman registered; he also settled a factory there, of which he was appointed president, and in that capacity conducted the trade of the company with zeal, honesty, and diligence. These eminent services did not shield the honest Persian from envious aspersions and foul imputations. His competitor, M. Caron, by his intrigues had ingratiated himself into the highest degree of favour with M. Colbert, from whom he obtained an order in 1671, by which he himself was raised to the second post in the East India Company's service, and all the friends of Avanchinz were removed from their employments, and subjected to prosecutions, although in the order there was not one charge brought against him, nor a word to incriminate him. He addressed a full and satisfactory justification of his conduct to the minister, who, after a minute and searching examination, made an impartial report to the king, who entirely approved of Avanchinz's conduct, and testified to his innocence by a solemn *arrêt*.*

It is allowed that the factory at Surat was established by Caron, and also that at Bantam in the Island of Java, which the French held until the Dutch became masters of that kingdom, and succeeded in excluding from it both the French and English. These events occurred some years after his death. The selection of Surat as the chief seat of operations was judicious. The advantage of its situation was appreciated equally by the English.

Surat is supposed to be one of the oldest cities of Hindostan, being mentioned in some of the earliest records, although in the be-

ginning of the thirteenth century it was nothing more than a mean hamlet, consisting of some fishermen's huts standing upon the river Taptee, a few miles distance from the ocean. It was greatly exposed to the attacks of pirates, and on several occasions was subjected to their ravages. To check these destructive inroads a fortress was built there in 1524. At this period it had risen to distinction; its importance was considerably augmented when the Moguls made themselves masters of it. Being the only seaport town in their occupation, it became the emporium of all articles of foreign luxuries, and the depot from which they were transported to all parts of that extensive empire. At this early period the Europeans, who had no great settlements, here purchased Indian produce, and Surat then possessed a navy superior to any of the neighbouring ports. The ships of this port were strongly built and durable, and mostly of a thousand or twelve hundred tons burden. Large fortunes were realized by the traders, and several were masters of a quarter of a million, and some were far more wealthy. The plunder of this place by Sevajee, 1664, has been previously recorded. It repeatedly became the prey of the pirates; nevertheless, it continued to be the richest and most populous city in India. It received in exchange for its exports porcelain from China; silk from Bengal and Persia; masts and pepper from Malabar; gums, dates, dried fruits, copper, and pearls, from Persia; perfumes and slaves from Arabia; great quantities of spices from the Dutch; iron, lead, cloth, cochineal, and hardwares, from the English. After a residence of some time there, Caron began to think that Surat was not the best place for the chief settlement of the French. He took a dislike to the situation. He wished to find a more central and less exposed position either on the peninsula or in some of the Spice Islands, without which he thought it impossible for any company to support itself. His attention was directed to the Bay of Trincomalee, in the Island of Ceylon, the harbour of which was styled by Nelson "the finest in the world." It is almost land-locked, and the water is so deep that it is all but practicable to step, in many places, from the shore on board the large vessels moored alongside.* He accordingly sailed for that port with a powerful squadron lately arrived from Europe under the command of La Haye, who was ordered to act under his direction. This project, which should have been kept strictly private, was incautiously divulged and bruited abroad, and a public and deliberate attack was proposed instead of a secret and sudden

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, tom. iii. p. 146; *Hist. de la Compagnie des Indes*, pp. 63 and 64.

* Macculloch's *Geographical Dictionary*.

surprise. The French, it is said,* were intimidated by a fleet in no condition to fight, and which by no possibility could have received orders to engage. The greater portion of the crews and of the land forces fell victims to want and sickness; a small body of troops was stationed in a small fort that had been erected, and was soon constrained to surrender. A few who survived the hardships of the expedition—having gone to the coast of Coromandel in search of provisions, which they failed to procure at the Dutch settlement of Tranquebar or any where else—in their extremities made an attack upon St. Thomas, where, they were informed, a great store of provisions was hoarded. The town was easily and quickly captured by the French, who carried the fortifications, though formidable and in good repair, by storm, in 1672. They were not left long in possession. They were attacked and compelled to surrender in about two years afterwards; the Dutch, who were at war with Louis XIV., having aided the Indians in their expulsion. This disaster would have effectively crushed the enterprise after all the expense and royal encouragement that had been given, had it not been for M. Martin, who had come out amongst the late arrivals from Europe. He collected the survivors of the two colonies of Ceylon and St. Thomas, and with them he peopled the small town of Pondicherry, lately ceded to him, and which was rapidly acquiring wealth, population, and importance. But neither private enterprise nor royal favour succeeded in ensuring the prosperity of the new company. It became, every succeeding day, more and more apparent that matters were verging from bad to worse, and ruin was inevitably approaching with rapid strides. To consider in this emergency, and to endeavour to devise some remedy, a general court of the proprietors was summoned at Paris, and a faithful report of the embarrassments, perils, and apprehensions of the company was submitted, and the entire particulars, through the influence of M. Colbert, were presented to the king, who issued a declaration, September, 1675, by which he directed a dividend of ten per cent. to be granted to all the shareholders who paid up the amount of their subscriptions, and he allowed to all defaulters time to the 1st of July following to complete their payments, and then they were entitled as well as the others to the dividend. All those who should not have paid up on the day named, forfeited all money contributed by them, and this money was to be appropriated to the use of the company. In addition to these princely

* Raynal, vol. ii. book iv. p. 263.

favours, a debt of four million livres was discharged by his majesty, in compliance with the edict by which the company first received the royal patronage, and he also freely forgave four millions which had been advanced for their service. In the following year he gave a new proof of his deep interest in the welfare of the company, by relieving from all duties merchandise bought at their sales, except what was transported to Lyons, and even this was relieved from a great portion, having only to pay the one-fourth. During the ten first years of its existence it was thus preserved from dissolution solely by the munificence of the sovereign.

In 1681 some private persons having assured the proprietors that they would embark their fortunes in the Indian trade on being provided with licences, an application was made to the king for power to grant them. This was readily conceded on the following conditions:—"That these traders should transport themselves and their effects on board the company's ships both outward and homeward, and that they should pay their freight and passage before their departure; but that the goods they brought home, precious stones only excepted, should be exposed in the company's sales, and their produce fairly accounted for; that these licences should be in force only for five years, and if they should be found prejudicial to the affairs of the company, the directors might abridge or cancel them at their pleasure."*

There was no favour, however extravagant, which was sought from their liberal patron, Colbert, that was not granted; yet this careful and generous nurture communicated neither vigour nor success to the speculation. When that statesman died, in 1683, the spirit of this stimulated commerce died with him. The company continued to have a nominal existence, and kept up not only a court of directors in Paris, but, copying the example of the Dutch East India Company, maintained chambers of direction at several ports, a council in India,—although their affairs were in a state of rapid decline; and their general account, in 1684, exposed the fact that instead of realizing profits, they had then actually lost one half of their capital. This sad state of affairs was attributed to three causes chiefly: the war with the Dutch, which continued from 1672 to 1678; the frauds of their servants in Madagascar and India, who sacrificed to their cupidity the interests of their employers (it was no secret that in the ruin of the company several large private fortunes were made by their officers); and

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, tom. iii. pp. 158—160.

lastly, to the culpable indifference of the shareholders who had neglected to pay up. In this deplorable condition of their affairs, another effort was resolved upon to retrieve, if possible, the trade of the company, and it was resolved for that purpose to introduce a thorough reform, and change the entire system of government; to suppress all the little insulated chambers of directors, and to commit the entire management of affairs to the hands of twelve directors, who were to reside in Paris. Each of these was required to qualify, by the payment of thirty thousand livres upon the forfeited shares or actions, and to be allowed reasonable salaries. It was also decided that all defaulters were to forfeit their shares to the company, with a reservation that if in two years they should have paid in all their instalments, they should recover their former rights and have all their shares restored. These regulations were confirmed by royal edict, in February, 1685. The company were empowered, if they so pleased, to resume the sovereignty of the island of Madagascar, which they had surrendered in 1670, or to leave it, if they thought proper, in the king's hands. After considerable deliberation and some delay, it was resolved that the island should be left entirely to the crown, and this act was confirmed by the king's arrêt, dated June 4, 1686. Some time after this remodelling of the company, eight new directors were added for the avowed purpose of increasing the capital. Each of these was obliged to lay down forty thousand livres in case he possessed twenty thousand of the company's stock, and sixty thousand if he were possessed of none. These contributions, swelled with the sums advanced by the proprietors, so increased the available capital of the company, that now the most cautious and intelligent men of business began to feel sanguine of success, and these anticipations were confirmed by the dividends made in that year and in 1691, amounting in the whole to thirty per cent. This cheering aspect of affairs was soon overcast by an indiscretion of the minister, and a proof thereby supplied to show, that however ineffectual the power of the ruler may be to foster and render successful any great social enterprise, his power to check and destroy cannot be overrated. "In order," says one of the authors of the *Universal Modern History*, "to understand that there is nothing easier for a minister than to destroy a branch of trade by an ill-judged and untimely interposition, the following instance, one of the most material points in the history of French commerce, deserves attention. The French East India Company finding that gold and silver bro-

cados and painted cottons were articles in the quickest demand, struck into that branch of trade, by which they were very considerable gainers; and, that they might encourage the artizans of their own country, they imported chiefly white cottons, and caused them to be painted in France after the Indian manner, by which they had the command of the fashions; and when people began to be tired with one sort of goods, they revived their appetites by introducing another. The demand for these goods being by this means kept up and continually increasing, the manufacturers in France set up a general clamour, that they were sacrificed to strangers; and that if a stop was not immediately put to the importation of these silks and cottons, they should be all starved. Upon this, out came an edict, dated January, 1687, by which this branch of commerce was prohibited; and it was with very great difficulty that the company procured leave to sell off what they had in their hands, and what might arrive by the next ships; but what was most extraordinary they were required to break all their moulds for printing, without considering that this was as much a manufacture of France as any other. As to the brocades they were allowed some little indulgence, which, however, did but just keep them from sinking; with the assistance of some other favours, which the few friends they had left at court, not without much solicitation, had obtained. By this the reader may see how little safety there is for trade under any arbitrary government, where all things depend at best upon the understanding of a minister, which is a very precarious tenure, or very often upon his caprice, or the influence that he is under, which is the most dreadful situation people can be in that have any property at all."*

The farmers of the public revenues, whose influence with the government in France was very great, also complained that the revenue was prejudiced by the privileges and immunities granted to the India company. The result was that the minister abstained from violating the original edict, but means were soon devised of gradually undermining these immunities, though they were not taken away. They were next prohibited from selling piece goods to foreigners, on the assumption that if they could not buy Indian goods from the company, they would be obliged to purchase French; but the fact was the foreigner ceased to attend their markets. The next step was the imposition of a heavy duty on raw silk. In this narrow spirit of commercial legislation all the pains taken by Colbert were rendered abortive, and as the inevitable result of such

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. xi. p. 87.

imprudent restrictions, after a very brief gleam of prosperity, the affairs of the company relapsed into a state of cheerless inactivity, which was rendered all but extinct by the effects of the European war which commenced in 1691.

Having so far followed the fortunes of the company in consecutive order, the progress of their affairs in India imposes the necessity of going back a few years. After Martin had made a settlement, with the consent of the rajah, in Pondicherry, a fine opportunity was presented to the French authorities of making an establishment in Siam. Some French missionaries had visited that kingdom, and had conducted themselves with so much forbearance, propriety, and friendliness, that they are said to have secured the love of the people, and to have inspired them with respect for the French generally.

Previously to this, a Greek adventurer, Constantine Faulkon, had travelled into Siam, was well received at court, and soon rose in favour with the sovereign. In the course of time, he was raised to the very important post of prime-minister or barcalon. In this elevation he treated both the prince and the people despotically. The former was weak, sickly, and without issue. The minister entertained the notion of securing the succession to himself, and he is charged with the criminal intention of removing the ruling monarch out of his path. To enable him the more effectually to compass his ends, he resolved on attempting to make the French subservient to his scheme; he therefore sent ambassadors to France, in 1684, to tender his royal master's alliance, and to offer some sea-ports to the French merchants, and to ask for ships and troops.

Louis XIV. eagerly took advantage of this unexpected proposal, which he justly considered calculated to benefit, in no small degree, the Indian Company. He accordingly dispatched a squadron to cultivate the favourable opportunity offered, but this object seems to have been only secondary, for the French writers say that it conveyed a greater number of Jesuits than of traders, and in the treaty which was concluded between the two kings, under the direction of the Jesuit Pachard, much more attention was paid to religious concerns than to those of commerce.* The hopes created by the early success of the Christian missionaries were blasted by the conduct of the Jesuits now imported. These paid too much court to the unprincipled minister, who had, at this time, by his arrogance and ambition, estranged from him-

* Raynal, *History of Settlement and Trade in the East and West Indies*, vol. ii. p. 265.

self the affection and respect of the court and the people. The missionaries, as his creatures, became unpopular, and the public hatred was soon transferred from their persons to their teachings, and to such an extent was this odium carried, that it provoked a popular revolt, during which their churches and monasteries were exposed to the fury of the superstitious and the licentious.

The fortress of Bangkok,* built at the mouth of the Menana, had been given up to the French. It was very favourably situated for commercial purposes. The Menana flows through a valley of that name, and is the most important river in that kingdom, passing through the greater part of it, and, monopolizing its trade and navigation,† after a course of eight hundred miles, falls into the gulf of Siam by three channels. The town was also an excellent mart for all the productions of China, the Philippine Islands, and all the eastern parts of Asia. The situation of Siam, between two gulfs, washing coasts respectively one hundred and sixty and two hundred leagues in extent, gives it a command of the navigation of all the seas in that part of the world. Mergin, then the principal harbour in the kingdom, and said to be one of the best in Asia, was likewise ceded to them. This port would have greatly facilitated the trade with the coast of Coromandel, and chiefly with Bengal. It secured an advantageous intercourse with the kingdoms of Pergu, Ava, Arracan and Lagos, where the finest rubies in the world, and some gold dust, were to be found.‡

These great opportunities were lost upon the French. The officials of the company and the Jesuit fathers were equally ignorant of their commercial advantages; and eventually, when Faulkon's treasons were ripe for execution, having but feebly assisted in his enterprise, they were involved in his disgrace, and the fortresses of Mergin and Bangkok were wrested from the French garrisons by the most cowardly people in the East.

During their very brief sojourn in Siam, the French made an attempt to plant a settlement in Tonquin. They considered that a trade could be carried on with safety and advantage with a people which had been for several centuries in commercial communication with the empire of China.

Expelled from Siam, the French Company, surrendering all hope of being able to make an establishment in the remote parts of Asia, began to regret the loss of their factory at

* From its situation, this town has become the great centre of all the commerce of Siam.

† Blackie's *Imperial Gazetteer*.

‡ Raynal, vol. ii. p. 272.

Surat, to which they could not return, as they had left without discharging the liabilities incurred there. The Mogul government, which was anxious to encourage the traffic of Surat, and to attract as many vessels as possible to that port, often solicited them to pay their creditors. This they failed to do, and therefore could never recover from the obloquy to which their bad faith had subjected them.

Excluded from all other parts of Asia, the French were compelled to concentrate all their attention on Pondicherry, and on its effective fortification. But these designs were interrupted by a fierce war, which, though deriving its origin from remote causes, now broke out, and in which the French nation had to maintain a contest provoked by its own aggrandizing ambition against a confederation of the most powerful states in Europe.

To the prudence and ability of M. Martin was the safety of the French settlement, and the prevention of the total ruin of the company, due. The famous Mahratta chief, Sevajee, having approached the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, threatened with his formidable force to overwhelm it as a dependency of his enemies. By the friendly offices of a neighbouring Indian prince, however, a treaty was formed with Sevajee, and license granted to trade in his dominions on payment of one thousand six hundred rupees. This treaty was concluded in 1680, and the territory had been purchased, the year previously, of the Rajah of Visapore. The only apprehension that was now entertained by the French, was lest the son of Sevajee, who was now the Peishwa, and had become the master of Pondicherry by right of war, might resent any attempt to fortify it; but his permission was obtained in 1689, and then it was strongly surrounded with defensive works.*

As soon as intelligence was conveyed from Europe of the declaration of hostilities there, the Dutch, who had for some time looked on with jealousy at the rising importance of Pondicherry, offered very large presents to the Peishwa, in whose dominions it lay, to eject the French; but, with a morality which should have put the Christian to the blush, the son of Sevajee rejected those offers with contempt. "The French," he said, "had fairly purchased that settlement, for which they had paid a valuable consideration, and that, therefore, all the money in the world should never tempt him to eject them." What the Peishwa refused to do, the Dutch themselves accomplished. They besieged Pondicherry in 1693, having arrived before the

place with a fleet of nineteen sail, and an army of three thousand men, with a fine train of artillery and six mortars, and to ensure their conquest, they applied to the new Peishwa—whose laxity of principle, it is to be hoped, was not the result of Dutch ethics—who, on receipt of about twenty thousand pounds, made over to them the whole country. After a good, protracted defence, M. Martin, who was still director-general, surrendered upon very honourable terms. On the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick, 1696, the Dutch were compelled to restore it, and in a much better condition than they found it. They had built new walls, and seven bastions, and, in fact, had made it one of the best defended fortresses in India.

Martin was again appointed governor, and dispatched from France—to which after the surrender he had returned—with a squadron, having on board two hundred regular troops for the augmentation of the garrison, and with orders to put the place in such a state of defence that, in case of a second war, it would be in a condition to repel any assailants. He took out with him for that purpose several able engineers, a vast quantity of military stores, and everything necessary to ensure security. He managed the affairs of the company with such skill, integrity, and wisdom, that he was enabled in the space of four or five years so to improve the town, that it could be scarcely recognised by its appearance. Not only were the fortifications completed, but the garrison was increased to eight hundred men; one hundred new houses were added, a plan for a large town laid out, into which, in a very few years, he drew more than sixty thousand inhabitants; and in 1710 it had become one of the most considerable towns in the hands of the Europeans.* Had Martin's efforts been seconded by a liberal policy at home, the French company would have been placed upon a level with its more favoured rivals, the Dutch and English.

The intelligence and patriotism of M. Martin could effect no more than laying the basis of the future success of the company by impressing on the natives a very favourable opinion of the French, by the incessant and scrupulous attention he paid to training up well qualified and conciliatory agents; by the information he, with great industry, accumulated for his and their direction; by the excellent system of administration he established and maintained in his government; and by the daily increase of inhabitants in Pondicherry. But all these prudent and salutary measures failed to invigorate the waning prosperity of the company, subject

* *Memoire dans les Archives de la Compagnie des Indes, num. i.*, quoted in the *Universal Modern History*, vol. ii.

* *Histoire des Indes Orientales*, tom iii. p. 231, 232.

from its infancy to such inherent disorders as were calculated eventually to effect its dissolution.*

Martin's original intention was to re-establish on a firm basis a great empire in Madagascar, and with that object he transported thither nearly seventeen hundred colonists, who, though cheered with the hopes of enjoying a delightful climate, and realizing a rapid fortune, encountered on their arrival nothing but famine, dissension, despair, and death. Their fate rendered all after efforts apparently impracticable. The shareholders became defaulters. The government which had pledged itself to give without interest a fifth of the subscribed capital, and who on those terms were at this period liable for only two million livres,† advanced it from the exchequer, in order to sustain a project so much in royal favour; and some time after, it generously made a grant of what at first was a loan. This encouragement failed to effect its object, and the company were obliged to confine their operations to Surat and Pondicherry, and to abandon their settlements at Bantam, Rajapore, Tilseri, Masulipatam, Gombroon and Siam.

The fierce war of 1689 considerably increased the embarrassments of the company, even by the success of French arms. Several privateers, fitted out in the ports of France, by their vigilance and intrepidity, gave great annoyance to the traders of England and of Holland. The Indian goods which fell into their hands by the seizure of several prizes, the privateers were enabled to sell at a comparatively low figure. Though remunerative in comparison with their outlay, this competition had the effect of compelling the company to sell at prices under the first cost; and when they made complaints to the minister, he did not feel himself justified in sacrificing to their interests a body of men, who so seriously annoyed the enemy, and rendered such essential services to their country.

Every resource having been exhausted, the conviction became general that the company could not persevere unaided; therefore they, in 1707, complied with the proposal of some wealthy merchants, who agreed to send their own ships to India, upon the condition that they should allow fifteen per cent. to the company, upon the merchandise which should be imported by them, reserving the right to take such share in the ships as their circumstances should permit. Even after this they were reduced to the necessity of making over the entire and exclusive exercise of their

privilege to some privateers of St. Maloes, still reserving the same power which had for some years warded off their extinction.

Although thus involved, and their situation desperate, the company in 1714 solicited from their royal founder, protector, and patron, a renewal of their charter, which was on the eve of expiring, and which they had now enjoyed for nearly half a century. When this application was made, their entire capital had been expended, and their debts amounted to ten million livres;* nevertheless, their request was granted for ten years. Upon the death of Louis XIV. which occurred shortly after this renewal of the charter, the Duke of Orleans became the regent. To him the company applied for a prolongation of their term. In seeking this favour, the real object is said to have been to obtain a recognition of their privileges, in the expectation that should they so far succeed, they would be able to obtain from him more solid advantages, and such help from the treasury as would enable them to revive their trade. From the public they had no credit to expect, the period of their new charter being so very limited.

These expectations were defeated by the financial derangements, which, having their source in a remote period, had been fearfully augmented in the late reign, and had come to a crisis in 1715. Instead of having money to lend, the crown was enormously in debt, and the regent and his ministers, instead of having money to give away for investment in commerce, were engaged in devising means to make the commerce of the kingdom subservient to their own pressing demands—to fill the exchequer, to pay off the obligations of the crown, and to discharge the accumulated claims on the government and the nation. The contrivances to meet these exigencies were long known in France by the name of the System; and they, with their consequents down to the revolution, form no inconsiderable portion of the history of modern France.

One of the most popular expedients then proposed was that of the celebrated Law, a Scotchman; and it is more than probable that the high estimation in which the memory of the celebrated Colbert, the descendant of a Scotchman, was held, gave an impulse to his popularity. This state empiric engaged to re-establish the finances. His first step was the establishment of a bank. The success which attended its early operations silenced the arguments and clamours of his opponents. This bank commenced business in 1716. The gratitude of the French rose so high, that

* Raynal's *History of Settlements and Trade in the East and West Indies*, vol. ii. p. 285.

† £83,333 *Gs. 3d.*

* £416,666 *lrs. 4d.*

they pronounced the services he had rendered worthy of the most honourable monuments and testimonials a nation could in its gratitude bestow. Thus estimated, it is not strange that he found himself with influence enough to organize the Western company, the privileges of which were at first restricted to the trade of Louisiana, and to the beavers of Canada, but shortly after the Western company secured its charter, the companies trading to Africa, the East Indies, and to China, were incorporated with it. This amalgamation ambitiously proposed to pay off the national debt, and thus relieve France from the accumulated obligations of ages, which had long weighed heavily on her, and which threatened to crush her to the earth.

The edict of "Amalgamation" extinguished the titles of East and West India Companies, as well as those of the minor companies associated, and substituted the comprehensive name, "The Company of the Indies."

To this new company was granted the

exclusive privilege of trading from the Cape of Good Hope to the utmost extent of the East Indies, as also to the islands of Madagascar, Bourbon, and France, the coast of Sofala in Africa, the Red Sea, and Persia, to the dominions of the Mogul, of the King of Siam, and of the Emperors of China and Japan, and also to the South Seas, from the Straits of Magellan to the East Indies, and rigidly excluding all the other French subjects from those parts under pain of the confiscation of their vessels and effects.* All the property and possessions of the amalgamated companies were secured to them, but they were made responsible for all the just liabilities these companies had incurred. To enable them to enter with effect upon their extensive sphere of action, they were authorised to issue new shares, to the amount of twenty-five million livres, to be purchased with ready money only, on the same terms that the West India Company possessed shares to the amount of one hundred million.

CHAPTER LX.

FRENCH ENTERPRISE IN INDIA AND THE EAST FROM THE FORMATION OF "THE PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES" TO THE WAR WITH ENGLAND.

So popular was the new undertaking that in an incredibly short time, instead of twenty-five million livres, fifty millions were subscribed. In this state of prosperity the company volunteered to pay off, at the rate of fifty millions in every month, the enormous quantity of paper in circulation, amounting to nearly sixty millions of our money. As an acknowledgment of this generous and patriotic proposal, the king, by an arrêt dated July, 1720, changed the terms on which their privileges were granted, declared the company perpetual, and restrained himself and his successors from treating them as other companies had been treated, and from this time they acquired and bore the title "The Perpetual Company of the Indies."

The capital, as has been already noticed, consisted of the original capital of the West India Company, and the twenty-five millions added thereto upon the amalgamation; but in order to guard the new company against stock-jobbing, a revision of the shares was made, in 1723, in order to ascertain which of them had been obtained fairly and by purchase. The consequence was that in the same year the king fixed the shares at fifty-six thousand,

and thus the capital on which dividends were to be paid, was settled at one hundred and twelve millions, and upon this the king assured to them a yearly revenue of eight millions four hundred thousand livres. This revenue from the state was given because the company, by the proposal to undertake the national liabilities, had placed itself in the position of a public creditor.

In 1725, by another arrêt, five thousand shares were cancelled and burned, and the capital reduced to that extent, and their dividend secured by the annual payment of eight millions from the taxes on tobacco, the exclusive, perpetual, and irrevocable privilege of selling which was conceded to them in 1723, and confirmed to them in 1725, together with the profits arising from the Canadian fur trade.† Thus the fund for the annual dividends, was as effectively guaranteed as it could by possibility be. As a collateral security the commerce of India was assigned, and the proceeds thereof were to be allowed to accumulate for some time, and to be eventually

* *Histoire de la Compagnie, des Indes*, p. 112; *Universal History*, vol. ii. p. 122.

† *Dictionnaire de Commerce*, tom. ii. col. 1080.

appropriated to strengthening the funds for promoting that important trade, and placing it in a position to yield a large revenue to swell the annual dividends. With such securities, such extensive privileges, ministerial patronage, and brightening prospects, it is not matter of surprise that the shares were eagerly sought for, and rose into high estimation at home and abroad.

This short sketch of affairs in France was necessary to elucidate French proceedings in the East, and to show how the repeated failures of all the attempts made for the prosperous cultivation of the Indian trade, had convinced most men that a repetition of such efforts would be equally unsuccessful; and that to prosecute it with success demanded the immediate supervision of the government. The ministers consequently resolved on taking it into their own care. It was decided to advance large sums of money on the speculation. In order to guard against the annoyance which would be likely to arise in the early stages of their operations, they undertook to pay the shareholders a stipulated dividend annually, such as was considered reasonable; and they furthermore considered that it would be prudent to suffer the profits, should any be yielded, to accumulate for some time, that sufficient funds might be available, as well in Europe as in India. This decision they did not make public; concluding that as soon as it was ascertained that profits accrued, the majority of the proprietors would insist on a distribution. They therefore judged it best to furnish no accounts, and also, to satisfy public expectation, to proceed actively to work. Accordingly, towards the close of the year 1720, the ministers, while they had money in their hands, enabled the company of the Indies to equip three ships for sea, which, in addition to a large cargo of European merchandise, conveyed a large sum in specie and bullion. This spirited proceeding raised the credit of the company and enhanced the value of the shares; and, as if in expectation of large returns, port L'Orient was put in a condition, by new improvements and the erection of magazines, to serve as a convenient depot for the expected commerce. The result of these spirited efforts is thus ably stated by an author frequently made use of:—"Yet, in the midst of this seemingly settled and regular establishment, the 'Perpetual Company of the Indies' remained upon such a foundation as nothing of the like nature ever stood upon before, and with respect to which the time will not be lost upon the reader if he will be pleased to reflect this company had a vast capital, but nominal only, for in reality and at

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. xi. p. 130.

the bottom they were without funds; their commerce as described, or rather prescribed, by the edict of UNION, was, beyond comparison, more extensive than that of any trading company in Europe, and the means of carrying on their trade as much out of comparison less. Besides all this there was another circumstance no less extraordinary than the other two, which was, that the directors of this mighty company, whatever they might seem in the eye of the world, were really under direction themselves; that is, they depended for instructions, ships, money, and everything else, upon the ministers of state; and yet, to speak from what time and experience have taught us, these very instances of weakness and instability appear to have been the sources of all their good fortune. For the directors, in quality of that employment, having the capacity of only representing the state that things were in, and the necessity they were under, had no temptations at any time to depart from the truth; with this additional cheek upon them, that if they did, it would have certainly been discovered, and themselves removed. On the other hand, the ministers of the day, knowing that their continuance in power must always depend on the maintenance of public credit, took care to furnish the directors with such supplies as were requisite to keep the machine of their commerce in constant motion, that the opinion which the public entertained of the restitution of their affairs might be fortified from their progress; thus their balance, which originally arose from necessity, and in some measure from accident, was more happy in its operations than any contrivance that could have been formed by human wisdom to answer these ends."*

This ministerial supervision and encouragement—which would in England be as ruinous in practice, as it is amongst a free people vicious in principle—resulted beneficially for France, subjected to despotic rule. During the fourteen succeeding years, sometimes three, sometimes four ships were sent annually to the East, and by slow but steady progress the affairs of the company were restored and strengthened. However, with this prosperous state, there was no accumulation of funds for distribution amongst the shareholders; the profits realized were swallowed by their increasing expenses, as the increase of the Indian commerce imposed the necessity of re-establishing their old factories and raising new ones. Indeed, for some of the early years their outlay exceeded their income, and

* The author has drawn this train of reasoning from the *Dictionnaire de Commerce*, to which the reader is referred.

though their European rivals, witnessing the steadily increasing extent of their trade, the regularity with which they exported to Europe, and being unacquainted with their secrets, thought their affairs to be in a flourishing state, yet such was not the reality; gradual supplies were required, and without such assistance many years would have rolled over before their commerce would have become self-supporting.

The directors of the company sustained its credit by the prudent disposition of the supplies from the East, and kept things in tolerable order; they had paid off the heavy liabilities of the various companies in the union, though these far exceeded their assets.*

To Orry, who had been appointed, in 1773, to superintend the finances of France—which he managed with surprising success—the great impulse henceforth given to commercial enterprise in the East is fairly attributable. It has been generally admitted that he was an upright and disinterested minister; but that his character was sullied by a harshness of temper, which contrasted offensively with the suavity of the courteous French. The apology which he once made when a friend reproached him for this blemish, was characteristic and not very creditable to the nation:—"How can I behave otherwise? Out of a hundred people I see in a day, fifty take me for a fool and fifty for a knave." His brother, De Fulvy, who had less principle, but possessed more affability and a greater share of capacity, was entrusted with the affairs of the "Perpetual Company of the Indies," and under such able direction it could not fail to prosper. These able ministers plainly understood that further supplies were demanded, in order to command a more remunerative trade and to extricate the company from existing difficulties. Before this was done, a most rigid investigation of their circumstances was made, and then, their affairs having been placed in the best possible position, the requisite sums were advanced. The minister's foresight was gratified by flattering results. On the termination of the second year, the returns from the East were doubled, and a fair prospect was presented of a large additional increase; and, in fact, the third year yielded thrice as much as they had been. Port L'Orient, which had been laughed at as a depot erected for an imaginary commerce, seemed now to have been providentially and wisely provided for a trade which had become considerable and regular; and so rapidly did it continue to progress that in 1742 the public sale there

amounted to the large sum of twenty-four millions of livres, that is, about one million of English money, besides which they reserved goods in the stores to the amount of four million livres; and the first ships that arrived in 1743, brought home a still more valuable cargo.

All the European powers, but more especially the maritime, were alarmed by this advancement of a company so insignificant and feeble a few years previously; but these apprehensions would have been considerably modified had it been reflected that it was all artificial—a hot-house plant, which in an unnatural location had, by applied heat, been forced into a premature, if not an unnatural, luxuriance, and therefore subject to very probable casualties, any one of which would suddenly withdraw its sustenance, dry up its sap, and destroy the forced exotic; while its acclimated neighbour gathered strength from the soil and healthful growth. Much of the success, it must be owned, is attributable to the long continued peace which blessed the pacific administration of Cardinal Fleury. The true condition of affairs was made manifest to the Company and the world, during the war of the succession to the throne of Spain, which broke out in 1740, and involved France and the chief of the nations of Europe in the quarrel. But this war had been carried on for some time before the exposure was made, or any suspicion of it reached the company or the public. On the contrary, the company relying on its fancied prosperous resources, thought it its duty to give its assistance to the nation. England and France having taken opposite sides, the war between them was stimulated by their contiguity and rival positions. The enormous expenses incurred by France, forced M. Orry, though very reluctantly, to inform the directors that public affairs were so complicated that they had no more pecuniary aid to expect from the exchequer, and should entirely rely upon their own resources, and carry on their trade in future as best they could. This disclosure and intimation scattered to the winds their delusive prosperity, and all which they had been doing for several years perished by the first exposure. The shares of the company, which had previously reached to two thousand livres and upwards, suddenly fell to eight hundred.* But this was not the only injury inflicted; a worse than this was that the governments of Europe had learned that French commerce could not exist, as in other countries, independent of royal bounty. In France it was supported by the state, in other countries it powerfully contributed to their

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. xi. p. 134; Raynal, vol. ii. p. 327.

* *Universal Modern History*, vol. xi. p. 138.

support. Though, as has been just stated, this commeree fell by one adverse blast, the company was not extinguished, and new appliances were devised to restore it to life. The proprietors, having recovered from their first painful surprise, were enabled by the aid of a few lotteries to extricate themselves from their immediate difficulties, and to resume operations.

During the prosecution of the war the government did not overlook nor neglect the affairs of the company in the East. A sufficient force was forwarded thither, not merely for defensive but for offensive action, and the officials selected for the civil, naval, and military services, proved the judgment of their appointments, and showed themselves equal to the exigencies of the crisis.

Dumas was sent to Pondicherry, and had not been long there, when he prevailed upon the court of Delhi to grant him leave to coin money. This permission the French valued at about twenty thousand pounds annually. He also managed to obtain possession of the town of Karical * which entitled him to a considerable share in the trade of Tanjore. Some time after this the Mahrattas invaded the Deccan, defeated and slew the Rajah of Arcot. His family and several of his subjects sought refuge in Pondicherry, and were kindly received. Ragojee, who commanded the conquerors, demanded the surrender of the refugees and moreover a sum of money, amounting to one million two hundred thousand livres, as arrears of tribute; to which, he alleged, the French had formerly submitted. Dumas, with a generous resolution, replied "that he could not consistently with the honour of the great monarch whom he represented, surrender up helpless refugees who had thrown themselves upon his protection; that every Frenchman in Pondicherry would readily sacrifice life for their protection, and that his own life would be the forfeit if his sovereign knew that he listened to the proposal of paying tribute; and, finally, that he was prepared and resolved to defend his post to the last." This manly tone had effect. Pondicherry was not attacked; no prisoners surrendered; no tribute paid.

Though the Mahratta army amounted to one hundred thousand men, still the French were in the position to make a formidable, if

not a successful, defence. The place was regularly fortified, and well stored with provisions; the garrison consisted of between six and seven thousand men, and its walls were protected by between four and five hundred pieces of cannon.* The conduct of the French on this occasion recommended them to the favour of the Mogul and his ministers, who ever after manifested the greatest kindness for Dumas, and the highest respect for the French nation. But this gratitude did not terminate at the mere expression. The young Prince of Arcot came in person to testify his sense of obligation, and presented a very fine elephant with splendid trappings; to this he added the cession of three districts in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, to Dumas personally, and this grant was confirmed by the Emperor of Delhi, and Dumas raised to the dignity of nabob, and to the command of four thousand five hundred horse. These favours were all personal; but, through his intercession, he procured them to be assigned to his office. Immediately after, in 1741, he surrendered his power and his office into the hands of his successor, Dupleix, whose transactions will more appropriately form a portion of the English division of this work; in those stirring scenes where the two great nations prosecuted—as no other nations can—the war-struggle for supremacy, and where he comes into no ignoble conflict with Admiral Boscawen.

Whilst Dumas was reflecting such credit and distinction upon himself and his country, the government sent an equally illustrious man, Bourdonnais, to another of the French settlements. The progress of events there challenge and merit attention.

The Mauritius, or the Isle of France, may be fairly said to have been, at that time, peculiarly the possession of the "Perpetual Company of the Indies." It was not included in the grants of any of the previously existing companies; not that they claimed no right, nor had overlooked it; for it is on record that nearly one hundred years previously to its concession, the French government had entertained the idea of planting a colony there. This island is said to be one of the most romantic and picturesque-looking in the Eastern hemisphere. It lies four hundred miles east of Madagascar, and about two thousand three hundred miles from the Cape of Good Hope, and nine thousand

* This town and district are situated within the British district of Tanjore, in the presidency of Madras, near the Coromandel coast of the Bay of Bengal, on a small estuary of the Cavery. The French territory is completely surrounded by the British, and contains an area of sixty-three square miles. It was restored to them at the general pacification in 1814, on condition that no fortifications should be erected thereon.—THORNTON'S *Indian Gazetteer*.

* Raynal, vol. ii. p. 331. The author in the *Universal Modern History*, says that the Mahrattas continued in the field all the year, 1740, till the month of April, 1741, and plundered every place within their reach, and tried without success what menaces would do with the Governor of Pondicherry: they at last accepted a small present and retired.—Vol. xi. p. 183.

five hundred from England. The first who made any settlement in it were the Dutch, in the year 1598, when they changed the name from Cerné to Mauritius, in honour of their Prince Maurice. The more tempting treasures held out to them further East, induced them to abandon it in 1710, and it was afterwards taken possession of by France in 1721, and was called *Ile de France*. It may be here said, that in the possession of that country it continued to remain till the year 1810, when the British government, exasperated by the great mischief done to our merchant vessels and East Indiamen by attacks made from this island, and apprehensive of similar results to our traders by the French men-of-war and privateers, sent, in that year, an expedition for its capture, in which they succeeded. At the peace, in 1814, the possession of it was notified, and from that time it has continued annexed to England. There is no exact account of the way in which the French first possessed it; but it must have been during the period the old East India Company's privileges lasted: however, the monument of possession taken, inscribed with the new name, erected by the Chevalier de Fonqueray, is dated September 3, 1721. Its first inhabitants came from the Isle of Bourbon, and were neglected, if not forgotten, during the space of fifteen years; and it was only in 1735, that the Perpetual Company decided on its occupation, and sent Bourdonnais to accomplish their designs there.

This man, since so famous, was born at St. Maloes, and had been at sea from the early age of ten. No consideration could induce him to withdraw from his profession, and in every one of his uninterrupted voyages he was successful, and had signalized himself by some remarkable feat. He was the first Frenchman who suggested the idea of sending armed ships into the Indian sea; his skill in ship-building was well known, and also his capabilities in navigating and defending a ship. His schemes were comprehensive, and not distracted by his minute acquaintance with details. He apprehended no difficulty, and possessed the rare and eminent gift of inspiring all under his command with a confidence of his powers and in their results. On arriving at his post his first care was to master the difficulties of his situation. He acquired an accurate knowledge of the island, and his next care was to instil a spirit of emulation into the old settlers, who had pined and become inactive from the neglect with which they had been treated by the mother country. He subjected them and the recent arrivals to a wholesome discipline. He made them cultivate rice and wheat for the supply of

the Europeans who might touch on their coast, and he knew that a regular supply would draw many traders thither. In a short time all the ships bound for India were hither attracted, assured that they would find all the refreshments and conveniences required after such a tedious voyage. Three ships, one of which was of five hundred tons burthen, were equipped and dispatched from the dock he had constructed, and he soon proved to the authorities at home, to what an important position their new dependency could be raised. These beginnings, pregnant with great promise, as is generally the case, did not meet with the approval of men of little minds, and a reply of Bourdonnais to one of the directors who charged him with having enriched himself, while he had exhausted the supplies of the company, deserves notice:—"I have managed mine according to my own judgment, and those of the company according to your direction."

He proposed to the government to place at his command a sufficient squadron, with which he would await, at the Isle of France, the commencement of the impending hostilities with England; and he promised when that event occurred, that he would proceed to the Straits of Sunda, and on that station—through which most ships sailing to or from China passed—would intercept all the English ships, and protect the French. Whatever might have been the result of this expedition if effected, there is no doubt whatever it was ably conceived. His antecedents, and what he afterwards did with a feeble force, confirm the opinion that it would have been fearlessly conducted, and would have seriously affected English interests in the East. Happily, his project was not executed on the scale he proposed, though the minister approved the plan.

Five vessels had been actually fitted out for him, and he had sailed with them. But he had scarcely departed when the directors, feeling annoyed because the destination of the squadron had not been communicated to them, regretting the expense incurred, and jealous of the power this appointment conferred on a man of whose previous influence they were apprehensive, remonstrated with the minister on the absurdity of it, assuring him that there was no reason to fear that the war in Europe would disturb the neutrality, which it would be as much the interest of the English as of the French to observe in the Indian waters. These remonstrances, unfortunately for France and the company, prevailed. Bourdonnais was recalled, and the promising opportunity lost of perhaps destroying the small squadron shortly after sent

from England to Asia, of making the French masters of the Indian seas, and probably of ruining the English settlements in those regions. Hostilities soon after commenced between England and France.

Bourdonnais deeply regretted the great political blunder, and remonstrated in vain with the directors and minister. Without money, without means, and without magazines, he by perseverance succeeded in forming a squadron composed of a sixty gun ship and five merchantmen, which he converted into men-of-war. With this small armament he successfully attacked the English squadron, and forced them to abandon for a time the coast of Coromandel; he attacked and took Madras, and proved to the home government, that, had he been well supported, he would not have met with the reverses which will be noticed when treating of the achievements of the English arms in the Eastern conflicts with the French.

Before the close of this chapter, in order to make complete the history of French commerce in the East, up to the period at which we have arrived—namely, the eve of the commencement of hostilities arising out of the war which was declared in 1740 between England and France—it is necessary to supply a brief account of the French Chinese Company, which though absorbed in the amalgamation which constituted the Perpetual Company of the Indies, deserves notice for its previous and independent action.

The French historian makes mention of four companies which were formed for cultivating a trade with China. The first of these was formed in 1660, by the exertions of Fermeil, a wealthy merchant of Ronen, who had induced several others to join with him in the speculation, and amongst these were men of very high rank and influence. Religion was the great stimulant, as the object of most of the supporters was to transport to that vast country several prelates and priests, whom the pope had appointed to preach the gospel there.* The royal sanction was granted to it in 1664. The commercial results were so trivial, that a second voyage was never made. The second company was established by virtue of a treaty with the East India Company in 1698, supported by an arrêt of council, dated January in that year.

The arrêt was granted to M. Jourdan, a merchant, who equipped with great expedition a vessel of large tonnage, which sailed in the month of March following, and returned safely with a large and profitable cargo in August, 1700. The success of this experiment raised the expectations of the public in

* *Histoire de la Compagnie des Indes*, p. 93.

no ordinary degree. The same vessel was again prepared for the voyage, and returned in 1703, with equally remunerative results, though she had a narrow escape from shipwreck on her return in the Canton river. In consequence of these successful trips, letters patent were granted to the proprietors in 1705, by which they were incorporated with the title of the "Royal Company of China;" and, with the consent of "the East India Company of the Indies," their privileges were to terminate with those of the latter company. Within the space of eight years, three ships returned with cargoes consisting principally of silks, but a prohibition having been imposed on that commodity, the owners, in disgust, declined to continue their speculation. It may be also that this resolution was influenced, and in no small degree, by the apprehension created by the war which France then waged against most of the powers of Europe. Their privileges they still retained, and these extended not only to the coasts of China, but also to Tonquin, Cochin China, and the islands adjacent, and all the other traders of France were excluded from them.

In the year 1713, another China Company was formed under letters patent altogether independent of the East India Company, for a term of fifty years, extending from the month of March, 1715. This company dispatched two ships to China, one of which returned to Ostend in 1718, and the other in the same year to Genoa; but in 1719, it was swallowed up in the Company of the Indies.

In 1740, and from that to the present, Pondicherry was the seat of the governor-general of the French settlements in India. The affairs of the company were then in a flourishing condition; they retained their beaver trade in Canada, and the slave trade on the coast of Africa, which they lost the succeeding year. They had not only peopled the Isle of France and brought it to a state of prosperity, but they bestowed the same blessing on the Isle of Bourbon, and rendered both valuable possessions to France. Their trade was carried on to such an extent, and with such brilliant success, that they excited the jealousy of the Dutch and English companies. In the year 1734, their sales at L'Orient amounted to eighteen million livres, and in 1740, they reached twenty-two millions. In fact, having grasped at too much, they became sensible that their trade was too extensive for their resources, and that it was impossible for them to manage it to their satisfaction and benefit. Accordingly, in the year 1730, they importuned the king to take off their hands the trade of Barbary. He also resumed the trade in

tobacco, which had been farmed to them; out of this, however, they reserved an annual revenue of eight millions. In the following year the company surrendered Louisiana into his hands, and paid one million four hundred and fifty thousand livres for being suffered so to do.

The company was not without its adversaries, and some of these calculate their sales at a lower rate, but in their statements they advisedly exclude the imports from China, the Mauritius, and Bourbon, and all the private goods imported by the officers and men engaged in their vessels.*

CHAPTER LXI.

BRITISH AFFAIRS IN CHINA DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE century opened with discussions as to the quantity and consequences of the export of silver to China, just such as occupied the city financiers in London during November, 1858. To lessen these exportations, on account of the Chinese trade, the directors of the East India Company ordered their supercargoes to send to Madras from China £20,000 in gold.*

During the first few years of the century Chinese commerce was carried on mainly between Surat and Bengal on the one hand; and Amoy, Chusan, and Canton on the other. Condore and Mocha, were also entrepôts of Chinese trade.†

The Chinese adopted the vexations and oppressive expedient of compelling Europeans at Canton to transact all their business with one man called "the emperor's merchant." This was fiercely and perseveringly resisted; for the emperor's merchant proved himself incompetent, besides he had neither capital nor goods, his patent of exclusive trade being his sole property. He finally allowed others to trade on condition of their paying to him five hundred "tales" per ship. A four per cent. duty was after some time levied: the company's agents thus describe its origin; and it is inserted here as strikingly illustrative of the spirit of Chinese procedure ever since:—"It may not be amiss in this place to take notice, that this four per cent. is an imposition lately crept upon us by the submission of our predecessors the two preceding seasons. One per cent. of the four is what has been usually given by the Chinese merchants to the linguist upon all contracts, and the linguist was used to gratify the Hoppo out of this sum for his employment. The other three were first squeezed from the China merchant, as a gratuity for upholding some particular men in monopolizing all the business, and this used to be given in a lump, so that by undervaluing the goods, and concealing some part, they used to save half the charge; but to show how soon an ill precedent will be im-

* Peter Anber.

† Ibid.

proved in China to our disadvantage, the succeeding Hoppo, instead of the persuasive arguments such as their predecessors used, are come to demand it as an established duty."

In the year 1704, Gerardini, a celebrated painter of those days, a native of Italy, who had spent eight years at Pekin, adorning the emperor's palace—at the instance of the Jesuits—desired to embark for Europe in a good ship. The emperor sent orders to the Hoppo at Canton to facilitate his purpose: by this means the merchant fleet, lying in the Canton waters, was enabled to depart free from the impediments and vexations by which ships were commonly obstructed.

It was not until the year 1715 that the intercourse of the English with the Cantonese assumed a regular and systematic character, although the struggle of the earlier English adventurers to open up commercial communications with China had been so brave and so persistent. Tea now became a commodity of considerable export, but silks constituted the staple of trade. A house was occupied at Canton by the company's supercargoes, and their transactions assumed importance. M. Auber affirms that the usual course of procedure, on the arrival of ships off Macao, was for the supercargoes to land for the object of ascertaining how affairs stood at Canton and whether they might proceed and do business with their ships in safety:—"These points proving satisfactory, the ships proceeded to the Bocca Tigris, where some of the Hoppo's officers came on board. The supercargoes then intimated their intention of waiting upon the Hoppo, who invariably admitted them to a direct interview; at which, after compliments, they stipulated, through their linguist, for the

* Macpherson's *History of European Commerce with India*, p. 273. Raynal, after relating these particulars adds:—"Il est des Empires où l'on vend également le droit de scrupiner, celui de se délivrer et celui de s'enrichir, parce que le bien et le mal, soit public, soit particulier, peuvent y devenir un objet de finance."—*Hist. Phil. et Polit.* vol. viii. p. 110.

observance of a series of articles, generally to the following purport :—

“1st. They demanded a free trade with all people without restriction.

“2nd. That they might entertain in their service what Chinese servants they pleased, and turn them away at their pleasure; and that if their English servants should commit any disorder or fault deserving punishment, the Chinese should not take upon them to punish, but should complain to the supercargoes, and they would see them sufficiently punished according to the crime.

“3rd. That they should have liberty to buy all sorts of provisions and necessaries for their factory and ship, at their will.

“4th. That they should pay no custom or other duties for any goods they should bring on shore and not dispose of, and that they might ship them off again free of all duties. That they should pay no duties for wine, beer, or other stores expended in their factory.

“5th. That they should have liberty to set up a tent ashore, to mend and fit their casks, sails, and rigging, and other necessaries.

“6th. That their boats should have liberty to pass the several custom-houses or boats as often as should be thought fit, without being called to or examined on any pretence whatsoever, when the British colours were hoisted, and that at no time their seamen's pockets should be searched.

“7th. That their escritaires and chests might be brought on shore into their factory, and be carried on board ship again on their departure, without being searched.

“8th. That the Hoppo would protect them from all insults and impositions of the common people and mandarins, who were annually laying new duties and exactions which they were forbidden to allow of.

“9th. That the four per cent. be taken off, and that every claim or demand the Hoppo had, should be demanded and determined the same time with the measurement of the ship.

“As the supercargoes required these several privileges, the linguist signified the same to the Hoppo; who consented that all should be granted according to their request, excepting the last article, as to the remission of the four per cent. duty, which he could not agree to. The supercargoes represented that it was a great hardship and imposition, and that they must insist on it; but at last, finding all that they could say was to no purpose, they let the argument drop.”

Matters went on after this manner until 1720, when the native merchants with whom the English supercargoes transacted business, formed themselves into one body, or, as it was

called by the company's agents, a “Co-hong.” This combination was for the purpose of raising prices, so that by never underselling one another, the English and other agents were at their mercy. For a time, trade was from this cause almost impossible. The English, however, found means to present their case to an imperial officer of authority, whom they called the Isontock, who summoned the Co-hong to his presence, and threatened that if it were not speedily dissolved, he would dissolve it for them in a manner more certain than agreeable.

In 1721, an officer of the Hoppo was accidentally killed near Whampoa, and the Chinese took up the matter with much injustice and resentment, seizing the petty officers of some of the ships, and menacing the supercargoes. The English seem to have been the sole sufferers on this occasion. Once more the company's agents found means to reach the higher officials by their influence, which they exercised with such force and address, that the mandarin who menaced and insulted them, was ordered into custody, and a promise given that he should be bastinadoed with bamboos, and turned out of the emperor's service.

Acting upon orders from home, the supercargoes, in 1722, made renewed efforts to create a trade fair in itself and free. In this year much injustice and large imposition of fines was inflicted upon the English in consequence of the accidental death of a Chinese boy in a paddy field, from a shot fired by the mate of an English ship at a bird.

In 1727, in consequence of the exactions and impositions practised by the emperor's officials, the supercargoes intimated their intention to withdraw to Amoy. This alarmed the trading community, and most of the restrictions were withdrawn. The removal of grievances was, however, merely to alter the purpose of the supercargoes to go elsewhere, and when it was supposed that such a resolution was laid aside, the system of impositions was renewed, and ten per cent. duty was laid upon all goods sold by the merchants. The supercargoes and Europeans then at Canton, of whatever condition, resolved to place their complaints in person before the Isontock. Every obstruction possible was raised to their doing so, and on one occasion they had to break through the outer gates of the city, and, to the amazement of the Chinese, force their passage to the residence of the great authority. Here they met with chicane, insolence, fraud, falsehood, and the grossest injustice, and they received at last some partial redress, but were informed they must never come again with complaints. It is

strange that no fault appears to have been found with them for marching in a body against the will of mandarins into the great presence. What a miniature picture of the events of modern times at Canton such proceedings present: the same spirit of cheating and prevarication on the part of the Chinese, and the same energy of will and daring on the part of the representatives of the western nations.

The supercargoes wearied at last of their attempts to obtain justice from the Cantonese authorities, endeavoured to make known their grievances to the court of Peking, in 1728—thus exhibiting another feature of the picture presented to the world in the connection of Europeans with Chinese affairs of late years. As there was no way of applying force to the convictions of the emperor, it does not appear that he listened to their appeals, nor even that their complaints reached him.

The Chinese continually interfered with European ships and boats, and, contrary to existing agreements, when under the flags of their respective nations, adding yet another point of resemblance to so many parallels in the state of affairs in those days to that which brought on the Chinese war with France and England in 1857. This practice became intolerable in 1730, and continued for three years to be perpetrated in a manner which could serve no purpose, but that of insult to the Europeans, and the gratification of an overbearing tyranny on the part of the Chinese.

Meantime, the attempts of the English to obtain a commerce with Amoy failed, the prejudices of the people and the tyranny of the superior classes rendering it impracticable.

Kien Lung succeeded to the throne in the year 1736, and he immediately issued an edict abolishing the ten per cent. duty. He, at the same time, showed a jealousy of Europeans, by insisting that within fourteen miles of Canton, all armed ships should surrender their arms until they were again leaving. As no doubt was entertained that the mandarins would steal the stores of war deposited in their custody, the ship's captains were very unwilling to comply with these requirements.

On the publication of the edict, the native and European merchants were summoned to hear it read, and commanded to prostrate themselves in homage to the emperor. This the Europeans refused, and the ceremony was waved, the Europeans making valuable presents to the Isontock.

After these events, the chief agitation was in connection with the 1950 taels exacted beyond the measurage duty upon ships. The letters of the supercargoes to the direc-

tors in 1738, imply, without clearly expressing it, that the depositing of warlike stores by ships' captains was not insisted upon.

One Foo-yuen, who appears to have had much cunning as well as authority, raised new difficulties in the way of trade in the year 1741. Indeed, with the exception of brief intervals, there was always some official sufficiently powerful, venal, capricious, or tyrannical, to impede the free and fair interchange of commodities.

Towards the latter end of the same year, the first English ship of the royal navy visited Canton. It was the *Centurion*, under the command of the far-famed Commodore Anson, whose captures of rich Spanish ships, especially when carrying specie, so injured the Spaniards, enriched himself and his crews, gained reputation for his daring and nautical skill, and gratified his country. The Chinese were not disposed to be courteous to the commodore, and that officer, being ready and prompt in his actions, was about to resort to force, but for the interposition of the merchants. The commodore was averse to diplomacy, and long consultations; his mode was to make his wants plainly known, and to take redress for injuries without any other delay than what was requisite to obtain a simple and speedy reply to his requisitions. The result was the Chinese greatly respected him when they found their first few attempts at prostration in vain, and granted him whatever he desired, his requests being only reasonable and just. The impression his presence and manners created among the Chinese officials was aided by an exploit against the Spaniards. Yearly a vessel leaving Spain sailed from Acapulco and Manilla to Lisbon. Anson attacked and captured this splendid prize, and bore it into the river of Canton. The Chinese, although filled with admiration of the commodore's spirit and enterprise, could not let the opportunity slip of obtaining in an indirect way some share of his booty: they demanded duties upon the ships and cargo. He purchased provisions and stores of the Chinese merchants, who would not deal unless paid beforehand, and then would not fulfil their engagements. Anson demanded an audience of the viceroy, by letter, and sent it by one of his officers. Before a reply could arrive, a desolating fire broke out in the city which destroyed one hundred of the principal shops, and eleven streets of warehouses, and would have probably destroyed the whole city, but for the opportune arrival of the commodore and his crew, when, by the exercise of systematic and intelligent efforts, as well as by dauntless daring, the fire was subdued. The viceroy was so much pleased with the disci-

pline and courage of the commodore's men, that he granted an audience. The commodore presented a statement of his own grievances at the hands of the merchants who undertook to supply him with provisions and stores, and also of the hardships to which the supercargoes had been subjected by venal mandarins. The only reply he received was that the viceroy wished him a prosperous voyage to Europe. Neither the commodore's services to the city, nor the sensation created by his dashing bearing and exploits could charm the Chinese where money exactions were concerned. They continued to cheat and to oppress after the commodore's departure, and in spite of the imperial edict.

An affair occurred in 1747, which widened the breach between the two parties. An officer refused permission to the mandarins to allow his *escritoire* to be examined. The Chinese demanded that he should be delivered up to punishment, and the linguist of the supercargoes was put in chains. The supercargoes resisted, and much contention ensued, the Chinese resorting to various acts of treachery, to get into their possession some of the company's agents, who, supplied with provisions, shut themselves up, their reputation for the effective use of fire-arms preventing their cowardly assailants from close attack. It is not clear from existing records of those transactions, how the company's employés emerged from this particular difficulty; but in the year 1751, the supercargoes were engaged in the same monotonous and fruitless task of negotiating for the remission of the obnoxious "tales" upon the shipping.

The Chinese continued for a number of years to devise every ingenious means for tormenting the Europeans and embarrassing trade. Edicts were in vain published by imperial authority; the mandarins frustrated, by cunning in administration and false representations, any good intentions entertained at Peking. Among the most annoying embarrassments of the trade was the appointment of what were called security merchants. M. Auber describes this peculiar and oppressive measure in the following terms, under the chronological heading of 1754:—"A discussion took place at the same time with reference to the practice of naming security merchants for each ship, a practice which, it was stated, had not existed above twenty years, and to which the merchants themselves very strongly objected, as they thereby became responsible to the government for the duties and customs on all the goods imported in such ships, whether purchased by the security merchant himself or any other person. In like manner, he was also accountable for

the duties on export cargoes, and he became subject to demands for curiosities brought out in the ship; so that he was either impoverished, or the company charged excessive prices for the commodities of trade. An interview was obtained with the Isontock on the 29th July, who received the supercargoes very courteously, but refused to give them a written answer to their application that the merchants might be released from security; and on the 9th August, two merchants were named for each ship, notwithstanding their entreaties to be excused; but they were informed that any deficiency would be levied upon the whole body."

In the year 1753, the directors at home forwarded instructions for the encouragement of the study of the Chinese language by their agents, and sent out two young men to study at Canton, for the purpose of becoming efficient linguists.

During the same year a mission was sent to Limpo, in the hope of reopening trade there, but it was unsuccessful as to any ultimate and long extended benefit.

The supercargoes became so wearied of the oppressions to which they had been subjected, that in 1754, they declined allowing their ships to come up to Whampoa. The Isontock did not feel it to be to his interest, in the face of the emperor's edicts, to allow the trade altogether to vanish from Canton; so he promised redress of grievances, and afforded a proud, yet courteous reception to the supercargoes. During this year, the privilege of walking within certain limits on Dane's Island was accorded to European seamen.

In the year 1755, a new series of disputes arose from the prohibition of trade with private merchants and shopkeepers of Canton, all dealings being confined to the Hong merchants with rigorous strictness. After much verbal conflict, some slight relaxations of these stringent orders were allowed.

An important revolution in the trade with China occurred in 1757. The emperor, by edict, prohibited all foreign trade conducted by Europeans with Eastern China, and the European establishments at Limpo, Amoy, and Chusan had to be broken up. Such foreign commerce as might be conducted at these ports by natives was subjected to double duty, and although the native vessels of other Asiatic countries were allowed to enter the ports, they dared not while there carry guns, ammunition, or even sails. The whole trade with China was limited to Canton. This was supposed by the Europeans to be the work of the ever scheming Canton merchants, who, by bribing the imperial ministers, hoped to obtain a monopoly. So

sternly were Europeans interdicted the ports of Eastern China, that vessels touching there could not obtain the smallest quantity of the necessaries of life, even when in the most serious want of them. The East India Company appointed a Mr. Flint, a man of resolution and ability, to proceed to Limpo, with presents of looking-glasses for the emperor, and a letter requesting permission to reside for some time at Nankin, as the representative of English merchants. On arriving there he was repulsed rudely, and returned to Canton. Upon his arrival at that place, the Isontock requested an interview, and, at the time named, he proceeded to the palace of that great functionary, accompanied by the supercargoes as a body. They were allowed to enter within the first and second gates, and were then disarmed of their swords. They were commanded by the mandarins to prostrate themselves before the Isontock, but on refusal, were thrown down and much abused. To their amazement, it was discovered that the object in sending for Mr. Flint was to kidnap him. He was told he was the emperor's prisoner, for going to Limpo without permission, and that he was to be incarcerated for three years at Macao, or near it, after which he might visit Canton, to transact his business, and depart never to visit China again. The native who translated into Chinese the petition which he sent to the emperor from Limpo, was that day to be beheaded. The protests of the supercargoes were unavailing: Mr. Flint was actually held a prisoner for nearly three years at Macao. The foreign supercargoes of all nations met at the house of the chief agent of the English company, and informed the Isontock that they believed such tyranny was unknown to the emperor, and that their respective nations would find means to make him acquainted with the disloyalty and unlawful proceedings of his officers: they were treated with contempt. They had no force to back their protestations, therefore the Chinese did not respect or heed them: under the cannon's mouth they would have consented to justice, not otherwise. The traders, especially the English and Dutch, were ready to bear almost any indignity, if commercial gains could be secured, although, without that proviso, they were more ready to resist than any others.

The directors in London sent out Captain Skottowe, in 1760, to "settle the differences which had sprung up." The captain commanded the *Royal George*, and brought a letter from the court of the company to the Isontock. His instructions were curious, and his demands were very specific:—"He was not to be seen in the shops, or purchasing

Chinaware. That if he wished to purchase any goods he was to send for the merchants and not to go after them, and never to appear in undress in the streets, or at home when he received visits: he was to be called *Mr. Skottowe*, not *Captain*, and it was to be given out that he was the brother of his majesty's under secretary of state, who had the honour to write the king's letters.* The court's address requested the liberation of Mr. Flint, who they stated was a British subject as well as a servant of the company; and after expressing their mortification at their exclusion from Limpo, pointed out the exactions and grievances from which they desired relief, viz.:—1st. The 1950 taels. 2nd. The six per cent. on imports, and the two per cent. on all silver paid the Hoppo. 3rd. To be allowed to pay their own duties, and not through the merchants who are styled securities, whom they charged with applying it to their own purposes. 4th. That the Hoppo should always hear the representations of the supercargoes, and that an appeal might be made by them direct to the Isontock." The company seem to have imagined that all these arrangements were very cunning and very clever. The Chinese laughed at them. It was unnecessary to offer statements of grievances, or arguments for the justice of their demands; the Chinese were already aware of the grievances and convinced of their injustice. With them the only question was what force the barbarians would employ: negotiations not backed by a fleet would always be unavailing, unless some singular combination of circumstances favoured the negotiations. *Mr. Skottowe*, his cause, and his country, were treated with supercilious scorn. This the company might have understood would have been the case, for there had been a hundred years' experience of the Chinese already, and it ought to have been well enough known that the traders, officials, and people were alike destitute of honour and principle, and were capable of barbarous cruelty, when opportunity allowed. So little knowledge, however, had the English people acquired of China, that in the year 1762, at the suggestion of the Royal Society, the directors sent out certain queries as to the affinity of the Chinese and Egyptian languages, both bodies believing that the languages were identical.†

Fends, oppressions, complaints, petitions, remonstrances, threats, and interruptions of trade, continued until 1771, when a British

* Captain Skottowe's brother was employed under Government.

† *China, an Outline of its Government, Laws, and Policy.* London, 1834.

ship of war having submitted to indignities at the instigation of the supercargoes, who feared that the trade might otherwise suffer, a native merchant named Puankhequa purchased for 100,000 taels the dissolution of the Co-hong; the money was repaid afterwards by the supercargoes.

A curious circumstance occurred at the close of the year, of which the directors were advised by their agents to the following effect:—"A small vessel arrived at Macao on the 23rd September, commanded by a Hungarian baron, Maurice Augusto Madar Beniofski, which event occasioned much speculation. He was at Macao, but not obtaining permission to proceed to Canton, the supercargoes could not procure intelligence, having no opportunity of meeting him. It was stated that he came from Kamtschatka, but by what track, or what were his motives, were unknown. He subsequently claimed the protection of the French, and had a chop procured for him and some of his officers to go up to Canton; and by their being mentioned in the chop (which was procured by Puankhequa), under the denomination of French merchants, and the Hoppo's officer at Macao having had them described to him differently before, he returned the chop to Canton, and would not suffer them to proceed. The mandarins were apprehensive they might be Russians, and Puankhequa, fearful of being involved in embarrassment, declined interfering. They remained at Macao until the French ships left China, in which they were to embark for Europe."

It is remarkable, in connection with this circumstance, that the celebrated Gibbon met with this Hungarian captain subsequently in Paris, and wrote to Dr. Robertson, the historian, then in the zenith of his reputation, describing him and his adventures. Gibbon's letter to Robertson was as follows:—"A few days ago I dined with Beniofski, the famous adventurer, who escaped from his exile at Kamtschatska, and returned into Europe by Japan and China. His narrative was amusing, though I know not how far his veracity in point of circumstances may safely be trusted. It was his original design to penetrate through the north-east passage, and he actually followed the coast of Asia as high as the latitude of 67° 35', till his progress was stopped by the ice in a strait between the two continents, which was only seven leagues broad. Thence he descended along the coast of America, as low as Cape Mendocin, but was repulsed by contrary winds in his attempts to reach the port of Acapulco. The journal of his voyage, with his original charts, is now at Versailles, in the *Depôt des Affaires Etran-*

gères, and if you conceived that it would be of any use to you, for a second edition, I would try what might be obtained."

About 1764, the Chinese set up a claim to try according to their laws all Europeans who had offended other Europeans, a prerogative strenuously resisted by the supercargoes. A French seaman killed a Portuguese seaman in the service of the English, while in the house of a native merchant, and then fled for protection to the French consulate, where he was maintained, the French at that date having assumed much importance at Canton. As the offence was perpetrated in the house of a Chinese, the government determined to force the consul's house, to prevent which, when matters came to an extremity and the French found they had no adequate means of resistance, the man was given up to the Chinese officials, by whom he was publicly strangled. This seems to have intimidated the Europeans generally.

A Captain M'Clary, who destroyed a country ship, supposing it to be Spanish, was incarcerated until the English paid seventy thousand dollars for his liberation. This event is variously fixed at 1779-80 and 81; it also showed the Europeans that the native government was determined to enforce its authority.

In 1779 two royal ships, the *Resolution* and the *Discovery*, arrived off Macao, being in want of provisions and naval stores. While there tidings arrived of the death of Captain Cook, the distinguished navigator. These English ships had been as far north as 70° 44', where they were stopped by the ice.

The year 1780 was rendered important to the English at Canton by one of their company, named Smith, refusing to recognise the authority of the company in these parts. He was forcibly seized, but, nevertheless, in all other respects politely and kindly treated, and sent home. This was by the command of the directors.

Captain M'Clary again brought the English into trouble at Canton. Hearing that war had broken out between his countrymen and the Dutch in Europe, he made prize of a Dutch ship in Chinese waters, and the government of the emperor, or, at all events of his viceroy, were as indignant as the governor of a European nation would be under similar circumstances. The viceroy could not get at the captain this time, but he threatened to seize all the English at Canton, unless Captain M'Clary gave up his prize, by doing which the dispute terminated. Scarcely did one quarrel end than another began, and the Chinese were prepared for every contingency, as far as craft and treachery could qualify them for new inflictions of injustice. The

company's officers could not obtain the payment of debts from the natives, nor the repayment of advances. From such causes the English trade suffered up to 1784, when fresh disturbances inflicted still heavier injuries on commerce. A shot fired from an English ship accidentally killed a Chinaman. The officers of the viceroy demanded that the gunner should be given up. The English declared that the gunner had escaped; the viceroy demanded that some one else from the ship should be given up in his stead. The supercargo of the ship proceeded to the authorities to explain the circumstances; he was induced to go into the city, where he was detained until the gunner should be surrendered. All the European natives united, manned their boats, and presented an imposing force. The Chinese officials opened negotiations with other Europeans to detach them from the English, towards whom the officials seemed to bear a peculiar hatred, but this stratagem did not succeed. The Americans appeared in a prominent way, for the first time, on this occasion, acting with the Europeans throughout. After much parade of resolution, upon which the Chinese looked with a patient and quiet bearing, the English, as usual in their Chinese transactions, surrendered all they had with so much uproar contended for: the poor gunner whom they declared had absconded, they were obliged to admit had been all the time on board ship, and they allowed the Chinese to bear him away captive, for the trade was stopped. They "recommended the gunner to the protection of the Chinese!" The mandarins told them "not to be uneasy as to his fate!" The man was strangled, and the same day the agents of all the European nations at Canton were informed of the event, and that in case any Chinese subject fell by the hands of a European, no matter how, several lives from that nation would be exacted as a penalty. The emperor's disapproval of the falsehood to which the English had resorted to preserve their countryman, was also conveyed in haughty, menacing, and insulting terms. The conduct of the English throughout the transaction was calculated to lower their nation. After declaring that they would endure all perils rather than surrender the life of an innocent man, who could neither have foreseen nor controlled the accident, and after having declared that he had escaped, they delivered him up, begging mercy for him, when, as might be supposed, their prayer was treated with mockery. The Chinese showed throughout a keen knowledge of the persons with whom they had to deal, and the surest mode of accomplishing their object. The "select committee" at Canton, in address-

ing the court of directors in London, take marvellous credit to themselves for ordering up the boats, and the imposing martial appearance they made, to which they attributed the termination of the troublesome affair. The surrender of the unfortunate and guiltless gunner to be murdered, rather than stop the trade, really ended the matter. The following extract from the despatch of the select committee shows how determined the Chinese government were to have blood for blood, even when a subject of the empire was slain by accident, and the difficult position in which the English were placed, until at a much later period, treaties, with difficulty enforced, gave some assurance of security:—"From the circumstances that followed the seizure of the supercargo, the frequent mention of Mr. Pignon's name, the president, in the several conferences with the mandarins, and the express stipulation that he should not leave Canton, and the concurrent testimony of every Chinese deserving of credit whom we have conversed with since the termination of the affair, there does not remain a doubt that the local officers' determined resolution in the beginning was to seize the person of the chief, if they found that of Mr. Smith ineffectual. As repeated experience shows the utter impossibility of avoiding the inconveniences to which we are constantly subject from the imprudence or wilful misconduct of private traders, and the accidents that may happen on board their ships, it were to be wished that the powers, if any, which we really possess over them, were clearly and explicitly defined, or if no law, or construction of law, now existing allows of such powers, how far the absolute commands of the government under whose jurisdiction we are, will justify our compliance, and how far, in such a case, the commanders and officers of the honourable company's ships are bound to obey our orders; at present equally destitute of power to resist the unjust commands of government and to carry them into effect; we know of no alternative but retiring to our ships for protection."

Some time after these misfortunes, several English sailors were attacked on Dane's Island, and one man killed. The president of the English factory brought the matter under the notice of the authorities. The man was found and arrested, and a communication was made to the president that he was strangled, but no proof was ever afforded of the fact, although the English believed, or what was more likely pretended to believe, the representations made to them. At all events, their conciliatory bearing was rewarded by a visit of the Isontock, who, for the first time, on this occasion entered a European house.

In 1787 the select committee received a despatch from the court of directors regarding the fate of the gunner, and the conduct of the factors on that occasion. This despatch was so wise and just as to set on its proper basis the policy of the English agents. The following extracts point out principles of action and probabilities which were for a long time applicable to the relations of the agents at Canton, and the current of events there, and, indeed, until wars and treaties in the nineteenth century modified and influenced them all:—"Experience had shown that the court of Pekin would use its power to carry into execution whatever it declares to be the law. Individual Chinese may be, and often are, afraid of Europeans, but the government was not so. Despotic in itself, ignorant of the power of foreign nations, very superior to the divided and small states that surround it, the Chinese esteem themselves not only the first nation in the world, but the most powerful. Such circumstances and such notions had naturally produced a high and imperious spirit in the government, but no fear." Adverting to the attempt at intimidation on the part of the factory, and the effect it might have produced on the mandarins, it was remarked, "if they had any apprehensions, it must have been of their own government, which absurdly supposes that if a mandarin is active and diligent in performing the duties of his office no disturbance can happen, and of course if any does, it must proceed from his negligence." This oppressive and unjust system of Chinese policy was supposed to have operated on the occasion in question, for the Foo-youen was degraded soon after, and for some time not permitted to go to the court of Pekin.

The power of the company's agents at Canton to send away refractory persons of the English nation was defined and declared by an act of parliament, which tended to prevent embarrassments of a particular description. The conduct of English seamen had long been a thorn in the side of the president. The tars of England were bold and unruly, and were prone to attack the sailors of other European nations, partly from national invidiousness, and partly from a desire to try their strength with others, arising from the exuberance of their daring. The court of directors sent out regulations calculated to stop these practices.

Towards the close of the eighteenth century the Chinese showed more jealousy of the English than of any other nation. This arose from the victories of the English in Bengal, and from a conviction that as in India so everywhere, when once they got a territorial footing they could not be expelled.

The supercargoes and captains of ships were painstaking to avoid offence and were conciliatory; but it was all in vain. The opinion held by the Chinese could not be removed, that while the English were low they would be submissive, provided they were permitted to a certain extent to trade, but that if allowed to grow strong, they would drive all before them with a high hand.

In the year 1792, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas being then members of the English cabinet, set their minds upon an embassy to China, and arrangements were made with the directors of the East India Company to send out Lord Macartney. The directors and the ministry differed as to the measure, but were agreed as to the man. The English were now the principal traders from Europe in the Chinese market, and the trade was deemed valuable, especially in silks and teas. It was supposed by the cabinet, that the address of Lord Macartney might remove the differences which existed, or, at all events, ascertain the nature of the jealousy which the Chinese entertained of the English, and whether their exclusive conduct arose from a fixed policy, or one that was capricious and temporary. The East India Company knew the state of matters in these respects already, and had no faith that any ambassador could mend it, but, as often before, they deemed it politic to fall in with the views of the government, however divergent from their own.

The ambassador embarked at Portsmouth on the 26th September, 1792, on board the *Lion*, Sir Erasmus Gower, captain. Our space will not allow of a minute description; the author of an account of the British and Foreign embassies to, and intercourse with, that empire, sums up, in the following laconic style, the history of Lord Macartney's embassy, published in London shortly after his return. "The whole course of the embassy, from its arrival and disembarkation at the river Pe-ho; its progress towards Pekin; the designation on the flags of the boats in which Lord Macartney and his suite embarked, 'the ambassador bearing tribute from the King of England;' the consent of his lordship to go through the ceremony before the Chinese throne, provided a Chinese did the same to the picture of the King of England; the journey of his lordship and suite to Ge-hol, the country seat of the emperor, who was in his eighty-third year, and who rose each morning at three o'clock and retired at six in the afternoon; the ceremony being waived by the reception of the ambassador on merely bending his knee; the studied respect shown to the embassy and suite amidst the jealous and careful watchfulness of the Calao and

Legate; the degradation of the latter because he had not gone on board the *Lion* on her arrival with the ambassador, as desired by the emperor, and being consequently obliged to wear an opaque white instead of a transparent blue button, and a crow's instead of a peacock's tail pendant from his cap; together with the various entertainments given by the emperor, are so fully detailed in the account of the embassy published shortly after its reaching England, that it would be quite superfluous now to enter upon them. The embassy was about fifty days from the period of landing at Pe-ho to that of its quitting Tien Sing on its return to Canton."

The aim of the Chinese court was to trick and outwit his lordship. It had no intention of negotiating honestly or prosecuting trade on terms of mutual advantage, but was desirous of keeping open every point which would by its uncertainty leave to the stronger on the spot the power to determine the issue off hand. Lord Macartney thought otherwise, but he was deceived. The issue falsified the expectations of Pitt and Dundas, and confirmed the prognostications of the directors of the East India Company.

Most of the forms and ceremonies which were observed during the embassies of the Russians and Dutch, noticed on previous pages, were insisted upon with Lord Macartney: after hundreds of years the court of Peking was still the same. His lordship chiefly attributed the failure of his negotiations to the alarm created by the exploits of the English in Hindostan.

His "celestial" majesty condescended to write to his English tributary, declaring that none of his requests could be granted; that they were impracticable, and in fact improper. Having given a most explicit refusal in terms not insulting, except so far as they were haughty and assuming, "the emperor of the universe and the son of Heaven," thus exhorted the King of England on the subject of the latter's petition:—"I again admonish you, O king, to act conformably to my intentions, that we may preserve peace and amity on each side, and thereby contribute to our reciprocal happiness. After this, my solemn warning, should your majesty, in pursuance of your ambassador's demands, fit out ships in order to attempt to trade either at Ning Po, Tehu San, Tien Sing, or other places, as our laws are exceedingly severe, in such case I shall be under the necessity of directing my mandarins to force your ships to quit these ports, and thus the increased trouble and exertions of your merchants would at once be frustrated. You will not then, however, be able to complain that I had not clearly fore-

warned you. Let us, therefore, live in peace and friendship, and do not make light of my words. For this reason I have so repeatedly and earnestly written to you upon this subject."

On the 4th September, 1794, Lord Macartney arrived in safety with his ship. The wonderful perseverance of the English was not exhausted; failure seemed only to sharpen their persistence. Presents were sent from England to the emperor, and his great officers, and every step in presenting them was marked with extraordinary deference to Chinese custom and prejudice. These presents consisted of such manufactures as it was supposed would be profitable to the English to sell, and pleasant to the Chinese to buy. The manufactures were accompanied by letters from his majesty and his ministers, as well as from Lord Macartney; and all were as sanguine of success as if the Chinese had only just been heard of, and the writers of the epistles had never studied human nature in its oriental phases.

The viceroy and the Hoppo at Canton pretended that the letters and presents must have been intended for their predecessors, and therefore it was improper to receive them; but the despatches and gifts for the emperor were forwarded. Some slight relaxations at Canton followed, but they were of short duration.

In 1800 an English ship-of-war fired into a Chinese boat at night, the crew of which, the captain had reason to believe, intended to cut his cable, as he had been repeatedly robbed. A Chinese was wounded, another leaped into the river and was drowned. The new viceroy was somewhat partial to the English, but the usual demand was made for the person who fired to be delivered up to a Chinese tribunal. The traders at Canton fearing that nothing short of this would satisfy the authorities, without recommending the surrender, indicated its necessity. Captain Dillon bravely said that no sailor of his should be examined but in his presence, and with adequate guarantee for his safety; but he would take upon himself the act done and its consequences, and it would then remain for the Emperor of China and the King of England to settle the dispute as one that pertained to themselves. This bold procedure at once preserved the sailor, who had merely performed his duty, the Chinese boat having refused to be warned off, and the honour of England was maintained. The wounded Chinese recovered, and, under the pretence that the drowned man had been in fault himself in leaping overboard, the viceroy declared that he had no further demand to make on the gallant captain.

Some English sailors, who had escaped from an American ship, on board of which they had been barbarously ill-used, were received at a place remote from Canton, most kindly treated, and sent to the factory. This circumstance led to mutual acts of politeness, and tended to soften the asperity of the intercourse.

The century closed, leaving the English in possession of but few advantages in their trade with China which they had not when first they found any footing there. Fear of English arms began to prevail, and induced a constrained respect, but deepened the dislike of the Chinese people and officials to the English nation.

CHAPTER LXII.

THE BRITISH IN WESTERN INDIA DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE eighteenth century was destined to be one of deep interest to India. Events of the greatest magnitude were determined by an all-wise Providence for its history. Eastern India became the chief theatre of the exploits which throw such a halo of romance over the history of the period. Western India, containing the oldest settlements of the company, demands, however, the first notice. The century opened at Surat upon scenes of strife and bitterness between the two companies, to which reference has been made in previous chapters, as darkening the character of English commerce during the closing years of the century which had just passed away. Sir Nicholas Waite and Sir William Norress waged incessant warfare upon one another, being what might be called the plenipotentiaries of the two companies in India. The amount of money consumed in bribing the Mogul and his great officers and chief religious advisers was enormous; and as this rivalry of corruption was intense, and the court was influenced by no views of what was just, but simply by venality, it was impossible for his imperial majesty to administer speedy any more than "cheap justice." * To such an extent did the rivals carry their animosity, that the old company refused to allow deceased servants of the new to find a resting place in their graveyard at Surat, and but for the superior charity of the Armenians these deceased Englishmen must have remained unburied.

The diary of the English Company's factory at Surat retains painful evidence of the broils and debauchery of their servants there at the beginning of the century. The author of *The English in Western India* presents the following terrible picture:—"Possibly it will occur to the reader, as it has occurred to the writer—that the *dramatis personæ* in this

chapter are all men of bad character; that I only present offensive details which are relieved by no examples of goodness and honour. I can only say that I represent the matter faithfully as recorded by the best authorities of the age. Vices were then trifles; to be corrupt and to corrupt others was the fashion. I do not find a word of anything good in the local annals either written or printed."

Scenes of violence and bloodshed were common among the highest officials, and their language was such as might be supposed common to the lowest blackguards, although in official documents there was much cant, and the assumption of spirituality. The most striking features of English character at Surat were at this time tyranny, and general contempt for law. Men were cast into prison at the caprice of the president, swords were drawn by members of council against one another on occasions that were trivial. Each official seemed to take pleasure in oppressing him who was just below him, and all treated such of the natives as were in their service as if they were brutes, rather than men and brothers. The author last quoted gives the following as a sample of the headstrong and brutal character of the English at the beginning of the century, showing that under the Stuarts, after the restoration, the English character had rapidly deteriorated, so that they could scarcely be regarded as men resembling their fathers of half a century before:—"John Wyatt had command of the guards for the day, and about eleven o'clock at night left the apartments of Mr. Demetrius and Mr. Wright for his own quarters. At this time he was much intoxicated, although quite sober and rational when brought before the council at five the next morning. After leaving his friends, when he came near his own door, the sentry challenged him, upon

* Bruce's *Annals*, 1700—1702.

which the captain became extremely angry, drew his sword, and made a thrust at him. The sentry fled, and one who was stationed at Woodford's door followed his example. Both made for the main guard, pressed hard by their persecutor. Just at that moment the sand of the hour-glass had run out, and the sepoy, in whose charge it was, called to another to strike the gong. This seemed to add fuel to Wyatt's rage; he instantly ordered the corporal of the guard to relieve and bring the sentry before him. He then commenced to beat the poor fellow, asking him how he dared to have the gong struck without waiting for his orders. The other meekly replied that he was merely acting according to established rule, but for the future he would only act as the captain should think proper, and begged that he would cease beating him. Wyatt then took the man by the arm, deliberately turned him round, and ran his sword through his side. The sepoy dropped down dead upon the spot. This savage madman added to the barbarity of his crime by kicking and otherwise abusing the corpse of his murdered victim. The deputy governor was immediately summoned from his bed, and had the murderer secured. The decision of the governor in council was, that Captain Wyatt should be deprived of his commission, confined in irons, and sent to England." This sample of English life at Surat is followed by another on the same pages, which will suffice to illustrate the utterly corrupt state of social existence in the factories:—"In March, 1701, we find John Hall, Provost Marshal, confined to the Fort of Dongari. There was once an intention of giving him an ensigny; but he was then charged with being an infamous drunkard, and in other respects a bad character. When required to clear himself of these charges, he only cursed and swore at every one, from the highest to the lowest, expressing a hope that the time might come when he would have his revenge. The government were obliged to put him in confinement at Dongari, although, as they significantly remarked, 'having too many such as he is in that or your fort or other, and with submission to your excellency in council, if they were all sent home, there would be a happy riddance of them.' Hall was accordingly shipped off, but Sir John Gayer, the general, and his council, thought that his masters had acted too precipitately."

The dawn of the century in Bombay witnessed a succession of fearful calamities. Crime was the first and greatest of these, for Bombay was even worse than Surat. A pestilence broke out, which carried away very

many of the natives, and, at its termination, only seventy-six Europeans remained alive—a proportion of these exhausted by sickness. Scarcely had the pestilence spent itself, when a violent storm raged along the Malabar coast, swept the island of Bombay of its produce, levelled property in the city, and, notwithstanding the shelter of the harbour, wrecked nearly all the ships there.* The poverty of the factories was such, that the agents had not sufficient food; indeed the whole island was on the brink of ruin. Sir John Gayer informed his masters that there was only one horse fit to be ridden, and only one pair of oxen which were able to draw a coach.

While matters were in this state at the factories, all India, but more especially western India, was in turmoil. Within five days' march of Bombay, Singhar was besieged by one of the many Mussulman powers into which the Mogul empire was breaking. The Mahrattas (Marathas) were rapidly growing in power, they were unquiet neighbours, levying contributions on the country, and preventing, by their devastations and forays, the cultivation of indigo.† The Mahratta fleet infested the harbour, keeping the English in perpetual alarm.‡

Whenever a trouble happened to the English in India, they found the Portuguese Jesuits at the bottom of it. The intrigues of those unprincipled men were at this time exerted to cause attacks from the Mahrattas, and prevent the arrival of provisions at Bombay. Perceiving the low state of the English from the combined causes above-named, the Portuguese sought occasion for quarrel, and at last assembled a fleet in Bombay harbour. At this juncture, the Arabs, who just then professed friendship for the English, arrived with a superior fleet, destroyed the Portuguese ships, landed on the island of Salsette, and put to the sword not only the garrison, but women and children. Such of the Portuguese as escaped, were glad to find shelter and protection with the English.

An ambassador from the King of Abyssinia to the general and president of Bombay, proposed the opening of commercial relations. He was received as well as the unfortunate circumstances of the presidency at the time allowed, and was sent back with such presents as the general was able to bestow. The documents connected with this interesting episode in the history of Bombay are nearly all lost, but the following singular letter, from the president to the king, at once throws light upon the times, and remains as

* Bruce, 1702-3.

† Bruce's *Annals*.

‡ Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*.

a curiosity in the archives of literature and politics :—

John Gayer, general for affaires of the Right Honourable East India Company in India, residing at Bombay, sendeth greeting to his most excellent Majesty Thoran, King of Abissine, and worshipper of Jesus, the Son of Mary, according to the laws of the Blessed Messias.

Your Majesty's royal letters and present of seven horses, twenty slaves, and three horns of civit I was honoured with in behalf of the Right Honourable East India Company, by your noble ambassador, Dumontre, whome received with all possible demonstration of honour, love, and affection, and have continued the same to him all the time of his ahodé in these parts, and now have taken care to transport him back to your territories with the President of the Right Honourable East India Company to your most sacred majesty, an account of which comes with this. That your most excellent majesty will graciously be pleased to accept thereof, and to lay your royal commands on me for the future, as in your most serenely and princely wisdom shall seem meet, is most humbly desired.*

The negotiations in England for the union of the two companies (noticed in a previous chapter), did not promote concord among their servants in India. Sir John Childs, in the former century, had brought the company he served to the verge of bankruptcy, by his ill-judged aggressive policy; and the agents of the English Company, which was solvent, objected to a junction with the London Company, which was in a state of all but declared insolvency. The agents of the London Company could not be brought to regard their rivals as other than interlopers. It required years of discreet interposition by the directors of the united company to cancel the malignant jealousies which raged between these two classes of agents in India.

The miseries to which the servants of the old company were subjected at Surat were great, in consequence of the offence taken by the Mogul because of the plunder of native merchant ships by rovers. Indeed the factors of all nations then having factories at Surat suffered more or less on this account, but the English company's agents continued to gain favour with the viceroy, and escaped these trials. The Rev. Mr. Anderson, quoting the diary of the London Company's factory at Surat from the 30th August to 11th October, 1704, thus depicts the condition of the Europeans at Surat at that unhappy juncture :—“The servants of the old company who were confined within the walls of their factory were the Right Hon'ble Sir John Gayer, general, the Hon'ble Stephen Colt, president, the worshipful Ephraim Bendell, Bernard Wyche, the accountant, and Purser Marine, the chaplain, four senior and five

* *Diary of the London Company's Factory at Surat, 1701-1704.*

junior factors, six writers and one surgeon. Instead of being encouraged to hope for a speedy release, these unfortunate persons were almost reduced to despair by hearing that some Europeans had committed fresh acts of piracy. Two piratical vessels had sighted five vessels belonging to Mussulmans, and immediately given them chase. Under cover of the night two of these merchant men proceeded on their voyage without molestation, a third had been compelled to alter her course, a fourth had been driven ashore at Swally, and the fifth captured. Great sensation was caused at Surat when these facts were known, and the governor asserted that the pirates came from Bombay. Alarmed at his threats the factors prepared to defend themselves within their walls. In anticipation that their usual supplies of provisions would be withheld, they had ordered a stock to be laid in, but sufficient time was not allowed them, and they were soon reduced to extremities. An ox, which they used for drawing water, was with great difficulty kept alive by feeding it with the straw in which wine had been packed, and at last was killed for food. Meanwhile the infuriated governor had seized the brokers of both the Dutch and London companies, hung them up by their heels, and flogged them until he extorted from them a promise to indemnify the losses of the native merchants with a payment of seven lacs of rupees. He then resolved to lay hold of the factors, and that he might starve them out the sooner, drove into their factory three English strangers whom he had apprehended, and who he trusted would help to consume their provisions. Nor did he spare threats, but vowed that he would have them alive or dead. They in reply declared they would never give themselves up, and would rather die than suffer again such misery as had been inflicted on them in their former confinement. At last, after twelve days, the governor moderated his fury, and consented to allow them a small supply of provisions. As an aggravation of their sufferings they not only knew that their rivals, Waite and his friends, were at liberty, but could see that they had hoisted the union jack as if to flout at their misery. The perseverance which they manifested when their circumstances were almost desperate, was highly honourable to them, and their fortitude was a credit to the English name.”

At the end of the year 1705, a Mogul army approached within three days' march of the coast opposite Bombay. There were not then more than forty English soldiers to defend it, and the condition of the place was, if possible, more wretched than it had been a few years

earlier. Its story, up to the end of 1707, offers little diversity in this respect.

About this period, a person afterwards notable as father of the historian of India in the eighteenth century, Mr. Orme, arrived in India. It appears from the memoir of his son, attached to the *Historical Fragments*, that the elder Orme went out in 1706 as an adventurer, and was employed as a surgeon at Ajengo. He afterwards became chief of Ajengo; his second son, the great historian of a certain portion of Indian history, was born there.

However culpable the conduct of the agents and factors at Surat, native oppression was such as might have "driven wise men mad." Every annoyance that ignorance, insolence, and arrogance could offer was put upon the English. So much did they live in daily alarm for life and honour, that at the time the Emperor Aurungzebe died, Sir George Gayer, when he heard of it, dared not promulgate it, but communicated it in an allegory to the directors in London. Anderson, condensing the accounts in Bruce and Elphinstone, thus recounts the matter:—"He represented on the first of March, 1707, 'that the sun of this hemisphere had set, and that the star of the *second* magnitude, being under his meridian, had taken his place; but that it was feared the star of the first magnitude, though under a remoter meridian, would struggle to exalt itself'—in other words, that the emperor had died, that Prince Azim, his second son, had assumed the imperial title, and marched towards Delhi, and that Prince Alam or Moazim, the eldest son, was marching to dispute the throne with him. This actually occurred, and a great battle was fought near Agra in June, in which Prince Azim was killed. Moazim then became Emperor, with the title of Bahador Shah."

While the Mogul interest pressed heavily upon the English, the Mahrattas were scarcely less alarming in their menaces. Sevajee, the great chief, was dead; but so many daring adventurers rose up, pirates by sea or robbers by land, who called themselves Sevajee, that the name and functions of the man who combined so strangely the offices of prince, general, and bandit, were perpetuated. Repeatedly, from 1703 to 1708, one Sevajee or another invested Surat, fired its suburbs, and compelled the Europeans to take extraordinary measures for defence. The Mahrattas hired Arab rovers, who attacked English ships, but were nearly always beaten by a fifth of their force. Pegu, with its teak forests, so admirably adapted for ship-building, was the chief place where these expeditions were fitted out, the king of that country favouring

the pirates. From the situation of Pegu, the Arabs were enabled to cruise at once into the Bay of Bengal and through the straits into the Archipelago, so that their ravages ranged from the Arabian Gulf to Japan. By sea and land the English and other Europeans were harassed by robbers. The Dutch alone successfully combatted these great difficulties. They blockaded Swally, captured the Mogul's ships, and compelled him to redress their grievances.

Among the sea robbers whose acts were most infamous were various English, and one Hamilton (who afterwards lived in Scotland) perpetrated so many terrible outrages, that his ambition appeared to be to reach the uttermost verge of crime and cruelty.

A proclamation was sent from England, offering pardon to all pirates who surrendered and made confession, and rewards to all pirate crews who would deliver up their ships and commanders. Commodore Settleter arrived with this proclamation. It was soon proved that many who were supposed to be Arab cruisers were English, for this measure nearly put down piracy.

There can be no doubt that a general impression unfavourable to the honour and honesty of all Europeans had sprung up in the native mind, and the conduct of the strangers justified it. A moral influence of the most unfavourable nature was exercised by all the European nations upon the natives. Bruce, in his *Annals*, quotes a strange letter to this effect from President Pitt, who was grandfather of the great Earl of Chatham:—"When the Europeans first settled in India, they were mightily admired by the natives, believing they were as innocent as themselves; but since, by their example, they are grown very crafty and cautious, and no people better understand their own interest; so that it was easier to effect that in one year which you shan't do now in a century; and the more obliging your management, the more jealous they are of you." Like his great descendants, President Pitt was a man of extraordinary force of character, and a keen discriminator of men and things, but he took up a prejudice in favour of "native innocence" common in his day, the races inhabiting India having the address to conceal their motives, feelings, and opinions probably better than any other people in the world. The experience of the English, after a hundred years' knowledge of them, was not calculated to confirm an opinion of their simplicity or ingenuousness.

The sufferings of the British from native misrule at the close of the first decade of the century, led to a deep impression that unless the native powers were made to fear Euro-

peans more, justice, or even exemption from greedy exaction and rigorous oppression, was not to be hoped for. The Rev. Mr. Anderson thus describes the injuries endured by the English at this period, and no writer has ever written more impartially of his countrymen, neither extenuating their errors nor unduly lauding their virtues:—"There was no power sufficient to protect the merchant either by land or sea. If he wished to convey his goods from Surat to Agra, he could only hope to defend them against plunderers by mustering a strong party, and setting regular guards at each camping place, as though he were in an enemy's country. Even then he might be overpowered by the free lances of Hindostan. Still more dangerous were the paths of the ocean. There he must entirely depend upon his own resources, for it would be vain to seek protection from the law. Nay, the proud emperor appealed to the despised strangers that his shipping might be protected, and they were expected not only to defend themselves, but also the mariners and traders of a vast empire. Yet he and his subjects, helpless haughty barbarians, affected to despise the English, wronged them incessantly, imprisoned their chiefs, insulted their envoys, fleeced their merchants, and drove them to turn upon their oppressors in despair. Thus the evils of native rule compelled English merchants to protect their warehouses with battlements, and all the muniments of war. Then, as they still suffered injuries, the facility with which they managed to defend themselves suggested defensive operations, and led to territorial aggrandizement. Politicians think, or rather say, that because it is an age of commerce it cannot be an age of conquest. But the fact is, the necessities of commerce throw open the door to conquest, and the defence of their trade first suggested to the English a policy which ended in the subjugation of India. Short as this history is up to this point, it yet seems a labyrinth of human follies and errors. Religion, however, which is the only solid basis of all knowledge, enables us to trace through it all a mysterious clue of divine providence and divine direction. European vices and native vices bear an overwhelming proportion on the record, and the catalogue is relieved by few items of virtue. But as two negations make an affirmative, so the vices of European and natives have produced a positive good. The thirst for riches, the unscrupulous efforts of ambition, the reckless violence which often struck Hindoos with terror—all these were the disgrace of the English, but yet they hurried them on to empire. The perfidy, the cunning which overreached itself, the cowardice, the exclu-

sive bigotry, which disgraced the natives, smoothed the way to their subjection; and surely these two results are being directed by the Universal Benefactor to good. We know of no other way in which India could have been regenerated. Had the English in India been a set of peaceful saintly emigrants, what impression would they have made upon the country? Had the natives placed confidence in each other, and been united under a common faith, how could they have given way to the encroachments of a few foreigners?"

Much, that would otherwise be unaccountable in the condition of the English in India during the early part of the eighteenth century, becomes explicable by a knowledge of the apathy which prevailed in England in reference to India and Englishmen there. The merchants discussed keenly the profits and prospects of trade in the East, but the statesmen, professional men, litterateurs, men about town, the middle classes, &c., took no notice of it, and hardly knew what their fellow-citizens in the East either achieved or suffered. The accounts sent home to the directors were kept to themselves, or to some extent made known in open court, and the people at large knew and cared nothing about India. English authors in either the seventeenth or early part of the eighteenth century, seldom refer to India, still less to their countrymen within its precincts. Butler and Dryden do refer to Gujerat—barely refer to it: Evelyn, Pepys, and a few others, were accustomed to go into the city to ascertain the quotations of India stock. From 1708 to 1740, India is hardly named by any author whose works have come down to us. Indeed, there is a singular deficiency as to the authorities for this portion of Indian history. Few have written at all concerning it; existing documents are meagre; no period of the history of India, as to British interests and transactions, is so barren of recorded incident. The documents that are extant chiefly relate to western India.

At the close of 1708, the company, under the stringent necessity of economy, had withdrawn their factories from the following places on the western coast of India; namely, from Cutch, Brodera, Raibagh, Rajapore, Batticolo, Onore, Barselore, Mangalore, Dhurmapatam, Cananore, Paniani, Cranganore, Cochin, Porea, Carnopoly, and Quilon,—all of them small establishments, in which probably the only European residents were a factor, and a writer, who served him as assistant. But they retained their principal fort on the island of Bonibay, besides smaller forts at Mazagon, Mahim, Sion, Sewree and Worlee; forts and factories also at Carwar, Telliherry, Ajengo, and Calicut; and factories at Surat, Swally,

Broach, Ahmedabad, to which was afterwards added a residency at Cambay.*

The operations of the Ostend Company not only gave uneasiness to the East India Company in London during the next dozen years, but the arrival of their ships in India created quite a sensation; and no manner of falsehood, fraud, and violence was left untried by English, Dutch, Portuguese and French, to prevent them from trading. In another chapter, the formation and history of this company was sketched; it is here pertinent only to say that its attention was less directed to western India than to other Asiatic fields of commerce.

The correspondence of this early portion of the century discloses a number of singular terms and phrases now unknown, but then belonging to the vocabulary of Indian trade, such as "Brannels, chelloes, dutties, geinea stuffs, perpetts, scarlet drabs, lungees, tapseils, meanees, &c." Calico, indigo, rice, sword-blades, hardware, muskets, saltpetre, powder, are words continually occurring; the names of spices much less frequently than formerly, but tea was written oftener as the century waxed older.

In 1715 the population of Bombay Island was sixteen thousand.† It is remarkable that at that date a great change had taken place in the sanitary influences of the locality, so that Mr. Cobb considered an Englishman might live with nearly as good health there as anywhere, if he adapted himself to the climate. The year 1716 was signalized by the inhabitants generally, but more especially the merchants, voluntarily consenting to increased taxation, in order to put Bombay in a better state of defence. A few years ago, an inscription was removed from the Apollo gateway, which conveyed the information that the town wall was completed that year, Charles Boone being governor. This man was an accomplished scholar and a good man.‡

The year 1718 saw another important change at Bombay. The company resigned their feudal claims upon the landowners, on condition that a tax should be imposed upon all who resided within the town wall.¶ From 1712 to 1720 a taste for antiquities prevailed, and efforts were made by various learned and industrious persons to examine and describe the caves of Elephanta, so deeply interesting to the antiquary. These efforts

* Macpherson's *History of Commerce*. Milburn's *Oriental Commerce*.

† Rev. Richard Cobb's *Account of Bombay*.

‡ *A New Account of the East Indies*, being observations and remarks of Captain Alexander Hamilton, who spent his time there, from 1688 to 1723. Edinburgh, 1727.

¶ *Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society*.

have been pithily summed up by an able reviewer, in the following brief account:—"A taste for Indian antiquities was now exhibited for the first time, and we note the observations of two gentlemen at Elephanta, as they show the gradual dawn of knowledge, and preserve the memory of some monuments which time and the ruthless hands of barbarians have since destroyed. Captain Pyke, who then commanded an East Indiaman, and was afterwards governor of St. Helena, went in 1712 to explore the caves—an enterprise attended both with difficulty and danger; for intelligent guides were not easily found, and the cruisers of Kanhojee Angria were constantly on the look out, ready to pounce upon and kidnap any Europeans who might come within their reach. As Pyke and his party approached the island, they took for a landmark the figure of an elephant sculptured in stone, with a small elephant upon its back, the greater part of which has now disappeared; and a little further on was another statue, called 'Alexander's Horse,' of which there are now no traces. The explorers speculated on the origin of the subterranean temple, which has since exercised so much the fancy of imaginative and the judgment of learned persons, and deciding against the claims of Alexander the Great, leaned to the conclusion of Linschoten, who, in his *Voyages to India*, pronounced them to be the work of Chinese merchants. The smaller caves they found to be used by the Portuguese for cow-houses, and an aristocratic Vandal of that race had been amusing himself by firing a cannon in them and destroying the images. Captain Pyke made faithful sketches of the various figures, which were afterwards engraved and published by the Society of Antiquaries. George Bowcher, formerly a servant of the old, then of the new company, and afterwards residing for many years as a free merchant at Surat, devoted his attention to the literary monuments of the Parsees, and in 1718 procured from them the *Vendidad Sade*, which in 1723 was sent to Europe, where it remained for long as an enigma, oriental scholars not being able even to decipher its characters. Governor Boone also had drawings made of the figures in the caves of Elephanta, and a descriptive account written. He was clearly a man of elegant and refined mind, who loved classical and antiquarian studies; and a Latin inscription placed by him over the Apollo Gate of the fort, as well as one on a bell which he presented to the new church, exhibit him as tinged with some knowledge of Roman and mediæval antiquities."

The erection of a church in Bombay, which

afterwards became the cathedral, was one of the improvements of the early part of the eighteenth century. At that time, the English much neglected their ministers, and they alone of all Europeans who settled in India built no churches. Some writers complain that when the great men of the English factories gave banquets, the Roman Catholic priest always had the place of honour at table conferred upon him, and the clergyman of the Dutch church the next, but the English clergyman occupied a low place, their inferiority in the esteem of their host being thus strongly marked, and as tamely acquiesced in by the objects of this disrespect. The church was completed in 1718, the steeple at a subsequent period. The consecration was very imposing; "Ramajee" and all his caste, with a crowd of natives, being spectators, who, with the courtesy characteristic of them, stood the whole time. The governor, council, and ladies retired after service to the vestry, and "drank success to the new church in a glass of sack." The day was one of great rejoicing. The conduct of the chaplain throughout these proceedings was full of zeal, and marked by wisdom, goodness, and prudence. That the fabric might be maintained, a "new custom's duty was levied upon imported merchandise." Mr. Cobb, the chaplain, was not satisfied with building a church, he spared neither rich nor powerful in his sermons, but with a stern fidelity insisted upon all, even to the governor and council, conforming to the requirements of Christianity. On one occasion, he refused the communion of the Lord's Supper, to a member of the council, notoriously a violator of the decalogue, and for this, and for his public rebukes of the sins of the high officials, which was called "political preaching," he was suspended by the governor and council. Fifty-two years after the ungrateful and cruel treatment he received, he published his book upon Bombay. Soon after the church was completed, a joint-stock bank was established, but its history, so far as can be gathered, was nearly identical with those which of late years have carried so much destruction and sorrow through English society. The chief direction was in the hands of the council, but that circumstance did not afford safety. Sums were lent without security, and were never repaid, and business was conducted on unsound principles. The want of success in establishing a suitable bank was a great evil, as it was much required, and would have met with the support of the wealthy natives.

The administration of justice was truly horrible: the natives exposed themselves to punishment by their treachery and treason,

for some of the wealthiest among them were constantly in correspondence with the enemies of the English, instigated partly by love of gain, partly by sympathy with any native party, however bad, when opposed to the foreigners, often by religious bigotry, and not unfrequently from a settled antipathy to English laws, and their administration. Conspiracies among the natives to ruin one another by legal processes were tempted by the condition of English law, and its uncertain action, and this temptation was largely yielded to. The English government on some occasions resorted to torture, to extort confession from alleged criminals. Witchcraft was believed by the highest functionaries, and laws administered founded on the belief. Sometimes when natives were accused, and condemned on false evidence, and their innocence was subsequently demonstrated, they were *pardoned*, and received some slight pension in lieu of their confiscated property. The government of the English in Bombay during the first half of the eighteenth century was as essentially unjust as the character of those entrusted with it was demoralised. The punishments for witchcraft were flogging (this was inflicted on women) *at the church door, and penance in church.*

The civil administration of the military department was the worst possible. Robbery in every form was perpetrated upon the soldiery by purveyors and others, almost with impunity. The exposures at home, in this latter half of the nineteenth century, of the wrongs perpetrated upon the British soldier, are horrible and surprising, but fall far short of those endured, without redress, by the men serving at Bombay, natives and British. The contempt entertained for the natives was often displayed in a manner transparent and absurd, the governor and council often exposing themselves, by their mean tricks and low artifices, to the contempt of the natives in return. The following entry appears in the diary of the proceedings of the council of Bombay, May 22nd, 1724:— "There being four horses in the stables, altogether unserviceable, and if offered for sale not likely to fetch anything, the president proposes presenting them to four of the most considerable Banian merchants on the island, which may be courteously taken; and to render them the more acceptable, offers the dressing of them with a yard and a half of red cloth; which the board agreeing to, the warehouse-keeper is hereby directed to issue out six yards for that purpose, to be presented on his majesty's birthday, the 28th instant." The native merchants and capitalists of

Bombay knew a good horse as well as "their masters," and must have been amused at the trick, while they despised the meanness of those who resorted to it.

As the century advanced, the dangers to which the English in Western India were exposed thickened. The breaking up of the Mogul empire brought novel perils to them, for when they had nothing to apprehend from that fading power, new authorities started into existence everywhere, and each was a danger to the Europeans. In 1720 the chief and council of Surat wrote home a graphic description of the *disjecta membra* of the old Mogul empire, and the especial alarm which each of these occasioned to the English interests. Several of the usurping authorities had fleets, which they chiefly used for purposes of piracy.

Kanhojee Angria, a Mahratta (Maratha) chief aspiring to royalty, was the principal sea pirate amongst the native competitors for dominion. He fixed his head-quarters in a strong fortress of the province of Bejapore, which was called both Gheria and Viziadroog. This place was built upon a rocky site, on a promontory of the Concan, about eighty-two miles north of Goa. The whole coast, nearly from Goa to Bombay, was under the control of this piratical chief, and in every bay and creek he had vessels or a fortress. In 1717 the rovers of this sea king captured the English ship *Success*. The company declared war, in retaliation for this outrage, hoping soon to reduce the robber chief to the necessity of seeking terms. His resources were, however, underrated by the English, and for more than thirty-seven years the war continued. This may be readily believed from the mode of warfare adopted by Angria. His fleet was composed of grabs and gallivats, varying from 150 to 200 tons burthen. The grabs carried broadsides of six and nine pounder guns, and on their main decks were mounted two nine or twelve pounders, pointed forwards through port-holes cut in the bulkheads, and designed to be fired over the bows. The gallivats carried light gns fixed on swivels; some also mounted six or eight pieces of cannon, from two to four pounders, and all were impelled by forty or fifty stout oars. Eight or ten of these grabs and forty or fifty gallivats, crowded with men, formed the whole fleet, and with smaller numbers their officers often ventured to attack armed ships of considerable burthen. The plan of their assault was this:—Observing from their anchorage in some secure bay that a vessel was in the offing, they would slip their cables and put out to sea, sailing swiftly if there were a breeze, but if not, making the gallivats

take the grabs in tow. When within shot, they generally assembled as soon as they could astern of their victim, firing into her rigging until they had succeeded in disabling her. They would then approach nearer and batter her on all sides until she struck; or, if she still defended herself resolutely, a number of gallivats, having two or three hundred men on each, would close with her, and the crews, sword in hand, board her from all quarters.* In 1719 an attempt was made to surprise Cavery, a fortified place in possession of this pirate king. The garrison was apprised of the intention, and the plan was defeated. One Ranea Kamattee, a native of rank in Bombay, was tried and convicted for the offence; but as the evidence against him was extorted by torture, the governor himself having in private applied the thumb-screw, little credit was given to the judgment, which was ultimately reversed, facts having come to light which brought home the treachery to certain Portuguese in the English service, who, to screen themselves, forged documents to convict the unfortunate Kamattee, who, no doubt, wished well to the cause of any native power opposed to the English, although innocent of the particular act of treason for which his property was confiscated and his person imprisoned.

In 1720 four of the piratical grabs and ten gallivats captured the English ship *Charlotte*, and brought her a prize into Gheria. The English at length determined to attack Gheria itself: a fleet, with strong detachments of troops on board, the whole under the command of one Walter Brown, was dispatched against the stronghold of the enemy. At the outset, Mr. Brown encountered an unlooked for difficulty. The natives were unwilling to supply provisions for the fleet, and raised an outcry, because some cattle were slaughtered to provide the ships with beef; their belief in metempsychosis being outraged by such an act.

Walter Brown at last set sail, and reached, unopposed, the entrance of the river upon which Gheria was situated, where he landed his soldiers, an operation which the enemy appears to have permitted without attack; but no sooner were they disembarked and prepared to march, than they were assailed; but their assailants were defeated. The enemy, however, hovered around the small party of British, resisting their progress step by step, but always without success. On one occasion, a platoon of Angria's soldiers gallantly held the ground until within "range of partridge shot," as the records of the event express it, when a discharge of that missile

* Orme's *History of Hindostan*, book v.

killed half their number: several of the English were at the same time killed by the bursting of a gun. The enemy still retired, until they obtained the shelter of their fort.

While the troops were thus engaged the fleet was also actively employed, sixteen of the piratical craft were destroyed, and the fort cannonaded, but the ships' guns made no impression upon its strength. Finding that the fortifications were impregnable, Mr. Brown drew off his ships and re-embarked his troops.

The English were struck by the skill and bravery of the enemy, and the latter were no less impressed by the dash and strength of their adversaries. Certain Portuguese auxiliaries to the British behaved badly in this affair, and were taunted for their cowardice by letters from Angria himself. The Governor of Bombay made celebration of the victory on the return of the expedition, and Angria wrote to him jeeringly for rejoicing over the flight of his forces, for he (Angria) still remained ready to defeat again English or Portuguese, or both combined.

It appears, from the obscure records of this period, that the Dutch had made an attack previous to that of the English, and with results in all respects similar.

Angria proposed terms of peace to Governor Phipps, of Bombay, soon after these events, but the governor refused to treat until the European prisoners held by the Mahratta were given up. The correspondence between the governor and Angria is singularly interesting, and as, on the whole, the rude Mahratta had had the advantage in war, so had he also in argument, and especially in that description of reply which insinuates the *tu quoque*. The editor of the *Bombay Quarterly* has ingeniously, and also ingeniously, compared the productions of these eminent correspondents, and given its gist in the following comment:—"We can now smile at the wise saws and edifying proverbs with which his (Angria's) epistles are garnished; but at that time they must have been gall and wormwood to his correspondents. He condescended to make proposals of peace, but Governor Phipps, in reply, refused to treat until his European prisoners were released. Angria then sent the following rejoinder:—Recapitulating with the utmost exactness the subjects contained in the letter which he had received, he observes how his excellency reminds him that he (Angria) is solely responsible for their disputes; that the desire of possessing what is another's is a thing very wide of reason; that such insults are a sort of piracy; that if he had only cultivated trade, his port might have vied with the great port of Surat; that those who are least expert in

war suffer by it; that he who follows it merely from love for it will find cause to repent; and, lastly, his excellency refuses to treat for peace until all prisoners are restored. All these matters are then passed under review by Kanhojee, who meets his correspondent's arguments with subtlety and skill in repartee. He delicately hints that the English merchants have also a desire of possessing what is another's, and are not exempt from 'this sort of ambition, for this is the way of the world.' It was incorrect to say that his government was supported by piracy; it had been established by the Maharaja Sevajee, after he had conquered four kingdoms. If his port were not equal to Surat, it was not for want of indulgence shown to merchants. As for their appeal to the sword, there had been losses on both sides, and it was true that such as love war will find cause to repent, 'of which,' he slyly insinuates, 'I suppose your excellency hath found proof; for we are not always victorious, nor always fortunate.' He concludes by an assurance that he will agree to an exchange of prisoners; that if the governor really desire peace, he is quite ready to meet him half way; and adds, 'as your excellency is a man of understanding, I need say no more.'"^{*}

In 1722 the English sent an expedition against "Angria Colaba." This was commanded by Commodore Matthews, and consisted of three ships; the troops being chiefly Portuguese. This enterprise failed utterly, the Portuguese being once more unfaithful.

The Dutch, with a far superior fleet to any yet sent against the Mahrattas, were defeated in attempts to bombard and storm the fortifications of Gheria, in 1724. The repulse of the Batavians was destructive and signal. Angria was a man of a high order of courage, great naval and military skill, so far as military and naval science were then understood, and of an original genius.

The English suffered very much from other pirates even while engaged in fierce struggle with Angria. The Sanganians had troubled the merchants from the beginning of the century, and continued to do so, more or less, until the first forty years of it had passed. They were particularly active while the Europeans were concentrating their attention in a warlike way against Angria. One of the fiercest battles which took place was between the English merchant ship *Morning Star* and a fleet of five ships manned with two thousand men. According to the English account,^{*} there were only seventeen fighting men on

^{*} *A Chapter in the History of Bombay*

[†] *Consultation Book of the Bombay Government*, 6th Sept. 1720.

board the *Morning Star*. There were, however, a considerable number of other men, as she was a large ship. Twenty-six native merchants and one native seaman went on board the enemy's fleet, according to the accounts—which are given with some plausibility—for the purpose of dissuading the pirates from their purpose.* It might be supposed that one or two of these natives to each ship of the enemy would have been sufficient for negotiatory purposes, and that the rest had proved themselves more loyal in standing by the guns of the *Morning Star*. After a series of attacks upon the British ship, during which she was twice boarded, and three times set on fire, her captain and crew all wounded, several mortally, the *Star*, by the good seamanship with which she was worked, contrived to leave the enemy's fleet entangled with one another in such confusion, during the last effort to board her, that she was enabled to escape to Bombay. The native merchants were ransomed, and the commander of the piratical squadron hanged by order of his superior, for allowing a few Englishmen to repel so great a force.† The accounts of these transactions handed down to us are incredible, a few wounded men are represented as repelling thousands, even when a footing was gained upon the deck of the ship they defended. If these representations be correct, there is nothing in the naval history of England comparable for valour, skill, and fortune, to the exploit of the *Morning Star*.

Another combat of an English ship with Madagascar pirates, or pirates who had made that island their haunt, partakes of as much of the marvellous as the conflict just related; for, although not presenting scenes of such wonderful heroism and strength, the address of a certain captain surpassed that which we read of in any other authentic story of sea-fights with pirates. This narrative comes down to us chiefly on the authority of Alexander Hamilton.‡ Three ships, two British and one belonging to the Ostend Company, now (as was seen in another chapter) come into notoriety and activity, were lying at anchor off the island of Madagascar. Two Dutch-built pirates attacked them. Being fitted exclusively for war, the two vessels were more than a match for the three merchantmen. The Ostender made sail, followed by the British ship *Greenwich*, and escaped. They seem to have left their companion in danger, in a shabby way, for she made fight, but ran by accident on some rocks, pursued

by the lesser pirate-ship, the larger having given chase to the two successful fugitives. The pirate in pursuit of the *Cassandra* also went upon the rocks, while seeking to board her expected prize; the positions of the two ships were favourable to the *Cassandra*, which raked the pirate's decks, killing or driving the crew below. Affairs were in this attitude when the other piratical ship returned from her unsuccessful chase, and sped to the assistance of her consort. The English captain manned his boats, and gained a position in shoal water, where he could not be pursued. According to the story transmitted to us he had the hardihood to offer or ask truce, and go on board the pirate, where his persuasive powers were such that he succeeded in gaining immunity, and even a *present of the ship whose guns he had silenced*, his own having become a wreck. There is nothing in the relation of this transaction to justify the assertion that the English merchant captain was able to give proof that he had pursued the same calling, thereby exciting a fellow-feeling, a suspicion which might be fairly entertained from the cordiality with which he was treated when he and his late assailants came to understand one another. At all events, when he reached Bombay he was feted, and as Captain Massey, who signalized himself at the Redan in the Crimean war of 1854-5, remarked, "had the inconvenience of being made a hero." The generosity of the pirates was not, however, appreciated at Bombay, for an expedition was fitted out against them, under Commodore Matthews, who met with no better success than he had obtained at Angria Colaba.

The perfidy of the Portuguese had ever been a source of anxiety at Bombay. There were at least 6000 Portuguese there who professed loyalty, but were seditious to a man. The people would probably have fallen in with English interests, and become identified with the prosperity of a government which it was not possible to disturb, but the Jesuit portion of the clergy—and nearly all were of that order—irritated the public feeling perpetually, and kept alive a hatred to the English, impotent, except to torment, but often bringing disastrous consequences to the Portuguese themselves. The English endured these things with much toleration, for there had existed a considerable sympathy with Romanism on the part of many of the officials and writers who professed Protestantism. The annoyances offered by the constant enmity and treasons of "the Portugals" became at last unbearable, and the president and council took the matter into serious deliberation. The mode of securing some

* *Diaries of the Bombay and Surat Governments.*

† Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas.*

‡ *New Account of the East Indies.* By Alexander Hamilton.

loyalty from the Portuguese subjects, which the officers of the company hit upon, was the assumption of the ecclesiastical patronage of the Roman Catholic churches. This had previously been in the hands of the King of Portugal, who, by that means, was enabled to possess himself of precise information as to English affairs at Bombay, and to disturb its government whenever he pleased. This power he more effectually secured by giving the people of the parishes a *veto* upon his patronage. The council determined to seize this patronage, and so to administer it that none but clergymen of reputed loyalty should exercise pastoral functions among the Roman Catholics of the island. The East India Company approved of the policy of their Bombay subordinates. The measure was carried out, no clergyman being allowed to officiate at the altar until he took an oath of allegiance to the king of England—an oath not to preach against the civil rights of the East India Company, and an oath to submit in civil matters to its orders. The priests resisting, the churches were transferred to clergymen of the Carmelite mission, under the superintendence of Don Frey Mauritio, who held authority direct from the propaganda at Rome. The Don entered upon his episcopal functions with no good will from the Portuguese clergy. He and his Carmelites took the following oath:—"I, Don Frey Mauritio, of Sancta Teresa, Bishop of Anastatopolis, vicar-general in the empire of the Great Mogul, of the Island of Bombay and the jurisdiction thereof, do swear upon the holy evangelist (on which I have placed my right hand) entirely to obey His Most Serene Majesty of Great Britain, and that I will never, directly or indirectly, teach, preach, or practise anything contrary to the honour and dignity of the crown of his said Most Serene Majesty, or to the interest of the Right Honourable English Company, and that I will pay all obedience to the orders of the Honourable the Governor for the time being, and to exercise the Roman Catholic religion according to its primitive institution, without any alteration. In witness whereof I have hereto set my hand this 6th day of May, 1720." Padre Frey Pedro, of the most Holy Trinity, and Frey Elizel de St. Joseph took and subscribed the same oath.

This oath was taken in October, 1719. As soon as the ceremony was over, proclamation was made by the governor and council, requiring "all inhabitants, of the Roman Catholic religion, to pay the same obedience to the bishop, Don Frey Mauritio de Sancta Teresa, and the priests appointed by him, as they formerly did to the Portuguese bishop and

priests." The Rev. Don remained in his episcopate until his death, in 1726, when he was succeeded by "Peter of Alcantara, called Bishop of Areopolis, in Asia Minor, and apostolic vicar of the Mogul Empire, the kingdom of Isdal Khan, Goleonda, and the Island of Bombay." As soon as the proclamation was issued, recognising Don Mauritio in the episcopate, the Portuguese priests received notice to quit the island in twenty-four hours, an order which was enforced.

It was expected by some in the English interest, favourable to the policy adopted, that a schism would arise, by which the Roman Catholic party must be weakened. The ultimate result justified such speculations, in some degree, for ecclesiastical disunions among the Roman Catholics of Bombay, dependent upon claims of episcopal jurisdiction, sometimes arising before the courts of law, have long troubled that community. The immediate result was not in accordance with these expectations, for the people refused to discuss the matter, and looked on with apparent indifference, although they felt many misgivings and much disapprobation. In the governments of "the general of the North," as the Portuguese chief officer was styled who controlled the factories in Bassein, Diu, Damaun, &c., &c., the Portuguese clergy offered strong remonstrances; but the people were quiet, as it is probable they were advised, under the circumstances, to be. The measure did not eradicate the ill-will entertained towards the English, as heretics and supplanters. There was a change of policy on the part of the Roman clergy, but no change of feeling, except that the new clergy did not regard the English, from a national, as they did in a religious point of view, with such keen hatred. Still there existed a repugnance towards the English, which, whether ethnological or circumstantial, showed itself when events called it forth, so that the Roman Catholics of Bombay were esteemed by the English undesirable subjects.

The expelled priests, in concert with the people who had appeared so passive, and probably with the knowledge and concurrence even of the new clergy, made representations to the King of Portugal, to whom they really held allegiance. These were forwarded to the English court, and increased the distrust and dislike with which the Portuguese at Bombay were regarded by the company. What advice arrived from Portugal to the Portuguese descendants in India it is difficult to say, but the representative of that government in the north of Western India proceeded to extremities, prohibiting all communication with Bombay, until the expelled priests were

restored; he interdicted also the transport of provisions, and seized English vessels when opportunity was afforded. The English were not likely to allow of these affronts without retaliation, they accordingly proclaimed that all "Portugals" holding property in Bombay who were absent from the island, who did not return in twenty-one days, would be considered rebels, and their property would be confiscated. The absentees did not appear, and the property was seized.

This proclamation was conveyed from Bombay to Salsette by two passengers; the Portuguese placed them in irons and carried them about, as little boys in England on the 5th of November carry effigies of Guy Faux. The mock triumph was first exhibited in Tanna, then in Bandora, where they were hoisted on a gibbet, but were taken down again and sent back to Bombay bruised, torn, and exhausted, after experiencing almost every form of insult and coarse indignity.

The English promptly accepted this as a declaration of war, the long negotiations of modern times not being then fashionable with Englishmen in the East. A detachment of soldiers marched to the straits of Makin, and shelled the fortified church of Bandora. The Portuguese, who were disposed to defend it, were speedily put *hors de combat*, and the terrified inhabitants begged for mercy; this was granted without any exaction but a promise to abstain from injuring defenceless Englishmen. This pledge was given by people, clergy, and civil officers, accompanied by the warmest expressions of regret for conduct which could not be justified among nations practising humanity, or honourable in war. After exchanges of courtesies, the English withdrew, and the Portuguese immediately prepared to strengthen the place, so as to be enabled to perpetrate fresh acts of cowardice and brutality with tolerable prospect of impunity. New and more cowardly injuries on unarmed Englishmen and peaceful coasting boats followed. The English again appeared, again shelled the church, and after slaying many, and filling the place with consternation, responded to a renewed cry for mercy, by renewed generosity and forbearance. After this, except by the private assassination of Englishmen, no further outrages were committed.

In the year 1706, a "savage pirate" had captured an English ship called the *Monsoon*. A Portuguese frigate conquered the pirate, and retook the prize, but instead of giving it to the owners, as the ostensible peace between the two nations and the requirements of humanity would have enjoined, the Portuguese war ships proved as dishonest as the

pirate, and kept the prize. The facts of the case did not become known to the English for years after, and then other troubles prevented action from being taken in the matter. In 1715 the English were disposed to revive the memories of old injuries, and sent the Worshipful Stephen Strutt, deputy governor of Bombay, to demand reparation from the viceroy of Goa. He was also commissioned to visit the factories south of Bombay, such as Carwar, Tellicherry, Calicut, and Ajengo, to inquire into the systematic and extensive frauds practised there by the company's own agents. He did not embark on these errands until October, 1716, just a year and a day after his commission to do so was signed. His squadron consisted of but two ships, and he had scarcely passed Malwa, when he was attacked by the Mahrattas, a grab and a gallivat attempting, with astonishing intrepidity and much skill, to cut off a valuable ship which accompanied the commissioner. Although the rovers were beaten off, they managed to escape unhurt in either man or ship. Such, however, were the perils which, little more than a century and a half ago, attended a cruise along the southern Bombay coasts.

Arriving off Carwar, his worship found a Portuguese squadron of considerable power stationed there to protect the coast from pirates, which task their crews were too cowardly to perform, while they robbed every merchantman whose confidence they invited and betrayed. These rogues would, no doubt, have attacked the English commissioner had they not been deterred by their fears.

His worship landed at the different factories, creating consternation when the objects of his mission became known. He acted with moderation and judgment, rectifying, at all events *pro tempore*, many abuses, dismissing dishonest servants, and promoting those of good repute. At Goa, his worship hired a priest to be the advocate of the proprietors of the English ships, but his eloquence was as little potent as the viceroy's honest efforts, and all reparation for the affair of the *Monsoon* was, in polite but firm terms, refused.

It does not appear that the English took any measures for the recovery of damages for the *Monsoon*. Whenever their affairs fell into very great hands—like these of the Worshipful Mr. Strutt—a compromise of some sort, a diplomatic defeat, or a humiliation, mostly resulted: whenever the general community of the English anywhere took up a matter, it was usually carried out with daring courage, promptitude, and corresponding success.

The state of the factories south of Bombay,

at that time, are disclosed by the reports of this voyage of Mr. Strutt. Carwar he found fortified, the Mogul having robbed it some time previous. The Dessaree, the rajah of the neighbouring country, invaded Carwar in 1718, and besieged it for two months; but succour arriving from Bombay, he was obliged to raise the siege, but not until after many perils to the garrison, and those who came to their assistance. The troops sent from Bombay could with difficulty be landed in consequence of the high surf. The first attempt was unfortunate,—eighty men were either killed, drowned, or fell into the hands of the enemy. When the second attempt was successful, a pause in the operations on both sides was made, which lasted for six weeks. Four hundred men then attacked the enemy, covered by the guns of the small craft, and the Dessaree received a severe chastisement, leaving two hundred men upon the field. One hundred and fifty Arabian horses, which had arrived for the Dessaree, were captured, and a number of his coasting craft. The enemy returned and hovered about Carwar, no action taking place until a large force, arriving from Bombay, of 2280 men were landed. The enemy began to retreat; the English officers, instead of offering hot pursuit, practised a variety of manœuvres remarkable only for military pedantry and professional folly. This conduct encouraged the enemy, who, at first, puzzled by what they had never before seen, at last supposed that what was performed from sheer conceit of military tactics resulted from fear, and consequently rallied and charged. What followed is only told by a prejudiced witness, Alexander Hamilton. He declares that the English commander ran away, and threw off his uniform to render his flight more successful. The other officers, whose tactics were so pompous and scientific, followed the example of their superiors, and the men, without officers, were assailed with such advantage as speedily left two hundred and fifty of them dead upon the field. They would all have been driven into the sea, but that their flight was covered by the guns of the floating batteries, which had been prepared to cover the landing.

According to the testimony of Hamilton, the English made no efforts to retrieve their dishonour, but acted on the defensive, although the total number of the Dessaree's forces was only 7000. His finances at length failing, he drew off his army, leaving the English unmolested, but entertaining contempt for their capacity and courage. The grand subject of difference between this chief, and Taylor, the head of the English factory, was

the right to the spoils of such ships as were thrown upon the coasts. Both these persons were "wreckers;" the Dessaree considered that he had a natural and inherited right to rob shipwrecked mariners of all nations, and the English chief considered that he might as well take the right of plundering the unfortunate of all nations in such circumstances, excepting, of course, those of his own. This contest might be called the war of the wreckers. The company were obliged to withdraw the factory, for the native hostility and contempt was irreconcilable, and the English there had lost all moral power. What reverses the British experienced; how frequently their capacity proved deficient; what general mediocrity was displayed by them on land! How marvellous that the company still extended its power, although all its branches and the parent stem were violently subjected to the rudest blasts of adversity: as the oak which is most fiercely shaken by storms, takes the deepest root in the soil where it is planted.

Calicut had been one of the oldest stations of the Europeans in India. The English were prospering there; but in 1714 the Dutch seized some land, which they declared had been assigned to them by compact with a former rajah, and began to build a fort. The English were anxious to have them removed before the fort was finished, but did not dare to attack them openly. They intrigued with the rajah, who, like the English themselves, in this case preferred a treacherous and underhand course to open and manly hostilities. By a base, cowardly, and perfidious scheme, the Dutch were attacked, and many assassinated; but they soon returned, exacting heavy vengeance, and re-establishing themselves with sufficient solidity. From that day, English interests at Calicut rapidly declined; they were unable to compete with the Dutch as traders, and the whole of the business which they had conducted was, by the fair competition of men of superior business capacity, withdrawn from them. The Dutch were too well prepared, and knew how to defend themselves too well, for any attempt to rob them by force of their well-earned success; so the English removed to Tellicherry, leaving a Portuguese interpreter behind, as their only representative.

Tellicherry was one of the ports earliest occupied by the French, the account of whose rise and fall in India belongs to other chapters. At this period their name was somewhat important in Western India, although that was not the region where their power was developed. When at Tellicherry they erected a mud fort, and as it has been the fate of Frenchmen to found foreign settlements,

and build fortifications for Englishmen to gain possession of in some way, so was it at Tellicherry. The old mud fort of the French became English property in 1708, the principal Nair of the place claiming the right to dispose of it, and choosing, for purposes of his own, to make it the property of the English. They erected a stone fortification upon the site of the mud-built defences, and it always turned out in India that where they fixed themselves resolutely, no power was able to extirpate them, except in some season when accident performed what force otherwise would have failed to achieve. A mania for building seized the English at Telli-cherry; they "fixed" their capital in walls and batteries, and soon experienced the usual inconvenience in all matters of a purely commercial nature.

According to that indefatigable asperser of his countrymen, if engaged in the company's service, Alexander Hamilton, the garrison were drunken and dissolute; the officers not only setting a horrible example, but in the most tyrannous manner compelling the men to drink, that they might themselves profit by the sale of "penceel." Thus the meanness with which most writers charge the English traders of this period settled in India, was quite as signally shown, and more culpably practised, by "officers and gentlemen." Disturbances soon ensued between the native authorities and the English. The former endeavouring to exact exorbitant duties, the latter setting the tariff of the "Nair" at defiance. Mutual bitterness often issued in blows, and these conflicts continued for a long time.

The calamities of the English in Western India were very numerous in the first quarter of the eighteenth century—the massacre of Ajengo is one of the most unhappy illustrations of this remark. A dispute arose, as usual, about duties or tribute; the English appealed to the Rance, and went in a body to her highness's palace:* they were waylaid and most of them massacred. The English imagined they saw the hand of the Dutch in this, as they did in most transactions that were adverse to them; but the latter published a strong and ardent protestation of innocence, and an indignant denunciation of "the detestable massacre."

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Western India began to feel the influence of events connected with British interests in Bengal. Thus the factory was altogether removed from Surat in 1712, in consequence of the robbery and oppressions

* The line of descent in the reigning family passed to females, to the exclusion of males.

of the native governors of that place, and for three years the English trade was stopped there; but in consequence of an embassy sent from Hoogly to the Mogul, matters were arranged, and the factors returned. This was in 1716, and as a result of the success of the Hoogly embassy, the agents were allowed to attach fifteen acres of ground to the factory. Thus, territorially, the English illustrated the Spanish proverb, "Give me room to sit down, and I will make myself room to lie down."

The firman of the emperor resulting from the Hoogly embassy was favourable and just. Seldom has a public document been drawn up with more skill and honesty. The framers, and the emperor for whom it was prepared, were actuated by a sincere desire, not only to avoid complications in future, but so to provide against them as to render them almost impossible, while his imperial authority was respected. Yet it did not long secure the English from grosser outrages than ever. As the latter have been accused of not acting upon the law as laid down in this firman, the document is given to the reader, who must be convinced that the interests of the English lay so strongly in a just compliance with the treaty, that they never would give any occasion for its violation. The following translation of the firman from the Persian was made by Mr. Fraser, one of the factors, and entered in the records:—

"Governors, Aumils, Jagheerdars, Foujdars, Crories, Rhadars, Goujirbans, and Zemindars who are at present, and shall be hereafter in the Soubah of Ahmedabad and the fortunate port of Surat and Cambay being in hopes of the royal favour,—Know that at this time of conquest, which carries the ensign of victory, Mr. John Surmon and Choja Surhud, English factors, have represented to those who stand at the foot of the high throne, that customs are remitted on English goods all over the empire, except at the port of Surat; and that at the said port, from the time of Shah Jehan, two per cent. was fixed for the customs; from the time of Aurungzebe, three and a half per cent. was appointed; and in other places, none molested them on this account; and in the time of Bahador Shah, two and a half per cent. only was fixed, and is in force until now; but, by reason of this oppression of the Muttaseddees, the English withdrew their factory three years ago; and in the Soubahs of Behar and Orissa this nation pays no customs; and in the port of Hoogly, in the Soubah of Bengal, they give yearly three thousand rupees as *Peshkush*, in lieu of customs. They hope that a yearly *peshkush* may be fixed at the port of Surat

in lieu of customs, as at other ports, and they agree to a yearly peshkush of ten thousand rupees.

"This order, which subjects the world to obey it, and which ought to be followed, is issued, in order that, as they agree to pay ten thousand rupees as peshkush at the port of Surat, you should take it annually, and on no account molest them further; and whatever goods or effects their factors may bring or carry away by land or water, to or from the ports of the Soubahs, and other ports, you are to look upon the customs thereof as free; let them buy and sell at their pleasure, and if any of their effects are stolen in any place, use your utmost endeavours to recover them, giving the robbers up to punishment and the goods to their owners; and wherever they settle a factory, and buy and sell goods, assist them on all just occasions, and if their accounts show that they have a claim upon any merchant, give the English their just due, and let no person injure their factors. They have likewise petitioned that the Dewans in the Soubahs may have on demand the original Sunnud, or a copy with the Nazim's or Dewan's seal affixed. It would be difficult to produce an original in every place, and they hope that a copy under the Croy's seal will be credited; and if they do not demand the original Sunnud, they will not be molested on account of a copy with the Nazim's or Dewan's seal; and in the island of Bombay, belonging to the English, where Portuguese coins are now current, the fortunate coins may be struck according to the custom of Chinapatam; and any of the company's servants who may be in debt and run away, must be sent to the chief of the factory; and the company's servants must not be molested on account of the Foujarie and Abwab Munhai, by which they are vexed and discouraged. This strict and high order is issued:—that a copy under the Croy's seal be credited; and that fortunate coins struck in the island of Bombay, according to the custom of the empire, be current; and if any of the company's servants run away in debt let him be taken and delivered to the chief of the factory; and let them not be molested on account of the Abwab Munhai. They have likewise represented that the company have factories in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and that they are willing to settle in other places. They hope that wherever they settle a factory, forty beegahs of land may be graciously bestowed upon them by the king; and that when their ships are driven ashore by storms and wrecked, the governors of the ports oppressively seize their goods, and, in some places, demand a fourth part. The royal

order is issued, that they act according to the customs of the factories in other Soubahs; and as this nation has factories in the king's ports, and dealings at court, and have obtained a miraculous firman, exempting them from customs, take care equitably of the goods of their ships which may be wrecked or lost in their voyages, and in all matters act conformably to this great order, and do not make an annual demand for a new grant. In this be particular.—Written on the 4th of Safir, in the 5th year of this successful reign.*

Notwithstanding the exceeding perspicuity of this firman, only a few years were permitted to elapse, when the native authorities and merchants at Surat conspired to extort money from the English. The first attempt of this sort was very characteristic of a Mohammedan government. The English were informed that their factory and the ground annexed to it, by firman, was given to a great saint who took a fancy to it, and from whom the emperor could withhold nothing. It was at the same time intimated that a present to the governor might be instrumental in preventing the transfer, as he would use his influence with the aforesaid saint, not to be persistent in his desires to possess the property of the English. The latter submitted to this exaction, based upon so flimsy a pretence, but intimated that if their factory were taken from them, they would leave Surat, and if driven to do so, they would blockade the port and ruin its trade.

Soon after another occasion arose which gave an opportunity for extorting money from the English. A strange ship, which was generally supposed to be Danish, cruised in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, capturing Mogul shipping. When tidings of these piracies arrived at Surat, there was a terrible outcry amongst the native population. The English factory was attacked by the populace, and the lives of its inmates endangered. The English were told that they must make good whatever the merchants of Surat lost by pira-

* The following explanation of the terms used in this firman, may be desirable for persons unacquainted with Indian terms. *Aumils* are collectors of revenue, or superintendents of districts. *Jagheerdars*, holders of assignments of land. *Foujdar*, a police magistrate at Surat; his duties were confined to the suburbs and places in the vicinity. *Croy* or *Karoory*, an officer who makes himself responsible for the rents of a district. *Rhadar*, a collector of duties payable on the roads. *Goujirban*, a collector of duties at ferries and passes. *Zemindar*, a landowner, who paid a yearly sum to the king. *Muttasaddce*, an accountant for the Soubah. *Peshkush*, a present or tribute. *Dewan*, the receiver general of a province. *Nazim*, the first officer of the province. *Abwab Munhai*, a tax on forbidden things, such as spirituous liquors, courtseans, &c. *Soubah*, a province. *Sunnud*, a patent or charter.

cies, and no remonstrances on their part, upon the unreasonableness of making them responsible for the acts of robbers, either of their own or any other nation, had the slightest effect upon the governor, who placed guards upon the factory, virtually making prisoners of its inmates. The company's broker was assaulted in open durbar, and finally incarcerated. Upon this, the English chief laid in stores of provision and ammunition, as far as clandestine means allowed him, and prepared for the defence of the factory. When this was accomplished, he ordered the English ships lying off, to lay an embargo upon all Mohammedan vessels. The governor was compelled, in order to put an end to such an inconvenience, to open negotiations, and promised that no molestation of the English or their property should be again permitted, the president, on his part, promising to make compensation if it were proved that a piracy was committed by an English ship in the company's service. Thus the only argument of any validity in the esteem of the natives—force, soon brought matters to their ordinary course. These events were followed by sanguinary feuds and foul conspiracies among the natives themselves, in which the English had no part, but which more or less affected their interests. Gradually, however, they became more influential, and governors found it to be their interest and duty to afford them opportunities of peaceful and equitable trade.*

At Cambay, where the English had a small factory, their history was a counterpart of that of their countrymen at Surat. The English continued to outwit the extortioners, and retain the factory, and carry on some commerce, although the country around was often laid waste, and the town repeatedly fired by contending freebooters. Every rajah was a robber, and the people did not like them the less on that account.

The following passage from "A Chapter on the History of Bombay," in the *Bombay Quarterly*, of January, 1856, must read very strangely to those who laud "the great Mohammedan democracy:"—"The followers of Hameed Khan next appear on the horizon, levying thirty-five thousand rupees on the town, and demanding a thousand from the residency. 'The first time they went back with a put-off,' writes Mr. Innes, 'the next with a flat denial, and I have not heard from them since, further than that the governor and the Geenim fellow here has advised them to desist, the latter adding that the English even would not pay them. They are but two hundred men, and I am under no manner of apprehension of danger.' The governor then

locked, and affixed seals to, the English broker's warehouses. This measure Mr. Innes 'judged to be bully;' so counteracted it by menaces and two cases of drams, which were more effectual than money in subduing the rapacity of these licentious Mussulmans. The seals were removed, and the eccentric resident a month later replies to the congratulations of his superiors with this counter-hint:—'I shall have regard to your hint of the governor being dry; though I have quenched his thirst at my own charge too often for my pocket.' Terrible days were those for merchants and helpless ryots. Pelajee, Kantajee, Hameed Khan, governors from Delhi, and certain Cooly chiefs,—all squeezed them in turn, until the cultivators refused to till the ground, and the country was threatened with famine. After Hameed Khan's followers had gone away almost empty, a new deputy-governor was appointed, on condition that he should send to Ahmedabad ninety thousand rupees, to be extorted from the inhabitants. No sooner did the unhappy merchants and shopkeepers hear of his approach, than they hid themselves, or made their escape to the neighbouring villages. For six days not a man was to be seen in the streets of Cambay, although his excellency threatened that unless the people made their appearance he would deliver the city to indiscriminate pillage!"*

Early in the eighteenth century, and some considerable time before the company's agents were sent thither, independent Englishmen went to Scinde, and introduced a coasting trade between Saribundur, on the Indus, and the western parts of what is now called the Bombay presidency. Among the interlopers who adventured upon this traffic, was Alexander Hamilton, author of *The New Account of the East Indies*. He found the coasts and inland roads swarming with robbers, Beloochees, and Mackrans, who, the *Bombay Quarterly* suggests, were the fisher caste. Captain Hamilton having in his voyages encountered and conquered various pirates, obtained a reputation along the coast which kept many in awe of his sword who were very desirous to plunder his property. On one occasion, he sold goods to certain merchants in the interior of Scinde, who dared not convey their purchases in consequence of the predatory hordes who beset the way. Hamilton, in order to secure the payment, undertook to escort the goods to their destination. He joined a Kaffela of fifteen hundred beasts of burden, the same number of men and women, and a guard of two hundred horsemen. His own party consisted of thir-

* Letters from Daniel Innes, in the *Surat Diary*, 1720 to 1725.

* *Surat Diary*, July, 1724, Feb. 4, 1725.

teen sailors. The strange cavalcade had not proceeded far, when troops of robber horse presented themselves in large numbers, brandishing spears and swords. Hamilton placed the baggage animals in a line as a barricade, with the cowardly native horsemen on the flanks; he armed his sailors with fuses, and appointed them to eligible positions for an effective defence. The robbers sent forward one of their number, who demanded unconditional surrender; menacing promiscuous slaughter, in case of refusal. One of the sailors shot the miscreant through the head. Possibly the robbers considered that some mistake had been committed, for a second was sent on a like mission, who met with the same fate as his predecessor. A third coming to reconnoitre the cause of these misfortunes, fell dead from another shot the moment he came within range. The enemy became panic-struck, and the escort of the merchants taking advantage of their disorder, charged them with effect, slaying some, and dispersing the whole. Hamilton, according to his own account, was regarded as a hero of surpassing prowess, alike qualified to humble robbers by land or sea.

Towards the close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century, the East India Company established its agents in Scinde, and carried on with difficulty a desultory trade in that region.

It is impossible to peruse the proceedings of the British during the first quarter of the eighteenth century, especially in the light of documents such as have of late been examined, without coming to the conclusion expressed by an American divine, not generally favourable to the English nor to the character they displayed in the acquisition and development of their Indian empire:—"In considering the course of policy pursued by the English, which has resulted in their acquiring in India one of the largest empires ever known, there appears much less to censure in the Directors and controlling power of the East India Company in England, than in their agents in India. Increase of territory has not generally been the desire of the proprietors or directors of the company, and in accordance with this view have been the general spirit, and often the positive character, of their instructions to their agents in India."*

CHAPTER LXIII.

THE BRITISH IN WESTERN INDIA DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

NOTWITHSTANDING the scantiness of English records, at all events of published records and accessible manuscripts, the history of the English in Western India during the second quarter of the eighteenth century affords interesting incidents, and such as illustrate the progress of British power. It has been as truly as eloquently written by a reviewer in the *Bombay Quarterly*:*—"A mercantile company transformed into one of the great powers of the earth, and driven by the force of circumstances to the conquest of an empire, is, like other effects which we do not trace to their causes, regarded as a phenomenon. This is merely because historians have been able to collect only a few facts relative to its earliest days, and those facts separated by frequent and large lacunæ. But an object of the present narrative is to show that the growth of English dominion, although fostered by a superhuman arm, was regulated by fixed and natural laws,—even by laws similar to those which regulate the development of the human

mind. The East India Company was trained and gradually brought to maturity by a process parallel to that through which a little inmate of the nursery may have passed when first starting on the race for fame. The possessor of a wooden sword, a penny trumpet, and a diminutive drum, glows already with military ardour as a gay regiment passes by him, and the spark is fanned into a flame by hard knocks at school, struggles in manly games, and perhaps town and gown rows at the university, until he submits to the preliminaries of drill, enters on real campaign, and in due time appears as a distinguished officer. So with respect to the East India Company, if its servants had been allowed to live peaceably in its nursery of Surat, without provocatives being offered to their military propensities, there would have been no more

* *India, Ancient and Modern, Geographical, Historical, Political, Social, and Religious; with a Particular Account of the State and Progress of Christianity.* By David O. Allen, D.D., Missionary of the American Board for twenty-five years in India.

* July, 1856.

probability of their becoming a political power than there is at present of any steam navigation or railway company becoming one; and at the breaking up of the Mogul empire they might have been found, like ancient Britons when the Roman legions were withdrawn, incapable of defending themselves against distant rovers or predatory neighbours. But they were very soon taught the necessity of self-dependence,—of looking to none but themselves for an assertion of their rights. The clamours of a ferocious mob endeavouring to beat down their factory gates first induced them to keep a small establishment of peons as a domestic police; the oppressions which they endured under native governments then convinced them that a fortified factory and an insular stronghold were required; next, because their trade would otherwise have been at the mercy of pirates, they built, equipped, and armed a fleet of grabs and gallivats; lastly, their very existence depended, not only on their maintenance of standing armies, but on their ability to cripple the strength of adversaries by invasions of their territories. We do not, indeed, assert that they have in every single instance been thus involuntarily led to aggression, or deny that they have more than once wilfully disturbed the comity of nations; but we maintain that they never contemplated the seizure of a province, much less of the Indian continent, until compelled by the force of circumstances; and that the Anglo-Indian is the only empire in the world which has not owed its origin to a lust of conquest. And it is highly instructive to observe that the events of the company's history form a regular chain, which was none of their forging. In welding the links together they were unconscious agents of Him who, holding nations in his balance, puts down one that He may set up another."

At the close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century matters in Western India had advanced to this condition, or a state of things approximating to it—that either the English must retire from India, allowing hordes of savage pirates, robbers, and Maharrattas to drive them out, in spite of firmans and treaties with the Moguls, or the sword of England must defend the commerce of England in India, and the lives and property of Englishmen on its shores.

In the last chapter reference to the daring and deeds of Angria has been frequently made. In the period now about to be treated, that able pirate became more conspicuous still as a creator of English history, for he did more than any other Indian chief to draw out the valour of the English, and to cause

them to nurse their military talents and resources.

In 1728 he made an offer of pacific settlement, but, in a few months afterwards, he captured the company's galley, *King William*, and made its master, Captain McNeal, a prisoner. This officer he held for years in bondage, and only gave him liberty on the payment of a large ransom. On the 12th of January, 1730, the English made a treaty with the Bhonislays of Sawunt Wave, for the purpose of holding Angria in check; but it did not answer their expectations. The death of Kanhojee Angria occurred the same year.* He left two sons, between whom his government was divided. Their names, which occur frequently in connection with this period of the story of the English in India, were Sukagee and Sumbhagee. The former obtained Colaba; the coast southward was assigned to the other, who was the younger brother. Both these chiefs imitated their father in his rapacity and daring, and, except when they quarrelled with one another (like the members of all Indian families), they were equally the enemies of the English. The elder, however, had not long an opportunity of proving his propensities, for he died in 1733, while proposing peace to the British, and his envoys were actually before the president at Bombay. Sumbhagee prepared to possess himself of his brother's inheritance by legitimate claim, but a natural brother, who partook of much of the spirit of their father Kanhojee, attacked Colaba, and took it by escalade, in a most intrepid manner. He was prompted to this act, and assisted in its performance, by the Portuguese, who were always meddling and intriguing, and always, in the long run, to their own destruction. All efforts to displace this chivalrous man were in vain. His power increased, he formed alliances, and extended his enterprise, and attempted the fort of Ageen, under the protection of the guns of which reposed the fleet of the Siddee of Jingeera. The rapid strides of his ambition and power alarmed the Bombay government, and Captain McNeal, then at liberty, was ordered to assist with a squadron the fleet of the Siddee. The squadron was not promptly dispatched, as its commanders lacked enterprise, for a considerable time elapsed before the ships left Bombay. It would have been better had they not left at all, for the orders received at Bombay were so unmilitary as to make the expedition simply ridiculous. Some muskets and powder were presented to the endangered ally, and the squadron left him to his fate, which was speedily sealed by the success of the enemy.

* Consultation Book of the Bombay Government.

Emboldened by success, and learning to despise the English, from their previous timid and time-serving policy, this scion of the house of Angria advanced his pretensions and his forces in the more immediate neighbourhood of the English. On the river Pen, which flows into the harbour of Bombay, stood a town called Rewanee: this the modern Angria seized, and thus commanded the communications between the Island of Bombay and the continent.

At this time, Bajee Rao, whose name is so illustrious in Mahratta history,* was in the zenith of his influence, and he had the discrimination to see that the resources, position, and character of the English ensured their ultimate superiority to all surrounding powers. He flattered them, and, in the name of the Rajah of Sattara, opened negotiations with them, and, in very humble terms, requested that they would not permit their fleet to interfere with his naval enterprises. Unfortunately, the Peishwa was in alliance with Angria, and they therefore would not offer those tokens of good-will which they desired.

The English meditated new hostile projects against their unrelenting foe, and, in order to accomplish their purposes, formed alliances with the Siddees. The *Bombay Quarterly* describes this condition of affairs as follows:—"Messrs. Lowther and Dickenson had arranged with the several Siddees of Jingeera a treaty of alliance, afterwards ratified by their government, according to which both parties bound themselves to act in concert against Angria, and not to treat with him except by mutual consent. They agreed that all prizes taken at sea should be allotted to the English, and to the Siddee all conquests made on land, with the exceptions of Khanery, which, if taken, should be delivered with all its guns and stores to the English, and the fort and district of Colaba, which should be demolished. The contracting parties were to divide equally between themselves the revenues of Colaba, and the English to build a factory and fort at Mhopal in that district, situated between the rivers Pen and Nagotana." To this paragraph the following note is added:—"The above account of operations against Angria is imperfect, but as complete as could be compiled from the mutilated records of government for the months from June to December inclusive, and March, 1734. Grant Duff, who chiefly depended for his knowledge of the records upon extracts furnished him by Mr. Romer, the political agent at Surat, has not alluded to these events, which belong to Maratha history, and are only worthy of notice as exhibiting the

* Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*.

first attempts of the English at offensive warfare." It is passing strange that so high an authority should describe this as the initiation of offensive war! The career of Sir John Childs and the policy of Sir Joshua Childs were evidences, as well as the bitter misfortunes they produced, that this was not the first essay in offensive warfare in India on the part of the British, whatever might be the merits of the cause in either case. The English, about this time, succeeded in intercepting Angria's fleet, by a squadron under the command of three captains, whose authority, as far as one can gather from the records of their proceedings, was equal. The enemy fled and escaped; the usual results of divided command, irresolution and ill-concerted action, ruined the undertaking.

The English found the Siddees of little use. The Mahratta spirit had stopped the career of these once renowned cruisers of the Indian seas: their day of glory, such as it was, became obscured; the Angrian star shone out cloudless. Family disputes broke out in the renowned and formidable house of the fierce Mahratta sea kings; a fraternal jealousy left scope for English diplomacy, for as the English became warriors in spite of themselves in India, so also did they become diplomatists. Captain Inchbird was deemed very efficient in that department, and was dispatched from Bombay for the express purpose of using his knowledge of native languages, usages, and dispositions, to foment the dispute between the Angria brothers, so that they might not coalesce for the injury of English interests.

Naval operations were undertaken which were committed to Commodore Bagwell. After long watching for the enemy, he at last, on the 22nd December, 1738, descried nine grabs, and thirteen gallivats, issuing from the fortified port of Gheria. He bore down upon them, although their force was vastly superior to his. They fled, and sought shelter in the river of Rajapore. As usual they were successful in flight, and although they suffered from the commodore's broadsides, they knew how to elude him. In spite of his vigilance, while he pursued this flotilla, other armed ships of the enemy captured English merchantmen. The English commanders seemed generally to possess more courage than capacity, more enterprise than intelligence. The conduct of the men, both military and naval, was perfect, daring to the uttermost, enduring, loyal, and obedient, worthy of being led by better men than their country generally assigned to the task.

The resources of the pirates were constantly recruited by the captures they made:

all sorts of military stores were obtained by plunder from English ships.

Soon after the cowardly flight of Angria's fleet from Commodore Bagwell's little squadron, four large East Indiamen were attacked by a powerful piratical flotilla belonging to the same chief. A single ship of the commercial squadron beat them off and punished them severely. The English in their sea encounters with the pirates were deficient in smartness, promptitude, and vigilance, but their courage, gunnery, and physical strength were dreaded by their foes; their capacity to tack and work large ships in action also inspired a salutary fear in their foes.

The *other* Angria, called Menagee, was a false friend and a weak foe. His perfidious insolence, cowardice, meanness, violence, and sometimes daring enterprise, were the subjects of perpetual complaint at Bombay. The grand diplomatist of the government and council, Captain Inchbird, was at last obliged to change the use of the tongue and the pen, for that of great guns and the sword; cruising about, he made prizes of Menagee's fishing-boats, grabs, and gallivats. Nevertheless, the latter seized the Island of Elephanta. When at last reduced to misfortune by his brother, he became the sycophant of the English, and humbled himself to beg their aid. They gave it, saved him from his enemies, and made him more an enemy than ever. There are men, says Charles Lever, who would betray you to the very men from whom you saved them. Such was Menagee Angria. It would strike a casual reader of the old documents which disclose the events of this period, that the English meddled too much, entangled themselves too frequently with weak alliances, and believed the promises of princes too often, if not too implicitly; a close study of their peculiar dangers, treatments, temptations, and deficiencies, however, extenuate such errors in some cases, and in others justify the resort to means which, in ignorance of all the peculiarities of the situation, would now be pronounced culpable.

Soon after the beginning of the second quarter of the century, the Rajah of Sattara became a very conspicuous person, although the vizier was virtually the sovereign, and the rajah little better than the prisoner of his ostensible servant. The rajah was regarded as the Mahratta, *par excellence*, the Sevajee of the day. Before his encroachments the Portuguese were steadily receding; fort after fort fell, factory after factory was plundered, and but for the protection of the English in some instances, a few years would have sufficed for the hordes of the rajah to sweep the Portuguese from the seaboard of Western India.

The English believed that an alliance with the Portuguese against the encroachments of this powerful enemy was their true policy, but as was commonly the case, their practice was time-serving and timid; they consumed in debate the time required for action, and were too late in the aid they offered, or proffered an amount of assistance so obviously below what was necessary, as to be equivalent to the refusal of help. Certainly, the Portuguese deserved nothing at their hands. The assistance rendered was, as might be expected, repaid with treachery. Morally, the Portuguese were no higher than the natives,—often lower. The impossibility of putting any faith in them, much influenced the procedure of the East India Company's agents. When the English really did render efficient and successful assistance, no gratitude or goodwill was evoked. The British were the objects of a deep, deadly, religious animosity, which no services could appease. This was well understood on both sides, and the impressions mutually produced by even acts of kindness on the part of the more fortunate English, did nothing to heal the feud.

The year 1739 was a memorable one for both nations, in consequence of the fall of Bassein. This city, the largest and richest oriental city ever built by the Portuguese, was besieged by the never-resting Mahrattas, whose determination to expel the Portuguese from India grew stronger as their efforts were crowned with success. The position of the city was one of considerable importance to the lords of Bombay; for, if a powerful power like that of the Mahrattas held it, they would by that means endanger the commerce and liberty of those who occupied Bombay. This may be seen, and also a glance at its present condition obtained, from the following well-drawn sketch:—"Situated at the northern extremity of that narrow arm of the sea which clasps the islands of Salsette and Bombay, is the ruined city of Bassein. It is a monument of departed greatness, and a love of splendour, as distinct from the love of money, for which the English were so famed. Its fertile soil still rewards the fortunate cultivator; but its streets are scenes of utter desolation, its buildings roofless, its tombs of lordly bishops and governors mouldering as the bones they conceal, and twisted roots struggle successfully to displace the stones of its massive walls. There, where a fanatically religious, irrationally proud, and coarsely dissipated people kept high festivals, led gorgeous pageants, toyed in wanton amours, and drowned the intellect of their species in Goanese arrack, or the heady wines of Oporto,—there silence and ruin sat supreme.

until at last a speculator's drastic energies have introduced the creaking mill, and jarring voices of native labourers. For years the tenantless city was itself a monument of the Indo-Portuguese race, and a fertile theme for the meditations of romantic visitors. 'It reminds me,' wrote Bishop Heber, 'of some story of enchantment which I had read in my childhood, and I could almost have expected to see the shades of its original inhabitants flitting about among the jungle which now grows in melancholy luxuriance in the courts and areas of churches, convents, and houses.' At the period of which we write, Bassein stood uninjured by an enemy, unshorn of its grandeur, having been for two centuries in undisturbed possession of the Portuguese, whose historian declares that it was the largest city which his countrymen had built in India, and comprehended the greatest extent of territory. Seven churches of an almost uniform style, had little to strike the observer, except their size and rather elegant façades; but surrounded, as they still are, by the ruins of tenements belonging to monastic orders, they testify that the Portuguese had a zeal for God, though not according to knowledge. The city was protected by a strong wall and ramparts, flanked with bastions, and so fearful were the inhabitants of a surprise, that for long no Mahratta had been permitted to pass a night within the gates.*

The Mahrattas laid siege to the place, which they conducted with bravery, skill, and persistence never before equalled by them. The Portuguese resisted with a bravery rarely equalled by any people. It seemed as if, in the hour of their decline, they were once more to appear glorious, like the flame of a decaying lamp, bursting brilliantly upwards before it totally expires. The city at last surrendered, when defence was no longer possible even by the wisest, strongest, and bravest, 800 officers and soldiers, as well as many inhabitants, having perished, the enemy having lost 5000 men, or, as the English at Bombay believed, 20,000. The besieged, during their arduous struggle, implored the assistance of the English, both as to skill and money. The advice tendered was impracticable; some money was lent on the security of six brass guns taken down from the defences. The acceptance of security by the English has been much censured; but when a former governor lent money for the defence of an ally, the company compelled him to refund it from his own purse, alleging that he did not hold money for political speculations, but for commercial purposes and the defence of Bombay, and he had no right to lend the

company's money without its order, however he might please to act with his own. The acceptance of the guns as security, which ought to have been used for the defence, has been also charged against the English as an act of selfishness; but the guns had been previously removed from the defences, on the strange ground that the king would value them too highly for the governor to risk their injury, and for the additional strange reason that the hands and hearts of Portuguese were better defences than mere matter! The English, therefore, asked only for the security of guns which were not used, and were not intended to be employed against the enemy. Besides, at the very time the Portuguese were crying out for money to the English, without offering any adequate security, the Jesuit establishments of the city were rich, and refused to part with their plate and treasures. Some assistance was obtained from them, after the English declared their want of authority to lend the company's money; but even then it was bestowed with reluctance. Most of the troubles to which the Portuguese were exposed were either occasioned or aggravated by that ecclesiastical party: so infatuated were they, that when, a short time before the siege of Bassein, the Mahrattas were investing Tanna, and it became necessary, on the advice of the English engineers sent to assist, to break down all buildings which might impede the fire of the besieged, or offer cover to the foe, the members of the Jesuit order resisted, and successfully resisted, all attempts to comprise their property in the necessary demolitions, until the English, with a high hand, compelled the measure to be carried out. When Bassein fell, the English, acting within what they supposed to be the limits of their authority, sent a strong naval escort, and brought off the whole garrison and all the Portuguese civilians of the place, to the number of nearly 1000, who were fed in Bombay at the public expense. The guests behaved as badly as the hosts behaved generously. The Jesuits had undertaken to lend a certain sum for the payment of the troops, in order to enable the latter to purchase food and other requisites for prolonging the defence. Their reverences now refused to fulfil their promise, while the Portuguese soldiers were mutinous against their officers, and filled Bombay with tumult. Both parties agreed to use the English as referees. The governor and council decided against the Jesuits; but the fathers were not so willing to yield to a decision against themselves as to make a reference. It was necessary for the English to give hints that force must be employed to induce the Jesuits to fulfil their pledges and

* "Bassein, as it is and was: " *Bombay Quarterly*.

abide by the reference. The troubles of the English from their guests did not end there; broils and bloodshed constantly occurred among the Portuguese soldiers, who also wounded and robbed the inhabitants of Bombay, and it had become a serious consideration whether the council must not send this vile military rabble away, when the time arrived with the opportunity for their own withdrawal. They then refused to embark unless fresh arrears were paid to them; the English advanced the money to the Portuguese governor, a brave and magnanimous man.

The English were beset with importunities to assist other beleaguered Indo-Portuguese cities,—to lend money, without security, for their defence, while the Jesuit fathers were in possession of treasures which could only be wrung from them by force, in the service of a country which had loaded them with honours and riches, and was so devoted to them. They acted as men who owed no allegiance to the Portuguese crown, but whose service was due to a distinct power for whom their resources must be reserved, from whatever country derived. The remnant of the Portuguese were withdrawn from Bombay, by arrangements made by their own viceroy at Goa; but so absurdly defective were their plans that the drooping soldiers and civilians had to march a long way overland to Goa, and fight their way, leaving a third of their number slain or in the hands of the Mahrattas. The gallant governor of Bassein was made an exile and a beggar by his ungrateful country.

The English became now the protectors of their old enemies, and with much discomfort to themselves. They counselled the surrender to the Mahrattas of certain small forts which could not be defended, under a treaty securing peace to their other possessions. Had this not been done, either the Mahrattas or Angria would have taken them. It was with great difficulty, through the redoubtable diplomatist, Captain Inehbird, that the English persuaded the Mahrattas to act towards the Portuguese with any forbearance. When the arrangement was effected, the Jesuits refused to allow any portion of their property to come within the stipulated surrender, and preached so seditiously to the ignorant people, that an insurrection was raised. Fear of the Mahrattas, on the one hand, and the necessity of leaning upon the English, at last prevailed with the people, and the reverend fathers, after many protests and denunciations against Mahrattas, English, and Portuguese politicians, were obliged to give way. The English, whose pity was strongly moved by the sufferings of the Portuguese people, were made indignant and angry by the selfish, bigoted, unpatriotic,

and mad proceedings of the Jesuit fathers: they acted as if their minds, absorbed in one class of ideas, were unable to comprehend any other, however obviously justice, or the exigencies of circumstances, might demand calmness and good sense.

In this year of disaster to the Portuguese, the English sent a complimentary letter to the supposed head of all the Mabratta tribes, the Rajah of Sattara, by Captain Gordon; and another letter to the Peishwa, by the ubiquitous Captain Inehbird. These letters were full of compliments, while the private instructions of the envoys were full of intrigue and treachery. This the English justified by the fact that they had to deal with persons without honour or forbearance—that it was necessary, if possible, to fathom all their schemes, safety depending upon the result, and that such salutary and essential objects only could be obtained by playing a superior part to their adversaries in the game of finesse. It is scarcely necessary to add that a direct and manly part would have answered better all purposes that ought to have been entertained at all.

Captain Gordon proceeded to Sattara, and delivered his credentials to the rajah. The captain was charmed with the magnificent scenery of the Deccan, which was not known at Bombay, and which in the appropriate place has been described in this work. Gordon's object was penetrated by a son of Bajee Rao; but nevertheless, it was impossible for the young man to make so sure of the conclusion to which he had come, as would enable him to act in any way against the company's representative. On his return, Captain Gordon had an interview with the Peishwa himself at Poonah, which city was then enriched by the plunder of Southern, Central, and Western India, and by the commerce which was created by the residence of the English at Bombay. Gordon fancied that the Peishwa against whom he was intriguing was not unfriendly to the English, and that within the whole region which was traversed by the envoy the English were popular. This arose from an impression that, as compared with the Portuguese, they were a people of religious toleration; as compared with the Dutch, they were conciliatory and polite to native powers; their demand for the products of the looms of Poonah made them very popular with the weaving population of the city and populous country around; and their possessions in India were of a character to command respect from those who held power and success in reverence. At Surat, Bombay, Tellicherry, Madras, and on the Hoogly the English were strong. At Surat they had no territory

except the little ground connected with the factory, but most of the merchants were their debtors. They did not, like the French, settle there, and stay long enough to incur large debts, and then flee to other places, in order to make them the scene of similar dishonesty. Bajee Rao, whose word was law from the foot of the Rajah of Sattara's throne to the remotest bounds of Mahratta incursions, respected the English for the firm way in which they had kept their footing, and their probity in payment. The rajah thought the English a good sort of people; Bajee Rao, who really possessed the power of the rajah, thought them useful; the citizens of the great city of Poonah almost deemed them necessary. Each of these tribunals pronounced a favourable verdict, and speculated after its own way as to the future. The people of Poonah wished for larger orders for their beautiful fabrics, and looked to the English to obtain them. Bajee Rao considered them as "the balance of power," and the most reliable commercial people who traded with the peninsula, and a nation not to be intimidated, nor lightly to be provoked in war; the poor rajah considered them clever and rich, and begged them to send him presents of "pigeons and turkeys, and European fowls and birds." It does not appear that Captain Gordon effected any object contemplated by his mission, but he made some blunders in the attempt to conceal his object, brought back a great deal of useful information, political and commercial, preserved accurate and written detail of what he saw and heard, and was probably the most economical envoy ever sent out by the East India Company from any of its presidential capitals.

Captain Inchebird's mission was to the Mahratta at Bassein. He was met by the general there, who, however, demanded as a preliminary the payment of a certain sum. It does not appear plain whether this demand was for tribute or a simple piece of extortion; the captain however refused, and neither blandishments nor menaces could induce him to give any money. He boldly replied that his country submitted to no impositions, which, however, was a barefaced untruth, as the policy of the company always was to buy off, by money payments, the enemies by which they were surrounded, so long as doing so could be made to comport with profitable trade. Inchebird discovered that the Mahratta chiefs were all well acquainted, quite as well as he was, with the objects for which Captain Gordon had been sent to Sattara. It was obvious from this circumstance that the company's officers were in some cases unfaithful, or that the president and council of

Bombay were surrounded by spies and traitors in the persons of their confidential native employés. Inchebird was a man well fitted for his office; he extricated himself from the difficulties and dangers with which the penetration of the Mahrattas, of the double game his employers were playing, had thus unexpectedly beset him. He even succeeded in blinding his astute interrogators, and persuading them that their interests lay in alliance with the English, or at all events, in a material obligation of peaceful and commercial intercourse. His mission terminated much to his own credit by arranging the terms of a treaty, dated the 12th of July, 1739, which was ratified at Bombay. According to this, the Peishwa conceded to the English free trade in his dominions. The contracting parties mutually engaged that debtors endeavouring to evade their responsibilities should be either delivered up, or compelled to pay all that was due; that runaway slaves should be seized and restored to their masters; that if the vessels of one power should be driven by stress of weather into the ports of the other, assistance should be rendered them; and that such vessels as were wrecked on the coast should be sold, one-half the proceeds of sale being paid to the owner, the other half to the government on whose coast the wreck might be thrown.*

Soon after these transactions, Bombay was filled with consternation by "wars and rumours of wars," in which these terrible Mahrattas had the chief part. Preparations were making for enterprises which were variously interpreted, but the terrified inhabitants of Bombay believed that for an invasion of their island, the gathering together of arms and men, and ships, on various points, was intended. Spies or merchants made known that Poonah was a focus of military preparation; and cannon foundries were at work on a large scale, producing guns and mortars of larger calibre and better manufacture than had been known among the native powers of India. Many of the people of Bombay buried their valuables or fled. The president was afraid to send away the ships of war as convoys with the merchantmen, lest the Mahrattas from Salsette or Bassein should make a descent. Such ships as went without convoys were captured by some one of the half-dozen of distinct piratical powers which made these seas a terror to the unprotected merchant. When the convoys were sent, indications of a sudden attack appeared, which increased until the return of the naval squadron afforded protection; the

* "The First Wars and Treaties of the Western Presidency:" *Bombay Quarterly Review*.

people of Bombay all the while living in the utmost consternation. Matters assumed a condition of alarm and uncertainty as bad as had ever been experienced since the English came into possession of it.

On the 9th of November, 1739, while Bombay was thus overcast with gloom, a storm burst over the coasts of South Western India, such as had not been known to living men. Three of the company's largest and best armed ships, commanded by three of their ablest and bravest officers, foundered, and all on board perished. When the terrible tidings reached the agitated community of Bombay, fear struck every soul, and the belief universally prevailed that the days of prosperity in Bombay were numbered. The place was at the mercy of strong and powerful enemies.

Their fear was followed by what appeared to be a foretaste of their fate. Sumbhagee Angria, their old and malignant enemy, sallied forth, swept the harbour of Bombay of the fishing-boats then upon its waters, and made captives eighty-four men of their crews.

In this state of suspense, the factors, garrison, and community of Bombay must be left for a while, until some notice is taken of other portions of Western India, where British interests sustained the pressure of the times, and where the condition of affairs exercised some influence upon the fortunes of Bombay. As in a chain, the weakness of some links changes the power of the whole concatenation, however strong the other links with which the weaker are connected, so it was with the chain of forts and stations where the English now transacted their business. These forts and stations were as grappling irons, which were fixed to the great prize which the English adventurers were to board and capture and keep for ever. However unconscious the English were of their actual relation to the country, as it regarded the political action of their power upon it, and the working of those natural laws in the moral government of God, by which nations affect nations in the various contiguities into which they are brought, it is not now difficult to see how these laws were at work, and how consistent, consecutive, and ramified the influences which were gradually consolidating English power. The very seas and storms which tossed the bark of English fortunes, bore it in safety over the shoals which lay in its course, and against which, in calmer seas, it might, probably, have been made a wreck.

Tellicherry was a very important station commercially and politically. After Bombay, it was the most important position, in every

respect, which the English occupied in Western India during the first half of the eighteenth century. It was so much thought of by the directory at home, that a chaplain was assigned to it, a privilege accorded only to Bombay and Tellicherry. When they received him, which was about this time, they did not know what to do with him. How to value his sacred ministration was not their first care, but what place they should assign to him in society! This was a question too puzzling for the intellect of the East India Company's servants at Tellicherry in those days, and they referred the doubtful investigation to the pellucid minds of their superiors—the president and council of Bombay. The latter were amazed and angry that such a question should be sent in the midst of “struggles for life,” whilst the Mahratta was knocking with his spear butt at every one's door. They perceived at once that the chaplain should take his place *after the factors!* Such was the esteem in which English commercial men in the service of the East India Company in the early part of the eighteenth century held professional men, and especially the members of the most sacred and learned of all professions. The English in India were not disposed in those days to worship their priests, and seemed more willing to do without them than the factors of one hundred years before.

With or without a chaplain—and whether or not the possessor of that office was treated as a scholar and a gentleman ought to have been, which seldom was the case in the company's factories in those days—Tellicherry grew rapidly in power and in relative importance. In relation to other English possessions it was of some note. The factory of Onore was subordinate to it. This lesser settlement was celebrated for the pepper which grew on the lowlands, and for the sandal wood which was native to the rocky heights in the neighbourhood. Onore itself acquired some considerable celebrity in the annals of after wars. Bajee Rao and his Mahrattas had plundered the country around, levying tribute upon the Carnatic far and wide, so that the inhabitants of Bednure and Balgee left their fields uncultivated, and caused the functions of the English factors at Onore for a time to be suspended. This occurred in 1727, but how long this state of alarm lasted, it is difficult to conjecture. Up to the year 1740, the fear of Mahratta freebooters depressed cultivation, and, consequently, trade in this district, more or less.

The general position and relation of Tellicherry to English interest, may be seen by the following brief and accurate description

by the author of *The First Wars and Treaties of the Western Presidency*:—

“The town of Tellicherry was built on a rising ground near the sea, in a country consisting, like all Malabar, of low hills and narrow valleys, and was in the petty kingdom of Colastry, though closely bordering on that of Cotiote. Moderate land-winds, with cool and refreshing breezes from the sea, made the climate celebrated amongst Europeans for its salubrity, and they were in the habit of styling Tellicherry the Montpellier of India. To the west of the town, on a neighbouring hill two hundred and twenty feet in height, the English had a large, oblong, ill-constructed, and worse situated fort, containing a place of worship for themselves, and also for Roman Catholics, a handsome residence for the chief, warehouses, offices, barracks, and other public buildings. Opposite the fort, at the distance of a mile from the land, lay the shipping, where the water varied in depth from ten to twelve fathoms; and between the fort and shipping, on some rocks about four hundred yards from the shore, a small battery was annually raised for protection of the trade, and as regularly removed before the monsoons set in. Overlooking both town and fort was a tower called Cockan Candy, and a redoubt called Codoley, which could only have been rendered capable of defence against a regular army by a large outlay of money. Several other outworks also had been built on the land side, a mile and a half to the southward, and close to the sea, was the fort of Moylan, belonging to the English, and at one time or another they raised fortifications on the small island of Dhurmapatam, two miles and a half north-north-west of Tellicherry, between the territories of Colastry and Cotiote; on the Island of Madacara, about three quarters of a mile from the shore, stood another small fortress, so situated as to command the entrance to the river of Billiapatam, about twenty-one miles from Tellicherry. Dhurmapatam, of which they obtained possession in 1734, was extremely fertile, so that the lowlands yielded two crops of grain annually, and from such as were near the sea, salt was procured. The chief and factors at first attempted to cultivate the ground themselves, but unsuccessfully, and afterwards, by letting portions on lease to a Captain Johnson, who much improved it, and to some natives, they raised an annual revenue of 13,880 fanams, in addition to 6,598 fanams which Tellicherry and Moylan yielded. The cultivation of the coffee plant, which was early introduced from Mocha, soon became highly remunerative. Dhurmapatam would

have afforded a much better site for the company's factory than Tellicherry, as it was encompassed by three rivers, had a bold front towards the sea, a fine sandy road for ships, and was not commanded by any neighbouring hills. No fewer than five fortified works were built upon it, two of which protected the entrance of the river. Near it, and in the sea, was Grove Island, two hundred and fifty feet in length, on which also was a battery. We should observe, however, that the English were only now commencing to raise these fortifications, and that in enumerating them all, we have a little anticipated events; but even in 1730 the monthly expenses of the garrison required to defend them all, amounted to seven thousand rupees, and the company groaned under such a burden, which in those days appeared almost insupportable.*

In relation to the native powers, Tellicherry was securely placed. The surrounding chiefs were comparatively feeble and always at feud. Some were bribed, others made friends by complimentary letters and titles, &c. The factors at Tellicherry were adepts in the diplomacy requisite in dealing with small rajahs; in no other part of India had the company's servants an opportunity of becoming so expert. It was in relation to other European, or at all events to one European power, more particularly, that Tellicherry was at this juncture most important. The French were now firmly settled in India (as a future chapter will show), and their ambition was boundless. Before the first half of the eighteenth century had run its course, the idea of making the whole peninsula a French conquest inspired the French, and especially their chief, the great Labourdonnais.

At Surat, the French were dishonest and insolent traders, and the patrons of Capuchin friars, whose chief work seemed to be the conversion of the English, among whom they made some converts, a matter likely enough, when the half Protestant character of the company's servants there is considered; their ignorance, indifference, and irreligion left them open to persuasive advocates of any plausible system, true or false. In 1722, the French were invited to settle in Malabar by the Boyanores chiefs, who, alarmed at the growing power of the English, were eager to find some strong European nation to place, as it were, between themselves and the dreaded encroachments. The French fixed upon Myhie, about three and a half miles from the English fort of Tellicherry. The position

* *Bombay Quarterly*. Forbes's *Oriental Memoirs*, and the Reports of the Tellicherry Factory, supply the materials for this description.

chosen was superior to the English station both in a sanitary and military point of view; but a quarrel with the Boyanores deprived the Gauls of a station which would have seriously menaced the English settlements in that quarter. As early as 1725, the French disappeared from Myhie. In a chapter devoted to the progress of the French East India Company, the reader had an opportunity of marking how, under the auspices of Richelieu, Colbert, Louis XIV., and other powerful persons, the French merchants had opportunity provided and means supplied to carry on schemes of enterprise in the East. Here it is only necessary to observe that while the French had been, for a considerable time, well established in their "Isle of France,"* so they had acquired a powerful position at Pondicherry, which was the seat of a French governor. This city was strongly built, well fortified, and populous without being encumbered with masses of helpless natives. When Labourdonnais arrived, it possessed more than 70,000 souls. The natives of the surrounding districts often fled to it for safety from the marauding Mahrattas. In 1734, Dumas was governor, and began to raise money with the effigy of the king of France. He was also proclaimed a Nawab of the empire, and three large and fertile districts of territory were assigned to him. In 1741, Dupleix arrived and found it a flourishing place, which it might have continued, if not ruined by his ambition.

The English factors at Tellicherry had the honour, if such it may be regarded, of fighting the first field action, at all events with artillery, against the native Indian powers. This event came about as follows:—The French, after having been driven from Myhie by the Boyanores, fled to Calicut, but were reinforced, and recaptured their old settlement. From that time they became more firmly fixed as very near neighbours of the English, and proved to be very unneighbourly, as they constantly incited the petty chiefs against them, and against one another, when, by so doing, the peace of the English might be endangered. On several occasions, native chiefs assembled ostensibly for hunting parties, and with the intention of trespassing upon the English territory, so as to lay foundation for a subsequent claim, on the principle that none hunt but on their own ground. This was a common prelude to some meditated land robbery in India, when one petty chief coveted the domains of another. The English, being apprised of this, occupied a neighbouring hill, upon which and in the vicinage of which the

trespass was expected to be made. At the time and in the manner the English had been led to believe, the great hunting party appeared, accompanied by a number of French military officers, evidently abetting the scheme and pointing out how it could most skilfully be accomplished. The English lay in ambush, and the moment the trespassers trod their ground, discharged their musketry upon them, bringing down many. The sham hunters being numerous and well armed, charged the hill; but the English, prepared against such an eventuality, had placed small cannon in position and swept off the intruders, who fled before this unexpected demonstration. The English, pursuing, skirmished in the plain, which was wooded, and kept up all day a dropping fire, in reply to that of their opponents, who were finally driven away. Next day, in greater numbers and better armed, believing that the English would suppose the danger over, the hunters returned; but the English had knowledge of their projects, and were prepared on all points to give them a warm reception. The second day was, in every respect, a repetition of the first, and the French and their native tools were much chagrined at the result. On a minor scale, these armed trespasses were practised for several years prior to 1730.

These occurrences prepared the native mind for intrigues and plunder, and led to alliances on the part of the French and English with neighbouring tribes; so that while the two great European nations were at peace with one another, they were indirectly at war in that part of Western India, through the media of the petty rajahs of the district. These ambushes and skirmishes may not be called field engagements, or dignified by the name of battles; but at length an opportunity arose for fighting a real battle against a native force.

In 1738-9 a war took place between the Malabarese and Canarese. The English took the part of the former, who, in a very cowardly manner, allowed their European ally to bear the brunt of the war. They acted as the Spaniards so frequently did in the wars waged under Moore, Wellington, Evans, and other generals on their behalf—kept at a distance until the fortune of battle was decided. The English, having inflicted defeats upon the Canarese, succeeded in intercepting their communications with their fortress of Modday. Rugonath, the Canarese general, made efforts to gain the fort, but the English dealt destruction to his forces. At last Captain Sterling, the English commander, permitted the unfortunate general and his beaten army to enter the place. The forbearance was not lost upon

* Better known as the Mauritius, the name given to it by the Dutch after their Prince of Orange.

the Canarese chief, who sought the protection and friendship of the English. During these operations, the Malabarese looked on from a distance, leaving the English to fight their battle.

Up to the close of the half century there were other skirmishes of a similar nature, in which the natives were equally deficient in courage and the English in any permanent advantage. The assistance which every enemy of England in India—at all events every native enemy—derived from the French, enabled them to harass the factories and put the factors to expense; it also laid the foundation of those fierce wars with France in which that power was so seriously humbled and injured.

The condition of the East India Company's factories in Malabar at the close of the half century was, in almost every case, one of trouble and danger, mainly from the intrigues and warlike proceedings of the French, although Dutch, Portuguese, and natives also did their part in making the last decade of the half century one of struggle and conflict to the company. The Dutch and English were engaged during this period in angry discussions, especially at Surat and Ajengo. The Dutch, very learned and much given to argument, in the management of which they excelled, set up claims to exclusive trade in those places, on the ground of old treaties with native princes granting them a monopoly. The English factors were by no means so well educated or expert at their pens as the Dutch; they were prompt to answer in their own direct way, that they were there by treaty with the sovereigns of the country, and would stay there until driven away by the strong hand. Which hand was the stronger the Dutch at that advanced period were not disposed to try.

The conduct of the Portuguese was as foolish as faithless. While begging help from the English in one direction, they were in another insolent, overbearing, and aggressive. The French quarrelled with all, made enemies of all, but especially provoked and showed hostility to the English. The natives kept no faith, but robbed Europeans and also one another as occasion offered, and forced the English at last, as did also the French, to be combative. The following is a brief but accurate view of the general condition of Western India in relation to the English at this time:—“Before the British aspired to make conquests in Western India, the whole coast between the harbour of Bombay and Aguada, near Goa, was in possession of pirates. The Angrias of Colaba, the Siddees of Rajapore, the Angrias of Gheria, the Malwans and Savvnts, were the ruling families, and claimed the districts

on the sea board from north to south, according to the order in which their names are here mentioned. To the south of Goa were the British stations of Carwar, Honawur, and Tellicherry; also the following forts, some of which are still to be traced on the map, but the names of many appear to be lost. First came the forts of Cauligur and Seevashwur belonging to the Rajah of Soonda; then Peergur and Simpigur belonging to the Portuguese; two forts, the names of which were unknown, in the district of Ancola, belonging to the Rajah of Soonda; Condammum Berum, Mirjaurgur, Rajamangur, now called Rajamundroog, Cuntim, Chnndauber, Honawur, Bockraw or Gursupa, Munky, Moodeshvur in the sea, Cundapoor, Bassanore, which included four forts, named respectively Ganjolly, Dugree, Cundapoor, and Cadnore, Barkoor, Cappy Carpary, Moolky, Malkem Patem in the sea, Mangalore, Coombla, Consaresat, Chundra-giri—all belonging to the Rajah of Bednore; Baikool, belonging to a Nair; Hoosdroog, belonging to the Rajah of Bednore; two forts of Nelleasaroon taken by the French from the Rajah of Bednore; Mally, Mallaly, Ramdilly, and Hunmuntgur, belonging to the French. The towns of Murjee and Bassanore, respectively to the north and south of Honawur, were, according to Forbes, supposed to be the Musiris and Barace of the ancients; but for this allocation there does not seem to have been sufficient reason. Near Mangalore was a celebrated temple of great antiquity called Kurkul, and a colossal image of the god Gomateshwur. A little way to the north of Tellicherry was Cananore, a sea-port, possessed by Ali Raja, petty ruler of the Maldives. Sailing from Tellicherry to Ajengo, the southernmost factory of the British, the voyager passed the French settlement of Myhie; then Sacrifice-Rock, so called because an English crew had been massacred there by pirates at the commencement of the century; Calicut, the decayed sea-port of the Zamorin, where there was no longer a British factory, but only an agent; Brinjan, where was an English banksal or storehouse; Chetwa, a Dutch settlement; then Cranganore, the seat of a Portuguese archbishopric until it fell into the hands of the Dutch; the town of Cochin, with its extensive fortifications constructed by the Portuguese, but afterwards also captured by the Dutch; Porca and Calicoulan, Dutch factories for the purchase of pepper and cassia; and then Coulan, another town with numerous churches and strong fortifications taken by the Dutch from the Portuguese. Sailing three leagues further, he passed Eddava, once a Danish factory, but where only a Portuguese agent of the

British then resided, and after three more leagues he arrived at Ajengo.*

"This account of the towns and forts on the coast, though not complete, is the best that can be drawn up with the aid of English records. It satisfies us that the inmates of the factories must have been dependent for their quiet and security not only on the dispositions of their native neighbours, but still more on the state of European politics. They were now so strong, that if they offended a native chief they suffered annoyance, not danger; but if Great Britain were involved in a war with France or Holland, an invasion from Myhie or Cochin might bring captivity, death, and ruin. In these factories, therefore, we find especial interest taken in the affairs of Europe, whilst the communications with the French and Dutch settlements are elaborate and important."†

At Tellicherry the alarm concerning a general war in Europe influenced the proceedings of the factors, both in the internal economy and external relations of the settlement. In the years 1740-1, this expectation was more general; and both the English and the French at Myhie were looking forth eagerly for orders to begin the war in India. England and France were at this time jealous, angry, and hostile; they were expending their resources on opposite sides of a struggle to which England had not yet committed herself as a principle. In 1744, however, the war broke forth, which, extending itself to India, produced such remarkable results. During the few years which intervened, the English and French in the neighbourhood of Tellicherry were close commercial competitors and rivals for native influence. It is here impossible to do more than refer to this as the key of many complications of the English with the natives; the detail must be reserved for chapters exclusively given to the conflicts of the English and French. The English had the best of the struggle which went on ere yet war was proclaimed; they were more successful in gaining influence over the natives—in securing the best of the pepper trade, and in creating annoyance to their adversaries: their action was more continuous, persevering, and steady, and their resolution more dogged and obstinate. The French were successful in gaining over one influential native, who was as dangerous to his friends as to his enemies; this was one Ali Raja, a rash, active, unprincipled Mohammedan zealot. He made various plundering expeditions to the

English island of Bhurmapatan, where he destroyed both property and life.

Frequently during the last decade of the first half of the eighteenth century the Mohammedans of Malabar were in a state of frenzied religious excitement. The Moplahs, a particular order of fanatics with whom the shedding of infidel blood was a profession, slaughtered many persons, the Portuguese priests whom they intensely hated suffering more particularly at their hands. These outrageous bigots conspired to murder all the European and Christian inhabitants of Malabar, but their plot was detected, and its authors punished or put to flight. The native chiefs professed to abhor these people and their acts, but were in reality delighted to hear of them, and extended protection to the assassins as widely as they dared. The French showed more dexterity in dealing with these persons than the English did; and, indeed, generally in suppressing native crime within their settlements, they were more skilful than their rivals; yet they maintained the forms of law, and dispensed substantial justice. However disposed at times the British and French were to mutual forbearance, the conduct of the native chiefs so complicated each as rendered it difficult to preserve a neutral attitude. If a native chief desired to prove his friendship for French he attacked the English; or if, in alliance with the latter, he molested the French. The French seldom had a war with a native chief that the English were not obliged either to aid the latter, or to mediate, so as to preserve the company's treaties and obligations. Thus matters continued at Tellicherry until the breaking out of the great French war.

Ajengo, situated lower down the coast than Tellicherry, was an old settlement of the English, and one of the pleasantest in India. It was built on the banks of a small river which flowed rapidly between wooded banks, winding its bright way deviously, and forming picturesque islets, which were crowned with the luxuriant verdure of a land of perpetual summer. The pretty town was surrounded with gardens glowing in the bright attire of tropical floral beauty. The defences were four bastions commanding the approaches by land and sea, and mounted thirty-two eighteen pounder guns. The sea approach was further protected by a battery of twenty guns. The defences were in bad condition during the last ten years of the half century. There was but one gunner, and he was both blind and insubordinate. The French ships of war came very often to look at Ajengo, and the King of Travancore came too often to ascertain whether, as the ally of England, it was necessary for him to exterminate the ex-

* *Diary of the Select Committee, Jan. 1758.* Forbes's *Oriental Memoirs*, vol. i. chaps. i. xi. xii; vol. ii. chap. xvi.

† *The East India Company's Factories in Malabar*, by the Editor of the *Bombay Quarterly*.

pected invaders. This man was a terror to the Dutch, over whom he obtained several victories, disastrous to their power in these parts. He had been the minister of the queen of Atringer, whose power all native princes respected; but he betrayed her, and usurped her authority. He became sovereign of a territory which ranged along one hundred and twenty miles of coast, southward from Cochin, but was of uncertain breadth; it, however, extended far into the interior, and comprised rich provinces. The annalist of the East India Company's factories in Malabar, gives the following curious account of the opinions, practices, and policy of this fierce bandit:—"So great was the quantity of blood shed in his wars, that, when smitten with temporary remorse, he was induced by Brahmans to make an atonement,—such an one as could only have occurred to the wild imaginations of orientals excited by superstition and avarice. With two hundred and fifty-six pounds of the purest gold was formed the image of a cow, into which, on the twenty-first of March, 1751, his majesty entered, and there remained three days. At the expiration of that time he made his exit, purified from all the crimes of his past life, and regenerate. Congratulatory presents were sent him from the Dutch and English chiefs of Cochin and Ajengo, and the cow being cut into small portions was distributed amongst the interested inventors of this method for the remission of sins. From that time the ceremony, though rare as the hecatombs of the Greeks and horse-sacrifices of Northern India, became national, and some years afterwards, when Forbes was residing in Travancore, the reigning sovereign raised himself by it from a low to a high caste—an instance of exaltation unparalleled in modern times, but not without precedents in Hindoo antiquity." This prince was as brave as he was superstitious—as warlike as he was tyrannical. To the British he was for a long course of years, not only courteous, but kind, carrying on trade with them, and proving true to his agreements.

The English undoubtedly assisted this fierce king in his wars with the Dutch, although they were unwilling to acknowledge it when challenged by the Dutch agents to account for their conduct. The Hollanders, as much to test the professed neutrality of their British neighbours as for sake of any advantage to be derived, requested permission to march through the company's territory to attack his belligerent majesty of Travancore, but the request was refused, although arms and ammunition reached his sable majesty from the English arsenal. It was, at all events, in some measure from this cause that the Dutch, in 1740-2, suffered so much, and sustained such

mortifying reverses. From causes which the English did not profess to know, the soldiers, and even officers, of the Batavian army deserted to the English, who refused to surrender them. When the fort of Colesly was lost by the Dutch, after the King of Travancore had maintained a long siege against it, proof was afforded that to the deserters harboured by the English, he owed his success. Still, when he offered to the English the exclusive trade of all the pepper and cloth produced in his dominions not required for its own consumption, if they would form an alliance offensive and defensive with him, they peremptorily refused. He found the French more accommodating. Notwithstanding this show of peace on the part of the British, the Dutch attributed their misfortunes to the factors of that nation, and threatened to drive the English out of the land: a more formidable power soon after essayed to do what the Dutch menaced, and was itself destroyed.

The King of Travancore, finding the French deceitful, and the English more bent on trade than war, refusing to be his ally for aggressive purposes, suddenly turned round and proposed an alliance with their enemies. The Dutch, who had strongly denounced the immorality of the English in cultivating the friendship of such a robber and assassin as the despot of Travancore, immediately accepted his alliance, and the proposal upon which it was based of driving all others out of India who disputed their combined supremacy. The king intended to use the Dutch for his own purposes, and then cast them away; they hoped to employ his resources for objects exclusively their own, and then turn upon him and subjugate him: the grand object of the alliance was, that each of the allies might find by it more facile means of robbing and destroying one another. Such was the political morality of India, native and European, at the close of the half century, the events of which are here related.

To the British in Ajengo, 1746 was a year of unusual peril. The topasses or native troops revolted, incited by a well-paid Mohammedan officer in their service. The mutiny was suppressed by means of sheer resolution on the part of the factors, and the ringleaders were punished. Thus early the English had warning of how little reliance was to be placed in native troops. In the field they had deserted on many occasions, in the garrison it was now found that they could be mutinous at a juncture when its safety rested upon their fidelity.

In the Ajengo diary of 1751 there is a curious record of how impossible it was for the English to hold any intercourse with the Portuguese without sustaining some injury.

The Portuguese bishop of Cochin was one Don Clement Joseph. He intrigued against the Dutch, who conquered that city, and they expelled him. The English had always some among their factors everywhere who leaned to the Church of Rome, or, at all events, considered it as the next best system to the Church of England. They were not such uncompromising Protestants as the citizens of the States-General. Don Joseph was welcomed with his priests and retinue to Ajengo, where shelter and succour were afforded him in his troubles, on the usual condition that he and his would be subject to the laws by which English citizens were bound. Don Joseph accepted the hospitalities sought so piteously and offered so generously, with protestations of gratitude and conformity to English interests. Scarcely had he been quietly located when he endeavoured to corrupt the English European soldiery, hoping to make proselytes of them, and thereby attach them to the Portuguese interests. This treacherous work was carried on so clandestinely that some success attended it before discovery prevented the further extension of mischief. The bishop was seized, and he and his associates were charged with acting as spies, and transmitting treasonable information as to the garrison, &c., to the Portuguese and French. They were placed as prisoners on board an English ship bound for Bombay. The bishop's intrigues were as active by sea as on land, and he laid a plan for the escape of his people, and for making the English captain its disloyal accessory. His schemes were again discovered, but no punishment was inflicted upon him, he was allowed to withdraw to a Portuguese settlement, taking with him his converts, whom he persuaded to transfer their allegiance from their own sovereign to that of Portugal. The English had had a very long experience of the Portuguese, their priests and superior clergy, and they might have concluded that their engagements would have been kept no longer than a chance of safety attended the violation, and that to pervert the minds of the troops, sow sedition, and betray the condition of the garrison to such of the rival powers as were Roman Catholic, would result, as a matter of course, for any indulgence accorded.

Dependent upon the government of Ajengo were several other factories on the Malabar coast, of less importance, but each of which had its exciting history. The French were the interlopers in these days, and stirred up the native rajahs against the minor as well as the major stations of the English traders. The author of *The East India Company's Factories in Malabar*, gives a sketch of these

minor stations so brief, yet so pertinent and complete, that it conveys all that need be written upon the subject, and nearly all the reader would desire to know of these lesser agencies:—"At Brinjan was a bankal or storehouse, the English resident of which was jealously watched by the native chief, and not being permitted to raise a flagstaff, was fain to hoist the British colours on a tree. Ruttera, where a century before the English had a small factory, had long since been deserted by them, and although it was within the limits of the company's privileges, the French attempted to open a trade there. The chief of Ajengo immediately dispatched a corporal and ten privates in a manchau, together with another well-manned and well-armed boat, to seize the interlopers; but on the native rajah declaring that if the French were molested he would raise the country and destroy every man of the detachment, they hastily retraced their steps. The French afterwards sent an agent with three chests of treasure to Coletche, where he succeeded in opening a warehouse. At Eddava, half-way between Ajengo and Coulan, the English had a warehouse, the business of which was transacted by a Portuguese linguist, who did a little for them in the pepper trade, and a great deal for himself by intriguing with the natives. At Cotiote, although close to Tellicherry, there resided an European agent from the factory of Ajengo. Richard Secker was appointed to this post, and his brief occupancy is one of many examples to prove what must have been the miseries of faint-hearted civilians at that time. His residence, a native hut with a roof of rotten leaves, was an insufficient protection from the weather, and during the heavy rains he was compelled to shift his bed from place to place in the vain hope of finding a dry spot of rest; his single room served for kitchen, parlour, and all; at night it was overrun by vermin, and to his horror he frequently found himself bitten by rats. He had not a single companion, and, unable to converse fluently in the native language, was excluded even from the barbarous society of the place. His spirits gave way, and instead of purchasing pepper, his time was taken up with indicting accounts of his wretchedness, and petitioning to be removed."

The smallest stations dependent upon Tellicherry were more important. Carwar had been an early settlement of the company, and since they had been obliged to close it in 1720, they made repeated efforts to re-establish themselves there. The French offered every opposition which indirect influence could wield. The Portuguese, at the very time the English were compassionating them

elsewhere—affording them succour in some instances, and hospitality in many—were malignantly hostile to the re-establishment of the English at Carwar, and soon after the second half of the eighteenth century commenced, suddenly, in a time of peace, while the English were persecuted by the natives, appeared with a fleet off the coast, landed troops, attacked the English without summon to surrender, or declaration of war, and easily carried by their overwhelming numbers the fort on Peer Hill, from which the English had no means to dislodge them. The only moral defence the Portuguese offered was one which, if valid, justified war and a general attack upon the English settlements, but could not mitigate the atrocity in a time of peace of a wanton and cowardly attack with an overpowering force upon a weak and almost defenceless station. They alleged, after the old fashion, that they were the original traders to the East; that the English were interlopers; that, moreover, the latter were not the friends of the Jesuits, and had insulted them. This last charge was untrue; the English having rather petted that order, until their treachery and arrogance in many cases, and their treason in all, compelled their punishment or expulsion from British settlements. Horcawur, and a few other small places, were established or resuscitated about 1750—some of them rather before that date, and others shortly after; and in connection with one or two of these, events occurred which were exciting to the English and had some influence on their future fortunes, but the narrative of which fall properly within the relation of the occurrences of the second half of the century.

Students of Indian history have been struck with the coarseness of the English factors as compared with the first British settlers in India, and in comparison also with contemporary factors of other nations. The Dutch had at all their stations the humanizing influence of chaplains, who were selected for their piety, learning, and zeal, and who much restrained their flocks, who were probably as much given as the English to the vices of the day and of human nature in their circumstances. The administration of justice was, amongst Dutch, Danes, and French, far superior to what it was among the English. The Dutch lawyers were frequently very eminent.

International, maritime, and commercial laws were studied by the Dutch merchants, who in general intelligence and respectability much surpassed the English. The French were dissolute, but their manners were cultivated. They were hardly less sincere in the conflict of commerce and diplomacy, but they were much more polite than their British rivals. The correspondence between the French and English extant, places our countrymen in a far inferior position in point of education, manners, and good behaviour; the composition and even spelling of the English letters are barbarous. Probably there are no public letters of that day in existence so low-bred, vulgar, and ill-written as those of the English factors of Tellicherry, in reply to communications courteous and very elegantly expressed. There was a low, ruffianly tone about the correspondence of that day which contrasts painfully with the letters of the English factors of one hundred years before. This allegation has been made in several of the Indian periodicals, and a writer in one of the quarterlies thus puts it:—"In the Diary of Ajengo we notice the last traces of that excessive vulgarity which disfigures the mediæval, much more than the most ancient, records of the company. The manuscript—written, it should be observed, not by a clerk, but by the European secretary himself, and signed by the chief and council—abounds with such passages as the following:—"The other boat was *a cruizing* to the southward; we found in her a letter from *a black fellow* the French *keeps* at Caletche;" 'the moors are *a preparing* an army;' 'five sail of men-of-war were *a fitting* out to *releive* Commodore Bennett;' 'the king is *a going* to a feast;' 'we *were let known*' of a certain event. Everywhere the natives are designated 'black fellows;' what we now call a native apothecary was with the factors 'a black doctor;' a regiment of sepoy was 'a black regiment,' or 'a black battalion,' and, using a curious form of elliptical expression, they always styled the letters of native correspondents 'black advices.' Indeed this epithet *black* was long afterwards applied to natives even in official documents, and, as Mill indignantly remarks, Sir Elijah Impey could find no better title than 'black agents' for the native magistrates and judges of India."

CHAPTER LXIV.

MADRAS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO THE BREAKING OUT OF HOSTILITIES WITH THE FRENCH IN 1744.

ALTHOUGH towards the close of the first half of the eighteenth century events were of magnitude and importance at Madras, it was the dullest portion of the company's settlements in India at the beginning of the century, and for many years after. The traders proceeded in their routine, buying and selling, sometimes quarrelling among themselves and oppressing one another, and sometimes enlivened by danger from without. The neighbourhood of Fort St. George was constantly a scene of contest amongst the native powers; but the factors had been long accustomed to that, and took no interest in the wars, and rumours of wars, which raged around them, except when their own interests and those of their employers were menaced.

The directions from London to the governor of Fort St. George were wise and peaceful; he was ordered on no account to mix himself up with the disputes of the petty rajahs in his vicinity, and to avoid all complications by political alliances, either with native princes or Europeans; while commercial covenants, based on mutual advantage, were to be sought and respected. That the directors were intent upon the peaceful and populous settlement of their territory around Fort St. George, is made evident by directions to promote the influx of industrious and quiet inhabitants, of whatever creed or race. The directors thus wrote to the council on this subject:—"What is of the last importance to us is, that the bounds be filled with useful inhabitants, and the only way to get and keep them is by a steady and constant, just and humane government, doing right to every one, and not suffering the voice of oppression to be heard, or so much as whispered in the streets. We hope Mr. Pitt has been careful, and will continue and persevere therein, which will be for his honour and our advantage. The increase of the inhabitants and of the revenues, and the lessening of the annual expense, will be to us the most convincing arguments of his good management, especially if thereto be added (as we expect) the due care of the investments."

There appears to have been well-organized local government. Charles Lockyer wrote, in 1711, "They have a mayor and aldermen, who exercise the same authority as in corporations in England. Quarrels, small debts, and other business of the meaner sort, are

decided by them at a court of six aldermen, held thrice a week in the town-hall. Black merchants commonly apply to this court, but Europeans usually seek favour of the governor. When any are not satisfied by the mayor's justice, they may appeal to a higher court, where for much money they have little law, with a great deal of formality. Here a judge allowed by the company presides, who on the report of a jury gives a final decree of European malefactors; they hang none but pirates, though formerly here have been men put to death for other crimes, whence I am apt to think that the governors had then great powers." He adds: "Lawyers are plenty, and as knowing as can be expected from broken linendrapers and other cracked tradesmen, who seek their fortunes here by their wits."* Notwithstanding this advantage, the administration of justice was considered by the directors in London to be so deficient in Madras, and in India generally, that in 1726 they represented to his Majesty George the First, "that there was great want at Madras, Fort William, and Bombay, of a proper and competent authority for the more speedy and effectual administering of justice in civil causes, and for the trying and punishing of capital and other criminal offences and misdemeanors."† In result of this representation, measures were taken by the English government, by which many improvements, and unfortunately some abuses, were introduced in the three presidencies; the chief alterations affected Bombay, but Madras was also influenced by these new arrangements.

In the correspondence between the directors and the factors, the chief concern seems to have been how best the expenses of the establishments, civil and military, could be effected. In order to accomplish this, and to maintain an attitude of increased independence as well, the governor refused the usual presents to the nabob, and his conduct met the approbation of the directors.

In 1725 permission from the court of directors was given to the governor to rebuild the silver mint, but it was strictly ordered that there should be "no charge of ornaments," but that the money should be expended on the "useful and substantial." Writing of

* Quoted in Kaye's *Administration of the East India Company*, part iii. chap. i.

† Auber's *Analysis*, p. 229.

"the east curtain at Fort St. David's, and the covering of the garden-house, and the Cudalore factory," the directors say—"It is a prodigious sum our buildings there and at Fort St. George have cost us, so that every motion for laying out more sounds harsh."

In 1732 a discussion ensued concerning the lowering of duties on trade, but the directors pleaded the state of finance at home against any reduction. This year, measures were taken to induce large numbers of native weavers to settle at Madras, which circumstance mainly arose from the urgent advice of the directors some years before, to "encourage the settlement of the natives within the bounds." Soon after, there was great scarcity of rice, and consequent famine; the president and council of Fort St. George used the most active, politic, and humane exertions to mitigate the horrors of the crisis, and earned very strong expressions of approbation from the directors.

The Mahrattas harassed the president and council. To give a detail of their proceedings would be to repeat incidents too similar to those which have been recorded in connection with affairs in the sister presidency of Bombay. The English acted with great spirit in repelling all incursions, and refusing all demands for tribute,* and the directors sus-

* Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*. This authority has been frequently quoted during the progress of this work, it is therefore appropriate while making our acknowledgements to its gifted author, to inform our readers of his decease while this work has been passing through the press. As few men have contributed more to a correct historical knowledge of Southern India than Mr. Duff, the reader will be interested in a short sketch of that author's own personal history. It is abridged from the *Banffshire Journal*, the editor of which, from his local connections, had peculiar sources of information as to the early life of Mr. Duff. His public services are well known to all persons acquainted with modern Indian history, as his writings are appreciated by all who are students of the history of the native races in India:—"The late Mr. J. C. Grant Duff was the eldest son of Mr. Grant, of Kincardine O'Neil, and was born in Banff on the 18th of July, 1789. One of the earliest recollections of his childhood was seeing his father dry before the fire the newspaper which contained the account of the execution of Louis XVI. (in 1793). Mr. Grant Duff was in the habit of telling many anecdotes of his early life in Banff, some of which were curiously illustrative of a state of things from which we are separated by half a century, which has produced more changes in the state of the country than any other in Scottish history. From Banff his mother removed to Aberdeen, where her son James was for some time at school, then for a longer period a student at Marischal College. It had been intended that he should proceed to India as a civil servant, but the arrangements which had been made towards this end fell through at the last moment, and, impatient of longer delay, the boy, then only sixteen years of age, accepted a cadetship and sailed for Bombay. After a short period of study at the cadet establishment he was ordered to join the Bombay Grenadiers. The first affair of impor-

tained their policy, lauded their measures, and incited their resolution.

The following letter of the 21st January, 1741, exemplifies this:—"The Mahrattas invading, overrunning, and plundering the Comorandel coast, give us a most sensible and deep concern, more especially as they come within our bounds, and sent you a most insulting message, tacked to an enormous and unheard-of demand, which you did well to

tance in which he was engaged was the storming of Maliah, a strongly fortified town, which was defended with the energy of despair by the crew of freebooters and cut-throats to whom it belonged. The party, commanded by Ensign Grant, then only nineteen years of age, was almost cut to pieces, and the adventures of their boy leader were of the most romantic description. It was not, however, till the close of the day's work that he had any idea of the desperate character of the service in which he had been engaged. 'This, I suppose,' he observed to an old officer, 'was mere child's play compared to Bhurtapore.' 'I doubt that,' answered his senior; 'the round shot at Bhurtapore were far worse than here, bat, for snipping, I think this beat it.' Mr. Grant's careful attention to his duties did not remain entirely unrewarded. He became Persian interpreter to his regiment, as well as adjutant, at a very early period, and long before he quitted the regular line of the service his position and influence were far greater than his rank in the army would naturally have indicated. At last his day of good fortune dawned. The keen eye of Mountstuart Elphinstone, then resident in Poona, saw in the young soldier an instrument fitted to his hand. He made Lieutenant Grant his assistant, in conjunction with Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Pottinger, and the friendship which then began between master and pupil, remained unbroken till the death of the latter. He had not been long attached to Mr. Elphinstone when the Peishwa threw off the mask which had for some time indifferently concealed his bitter hostility to the English name. The residency was taken, plundered, and burnt. The decisive fight at Khirkee poised the insolence of the treacherous Mahratta, and a long train of operations, in which the subject of this memoir was constantly employed, partly in a military and partly in a civil capacity, completed his overthrow. It now remained to settle the country, and to this object Mr. Elphinstone immediately addressed himself. The unwearying labours and great abilities of his young assistant were rewarded by the 'blue ribbon of Western India,' the Residency of Sattara. He was not quite thirty years of age when he was sent, with only one European companion and a body of native soldiery, into the middle of the great and warlike province, which was the centre of the Mahratta confederacy. His mission was to bring order out of chaos, civilization out of barbarism, peace and prosperity out of war and desolation. How he grappled with his great task, and how he succeeded in these benevolent objects it would be long to trace. . . . The long and enthusiastic labours of Captain Grant soon broke down a constitution of no ordinary strength, and, after five years, his physicians insisted on his return to Europe, not as the means of buying health, but as absolutely essential to his existence. About two years after his return to this country he succeeded to the estate of Eden, which had descended to his mother while he was absent in the East. It was upon this occasion that he assumed the name of Duff. Mr. Grant Duff's first task, after returning to England, was to complete his *History of the Mahrattas*, a work in three octavo volumes, for which he had collected the materials at vast

answer from the mouths of our cannon, and thereupon to put yourselves in the most defensible posture; we hope that long before now the coast is well rid of them, and that the country powers have been roused to defend their subjects' property against all such formidable enemies in future; however that may be, you must by no means become tributary to, or suffer contributions to be levied upon us, either by the Moors or Mahrattas." Notwithstanding this high commendation, the directors considered that peace might not have been made on such advantageous terms, if the wisdom and courage of the president and council had not been acted upon from home:—"You will see how much we approve of your measures in making peace with the Mahrattas, at the same time we perceive if it had not been for our express orders, you would not have judged so well for our interests, by being overcome with your false fears. This may intimate to you how acceptable it would have been to us, had you pursued the same measures with respect to all other Indian powers."

The dangers of the English at Madras now thickened fast, and great preparations were made to avert them, by keeping on terms with the natives and strengthening the fortifications. The progress of the French, already described as so annoying in the Bombay presidency, was still more alarming in that of Madras. The coast of Coromandel and that of Malabar were both within the schemes of French and native ambition, and both were plundered by pirates, whose activity never tired, and who emerged from every defeat with fresh vigour. The position of Madras exposed it on either side to the apprehension of enemies, and the state of fear in which its peaceable inhabitants generally lived at this period was such as to make "life in Madras" by no means enviable. The greatest embarrassment of the president and council was the correspondence of the directors, whose orders were frequently con-
 expense and with no small personal labour, amidst his public duties at Sattara. In 1825 he married the only child of Dr., afterwards Sir, Whitelaw Ainslie, the author of the *Materia Medica Indica*, and long well known in the scientific circles of Edinburgh and Paris. He then settled at Eden, and devoted himself for many years to improving—nay, we may almost say re-creating—his property. Till very recently we believe he never drew a farthing from the estate, but expended every year more than the entire income upon increasing its value and its desirability as a residence. Early in the year 1850 Mrs. Grant Duff succeeded to a small estate in Fifeshire, which had been long in her mother's family, whereupon her husband assumed the name and arms of Cunningham in addition to his own. Later in the same year the death of an uncle of Mrs. Grant Duff, the late Mr. Douglas Ainslie, added largely to the property of the family. The deceased leaves a daughter and two sons, the elder one member of parliament for the Elgin district of Burghs."

tradictory; and, while stimulating the factors and the garrison of Fort St. George to exertion, they blamed the smallest outlay, and even reduced, and, but for the urgent remonstrances of the president and council, would have still further lessened, the number of troops in Fort St. George, and the small maritime force kept off the coast. Thus they write at a period when, in Madras, men's minds were failing them from fear, in view of the vast interests at stake and the overwhelming number and power of their enemies:—"You will see that we are utterly averse to the keeping up of such a marine force as you require. We are unanimously of opinion the force we now allow you is sufficient for your safety and our purpose, which, in short, is our own defence and no further." This communication was made at a time when the directors were urging the president to send them all the information in their power about the French, and in a tone and style which betrayed great uneasiness. The directors would not lay out money for military purposes until their stations were on the verge of destruction. Everything—safety, honour, and their position in India, was risked rather than the expense of even a very moderate outlay for military purposes.

The president and council did not show such a mean and foolish jealousy of the military as was shown by the authorities at Bombay, and they consequently employed officers of intelligence in treating with the Mahrattas. For this, however, they received severe censure from the directors, who appear, at this juncture, to have entertained an intense jealousy, if not absolute dislike, of military men:—"We must also remark here our dissatisfaction at your employing none of our council in the important transactions with the Mahrattas and others, for notwithstanding any pretended superior capacities in those you did employ, we do not reckon military men proper judges of these affairs; but rather that they have a strong bias in their minds." The peace with the Mahrattas, which was concluded in July, 1739, between Mr. Law, governor of Bombay, on behalf of the company, and Bajee Rao, the first minister of "the most serene Son Rajah," did not secure peace to the English in Madras any more than in Bombay. Its fourteen articles were all violated, in one way or other, by the Mahrattas. Sometimes the authority of the Son Rajah was pleaded against that of the Bajee Rao, and often the agents of the latter, notwithstanding his well-known respect and admiration of the English, set at nought their obligations of duty to their master, and of peace to his ally.

The agents of Fort St. George seem to have taken considerable interest in the repression of the piracies of Angria, and the prevention of that tyrant's seizing the territory of the Siddees, for their letters to the directory at home, in 1735, acquaint their honours that Angria was "shut up," and in straits, in consequence of the measures taken against him. These representations do not well agree with such as were made by the council of Bombay, who knew Angria better than did that of Madras. Yet in the year following, the directors, in their general letter to Bengal, take for granted the representations made to them concerning Angria from Fort St. George, and base upon them expectations of economy.

At this time Madras was of considerable importance. Charles Lockyer, a little earlier, described it as "a port of the greatest consequence to the East India Company, for its strength, wealth, and great returns made yearly in calicoes and muslins." The fortifications were of considerable relative strength. The citadel had four bastions, and curtains, on which were mounted fifty-seven pieces of ordnance, one of which was a mortar. The main guard was the western, which was kept by "an officer's guard;" the eastern guard was maintained by a corporal's party. The English town was defended by batteries, crescents, and flankers; one hundred and fifty guns and three mortars were mounted here, and thirty-two guns on the outworks. Eight field pieces were ready to be employed around the fort as circumstances admitted or demanded.

The "Black City," where the natives resided, was beyond the fort, and surrounded with a brick wall of considerable height and great thickness. This separate town, as it virtually was, had a defence of artillery, and was well fortified. To the southward lay Magna Town, where the Mosullah boatmen lived, a hardy and venturesome race.

Beyond these fortified environs, the company held valuable territory. Within a circuit of about three miles, lay villages called Egmore, New Town, Old Garden, &c., which were rented out to merchants or farmers. Lockyer says, viewing the whole of the city and suburbs, that it had "good fortifications, plenty of guns, and much ammunition." He further describes it as a "bugbear of the Moors, and a sanctuary to the fortunate people living in it."

There was a large church in Madras, which had some pretensions to architectural taste, the interior decorated with curious carved work; it had very large windows, and a fine organ. There were no bells, as the Brahmins regarded them with certain superstitious feel-

ings which it was deemed judicious not to countenance. There was a public library, which was at least respectable; and beneath the room in which the books were placed, a school was held, which was free. It is curious that there was a loan society for poor persons connected with the church; certain funds not required for ecclesiastical purposes being lent out to poor, industrious persons, at the rate, then low, of seven per cent.

The internal economy of Madras was such that some alleged the English drew as much revenue from Madras as the Dutch from Batavia, which Lockyer thought improbable. The writer last referred to gives as interesting sketches of Madras early in the eighteenth century as the Rev. Mr. Anderson, in his work on Western India, has recently given of Snrat and Bombay up to that period from still earlier times. Writing of the revenues, he says:—"A seagate custom of £5 per cent., yielding 30,000 pagodas per annum; and a choultry, or land custom of two-and-a-half per cent. on cloth, provisions, and other goods brought in from the country, yielding 4000 pagodas. Anchorage and permit dues, licences for fishing, arrack and wine, tobacco and beetle-nut farms, mintage, &c., furnished various sums." The income of the various officials furnished no temptations to retain their posts against their conscience:—"The governor had £200 a-year, with a gratuity of 100; of the six councillors, the chief had £100 per annum; the others in proportion—£70, £50, and £40 per annum; six senior merchants had annual salaries of £40; two junior merchants, £30; five factors, £15; ten writers, £5; two chaplains, £100; one surgeon, £36; two "essay masters," £120; one judge, £100; and the attorney-general, 50 pagodas. Married men received from 5 to 10 pagodas per month, as diet money, according to their quality; inferior servants, dining at the general table, had no other allowance beyond their salaries than a very trifling sum for washing, and oil for lamps."* It is evident that the servants of the company could never have supported themselves at Madras, had it not been for their carrying on private traffic, which was as injurious to the interests of their employers, as the like practice was elsewhere.

There was no name so prominent in Madras, during the early part of the eighteenth century, as Mr. Thomas Pitt. This gentleman has been sometimes confounded with his cousin, a Mr. Pitt who first went to India as an "interloper," then became an agent of the new or English Company, and afterwards was

* Lockyer's *Trade of India*, p. 14.

known as "President" and "Consul Pitt." Mr. Thomas Pitt obtained celebrity for his prudence and good temper in the management of the affairs of the company in troublesome times. He was also made notorious by the possession of the celebrated "Pitt diamond." Captain Hamilton declared that it was obtained in a way not creditable. According to his account, a Mr. Glover saw it at Aroet, and induced the owner to offer it for sale to the English at Fort St. George, and that he placed in the owner's hand 3000 pagodas as a guarantee. The pledge was broken by Pitt, and the money forfeited by Glover. Much doubt has been thrown upon this story, as Hamilton was so thorough an asperser of the company and its servants; but on the other hand, Mr. Pitt's friends have never fairly accounted for his possession of this extraordinary gem.

The settlement of Madras, as well as those of Bombay and Surat, were troubled by Dutch fugitives and deserters, and by the insolent demands of those who made reclamation of them. The factors seem to have received all deserters—Dutch and French more particularly—who were disposed to serve in the ranks of the military. Some of these proved bad soldiers, and deserted again to some other power when opportunity served; but others, like many mercenaries in all nations, and in all times, were faithful to the service which they adopted, and proved good soldiers.

As the events connected with the Madras presidency during the portion of the eighteenth century which expired before the war broke out between the British and French settlements, were less striking than those which made up the same period in the eastern and western presidencies, the space required for their treatment is proportionably small; accordingly, some subjects not alone applicable to Madras, but as much so to either of the other presidencies, may, with propriety, obtain notice here. In a chapter devoted to commerce, the present way of doing business in India was stated and explained; in the early part of the eighteenth century, the mode was somewhat different, as were also the materials of trade. Then, especially at Madras, the products of the town were the grand subjects of export to England. The spice trade fell away during the eighteenth century, and so rapidly did the demand for spices fall in Europe, that the Dutch, who mainly relied upon it, were great sufferers. In some places, the Batavian commerce was ruined, and so quickly did the prosperity and resources of the Dutch East India Company vanish, that when England found herself

crossing swords with France in India, it was a matter of little account in the great contest what part the Dutch might take, or whether they should take any. The English, while they dealt largely in pepper, and considerably in cloves, were more desirous to obtain dye stuffs, and the products of the weaver's shuttle; and the decline of the demand for spice in Europe, did not therefore affect their commerce, except so far as it favoured it by removing the great spice merchants, the Dutch, from competition with the English in other matters. The swift decay of the resources of the Dutch prevented them from putting forth their energies in the departments of trade which flourished in the hands of the English; yet, at the beginning of the century, neither French nor British had a position of power, or a prospect of extensive and triumphant commerce, to be compared with the Hollanders.

The way in which commodities imported from Europe were disposed of at Madras and the cities of the other presidencies was by auction, the same mode as that adopted in London for the sale of oriental produce.

Previous to the breaking up of the Mogul empire the Europeans generally travelled some distance into the interior, or sent their goods thither by such reliable agency as they could find. There was then some protection, the chief danger being of plunder under the name of purchase, by the native governors of the Mogul. But when the empire was sinking step by step to dissolution, there was little protection for goods sent into the interior, and this branch of commerce, by which the factors had personally profited, became greatly reduced. The English found their treaties with the Mahrattas of great value, and although these were often violated, where territory was concerned, where ships were wrecked upon the coast, or where a chance of piracy was offered, yet they often secured the passage of goods by the hands of the native merchants to important marts and bazaars in cities far removed from the seaboard. At the very time the English at Calcutta were cutting the Mahratta ditch, to intercept the cavalry of Bajee Rao, the English, both at Madras and Bombay, were carrying on friendly intercourse, buying the products of the looms of Poonah, and sending thither, and all through the provinces of the Rajah of Sattara, the imports from England.

The agents of the company purchased the piece goods at the different cities where they were made; those agents were generally natives, as Europeans would have been in danger of being robbed, as indeed their native agents frequently were. When the goods

were brought to Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Surat, and other ports, they were deposited in warehouses situated within a certain defined, and generally fortified space, called the factory. It was necessary to arm and discipline the inmates of the factories, and to place the buildings in situations affording scope for defence, also to loop-hole the walls of the warehouses and residencies, and fix strong embrasures to support cannon, so that in case of any oppression on the part of native rulers, or incursion of predatory tribes, the trading depot of the company might be also the citadel of the traders. The mode of bringing the weaver's work to market was exceedingly complicated. The whole process has been thus described:—"The European functionary, who, in each district, is the head of as much business as it is supposed that he can superintend, has first his banyan, or native secretary, through whom the whole of the business is conducted; the banyan hires a species of broker, called a gomashlah, at so much a month: the gomashlah repairs to the aurung, or manufacturing town, which is assigned as his station, and there fixes upon a habitation, which he calls his *cutchery*: he is provided with a sufficient number of peons, a sort of armed servants, and *hircarahs*, messengers or letter carriers, by his employer; these he immediately dispatches about the place, to summon to him the dallals, *pycars*, and weavers: the dallals and *pycars* are two sets of brokers, of whom the *pycars* are the lowest, transacting the business of detail with the weavers; the dallals again transact business with the *pycars*: the gomashlah transacts with the dallals, the banyan with the gomashlah, and the company's European servant with the banyan. The company's servant is thus five removes from the workman; and it may easily be supposed that much collusion and trick, that much of fraud towards the company, and much of oppression towards the weaver, is the consequence of the obscurity which so much complication implies. Besides his banyan, there is attached to the European agent a *mohurrer*, or clerk, and a cash-keeper, with a sufficient allowance of peons and *hircarahs*. Along with the gomashlah is dispatched in the first instance as much money as suffices for the first advance to the weaver, that is, as suffices to purchase the materials, and to afford him subsistence during part, at least, of the time in which he is engaged with the work. The cloth, when made, is collected in a warehouse, adapted for the purpose, and called a *kottah*. Each piece is marked with the weaver's name; and when the whole is finished, or when it is convenient for the gomashlah, he *holds a kottah*, as the business is called, when

each piece is examined, the price fixed, and the money due upon it paid to the weaver. This last is the stage at which chiefly the injustice to the workman is said to take place; as he is then obliged to content himself with fifteen or twenty, or often thirty or forty per cent. less than his work would fetch in the market. This is a species of traffic which could not exist but where the rulers of the country were favourable to the dealer; as everything, however, which increased the productive powers of the labourers added directly in India to the income of the rulers, their protection was but seldom denied."*

The way in which the government of the factory and of the territory at Madras was conducted in the first half of the eighteenth century was, with some slight variations, identical with that of Calcutta, and of Bombay. At that time each presidency was independent of the other. Up to the year 1707, the business of Calcutta had been diverted from Fort St. George, but after that date it was separate and independent. Each presidency corresponded directly with the directors in London. The governing body, or president and council, was composed of a body seldom less in number than nine, seldom more than twelve, including the president, according to the will of the directors in London. The members of council were selected from the superior civil servants, but occasionally, especially at Bombay, the chief military officer sat in council. Business was decided by majorities. The members of council also served in subordinate offices, indeed if they had not done so they could hardly have subsisted, so small were their salaries, and so profitless their honours. Doctor Hayman Wilson writes as accurately as strongly when he thus describes the condition of these men:—"There were no lucrative offices, for many years, under the company's administration. For some time, the salaries of the chiefs of Bombay and Fort St. George, did not exceed £300 per annum, and those of merchants and factors were but £30 and £20 per annum. Even as late as the acquisition of all real power in Bengal, the salary of a councillor was £250 per annum; of a factor, £140; of a writer, as then lately increased, £130. The advantages made by the company's servants, arose from their engaging in the internal trade, and also in the trade by sea to all eastern ports north of the equator, except Tonquin and Formosa. In either of those branches of trade, much depended upon convenience of situation; and, so far, the company's servants were dependent upon the principal, with whom it rested where to employ

* Mill, vol. iii. lib. iv. cap. 1.

them. The official emoluments attached to any situation, were, in all cases, of small amount."

When members of the council were appointed to be chiefs of subordinate factories, they still retained their place in the council, and gave their voice in its affairs; this regulation, although a personal protection to the chiefs, and a support to their authority, was also a shield to their misdoings, especially when their private interests obtained more of their time and zeal than the service of the company. In fact, it was difficult, almost impossible, for a subordinate to obtain justice from an oppressive superior, or for a man not a member of council to make himself heard, and cause his wrongs to be redressed by the governing body. The president generally overruled the council, and well-nigh did as he pleased; and in few places during the history of oppression in this world, have men been more hopelessly subject to tyrannical caprice, than in the factories of the Honourable East India Company. Mill, quoting the select report of the committee of 1783, thus describes the functionaries and their investment with office and authority:—"The president was the organ of correspondence, by letter, or otherwise, with the country powers. It rested with him to communicate to the council the account of what he thus transacted, at any time, and in any form, which he deemed expedient; and from this no slight accession to his power was derived. The several denominations of the company's servants in

India were, writers, factors, junior merchants, and senior merchants; the business of the writers, as the term, in some degree, imports, was that of clerking, with the inferior details of commerce; and when dominion succeeded, of government. In the capacity of writers they remained during five years. The first promotion was to the rank of factor; the next to that of junior merchant; in each of which the period of service was three years. After this extent of service, they became senior merchants; and out of the class of senior merchants were taken, by seniority, the members of the council, and when no particular appointment interfered, even the presidents themselves."

For one hundred years Madras had been the chief settlement of the British on the coast of Coromandel, and notwithstanding the rapid rise of Calcutta from the year 1717, it still retained great influence in India, and was famous for its population and riches all over the East. The extent of territory of the English extended at least five miles along the coast. The treaty obtained by the Calcutta embassy in 1715-17, had given three villages to Madras, which were of value for their population and the fertility of the circumjacent country. Not less than a quarter of a million of inhabitants occupied the company's boundaries and owned its authority when the clarion of war was sounded, and Madras became a sharer and a sufferer in the grand tournament of France and England for ascendancy on the shores and plains of India.

CHAPTER LXV.

EVENTS IN BENGAL FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY TO THE BREAKING OUT OF HOSTILITIES WITH FRANCE IN 1744.

THE settlements in Bengal had steadily acquired importance during the closing years of the seventeenth and the opening years of the eighteenth centuries. The most notable thing in connection with that settlement during the early part of the eighteenth century, was an embassy sent to the Emperor Ferokshere, then at Delhi, in 1715. Two of the most intelligent factors of the presidency were sent on this mission, which proved to be one of great results to the company. Several letters of these worthy envoys are still in existence, and deserve to be classed with the "curiosities of literature." The first of these communications which gives any detail, is directed to the authorities at Calcutta, and is as follows:—"Our last to

your honours, &c., was from Agra the 24th ultimo, which place we left the same day. We passed through the country of the Jaats with success, not meeting with much trouble, except that once in the night, rogues came on our camp, but being repulsed three times, they left us. We were met on the 3rd July by Padre Stephanus bringing two Scerpaws, which were received with the usual ceremony by John Surman and Coja Surpaud. The 4th, we arrived at Barrapoola, three coss from the city, sending the padre before to prepare our reception, that if possible we might visit the king the first day, even before we went to the house which was got for us. Accordingly, the 7th, in the morning, we made our

entry with very good order, there being sent a munsudbar of two thousand munsud, with about two hundred horse and peons to meet us, bringing likewise two elephants and flags. About the middle of the city we were met by Synd Sallabut Caun Behauder, and were by him conducted to the palace, where we waited till about twelve o'clock, till the king came out, before which time we met with Caundora Behauder, who received us very civilly, assuring us of his protection and good services. We prepared for our first present, viz., one hundred gold mohurs; the table-clock set with precious stones; the unicorn's horn; the gold scrutoire bought from Tenny Caun; the large piece of ambergris; the afo, and chel-lumche manilla work; and the map of the world; these, with the honourable the governor's letter, were presented, every one holding something in his hand as usual. Considering the great pomp and state of the kings of Hindostan, we were very well received. On our arrival at our house, we were entertained by Synd Sallabut Caun, sufficient both for us and our people; in the evening he visited us again, and stayed about two hours. The great favour Caundora is in with the king, gives us hopes of success in this undertaking; he assures us of his protection, and says the king has promised us very great favours. We have received orders, first, to visit Caundora as our patron, after which we shall be ordered to visit the grand Vizier, and other Omrahs. We would have avoided this if we could, fearing to disoblige the Vizier; but finding it not feasible, rather than disoblige one who has been so serviceable, and by whose means we expect to obtain our desires, we comply with it. —*Delhi, or Shah Jehanabad, July 8th, 1715.* In another letter "their honours" are informed that the emperor had left Delhi, not considering that he had as much authority in his capital under the circumstances in which he fancied himself, as he would in some province of his empire. His majesty, under the pretence of worshipping at a peculiarly sanctified place, twenty coss from Delhi, got clear of the entanglements which environed him at his capital; and although the Omrahs petitioned him to return, and he moved round the city eight or ten days, he finally located himself at a distance, and thence issued his orders. The ambassadors followed him, and experienced many and great difficulties in the performance of their arduous task, not the least of which was the neglect of their superiors, who left them without renittances until they were reduced to the greatest necessities, and at last respectfully wrote, dated *twenty coss from Delhi, 4th August, 1715*, that unless they received supplies of money they

could not go on with their business, and intimated that if not provided with means of performing the duties imposed upon them they must sink to the last straits. It is not recorded what reply "their honours" made to their ambassadors in distress, but it is to be supposed some money was sent, for they "went on with their business." It is impossible for any student of the company's proceedings at this period, not to be struck with the mean and despicable parsimony which was constantly exhibited not only without real economy, but causing in the long run very extensive loss. Yet, besides this unjust and greedy penuriousness, might be frequently seen a shameful extravagance where the greater personages were concerned.

In a letter dated Delhi, Nov. 3, 1715, the envoys inform their employers of the dangerous illness of his majesty, and the success which attended the efforts of a medical man who accompanied them in restoring his health. The native physicians had been called in without avail, and his majesty was reduced to much distress of mind, as his marriage to a princess of renowned beauty was to have taken place at that time, and he was extremely impatient of its postponement. When all hope of recovery through the usual court physicians had failed, Mr. Hamilton, the English surgeon, was invited to prescribe for his majesty. The disease was happily one within the management of the faculty, and in a very few days the emperor was pronounced convalescent. Coja Surpaud, the native gentleman under whose auspices the envoys had travelled and been presented to court, was thanked by the emperor, and many encomiums upon the wisdom and science of his friends the English were used by the Mogul.

Again, on December 7th, the ambassadors directed a letter from Delhi to their superiors at Calcutta, in which a most curious account is given of the complete recovery of the emperor, and his gratitude to Mr. Hamilton. The following extract cannot fail deeply to interest the reader:—"The king was pleased the 30th to give him in public, viz. a vest, a culgee set with precious stones, two diamond rings, an elephant, horse, and 5000 rupees, besides ordering, at the same time, all his small instruments to be made in gold, viz. gold buttons for coat, waistcoat, and breeches, set with jewels: the same day Coja Surpaud received an elephant and vest as a reward for his attendance on this occasion. Monsieur Mart was to have received a reward the same day with Mr. Hamilton; but considering it was not for the credit of our nation to have any one joined with him, especially since he had no hand in the business, we got his reward

deferred till three days afterwards, when he had a vest, an elephant, and 1000 rupees; a favour purely owing to his majesty's generosity, and because he was his servant. We have esteemed this a particular happiness, and hope it will prove ominous to the success of our affairs, it being the only thing that detained us hitherto from delivering our general petition; so pursuant to the orders we received from Caundora, the king's recovery was succeeded by the giving in the remainder of our present (reserving a small part only till the ceremony of his marriage should be over), and then delivered our petition to Caundora, by his means to be introduced to his majesty. Synd Syllabut Caun, who has all along managed our affairs under Caundora, being at that instant and some time before much indisposed, we were obliged to carry it ourselves, without taking care to have his recommendation annexed. Since the delivery, Coja Surpaud has been frequently with Caundora, to remind him of introducing it to his majesty, but has always been informed no business can go forward till the solemnization of the king's wedding is over, when he has promised a speedy dispatch. All offices have been shut up for some days, and all business in the kingdom must naturally subside to this approaching ceremony; so that we cannot repine at the delay."

The result of the singular providence which attended this embassy was the issue of a firman (a phirmaud), before the close of the year 1715, conferring additional privileges upon the company, and giving far better security for freedom of commerce than any previous firman. When the directors at home heard of this great success, new arrangements were made conferring upon their servants at Calcutta new dignity and privilege. By anticipation Bengal has been called a presidency; but it was not until 1707 that it was so ranked, and not until after the events at Delhi turned to such prosperous account for his employers by the patriotic and gifted Hamilton, that Calcutta was regarded by any as the probable seat of Indian government, the president and council of which should one day preside over the affairs of India, and be only responsible to the directors in London.

The success of the ambassadors excited the envy of the imperial politicians, as that of Mr. Hamilton excited the envy of the native medical practitioners. A train of events was laid by the jealousy thus caused, which issued in war, to both natives and English, and in defeat, disaster, and subjugation to the former, as in victory and conquest to the latter.

Jaffer Khan (or, as some write it, Jaffier Chaun) held the government of Bengal under

his imperial majesty. The office was not only one of great honour, but of power almost sovereign, and the influence of Jaffer at the imperial court was paramount. His conduct towards the English was unjust and cruel. He was determined, if possible, to render nugatory the privileges of the imperial firman, without involving himself in the displeasure of the Mogul by a direct refusal to put in force his orders. Before the ambassadors left Delhi they had some knowledge of this state of affairs, and on their return at Cossimbazar, they addressed the council at Calcutta on the subject, with whom they had previously corresponded, as to what was best to be done so as to yield nothing to the khan and in no respect offend the emperor.

"Cossimbazar, August 15, 1717.

"We are entirely of your opinion that you ought not to acquiesce in Jaffer Cawn's (Khan) refusing obedience to the king's royal orders, nor sit quiet under his disobedience of them; we never entertained such imaginations, but rather that he ought to be compelled to it by such means as your honour thinks best. You are sensible that no black servant in the country dare speak with that peremptoriness to so great a man as Jaffer Cawn, as sometimes the nature of our affairs require, on which consideration we ourselves went in person to him, and showed him the phirmaud, and demanded the free use of the mint as before advised. Mr. Feake disputed the point himself with Jaffer Cawn in the Hindostan language, face to face, Eckeram Cawn Duan and others being present, with ten or a dozen munsuhdars and several of the matsuddies, in a public court, who were all eye and ear witnesses to the smart and warm replies Mr. Feake at last made him: the whole durbar was surprised, and several whispered to Coja Delaun with a seeming fear in what the dispute might end. Jaffer Cawn remained ailent for some time, and then ordered beetle to be brought, and dispatched us with a few sweetening words, that he would rest satisfied he should not be our enemy, but see what was to be done, and the like, which is a customary cajole he uses to get rid of company he don't like, as was plain he did not ours, for he never had so much said to his face since he has been a duan or snbah, nor does he usually give any one such an opportunity. Nothing that was necessary to be said or done remained, but giving the duhoy, which experience has taught us is of no value with Jaffer Cawn, who suffers nothing to be sent to court without being read and approved by him: those officers dare as well eat fire, as send anything unknown to him. Our vakcel, though an elderly man, and possibly not so brisk as some others, yet he has the character of the boldest vakcel in this durbar; he once before did give the duhoy, and shall do it again, if your honour, &c., please to give orders; but we crave leave to offer some reasons we have against doing it at this juncture."

The khan was incensed against the bold spoken Englishmen, conceived against their nation an intense hatred, and determined to thwart their interests at all risks. The English counterplotted his excellency with considerable skill, and were well supported in their efforts by wily natives, whose diplomatic temper caused them to enter with zest into the cause of the English, when once their interests

were engaged. Curious disclosures were made, and prompt information given to the English, so that the actions of the khan were well spied; but the conduct of the superior officers at Calcutta was neither so skilful, nor active—so bold, nor yet so cautious, as that of their subordinates, whose duty it was to take part in these transactions. The success of the English in this most important of their diplomatic affairs, at all events previous to the great French war, has been attributed to a bribe opportunely given to a eunuch in the service of either the vizier or the emperor, and constantly in attendance upon the darbar. Mill and Wilson sanction this opinion, and give the following account of the mode by which they ultimately secured the concessions sought—the abuse on the part of the English traders of those privileges, the decisive suppression by the native government of Bengal of these abuses, the consequent enterprises of the English in the coasting trade, and the rapid development of Calcutta, its commerce, and its power as the result:—"The power of the vizier could defeat the grants of the emperor himself; and he disputed the principal articles. Repeated applications were made to the emperor, and at last the vizier gave way; when mandates were issued confirming all the privileges for which the petition had prayed. To the disappointment, however, and grief of the ambassadors, the mandates were not under the seals of the emperor, but only those of the vizier, the authority of which the distant viceroys would be sure to dispute. It was resolved to remonstrate, how delicate soever the ground on which they must tread; and to solicit mandates to which the highest authority should be attached. It was now the month of April, 1716, when the emperor, at the head of an expedition against the Sikhs, began his march towards Lahore. No choice remained but to follow the camp. The campaign was tedious. It heightened the dissensions between the favourites of the emperor and the vizier; the ambassadors found their difficulties increased; and contemplated a long, and probably a fruitless negotiation, when they were advised to bribe a favourite eunuch in the seraglio. No sooner was the money paid than the vizier himself appeared eager to accomplish their designs, and the patents were issued under the highest authority. There was a secret, of which the eunuch had made his advantage. The factory of Surat, having lately been oppressed by the Mogul governor and officers, had been withdrawn by the presidency of Bombay, as not worth maintaining. It was recollected by the Moguls, that, in consequence of oppression, the factory of Surat had once before been withdrawn; immediately

after which an English fleet had appeared; had swept the sea of Mogul ships, and inflicted a deep wound upon the Mogul treasury. A similar visitation was now regarded as a certain consequence; and, as many valuable ships of the Moguls were at sea, the event was deprecated with proportional ardour. This intelligence was transmitted to the eunuch, by his friend the viceroy of Gujerat. The eunuch knew what effect it would produce upon the mind of the vizier; obtained his bribe from the English: and then communicated to the vizier the expectation prevalent in Gujerat of a hostile visit from an English fleet. The vizier hastened to prevent such a calamity by granting satisfaction. The patents were dispatched; and the ambassadors took leave of the emperor in the month of July, 1717, two years after their arrival. The mandates in favour of the company produced their full effect in Gujerat and the Deccan: but in Bengal, where the most important privileges were conceded, the subahdar, or nabob as he was called by the English, had power to impede their operations. The thirty-seven towns which the company had obtained leave to purchase, would have given them a district extending ten miles from Calcutta on each side of the river Hoogly; where a number of weavers, subject to their own jurisdiction, might have been established. The viceroy ventured not directly to oppose the operation of an imperial mandate; but his authority was sufficient to deter the holders of the land from disposing of it to the company; and the most important of the advantages aimed at by the embassy was thus prevented. The nabob, however, disputed not the authority of the president's dustucks, a species of passport which entitled the merchandise to pass from duty, stoppage, or inspection; and this immunity, from which the other European traders were excluded, promoted the vent of the company's goods. The trade of the company's servants occasioned another dispute. Besides the business which the factors and agents of the company were engaged to perform on the company's account, they had been allowed to carry on an independent traffic of their own, for their own profit. Every man had in this manner a double occupation and pursuit; one for the benefit of the company, and one for the benefit of himself. Either the inattention of the feebly interested directors of a common concern had overlooked the premium for neglecting that concern, which was thus bestowed upon the individuals intrusted with it in India, or the shortness of their foresight made them count this neglect a smaller evil than the additional salaries which their servants, if debarred from other sources of emolument, would

probably require. The president of Calcutta granted his *dustucks* for protecting from the duties and taxes of the native government, not only the goods of the company, but also the goods of the company's servants; and possibly the officers of that government were too little acquainted with the internal affairs of their English visitants to remark the distinction. The company had appropriated to themselves, in all its branches, the trade between India and the mother country. Their servants were thus confined to what was called 'the country trade,' or that from one part of India to another. This consisted of two branches, maritime and inland; either that which was carried on by ships from one port of India to another, and from the ports of India to the other countries in the adjacent seas; or that which was carried on by land between one town or province and another. When the *dustucks* of the president, therefore, were granted to the company's servants, they were often granted to protect from duties, commodities, the produce of the kingdom itself, in their passage by land from one district or province to another. This, Jaffer Khan, the viceroy, declared it his intention to prevent, as a practice at once destructive to his revenue, and ruinous to the native traders, on whom heavy duties were imposed; and he commanded the *dustucks* of the president to receive no respect, except for goods, either imported by sea, or purchased for exportation. The company remonstrated, but in vain. Nor were the pretensions of their servants exempt from unpleasant consequences; as the pretext of examining whether the goods were really imported by sea, or really meant for exportation, often produced those interferences of the officers of revenue, from which it was so great a privilege to be saved. Interrupted and disturbed in their endeavours to grasp the inland trade, the company's servants directed their ardour to the maritime branch; and their superior skill soon induced the merchants of the province, Moors, Armenians, and Hindoos, to freight most of the goods, which they exported, on English bottoms. Within ten years from the period of the embassy, the shipping from the port of Calcutta increased to ten thousand tons."

The terms of the firman were, that the cargoes of English ships wrecked on the Mogul coasts should be preserved from plunder; that a fixed sum should be received at Surat in lieu of all duties; that three villages contiguous to Madras, which had been granted and again reserved by the government of Arcot, should be restored in perpetuity; that the island of Diu, near the port of Masulipatam, should be given to the company, for

an annual rent; that all persons in Bengal who might be indebted to the company, should be delivered up to the presidency on the first demand; that a passport (*dustuck*), signed by the president of Calcutta, should exempt the goods which it specified from stoppage or examination by the officers of the Bengal government; and that the company should be permitted to purchase the zemindarship of thirty-seven towns, in the same manner as they had been authorized by Azeem-oo-Shaun to purchase Calcutta, Suttanutty, and Govindpore.

The directors at home, while much pleased with the new advantages derived through Mr. Hamilton, at Delhi, were very anxious that economy should be practised in Calcutta, that attention should be directed to the revenues, and all possible care taken to make no acquisition of territory beyond that which had already fallen to them. The company was very solicitous that its military strength at Calcutta should be reduced; but this, it appears, the agents positively refused, on the ground of the necessity of troops to maintain freedom of commerce and personal security. Various significant events occurred, the detail of which need not encumber these pages, which soon proved the wisdom of the president and council of Calcutta in this particular. On the 3rd of February, 1719, the directors wrote, actually forbidding their officers to take possession of the territory granted by the late firman, but only so much of it as lay above and below the town on the river at both sides. On other subjects, the following extract shows the spirit of the company at that juncture:—"We come now to take notice of that which we must always have a due regard to, viz., the articles of our revenue. We need not repeat the reasons; we have often mentioned them. The assurances you have given us, that you will, and still do, continue to enlarge our revenues all you possibly can without oppression, and faithfully promise your utmost endeavours, as well to augment them as diminish the expenses, excepting that of the military, which you would not lessen, are so many acceptable instances of your care and zeal for our service. We can desire no more, but to see these promising blossoms ripening into fruit. We would not have them enlarged by oppressing any, the poorest person; and allow the reason you give for continuing your military, that it is the best argument you can use for supporting our privileges and the trade, to be very substantial; the experience at Cossimbazar, and for bringing down your goods, are pregnant instances of it, among many others."

On the 16th of February, 1721, the directors

again wrote to the president and council at Calcutta, urging them to use whatever address opportunity afforded to obtain the privileges granted in the firman of 1715, but not to claim any territory, if the distance at which it lay from Calcutta was inconvenient, as trade, not territory, was the company's object. In that letter, the directors review the political position of Bengal with much astuteness, and compare the pretensions and prospects of Hyder Cooly Khan and Jaffer Khan with intelligence and foresight. These two influential natives were rivals for political power: Jaffer Khan had the advantage of long-acquired influence in Bengal, and a strong party, who were inspired, by terror of his energy and cruelty, and by identity of interest, to serve him in all extremes. Cooly Khan was a favourite with the emperor and a friend of the English. When viceroy at Surat, he caused the firman in favour of the English to take effect there, in spite of the opposition of formidable native influences and the intrigues of the rival European powers. There was some probability of his succeeding Jaffer Khan in the government of Bengal. The president and council had advised the directors of the contending claimants for power and the modes in which they were conducting their contention, asking for counsel as to the impending crisis. The company, in reply, left matters pretty much to the discretion of its officers, except as to the non-acquisition of any lands that were not of some immediate necessity to the preservation of their trade. As usual, the most impressive obligations are laid on the council to spend no money for any purpose, if by possibility such expenditure could be avoided, and, at all events, to consume no money in the rival intrigues of the two khans, until it might be seen, with some certainty, how the competition would end: in such case, they were not to offend Jaffer, if power lay with him; but if there were any chance that Hyder Cooly might turn him out, then the council must support their own friend with all means at their disposal. Such was the policy of the directors, and it probably harmonised with that of the council at Calcutta, judging not only from the course pursued by the latter, but from the spirit in which it was followed.

It is singular that while, in 1857-8, certain parties accused the company of never having paid attention to public roads, that in the correspondence of the directors with their president at Calcutta, in 1721, an anxiety for covering with roads the territory then subject to them is clearly expressed. Nor would it be difficult to prove that ever since, except when the ravages of war, or the failure of crops, de-

olated the country, or when the revenue, from these or other causes, was exhausted, the directors at home have always been solicitous to open up facile communications through their territories. One difficulty, at this early period, presented itself, that the native powers either chose to take offence, or to claim compensation for danger or injury supposed or pretended by them, in consequence of creating highways.

The following is a specimen of the policy which, in 1722, the directors desired to be observed towards the native governors in Bengal: it is taken from the "general letter to Bengal," written on the 14th of February, in that year. Considering that this counsel is given at a time when the council of Calcutta had assured the directors that it was "pretty easy with the country government," it indicates that, in the opinion of the directors, the time was approaching when gentle measures must be seconded by decision and force, if their interests with the governors of provinces and petty rajahs, who took upon themselves more than the authority assumed by the Mogul, was to be considered. The blending of diplomacy and decision, finesse and force, which this document commends, must be very edifying to modern adepts in Indian policy, and modern censors of Indian politicians:—"The accounts you give us of being pretty easy with the country government, notwithstanding the unsettled condition of the country, is acceptable, and much more your proceedings in clearing Contoo, the Cossimbazar broker, when seized by the nabob, and your boats when stopped by the several choukies. These are so many new proofs of the necessity of putting on a face of power and resolution, as we have often mentioned, to recover our privileges when openly infringed, and softer methods and applications for redress prove ineffectual, and that even the country government are afraid when you give them the duhoy in a prudent manner, and on well-grounded occasion. Yearly experience shows you that they are always watching for opportunities to get money out of you, as in the dispute of your making the road for the benefit of your towns. Let it be your constant care (as hitherto, by what appears, it has been), to give them no just handles if possible. We need not add (because it hath been often recommended to you), that you continue to keep fair with the Hoogly government, which, with a little prudence, may be done at a cheap rate, even your usual piscoshes. Be equally careful to keep up a good understanding with the nabob, so as good words and a respectful behaviour, without paying too dear for it, will contribute. Is there no likelihood of contracting a friendship with one or more of his favourites, to

make your way to, and the obtaining your requests from, him more easy? Such things have been practised formerly, and particularly by President Eyres, who, by his intimacy with Mirza Mudusfa, first obtained the grant of your towns."

In 1726 a Mayens court was established in Calcutta, mainly on the model of that originally instituted at Madras. It does not appear that it produced as much satisfaction in Calcutta, as courts of a similar nature in the capitals of the sister presidencies.

In 1725 Jaffer Khan, the enemy of the English, died, and was succeeded by Sujah Khan, his son-in-law, who established his government in Moorshedabad, then a large, populous, and trading city, and, in many respects, well adapted to be the capital of Bengal. Ally Verdi Khan, one of his omrahs, accompanied him, remaining constantly by him, and exercising influence over his mind. In 1729 Ally was appointed governor of Behar, which place, together with Orissa, had been first united with Bengal, under the government of Jaffer Khan. Ally Verdi was an intriguing and dextrous man, and, by a bold stroke of policy, suddenly given, but long prepared, he had himself proclaimed as the Nabob of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. These events were gradually opening the way for the development of greater changes, which were soon destined to pass over the lower provinces of India.

For several years the chief features of events in Bengal were those which marked the progress of trade. Efforts were made to prevent the natives from inroads upon the Calcutta territory, without necessitating armed collisions. Endeavours were put forth to outwit the native diplomatists, whose treachery and chicane were so much a delight to those endowed with these aptitudes, that they appeared to practise them for the enjoyment their exercise afforded, when nothing for their masters or themselves could be gained by such practices.

The administration of the Bengal territory was at this time kind and prudent on the part of the directors at home, and, so far as their intentions were carried out, were beneficial as well as benevolent to the natives. Thus when, in 1738, a fierce storm swept over Calcutta, damaging houses and fields, and carrying destruction to hut and homestead, the directors thus address their agents:—"We approve of your relieving the inhabitants, on their suffering by the storm the loss of their dwellings and great part of their substance, and in forbearing to collect the revenues of the poor people in the town for some time." In the succeeding year, when famine smote where storm had desolated, the council afforded

extensive relief to the natives, and obtained for so doing the approbation of their employers, who thus addressed its members:—"You did well in prohibiting the exportation of rice on the scarcity; the welfare of the place, on all such melancholy occasions, must be first and principally regarded. We cannot but acquiesce, on so general a calamity, in your taking off the duty on all rice brought into the town; and approve of buying a parcel with our money, to deliver out in small parcels at the bazaar rate."

Events now occurred of warlike importance to Bengal and to the English. It will be recollected by the reader that Sevajee, the daring Mahratta, overran the greater part of Hindostan. In the year 1735 the Mahrattas obtained authority to collect a fourth part of the revenues of the empire, except in Bengal. In 1739 Nizam-ool-Moolk, the subahdar of the Deccan, became jealous of the growing ambition and power of Ally Verdi, the nabob of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, as before related. The nizam instigated the Mahrattas to demand the *chaut* (fourth part of the revenue) for Ally. They soon advanced from Poonah and Berar, concentric points of their power and resources, to Burdwan. The celebrated Bajee Rao, already brought before the reader when narrating the events which occurred on the opposite shores of the peninsula during this period, was the leader of the fierce hordes of the invaders, assisted by his commander-in-chief, also brought before the reader's notice while relating the history of the Bombay presidency. The wild Mahrattas swept over Bengal, as the descending waters of the Ganges or the Brahmapootra deluge the plains in the rainy season. The feeble inhabitants of Bengal displayed no capacity even for flight, and in great numbers fell victims to famine or wild beasts in the jungle.

The English at Calcutta took advantage of the occasion to demand from the nabob permission to build some field works around their territory. These, when completed, were of the simplest kind, chiefly suitable for intercepting horsemen and artillery. The circuit of these works was called the Mahratta Ditch, and extended for seven miles around Calcutta, along the bounds of the territory then recognised by the nabob as belonging to the company. Ally Verdi was a man of resolution and energy; he recruited his forces, and in the following year, by the aid of men from the upper provinces, attacked the Mahrattas, who were spread over his territory. These, as the floods retiring after the monsoon find vent in the current of the great rivers, rapidly concentrated, and retreated to the shores of

Malabar and the valleys of the Deccan. Ally Verdi had been out of favour with the Mogul, because of his ambition, and his seizure of Behar and Orissa, but he was now restored to the light of the imperial countenance, petted, and rewarded by an ostensible recognition of all the titles and powers he had rebelliously assumed. On his part, engagement was made to send to Delhi a considerable tribute annually.

In the interval of space which followed, the council at Calcutta was agitated by questions connected with the administration of justice, more particularly the taking of oaths; Brahmins, Mussulmans, and others refusing to be sworn in the modes most agreeable to the English. These difficulties, and the disputes and denials of justice which arose out of them, were settled by the directors at home sending out specific regulations for such matters, which were liberal and enlightened.

During the progress and solution of these affairs the French were, in every direction towards which they operated, gaining ascendancy over the native mind. The chiefs and rajahs had believed the English irresistible at sea, until Angria and other pirates contended with them so successfully; but just before the bursting forth of the war with France that opinion had somewhat abated, although still the English war ships were esteemed as, at least, equal to those of the Dutch and superior to those of any other power. As traders, the Dutch stood first and the English second in order; but the formation of companies at Ostend and in Prussia, as well as in Denmark, which were soon understood by several of the native powers, led to the belief that there were other European nations which, as traders, and perhaps as mariners, might rival the British. The French were considered inferior to the English both as mer-

chants and sailors, although in the latter capacity they at last acquired, by the conduct of Labourdonnais, a rapid fame. As soldiers, the English were esteemed by the natives to be prompt, obstinate, and brave in battle, but inferior to the French in taste for the profession of arms, and in the science of war. The natives believed that the English were fighting shopkeepers; but they regarded the French as cavaliers, as men above the mere instincts of trade, and who, like the natives themselves, considered the profession of arms a renown: they were esteemed as the Rajpoots of Europeans. The every-day carriage and air of the Frenchman was *à la militaire*, while that of the Englishman, even when decked in uniform, was brusque, ungainly, and gave the impression of the shop. These were the real feelings of the natives. They could readily credit any account of obstinate battle maintained by Englishmen, but that they could launch forth armies on a great field as Frenchmen could, or as the generals of the great Mogul might be supposed able to do, was beyond credibility. A little time soon dissipated these impressions. The short quietude which Bengal saw after the Maharrattas had fled before the skilful arrangements and attacks of Ally Verdi, was like the dropping of the curtain between the scenes in the drama: that curtain was soon to rise on a more eventful act, involving scenes more varied and startling than India had witnessed; and from amidst the transitions and tumults caused by the passing of armies, and the thunder of European war on Indian fields, the English were destined to come forth the heroes and the victors, before whom Indian and European were forced to bow, as the native shrub and the exotic together shed their foliage and drop their branches before the path of the resistless storm.

CHAPTER LXVI.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGULAR NAVY AT BOMBAY, AND OF REGULAR MILITARY FORCES IN BOMBAY, MADRAS, AND BENGAL.

IN previous chapters, notice has been taken incidentally of the formation of military establishments at Bombay, and of the employment of armed boats and ships to protect the harbour, and the commercial transactions conducted in the Indian Ocean.

The earlier occupation of Bombay entitles it to more especial as well as prior attention in this matter, as compared with the other

presidencies. Indeed the only one of the three presidencies which has arrived at the dignity of maintaining a regular navy is Bombay, although Bengal has a marine service which more resembles a mercantile than a warlike navy. Madras possesses no maritime establishment. The Bombay navy protects the coast of Malabar, as well as the commercial interests of England and India

in the Arabian and Persian Gulfs, and the Indian Ocean. The Bengal marine is of service along the Coromandel coast, and throughout the Bay of Bengal.

In previous chapters, the progress of the company's mercantile marine has been related with ample detail, and the warlike operations of merchant ships in the seventeenth century, and those in the early part of the eighteenth century conducted by "grabs" and "gallivats," depicted. It has been seen that the company's martial marine (if it deserved the name) was in a low condition as to the number of ships, men, and guns in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but the quality of both men and material were excellent. It is very difficult to supply the place of good sailors and experienced officers in time of war, if during peace a country, on the ground of economy, discharges them. The East India Company did not think so when, in 1742, a peaceful period, the economical merchants of the directory resolved to retrench by discharging seamen, and "putting ships out of commission,"—as we say in modern phraseology. The reductions were intended to be more considerable than became actually the case, for the president and council were slow to reduce the maritime power of the presidency, and by references home of one sort or other, postponed the evil day. At last, the economical arrangements were effected, and the abridged navy of Bombay assumed the following dimensions. There were—"A superintendent, eight commanders, (one of whom was styled commodore), three first lieutenants, four second lieutenants, four third officers, and six masters of gallivats. The superintendent's salary was £220 per annum; a commander's, from 60 to 80 rupees per mensem; a first lieutenant's from 32 to 40; a second lieutenant's, 24; a midshipman's, 12; a surgeon's, from 31 to 40; a gunner's or boatswain's, 22; a carpenter's, 26; an able seaman's, 9; a native officer's, 10; a marine topass's, 6; and a lascar's, 5. Amongst the ships, ranked first 'the fighting vessels,' the principal of which were two grabs, called the *Restoration* and *Neptune's Prize*, the former being manned by eighty Europeans of all ranks, and fifty-one lascars; the latter, by fifty Europeans and thirty-one lascars. On each of the prahims there had usually been thirty Europeans and twenty lascars; but these numbers were now slightly diminished. As frequent complaints of favouritism were made by the officers, it was at last resolved that promotions should be regulated according to dates of commissions.*"

* *Bombay Diary*, 13th Aug., and 26th Nov., 1742; and 16th Feb., 1743. *Bombay Quarterly*, April, 1857.

The result of these reductions, so far from being a saving of money, as was expected by the directors at home, was a source of loss, and of great danger to the trade with India. The coasting trade was at last stopped, in consequence of the daring piracies effected by Arabs, Mahrattas, Europeans, &c. The *Bombay Quarterly* gives a brief sketch of the disasters which followed the reduction, before matters arrived at a crisis, in the following terms:—"An immediate consequence of these reductions was, that the mercantile marine, now larger than ever, suffered serious losses from pirates, and the company received some severe blows. The *Tiger*, a gallivat, when disabled by a waterspout, on her passage from Gombroon, was boarded by subjects of the Siddee at Mufdafarbad. Her crew, after a severe conflict in which seven fell, were overpowered, and she was carried away as a prize; but on a proper representation being made to the Siddee of Jinjeera, whom the Siddee of Mufdafarbad acknowledged as lord paramount, she was restored. Near the port of Surat cooly rovers swarmed, and waited for their prey as the ships lying at the bar attempted to discharge their cargoes. The treaty which had been made with Khem Sawunt was, as soon as the government of Bombay was supposed to be without power, shown to be waste paper, for in spite of it that chief made prizes of seven boats valued at eighteen or nineteen thousand rupees. The Malwans seized others valued at ten or eleven thousand. The subjects of the Peishwa showed themselves equally rapacious, and although their government, when appealed to, promised that the offenders should be punished, it was only on the improbable supposition that they could be discovered and convicted. Even Menajee Angria, whilst professing to be a close ally of the British, countenanced his subjects in attacking their vessels, and never hesitated to pick up a stray boat, if he could hope to escape detection; yet on one occasion he rendered a valuable service in rescuing the *Salamander*, an English ketch, which had been captured off Colaba by the fleet of Sumbhajee Angria. Seven grabs and eight gallivats, in the service of the last mentioned pirate, after fighting for a night and day with the *Montague* and *Warwick*, two East Indiamen, carried off five boats and a Portuguese ketch sailing under their convoy. A vessel, however, which he had taken and sold for ten thousand rupees, was recaptured by Captain Charles Foulis, of the *Harrington*. But nothing could compensate the merchants of Bombay for the losses they had sustained." Under such circumstances, they held meetings and made representations to government of their desperate state. So great was the in-

security, that the bankers would make no advances upon goods or ships. The diaries of Bombay, Surat, and Tellicherry abundantly prove that such was the condition of affairs. The peace principle was carried out into a fair experiment, and its most ardent admirers could not fail to admit that if carried out a little longer, its only result to English commerce in the Indian seas would have been annihilation, to the company bankruptcy, and to peaceful commercial sailors captivity and slavery.

The company did not at first feel the full force of the blows struck at commerce in those waters. Native merchants, and native ships, coasters, first suffered, but at last the proudest ships of the company were damaged or captured.

The French were the means, it is well known, and generally recorded by historians, of causing the English to organize a large native army, and that nation was also the occasion of the organization of a well-equipped naval force in the company's service. In the year 1744 war broke out between England and France, and the latter became famous for her privateers. Two of that description, of half men-of-war, half pirate ships, sought enterprise in the Indian seas immediately that war was declared. One of them was the *Apollo*, fifty guns; the other, the *Anglesea*, of forty guns. The latter, from her name, had probably formerly been an English ship. After committing ravages in the neighbourhood of the Cape of Good Hope, and of Madras, they cruised in the neighbourhood of Bombay.

To meet this small force, the government of Bombay could do nothing but send out grabs and fishing-boats, well-armed, to look out for British ships, and warn them of their peril. This saved several very richly-laden ships, whose escape was narrow. A large Indiaman, the *Anson*, did not heed, or could not understand the signals, and was attacked by the *Apollo*. The conflict was long and fierce. The English ship, neither constructed, armed, nor manned to resist such vessels as the *Apollo*, nevertheless fought until utterly disabled, and then her captor was found to be in so shattered a condition, that she was unable to continue her cruise; for every man hit on board the Indiaman, nine were struck on board the privateer. This conflict is the more remarkable, as it is the only recorded naval action between the English and French which ever took place off the coasts of Western India. The directors were so pleased with the heroism displayed by the crew of the *Anson*, that they voted them a gift of more than two thousand pounds sterling.

After these events, means were taken to augment the Bombay navy. "In the enlarged marine service were three ships, each of which carried twenty guns, a grab with twenty guns, from six to twelve pounders, five ketches carrying from eight to fourteen guns, from four to six-pounders, eight gallivats, and one prahim. Two other ships were employed alternately as guard-ships at Gombroon. On each ship or grab were from fifty to seventy Europeans; on each ketch, from six to thirty; and two or three on each gallivat. To the list of officers were added two commanders, one first, six second, and three third lieutenants. At the same time the first attempts were made to improve the religious and moral character of both officers and men, orders being sent from the court of directors for the regular performance of divine service on board all the vessels, and a strict prohibition of all gambling, profane swearing, and indecent conversation. As, however, it was thought that these reforms would be incomplete until the Bombay marine should have an official uniform like a regular service, a petition was presented in 1761 by the officers to the governor in council, and they were ordered to wear blue frock-coats turned up with yellow, dress-coats and waist-coats of the same colour, and according to a regulated pattern. Large boot-sleeves and facings of gold lace were the fashion for the superior grades; whilst midshipmen and masters of gallivats were to rest contented with small round cuffs and no facings. With increased numbers, improved discipline, and fine clothes, the Bombay marine became a little navy, although it did not venture to assume that name. The English fleets, with their first-rate men-of-war and frigates, now floating in the harbour under the command of Admirals Watson, Cornish, Poccocke, and Stevens, threw it into the shade, but at the same time taught it emulation and efficiency."

Such is a brief narrative of the early establishment of the Bombay navy. Its deeds, as shown in the course of this history, will be the proofs of its efficiency, as those events are related which gave opportunity to the maritime force of the company to distinguish itself.

The military establishment of Bombay had its origin when the company was put in possession of Bombay Island. The various events connected with the raising of troops, and their character, moral and military, have incidentally been related in foregoing chapters. The army at Bombay deteriorated gradually from the first fine body of royal troops, who garrisoned it until towards the

close of the first half of the eighteenth century. The number of men was necessarily greater as the company's interests expanded, but the quality of the troops became worse, until the increasing consequence of the French, and their intriguing and aggressive policy, caused the president and council of Bombay to feel that the western presidency must have something that might be called an army. "In 1741 it consisted of but one regiment, consisting of a captain, nine lieutenants, fifteen ensigns, a surgeon, two sergeant-majors, eighty-two sergeants, eighty-two corporals, twenty-six drummers, three hundred and nineteen European privates, thirty-one mustees—by which term we conceive mastisa's, or Indo-Europeans are meant—nine hundred topasses, twenty-seven servants, two subneeses or native paymasters, a linguist, and an armourer—in all fourteen hundred and ninety-nine men. They were distributed into seven companies. Their monthly pay amounted to 10,314 rupees.*

There was a native militia of sepoy's numbering seven hundred men, native officers included. The appearance of this body on parade must have presented the most extraordinary spectacle ever witnessed on occasion of reviewing troops. They were differently apparelled—some wearing a uniform like English soldiers, some in the habiliment of English tars; or, rather, partly attired in the uniforms of three services. Rude native military uniforms decorated others. A few made themselves like South Sea islanders, by bedizening themselves in the most fantastic manner; very many wore scarcely any apparel at all—the usual piece of calico wound round their body serving for raiment and uniform. Their arms were as various as their costumes, muskets, matchlocks, swords, spears, bows and arrows, and many nondescript weapons provided by themselves under the idea of being peculiarly warlike and terrible. Except in war they were seldom mustered; most of them were attached as "peons," servants, bearers, runners, &c., to the civil servants; just as at this day, but under different regulations, the sepoy's are employed. They were very badly paid, and worse treated, kicked, smitten, flogged, at the caprice of the civil servants to whom they were attached. They endured degradation and misery with marvellous patience, and, on the whole, preferred the military to other employments, as was proved by the eagerness with which they re-enlisted, after having been "broke." The system of peons was adverse to the progress of the army; it was not until 1752 that these men were struck off the military roll, and

* *Bombay Quarterly*, April 1857.

their expense charged to the civil department. In Bengal and Madras the sepoy's were better disciplined, and some were brought to Bombay; but they refused to serve except at higher pay than the custom was to give the natives of Bombay. The latter were offended at the invidious distinction, and murmured, so that the practice of employing Madras and Bengal sepoy's in the western presidency was given up. Ultimately, the transfer of sepoy's from Bombay both to Bengal and Madras became usual. There existed a strong indisposition among the members of the company in London to pay for military, and the instructions to the president and council to reduce expenditure by a reduction of their military force was incessant. Thus a European regiment was removed from the fort at Sion, and its place supplied by topasses, by which a saving of 14,364 rupees was effected, but the safety of the place was endangered, and the president and council of Bombay filled with anxieties and cares, when their minds should have been free to attend to the company's business. The topasses were very uncertain soldiery; being of mixed Portuguese and Indian descent they had the prejudices of both races; they were generally of the religion of the Portuguese, with a large leaven of native idolatry. It was not without cause, therefore, that the president and council expressed their apprehensions when ordered to occupy so important a place with such rabble for soldiers:—"For Sion was a frontier post, and topasses were so little accustomed to strict discipline, that they might easily be surprised by a sudden invasion from the Mahratta country; and what was most strange of all, their homes, where their wives and children continued to reside, were in Salsette, then part of the Mahratta dominions. It was remembered that when the Portuguese were defending Tanna, they had been intimidated by the enemy seizing their families, and threatening to slaughter them unless the fortress capitulated; and was it to be doubted that the same plan would be resorted to in the case of the British? Then these soldiers in buckram would only enter the service on condition that they should be permitted to take their meals and attend mass on the other side of the strait; many actually, when on duty, left their posts for these purposes, and the dismissal of a hundred and seventy-two only caused a temporary abatement of the evil. A foolish economy and ignorance of the native character were the only reasons why this fatuous system was continued, even when the age of Indian conquest had commenced. On the one hand, the frugal court of directors would not increase the topasses' pay from four to five

rupees per mensem, which would have induced them to bring their families within the company's limits; on the other, they still retained the opinion that natives would not submit like topasses to be organized on the European system.*

The officers of the company's service were both European and native, the latter frequently proved unfaithful, and were generally hostile in their hearts to all Europeans. The English officers were men of low birth, who had followed occupations the meanest, and were uneducated, with few exceptions. Officers have, in some few cases, sustained important local commands, who had attained to the rank of captains without being able to write! Existing documents in Bombay reveal the plans and shifts to which the civil authorities were frequently put, to avoid the inconvenience attendant upon the illiterate character of their officers. The pay of the European officer was small, and he accordingly adopted various expedients for plundering the men under his command in their food and clothes, until mutiny at last taught the government that the robbery of the soldier was neither a humane, honourable, nor safe mode of paying the officers.

The retrenchments of the directors were not long in operation; the menaces and violence of the French and of the Mahrattas, as well as the known designs of other enemies, compelled an augmentation of force at Bombay and Tellicherry, and the factory at Surat was strengthened in such way as the position of the English there allowed. A change in the commanders attended upon increased garrisons. Officers of distinction in the royal army were sent out, and young gentlemen of birth and education were appointed as cadets. Sepoy regiments were gradually enrolled in imitation of the French; and royal regiments of infantry as well as regular companies of artillery were sent from England. Such changes were carried out with more earnestness when, in 1744, the war burst forth between the settlements of the two great European nations. In 1746, while the conflict was proceeding, the president and council raised at Surat a native force of two thousand men. It was deemed politic to collect these men from various sects and nationalities—Abyssinians, Arabs, Mussulmen of India, Hindoos, and, probably, a few Jews, topasses, and Parsees were among them. The creation of this force enabled the president, the next year, to send from Bombay considerable assistance to Fort St. David.

In the desire to obtain experienced officers soon after the foregoing events, the governor

* *Bombay Diary. Bombay Quarterly*, April, 1857.

engaged one Goodyear, a major of artillery, who served on board the fleet of Admiral Boscawen. To this officer the command of the garrison at Bombay was consigned, and he took rank as a member of council, a circumstance which raised the status of the military. The salary of this high officer was but £250 a year, with allowance for servants, palanquin, and mess. A local company of artillery was then raised, and the old system of gunners and assistants was abolished. Ten companies of infantry, seventy men to each company, were next raised. The officers and non-commissioned officers raised the total number in the battalion to 841. Promotion went by seniority, except in especial cases; and then the governor was bound to inform the directors on what grounds he departed from the rule.

It was a curious circumstance that all Roman Catholics were excluded from service, even in the ranks of either the artillery or infantry; yet, nevertheless, the service was so popular with many of them that by degrees, in spite of every prohibition, they continued to enlist until, for a short time, a majority of the soldiers were of that persuasion. The physical and moral character of the troops was very bad; old men, invalids, criminals, and deserters, to a large extent, made up the muster roll. The hopelessness of finding sober and able-bodied Englishmen, to enlist in their service, led the company to seek recruits in that common recruiting ground of Europe—Switzerland. In 1752, Captain Alexander De Zeigle, and a Swiss company under his command, arrived in Bombay. This scheme failed. Dupleix, the French general, with the foresight for which he was characterized, predicted the result. The Swiss had hardly commenced their duties, when they found their soldierly pride wounded by insults and oppressions of various sorts, and their miserable pay afforded them insufficient subsistence. Discontent, neglect, insufficient food, and sickness, wasted their numbers; and a large proportion of the remainder deserted to the French, where they were received as brothers and fellow-countrymen. As the places of the deceased, and those who deserted, were filled up with topasses, the Swiss company soon became only such in name.*

In August, 1753, Major Sir James Foulis, Bart., took command of the troops. He introduced many reforms useful to both officers and

* *Bombay Diary*, 17th of October, 1752; 3rd of April, August, and November, 1753; 7th of December, 1756; 20th of September, 1757; 20th of May, 1760. Speech of William Beckford, Esq., in the House of Commons, 19th of February, 1754.—*Bombay Quarterly*, April, 1857.

men, but which were unpopular among both. Ultimately he conciliated the affections of all classes of his soldiers, and was then thwarted by the civil officials, until, at last, under a stinging sense of insult, he resigned his post and returned home. All efforts to establish the discipline of the company's troops on a solid basis failed until the mutiny act was made applicable to India by a bill which passed the British parliament in 1754. The act took effect on the 25th of April in the same year, and is one of the memorable incidents of British legislation for India. On the first of October following, this act was proclaimed at the fort gate of Bombay. The troops, who were drawn up on parade, were asked if they were willing to serve under the terms of this law, and they unanimously assented. The topasses probably did not understand its provisions, for they pleaded ignorance when arraigned for violation of the act for a considerable time afterwards, although every two months it was read at the head of every company. Many date the formation of the Bombay army from the day when the mutiny act was proclaimed at the fort of Bombay.

In order to carry out the design, so generally entertained among official persons, of perfecting military force, a select and secret committee for the management of military and diplomatic affairs was appointed at the beginning of the year 1755, by the court of directors, and ordered to correspond by ciphers of two kinds with committees similarly constituted in each of the three presidencies. The author of *The Rise of the Navy and Army at Bombay*, in the review published in that city, observes:—"To the skilful management of these boards must, under divine Providence, be attributed the success of these grand operations by which Great Britain first obtained political power in India."

Towards the close of the year 1755, Major Chalmers arrived at Bombay in command of three companies of royal artillery, which enabled the local artillery company to improve itself upon their model. The year following, according to the *Bombay Diary*, the number of regular troops on the island, was 1571. Of these 126 were in hospital; 986 were Europeans, comprising Germans, Dutch, Swedes, and a few Swiss, as well as English: the remainder were topasses. Besides this regular force, there was a brigade of 3,000 sepoy: these were distrusted both by the authorities and the regular force. At Surat and Cambay, where there were small sepoy garrisons in the factories, the factors expressed their doubts both of their fidelity and courage, and preferred arming Arabs, notwithstanding their

occasional bursts of fanaticism, and the fierceness and waywardness of their temper. Even after the battle of Plassey proved how sepoy might be disciplined and wielded, there was throughout Bombay a great reluctance to employ them. In 1759 a separate corps of 500 sepoy was disciplined on the English system. This was the first attempt in the Bombay presidency, to use the sepoy as regular troops. The same year, when a French invasion was anticipated, it was estimated that on an emergency 15,750 men could be called out for service at Bombay; but not one half of them had ever smelt gunpowder, and not a quarter had learnt their drill. The number was made up thus:—Of the king's artillery were mustered 236 men; of the company's, 285; of the company's European infantry, 848—thus making 1,369 disciplined troops. There were also of sepoy that had been some time in garrison, 955; of sepoy that had lately been withdrawn from the Siddee's service, 754; of sepoy recently enlisted at Surat, 209; of Arabs, 316; of recruits raised in Seinde, 178—in all 2,412 irregulars. In the marine service there were 450 available men. Covenanted servants, captains of merchant vessels, free merchants, and other Europeans, who formed a separate corps, amounted to ninety-eight. The native population, capable of bearing arms, amounted to 3,017, and that of Mahim to 1,865, exclusive of clerks in offices, 648 labourers who were also a separate corps, and 150 private slaves—the whole amounting to 6,539 able-bodied persons. So silent are historians of British India regarding the rise of the European and native army, that their readers might almost suppose it to have been without any rudimental germ, never to have passed through the slow processes of growth, but to have sprung at once into vigorous existence. We read of no mortifications, no blunders, no failures to which men must ordinarily submit before their institutions attain to full strength. Such, however, there certainly were. Even when soldiers had been found, and the living material provided for the ranks abundantly, there was continual perplexity when attempting to make the proper arrangements for clothing, arming, paying, provisioning the troops, and other similar matters. At first clothing was issued to Europeans once a year; to topasses and others, once every two years. Long before the time for renewing it arrived, the men had supplied themselves with garments purchased by themselves; otherwise they must have marched in rags; and there appeared on parade a most curious variety of costume. The first reform in the dress of sepoy, who had up to that time retained the clothes in which they en-

listed, was to provide them with a jacket of red broadcloth and linen turban, to distinguish them from the enemy. Not until 1760 was it finally arranged that all the troops should be clad in uniforms corresponding to those already used in Madras and Bengal. Then the men made numerous complaints of the deductions from their pay to purchase these uniforms, and the regulations on the subject were frequently revised. It was difficult also to determine the periods of issuing pay; at first the Europeans were paid daily; then they were kept a month in arrears, it being supposed that all their cash would be required for debts contracted in the interval, and could not therefore be expended in drunken revels; and lastly, when they murmured loudly against this, the worst plan of all was adopted—that of issuing their pay monthly in advance. At the same time, as they were suffered to procure their own food so long as they dealt with the tradesmen whom the barrack-master patronised, and had no regular mess, their diet was usually bad and unwholesome.*

Courts-martial were much abused by officers, although frequently the only means by which they could protect themselves from the oppressions and insults of the factors. It is a curious circumstance, that the great Clive was mixed up with disputes connected with such transactions, when, as Colonel Clive, he served at Bombay in 1756. On that occasion the great man quarrelled with the president and council for appointing an officer junior to himself as president of a court-martial. Yet, although so prompt to assert his own rights and privileges, he was ready enough to trample upon the prerogatives and insult the dignity of inferior officers himself when they fell under his displeasure.

The hostility between the army and the civil authorities about 1760 is a fearful episode in the history of the Bombay presidency. "Defiance of authority seemed to have become the governing principle of the military. The new code of military law, the importation of regular troops from England, the organization of an army with European discipline and admirable appointments, had produced no better fruit than this. The spirit which animated the officers was active also in the ranks. Desertions were frequent, and Sir James Foulis estimated the annual loss from this

* *Bombay Diary*, 14th of November, 1755; 10th of February, August, 1756; 5th and 12th of August, 1st of September, and 2nd of October, 1757; 4th of October and 13th of December, 1758; 7th of August and 3rd of October, 1759; 11th of March, 1760. *Surat Diary*, 1st of June and 10th of August, 1756; August 1757; 5th of April, 1759. *Diary of the Secret Committee*, 1755 and 1756. *Letter from Calcutta*, dated 5th and 7th of July, 1756.—*Bombay Quarterly*, April, 1857.

cause and death, at ten per cent. So many men deserted from the factory in Scinde, that sufficient were not left for its defence in case of a sudden surprise, and it became necessary to release some prisoners for want of a guard. Punishments were of frightful severity, but apparently without any good effect. At Surat eight Europeans deserted during the military operations; all were retaken; one was shot, the others received a thousand lashes. Of seven topasses who deserted a little later under extenuating circumstances, five were sentenced to be shot, but as an act of mercy, permitted to escape each with eight hundred or a thousand lashes. Even the king's troops were contaminated, and at Tellicherry, when called into active service, loudly and insubordinately uttered the old complaint of want of beef, protesting against the fish rations provided for them on four days of the week.* The Bombay army was frequently used on service in the other presidencies during its more perfect formation, and after discipline and military law became established.

In 1754, the few Swiss then left, three companies of sepoy, and Captain Forbes's company of Europeans, from Bombay, and 150 topasses from Tellicherry, were sent to Madras. These were followed by fifty topasses from Ajengo, and a considerable number of Indo-Portuguese recruits. These troops, commanded by Captain Armstrong, served under Major Lawrence. The captain and his troops complained bitterly of the partiality and injustice of Clive, and his inequitable distribution of prize money. The conduct of the hero in return was marked by cruelty, malice, and persecution, with a contempt for law and military order, when either stood in the way of his own strong passion and indomitable will.

The Bombay army, whether serving in its own or in the sister presidencies, continued to have cause of complaint against the government. Perhaps, on the whole, they were better treated in Bombay than in either Bengal or Madras. During the whole history of the Bombay army, the government was chargeable with culpable neglect of the comfort, health, and life of its soldiers. The whole British army in India was thus ungenerously disregarded, until after the English nation was awakened by the disclosures of the Crimean campaign to the danger and disgrace of such disregard of the happiness and efficiency of the noblest soldiers in the world. Yet, even then, the system of neglect was but slowly abolished. In October, 1858, public opinion in Bombay on these matters was thus

* *Bombay Quarterly*.

expressed in the *Bombay Standard*:—"The people of England are beginning at length to reflect that, if India is from henceforth mainly to be maintained by British troops, the foremost matter to be seen to is how best to preserve the health and economize the energies of the men. They are right in this; these are the very first things to be considered. We have hitherto proceeded either as if they were the last, or as if there was no particular occasion for bestowing any consideration on them at all. Until within the last ten years the Horse Guards acted as if their aim had been to destroy and demoralize the men as fast as possible, and the mutinies themselves have not had the lives to answer for Whitehall red-tape has destroyed within the past twenty years. The men were provided with the heaviest and most inefficient weapons and worst possible clothing, to begin with; these we shall pass by, as the home authorities begin to see the error of their ways, and amend. A rigid attention to the regulations, as the regulations in these matters were wont to be attended to, would have lost us last year's campaign. By some extraordinary arrangement the men were, till 1850, in three-fourths of cases, dispatched so as to be sure of arriving during the rainy season, when their services could not be required and their health was certain to suffer. The allowance of intoxicating liquor during the voyage was such as to make one-half of them drunkards before they touched Indian ground at all. The Horse Guards never condescended to consult the India-house as to the date of dispatch, nor did the home military powers deem it requisite to state beforehand for what presidency troops were intended. A regiment turned up of a rainy morning at Bombay or Madras which the military authorities at these places respectively believed on its way to Calcutta, when the barracks were damp, moss-grown, or mildewed, and not the slightest preparation had been made for the reception of troops. The remedy for this last was brought about by a newspaper. On hearing the matter made constant subject of complaint, and being assured that no representations sent to the home authorities received the slightest attention, we, in 1842, caused our London correspondent to insert in his shipping list the number of men embarked, and the place of their destination. We are speaking under the most rigid review of facts; all these things were duly tabled at the time, with the full approval of authority. The men, as already stated, on arriving in the rains, were started for the Deccan as quickly as possible; but it is only within these ten years that the slightest shelter on the way was provided for them;

on they marched through floods of water, under deluges of rain, sleeping in swamps for six nights on end. The transfer from Bombay to Poonah commonly in these days cost one per cent. in the course of a fortnight, or at the rate of twenty-four per cent. on the year, had this rate of mortality been kept up. As we had taught the men to drink on the voyage out it was but natural the accomplishment should be kept up, so every morning, when the stomach in the East is most weak and languid, and tea and coffee are naturally wished to soothe it, we fired off the 'morning dram'—a dose of red-hot poison, to inflame the blood and bowels and create a thirst other drams could alone allay. Old officers told you that the abolition of this would create universal mutiny. In the first year of his reign the Marquis of Dalhousie said the abomination should cease, and it did cease; the most inveterate drunkard was ashamed to complain, all but confirmed drunkards held it a blessing to be kept aloof from temptation. All these things came to pass within ten years, to the saving of the lives of thousands; until within these twenty years none of them ever seem to have been thought of. So far have we done well, but we have barely made a beginning. The task before us when once commenced will be found quite as easy as those now seem that have been performed, and infinitely more important."

The military system of Madras progressed very slowly. There was a strong objection to enlist the natives, from a fear that the power thus raised might turn against those who created it:—"But here were special objections to the enlistment of Mahratta and other native sepoys. They belonged to races with which the English would ere long perhaps be at war; their language, manners, religion, were not only distinct from those of the English, but their superstitions regarding caste were so inflammable, that a single spark might set them in a blaze; they had not been used to the military system of Europe, and probably would not submit to its stringent discipline; and lastly came the most important consideration of all,—their wives and children lived under the shadow of native powers, and remained as hostages that their husbands and fathers should never resist the chiefs who had natural claims upon their allegiance. On these grounds, it might not only be fairly concluded that the sepoy would be an unsafe protector; he might also be a treacherous friend and dangerous spy. For what arguments could be urged against these cogent ones for rejecting his services? What inducements could be expected so to counteract the influence of established custom, religion, and family ties, as to make him a

loyal soldier? The offer of seven rupees a month, and the prospect of twenty, were the only inducements that could be thought of; and these had been already met by native states, who actually offered higher pay. No patriotism, no chivalrous sentiments, no lust of conquest were to kindle enthusiasm in sepoy, and secure their constancy. The only bond between them and their employers was to be the pittance of a soldier's pay."

Amongst the Europeans at Madras there was no military spirit. The factors were unwilling to carry arms, and the young men of England were reluctant to enter upon a military life in India, and especially in Madras, which was supposed to be wholly without attractions. The language of an Indian reviewer of the present day, in retrospect of this period, is strikingly applicable:—"The people of England were tranquil, prosperous, and selfish; indisposed both at home and abroad to attain celebrity by acts of enterprise or enthusiasm. This prosperity, torpidity, and lack of generous sentiment are especially to be observed in India. The age of discovery and adventure had passed away; the age of military exploits had not begun; so that the characters and actions of Anglo-Indians were for the most part flat and insignificant. Hawkins, Best, and Downton were almost forgotten; even the era of Aungier, Oxenden, and Child seemed as the days of the giants; and as compared with them, the governors of this time felt themselves but ordinary persons; whilst on the other hand, Clive was still giving and receiving black eyes at Merchant Tailors' school, or spending his indomitable energy in clambering up the church tower, and playing tricks upon the tradespeople of Market Drayton. In this middle age the highest ambition which the English of India could entertain was to accumulate money and retire. The larger number stopped far short of that, contenting themselves with a life of idleness, sensuality, or reckless dissipation, which was usually terminated by disease and an unhonoured death."

The military preparation at Madras, when, at the close of the half century, the French appeared off its coasts, was deemed considerable; a few hundred soldiers only were British, several thousand were topasses and sepoy.

The climate of Madras is, from its southerly situation, the hottest in India. The troops of that presidency, European and native, have always been severely tried by the burning sun in any field operations; yet, with the infatuation which has generally characterised the economical and sanitary departments of British military management, the troops have been clothed in a manner which has caused numerous deaths, from the time of the first

service of European soldiers in Fort St. George to the present day. That the reader's attention is not unnecessarily called to this subject, the reports of medical men, both civilians and military, and various treatises published by them during 1858, abundantly prove. The following remarks on the clothing of our Indian army, from a London scientific periodical, is a valuable contribution to the intelligence which is requisite and ought to prevail on this matter:—"The flowing burnous of the swarthy Arabian and the loose-fitting snowy robes of the Indian tell us, clearly enough, what are the natural habiliments of the inhabitant of tropical regions; the European, indeed, left to himself in those climes, quickly rids himself of his dark woollen coverings, and gladly adopts the light cotton dress of the natives. The voice of nature, however, of reason, and of science, makes no impression on the stiff ear of the martinet colonel, or on the well imbued red-tapist soul of bureaucracy. We still are obliged to hear of dragoons charging the enemy under a sun throwing down its burning rays of 115 degrees, with their brows compressed by helmets, the metal of which would burn the hand laid upon it; our soldiers still march, or stagger along, with stocks and tight buttoned-up woollen jackets; and the best heat-absorbing colours are, in many cases, the dresses they wear. We wish now to say one word about the soldier's dress; and hope that a fact demonstrated both by experience and science may meet some willing ear among the authoritative few. Dr. Coulier has lately investigated, scientifically, the nature of the soldier's different habiliments as agents protecting him against heat and cold. His experiments show that a thin layer of white cotton placed over a cloth dress is sufficient to produce a fall of seven degrees per cent. in the heat of it. He gives the following table, which shows the effects of the sun's rays upon the temperature of tubes centrigrade, covered with the following different articles of dress. Thermometer in the shade, 27°; exposed to sun, 36°. Tube not covered, 37°5; tube covered with cotton shirting, 35°1; with cotton lining, 35°5; with unbleached linen, 39°6; with dark-blue cloth, 42°; with red cloth, 42°; with dark-red capote cloth, 42°5; with red cloth for the 'sous-officers,' 41°4; with dark-blue cloth for ditto, 43°. Here, then, is the fact scientifically demonstrated, that a diminution of temperature, such as might suffice to prevent a soldier from being struck down by the heat of a tropical sun, may be obtained simply by placing a white cotton covering over his dark woollen dress. These are Dr. Coulier's general conclusions:—1. The colour of soldiers' clothes has very little sensible influence over

the diminution of caloric.—2. All kinds of textures are capable of absorbing a certain quantity of hygrometric water in latent state. The quantity is considerable in the case of wool, but linen absorbs less, and cotton least of all.—3. This absorption takes place without any immediate loss of its caloric by the body.—4. The colour of clothes has a great influence upon the absorption by them of solar rays; and whatever the nature of the clothes, the greatest advantages are obtained by covering them with white-coloured materials, when the wearer is exposed to the burning sun.*

In Bengal the progress of raising a native army was similar to that at Bombay and Madras; but the natives were there sworn—organized as regular soldiers, as has been already stated in this chapter. It does not appear, however, that this took place quite so early as many suppose; for in 1707, when Calcutta was exalted to the dignity of a presidency, the garrison was augmented to 300 men, who were chiefly sepoy. During the Mahratta incursions of 1739, and following years, some progress was made in disciplining native companies. In 1743 the directors wrote to the president and council at Calcutta, acknowledging their services in organizing Lascars and militia, and providing material of war; but no mention is made of sepoy, yet at that time great progress had been made in preparing sepoy for service. The directors, in all probability, not paying particular attention to that feature of their servants' efforts, class the sepoy under the words Lascars and militia:—"We entirely approve of the necessary precautions taken on the Mahrattas' invasion to prevent a surprise, by hiring a number of Lascars, forming the inhabitants into a militia, surveying the town, fortifications, guns, purchasing some small arms, and the like; the expense upon such an urgent occasion we cheerfully acquiesce in, relying upon your care and frugality in disbursing our money on every article." The directors, in the same letter, encourage the council to proceed with their excellent military organization, so as to be prepared for further dangers from the same quarter. "As the province is liable to the Mahrattas' incursions, we would have such additions made to our fortifications as you upon the spot shall deem requisite for the security of the settlements, putting us to no further expense herein than is necessary."

Acting on this general, but cautious direction, the council proceeded with its military measures, which were more in reference to the perfection of the resources they had, than to any increase of them; and among the other useful acts to which they resorted, was the

more complete discipline of their sepoy, so that regular troops, well organized on the European system, chiefly natives of the upper provinces of Bengal, but some few Assamese, Burmese, Pegnins, men from the coast of Coromandel, and even recruits from Malabar, were numbered among them.

When Clive became acquainted with military affairs, he, both at Madras and Bengal, called forth the energies of the sepoy: indeed, whatever was done before his time was only a preliminary to what he accomplished. He caught up the French idea of drilling the Spahis (sepoy), and ranking them with European soldiers in the field.

The histories of the Madras and Bengal armies, up to the breaking out of the great eastern war with France, are brief, while that of Bombay, the oldest presidency, covers a large space of time. The progress of the Madras and Bengal armies up to this point was uniform as short; that of Bombay was chequered and eventful, and, if minutely pursued, involving numerous incidents interesting to military men of all nations, but especially to English officers, and still more especially to those who have served the East India Company. From the period of the great oriental struggle with France, the histories of the three armies so blend with the general development of English conquest and glory that the story is one: no separate treatment is required to mark successive stages of advance.

Having followed the progress of the English in continental India up to the period of the French war, and the improvement of the navy and army of the company to a date several years later; having directed attention to the action on India and Indian affairs in the eighteenth century of the different European nations whose relation to the East has been traced in previous chapters; frequent reference having been made to the companies organized in Ostend, Denmark, and France, in rivalry of those of the other European countries earlier in the field of oriental commerce; having given also brief notices of the minor associations formed in Prussia, Trieste, and Spain;—there will be no necessity for digressions in the future story of English power in the East, in affairs connected with those nations, excepting the French. The position of England immediately after the period already treated could hardly be understood, and the development of her success could with difficulty be appreciated, unless her relative standing, as compared with all her competitors, was seen, and especially with the greatest of them—France. To the preliminary quarrels with that nation the reader's attention will now be directed.

* *Medical Times.*

CHAPTER LXVII.

JEALOUSIES AND QUARRELS WITH THE FRENCH PREVIOUS TO THE FIRST BREAKING OUT OF WAR BETWEEN THEM AND THE BRITISH IN INDIA.

“COMING events cast their shadows before,” is a saying as true and philosophical, as it is trite: it contains a beauty and significance in its mode of thought and expression, which are strikingly reflected in the actual facts of history. During the early part of the eighteenth century, especially from the year 1730 to the breaking forth of war, the relations and feelings of the French and English in the Indian peninsula plainly portended the coming struggle. Such events as were approaching were too mighty and momentous not to cast the shadow of their coming. The minds of both French and English were in a state of preparedness for war; events partly produced this condition, and partly brought it forth to view as far as it existed independent of them. Historians have neglected the signs of the times in India previous to the war, as indicative of the relations of England and France there at the moment when the trumpet of battle was sounded, and as foreshadowing their probable relations when the spoils of the field should be gathered. The writers of Indian history are generally too hasty in hurrying from one great prominent event to another, to perceive, or at all events to describe, how these arise from minor incidents, or from facts and principles of which these minor incidents are tokens. Looking carefully at the attitude of England and France on the peninsula for a number of years before war was declared, it was obvious that between two such nations a struggle for mastery must arise. In laying the foundation, as well as in raising the superstructure of their plans and policy, each nation acted in a manner characteristic: the French were impressive, brilliant, and dashing; the pomp of arms and the parade of military power were, in their measure, as conspicuous at Pondicherry and Myhie, as in Paris. The English plodded along perseveringly, holding by what they acquired tenaciously, wasting no words or polite expressions to their flattering competitors; rude, obstinate, enduring, arduous, fierce in encounter, the Britons held on their course in peace and war, if their condition at the factories might with accuracy be described as either, at a time when over their serene day clouds and tempests gathered, and when in the most quarrelsome episodes they were sure to find some unlooked for ally, or some peace-compelling fortune. For more than a

century the power of the English had grown slowly but surely; as the tree which has been long rearing its trunk strikes deeper its roots, so it had been with them. The French career had been short and brilliant; it was like a graceful shrub, with much display of foliage and blossom; but however vigorous as to its kind, unable to resist the buffeting of storms which might beat upon the sturdy oak in vain.

Pondicherry, although it did not assume a position of great power before 1741, when Dupleix made it the centre of his operations, yet several years earlier, under Dumas, it was of consequence, and exercised control over the factories or *comptoirs* of Chandernagore in Bengal, Karical on the coast of Coromandel, and Myhie on the coast of Malabar. On the western coast of India the French were better traders than on the Coromandel shore, except at Surat, where they were more missionary than mercantile, and were intensely solicitous to make converts of the English.

In 1722, their first settlement appears to have been made in Malabar. Boyanores (referred to in a previous chapter) invited them to settle there, as his alarm at the growing power of the English became intolerable to himself. The position selected by the newcomers was supposed to show judgment and taste, but they displayed more skill in the selection as soldiers than as merchants. The place chosen was an eminence with a commanding view, and convenient site. A river discharged itself into the sea near the spot, but it was navigable a considerable distance up its course. Without being landlocked, the harbour was sheltered from all prevailing winds. A factory was built on the hill, and thus the settlement of Myhie was established. This spot is worthy of note, as in the conduct of its factors and garrison there were more indications of an intention to undermine and thwart the English than in any other of the French settlements. The future conflict was, as it were, anticipated between Myhie and the English settlement of Tellicherry, but four miles distant.

According to Auquetil de Perron, it was in 1725 that the French settlers at Myhie first quarrelled with the natives. The Boyanores suddenly made an incursion, cut down the French flag-staff, and drove the factors away, who retired to Calicut. As the Boy-

anores, although so jealous of the English, were thus for a short time more friendly with them than previously, their hostility was attributed to the English, whom the French believed to be jealous of their rising influence. They considered their own influence to be as the golden star of day, and that of the English as the silver star of night, whose light should soon be quenched in that of the more glorious orb. This or very similar phraseology was employed by them in their various communications with the French directors. They alleged that one of the two powers must gain empire in India, that the glory was reserved for France, that England believed as much, and was sick with envy at their rising fortunes. It was not, however, deemed sound policy at Pondicherry to attribute openly to the English at Tellicherry or Bombay the aggressive proceedings of Boyanores, but preparations were promptly made to chastise the latter, and to teach the former that "France was too strong for savages, native or English." Five merchant vessels were laden with troops and stores, and the whole placed under M. Pardaillan Gondrin. Under his command, and next in authority, was Bertrand François Mahé de Labourdonnais. He had just arrived in Pondicherry with the rank of second captain, when the expedition was about to sail. As he had obtained great reputation for his knowledge of naval engineering, then little understood, and of naval gunnery, rather better known, and as the fame of his pamphlets on naval affairs published in Europe had reached Pondicherry, he was at once placed in high official relation to M. Gondrin. The descent at Myhie was a masterpiece of skill. The enemy, in great force, prepared to resist, but Labourdonnais invented a species of raft, on which he protected his troops by bales of cotton, and disembarked in the face of the enemy nearly in order of battle without losing a man. The subsequent conflicts, however, cost loss of life, and demanded much spirit and courage. Labourdonnais was the real commander of the expedition, and won the glory of its success, the details of which are not of sufficient importance for our story. On shore as well as at sea, Labourdonnais was the genius of order and authority; he occupied the place, secured the position, and made it strong in the face of native foes and English rivals. Historians and biographers notice, as a singular coincidence, the name of the officer and of the place so easily captured by his inventive genius—*Mahé*; but this name seems to have been subsequently given to the place by the French, and not until they had ultimately evacuated it, and then rather by those

who wrote about it than by those who acted in it. In the documents of the English factory at Tellicherry, and in other contemporary records, it is always called Myhie, so that the coincidence upon which so many French writers and some English love to dwell had no existence.*

The fame of this expedition and of Labourdonnais sped all over India, and created unpleasant feelings in the English communities, and especially in Tellicherry, the nearest to the scene of the exploit. The English there felt extreme apprehension that a conflict for ascendancy must soon begin, and they, with their characteristic bluntness, took no pains to conceal what they felt. The French, on the other hand, knowing that the English were rather deeply rooted in India, and that Tellicherry must for some time be stronger than Myhie, and Bombay more powerful than Pondicherry, acted warily, and assumed the utmost cordiality and courtesy; which, when it appeared safe to set aside, was lightly thrown off, and a tone of haughty defiance, and insolent contempt adopted in its stead. The French commander, on his arrival, opened a correspondence the most bland and insinuating with the chief of the English factory, who responded in a brusque and business-like tone and form, which contrasts strangely with the studied language of the French commander. This correspondence was singularly characteristic, and throws more light on the men, and their modes at that juncture, than could be brought to bear upon them by a far more extended narrative. This correspondence never appeared in print, except once some years ago, in an Indian periodical; it is, therefore, interesting for its novelty, as it is on account of its "inuendoes, diplomatic evasions, and other curious characteristics." Mr. Adams, the chief, eight years before made the chaplain a present of plate, on which was an inscription in classical Latin; "but if he ever had any scholarship, his letters would show that it had been long ago rubbed off in the warehouse of Tellicherry." The French commander thus opens the communications:—

*On board ship La Vierge de Grace,
November 29th, N. S., 1725.*

MONSIEUR,—I am charmed that the affairs which have conducted me to this coast, have given me this day the pleasure of your acquaintance. It will not be my fault, if there is not a perfect union reciprocally between us.

The subject of my voyage to this place, has no other view than to revenge the insults and perfidiousness that the French nation have received from the Prince of Bur-

* Mr. Mill commits this error uniformly, calling the place *Mahé*, and as most modern writers follow Mill slavishly, this name has obtained currency in England.

gorah, and I shall go directly about making him repent it, if he wont submit to reason. I hope, through the perfect union that is between the two nations, if I should want any succour, to find it from you, whom I address preferably to any other. In return I offer everything that depends upon me, and am perfectly, Monsieur,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
PARDAILLAN GONDRAIN.

P. S.—I am desired by Monsieur Perier to assure Mrs. Adams of his respect, and I have the honour to assure her of mine.

To this polite letter the English chief replied in terms coarse but candid and pertinent:—

Tellicherry, November 20th, 1725.

MONSIEUR,—It was with the greatest satisfaction imaginable I received the honour of yours by Monsieur Louet, and shall on all occasions take the opportunity of cultivating and strengthening our new acquaintance, promising on my part, it shall not be my fault if there is not a perfect union between us, congratulating your safe arrival on this coast.

Am obliged to you for the notice you give me of the occasion of the voyage you have undertaken; the Malahars have always been perfidious, which the English have very often experienc'd, and was design'd for these three years last past to have made Boyanore sensible of their resentment. The reason why they did not know to you. However, may depend shall observe a strict neutrality, and serve you what we can, consonant to the perfect union between the two nations in Europe. But cannot but complain of the usage we have received from Monsieur La Tuet of the *Triton*, to whom have sent twice, to admit our boats to go into the Myhie river, and fetch out the hon'ble company's goods lying there, but he would not permit it. As heard of your coming was not pressing with him, but hope to receive better usage from you, in which request your positive answer, that may accordingly take measure to get those goods, and advise my superiors. Your concurrence in this will demonstrate your resolution to keep to the good union and harmony between the two crowns, and lay me under the obligation of serving you with all readiness.

My wife and self are highly obliged to you and Monsieur Perier for kind remembrance, and in return tender our services, and am, Monsieur,

Your very humble, &c.,

ROBERT ADAMS.

The French landed, conquered, but lost forty men, and on the evening of the same day, their chief wrote to Mr. Adams:—

*From the Camp at Myhie,
December the 2nd, N. S., 1725.*

MONSIEUR,—The gracious letter which you had the goodness to write me, obliges me to give you an account of the descent I made to-day, and forced the intrenchment, which appears to me different from what the Indians are accustomed to make.

Where I took two pieces of caannon. I believe this will give you pleasure from the regard you have to what relates to me. I shall not fail acquainting you of what happens for the future in this expedition, having the honour to be perfectly, Monsieur, &c. &c.,

PARDAILLAN GONDRAIN.

P. S.—Suffer me, if you please, to place in this my respects to Mrs. Adams.

One came and assured me, sir, that they saw very nigh this morning, in the time of action, ten Englishmen. I would not believe it to be true, but I am obliged to tell you, sir, that all Europeans which I find with arms in their hand I shall hang.

The skill displayed in blending politeness with insinuations against the English is admirable. The trenches were not such as the Indians were accustomed to make, and as there were no other Europeans in the neighbourhood but the English of Tellicherry, the implication was plain. Ten Englishmen were seen "very nigh," in the time of action. The polite commander, of course, could not believe the like, but, at the same time, out of pure love and courtesy was obliged to inform his English friend that all Europeans found in arms he would hang; as if Europeans had not a right to take service with a native prince. The plain-spoken Englishman denied the impeachment, and urged the redress of grievancés:—

Tellicherry, November 21st, 1725.

SIR,—This night was honoured with your favours of this date, and am obliged to you for an account of your success against Boyanore, in which wish you joy.

Am sorry any one should inform you that any English were under arms against you this day. That would be acting the same that have so often complained of; therefore you will harbour no such thought.

In my last, wrote you about some merchandise that lies in Myhie river, belonging to my hon'ble masters, to which you have not been pleased to reply. Beg the favour futarely you will please to write your mind on that and other public affairs to John Braddyll, Esquire, who is here a commissary for the hon'ble English company on this coast.

My wife and self are obliged to you, and in return she gives her respect, and I am, sir, &c. &c.,

ROBERT ADAMS.

The directness of the Englishman brought the diplomatic quibbling and nonsense of the French commander to bay. He at once dropped his politeness, addressed the council instead of his friend "the English chief," and intimated his scorn of mercantile matters:—

*To the Council for affairs of the English
nation at Tellicherry.*

*From the Fort at Myhie,
December 4th, N. S., 1725.*

GENTLEMEN,—I received the letter you had the goodness to write me. You tell me of boats of merchandise which you have in the river. Give me leave to tell you that 'tis talking Greek, for I neither understand, nor will I embarrass myself in affairs of commerce; for I meddle in nothing but matters of war. You may, for the future, in such like cases, apply to Mousieura Molladin and Tremisot,

I have the honour, &c. &c.,

PARDAILLAN GONDRAIN.

The English, still true to their matter-of-fact character; apply to the gentlemen to whom the bombastic commander referred them, who reply that they are too much engaged in war to be tormented with such small affairs of trade; that they could not decide the point even if they had time, and it was worth their while; and finally recommend their interrogators to apply to the council of

Pondicherry. Notwithstanding the strangeness of making a reference to the supreme council for French affairs in India, concerning a matter which was too mean for the French commander, or his mercantile colleagues in direction of French affairs at Myhie, the English, still commonplace, in their own common-sense way, proceeded to appeal to the council for their property and redress of injuries. The tone of these French communications was as devoid of true courtesy as of justice and honour. Further correspondence between the two factories of Myhie and Tellicherry ensued, but no person at either factory understood the language spoken at the other sufficiently well to carry on a clear correspondence, and delays and mistakes resulted, until it was mutually agreed to transact business in Portuguese, as men of that nation, or natives — half-caste Portuguese — resided at both places.

The native chiefs were not slow in learning the true state of feeling between the English and French, and did their best to inflame their jealousies and enmities, fearing that both might unite for purposes of territorial aggrandizement. The Boyanore pretended to ally himself with the English; a "Nair," named Curringboda, ostensibly attached himself to the French, and both European powers were placed by their cunning native allies in an attitude of anger and defiance. No English were allowed to cross the French borders, nor were the latter permitted to pass into British territory; if such a circumstance by chance occurred, the intruders were chased like spies or poachers. The vessels of either nation were forbidden to enter the harbour of the other. A French "muncha" persisted in approaching the harbour of Tellicherry, and when warned off, the crew used insulting language. The offended council at Tellicherry demanded from that at Myhie an apology for the trespass and rudeness of their mariners, and also demanded explanations as to the object of the muncha's voyage, which the English alleged was to land ammunition and military stores for the supply of the Rajah of Cotiote, in order that he might have means of making war upon the Boyanore, so as to prostrate or enfeeble the ally of the English. The object of the French was to make war upon the British indirectly, and without incurring the responsibility of appearing in arms. The French commander apologised in most complaisant terms, which might have been intended for irony, for the rudeness of his sailors, but took no notice of the serious impeachment of stirring up feuds to the damage of the English, and supplying their known enemies with munitions of war. Thus, step

by step, the French were accumulating an amount of injuries to the English, which no attempt was made to explain away, soften, or compensate; and the irritated British were nursing their pent-up rage for the hour of decisive action. The diary of the Tellicherry factory from November 7 to December, 1725, is a journal of grievances against the French.

In 1726 the French and English were very near coming into conflict. The Boyanore was attacked by the French. The latter pretended various grievances, but the real motive was to weaken the relative power of the English by the conquest of their most ostensible ally, and to produce a moral effect among the native powers, by showing that the English were not able to protect their friends against France, and that to incur the ill-will of the latter was destructive to all native powers, whatever their European alliances. This was a bold motive, and the measure was well calculated to carry it out. The Boyanore claimed assistance, for which he offered to pay, a condition upon which the English insisted. They sent him one hundred nairs, but the Boyanore had neither money nor probity, and as he had already contracted a large debt for military supplies, they were unwilling to allow him to increase it. The results were that the Boyanore demanded a truce with the French, and came to terms. The French accomplished their object, the prestige of the English was lowered, and their characteristic habit of adopting a costly economy was once more brought prominently out.

The French were emboldened, and joined the natives that were hostile to the English in every demonstration of ill-feeling. It was at this juncture that the French united in a pretended hunting expedition with certain native chiefs, a circumstance incidentally referred to in a former chapter to show the relation of the English to the native powers around them. The conduct of the French on that occasion was palpably hostile, and the English demanded satisfaction. The reply was somewhat submissive, as if its authors were conscious that they had gone too far, and that they might incur the displeasure of the authorities of Pondicherry; or else they were alarmed at the practical manner in which the English had shown their disapproval of "the hunting party" of native chiefs and French soldiers, by volleys of grape-shot and musket balls. At all events, the tone of the French was apologetic; they declared they merely went a hunting, and were surprised to find the English so unneighbourly, and hoped, for the future, to "live in peace and harmony with all," especially their

European neighbours, and chiefly their British friends. Soon after, the French fired upon an English hunting party—a *bond fide* party of pleasure—and demands for redress were of course made. The French pleaded unqualified innocence. The answer of the chief of the English factory is one of the most remarkable specimens of English diplomacy ever disclosed. The plain-speaking Briton was not to be soothed by heartless words, but in direct terms informed his French correspondents what he thought of them. It is so unique, that the reader cannot fail to peruse it with interest. It is signed by all the members of the council, but the style identifies it as the production of the chief, Robert Adams. The "Cuny Nair" referred to, is the native leader, previously termed "Curringboda," the English having been accustomed to term him "Cunny," or "Cunny Nair," in writing or speaking of him:—

To M. Tremisot and his Council.

Tellicherry, October, 21st, 1736. O.S.

GENTLEMEN,—We just now received yours of this date, by which you acknowledge the receipt of ours of the 16th instant. By this we find, as we have always done, commit what you will, are never at a loss for an evasion, which treatment is grown so old, that it will hardly pass for current at this time of day. It is with satisfaction find you confess to have had some of your people out those days we hunted, which we designed for our recreation, till obstructed by you and your accomplice, Cuny Nair, who of himself would never have dared to have broken the peace with us without your inciting and assisting him, as he did in conjunction with your people, by firing on us first, which was a good reason for us the next day to go with more caution and preparation in our own limits and conquest. It is very unaccountable you of the French nation should not only with your money and ammunition encourage the country against us, but appear personally yourselves in an hostile manner, and till you can deprive us of the evidence of our senses, we shall not fail to continue to charge the French with the breach of the good harmony between the two crowns in Europe, as expressed in our officers' and soldiers' narrative sent you of the actions of the 12th and 13th instant.

We did in ours of the 16th, reply to all you wrote, and did then signify that Cuny Nair to the 12th instant was esteemed by us a friend, and might have continued so, had you not beguiled him with vain promises of protection and charges to disturb us. If this is your meaning of loving tranquillity, we are strangers to it, and shall be proud of being accounted so. As to the contents of what you wrote, we are, and always have been, observers of the peace and good harmony between the two crowns, and find with concern our patiently bearing all your insults, both by sea and land, has not only given you the opportunity to proceed as you have in this hostile manner, but has encouraged you to do what you have lately done with Cuny Nair; but your design not taking effect, are resolved to deny it. Otherwise, might have been as open as Monsieur Boisron of the *Lyllie* was, when he not only seized and detained, but plundered the *Deury* grab of Mangalore.

These your treatments are so plain and obvious, that we need not enlarge on them, and that now you should begin, as did on the 12th and 13th instant, to give us new testimonies of your continuing to disturb us, does not at all

answer your expressions of this date, not to give us any disturbance by land or sea. We should think ourselves very happy, did your actions answer your writing; then we could be able to say, as we have always made it our study and endeavours to be in good harmony with you; but while you agitate, assist, and excite the country people in friendship with us, not only to take up arms, but appear with them against us in an hostile manner as above, you must pardon us if, in making the just and true representation, we occasion you any uneasiness or confusion, for we cannot but say, your usage, for these three years last past, has been without regard to laws of nations or nature; and as to Cuny Nair, who has broke his faith with us, whenever we think convenient to call him to an account for it, shall not, we hope, find any of your people with him; which will induce us to be, gentlemen,

Your most humble and most obedient servants,

ROBERT ADAMS.
JOHN JOHNSON.
STEPHEN LAW.
WM. FORBES.
HUGH HOWARD.

Probably, under the circumstances in which it was penned, no communication could have been more pointed and prudent. The French had all the advantage of style and dexterity; the English, whatever their disadvantages in those particulars, were so "downright straightforward," as to cause confusion to their intriguing rivals, and leave them little power to reply to any purpose.

Soon after the suave expressions of the French in this correspondence, the English received certain intelligence of the hostility of Cuny Nair. It will be recollected by the reader, from the perusal of previous chapters, that there were several hills in the immediate vicinage of Tellicherry. These, if occupied strongly by the British, would enable them to command the plains and the land approaches: if occupied by an enemy, Tellicherry would be untenable, and on this account the situation was deemed ineligible by military men, as requiring a larger garrison than the amount of its commerce could afford. Myhie, on the other hand, could not be commanded, while its own position was elevated and strong. One of the hills near Tellicherry, the occupation of which by an enemy might prove perilous, was called Putinha, and this Cuny Nair intended to seize. The English reasonably believed that this movement was impelled by French instigation, which the subsequent conduct of the authorities at Myhie proved. The English anticipated Cuny, and occupied the hill themselves. There was another hill under the guns of the English fort, called Caria Cuna, and as soon as the French perceived the movement of the British towards Putinha, they seized the other eminence. Another correspondence ensued, which issued in a conference. One Louet visited Tellicherry, and debated affairs with the British, but this

conference did not prove satisfactory. Stephen Law and William Forbes proceeded as an English deputation to Myhie. The hospitalities shown in each case to the delegates softened the asperity of the contest, and the affair ended in "a drawn battle," both parties abandoning the military positions assumed, and Cuny keeping himself out of the way. On the whole, the dispute ended favourably to the British, for, practically, they succeeded in their object, although their demands for apology were not satisfied.

The military expenses of both British and French factories now so alarmed the directors of each company, that orders were sent out to cultivate a good understanding. The French only intended to cultivate it so long as necessity constrained, and hoped to recruit the sinews of war for a better opportunity. The English were in earnest, and orders were issued to the council of Tellicherry to reduce their armed forces, and to cultivate a kind intercourse with their Gallic neighbours. As the distance between the two settlements was so short, it was easy to reciprocate courtesies and hospitalities, which were for a while abundant, and apparently cordial, but the French continued to intrigue with the native princes against the English, and to the disturbance of the country, as far as their clever but mischievous influence reached.

In 1728 a treaty of peace and alliance was signed by the governors of Bombay and Pondicherry, and the directors of the East India Company in London, and the president and council in Bombay believed that differences were healed; but the Tellicherry people knew better, and while carrying out the directions of their superiors with frankness, did not relax their vigilance, nor increase their confidence in the political honesty of their new allies.

The English, who had been long enduring, became at length testy, and rather disposed to end harassing disputes, suspicions, and inquietude by arms. They ceased to be anxious for peace with French or natives, although they did not then see on what a grand scale of action the warlike powers of themselves and their countrymen in India should be soon tested. As the year 1740 approached, the tone of feeling in Bombay and Madras, on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, at Surat and on the Hoogly, was that of a sullen conviction that, some time or other, French gasconade and aggression would provoke war. The English did not desire it, but, as the French say, they "accepted the situation,"—they gradually conformed their minds to the conviction that it was best to fight it out, unless some decisive measure of peace in Europe should harmonise elements which so

actively repelled one another. This state of mind probably prevailed more at Tellicherry than anywhere else in India, from the juxtaposition of the settlement and garrison of Myhie. The pugnacious feeling created in the minds of the English by the conduct of the French found vent sometimes in a wrong direction, and made them too hasty in entering into native quarrels, which, in a calmer frame, they would have avoided. The combativeness thus called forth again reacted upon their tone and bearing towards the French. Events beyond their control, and the working of which was hidden, were preparing them for the development of the warlike genius, activity, and daring, which so soon made them masters of an empire. Probably the disturbances and disorder within the factory at Myhie, in 1739, prevented the occurrence then of the collision to which circumstances were fast ripening. The consciousness that the English were the stronger also averted overt acts on the part of the French, who were still further held in check by the derangements of their commercial and economical affairs.

In 1740 tidings arrived in India that England had declared war against Spain, and that it was believed in Europe France would, as usual, espouse the cause of the enemies of England. Previous to the arrival of this news, a war of correspondence was waged; but the advent of such information created an excitement which could with difficulty be repressed. The French, as usual when any difference ensued, and they supposed themselves strong enough, made hostile demonstrations. The British at Tellicherry had fortified one of the neighbouring hills, called Andolamala; the French formed intrenchments near it. The English, regarding this as an aggression, did not, as formerly, write blunt letters, or hold conferences, but directed a small party of soldiers, under the command of an ensign, to assault the trenches. This was admirably executed. The attacking party was small, and but one European officer with it. The French opened a heavy fire upon the advancing party when within range; but so rapidly, boldly, and orderly did the British charge, that they entered the trenches with little loss, and drove out the enemy with so much ease as to excite the contempt of the natives and deeply to humiliate the vaunting soldiers by whom the trenches were so insolently opened and occupied. The humiliation of the Gauls did not end with their defeat; they did not dare to strike another blow; but, instead of gallantly seeking to retrieve their disgrace, they endeavoured to bribe the native chiefs to make war in their stead. The result of the action to the English was a great in-

crease of their moral influence and self reliance. The event did not certainly dispose them to put up with further insults, which the French continued to offer in such way as to leave a declaration of hostilities on the part of the English on such ground impossible, while the affronts, nevertheless, irritated and annoyed.

Tellicherry was the focus, or, at all events, the principal focus, when there were several foci, of quarrel with the French. The factory at Ajengo, the progress and general troubles of which were related in a former chapter, was one of the points around which French influence and menace gathered; but as the Dutch preferred learned despatches to war, so the French preferred gasconade and display to any immediate appeal to arms, although they made it evident enough they were willing to strike but dared not. The English factors at Ajengo were as invulnerable to French satire as to Dutch casuistry: they pursued the even tenor of their way, and carried on their correspondence with the French with much less respect for their adversaries than when addressing the Dutch, notwithstanding the overlaid courtesy and compliment of the letters and despatches of the former.

At Carwar and Honawar, on the Malabar coast, the English were annoyed by the presence of French agents in the neighbourhood, fomenting disputes between the native chiefs, stimulating them against the English, and sowing seeds of envy and anger among the neighbouring Dutch and Portuguese, which were as prolific as those who scattered them could desire. Still it was at Tellicherry not only so far as Western India was concerned, but taking all India into account, that intrigues and open acts of hostility on the part of the French had the best opportunity of development; and when all was comparatively calm in the British settlements of Malabar, disturbances between British and French broke out again at Tellicherry and Myhie. The French troubles appeared to have been hushed to slumber at the other stations—even St. David's was comparatively little tormented by Pondicherry—when at Tellicherry there occurred new alarms and discontents.

In 1741 the expectations of a general war in Europe were yet more prevalent in India than they were, as above noticed, in the beginning of 1740. France and England, although virtually at war from 1740, were not actually in hostilities until 1744; accordingly, authors date the commencement of this war very variously, some considering that it properly commenced in 1742, others before that time, and another class of writers dating its commencement from 1744.

It was natural that the Europeans in India should in their own political relations be keenly susceptible of any impression from symptoms which portended a struggle between the two great maritime powers of Europe, when it is remembered how frequently their swords were drawn against one another. The relations of the two great contiguous European countries as to peace and war over a long period of history may be thus stated. There broke out wars between England and France at the following dates, and which lasted for the following periods:—"1100 for two years; 1141, one year; 1161, twenty-five years; 1211, fifteen years; 1224, nineteen years; 1294, five years; 1339, twenty-one years; 1368, fifty-two years; 1442, forty-nine years; 1492, one month; 1512, two years; 1521, six years; 1549, one year; 1557, two years; 1562, two years; 1627, two years; 1666, one year; 1689, ten years; 1702, eleven years; 1744, four years; 1756, seven years; 1776, seven years; 1793, nine years; and lastly, in 1803, twelve years: making in all 265 years of war within a period of 727 years."

The ideas of French power which prevailed amongst Englishmen, and amongst the men of other European nations in 1741, were very different from those which now prevail:—"During the early period of these wars, our continental rival continued preponderant, and the revenue and population considerably exceeded that of this country. The revenue of Louis XIV. was computed at nearly three times that of Charles II. The alliance against France, cemented by the perseverance of William, rendered victorious by the talents of Marlborough, relieved us from the dreaded overthrow of the political equilibrium; but even after our splendid successes, it continued a common opinion among foreigners, as among ourselves, that the resources of the French were more solid, and that they would soon equal or surpass us in those arts which form the constituents of national wealth.

"In the reign of George I., this country bore to France in point of population the proportion of only forty-five to one hundred. Were we to continue the parallel, we should find that as to population we shall probably overtake our ancient rival before the lapse of many years. Meantime, those who know that the issue of a military struggle mainly depends not so much on population as on disposable revenue, will be satisfied that at present we should have no cause to dread a contest single-handed with that power, against which our forefathers were obliged to seek continental alliances."*

* Colburn's *United Service Magazine*, January, 1857.

Between 1740 and 1744 the animosity between the two nations was intense, and their resources were squandered in indirect war. From the death of Charles VI., Emperor of Germany, in 1741, the certainty of an open and ostensible rupture between England and France at no distant date was obvious to every reflecting person in Europe and among Europeans in Asia.

At Tellicherry and Myhie, the grand struggle during this brief interval consisted of efforts to prevent either factory from its usual participation in the trade of pepper—a common source of quarrel between European nations in the East, and one peculiarly embittered. During that time, matters generally went in favour of the English; they secured by their more direct diplomacy the confidence of the native chiefs, who admired the French more, but trusted the English better. The English continued to receive lavish expressions of French compliment, and replied by unpolished, plain spoken, but on the whole civil letters, the writers of which cared nothing for French courtesy, and had no reliance on French honour. Meanwhile, the British had taken up the French game of intriguing with the native chiefs against their neighbours, and played it well; so well, that for eight months the settlements of France were blockaded by native powers at English instigation. Among the French no man, at least no public man, understood the true policy to be pursued by a European power in India, except the gallant and wise Labourdonnais. In 1740 his Asiatic services were so appreciated in France, that not only was he welcomed to his country with acclamation, but the honour was conferred upon him of returning to the East in command of both a fleet and army. He had previously, as the reader has seen, shown his warlike genius at Myhie in a comparatively humbler although honourable capacity; at the time now under review, he equally displayed it as a sagacious statesman and naval commander. On the 13th of November, 1741, he arrived at Myhie not only with naval and military authority, but as supervisor of French trade. Upon his arrival, he opened a correspondence with the English factors at Tellicherry, proposing accommodation and friendship. He was sincere; and the language in which he expressed himself showed the goodness of his heart and the greatness of his nature. He of course objected to those demonstrations of force which the English so frequently made against the French settlements in favour of their native enemies; and requested that in an attack contemplated by the French upon the Boyanore and Namburis, who were then blockading Myhie from the land, that

the English would not send succours of war either by land or sea; and if English boats came within a certain distance in spite of his warning and request, he begged that he might not be considered hostile if they were searched, to ascertain whether munitions were conveyed in them for his foes. His request was reasonable, and it would have been impossible to convey what duty and necessity dictated in language more manly, honest, just, and conciliatory. The reply of the English chief was civil and cold; he admitted the propriety of searching English boats, but took no notice of the other demands. The fact was, the predecessors of Labourdonnais had brought about a state of things which could not be removed by the kind and sincere policy of that great and good man. The French had entered upon a certain game, into which they had forced the English; and the latter were not likely to allow them to draw the stakes when there was a prospect of success to English pertinacity and common sense.

Labourdonnais stormed the native intrenchments, defeated Boyanore in the open field; followed up his successes in a short but brilliant campaign, and compelled the troublesome Indian to cede territory around the factory at Myhie, within a circumference swept by a radius of an English mile.* The French commander and supervisor then visited the English, for whom he had a cordial respect, which they appreciated, and received him with distinguished honour. His object was to conciliate and reconcile, as a Christian obligation, and a sound policy in the Asiatic interests of France, of the prospects of which he alone, amongst all the French officers and traders of the time, is known to have had foresight.

He proposed a treaty, several articles of which were characterized by justice, good sense, and moderation. One of these articles stipulated the mutual abandonment of all outlying forts, and military positions which only served as demonstrations of hostility, and created to both factories expenses destructive of the profits of their trade. The English freely accepted this point, for they had confidence in Labourdonnais, although not in his countrymen generally. Another article was that all differences between the natives and either the French or English, should be arbitrated by that one of the two European powers not mixed up in the dispute, and in case the native chiefs refused the arbitration, a combined force of French and English should enforce what appeared just to both. This was too complicated a proposal for the English factors; they preferred ending their

* *Diaries of Bombay and Tellicherry.*

own quarrels without French assistance, and they were not disposed to aid the French against the natives in quarrels which did not involve the interests of the East India Company. The proposal of Labourdonnais was transmitted for decision to the council of Bombay. After much deliberation the articles were agreed to and ratified at Bombay and Pondicherry.

The British, after the signature, became more hopeful of peace, and reduced their military forces; they also razed the forts of Putinha, Andolamala, and Termala. Labourdonnais being honest, and in earnest, the French forts of Canamala, Peringature, Chimbera, and Poitera, were razed. Labourdonnais appeared no more upon the western shores of India, but in other directions he made his genius and warlike power felt while the war between the two nations raged in the East. According to Raynal he was the first who suggested the desirableness of dispatching royal ships of war to the Indian seas.

On the withdrawal of Labourdonnais from Myhie, a factor named Leyrit assumed the government. He continued to maintain good relations with the English as recommended by Labourdonnais. The neighbouring native chiefs were alarmed at seeing the amity of the two European nations; and well understanding how easy it was to disturb it, they agreed among themselves to adopt whatever schemes were most likely to bring to pass some interruption to the prevailing harmony. The Boyanore, now an ally of the French, obstructed English trade, and the French, notwithstanding the binding obligations of the recent treaty, did not adopt any means to persuade or deter him from doing so, as they reaped a temporary profit by his proceedings. The King of Colestry defied and irritated the French, assuming that he did so as the champion of the English. A coolness sprung up; yet neither party was disposed to break the peace. In 1744 the chief of Tellicherry informed the president at Myhie that war between their respective countries had

been declared in Europe, but he proposed that, nevertheless, they should remain good neighbours; and to prevent any misinterpretations of the good understanding, it was agreed that their troops should not fire upon one another within sight of the factory flags. The English went still farther in their peaceful dispositions, and having been very successful in purchases of pepper, they sent eighty caudies of it to Myhie. The French returned naval salutes, and restored English deserters. The two companies encouraged these peaceful manifestations, and the chief French authority in Pondicherry ratified all that had been done at Myhie. The president and council of Bombay believed that such a compromise was injurious to the interests of the English nation generally, and more especially in the East, and deemed it better that the two nations should carry on the war at home and abroad until victory decided the mastery. The English government was of the same opinion. The chief at Tellicherry was censured by the government of Bombay, pointing out to him that the French were merely espousing a truce to gain time, their Eastern forces being inferior to those of England. At Myhie this was more evidently the case, as the exchequer of the factory was drained by pompous military spectacles, and continuous military expeditions, and once more, in the moment of perplexity, the Boyanore invested the place.

Such were the positions of the two powers in India, when the first bolts of war fell and shook the realms over which the mighty storm, long preparing, at last spent its force. There was a capriciousness and singularity about French and English relations in Western India. When the parent powers were at perfect peace, their factories were waging "a little war:" when there was open hostility in the British Channel, the factories were exchanging salutes, making presents, offering compliments, and vowing perpetual amity. It is necessary now to turn to other departments of the field of struggle, and to relate the progress of the war itself.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN THE EAST—SURRENDER OF MADRAS—SIEGES AND ASSAULTS OF FORT ST. DAVID BY THE FRENCH—SIEGE OF PONDICHERRY BY THE BRITISH—PEACE IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE.

WAR between France and England having been declared, and the efforts of the traders of both nations *in some* of the stations in India to preserve neutrality having proved unavailing, the conflict began at Madras in 1746. On the 14th of September that year, a French fleet, under the gallant Labourdonnais, anchored between four and five leagues to the south of Madras, and landed six hundred soldiers, seamen, and marines. The troops moved by land, while the fleet coasted during the remainder of that day and the morning of the ensuing. About mid-day of the 15th, they arrived before the city. Labourdonnais effected, without opposition, the landing of the remaining French infantry. The assailing force consisted of more than one thousand French, four hundred sepoy, drawn from the various French stations, chiefly Pondicherry, and four hundred blacks of Madagascar, called Caffres, who had been employed as a garrison in the French settlement of the Mauritius, and were well-disciplined by Labourdonnais himself. The troops landed were little short of two thousand men, and an equal number were on board the fleet to act as occasion might require.

The garrison was by no means adequate to cope with such a force, led by one of the best commanders of the age. The soldiers were two hundred, one hundred of whom were English volunteers, and were utterly inexperienced in war. These were all that could be relied upon. There were between three and four thousand Portuguese Indians who sympathized more with the French than with the British, and were not armed. The Syrian Christians and Jews were pretty numerous, and would have proved faithful to the English, but they were not warlike, and the British did not place that confidence in them which they deserved. Concerning the quality of the garrison, Professor Wilson remarks:—"A letter to a proprietor of India stock, published in 1750, by a person who was evidently concerned in the government of Madras at the time, states, that the soldiers were not only few, but of a very indifferent description; that the town was ill provided with ammunition stores, and that its fortifications were in a ruinous condition: the necessity for rigid economy at home, having withheld the means of maintaining the establishment abroad in a state of efficiency."

The governor was summoned to surrender, and refused. A bombardment opened from the whole fleet, and the artillery landed with the invaders. Notwithstanding the weakness of the defence, the bombardment was continued five days without any attempt to storm. The troops of the garrison were worn out, the native inhabitants filled with terror, and the half-caste Portuguese disaffected; the fortifications could no longer protect their defenders, and as an assault must be successful, the president offered a ransom. Labourdonnais was too much of a politician to accept the like. He knew that if the French flag was seen floating above Madras, it would produce a moral effect not inferior to a similar triumph at even Goa or Batavia, and he insisted upon surrender. Mr. Mill describes him as coveting "the glory of displaying French colours on the ramparts of St. George," which is not accordant with the temper, character, or conduct of Labourdonnais: he was solely actuated by a sense of duty and honour, and a clear view of the policy that suited his country.

While he insisted upon capitulation, he pledged his honour to restore the settlement upon payment of a moderate ransom of 100,000 pagodas, or rather bonds for the payment of that amount were given by the president, and the city surrendered. The conduct of Labourdonnais was as gentle while a victor, as it was fearless in war. He had not lost a man during the bombardment, and as he did all in his power to avoid bloodshed, only four or five English perished. His care in directing the shells, so as to inflict as little injury as possible upon private property, enabled him to effect his conquest with only the destruction of a few houses of the inhabitants. Labourdonnais gained a complete ascendancy over all with whom he came in contact; he was beloved alike by English and natives, his bearing was not that of a victor, but of a friend: even of his private fortune, he contributed to alleviate distresses, which, as a French officer, he could not avoid inflicting. History has not often recorded one so brave, so good, so tender, and so just in victory as this great and glorious man.

An English fleet had been dispatched from England, but the admiral having died, the command devolved upon the senior captain, who was deficient in skill and spirit, and evaded

a conflict with Labourdonnais, remaining in the harbour of Trincomalee, so that the French admiral was in effect not only master of Madras, but of the Indian seas.

Labourdonnais had a more formidable enemy than the English—Dupleix, the governor of Pondicherry, and supreme chief of all the French factories in India. He was a man of superior, of even great, intellectual parts, but of the lowest moral qualifications for his post. His envy was mean, his ostentation childish, his desire of praise avaricious, his ambition boundless and utterly unprincipled. He could conceive the greatest undertakings, and carry them out with a genius corresponding to that which devised them. No want of political intrigue was too intricate for him to comprehend or disentangle; but where the risk of personal safety was concerned, he was without courage, even if the completion of his dearest designs depended upon its exercise. He had the greatness of mind which belongs to the purely intellectual, but was without magnanimity, for it was never shown towards foes or friends, vanquished or victors, competitors in the same career, or those who achieved success in any other. He was implacable in his resentments, and degraded his country by using her power to gratify them. He was desirous of promoting French glory, but chiefly that France might be under obligation to him: he wished her to be made conspicuous by a light shining from himself. Such was Dupleix, and he never displayed these evil qualities more than in his conduct to Labourdonnais, and his opposition to what that magnanimous man proposed. When Dupleix heard of the success of Labourdonnais, his mind was filled with strangely conflicting emotions. Hatred to the English caused him to receive the intelligence with gratification—envy of Labourdonnais, filled him with mortification. He conceived the idea of so thwarting his own countryman, as to deprive him of his honour, if not of his glory, and of so treating the English, whom Labourdonnais respected, as to humiliate their generous friend and conqueror. Like the heroic Russian general who conquered Kars, Labourdonnais became the friend and protector of the valiant and unfortunate, whom nothing but fate could conquer; but Dupleix determined to frustrate that benevolence, and reverse that policy. Accordingly he refused to recognise the agreement made by the captor of Madras to restore it upon the payment of an indemnity. Labourdonnais was not a man to be trifled with, even by one so eminent and powerful as Dupleix, and he firmly insisted that the powers with which he sailed from France were inde-

pendent of Dupleix, and that he had not only acted in virtue of them, but under the instructions which he received from the French East India Company, which were characterized by moderation and forbearance. He had it in his power, Professor Wilson affirms, according to those instructions, to destroy or to restore, but not to occupy, Madras. The second of the alternatives, where so strong a nation as England was concerned, was the more politic; but independent of that, destruction and cruelty were revolting alike to the principles and feelings of the great Frenchman.

Unable to deter Labourdonnais, and afraid to take any penal measures of a direct nature against him, Dupleix sent instructions of such a kind, as while not directly overruling the admiral's orders, rendered it difficult for the French officers and agents to know which to obey or what to do. By such means the removal of goods and stores were impeded, and the fleet was unable to leave Madras (the worst point in a storm in all the Indian seas) until the monsoons began. On the night of the 13th of October a storm drove the fleet out to sea. Two of the ships were lost, all hands on board perishing except fourteen. The other vessels were tossed about, dismasted, and nearly wrecks. Dupleix refused all assistance. He next insisted that the date of the restoration of the city, which was to have been two days after the storm, should be deferred three months. Labourdonnais and the English with reluctance consented. The admiral could not remain on such a dangerous coast during the stormy weather which had set in, and on his departure the place was of course surrendered to Dupleix. He immediately violated the treaty in a manner as void of shame as of honour.

When Labourdonnais disappeared with his fleet, the nabob, at the head of a native army, attacked the French, resolving to possess himself of the great city for which the Europeans were contending among themselves. When the French fleet sailed, twelve hundred men were left behind, who had been disciplined by Labourdonnais himself after a peculiar manner, to serve on land or sea. This force encountered the numerous army of the nabob, making dreadful havoc by the rapid service of their artillery, and utterly discomfiting "the Moors." Thus the example was not set by Clive at Plassey, as is generally supposed, of a small European force well disciplined defeating vast numbers of the natives; the little army of Labourdonnais at Madras had that honour. This circumstance is noticed by Orme, but has been lost sight of by English writers generally. Dupleix's purpose



G. Stodart

LORD CLIVE.

From a Painting by N. Dance.

LONDON JAMES S. VIRTUE

of violating the treaty with the English president at Madras, was supported by the public voice at Pondicherry. Mill says (without giving authority for the statement) that Dupleix, by misrepresentation and power, induced or constrained the French merchants to present a petition against the fulfilment of the treaty. With or without such moral support as it was intended to be, Dupleix would have carried out his purpose, and he accordingly executed it with vigour. Madras was plundered; English and natives were not only deprived of their goods, but even of their personal ornaments. The most remorseless Mahratta robber was not less relenting than the French governor. Except some who effected their escape, the English as well as the chief native citizens were brought to Pondicherry as captives, not for the purpose of better security, but to mock them by a public triumphal procession, in which they were made to pass through every indignity that could be heaped upon captives; the French governor took part in the display with vain ostentation, and gave way to malignant and despicable exultation. He triumphed over his enemies and his noble rival after the manner of the most remote and barbarous times, such as had long perished from the usages of all but the weakest and most uncivilized peoples.

Among the captives who were led in that inglorious procession—inglorious to France, to Frenchmen, and above all to the execrable Dupleix—was one youth whom Providence had designed to avenge the indignity put upon himself, his companions, his country, and humanity. That youth was Robert Clive.

The present is a suitable moment in which to state something of the early life of the future conqueror, already passingly brought before the reader. The family of young Clive had been settled in Shropshire, near Market Drayton, on a small estate, for five hundred years, when he was born.* His father was bred to the bar, married a lady of Manchester named Gaskil, and had a numerous family. Robert was the eldest child, and was born the 29th of September, 1725. Young Robert was one of the many notable persons who have confirmed the saying, "the child's the father of the man." His early boyhood revealed the characteristics of his future manhood. He was a lad of indomitable will, obstinate, tyrannical, having the faculty of attaching to him the enterprising and restless, utterly fearless in danger, even loving it for its own sake, so that the wild and reckless adventures of his boyhood were the theme of

conversation for many a mile around Drayton, and for many a year after "naughty Bob" had disappeared from the scenes of his early exploits. Pugilistic encounters, in which he displayed endurance and courage, and mimic warfare among boys, in which he was always a leader of one of the parties, afforded him much delight. At school, boxing, skating, cricket, racing, and all manner of manly games, and of wild and daring adventures, engaged his affections, to the disparagement of literary progress and education. He was the terror of ushers, his defiant spirit brooked no indignity even when consciously in the wrong, and when a mild discipline might prove successful. One of his teachers, it is alleged, predicted that "wild Bobby" would yet be a great man. Lord Macaulay declares "the general opinion seems to have been, that Robert was a dunce if not a reprobate." His lordship does not add, as he might have done, that the opinion was in neither respect well-founded. In all his wildness there was character; he was deeply susceptible of the friendships schoolboys form; he was grateful, and if not dutiful to his parents, he would yet resent the slightest reflection upon them, and speak of them with reverence, regretting his own undutifulness. He was not addicted to books, but he made more progress at school than he got credit for, and possessed a quick discernment, clear judgment, and comprehensiveness of understanding. These intellectual characteristics were, however, more displayed in action than in preparing the lessons set by his preceptors. The intuition with which schoolboys perceive the merits of their companions, led them to invest young Clive with the attributes of a lad of sense and of a hero; their confidence in his courage and capacity in every boyish freak, equalled that with which his soldiers afterwards surrounded him in the broken battalions of Arcot, or followed him upon the desperate field of Plassey. Undoubtedly his chief excellences were, even in boyhood, prompt judgment in undertaking what was practicable, perseverance in carrying out what he undertook, a courage which no danger, however awful, could daunt, and a presence of mind which never forsook him in peril or difficulty. These qualities were exemplified when he climbed the steeple of Drayton Church, to the terror of the quiet inhabitants of that pretty village, as much as they were when he escaped from Pondicherry, captured, and afterwards defended Arcot, surprised French expeditions, or routed native hosts with a few hundreds of men. His chief fault was tyranny, and that he exhibited when he bullied the shopkeepers of Market Drayton, controlled his schoolfellows, and

* *The Life of Robert Clive; collected from the family papers communicated by the Earl of Powis.* By Major-General Sir John Malcolm, K.C.B.

raised insurrections against unpopular preceptors, as much as when he arbitrarily dismissed Captain Armstrong of Bombay while serving under him in Bengal, and when he put down pecculation and jobbery with a high hand in the factories during the hey-day of his power.

It is often the case in the families of men of original genius, that the last to recognise the peculiar parts of the eccentric, or supposed eccentric, person are his own near relations. This was the case with Clive. They did not perceive the mighty strength of this English Samson, and made no allowance for his weaknesses. Yet, their conduct and feelings towards him hardly justified the language of Lord Macaulay. "It is not strange that they gladly accepted for him, when he was in his eighteenth year, a writership in the East India Company, and shipped him off to make a fortune or die of fever in Madras." There is no material in the work of Sir John Malcolm which affords fair scope for placing the conduct of the family in such a light in a treatise professing to be a review of Sir John's biography. The elder Clive had so small an estate, and that encumbered, he made so little by his profession, and had so large a family, that he reasonably accepted the appointment for Robert. The ambition of the young man was, however, to become a Manchester merchant. He loved his mother's relatives, the Gaskils, in that city, and desired to enter upon the active species of mercantile pursuits which have always characterised the trade of that great city. Long afterwards, when far away from England, his thoughts often turned to the happy days he had spent in Manchester, whose scenes and associations he longed to revisit. He seemed to entertain the opinion expressed in a recent work, *Young America Abroad*, by Mr. Train, of Boston, United States, "I would rather be a clerk in London or New York, than the head of a large mercantile establishment in Madras." Thither, however, our young adventurer went, reluctantly bidding adieu to the white cliffs of his country, which he loved so well, and for which he eventually dared and did so much.

Voyages round the Cape are still long, compared with the overland route; before steam was known, the time consumed *viâ* the Cape was still greater; and a century ago, the voyage was rendered very tedious indeed by the architecture of the ships employed in the Indian trade, and the nautical habits of the sailors and captains of that age. Clive, however, had a very long voyage, which consumed a whole year. It is probable that it was, on the whole, a well-spent year—one of thought and reading, of meditation upon the future,

and reflection upon the past. The ships made a several months' stay on the coast of the Brazils, and there Clive studied the Portuguese language, which was always an advantage to him in his Indian career, the traces of the Portuguese being then still fresh upon the shores of the peninsula. Arrived in Madras, he was filled with disgust. He neither liked the place, the situation, nor the people. His pay was inadequate, and he soon incurred debts which harassed his mind. He was haughty, and, like many other adventurers, bold, competent, and self-relying; yet he was shy, and consequently made few acquaintances: he was miserably lodged, home-sick, and unhappy. With all his intrepidity, like Nelson, he was a delicate youth—at all events, out of his own climate; and he suffered greatly from the exhausting heats of all low situations in Southern India. It was not, Sir John Malcolm affirms, until he was several months in Madras that he formed an acquaintance with any family which a youth of his early associations and respectability could visit. He pined for his loved England, and for any one of the paths of honour and enterprise her industry and ambition provided within her own shores. He thus wrote to his relatives:—"I have not enjoyed one happy day since I left my native country. I must confess, at intervals when I think of my dear native England, it affects me in a very particular manner If I should be so blest as to visit again my own country, but more especially Manchester, the centre of all my wishes, all that I could hope or desire for would be presented in one view." Lord Macaulay, in his review of General Malcolm's memoir, says, of these passages, "He expressed his feelings softer and more pensive than we should have expected either from the waywardness of his boyhood or from the inflexible sternness of his later years." It is surprising that the great critic should not have perceived, in Sir John Malcolm's records of the youth of his hero, sufficient evidence of a tender and even a plaintive spirit, which lived within him in spite of all his rougher attributes, as a mild bright star beaming through the darkness and turbulence of a storm. His lordship, in vindicating the nobler attributes of Clive against his calumniators, points out the benignant and affectionate aspects of his disposition, which appear so touchingly amidst even "the inflexible sternness of his later years." While neglected in Madras, he met with some encouragement from the president, who threw open to him his library, which was well stocked with the best books of the day. There Clive studied with assiduity, and, having had the foundation of a

good education, he was able to make available easily the information to be gathered amongst the president's books. He thus emerged into public life neither ignorant of books nor men, and having passed through long periods, in proportion to his years, necessitating reflection by the circumstances of retirement in which he was placed. It does not appear that military reading formed part of his studies: he had, at that time, rather cultivated commercial tastes and ambition; but, as almost every English boy loves stories of military enterprise, he would be likely, from national taste as well as from constitutional sympathy with heroic adventure, to take up books recording the valorous deeds of his loved ancestral England. The singular intelligence on all military subjects shown by him at once, when emergency called for it, strengthens the probability that military history and tactics formed part of his studies. While he lived as a writer in Madras, his conduct was not very dissimilar to that of his boyhood: he was haughty to his superiors, and, without being actually insubordinate, was so wilful as to endanger his situation. It would appear that much of what was strange and wayward, and even bold, in his behaviour arose from disease. From his early youth or childhood, some morbid affliction, perhaps an affection of the brain, which influenced his emotions without obscuring his fine intellect, attended him; and, when lonely and apparently forsaken in Madras, he twice attempted suicide. The instrument used on each of these occasions was a pistol, which both times missed fire when the barrel was pointed to his head. Having convinced himself, on the latter occasion, that the pistol was well loaded, he received the impression that Providence or destiny had designed him for some important purpose, as his life was so miraculously preserved. Such was the state of mind of this young man when borne a prisoner by the perfidious Dupleix to Pondicherry, and there paraded about for the sport of a people who were little better than their then infamous governor. It is easy to conceive how the high spirit of Clive chafed under these indignities; but his resolute will and fertile genius soon found an opportunity to assert themselves: he assumed the disguise of a Mussulman, left the town by night, and reached the English fortress of St. David in safety. Well had it been for Dupleix and for France that the wanderer who so well affected the mien and garb of Islam had been fettered in Pondicherry, or that Labourdonnais' clemency and honour had prevailed, and left the young clerk in "Writers' Buildings," at Madras, until commercial success, dismissal, or suicide

had prevented him from interfering in the field of war with the ambition of the governor of Pondicherry, and the genius of French conquest.

When Clive arrived at St. David's, he, of course, found only occasional employment for his pen; he was in distress, utterly penniless. The indignation of the garrison against the French was great, and every man thought of the sword. Clive requested an appointment as ensign in the company's service, and his desire was granted. Thus began his military career, and, like another great hero, whose deeds in India afterwards won for him immortal renown—the Duke of Wellington—Clive began the routine of his profession by attention to the minutest things, acquiring the detail of discipline, and the rules of war, and forming his soldiers upon his own ideal model of drill and duty. Before he entered the service he gave proof of his audacious courage by a protracted and desperate duel with a military ruffian, whose insults had cowed the civilians at the fort, but which were no sooner directed to Clive than the vaunting desperado was made to feel that he had provoked a man of lofty and unconquerable spirit. When he entered the company's military service he was twenty-one years of age. In this position he must at present remain in our narrative, until other events have passed, and new transactions bring him once more upon the stage of action.

Fort St. David was situated only twelve miles south of Pondicherry, and was one of the most important places held by the company in India. Beside the fort—a comprehensive phrase, which expressed, not only the fortifications and barracks, but the English town—there was a large native town called Cuddalore, inhabited by native merchants and bankers; there were also several large villages, and a country territory more extensive than that owned by the company at Madras. Cuddalore was an imposing and important place. Three sides of the town were towards the land, and were defended by walls and bastions; the fourth side was open to the sea, but a river flowed between it and a high sand-bank, by which the river was separated from the ocean. The agents at Fort St. David took upon themselves the government of English interests along the Coromandel coast, performing the functions of the late presidency of Madras.

Dupleix resolved to reduce Fort St. David, and thereby conquer the whole coast of Coromandel. On the 19th of December, a force consisting of about one thousand nine hundred men, exclusive of officers, marched out from Pondicherry against the English settlement.

About two hundred of this little army were Caffres from Madagascar, trained by Labourdonnais; the rest were nearly all Europeans, but a few were sepoys, and a troop of cavalry was included in the full muster. Fortunately many of the English and loyal natives of Madras fled thence to St. David's, when they perceived that Dupleix had resolved to violate the treaty of Labourdonnais; these swelled the numbers able to defend the fort to more than three hundred men; one hundred, however, were topasses. The English hired two thousand natives, a dismal looking brigade, armed with spears and shields, swords and matchlocks, bows and arrows; these men were called "peons." To these peons muskets were distributed, which, with the matchlocks already possessed by them, changed the promiscuous and comparatively harmless armament into one of some unity and efficiency. These natives were placed upon the walls and bastions of Cuddalore; the English and topasses occupied Fort St. David. The English also applied for assistance to the nabob, who, anxious to avenge his signal defeat by the French at Madras, promised an "army," if the English would bear half the expense: This the British gladly accepted. The French arrived, after a deliberate march, before the fort, and took up an advantageous position, which they had no sooner done, than the nabob's army, numbering ten thousand men, appeared in sight. The French retreated, pursued by the combined forces, and losing one hundred and thirty-two Frenchmen, killed and wounded, of whom, however, only twelve were slain. After that discomfiture, Dupleix, persevering and sanguine, and relying much upon his diplomatic address with the native powers, made overtures of a friendly nature to the nabob, and while thus amusing him, without waiting for any formal arrangement of friendship, he resolved to attack the English by sea. His plan involved a surprise upon the Cuddalore portion of the defences. The scheme was well laid. The flotilla set out, every man confident of success; but a storm arose, and compelled the boats to put back. Having failed in conciliating the nabob, Dupleix sent troops into his territory, hoping thus to keep the army of his highness occupied in defensive movements, while another French force attacked Cuddalore. In accomplishing the first part of this plan Dupleix's troops committed scandalous excesses, which infuriated the nabob against the French nation, towards which his previous resentment was strong. At this juncture Dupleix received a great accession of strength. After the storm which scattered the ships of Labourdonnais, four of the finest of them made for

Acheen to refit; having accomplished that object, they returned. The nabob was easily persuaded that the reinforcements were much larger, and with that destitution of honour so characteristic of the natives of India, he changed sides and became the ally of the French. This circumstance revived the hopes of Dupleix, who described himself as apprehensive of the nabob's army blockading Pondicherry by land, and an English fleet arriving in time to blockade it by sea. Accordingly, on the 13th of March, 1747, a French force approached St. David's. The English auxiliaries skirmished and fell back; the French forced the passage of the river, and took up the position it had occupied when, on the previous occasion, the approach of the nabob's army compelled a retreat. At this juncture the fugitive English fleet was descried making for the roads. The French retreated, and, according to Orme, the retreat was almost a flight. Dupleix, fearing that his ships would be captured, ordered them from Pondicherry to Goa. Thence they continued their flight to the Mauritius, where they found three other royal ships, and the whole prepared to strengthen themselves for operations against the fleet which had arrived to the aid of the English.

The English naval reinforcement consisted of five men-of-war, under Admiral Griffin, and the squadron which had so ingloriously evaded Labourdonnais. Admiral Griffin having, as senior officer, superseded Captain Peyton, who previously held command of the squadron already in those seas, at once urged a course of activity. Having raised the siege of St. David's, he proposed carrying the war into the ports of the enemy, and expressed his intention to organize an expedition against Pondicherry itself. The land forces of the garrison of St. David's were at the same time augmented by reinforcements from England, composed of a few soldiers who came out with Admiral Griffin, a detachment of four hundred sepoys, sent from Tellicherry, and from Bombay one hundred European soldiers, two hundred topasses, and one hundred sepoys. Thus the sepoys trained in Western India were coming into service, although no hope was then entertained that they would ever become so well disciplined, or so extensively employed as was afterwards the case in the company's history. During the remainder of the year one hundred and fifty English soldiers arrived in different detachments, giving strength to the garrison such as it had never before possessed. At the opening of the year 1748, Major Lawrence arrived with the commission of commander-in-chief of the company's forces in India.

Nothing was done by Admiral Griffin against Pondicherry, notwithstanding his demonstrations of activity. He remained in the road of St. David's and sent out his lighter ships as scouts to watch the coast. The French fleet at the Mauritius received orders from Dupleix to convey reinforcements and money to Madras, avoiding an action with the English, but risking it in order to accomplish the object.

In the month of June the French fleet approached St. David's, as if to attack Admiral Griffin, but skilfully evaded doing so, made for Madras, landed the reinforcements, and again fled to Mauritius. Griffin set sail in fruitless search of them. Professor Wilson, in one of his notes to Mill, gives the following account of the way in which the admiral's conduct was subsequently arraigned in England, and his own explanation:—"Admiral Griffin, on his return to England, was brought to a court-martial and suspended the service, for negligence in not having stood out to sea upon first receiving information of the enemy's approach; by doing which, it was argued, he might have frustrated the object of the French squadron, if not have brought them to action. He published an appeal against the sentence, grounding his defence upon his having missed the land-wind on the day before the squadron was in sight, in necessary preparations to strengthen his own ships for an encounter with what his information represented as a superior force, by which he expected to be attacked." While Griffin was in pursuit of the French fleet, Dupleix, ever active, vigilant, and exploitful, resolved to attack St. David's before the admiral could beat back through the monsoon. He accordingly sent a fresh expedition against Cuddalore. French writers agree in awarding praise to the gallant and skilful manner in which Major Lawrence conducted the defence. He made a feint of abandoning the garrison, and the French were thus seduced to approach the walls rather tumultuously; but while applying the scaling ladders Lawrence opened a destructive fire of cannon and musketry, which caused havoc and dismay; the French throwing away their arms in precipitate flight. Lawrence was not in a condition to pursue them into the plain; he contented himself by making fresh dispositions against renewed attack.

The government of England resolved to throw forth more power upon the eastern theatre of the war. The means adopted to retrieve the losses incurred in India are thus described by an eminent historian:—"Nine ships of the public navy, one of seventy-four, one of sixty-four, two of sixty, two of fifty, one of twenty guns, a sloop of fourteen, a

bomb-ketch with her tender, and an hospital-ship, commanded by Admiral Boscawen; and eleven ships of the company, carrying stores and troops to the amount of 1400 men, set sail from England towards the end of the year 1747. They had instructions to capture the island of Mauritius in their way; as a place of great importance to the enterprises of the French in India. But the leaders of the expedition, after examining the coast, and observing the means of defence, were deterred, by the loss of time which the enterprise would occasion. On the 9th of August they arrived at Fort St. David, when the squadron, joined to that under Griffin, formed the largest European force that any one power had yet possessed in India."

Dupleix had improved the interval with his usual foresight and indefatigable zeal. He had laid in stores of all kind in Pondicherry and Madras; the fleet from Mauritius had already landed there a large supply of silver when with the reinforcements it had evaded Griffin. Dupleix, in his own account of his feeling at the time, written years afterwards, stated that he knew the nabob would desert him as soon as he saw the English armaments, and he resolved to make the best use of an alliance which was certain so soon to terminate.* The English at Fort St. David were urgent for active measures against Pondicherry, and they mustered a considerable body of troops which, with the fleet under Admiral Boscawen, it was believed must speedily reduce it.

Little more than two miles south-west of Pondicherry there was a fortified town called Ariancopang, to which the French of Pondicherry could retire if hard pressed there. It was deemed desirable to capture this subsidiary place, and little opposition was expected. The English had no means of obtaining plans of the fortifications, and they were wholly without information as to the resources of the garrison. An assault was ordered, and was repulsed in such a manner as was not flattering to the spirit of the sepoys and topasses in the British service, and who immediately formed a repugnance to the expedition. Batteries were erected, but the guns of the enemy were served with rapidity, precision, and valour. The French, so justly celebrated in war for their skilful defence of fortified places, highly deserved such reputation in this instance. Their sallies were conducted with daring valour, superior enterprise, and military knowledge. On the occasion of a desperate and successful sortie, the English commander-in-chief was borne away from the trenches in spite of the exertions of

* *Mémoire pour Dupleix.*

his soldiers. At last, what the valour and wisdom of this small body of Frenchmen had so well preserved was lost by accident—the powder magazine exploded. The garrison immediately blew up the defences, and retired to Pondicherry, strengthening the force which Dupleix there possessed. Although the approaching season, when the rains would render all warlike operations impossible, demanded haste, the English, with that fatal want of promptitude by which they have so often suffered in war, tarried five days repairing the fortifications, instead of leaving the task to the small garrison intended for its occupation. They then advanced to Pondicherry. When before that renowned place they continued their slow tactics, and their measures were as timid as dilatory. The trenches were opened at nearly twice the usual distance, although there was nothing in the position of the place to require such a departure from the custom of sieges then recognised. When the trenches were formed, after much delay, it was found that they were so far off, the batteries could make no impression on the town. The cannons and mortars of the fleet were nearly useless, and in truth, although Dupleix himself was frightened, the besieged laughed their besiegers to scorn. The intrenchments were carried slowly, cautiously, and awkwardly, to within eight hundred yards of the wall, and then it was found that a morass obstructed the workmen. It was at the same time discovered that at another side of the town from which no approaches were made, the works might have been carried to the foot of the glacis. The batteries erected on the edge of the morass were silenced by the superior cannonade of the enemy.

A whole month had now been wasted, and nothing had occurred in the result of so much labour but disgrace. A council of war was called, which wisely determined to abandon the siege, for the English were incapable of conducting it; their gunners were no match for the French, and the stormy season was at hand, when the ships would be driven away, wreck and loss of life occurring, as in the case of the fleet of Labourdonnais.

When the English retired, Dupleix made much noise about his exploits, writing to France, to the Great Mogul, and to all the

petty princes far and near, declaring that few victories were ever obtained where the disproportion of force was so great. All Pondicherry was in transports; their joy was brilliant as a Bengal light. Probably had the gallant Lawrence not been captured, there would have been cause for mourning. The result upon the interests of France was greatly to enhance them; upon those of England they were depressing. So speedily do Eastern peoples forget the effects of achievements gone by, that all the prestige of English valour passed away, and they were once more looked upon by the natives as essentially unwarlike, although personally brave,—as having vast resources, but not knowing how to make use of them.

Matters were in this condition when news arrived, in November, 1748, of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which put an end to the war, and placed the two parties in India *in statu quo ante bellum*. The English restored their late dearly-bought conquest, and received possession of Madras. Dupleix did all in his power to keep up the old spirit of irritation: he gave out that the French gave the English back Madras to show their charity and to prove that the cause of quarrel did not lie with him. This appeared to the natives as *primâ facie* true, and they wondered at the magnanimity and generosity of Dupleix. The English he taunted with their imbecility, reminding them that, but for events in Europe, he would have driven them out of India. Their operations by sea he derided as much as those by land, and the natives were generally of his opinion. Still somehow, by degrees, an impression gained way among the Indian chiefs that the English had an irresistible power somewhere, that, however incompetent to carry on wars in India, yet their proceedings elsewhere influenced Indian affairs so signally that no other European power made eventually successful war upon them. These impressions were fluctuating, as events raised one party or the other before the observers, whose keen eyes were ever directed to any change in the relative power of the different European interests on the peninsula.

Such were the facts and results of this brief war, which, however, only proved to be the preliminary of future conflict, as the first shock of the earthquake is often but the portent of a coming desolation.

CHAPTER LXIX.

ENGLISH CONQUEST OF THE CARNATIC—WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE RESUMED—
CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE TO THE RETURN OF CLIVE TO ENGLAND.

THE treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle did not long secure peace between the English and French in India. From the first, it was felt to be a hollow truce. Mr. Mill, always severe upon his countrymen, attributes to them the first act of indirect hostility in their armed interference at Tanjore; but this is not just, for it was notorious that Dupleix was enraged by the peace, and made no secret of his intentions to drive the English out of India, to possess himself of the whole Carnatic,* and to found a French dominion in Southern India. The restoration of Madras was made with the worst possible grace, and the French seldom met the English without predicting that the time was at hand when the governor of Pondicherry would rule the Deccan. The English were prevented from settling down into peaceful habits of trade by the menacing position and vaunting language of Dupleix. It was impossible for the English, after the experience of the late war, to disband their native forces and send home their European troops, while the French president retained his, sedulously strengthened his positions, as if preparing for war, and while yet surrendering Madras, and conforming to the terms of the recent peace, was opening new intrigues with the native chiefs of the same character as those which led to so much conflict during so many years. The aim of this ambitious and mischievous man was the same after the peace as during the war: his thirst for conquest and glory was not slaked; he still hoped, by the same means as he had already used, to achieve the end he had so long contemplated. The English determined to foster alliances, and to strengthen their own position.

The first event which broke the calm on the eastern shores of the peninsula after peace was proclaimed was an alliance with Syajee † or Sahujee, prince of Tanjore, on the part of the English. This prince had been deposed by his own brother, a common incident of Indian history. He invoked the aid of the English, and, in return, offered to them the fortress and district of Devi-Cotah, well placed on the banks of the Colaroone. As soon as it was known at Colaroone that an English expe-

dition was preparing at Tanjore, Dupleix affected great horror of the ambitious projects of the English. They took means indirectly to inform him that the place they desired to obtain was of value for trading purposes only, and they were not about to wrest it from its legitimate sovereign, but to conquer it, as his ally. Dupleix pretended that it was necessary for him to seek a counterpoise to English power in another direction, in consequence of this movement, whereas he had secretly been planning the measures already, which he represented as forced upon him by English ambition.

In April, 1749, the Rajah of Tanjore set out from Fort St. David's, accompanied by an English force consisting of four hundred and thirty Europeans and one thousand sepoy. The late war had brought this latter description of force into use as an important arm of Indo-European armies. The artillery attending this brigade was only eight small pieces, four of which were mortars: there was, however, a battering-train sent by sea. The land force was under the command of Captain Cope.*

After a march of ten miles, the British arrived before Devi-Cotah, meeting no regular force, but annoyed by a guerilla warfare throughout the march. This expedition was managed still worse than the siege of Pondicherry, in the war so lately concluded. No communications were kept up with the fleet, on board of which was the heavy ordnance, and although only four miles distant, the army was ignorant of its position. Several shells were thrown at the town from a distance which rendered them harmless. The besiegers retreated, and returned to St. David's after a bootless expedition as ever an army undertook.

The shame of this affair so affected the restored English government of Madras, that they determined upon another expedition, which was sent under Major Lawrence by sea, Admiral Boscawen commanding the flotilla. Mr. Mill thus noticed the motives and feelings prevailing at Madras, in ordering the new attempt upon the coveted prize:—"They exaggerated the value of Devi-Cotah; situated in the most fertile spot on the coast of Coromandel; and standing on the river Colaroone, the channel of which, within the bar, was capable of receiving ships of the largest burden, while there was not a port from Masulipatam to Cape Comorin, which could receive one of three hundred tons: it

* The reader, by turning to the geographical portion of this work, will find much assistance in tracing the course of the contending armies, an assistance without which any account of these conquests must be scarcely intelligible.

† Mill, Murray, and others call him Sahajee.

* Mill erroneously assigns it to Major Lawrence.

was true the mouth of the river was obstructed by sand; but if that could be removed, the possession would be invaluable."

The troops were conducted to the place of debarkation, from whence the walls of the fortifications were battered, until a breach was made; but the river flowed between the walls and the English, and the passage was so commanded from the walls and woods, that unless a large portion of the force could be pushed over at once, the hope of success was small. There were, however, no means for the accomplishment of such an object, and the second expedition was in danger of failing like the first, when a ship-carpenter, named Moore, devised a raft by which four hundred soldiers were passed over at once. When the raft was formed, a new difficulty presented itself, it could not be moved across. Moore bravely volunteered to swim the river, bearing a rope which, fastened to the opposite side, would enable the raft to be pulled across. To facilitate the accomplishment of this project, a heavy fire was opened which compelled the enemy to retire some distance; the brave fellow swam the flood, and executed his task during the night. The troops crossed, the trench was mounted, and the place was stormed. This was, however, not easily performed, and through the rash conduct of Clive, the future hero of India, many valuable lives were lost. He led the storming party. At the head of some Europeans, followed by seven hundred sepoy, he showed the most daring intrepidity, but advancing too fiercely he was separated from his men, who, being without orders, were thrown into confusion, and nearly all cut to pieces. Clive escaped unhurt, after passing through the most imminent dangers.

Major Lawrence, whom Lord Macaulay describes simply as a sensible man, devoid of the attributes of a great soldier, acted at Devicotah, as well as in his other enterprises, in a manner worthy of higher commendation from the great reviewer. He led his whole force across, and, with a skill in which Clive was at that time deficient, he carried the place, almost without loss. The reigning rajah offered to concede to the English the fort and the surrounding territory, if they would abandon the cause of his brother, in whose name they made war. To the disgrace of the British they accepted the overture. Mill says that but for Admiral Boscawen, they would have surrendered him into the hands of the actual rajah. Orme, however, gives a totally different account of the whole transaction. The only redeeming feature in the affair was, that a small allowance for the deposed rajah was exacted by the victors.

The conduct of the English was such that while the French had no pretence to complain of it, both the rajahs had. The English had been the ally of the man against whom they had made war for a bribe which they coveted, and when they found him ready to bestow as much, they basely deserted the cause of the man on whose behalf they took up the enterprise. The only apology for their conduct in that part of their policy was, that his representation of the public feeling of the people of his lost dominion was false, and its subjugation would have involved much cost and loss of men. The errors, politically and morally, into which the English fell in their conduct with the rival nabobs of Tanjore were not such as they had often incurred previously, but were peculiar to the occasion. They were so anxious to make a powerful counterpoise to the French, that honour and honesty were forgotten; "they stuck at nothing," as a writer more expressive than elegant remarked. The English at first made mistakes in policy, chiefly from applying the principles of international law known and recognised in Europe, to people who were ignorant of those principles, and who could see no propriety or justice in their application when those laws were pleaded or proposed as bases of treaty, grounds of amity, or reasons for redress. But in the short and inglorious war with Tanjore, the conduct of the English was truly oriental, and, on the whole, suffered by comparison, morally, with the policy of the reigning rajah. A time had now arrived when it was very difficult for any European nations to conduct relations with the natives, on any principles regarded as right and necessary in Europe, although all made a show of doing so. "The situation of India was such that scarcely any aggression could be such without a pretext in old laws or recent practice. All rights were in a state of utter uncertainty; and the Europeans who took part in the disputes of the natives confounded the confusion, by applying to Asiatic politics the public law of the west, and analogies drawn from the feudal system. If it were convenient to treat a nabob as an independent prince there was an excellent plea for doing so,—he was independent, in fact. If it were convenient to treat him as a mere deputy of the court of Delhi, there was no difficulty,—for he was so in theory. If it was convenient to treat his office as an hereditary dignity, or as a dignity held during life only, or as a dignity held during the pleasure of the great Mogul, arguments and precedents might be found for every one of these views. The party who had the heir of Baber in their hands, represented him as the undoubted,

legitimate, the absolute sovereign, whom all subordinate authorities were bound to obey. The party against whom his name was used did not want plausible pretexts for maintaining that the empire was in fact dissolved, and that though it might be decent to treat the Mogul with respect, as a venerable relic of an order of things which had passed away, it was absurd to regard him as the real master of Hindostan.*

The English had begun to understand this state of things. What Lord Macaulay describes as the views of Dupleix may be said of his rivals and enemies at this time, and explains the readiness with which in Tanjore the English espoused the cause of one brother against another in pretension to the rajahlik. "The most easy and convenient way in which an European adventurer could exercise sovereignty in India, was to govern the motions, and to speak through the mouth, of some glittering puppet, dignified by the title of nabob or nizam."†. When once the English adopted this view of Indian policy, they practised it with a success of which their Tanjore escapade gave no promise.

In the transactions thus recorded, Clive was a very prominent actor. He had only begun his military career when tidings of peace between England and France having arrived, the conflicts in India were for a time stopped, and Madras being restored, Clive retired from his temporary soldiering to resume his duties in "Writers' Buildings." He could use both sword and pen, but the sword best became him. Although historians say little of him in connection with the siege of Pondicherry—as indeed the records of English historians are altogether meagre concerning that event—yet Clive greatly distinguished himself. His distinction appears, however, not to have been for skill, but for courage. The same was the case in the war with the Rajah of Tanjore, for which he volunteered as lieutenant from his desk at Madras. Both before Pondicherry and in Tanjore, he was remarkable for the influence he gained over the sepoys, the excellent discipline to which he brought them, and the readiness with which they followed him into danger, where he constantly and recklessly placed himself. He understood the sepoys better than any other man at that time in India; he had a remarkable capacity for discerning their feelings, and a knack of winning their confidence; as he said afterwards, "I twined my laurels round the prejudices of

the natives." It does not appear that he had analyzed the springs of those prejudices, or penetrated the philosophy of the native religions; but as conscience did not prevent him accommodating himself to their superstitions, there was no barrier between him and them, such as usually exists where an officer is scrupulous in religious matters. A friend of his, named Hallyburton, who probably set Clive the example of disciplining the natives, and who possessed great talent as a regimental officer, was shot dead by one of his own sepoys, to whose prejudices he had given unconscious offence. This produced a deep impression on the sensitive heart of Clive, and seems to have impressed him with the necessity of going any and every length with the peculiarities of the native mind. It was Clive's policy from the beginning to put much confidence in such native officers as appeared to him to possess military talents, and through them he exercised more influence over the natives than by direct intercourse with them. All, however, whether officers or soldiers, adored him for his heroism, and they conceived at once a pride in following a leader who always chose the path of peril, and assumed the most imminently dangerous position for himself. After the short war with Tanjore, Clive again returned to his desk, and probably would have remained in pursuit of commerce, notwithstanding his military taste and his recent daring exploits, if new events had not called him again to arms. Lord Macaulay at once describes the condition at this time of the man, and the empire whose fortunes he was destined to influence so signally, in a single paragraph:—"While he was wavering between a military and a commercial life, events took place which decided his choice. The politics of England attained a new aspect. There was peace between the English and French crowns; but there arose between the English and French companies trading to the East a war most eventful and important, a war in which the prize was nothing less than the magnificent inheritance of the house of Tamerlane."

It is true that the ensuing war was *in its ultimate results* for the possession of all those regions over which Tamerlane once rode upon the tide of conquest; but the immediate conflict was for *ascendancy* only in a single province of the many territories which made up the mighty empire of the sovereigns of Hindostan. His lordship is virtually correct in describing the war as between the two European companies, although in fact, Dupleix, in spite of his company, or by misrepresentations designedly made, so far as he had their consent, strode over the land in the

* *Critical and Historical Essays; contributed to the Edinburgh Review.* By Thomas Babington Macaulay. *Essay on Clive.*

† *Ibid.*

love of conquest, with the morbid desire for military glory peculiar to a Frenchman, and with all the animosity prevalent in those days in the minds of the French towards England.

The unfortunate expedition of the English to Tanjore strengthened the influence of Dupleix with the native princes, and enabled him, with some show of reason, to assure the French company that the English were bent upon aggrandizement, in order to counteract which it was necessary for him to make extensive native alliances, to weaken the power and influence of native rulers friendly to the English, and, should occasion arise, to assert the supremacy of the French nation by arms. The French company were apprehensive of the policy of Dupleix and the power of England. They desired to enrich themselves by trade, and by territorial resources, acquired gradually and as peacefully as possible. They wished by trick and treaty to get hold of the lands which lay nearest to their factories, but dreaded warlike expenses, and protested that above all cares committed to Dupleix, stood the responsibility of breaking peace with the powerful English. The government of France sympathised with the company, with which (as was shown in a previous chapter) it was identified in a manner more closely than the English, or any other European government, was with the Eastern trading company which they respectively supported. The French king knew that however slow to arm the English were as a nation, they were still slower in laying down their arms when once taken up in war; and his majesty, through the company, enforced a policy of peace with the English, but gradual and safe encroachment upon the natives. Dupleix, however, continued in a subtle and ingenious manner to turn all his instructions from home to his own purposes, and while affecting to be very amenable to his government and the French company, to act independently, and carry on step by step his projects for ousting the English, and becoming lord of Southern India.

The time at length arrived for the new era of conflict, and, for the English, of strangely mingled reverses and victories, until their chequered fortunes assumed the character of a great and deeply interesting romance, made actual by the interposition of all-powerful destinies. Lord Macaulay describes the occasion of the approaching struggles, and the policy which availed itself of such occasion, in the following manner:—"In the year 1748 died one of the most powerful of the new masters of India, Nizam-ool-Moolk, viceroy of the Deccan. His authority descended to his

son, Nazir Jung. Of the provinces subject to this high functionary, the Carnatic was the richest and the most extensive. It was governed by an ancient nabob, whose name the English corrupted into Anaverdy Khan. But there were pretenders to the government both of the viceroyalty and of the subordinate province. Mirzapha Jung, grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk, appeared as the competitor of Nazir Jung; Chunda Sahib, son-in-law of a former nabob of the Carnatic, disputed the title of Anaverdy Khan. In the unsettled state of law in India, it was easy for both Mirzapha Jung and Chunda Sahib to make out a claim of right. In a society altogether disorganized, they had no difficulty in finding greedy adventurers to follow their standards. They united their interests, invaded the Carnatic, and applied for assistance to the French, whose fame had been raised by their success against the English in their recent war on the coast of Coromandel. Nothing could have happened more pleasing to the subtle and ambitious Dupleix. To make a nabob of the Carnatic, to make a viceroy of the Deccan, and to rule under their names the whole of Southern India, this was indeed an attractive prospect. He allied himself with the pretenders, and sent four hundred French soldiers, and two thousand sepoy^s disciplined after the European fashion, to the assistance of the confederates. A battle was fought; the French distinguished themselves greatly. Anaverdy Khan was defeated and slain. His son, Mohammed Ali, who was afterwards well known in England as the nabob of Arcot, and who owes to the eloquence of Burke a most unenviable immortality, fled with a scanty remnant of his army to Trichinopoly, and the conquerors became at once masters of almost every part of the Carnatic."

It is not necessary in this history to trace the conflicts which followed. The fortunes of the various native princes concerned changed rapidly as the scenes in a diorama, but amidst all these changes the genius of Dupleix triumphed, and wherever the French fought they maintained the reputation for gallantry which their nation had acquired throughout the world. In the various tests to which their bravery was put, their officers did not particularly distinguish themselves, and their chief leaders were sometimes incompetent. Dupleix himself avoided all exposure to danger, alleging that the smoke and noise of battle were unfavourable to his political

* This is an exaggeration of the number of sepoy^s by several hundreds, but there was a Caffre force which had landed at Pondicherry attached to the expedition, which brought the number of black troops up to one thousand nine hundred.

speculations. He, however, provided scope for the courage of his countrymen, if not ambitious of displaying his own.

Nazir Jung was slain by a chief who had, with his followers, betrayed their ruler. The Deccan fell into the hands of Mirzapha Jung. The conquerors entered Pondicherry in triumph. They were received with demonstrations of joy and honour unbounded. Not only did the cannon thunder their welcome as became such scenes and such victories, but the sacred name of religion and of its Author were invoked as sanctioning the intrigue and cruelty by which the results were brought about; public thanksgivings were observed in the churches, and even the Portuguese could not celebrate a *Te Deum* after some sanguinary atrocity more heartily than the French of Pondicherry did on this great occasion. It was in the capital of French India that the new nizam was installed in his grand office of viceroy or soubahdar of the Deccan, a circumstance not only flattering to the vanity of Dupleix, but calculated to cement his power and increase the prestige of France. In the public procession, Dupleix sat in the same palanquin with the soubahdar, and took precedence of all the nabobs, rajahs, and petty princes who came in the train of the great viceroy. The French governor was declared governor of southern India, from Cape Comorin to the Kistna river, and was appointed to the command of seven thousand cavalry, one of the highest honours conferred by a native prince. The French mint was proclaimed as exclusively authorised to coin money for circulation in the Carnatic. Dupleix amassed riches. The money and jewels which he received as *presents*, were estimated at more than a quarter of a million sterling in value. The revenues he derived personally could not be computed, as there were few sources of revenue open to the viceroy in which he had not some part.

The nizam's death, which occurred soon after his elevation, afforded an opportunity to Dupleix still further to enhance his authority, by nominating another prince to the viceregal throne. The influence of the European adventurer became boundless, and he used his influence arbitrarily, arrogantly, and harshly. Some of his acts were unnecessarily and wantonly vain-glorious, others were political though boastful. Amongst the most signal displays of his power and love of glory, was the erection of a pillar where he had effected the triumph of Mirzapha over Nazir Jung. The four sides of this column bore, in four different languages, an inscription proclaiming his triumph. Around the spot where this monument of his achievements stood, a considerable town

was built, to which he gave the name of Dupleix Fatchabad, which means "the town of Dupleix's victory."

The English sent a few troops under Major Lawrence to thwart or check the progress of the French, but ostensibly to resist the invaders of the legitimate viceroy and nabob, whom they continued to recognise. It was one of the chief modes of displaying hostility on the part of the two rival European powers to take opposite sides in all disputed successions, and as there was nearly always a disputed succession somewhere in the neighbourhood of their settlements, there was of consequence a perpetual contravention by intrigue, or military succour supplied to the native parties in contention. Major Lawrence was so disgusted with his allies that he abandoned them as impracticable; the French more than once were obliged to leave their friends on the same grounds, but the pertinacious and untiring policy of Dupleix, together with his tact and finesse, enabled him to restore amity between his soldiers and their allies. The retirement for a time from India of the brave and indefatigable Major Lawrence facilitated the designs of Dupleix, and rendered his military ascendancy more complete; for Lawrence was the only man in India capable of assuming a large command, although he was indifferently supported, and poorly rewarded both by the authorities in Madras and London. Clive had not gathered military experience, but in him was genius adequate to the great task of retrieving all that was lost, and asserting for his country a power and influence in India which the wildest dreams of her most imaginative sons never conceived.

The desperate affairs of Mohammed Ali at last demanded some efforts on the part of the English different from the feeble demonstrations they had previously made. Although nabob of the Carnatic, his own patrimonial territory was small, and Trichinopoly, its chief stronghold, was in daily danger of falling before the siege of the rival nabob, and the French. Upon the districts of Tanjore and Trichinopoly both competitors had fixed their attention as the centres of their respective influences and claims of authority and power. The accounts given by writers on Indian affairs of the pretensions and rights of the competing nabobs, are very contradictory. Mill professes to rest his account upon Orme, but his statements of Orme's opinions do not agree with that writer's own representations of the views he held; and it is scarcely of sufficient importance to the general English reader to analyze the evidence of the comparative claims of Mohammed Ali, and Chunda

Sahib, and of the right of either to be independent of the Mogul, even if it were practicable to unravel so intricate a skein of treachery and intrigue. Dr. Wilson says:—"The Hindoo princes of Tanjore and Trichinopoly had never been subdued by the Mogul, and although at times compelled to purchase the forbearance of the Mohammedan states of Bejapore or Golconda, they had preserved their independence from a remote date. The expulsion of their native princes was owing to domestic dissensions, which transferred Tanjore to a Mahratta ruler, and gave Trichinopoly to a Mohammedan. The latter was a relie of the Hindoo kingdom of Madura, and according to original authorities, Chunda Sahib obtained possession of it, not under the circumstances described by the European writers, who were avowedly ill-informed of the real merits of the case, but by an act of treachery to his ally Minakshi Amman, the reigning queen, whose adopted son he had zealously defended against a competitor for the principality—grateful for his support, and confiding in his friendship, the queen gave him free access to the citadel, and he abused her confidence by making himself treacherously master of the fortress."*

To reduce Trichinopoly was now the work of Chunda Sahib, and the prince offered to resign on terms to the French. The English interposed and insisted that, instead of this arrangement, Chunda Sahib should be recognised as nabob of the Carnatic, Mohammed Ali retaining Trichinopoly. The French answered with insolent contempt; and the tardy English, whose minds seemed full of confusion at the magnitude of the events passing around them, made some determination to resist. The allied army of Chunda Sahib and the French advanced to Arcot, contrary to the advice of Dupleix, who recommended the nabob to march upon Trichinopoly itself, while yet the hesitating English were dubious what course to pursue. An English force, under Captain Gingens, left Fort St. David to intercept, or at all events harass, the enemy. The sahib had encamped his forces on the great road between Trichinopoly and Arcot, when the English came up with him, and made dispositions for battle. The chief force of the British was sepoys, and there was also a body of Caffres, deserters from the French, and from the Dutch, who also had employed this description of soldiers. Some of these were natives of Mauritius, others of Madagascar, and various other blacks, not natives of India, were comprised under the general designation. The English com-

mander called a council of war, in which an action was opposed by some; those who were for attacking the enemy differed widely in their opinions as to how the attack should be carried out. The time consumed in dispute, and the anxious manner of the English officers, dispirited the troops, particularly their own countrymen, who went into action without that manifestation of daring spirit characteristic of Englishmen. The battle being begun the enemy replied with a spirited fire, and advanced to meet their assailants boldly. The native troops and Caffres in English pay fought well; but the English soldiers turned and fled, leaving their native allies to do battle alone. No attempts to rally the English were successful, not even the derision of sepoys and Caffres could move them to return to their duty, and the battle was lost. The exultation of the enemy was accompanied by tokens of supreme contempt for the beaten English; their sable comrades were equally prompt to upbraid them with their cowardice. It is but just to the English nation to say that only a few of the Europeans in the detachment were British: they consisted, for the most part, of Germans, Swiss, and Dutch, French and Portuguese deserters; all these, except, perhaps, the Dutch, were in awe of the French, whose reputation for discipline and military science, together with the late splendid victories of themselves and their allies, had spread an impression amongst all nations in India, save only a portion of the English, that they were invincible. The British retreated, and took post on the high road near Utatoa, but again fled upon the approach of the enemy. Once more the English drew up in order of battle at Pechoonda, but a third time fled before the foe, and, as from the previous encampment, without firing a shot. The conduct of the European portion of the British was thoroughly dastardly, and the officers were without influence or authority who commanded that portion of the troops. Most of the officers newly arrived from England proved worthless. The officers of the company's forces were inferior to those of the royal army as men of intelligence; their manners entitled but few of them to be received as gentlemen by their companions in arms in the royal forces: but they were more adventurous, and were better fitted for Indian campaigning every way. General intelligence, with commanders at that time, when opposed to native armies, was not important; knowledge of native character, especially in war, aptness to take advantage of every turn on the field with rapidity, contempt for mere numerical superiority, and, above all, promptitude in an enemy's presence, were the essential qualities, which the com-

* "Historical Sketch of the Kingdom of Pandya:" *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. iii. p. 199.

pany's officers possessed in a much greater degree than their comrades of the royal forces.

Having thus abandoned the country to their pursuers, the fugitive British found themselves in comparative safety under the walls of Trichinopoly. Chunda Sahib and his European coadjutors pursued, but not with sufficient rapidity. Chunda was too leisurely in his military movements, being fonder of the pomp of war than of its action. On his arrival, he withdrew from the side of the town where the company's forces were encamped, and in the opposite direction laid siege to the place. There is no ascertaining the strength of this army. Dupleix, after his return to France, described the native army alone as thirty thousand men. M. Law, by whom the French were commanded, stated, in his work entitled *Plainte de Chevalier Law, contre Sieur Dupleix*, that at no time did the entire force before Trichinopoly exceed eleven thousand eight hundred and sixty, of whom only six hundred were Europeans, and that, when afterwards a detachment was sent from that army to relieve Arcot, only six thousand six hundred and eighty men remained to conduct the siege. Mill says he is much more inclined to believe Law, as Dupleix was "one of the most audacious contemners of truth that ever engaged in crooked politics." At all events, the siege was so feebly conducted that, had the English beneath its walls shown the least enterprise and courage, the enemy could not have maintained it for many days. M. Law, in his vindication of himself, declared that he had no means to conduct the siege, no battering guns, no heavy cannon fit for guns of position, and that he had been three months before the place before any material of war suitable to his position reached him. If these statements be correct, they add much lustre to the honour, ability, and valour of the few Frenchmen who kept the power of Mohammed Ali at bay, and compelled the English to remain crouching under the city walls. M. Law threw the blame of the delay in making a capture of the place to the intrigues of Dupleix, who had entered into correspondence with Mohammed Ali, and secured his assent to deliver up the city, so that he (M. Law) was sent, not to besiege, but to receive it; Dupleix relying rather upon the dexterity and profoundness of his own schemes than upon the chivalry and skill of his soldiers.

During the delay and incompetency of the French, the English officers were actively engaged in quarrelling with one another as to the respectability of themselves personally, and of the royal and the company's armies comparatively. As commanders of men they were paltry and powerless; they had not even that

quality in which Englishmen are so seldom deficient, and which soldiers express by the the rough word "pluck." It was not only in that branch of the English army in India that such a spirit prevailed: Major Lawrence had found it an insuperable obstacle to his own efficient command, and declared that the British officers were objects of supreme contempt to their native allies. At Madras, St. David's, and elsewhere, the state of things was the same. The fighting qualities of the English were dormant, because the officers sent from home were not chosen for their military qualities, but for reasons pertaining to party, or to family interest. The necessity of taking and of defending the besieged city became, at last, obvious to both armies, for its situation gave it a relative importance to the war which could not be overlooked long even by the incompetent persons then holding power in the English interest in that part of India. Mr. Mill describes it thus:—"The city of Trichinopoly, at the distance of about ninety miles from the sea, is situated on the south side of the great river Cavery, about half a mile from its bank; and, for an Indian city, was fortified with extraordinary strength. About five miles higher up than Trichinopoly, the Cavery divides itself into two branches, which, after separating to the distance of about two miles, again approached, and being only prevented from uniting, about fifteen miles below Trichinopoly, by a narrow mound, they form a peninsula, which goes by the name of Seringham; celebrated as containing one of the most remarkable edifices, and one of the most venerable pagodas, in India; and henceforward remarkable for the struggle, constituting an era in the history of India, of which it was now to be the scene."

During these events, Clive was once more active, and in a manner calculated to give him that experience which he required. When the troops were sent out to intercept or annoy the sahib, Clive, then twenty-five years of age, was appointed to an office partaking both of the civil and military: he was made commissary of the forces, with the rank of captain. He was witness of the shameful flight of his countrymen at Voloondal, but was not in a position to do anything to retrieve that disaster. He brought up, from time to time, the reinforcements, contributed something to their discipline, became thoroughly acquainted with the country whence he drew supplies for the forces, obtained useful information for the authorities at St. David's and Madras, was brought more into connection with them, so as to gain their confidence and learn their peculiarities. He was thus made acquainted with the arts of provisioning an army, and

also with the mode of organizing resources, which task, to a considerable extent, devolved upon him. By his frequent and intimate converse or correspondence with all the authorities, military as well as civil, concerned, he was able to penetrate the weak points of British policy and arrangement, and to discern who were the weak men by whom vigorous measures were impeded or marred. In a short time, he gained such experience as enabled him to request, to obtain, and, with reasonable grounds of confidence, to undertake, the responsibility of a separate command, and to verify the high opinion always expressed of him by the noble-minded and valiant Lawrence.

According to Mill, the idea of relieving Trichinopoly by a diversion originated with the authorities at Fort St. David or Madras. Sir J. Malcolm, with more probability, attributes the idea to Clive; and Lord Macaulay endorses that view. Clive, according to these authorities, pressed upon the attention of his superiors the danger to which Trichinopoly was exposed, and the consequences that would ensue upon its fall, and requested to be allowed the command of a detachment, by which, threatening Arcot, he might compel the allies to raise the siege of the endangered city. This request was complied with, and, from that moment, the tide of fortune turned, and made 1751-2 years to be ever memorable in Indian history.

The advance of Clive upon Arcot, and its capture, is one of those stories in history which is related nearly in the same way by all historians. Every writer, whether fragmentary or voluminous, repeats the preceding narrator of this transaction. The most condensed and, at the same time, graphic account is that of Dr. Taylor, although partly copying Mill *verbatim et literatim*:—"His force consisted of two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoy, commanded under him by eight officers, six of whom had never been in action. His artillery amounted only to three field pieces, but two eighteen pounders were sent after him. On the 31st of August, 1751, he arrived within ten miles of Arcot; it was the day of a fearful storm; thunder, lightning, and rain more terrific than is usual, even in India, seemed to render farther advance impracticable; but Clive, aware of the impression such hardihood would produce on oriental minds, pushed forward in spite of the elemental strife. Daunted by his boldness, the garrison abandoned both the town and citadel, the latter of which Clive immediately occupied, giving orders that private property should be respected. As a siege was soon to be expected, he exerted his utmost diligence to supply the fort, and made frequent sallies to

prevent the fugitive garrison, who hovered round, from resuming their courage."

Mr. Mill describes the result in the following words:—"In the meantime Chunda Sahib detached four thousand men from his army at Trichinopoly, which were joined by his son with one hundred and fifty Europeans from Pondicherry; and, together with the troops already collected in the neighbourhood, to the number of three thousand, entered the city. Clive immediately resolved upon a violent attempt to dislodge them. Going out with almost the whole of the garrison, he with his artillery forced the enemy to leave the streets in which they had posted themselves; but filling the houses they fired upon his men, and obliged him to withdraw to the fort. In warring against the people of Hindostan, a few men so often gain unaccountable victories over a host, that on a disproportion of numbers solely no enterprise can be safely condemned as rash; in this, however, Clive ran the greatest risk, with but a feeble prospect of success. He lost fifteen of his Europeans, and among them a lieutenant; and his only artillery officer, with sixteen other men, was disabled. Next day the enemy was reinforced with two thousand men from Vellore. The fort was more than a mile in circumference; the walls in many places ruinous; the towers inconvenient and decayed; and everything unfavourable to defence; yet Clive found the means of making an effectual resistance. When the enemy attempted to storm at two breaches, one of fifty and one of ninety feet, he repulsed them with but eighty Europeans and one hundred and twenty sepoy fit for duty; so effectually did he avail himself of his feeble resources, and to such a pitch of fortitude had he exalted the spirit of those under his command. During the following night the enemy abandoned the town with precipitation, after they had maintained the siege for fifty days. A reinforcement from Madras joined him on the following day; and, leaving a small garrison in Arcot, he set out to pursue the enemy. With the assistance of a small body of Marhattas, who joined him in hopes of plunder, he gave the enemy, now greatly reduced by the dropping away of the auxiliaries, a defeat at Arni, and recovered Congeveram, into which the French had thrown a garrison, and where they had behaved with barbarity to some English prisoners; among the rest two wounded officers, whom they seized returning from Arcot to Madras, and threatened to expose on the rampart, if the English should attack."

Mill's account of the force detached from the sahib's army at Trichinopoly does not agree with the narrative of Monsieur Law, in which he professed confidence. According to

the chevalier, five thousand two hundred and eighty men were withdrawn from his army for service at Arcot. Clive returned to Fort St. David at the close of the year. As soon as the enemy learned that he had left Arcot, they collected their forces and marched into the company's territory, where they committed great ravages. Both Madras and Fort St. David had been nearly denuded of troops, to enable Clive to take the field against Arcot. Some troops afterwards arrived in these fortresses; but they were dispatched as reinforcements to Clive, so that when the enemy began their raid into the company's territory, there were no means of making head against them. In this emergency, Bengal supplied some soldiers, native and European, and Clive was not long in augmenting these by levies in his own presidency, so that by February he was able to go out against the invaders. The principal portion of the troops at Arcot made a junction with him, and he found himself at the head of a small but, in his hands, formidable force. As soon as he approached the enemy, they broke up their camp, but intended to turn their retreat to account by making a sudden assault upon Arcot, the residuary garrison of which was not by any means sufficient to man its defences.

At every period in Anglo-Indian history, there has been a sufficient number of sepoys and their officers in the English pay, corrupt or disloyal, to endanger the garrisons or enterprises of the British in most conjunctions of great danger. It was so in this instance. Two native officers had agreed to open the gates to the enemy; the plot was discovered, and the traitors seized. Accordingly, when the army of the sahib came before Arcot, not finding their signals answered, they concluded that they were themselves betrayed by those whom they trusted. Little confidence existing among natives, even when religion, and native land, might be supposed to bind them most together, it was a natural inference, in a war of succession, when the people were not much interested in either side, to suppose that the officers had made a double treason for a double profit. The sahib's army retired; but Clive was then on his way to Arcot to prevent the step which the sahib contemplated, and which his keen mind had anticipated. The enemy, knowing of his approach, prepared a surprise. Clive having heard of their retreat, naturally concluded that they would elude him; and was therefore astonished when the guns of the sahib opened with a furious cannonade upon his advanced guard, in a situation affording serious advantage to the assailants. A battle began, and Clive soon found that his opponents had mustered all their forces, and

that the effort was one of a desperate nature, the hope of altering the fortunes of the war to the disadvantage of the English, being concentrated upon that action, which continued all day with unremitting fury.

Clive felt that the artillery power of the enemy was so great, that unless it could be seized, he must next day be defeated. At ten at night he detached a party for that purpose. The night was unusually dark. By a detour, the detachment came upon the rear of the enemy's park; silently approaching the spot, no surprise being apprehended by the enemy, the infantry and artillerymen at that post were instantly overpowered, and either slain or driven away. The army of the sahib immediately dispersed, disheartened, and holding the name of Clive in terror. The boldness, suddenness, and judgment of the enterprise had invested it in native apprehension with something of the mysterious; and Clive was regarded by the lower orders as endowed with supernatural power.

As soon as this event terminated, Clive was ordered to Madras. This step was imprudent, as the enemy might have once more gained heart by his absence. The French troops were, however, recalled at the same moment to Pondicherry, in ignorance of Clive's withdrawal; and without such a *point d'appui* as the French afforded, the sahib could not have re-collected his demoralized men. The object of the recall of Clive to the presidency, was to send him and his troops to Trichinopoly, where, from what had already transpired, there was really nothing to fear.

The conduct of Clive was appreciated at Madras, and the fame of his heroism spread over all India. Still the remarks of Lord Macaulay are undoubtedly an exaggeration, when he says of the feeling at Fort St. George, "Clive was justly regarded as a man equal to any command." His lordship, however, conveys what is obviously true, when he expresses the opinion, "Had the entire direction of the war been entrusted to Clive, it would probably have been brought to a speedy close. But the timidity and incapacity which appeared in all the movements of the English, except when he was personally present, protracted the struggle. The Mahrattas muttered that his soldiers were of a different race from the British whom they had met elsewhere." Their opinion was certainly reasonable, and the circumstances which made it so were connected with the system of favouritism which, instead of a just and patriotic recognition of merit, influenced all royal military appointments; and the insolence, contempt, and neglect with which officers of superior merit

in the company's service were treated by the traders, amongst whom there existed an envious and yet arrogant feeling towards all professional men.

During these events, Clive showed not only the audacity of courage for which he had during several years received credit, but attributes of a higher order of soldierhood were conspicuously displayed. He proved himself to be remarkably subordinate to authority. Mr. Mill, and Lord Macaulay following Mr. Mill, represent this as surprising, seeing that his youth was so turbulent. Sir John Malcolm and Dr. Hayman Wilson affirm that the subordination of his military conduct, notwithstanding his frequent disagreement in opinion with official superiors, was in harmony with the habits of his earlier years. Sir John Malcolm severely criticises the expression of Mr. Mill; and the learned professor of Sanscrit at Oxford observes:—"There is nothing in the history of his adolescence to warrant the application (of the term turbulent); he seems to have been stubborn and dogged rather than turbulent." His ambition was animated by a passionate patriotism; and his jealousy for the glory of his country was united to a policy statesmanlike and wise. This was exemplified in his destruction of the pillar of Dupleix, when, in his career of victory, he arrived at the place where that monument was erected. He felt that it was an insult to his country, and therefore razed it; but he also judged that so long as it remained a memorial of French prowess and success, it would influence the superstitious natives to respect the power of France. Not satisfied with destroying the proud column, he swept the city itself from the face of the earth, and by this decisiveness, filled the imagination of the Asiatic soldiers of both armies with ideas of his boldness, comprehensiveness, and invulnerability, as well as with a fatalistic notion that victory sat upon the banners of the English, while the day of French glory had set.

When Clive was ready to take the field against the French and Chunda Sahib, who still remained before Trichinopoly, Major Lawrence arrived from England, and, as senior officer, assumed the command. Lawrence was probably not a politician, but he was well acquainted with the politics of the Carnatic and of the whole Deccan; he was a man of shrewd sense, and great penetration of character. As a soldier, he was fit for high command; and, had he served in any army where promotion went by merit, he would not have ranked as a major, while he commanded, with ability and good service to his country, armies in the field. Clive was delighted at the arrival of Lawrence, as so few of the English officers

were competent for any portion of responsibility; he had also a high sense of the military capacity and personal excellence of the major, which feeling was reciprocated by the senior of the two gallant friends. Both were incapable of jealousy, and exulted in each other's glory; so that it would have been difficult to find two persons of great talent more likely to co-operate efficiently.

While Clive was preparing his forces at Fort St. David's for the relief of Trichinopoly, the rajah sought assistance from Mysore, whence a large army was dispatched to his aid, accompanied by a strong division of Mahratta mercenaries, which had already served with Clive in the neighbourhood of Arcot. According to the Chevalier Law, the French and allied army did not then amount to more than fifteen thousand; this statement was confirmed by the French Company, but Dupleix informed the French public that it was nearly twice the number. Whatever its force, it held its position firmly in spite of the Mysore and Mahratta auxiliaries of Mohammed Ali. Such was the position of things when the army under Lawrence marched against the besiegers. Dupleix ordered Law to intercept this force, which was impossible, as that gallant man, already embarrassed by the impracticable orders of Dupleix, had extended his force to keep up an effectual blockade, in the hope of starving the besieged; so that his lines were, to use his own language, "weak at all points," and only by his superior tactics could he deceive the Mysore chief as to his actual numbers and actual weakness. He urged Dupleix to organize the means at Pondicherry of intercepting Lawrence, assuring him of the utter incapacity of his exhausted force to deal with his numerous foes. Dupleix, arrogant and deficient in military science, renewed his orders, which were of course not obeyed, because impossible. The result was, that the little army of Lawrence arrived to the relief of the beleaguered city. The French removed their forces to the island of Seringham, against the wishes of Chunda Sahib, who believed whatever Dupleix said as to what ought to be done in the circumstances. The French burned a large portion of their baggage and munitions. Ormesays that stores of provisions were also thus consumed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the Rajah of Mysore or the English. The chevalier, who knew best, and wrote like a man of truth and honour, declares that he had no stores of provisions—that his supplies were small, and he was becoming apprehensive of extremities.

Anxious to carry matters with his usual rapidity, Clive suggested to Lawrence that it

would be desirable to place a division of his army at the other side of the Colaroon, so that supplies to the French might be effectually intercepted. Lawrence pointed out the danger of dividing his army, lest each might in turn be attacked and overpowered. Nevertheless he believed that, if in Clive's hands, the measure would be carried through, and he gave him command of a division of his army to accomplish the proposed task. Clive executed the commands imposed upon him, or rather exercised efficiently the discretion confided to him, for Lawrence allowed him to take his own course. The measures of Clive were soon proved to be necessary, for Dupleix dispatched D'Auteuil with a powerful force and large convoy for the relief of the garrison at Seringham. Clive interposed on D'Auteuil's line of march, who, afraid to meet the conqueror of Arcot, retired into a fort whither Clive pursued him, capturing the fort, garrison, and commander, with all the provisions and munitions of war intended for Law. Lawrence, meantime, cannonaded Seringham with such judgment and effect, that the French greatly suffered, and, in addition, hunger began to inflict its miseries. Chunda Sahib's soldiers deserted in large numbers. The Mahratta legions did not like to fight against Clive, and went over to him in bodies. Chunda Sahib at last threw himself upon the mercy of the King of Tanjore, who had also become an ally of Mohammed Ali. The Tanjore general gave his sacred promise of protection, but no sooner had the sahib entered the camp than he was placed in irons. While he was thus situated, the French surrendered, prisoners of war, to Major Lawrence. There then arose disputes among the Mysorean, Mahratta, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly chiefs, as to the custody of the sahib. Major Lawrence, to deliver him out of their hands, proposed his confinement in an English fort. The rajahs retired to take this proposition into consideration, but the cruel King of Tanjore ordered the captive to be assassinated, and so settled the debate. Dupleix charged Major Lawrence with the murder, which the false-hearted Frenchman knew well was an act impossible to the brave and good man upon whom he sought to fix so infamous an imputation. The French East India Company charged Dupleix with the intention of imprisoning the unfortunate nabob, and making himself, or causing himself to be made, by his influence at the court of Delhi, soubahdar, or viceroy of the Deccan. Dupleix, however, was in possession of the fact, that the nabob intended to break faith with him as soon as his English and native enemies were mastered. Thus cruelty and deceit prevailed

amongst all the authorities in the Deccan, and prepared for that breaking up and recasting of all the governments there, which eventually ensued.

While affairs were proving so disastrous to the French throughout the Carnatic, the industrious and crafty Dupleix was, nevertheless, carrying on vast intrigues in another direction. In his plots with the various claimants for the viceroyalty of the Deccan, he acted through an agent named Bussy, a man almost as cunning and unscrupulous as himself. The Mogul refused to recognise the French *protégé* for the viceroyalty, and conferred the title and authority on Gazeo-ood-Deen, eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and the legitimate heir of the coveted post. The competitor of Gazeo was Salabat Jung, who was in possession, and refused to surrender his honours. The incursions of the Mahrattas so enfeebled and harassed the Mogul empire, that the padishaw was unable to enforce what he had commanded, and the intrigues of Bussy were so cunning and so constant, that Salabat Jung held his honours; while Dupleix, through his satrap Bussy, virtually ruled the Deccan, and indirectly exercised extensive influence over the Mogul. This great influence might have contented his ambition, but as the Carnatic was a part of the Deccan, he considered nothing secure until the whole of the region so designated was at his feet. Unfortunately for the peace of India, and of the English, the subtle genius of Dupleix found scope, and out of the very materials of defeat, he evoked renewed influence.

When Major Lawrence had won Trichinopoly, he was preparing to march through the province, and subject all opposition before Mohammed Ali. He urged that prince to muster his forces and accompany him, but was astounded to find that Mohammed had, unknown to his English ally, gained the alliance of Mysore by promising to give to the rajah the city of Trichinopoly, when the French were driven away. This promise, Mohammed, of course, never intended to perform, but now the Mysore rajah, at the head of twenty thousand men, demanded its fulfilment. The Mahrattas, too, had been led to entertain hopes that it should be given to them, both by the possessor, and by the promised possessor. They now demanded that the Rajah of Mysore should surrender his claim to them as a reward of their services, indemnifying himself how he could; and, at the same time, they intimated to the actual sovereign, that the true construction of his promises to them was that they should have the city. Mohammed refused to fulfil any

promise, pleading that extreme necessity justified promises which there was no intention of performing—a plea, the force of which his tormentors felt, because it accorded with their own principles, but they were not therefore the more ready to mitigate their demands. The chief of Trichinopoly at last persuaded the Mysorean chief to accept Madura, with the promise of receiving Trichinopoly also within two months. He pretended to accede, but went away resolved upon revenge. Major Lawrence advised the president of Madras to deliver up the city to the chief of Mysore, or else to seize him and the Mahratta leader until security was taken that they would not join the French. The company's representatives did nothing, the only thing which appears to have lain within the scope of their talents.

Dupleix was at once made acquainted with all these transactions, and from that hour resolved to make another effort to regain ascendancy in the Carnatic. He opened correspondence with all the aggrieved parties, and had the audacity to correspond secretly with Mohammed Ali himself. His offers to them all were most alluring, and so timed and put in such form, as to make it their obvious policy to keep his secrets and prepare to betray one another when the opportunity moment for so doing should arrive.

In consequence of his intrigues, as well as those set on foot directly by the disappointed allies of Mohammed, the standard of revolt was raised in various districts under the government of the ill-starred prince, whose victories were as disastrous as defeats, and even more dishonourable. Gingee was considered a strong place, and the governor refused to render allegiance to Mohammed Ali. The English undertook to reduce it, and fortune once more forsook their standard. The garrison consisted chiefly of French soldiers, and the English considered its capture would put an end to the war in Mohammed Ali's dominions. This was the opinion of the civilians by whom Major Lawrence and Captain Clive were overruled. Lawrence expostulated in vain: he pointed out a really feasible plan of procedure; but the heads of the traders at Madras and Fort St. David were turned with success, and they issued orders with a self-confident air, as if by their wisdom all had been accomplished, which only the talents and experience of Lawrence, and the genius of Clive, had achieved. The repulse of the English at Gingee was so signal, that the predictions of Major Lawrence were fulfilled. The French gained heart, and the feeble natives began once more to believe that they could conquer.

Dupleix, although badly sustained from home, found means to reinforce the troops at Gingee, so as to enable him to operate in the field. He, in fact, organized another army, and sent them under the walls of the astonished English of Fort St. David. The approach of the French to that place was anticipated at Madras, and one hundred Swiss were sent by sea to strengthen it. These men were sent in open boats, contrary to the advice of Lawrence, whose opinions were overruled by the self-confident, pragmatical, and incompetent council: the result was another painful fulfilment of Lawrence's predictions—the boats and troops were captured by a French man-of-war. Dupleix, cognizant of the intention of his enemies, and calculating upon their infatuated ignorance and conceit, took his measures accordingly, and with success. This was the first direct violation of the treaty of peace between the two countries. Hitherto the French and English only met in hostility as the allies, and acting under the ostensible orders, of contending native chiefs; in capturing English boats and troops, he assumed to make war upon England without the orders or acquiescence of his government, which afterwards held him responsible for his conduct.

Major Lawrence went forth against the new army, by which English territory was entered with hostile intent at a time of peace between the two nations. His force was chiefly from the nabob's army, consisting of a division of four thousand men. He had, in addition, a brigade consisting of four hundred Europeans and one thousand seven hundred trained sepoys. The French were greatly inferior in numbers, but superior in quality. They had about the same number of regular infantry, and consisting of the same proportions of Europeans and sepoys; but the European force in the English service was made up chiefly of mercenaries. Dupleix's European infantry were not wholly French, but were chiefly recruits lately sent out, and were physically inferior to the Europeans in English pay; but they felt that they were fighting the battles of their own nation, which gave them an ardour such as the mercenaries in the English ranks could not feel. The French had a rabble of native adherents; but only a few were enrolled as soldiers. Making up for the disparity in this respect, the French had a fine regiment of cavalry, numbering five hundred men. The nabob's troops with the English consisted partly of cavalry, but of the worst class. Major Lawrence offered battle, which was not accepted; but, making a feint of retreating, he lured on his vain-glorious enemies. The battle was short and decisive: the French

were signally defeated; but the nabob's cavalry would not pursue, but, instead, plundered the French camp. The energy and skill of Lawrence were displayed with striking effect in this action, and he was seconded by his friend and lieutenant, Clive, with his usual splendid military ability.

As the Mysorean general hovered about Trichinopoly, Lawrence could not follow up, in the direction he wished, the victory he had gained, nor could he spare troops from his little army for separate services. The ever-daring and inventive Clive undertook, with two hundred undisciplined European recruits, and such natives as he could muster, to capture the fort of Covelong, defended by the French. He collected some natives, and formed of them two sepoy companies of one hundred men each; and with this small detachment repaired to Covelong. The European recruits were morally and physically inferior: the sepoys were wholly ignorant of the use of arms. A shot fired from Covelong killed one of the Europeans, when they all took to flight. Clive, with the utmost difficulty, succeeded in inducing them to return to their duty. Siege was laid to the fort; but the sentinels being alarmed by a loud discharge of artillery, fled and hid themselves: one of them was found, after diligent search, concealed in a well. Clive remonstrated, persuaded, rallied them on their timidity, appealed to their manhood, and, by his own example, roused in them the sense of manliness, so that they became courageous, well-disciplined, and ready to dare whatever their leader's example pointed out as due to honour and duty. Probably, no band of timid, unsoldierly men were ever made so much of in so short a time, or made to perform so much. During this time, he was ill from the effects of fatigue, anxiety, and the climate. The French garrison surrendered, and Clive occupied it with a portion of his small force, somewhat augmented by deserters from the French, and men of a similar stamp to those he commanded when they first came under his plastic hand! Scarcely had he taken possession, when a French force was sent from Chingleput, to succour the garrison, ignorant of its capture. Clive laid an ambush, and, by one volley, placed *hors-de-combat* one hundred French soldiers, he then charged them, killing and wounding many and capturing three hundred. The

rest fled panic-struck, hotly pursued by their prompt assailant to the gates of Chingleput. To this place, reputed at the time to be one of the strongest fortifications in India, he laid siege. His artillery was very inadequate; but he effected a breach, and was about to storm it, when the French commander capitulated, on being allowed to retire with his men. After these events, Clive returned to Madras, where the incapable men who had thwarted him so often, regarded it as a great honour for him to be made the object of their commendations and attentions. His health now obliged him to seek repose, for his late achievements, inferior in ability and activity to none of his previous ones, were performed in weakness and suffering. He married a lady named Maskelyne, sister to the astronomer royal, of scientific notoriety. Macaulay describes her as "handsome and accomplished," and adds, "her husband's letters, it is said, contain proofs that he was devotedly attached to her." Very soon after they had received the congratulations of their friends upon their marriage, they embarked for England, where Clive arrived after an absence of ten years, several of which were spent with renown to his country and himself. He had redeemed her fallen military reputation in India, humbled the gifted Duplex, repressed French power in the Deccan, saved, with his coadjutor and friend, Lawrence, the Carnatic, at all events for the time, from becoming a French province, and filled India and Europe with the fame of his bravery and military resources. His departure from India was an irreparable loss to the English, as they were soon made to feel. Indeed, both before he left India and subsequently, wherever he or Lawrence was not, defeat and shame attended the English name from the arrival of Duplex at Pondicherry. It is customary for writers to give all the glory to Clive, who knew the worth of Lawrence too well to accept it. When, on the young hero's return, the directors of the East India Company offered him "a sword set with diamonds," he nobly refused to accept it unless Lawrence received one of equal or superior value. He regarded that fine officer as his teacher and benefactor; and the latter was immoderately proud and fond of his pupil and *protégé*.

CHAPTER LXX.

BRITISH CONQUEST OF THE CARNATIC—*Continued*: FROM CLIVE'S RETURN TO ENGLAND TO THE EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH.

WHILE Clive was reducing forts, getting married, receiving jewelled swords at the India-house in London, and enjoying his *otium cum dignitate* at Manchester and Market Drayton, Lawrence was bravely battling against all odds, ill-supported by the vacillating English at forts St. David and St. George. Dupleix had won over certain Mahratta chiefs, who, with three thousand men, marched to reinforce his army, which was then about to encounter Lawrence at Bahoor. On their way, the Mahrattas heard that the French were defeated, and that Lawrence and Clive were in the field; they immediately marched into the British camp, declaring that they would not fight against these two heroes, whom the gods favoured, but would serve under them against the disturbers of the peace of Southern India. The armies went into what is called in Europe winter quarters; and Dupleix, who had no competitor in diplomacy, succeeded in regaining by that means all the influence of which the British had deprived him in the field. Mysoreans and Mahrattas declared open alliance with the French. The designs of Dupleix were penetrated by Major Lawrence, and such advice given by him as met the necessities of the occasion; but although it belonged to his profession to judge of the practical bearing of Dupleix's new alliances, and the company's civil servants acknowledged his competency to pronounce an opinion, they did not in any case follow it, so as to carry out any plan of contravention to the schemes of the French director-general. Even the advice and commands of Lawrence to the officer in authority at Trichinopoly were not attended to, the civil officers of the company overruling his orders. On one occasion, Lawrence detected a plot to assassinate Captain Dalton, the officer in command of the garrison at Trichinopoly, by the Mysorean general Nunjeragh and the Mahratta chief Marao, and upon assassinating the English officer, to seize the city. Lawrence ordered Dalton to seize them, as a conference proposed by them for their own purposes would afford opportunity. The president and council of Madras gave Dalton contrary orders; the captain was not assassinated, but the detected traitors were left free to carry on all their treasons except the seizure of the city. Mill blames the morality of Lawrence's orders, and

admits the soundness of the policy; but it is obvious that Mill had not made himself acquainted with the whole case. Dr. Hayman Wilson defends Lawrence in the following terms:—"In justice to Major Lawrence, it must be remarked that this advice was given only upon the detection of a plot, set on foot by the Mysorean general, to assassinate Captain Dalton, and surprise Trichinopoly, there being no open rupture yet even with Mohammed Ali, much less with the English. 'It was on the discovery of this,' says the Major, 'that I proposed Dalton should seize on the Maissorean and Morarow, which he might easily have done by a surprise, as he often had conferences with them; and I must own I thought, in justice, it would have been right to have done it, but the presidency were of another opinion.'"* Never did man pursue a policy with more heroic obstinacy than Dupleix. Mr. Mill places his conduct in this respect in a correct light, when he thus describes his condition, resources, and prospects in 1752:—"Dupleix, though so eminently successful in adding to the number of combatants on his side, was reduced to the greatest extremity for pecuniary supplies. The French East India Company were much poorer than even the English; the resources which they furnished from Europe were proportionally feeble; and though perfectly willing to share with Dupleix in the hopes of conquest, when enjoyment was speedily promised, their impatience for gain made them soon tired of the war; and they were now importunately urging Dupleix to find the means of concluding a peace. Under these difficulties Dupleix had employed his own fortune, and his own credit, in answering the demands of the war; and, as a last resource, he now turned his thoughts to Mortiz Ali, the governor of Vellore. He held up to him the prospect of even the nabobship itself, in hopes of drawing from him the riches which he was reputed to possess. Mortiz Ali repaired to Pondicherry, and even advanced a considerable sum; but finding that much more was expected, he broke off the negotiation, and retired to his fort. The contending parties looked forward with altered prospects to the next campaign. By the co-operation of the Mysoreans, and the junction of the Mahrattas, the latter of whom, from the abilities of their leader, and

* Lawrence's *Narrative*, p. 39.

their long experience of European warfare, were no contemptible allies, the French had greatly the advantage in numerical force. In the capacity, however, of their officers, and in the quality of their European troops, they soon felt a remarkable inferiority. Lawrence, without being a man of talents, was an active and clear-headed soldier; and the troops whom he commanded, both officers and men, appeared, by a happy contingency, to combine in their little body all the virtues of a British army. "The European troops of the enemy, on the other hand, were the very refuse of the French population." Lord Macaulay, following Mill, and partly adopting Dupleix's own account, which is little to be relied on, gives a similar picture of the helplessness of Dupleix, except as he relied solely on his own genius. His lordship quotes Dupleix's own expression, that with the exception of Bussy he had not an officer on whom he could place the least reliance. Most of these statements are greatly exaggerated, and some of them totally untrue. It suited the circumstances in which Dupleix was placed, when defending himself in France against the French Company, to declaim against that body for its neglect of his requisitions; but the fact was, its supplies were lavish until it became convinced that he was squandering them in wars dangerous to France, and contrary to the commercial interests of the French Company trading to the east. It is astonishingly strange that such writers as Mill and Macaulay should adopt the assertion of Dupleix, that he had no good officers! Did he not persecute the intrepid, politic, and gifted Labourdonnais? Was it not by his own unmilitary measures that the Chevalier Law, a brilliant officer, was paralysed before Trichinopoly. D'Anteuil, Latouch, and other officers in his service, showed superior parts, but were rendered powerless by the complication of his own schemes, or the genius of Lawrence and Clive. Lawrence, in his own account of the transactions which arose out of the fertility of Dupleix's tricks, describes the efforts of the French officers at Bahoor and Trichinopoly to keep their men up under heavy fire, as most gallant, skilful, and honourable. The men sent out to Dupleix were no doubt such as he described them—children, thieves, and galley slaves; but he had also fine French regiments, such as met the armies of Europe with renown; and he had large supplies of Madagascars, who had been thoroughly trained in the Mauritius on French principles of drill and discipline, and well officered by gentlemen of the French army and navy. He had also good engineer officers, and artillery officers, such as the

French military schools produced. It was not of their officers and French soldiers that Chevalier Law and other French officers complained during the discussions which occurred in France after the return of Dupleix, but of the want of military knowledge and courage of Dupleix himself; and of the impracticability, in a military sense, of schemes which grew out of Dupleix's political speculations and alliances.

As to his resources, he had enriched both himself and the company's Indian exchequer, by his influence over the resources of Southern India, and by the great accessions of territory he acquired. When Mr. Mill says that the French company was poorer than that of England, he overlooks the fact,* that the government of France itself favoured the French East India Company, the resources of the state having been applied to the aggrandizement of the company, until the exchequer of France was exhausted, the extravagance of the company's agents in India, and their love of incessant war, having been one of the potential causes of that exhaustion. The whole history of these transactions shows that the estimate formed of Lawrence in the above passage by Mill, and copied by Macaulay, Taylor, Murray, and numerous others, place his talents below the reality. As to the superiority of the English officers to the French, there is nothing related on Mr. Mill's own pages to prove the assertion. There were no men up to the period to which the history is now brought, able to cope with the French officers, when Lawrence or Clive were absent. Whether in the open field or in the defence of fortified places, French military science was in the ascendant in almost every instance, except when Lawrence or Clive, or both, were present by their heroism and ability to turn the tide of battle. An accurate and careful examination of the authentic documents of the time, French and English, will confirm the allegation that the general current of modern historians, following Mill, and more recently Macaulay, have exaggerated or misstated the disadvantages of the French. Dupleix emerged from the temporary cessation of arms in 1752, consequent upon the weather, in a condition to menace the English, and sustain the prospect which his ambition and hope presented, that with proper management of his native allies he would humble the English in the Carnatic, perhaps expel them from Southern India, and himself reign supreme in the vast and magnificent dominions of the Deccan.

In the first week of the year 1753, the two armies took the field. The French were

* See chapters on the French Company for trading in the East.

very superior in numbers, especially in cavalry. Five hundred European infantry, sixty European cavalry; two thousand sepoy; four thousand Mahrattas, nearly all cavalry, commanded by Morari Rao, an able officer well acquainted with European modes of warfare, comprised the French movable army, independent of the large forces before Trichinopoly. The English army under Major Lawrence was composed of seven hundred European foot-soldiers, two thousand sepoy, and fifteen hundred of the nabob's irregular cavalry, who would any time turn aside to plunder, however urgent the requirements of honourable war.

The French showed good generalship, facts again confuting Mr. Mill's disparagement of their officers. They avoided a general action, employing their superiority of cavalry in cutting off convoys, so that Lawrence and his troops were exposed to great fatigue, and sometimes he was obliged to march with his whole army to ensure the safe arrival of a large convoy at its destination. This desultory war continued until the 20th of April, when a letter from Captain Dalton informed Lawrence that he had scarcely fifteen days' provisions in the magazine of the city. He had made a certain Mohammedan chief his storekeeper, and, like the Turkish pashas during the war with Russia, so this more ancient specimen of Mohammedan officer and ruler sold the provisions for his own profit. Lawrence determined on marching at once to the relief of the place. His march was attended by many casualties. The nabob's troops deserted in great numbers, so did some of the sepoy, and even of the Europeans. Dupleix's agents were busy offering better pay. Sickness had also made inroads upon his force. When he arrived at the place, and completed effective garrison arrangements, he had so small a force remaining for field operations, that the prospect of carrying on the war with advantage, without considerable reinforcements, seemed very gloomy. His European detachment was reduced to five hundred men, two thousand sepoy were at his disposal, and the nabob attached to these infantry forces a division of three thousand ill-paid and insubordinate horse. Scarcely had Lawrence arrived when French reinforcements hastened to strengthen Nunjeragh. These consisted of two hundred Europeans and five hundred sepoy. The forces were now relatively such that the French and their allies could not capture the place, and the English and the nabob could not raise the siege. From 6th of May, 1753 to the 11th of October, 1754, the conflict was sustained. Lawrence and his troops performing

prodigies of valour, for which he received only praise, and that was scantily bestowed by his own countrymen in the chief settlements of India.

The most condensed account, and at the same time sufficient in detail, which has appeared, of these transactions, amongst recent publications, is that by Hugh Murray, Esq., F.R.S.E. He thus describes the defence of Trichinopoly by Lawrence:—"The major was then able to open a communication with the southern districts for a supply of necessaries, and obtained some assistance from the Rajah of Tanjore, whose alliance, however, like that of all Indian princes, wavered with every variation of fortune. It became impossible in this scarcity to supply the inhabitants of so great a city as Trichinopoly, who, to the number of four hundred thousand inhabitants, were compelled to quit the place, and seek temporary shelter elsewhere; and the immense circuit of its walls was occupied only by the two thousand men composing the garrison. The provisioning of this important fortress now became the principal object of contest, the entire strength of both sides being drawn around it; and the French, with an immensely superior force, placed themselves in such positions as enabled them to intercept completely the entrance of convoys from the south. The brave Lawrence twice attacked, and, though with very inferior numbers, drove them from their posts, and opened the way for his supplies. On no former occasion, indeed, had the valour of the English troops, and their superiority to those of the enemy, been more signally displayed. The garrison, however, had nearly, by their own supineness, forfeited the benefit of all these exertions. One morning at three o'clock, the guard having fallen asleep, the French advanced to the assault, applied their scaling-ladders, made themselves masters of a battery, and were advancing into the city, when several of the soldiers happening to fall into a deep pit, their cries alarmed their companions, some of whom fired their muskets. The assailants thus conceiving themselves to be discovered, made a general discharge, beat their drums, and advanced with shouts of *Vive le Roi*. Happily a considerable body of British was quartered near the spot, who were immediately led on by Lieutenant Harrison to such an advantageous position, and directed with so much judgment, that the foremost of the storming-party were soon cut down, the ladders carried off or broken, and all of the enemy who had entered, to the number of three hundred and sixty, were made prisoners. Thus the enterprise, at first so promising, caused to them a loss

greater than any sustained by their arms during the course of this memorable siege. Soon afterwards, however, an English detachment, being sent out to escort a convoy of provisions, was attacked by a corps of eighteen thousand natives and four hundred Europeans. An inexperienced officer, who had the command, drew up his men in small parties at wide intervals. Suddenly Morari Rao and Innis Khan, with twelve thousand Mysorean horse, advanced with loud shouts at full gallop, and charged this ill-constructed line. Our countrymen had scarcely time to fire one volley, when they found their ranks broken by the enemy's cavalry. Deserted by the sepoys, they were left, only one hundred and eighty in number, without any hope of escape; upon which they determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible. The whole were either killed or taken, including a company of grenadiers, who had acted a prominent part in all the late victories.

"Amid these gallant exploits, the siege of Trichinopoly was protracted a year and a half, during which neither the French nor their numerous allies obtained any decisive advantage. Mr. Mill considers the object as very unworthy of such strenuous efforts; yet it ought to be remembered that the company were deciding on that spot the destiny of the Carnatic, and perhaps the very existence of their establishment in India. To have yielded in such circumstances might have realized the views of Dupleix, whose boast it had been that he would reduce Madras to a fishing-village." The same author thus notices other transactions, by which the fate of the war was more influenced:—"Important events were meantime taking place at the court of the Deccan, where Bussy with his followers were dictating or directing every movement. This influence indeed he seemed entitled to expect, both from the generosity and prudence of Salabat Jung, who had been raised by the French to his present lofty station, and by them alone was maintained in it against the Mahrattas, and Gazeo-ood-Doen, whom the Mogul had authorized to expel him. The latter, however, as he was approaching with a prodigious army, died suddenly, not without suspicion, perhaps unjust, of having been poisoned by the adherents of his rival. Salabat being thus relieved from apprehension, the great men around him, viewing with much indignation the thralldom of their master to a handful of strangers, urged him to adopt measures for extricating himself from this humiliating situation; and at their suggestion he took certain steps, which were favoured by a temporary absence of Bussy. The pay of the troops was withheld, and on plausible

pretexes they were broken into detachments, and sent into different quarters. The foreigner, however, on his return immediately reassembled them, and his own force aided by the alarm of a Mahratta invasion, enabled him to dictate terms to the soubahdar. He procured the discharge of the hostile ministers; and taking advantage of the accumulated arrears demanded, and obtained as a security against future deficiencies, the cession of an extensive range of territory on the coasts of Coromandel and Orissa, including the Northern Circars. This, in addition to former acquisitions, gave the French a territory six hundred miles in extent, reaching from Medapilly to the Pagoda of Juggernaut, and yielding a revenue of £855,000."

Thus, while a war in the Carnatic drained the exchequer of Pondicherry, Dupleix and his accomplice, Bussy, took care by their power at the court of the Deccan, to acquire territory, and receive far more than sufficient to compensate any such drain; while the Carnatic itself was, in the prospective policy of Dupleix, soon to belong to France, and England, utterly vanquished, would be compelled to withdraw from Madras and the shores of Coromandel.

Whatever might be the difficulties which presented themselves around Trichinopoly, or elsewhere in the Carnatic, it is obvious that Dupleix had encouragement to persevere, and found the means of doing so by his negotiations in the capital of the Deccan itself. He had there assumed a position which rendered it incompatible with the continuance of French power to allow a rival in the fairest province of the government of the soubahdar, a government which virtually belonged to France, and to Dupleix as her representative. The interference of the English at all in the Carnatic was a proclamation that the influence of Dupleix at the court of the soubahdar was an usurpation. The displeasure of the French East India Company with Dupleix was now considerable, the French government having been importuned by that of England to put a stop to his career. The English government could no longer be deaf to the reclamations of their own East India Company, and intimated to the French ministry that they could not any longer be burthened, directly or indirectly, with the expenses of war at a time of peace. A conference was held in London, when all parties agreed to place the blame of the bloodshed in India upon Dupleix. He seems to have found no advocate either in the French Company or the French ministry. Mr. Mill, who can always see the errors and defects of his own countrymen easier than those of their deadliest ene-

mies, has afforded him a posthumous defence which inculcates more by its dubious extenuations, than would a direct censure. The opinion formed of Dupleix by his countrymen was the correct one: he involved his country in a sanguinary war to gratify her love of glory and his own. Unwilling to take up the quarrel in Europe, they gave up Dupleix, his conquests, and his schemes, and conceded all that England demanded. This spirit of concession was no doubt greatly influenced by the fact that, during the London conferences, England sent out a powerful fleet to India—an example which France was unable to follow.

M. Godheu was appointed to supersede Dupleix, and with special instructions to terminate hostilities. He arrived in Pondicherry on the 2nd of August, 1754, and conducted negotiations in the spirit of his mission. The siege of Trichinopoly was raised in virtue of the treaty which followed, and all acts of war were stopped on both sides. Godheu was no doubt influenced by the fact which exercised so much weight with the French ministry—the transmission of a powerful fleet and large military reinforcements; otherwise it is difficult to suppose that he would surrender everything for which the French had fought, and concede all for which the English had appealed to arms. Such, however, was the result of his mission to Pondicherry. The French in India were deeply mortified at two clauses in the treaty, one of which recognised Mohammed Ali as nabob of the Carnatic, thus giving to the English an ostensible triumph; the other depriving the French of the vast territory lately acquired, and thus inflicting upon them in the eyes of the natives defeat in the most obvious and substantial form. But there was no use in murmuring, or resisting Godheu, for Admiral Watson had arrived with three line-of-battle ships, and a sloop of war, and nearly a thousand English soldiers. Godheu had brought with him fifteen hundred French; but the naval force of Watson, and the material of war which he took out, constituted a preponderating power; besides, it was known that the English had determined, if necessary, greatly to augment their forces, and France was not in a condition at that time to maintain, either in Europe or the East, a naval war with England.

When Godheu, and Saunders, the president of Madras—a very commonplace man when compared with his French competitors—had settled all matters thus satisfactorily to the English, they returned home, leaving their nations, as they supposed, at perfect peace with one another. But these appearances were illusory; the respective relations of the two nations to

the native powers were too complex not to necessitate disputes by developing conflicting interests. Both nations had maintained so intricate a diplomacy that it was next to impossible to retrace their steps, and stand to one another *in statu quo, ante bellum*. The policy of Dupleix was conceived with so much genius, and worked out by him and Bussy with so much foresight, and with the contemplation of so many contingencies, and consecutive developments, that it irretrievably committed the French. They had placed themselves in such a position that they must go on in a career of conquest and intrigue, until the thrones of the Indian chiefs was at their disposal, or sink into mere traders craving permission to traffic from petty chiefs, and in continual danger of losing all chance of mercantile success, in consequence of the superior trading capacity which the English and Dutch everywhere displayed. The roots of French diplomacy had so spread and fastened among the courts of Southern India, that there they must remain, unless cut out by the sword. The English eventually found that solution of the difficulty the only one, and did not shrink from undertaking the laborious task.

The English found their own treaties with the natives so complicated that it was no easy matter for them to carry out thoroughly and heartily, as was their interest to do, their treaty with the French. Thus, when the treaty was signed, the general of the Mysorean army before Trichinopoly, refused to recognise it, and remained before the place until events in Mysore compelled his return. One of the causes of that return was the appearance of a French force in aid of the soubahdar of the Deccan to collect tribute, which the Mysoreans refused to pay, and which the soubahdar would never have demanded but for French instigation, which was offered in consequence of the English affording assistance to Mohammed Ali, their old *protégé*, for whom they warred so long and so well, in order to enable him to collect the revenues of Madras, an enterprise in which they conquered all opposition, but could raise no revenue. The British entered into a money bargain with Mohammed, which was at once mean and impolitic. They agreed to enforce the collection of his revenues in certain rebellious districts, if he would give them half the sum raised. This was a bargain intended by the English to serve both parties; they could not afford to pay and employ troops for the rajah's benefit. It eventually served neither Mohammed Ali nor his patrons. After a fruitless attempt to collect the revenue, the British retired from the task baffled and chagrined.

Salabat Jung and Bussy, the French agent at the court of the Deccan, at the head of the French troops marched against the Rajah of Mysore, to collect tribute due by that prince, or alleged to be due, to the soubahdar. At the same time, the Mahrattas made one of their raids upon the territory, so that the Mysorean general withdrew from the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly to defend his master's lands. The rajah feared the Mahrattas, and therefore pretended submission to the viceroy. The English now displayed their triumph by investing their *protégé* with the insignia of his office as Nabob of the Carnatic, at his capital of Arcot. The efforts made by the British to gain the submission of the zemindars and polygars, so that Mohammed might receive his revenues, offended the French: they represented that the employment of English troops to interfere in the internal affairs of the Carnatic was in violation of the recent treaty. The real ground of annoyance with the French was the prospect of the nabob having a revenue, and being thereby enabled to defend himself. The governor of Vellore refused to recognise the nabob's authority, at all events, so far as revenue was concerned; and the determination of the English to enforce that authority was pleaded by the French as a ground for military interference in the refractory governor's behalf. The English, intimidated by this demonstration and the strength of Vellore, withdrew their troops. Other chiefs in his neighbourhood followed the example of the ruler of Vellore, and the whole of that part of the Carnatic became disturbed, and continued so for years. Madura itself was suddenly seized by one of the boldest of the khans, and held in defiance of the British. The French were solicitous to interfere more decidedly by arms, but the intrigues at the court of the Deccan kept them busy: they, however, perpetually incited the petty chiefs and district governors to revolt, being as determined as ever to prevent Mohammed Ali from obtaining the rule of the Carnatic, while they construed every attempt of the English to establish that rule (the treaty with the French having fully recognised it) into covert war against France. Nothing could be more evident at the close of 1755, than that the war between the French and English must be fought over again so far as the Carnatic was concerned, and that nothing but the entire prostration of the power of one or the other could ensure quiet.

The French, for a time, lost influence at the court of the Deccan, and negotiations were opened with the English at Madras to send troops to protect the capital, Bussy and his French soldiers being at the same time dis-

missed. The English were at this juncture occupied in Bengal in a life or death struggle, and could not make the tempting offer available. The prime-minister of the soubahdar caused the retiring forces of the French to be treacherously waylaid and attacked; but Bussy behaved with such intrepidity and skill, that he resisted all assaults until succours arrived. The soubahdar sued for peace, which was granted at the still further expense of his independence, and Bussy became more potential than ever. The breaking out of war in Bengal caused both parties to send troops in that direction; but the English, still persistently resolved to effect the complete subjugation of Mohammed Ali's dominions, and war having broken out in Europe between England and France, sent a large force to Madura, in the spring of 1757. There Captain Calliaud showed skill and heroism; but he had no battering guns, the place was strong, and before guns arrived, the French marched to Trichinopoly once more, before which they encamped on the 14th of May. The garrison was small, and, besides defending the place, had five hundred French prisoners to guard. Calliaud, active and intelligent, was soon apprised of the danger, and, on the 25th, arrived within nineteen miles of the beleaguered city. For miles his force watched every movement, for the French had denuded all their garrisons, even Pondicherry, in the hope of surprising Trichinopoly. The French had guarded every approach to the city. A plain of seven miles in extent, being an area of rice fields, was deemed impassable, and not guarded. Calliaud advanced towards the city, and made such demonstrations as an officer would have made in order to force one of the strongly-guarded posts; but at night he turned aside, approached the rice swamp, boldly entered it, and brought his tired soldiers safely through, effecting an entrance by daylight into the city. So much was the French general dispirited by this skillful and enterprising movement, that, according to Orme, he the next day retreated to Pondicherry.

Other detachments of the French harassed the country, and burned defenceless towns. The English took reprisals, and sought every opportunity to engage the French in the open field, who, although far the more numerous, declined battle, and maintained a sort of partizan warfare. The English were well handled in the field; but their officers were allowed little discretion by the factors at Madras, and the troops were harassed by orders and counter orders, as the stupidity or fear of the civilians at the presidency dictated.

The year 1757 was one of great activity on the part of the Mahrattas, who demanded

"chout" (tribute) from the Carnatic, and threatened Arcot, so that the nabob had to send his family to Madras for safety. The terrified nabob agreed to pay the chout, and expected the English to find the money out of the unpaid revenues of his own dominions, if they could; but, at all events, he looked to them for the means of redeeming himself from a Mahratta invasion. The English, having no adequate force to bring against the wild horsemen, and unwilling to lose the Carnatic—to the revenues of which, or their share of them, they attributed great prospective value—agreed to pay the stipulated rupees. The brave Calliaud, relieved from the presence of the French at Trichinopoly, again sought to reduce the refractory polygars of Madura and Tinnevely. He besieged Madura, but found it easier to buy his way in, than force his way through the breach. This seems, so far as native spirit was concerned, to have quelled revolt in these districts.

The French were now expecting a grand fleet and vast resources of men and arms from France. On the 8th of September, twelve ships arrived at Pondicherry, landed one thousand men, and returned to the Mauritius. This was not the fleet to which the Franco-Indians looked forward, as destined to sweep away all opposition in the Eastern seas, and to land such forces as would speedily subjugate all Southern India. The reinforcements, which were landed, immediately joined the army in the field, and fort after fort fell to the French, until eight strong places were subdued in the neighbourhood of Chittapet, Trincomalee, and Gingee. The French organized the collectorates of these districts, and received the revenue as if the territory was their own. The Mysoreans invaded the dominions of the nabob, and plundered the country up to the walls of Madura. The English laid an ambush in a narrow pass, and, although the detachment consisted entirely of sepoy, they fell fiercely upon the Mysoreans, inflicting appalling slaughter. This event terminated their incursion. In November the French withdrew their troops into the different forts; but the natives attached to the rival claimants for the nabobship ravaged the entire country—fire, rapine, and blood everywhere indicated the horrors of a war of disputed succession. The year 1757 terminated leaving each party in an expectant attitude; but the French had undoubtedly gained during the struggle in the Carnatic. On the 28th of April, the expected French fleet arrived. It consisted of twelve sail of the line, with a portion of the squadron which had the previous year returned from Pondicherry to Mauritius. This expedition left Brest when a fever raged in that port, and

brought the infection on board, so that three hundred men died on the voyage and many arrived sick; a considerable number dying in the roads of Pondicherry, or in the fort.

With this expedition, there was a body of troops not less than thirteen hundred strong. Most of them were Irish, in the French service—the men who, at Fontenoy, snatched victory from the English in the moment when the beaten French were forsaking the field. Probably no page of history records heroism more gallant and romantic than that which relates the courage displayed by the "Irish Brigades" in the French service, when fighting on the field of Fontenoy; and in the records of few battles is homage to the brave so freely accorded by men of all parties as to the gallant men who were the sole victors of that sanguinary conflict. With these troops was the Count de Lally, an Irishman (or, as some affirm, the son of an Irishman), who had on the field of Fontenoy greatly distinguished himself—so much so, that he was promoted to the rank of colonel by the French king at the close of the battle. Dr. Taylor and Mr. Murray describe him as a man of extraordinary prowess. The former says:—"Upon the breaking out of the war between France and England, in 1756, the French ministry resolved to strike an important blow in India. The Count de Lally was appointed to take the chief command. He was descended from one of the Irish families, which had been compelled to emigrate at the revolution of 1688, in consequence of having adhered to the cause of the Stuarts; and he was therefore animated by a bitter hatred of British ascendancy, which had crushed both his country and his creed. At the battle of Fontenoy he took several English officers prisoners with his own hand, and was raised to the rank of colonel by King Louis himself on the field of battle. He was accompanied to India by his own Irish regiments, composed of the best troops in the service of France, by fifty of the royal artillery, and by several officers of great distinction."

Dr. Taylor, however he may allow his own national predilections to influence his tone in the above paragraph, does not exaggerate the surprising heroism of the count or of his soldiers. The utmost confidence was placed in both by France; and as Lally was entrusted with all the authority previously allowed to Dupleix, it was supposed that the English would be speedily driven out of their long fostered possessions. Lally was not so fortunate as at Fontenoy; and England, whom in his remorseless bigotry he so bitterly hated, was destined to triumph over him on a distant field, and cause the sun of his glory to

set soon and for ever. Lally was not as skilful as he was brave, although he possessed many of the finest intellectual qualities of a good soldier. He was rash, vehement, impatient, tyrannical; he chafed at obstacles, which might have been patiently surmounted had he preserved his temper. A furious religious animosity towards the English, as the chief Protestant nation, blinded his judgment as to present means and probable results, and threw him into acts of precipitancy from which even his great valour and resources in danger could not extricate him.

The Count de Lally was ordered to attack Fort St. David as soon after his arrival as possible. Before communicating with the land, he caused his ships to take up positions against that place, and at once make hostile demonstrations, while he landed his troops at Pondicherry. Then, with a dispatch previously unknown in Indian warfare, except under Clive, and sometimes under Lawrence, he landed his Irish regiments, and an equal number of sepoy, and sent them forward at once against St. David's. The portion of the expedition furnished by the garrison of Pondicherry was badly commanded and badly furnished with material. Indeed, he found the garrison at Pondicherry in a wretched condition. A salute was fired with shotted guns, by which the hull and rigging of one of his ships was damaged. Lally complained bitterly of the ignorance and incompetence of the governor and his council, who could give him no information either concerning the place he was about to attack, or the strength of the English on the coast; neither could they furnish his men with good guides, or even sufficient provisions.

The forces arrived before Fort St. David utterly exhausted, and must have famished of hunger had they not laid the country under contribution. Scarcely had the French expedition approached, when the English fleet was descried from the ships in the road. Mill, quoting Lally himself, and Orme, gives the following account of the futile proceedings of both fleets:—"Mr. Pooceke, with the ships of war from Bengal, had arrived at Madras on the 24th of February; on the 24th of the following month a squadron of five ships from Bombay had arrived under Admiral Stevens; and on the 17th of April, the whole sailed to the southward, looking out for the French. Having in ten days worked as high to the windward as the head of Ceylon, they stood in again for the coast, which they made, off Negapatnam, on the 28th, and proceeding along shore, discovered the French fleet, at nine the next morning, riding near Cuddalore. The French imme-

diately weighed, and bore down towards Pondicherry, throwing out signals to recall the two ships which had sailed with Lally; and the English admiral gave the signal for chase. The summons for the two ships not being answered, the French fleet stood out to sea, and formed the line of battle. The French consisted of nine sail, the English only of seven. The battle was indecisive; the loss of a few men, with some damage to the ships, being the only result. Both fleets fell considerably to leeward during the engagement; and the French were six days in working up to the road of Pondicherry, where the troops were landed. Lally himself had some days before proceeded to Fort St. David with the whole force of Pondicherry, and the troops from the fleet were sent after him, as fast as they came on shore."

Meanwhile, matters on shore tried the skill and energy of Lally to the utmost. In order to procure attendants on his army, and as the president and council could not give him a sufficient number of men of low caste, he impressed men of all castes indiscriminately, causing consternation and rage everywhere; he was from that hour hated and distrusted by the natives. Lally became as much an object of hatred to the French as to the natives. He was instructed by the company to regard them rather in the light of unprincipled speculators, so that he arrived with a prejudice against them:—"As the troubles in India have been the source of fortunes, rapid and vast, to a great number of individuals, the same system always reigns at Pondicherry, where those who have not yet made their fortune hope to make it by the same means; and those who have already dissipated it, hope to make it a second time. The Sieur de Lally will have an arduous task to eradicate that spirit of cupidity; but it would be one of the most important services which he could render to the company." Such were the terms of the instructions he received. The want of means at Pondicherry for any military enterprise, and the tardiness with which all material aid was afforded to him for the reduction of Fort St. David, excited his anger to a vehement degree, so that he abused the French civilians in terms which were more appropriate to the lips of a madman than to those of a governor and commander.

Notwithstanding the impediments presented by the officials at Pondicherry, he was able to bring a force before St. David's superior to that of its defenders. The latter consisted of sixteen hundred natives; three hundred and sixty-nine European soldiers, of whom eighty-three were invalids; and two

hundred and fifty sailors unacquainted with military discipline. Lally brought against this garrison two thousand five hundred European soldiers, exclusive of officers, and an equal force of sepoys.* The place was soon captured; and the conqueror immediately sent an expedition to Devi-Cotah, which the garrison abandoned. On the 7th of June, he reentered Pondicherry, and celebrated a *Te Deum* with great ecclesiastical pomp, for Lally was as ardent in religion as in arms.

The English were astounded at so rapid a series of disasters. They called in all their troops from every department of the presidency to strengthen Madras and Trichinopoly. At this juncture, there is every reason to suppose that the English would have lost Madras itself had Lally been supported by the French; but the poverty of the exchequer at Pondicherry, the want of credit with the natives, and the hatred excited among the latter by the new general's tyranny and bigotry, dried up all sources of supply except what came from France; in India the enterprising general lost all hope of material aid, unless it could be supplied by Bussy. Lord Clive, many years after, thus described the condition of affairs at this time:—"M. Lally arrived with a force as threatened not only the destruction of all the settlements there, but of all the East India Company's possessions, and nothing saved Madras from sharing the fate of Fort St. David, at that time, but their want of money, which gave time for strengthening and reinforcing the place."

A letter written by Lally himself from Fort St. David, after the capture, to the president and council of Pondicherry, presents the poverty of French resources, and the disunion between him and the French civilians, in a light sufficiently clear to explain why Madras itself did not fall:—"This letter shall be an eternal secret between you, sir, and me, if you afford me the means of accomplishing my enterprise. I left you 100,000 livres of my own money to aid you in providing the funds which it requires. I found not, upon my arrival, in your purse, and in that of your whole council, the resource of 100 pence. You, as well as they, have refused me the support of your credit. Yet I imagine you are all of you more indebted to the company than I am. If you continue to leave me in want of everything, and exposed to contend with universal disaffection, not only shall I inform the king and the company of the warm zeal which their servants here display for their interest, but I shall take effectual measures for not depending, during the short stay I wish to make in this

* Orme.

country, on the party spirit and the personal views with which I perceive that every member appears occupied, to the total hazard of the company."

Bussy had in the meantime carried on a series of intrigues in the metropolis of the Deccan, worthy of his own reputation for energy and ability, and of that of his preceptor, Dupleix, for the like qualities. A series of revolutions occurred at the court of the viceroy as rapid as the shocks of an earthquake. Again and again the interests of France and the influence of Bussy were all but destroyed, but from the ruins of each successive catastrophe, the genius of Bussy rescued his country's influence, and even increased it by the very means adopted for its destruction. Lally had the infatuation to order Bussy away from the court of the soubahdar, and treated his statements as to the interests involved as pretences. The mind of Lally could not comprehend the subtle, complicated, and extended schemes of Bussy. The latter, on being treated as an impostor, joined the rest of his countrymen in hatred against the hot-headed innovator. Thus situated, the first resolution of the victorious commander was to attack Madras, carry it rapidly at any sacrifice, and obtain therefrom the accumulations of English industry,—those supplies which he so much required. The naval commander was, however, afraid of the English sailors, and would not even sail in the direction of Madras, to observe the enemy. He sailed south, under the pretence of intercepting English merchant vessels, but really in the hope of keeping out of harm's way. A large body of troops placed on board were thus kept idle, and drawn away from the French army at St. David's. Had these soldiers been from the Irish instead of the French portion of the force, they would probably, from their devotion to their general, have mutinied against the admiral. The latter succeeded in cruising about in such a way as to avoid the English, and Lally, unable to secure his co-operation, was obliged to adopt another project to gain supplies, and extend French influence. The rejected claimant of the throne of Tanjore had been held by the English as a prisoner at Fort St. David, and Lally conceived the idea of using this personage for the purpose of getting money from that country, the reigning rajah of which had formerly given a bond of 5,600,000 rupees to the French, to prevent their attacking his dominions. A demand was made for the money; the rajah did not possess the means of payment, and the French proceeded to dethrone him in favour of the prisoner at Fort St. David,

who would levy it on the inhabitants, with French assistance. On the 18th of June, 1758, Lally marched at the head of his disposable forces against Tanjore. In seven days the army arrived at Carical, the natives everywhere hiding their provisions, and showing the utmost hatred to the general. His own people rendered all support unwillingly; the troops suffered from fatigue and hunger, which the Irish bore even cheerfully, but the French and sepoys were discontented and murmured. A messenger from the Tanjore monarch arrived to treat, but the general would listen to no parley; either the bond must be paid, or he would seize its equivalent, and that of all further expenses incurred. He proceeded to the wealthy town of Nagpore, which he entered, no resistance being offered, but the rich natives had fled, and there was very little property left behind.

He next arrived at Kinloor, where a pagoda stood of great celebrity. He plundered it. Supposing the idols to be gold, he carried them away; they proved to be brass, but the effect upon the natives was the same as if they had been of the precious metal. He dug down to the foundations of the temple, swept all the tanks, and treated the property of the unoffending and defenceless with barbarity. Six Brahmins lingering about the camp, in the hope of obtaining their gods, he seized, denounced as spies, and blew them away from guns.

His track to the capital, where he arrived on the 18th of July, was marked by devastation. The king offered a treaty. Lally's demands, both in their nature and mode, were imprudent, and violated the most obvious religious scruples of the natives. Bigoted himself to the last degree, ready to resent the smallest indignity to his religion with fire and sword, he had no respect or consideration for the religious feelings of others. In civil and religious matters he was alike a tyrant, but he had the faculty, not only of ruling military bodies, but of attaching them to him. This was especially the case with his own Irish soldiers, who followed him with a contempt of danger, and a desperate courage which rivalled even his own, although he was reputed to be the bravest man in France.

The bombardment of the rajah's stronghold promptly followed the failure of negotiation which the king renewed under the cannonade, but attempting to trick Lally, as all oriental princes would at all risks, that officer vowed he would send him and his family as slaves to the Mauritius. The rajah, determined to resist, every feeling of his nature having been outraged by successive insults the most galling to a Hindoo imagi-

nation. He appealed to the English. Captain Calliaud had sent him a small detachment of sepoys from Trichinopoly, being afraid if he sent European troops, that the rajah might regard them simply as means of effecting an accommodation, and betray them into the hands of the enemy. Calliaud sent another and stronger detachment. The bombardment continued until the 7th of August, when a breach was effected. At that time, Lally had only two days' supply of food in his camp, and hardly one day's supply of ammunition. In that conjuncture of affairs, the English fleet arrived before Carical, the only place from which Lally had obtained supplies. During the siege, the two fleets had met, and fought, the English gaining a victory: this Lally also learned, and there now appeared no hope for the French, unless in an immediate assault. Lally called a council of war, two officers were for the assault, of which he was not one; the other thirteen counselled him to raise the siege. They began their retreat next day, but before putting that movement into execution, the besieged garrison sallied out, and partly effected a surprise, placing the French army in imminent danger. As it was necessary for the English fleet to keep on the *qui vive* for the beaten but not extinguished French squadrons, Lally hoped to reach Carical before the English would venture to land a force there. In this, he was successful, but when he saw the powerful navy of England riding in the offing, his hope failed, although his courage could not fail, and his rage against the hated English broke forth in torrents of furious and almost frenzied passion.

Lally soon saw that the entire evacuation of Tanjore and its neighbourhood was essential to the safety of the French. Their fleets were fugitive. The Mahrattas, at the instigation of the English, threatened that they would invade the French territory if Lally and his forces did not retire from that of Tanjore; and the civilians of Pondicherry urged his return, as twelve hundred English menaced even the seat of the presidency. Lally had not head for such sudden changes and complicated transactions, and he was bewildered and depressed, while the wants of his brave and patient, but harassed army, were as unprovided for as ever. The movements of the two fleets were uncertain, and their tactics at times unaccountable, both were the victims of the weather. The French had the best ships, the English the best men, and the more nautical skill. Most of the English ships were badly built, and in action the French, knowing that the chances were they would have to retreat, principally

fired into the English rigging to disable pursuit; while the English, firing at the hulls, and sweeping the decks, inflicted more serious and permanent damage, even when flight was not prevented, and killed and disabled a far greater number of men. The proceedings of the different squadrons are differently related by French and English authors, and the contradictions occurring in their relations, render it next to impossible to reconcile them. Mill's account is the clearest; he in the main gives the relation of Orme, with such modifications as information subsequently coming to light enabled him to supply. He thus describes what took place at sea:—

“After the first of the naval engagements, the English fleet, before they could anchor, were carried a league to the north of Sadras; the French, which had suffered less in the rigging, and sailed better, anchored fifteen miles to the windward. The English, as soon as possible, weighed again, and after a fruitless endeavour to reach Fort St. David, discovered the French fleet on the 28th of May in the road of Pondicherry. The next day, the French, at the remonstrance of Lally, who sent on board a considerable body of troops, got under sail; but instead of bearing down on the English, unable to advance against the wind, proceeded to Fort St. David, where they arrived on the evening after the surrender. The English sailing badly, fell to leeward as far as Alamparva, where intelligence was received of the loss of the fort. The admiral, therefore, not having water on board for the consumption of five days, made sail, and anchored the next day in the roads of Madras. The fleet had numerous wants; Madras had very scanty means of supply; and nearly eight weeks elapsed before it was again ready for sea. On the 3rd of July, three of the company's ships arrived from Bengal, with money, merchandise, and stores, but no troops. The monsoon had obliged them to make the outward passage towards the Acheen, and they came in from the southward. The French admiral, after touching at Fort St. David, had stood to the southward, to cruise off Ceylon; in opposition to remonstrances of Lally, who desired the fleet to co-operate in the destined enterprise against Madras. Lally hastened from Fort St. David to Pondicherry, and summoned a council by whose authority he recalled the fleet. The injunction reached the admiral at Carical on the 16th of June, and he anchored the next day in the road of Pondicherry. Had he continued his destined course to the southward, he could not have missed the three English East Indiamen from Bengal, and by their

capture would have obtained that treasure, the want of which alone disconcerted the scheme of English destruction. On the 25th of July, the English fleet were again under sail; and on the 27th appeared before Pondicherry, where the French lay at anchor. They put to sea without delay: but the difficulties of the navigation, and the aims of the commanders, made it the 2nd of August before the fleets encountered off Carical. The French line consisted of eight sail; the English, as before, of seven. The fight lasted scarcely an hour; when three of the French ships, being driven out of the line, the whole bore away, under all the sail they could carry. The English admiral gave chase; but in less than ten minutes the enemy were beyond the distance of certain shot. Toward night the English gave over the pursuit, and came to anchor off Carical. The French steered for Pondicherry, when the admiral declared his intention of returning to Mauritius. Lally sent forward the Count d'Estaign to remonstrate with him on the disgrace of quitting the sea before an inferior enemy, and to urge him to renewed operations. D'Estaign offered to accompany him on board, with any proportion of the troops. Lally himself moved with the army from Carical on the 24th of August, and, having passed the Colaroone, hurried on with a small detachment to Pondicherry, where he arrived on the 28th. He immediately summoned a mixed council of the administration and the army, who joined in a fresh expostulation to the admiral on the necessity of repairing to Madras, where the success of an attack must altogether depend upon the union of the naval and military operations. That commander, representing his ships as in a state of the greatest disablement, and his crews extremely enfeebled and diminished by disease, would yield to no persuasion, and set sail with his whole fleet for Mauritius on the 2nd of September.

“If we trust to the declaration of Lally, his intention of besieging Madras, still more his hopes of taking it, were abandoned from that hour. Before the fleet departed, an expedition against Arcot, with a view to relieve the cruel pressure of those pecuniary wants which the disastrous result of the expeditions to Tanjore had only augmented, was projected and prepared.”

Disconcerted although Lally was, and exhausted as were his means, his expedition against Arcot was conducted with extraordinary energy, dispatch, hardihood, and success. His Irish legion performed prodigies of valour, Lally himself ever foremost in the path of danger. The native enemy melted away

before their furious valour. Fort after fort fell. Every task was executed both by the general and troops with masterly ability, yet strategists affirm that the French commander failed in not cutting off supplies from Madras, which should have been a part of his scheme, and was practicable, as these critics allege. At all events, on the 4th of October, 1758, Lally, "on the terms of a pretended capitulation, amid the thunder of cannon, made his entrance into Arcot."*

The grand error in Lally's campaign was the neglect of Chingleput, which he might have captured without resistance, so great was the consternation into which the garrison was thrown by his triumphant course. This fortress covered the conveyance of supplies to Madras, and as soon as the English recovered from the temporary panic inspired by Lally's rapid and brilliant career, they strengthened the place in every way their means allowed, and resolved to defend it, if Lally's eyes being opened as to its importance, he should venture to assail it. While the French, or Irish commander, as he may with more strict propriety be called, sped as a fiery meteor over the country, a naval reinforcement arrived from England, conveying eight hundred and fifty royal troops, commanded by Colonel Draper. The brave and wise Caillaud, with his European troops, were recalled from Trichinopoly, and Chingleput was powerfully reinforced.

Lally, who declared that he never lost sight of Chingleput, but had comprised its capture in his plans, wrote from Arcot to Pondicherry for money to pay his troops and find means for carrying them against that place; but the council had no money, and the general was obliged to put his troops into cantonments, and hasten to Pondicherry himself, if possible to set things there in better order. The celebrated Bussy would have been a far more likely man to remove the disorder of that capital; he had just joined his superior as the latter entered Arcot in triumph. Instead of harmonious action between these two important men, erimination and re-erimination occurred upon their meeting. Lally, who was a man of honest and transparent mind, accused the wily diplomatist of a tortuous and fraudulent policy dishonouring to France. Bussy, without being more frank than wise, soon caused his master to understand that the lesser magnate considered him impolitic, precipitate, rash, and without a plan which, by its comprehensiveness, consecutiveness, and harmony would bring all his power to bear against the English. The sieur believed that by a bold, daring, onward warfare,

* Mill, lib. iv. cap. iv. p. 163.

the peninsula might soon be cleared of them; his men, he believed, could do it, if ammunition, food, and the sinews of war were provided. Bussy doubted if the English were a people to be removed in a hurry, as Lally might have known from the experience of his ancestors in Ireland; and Bussy also thought that money and power might both be had, if the means taken to obtain them were well chosen, and used with caution as well as courage. Another general of reputed ability, who had been appointed by Lally governor of Masulipatam, Morasin, also joined the conference. Lally urged these officers to raise money on their personal credit, which the conduct of Lally himself had rendered impossible. Bussy urged the consolidation of conquest, and the exercise of French power at the court of the Deccan, as much more important than the influence of the English with the inferior and subsidiary court of the Carnatic. It was to no purpose that reasons the most convincing were urged for such a course; Lally could see no object but one—the removal of the hated English from India, and war against them everywhere; and there is no doubt his views were popular with his Irish soldiery. The French officers were in favour of the plans of Bussy, and wished him to supersede Lally in rank and authority. The council at Pondicherry declared that they had no means to support the army. The officers urged an attempt to take Madras. Lally had no means for a siege. Count D'Estaing, one of the bravest soldiers in the French army, exclaimed in a council of war: "Better to die under the walls of Madras, than of hunger in Pondicherry." Lally himself hoped to pillage the black town, and thus supported, shut up the English in Fort St. George. He advanced his own money, 60,000 rupees, and prevailed upon various Frenchmen in Pondicherry to advance more, which barely exceeded half of his own contributions. With these means, he equipped a little army of about seven thousand men, of whom about two thousand seven hundred were French and Irish, and proceeded against Madras. He was ready to march by the first week in November, but the weather detained him six weeks, and his resources were being rapidly consumed, and he was then reduced to barely a week's supply.

The English prepared themselves against the danger which impended. Admiral Pococke landed his marines at Madras. A body of native cavalry, and the sepoy which had been part of the garrison of Trichinopoly, were posted so as to command the line of the French convoys. Lawrence, who had before been a victor so often, commanded the army,

which encamped on an elevated spot near the city. Governor Pigot commanded the fort, a man unsuitable for any military purpose, although shrewd, sensible, and with much capacity for business. The military in the fort consisted of seventeen hundred and fifty-eight Europeans, two thousand two hundred and twenty sepoy, and two hundred of the nabob's horsemen, who were of little value. There were one hundred and fifty Europeans, who acted as civil auxiliaries.

On the 12th of December Lally attacked Lawrence's outposts, who fought and fell back. Lally pressed upon him with impetuosity, and Lawrence sought shelter in the fort. The count reconnoitred all day on the 13th. On the 14th, he realized his purpose of capturing the black town, which was pillaged. The Irish soldiery became intoxicated. The English, acquainted with the fact, sallied out to the number of six hundred men, who were selected for their bravery and efficiency. These troops fell upon the revellers, and slew many; but although most were drunk, and all in great disorder, they proved much more formidable enemies than their French colleagues; they did not give way, but fought in scattered groups with undaunted bravery and determination, until two hundred of the English, who also fought with obstinate valour, lay dead in the streets. The remainder retreated, before Lally's soldiers could form. Bussy, instead of intercepting the fugitives, refused to act, or allow his officers to act, on the ground that he was without orders and without cannon,—an absurd pretext, for the English were driven back without cannon and without orders, and Bussy could have intercepted them had he as much spirit as his officers. Probably the want of cordiality between him and Lally accounted for it, and it may be that the feeling extended to Bussy's followers; for on Aughrim, Fontenoy, and other fields, where they fought side by side, the French evinced much jealousy of their Irish auxiliaries.

Lally having obtained money from some merchants who were resident in the black town, opened his batteries, as he himself alleged afterwards, without hope of capture, but with the intention to bombard. While the count was thus proceeding a million of livres arrived at Pondicherry, and with the funds thus placed at his disposal, he made regular siege, with the hope of subduing the fort before the English fleet, expected back in January, should arrive. With disadvantages, such as would have deterred any other man then living, unless Clive, and with nothing to encourage him but the heroism and noble devotion of his own Irish soldiers, and a few of the common soldiers

among the French and the sepoy, this dauntless man persevered. Mill did him and his poor soldiers no more than justice when he wrote the following account, which unites a fulness and a brevity not to be met with in any other record of these transactions:—

“ With only two engineers, and three artillery officers, excepting the few who belonged to the company, all deficient both in knowledge and enterprise; with officers in general dissatisfied and ill-disposed, with only the common men on whom he could depend, and of whose alacrity he never had reason to complain, he carried on the siege with a vigour and activity which commanded the respect even of the besieged, though they were little acquainted with the difficulties under which he toiled. By means of the supplies which had plentifully arrived from Bengal, and the time which the presidency had enjoyed to make preparation for siege, the English were supplied with an abundance both of money and of stores. The resolution to defend themselves to the utmost extremity, which has seldom been shared more universally and cordially by any body of men, inspired them with incessant vigilance and activity. The industry of the enemy was perpetually counteracted by a similar industry on the part of their opponents. No sooner had those without erected a work, than the most active, and enterprising, and often skilful exertions were made from within to destroy it. Whatever ingenuity the enemy employed in devising measures of attack, was speedily discovered by the keen and watchful eyes of the defenders. A breach, in spite of all those exertions, was, however, effected; and the mind of Lally was intensely engaged with preparations for the assault; when he found the officers of his army altogether indisposed to second his ardour. Mr. Orme declares his opinion that their objections were founded on real and prudent considerations, and that an attempt to storm the place would have been attended with repulse and disaster. Lally, however, says that the most odious intrigues were carried on in the army, and groundless apprehensions were propagated, to shake the resolution of the soldiers, and prevent the execution of the plan: that the situation of the general was thus rendered critical in the highest degree, and the chance of success exceedingly diminished; yet he still adhered to his design, and only waited for the setting of the moon, which in India sheds a light not much feebler than that of a winter sun, on the very day on which an English fleet of six sail arrived at Madras. The fleet under Admiral Pococke, which had left Madras on the 11th of October, had arrived at Bombay on the 10th of Decem-

ber, where they found six of the company's ships, and two ships of the line, with six hundred of the king's troops on board. On the 31st of December the company's ships, with all the troops, sailed from Bombay, under the convoy of two frigates, and arrived on the 16th of February, at a critical moment, at Madras. 'Words,' says Lally, 'are inadequate to express the effect which the appearance of them produced. The officer who commanded in the trenches deemed it even inexpedient to wait for the landing of the enemy, and two hours before receiving orders retired from his post.' Lally was now constrained to abandon the siege. The officers and soldiers had been on no more than half pay during the first six weeks of the expedition, and entirely destitute of pay during the remaining three. The expenses of the siege and the half pay had consumed, during the first month, the million livres which had arrived from the islands. The officers were on the allowance of the soldiers. The subsistence of the army for the last fifteen days had depended almost entirely upon some rice and butter, captured in two small vessels from Bengal. A very small quantity of gunpowder remained in the camp; and not a larger at Pondicherry. The bombs were wholly consumed three weeks before. The sepoys deserted for want of pay, and the European cavalry threatened every hour to go over to the enemy."

It is probable that but for the personal attachment of his own soldiers of the Irish brigade the French would have seized Lally, and given Bussy the command. On the night of the 17th the army broke up from before Madras, and made good their retreat. The English seem to have been so awed by the bravery and military capacity of Lally, and a portion of his troops, that they instituted no pursuit. Considering the superior force, equipment, and resources of the English at Madras, when the siege was raised, it was much to their dishonour that a hot and unrelenting pursuit was not adopted. The tidings of Lally's misfortunes at Madras arrived in Pondicherry before him, and were hailed with transports of joy, alike by French and natives, so completely had the bigotry and self-will of the governor counteracted the bravery, talent, and glory of the soldier. When he arrived at Pondicherry, if the joy at his ill success were less openly expressed, it was not less hearty.

Mohammed Ali, the actual nabob of the Carnatic, the *protégé* of the English, had proved himself a costly ally. He had, however, been true to English interests, and their honour and policy was to support him. His two brothers, who had been instigated by the

French, and who had so often sought French help, now, in the hour of adversity, betrayed them. One of the brothers actually assassinated all the French in his service, except a single officer, justifying the apprehensions entertained by Calliaud, recorded in a former page, when urged to send British troops to the assistance of the nabob himself. The native princes were entirely without faith, honour, or principle, and no confidence could be reposed in them, however gratitude or oaths might be expected to bind them to their engagements, or even to the observance of hospitality, justice, and mercy. The English were most anxious to recover the province, and prepared an expedition, but their funds had been so heavily drawn upon, that they were unable to take the field until the 6th of March, when a force, consisting of 1156 Europeans, 1570 sepoys, 1120 collierees (regular troops), and 1956 horse, was fully equipped for a campaign.

Besides this force, a native chief with a body of sepoys was sent to the countries of Tinnevely and Madura. When the troops had been withdrawn for the defence of Madras, Madura and Palam Cotah were attacked by the native chiefs; but the sepoys, who constituted the garrison, remained faithful, and drove them off.

When the army of Lally retreated from Madras, only a portion entered Pondicherry; another division marched to Congeveram, where the two armies remained in hostile array for three weeks, neither feeling strong enough to act upon the offensive. The English drew off to Wandiwash, took the town, and were preparing to open trenches against the fort, when the French moved from Congeveram to its relief. This was the expectation of the English, and, acting boldly and promptly upon the design previously formed, they turned, by a forced march, reached Congeveram, assaulted and captured it. The two armies watched one another, without giving battle, until the 28th of May, when both went into cantonments.

While these events were passing, the fleets were occupied by measures of usefulness. On the 29th of April, Admiral Pockocke arrived from the western coast of India, and cruised about, watching for French ships. About a month after the armies went into cantonments, the company's usual ships arrived at Madras, and brought one hundred soldiers for the service of the country, and announced that royal troops, in considerable numbers, might soon be expected. At the same time, it was announced that no treasure would arrive until 1760, tidings which dispirited the council, but which they did not then permit to transpire beyond the council chamber. In another

month, five ships arrived at Negapatnam with a portion of the expected troops, and, having landed stores and munitions, sailed for Madras.

On the 20th of August the French squadron sailed for the neighbourhood of Trincomalee, in the Island of Ceylon, where the fleet was reinforced by three new ships from France. On the 10th of September, the weather allowed the two navies to operate, and the English, having the wind, came down abreast, while the French lay-to in line of battle. The superiority of the French fleet was very great: they had eleven sail of the line and three frigates. The English had but nine sail of the line, one frigate, a fire-ship, and two of the company's traders. The superiority in guns on the part of the French was one hundred and seventy-four. The battle lasted but two hours, when the French line was broken, and made all sail out of the engagement. As usual, the English had suffered chiefly in the rigging, and could not follow. A pursuit of ten minutes proved that if the English had the best of the battle, the French were more skilful in making out of it. The loss of men was about equal; but the French ships were severely hulled, but suffered little in the rigging. The English next day entered the port of Negapatnam: the French, in four days, reached Poudicherry. Great was the distress of the people there, when a beaten fleet sought shelter, which they hoped would bring them the means of victory and large supplies. The disappointment and discontent spread wherever the French troops were quartered. The Irish brigade had received no pay for a long time—they had "borne the burning and heat of the day"—they had accomplished more in battle than the whole of the French troops besides—they alone had encountered with success the English; yet the limited funds of the presidency had been employed in recruiting and drilling sepoy, who ran away, and in supporting the civilians, French officers, and French troops, while Lally's own regiment was, like Lally himself, treated with something like hostility. In the hour of danger they were relied upon, and French compliment was lavished, to stimulate them, while, as at Madras, the toil of labour and battle were borne by them, and they were left to starve, unable to obtain either rations or their pay to procure them. Their long-enduring patience at last gave way: they mutinied, and the whole French army became disorganized. This corps had been regarded in India with the prestige it had acquired in France, and looked up to not only as the most chivalrous in battle, but the best disciplined; now their disobedience shook the loyalty of

every other corps.* But, although Lally's regiment mutinied under the pressure of hunger, and because they believed that their general and themselves were the objects of an invidious feeling, this did not hinder their usual aptitude in arms, as they soon proved in an action of great importance at Wandiwash.

Coote had not yet arrived, and the officer who was next in command, was Major Brereton. He was extremely solicitous to perform some brilliant deed, while the chance of commanding in chief remained with him. He accordingly induced the council of Madras to consent to his leading a force against Wandiwash. The whole army accordingly marched from Congeveram on the 26th of September. The two forces now in front of one another were very formidable, comprising the chief strength of each, but the English were far superior in *materiel* and equipment, while they were also well supplied with provisions. The French were deficient in every requisite. The English attacked the place on the night of the 29th, they came on with great gallantry, and they were received with equal spirit. It does not appear that the native auxiliaries on either side were of much use. The English passed through a terrible fire, and with the most audacious courage bore down all opposition; it so happened that at Wandiwash, as at Madras, they were once more brought into fierce conflict with their own fellow-subjects, who constituted Lally's corps, a sanguinary conflict ensued, and the English sustained a terrible defeat, leaving more than two hundred men dead, or in the hands of the victors. The repulse they experienced seems to have much injured the *morale* of the force, Mr. Mill relates the following anecdote, illustrative of the fact:—"In this action a detachment of grenadiers were very expeditiously quitting the vicinity of danger; when their officer, instead of calling after them, an imprudence which would, in all probability, have converted their retreat into a flight, ran till he got before them, and then, turning suddenly round, said, 'Halt,' as giving the ordinary word of command. The habit of discipline prevailed. The men stopped, formed according to orders, and marched back into the scene of action. But this success of the French, however brilliant,

* The first troops of the brigade were generally regarded in France as much better on the field of battle than anywhere else, and soon after they gained for France the far-famed field of Fontenoy, many complaints were urged as to their free way of living in quarters and their addictions to duels. The king pointed out the fact of these complaints to their general, exclaiming, "My Irish troops give me more trouble than all the rest of my army." "Sir," was the gallant and witty reply, "your majesty's enemies say the same thing."

neither clothed the men nor supplied them with provisions."

The state of affairs which ensued upon the French victory of Wandiwash, was, on the whole, unfavourable to France. A signal victory was gained without producing any moral influence among natives in favour of the French, for it was mainly to the valour of Lally's corps that the triumph was attributable, and the natives could not see any difference between Irishmen and Englishmen, and supposed that Lally's people were influenced by no principle in serving the French, but were mercenary soldiers who ought to have been on the other side. The natives did not fail to observe that, whenever the French and English met, unless the soldiers of Lally bore the brunt of the battle, the French were beaten; so that the English got the moral credit of the heroism of Lally's soldiers, and although they were defeated, still it was a battle lost to their own countrymen, and in the opinion of the natives redounded to English honour. The feeling became general throughout the Carnatic, and in other portions of the Deccan was rapidly making progress, that the French, however invincible to natives, were not as good soldiers as the British, and must finally give place to them. In various ways, such a feeling proved disadvantageous to the French, depriving them of native support. If the French lost a battle the English of course got the glory; if the French won one where the Irish brigade formed part of their army, the victory was attributed to the brigade, and the British had the glory again, even although they experienced repulse. The French were in a false position, and lost moral power day by day.

The removal of Bussy from the court of the Deccan left the French protégé, the viceroi, unable to cope with his ambitious rivals. A revolution broke out, and French influence then, deprived of the expert diplomacy of Bussy, melted away.

The general state of affairs at this juncture, as affected the French favourably and unfavourably, is voluminously presented by the great English historian of the time, Orme, and by Lally after his return to France. Mr. Mill collated these accounts, and thus gives the result:—"Neither the English nor the French had ever been able to draw from the districts which they held in the country, sufficient funds to defray the expense of the troops, employed in conquering and defending them. A considerable portion of those districts, which the French had been able to seize upon the arrival of Lally, the English had again recovered. The government of Pondicherry, left almost wholly destitute of

supplies from Europe, was utterly exhausted, first, by the long and desperate struggle in which they had been engaged; and secondly (for the truth must not be disguised, though the complaints of Lally have long been treated with ridicule), by the misapplication of the public funds: a calamity of which the violent passion of individuals for private wealth was a copious and perennial fountain. Lally had, from his first arrival, been struggling on the borders of despair, with wants which it was altogether out of his power to supply. The English had received, or were about to receive, the most important accession to their power. And nothing but the fleet, which had now arrived, and the supplies which it might have brought, could enable him much longer to contend with the difficulties which environed him.

"M. d'Aché had brought, for the use of the colony, £16,000 in dollars, with a quantity of diamonds, valued at £17,000, which had been taken in an English East Indiaman; and, having landed these effects, together with one hundred and eighty men, he declared his resolution of sailing again immediately for the islands. Nothing could exceed the surprise and consternation of the colony, upon this unexpected and alarming intelligence. Even those who were the most indifferent to the success of affairs, when the reputation of Lally, and the interest of their country alone were at stake, now began to tremble, when the very existence of the colony, and their interests along with it, were threatened with inevitable destruction. All the principal inhabitants, civil and military, assembled at the governor's house, and formed themselves into a national council. A vehement protest was signed against the departure of the fleet. But the resolution of the admiral was inflexible; and he could only be induced to leave four hundred Caffres, who served in the fleet, and five hundred Europeans, partly marines and partly sailors.

"At the same time the departure of Bussy had been attended, in the dominions of the soubahdar, with a rapid succession of events, ruinous to the interests of the French. An expedition from Bengal, fitted out by the English against the northern Circars, those important districts of which Bussy had obtained the dominion from Salabat Jung, had been attended with the most brilliant success; had not only driven the French entirely out of the country, but had compelled the soubahdar to solicit a connection with the English."

Bussy, however, continued to open communications with the revolutionists of the Deccan; and, with a perfidy only to be surpassed by Dupleix, finding his former pro-

tégé the weaker, entreated the count to side with the revoltors. Lally was a straightforward, honest man, who detested Bussy and his intrigues, and liked to adjust political differences by honest treaty, or downright hard fighting. He did not comprehend the arguments of his lieutenant, admitted that he had no knowledge of the politics of the Deccan, but began to see the importance in relation to the English of holding power with the viceroy, to whom the nabob of the Carnatic, the protégé of the English, owed allegiance. Lally permitted his minister to act as he pleased, and his first act was to declare Salabat Jung Nabob of the Carnatic. This pretender had raised an army, and had the support of the revolutionary power in the Deccan. The sieur confided to Bussy a body of troops to march to the assistance of the pretender, then directing his course upon Vellore. Bussy arrived at Wandiwash the day after the English suffered the reverse at that place, to take thence a portion of the troops upon his new enterprise. The French army, which was suffering extreme privations, at once burst into general mutiny. They believed that the admiral had left plenty of money at Pondicherry, and that the civilians had squandered it. The civilians did squander from time to time very much, and the chief cause of their hatred to Lally was his incorruptibility, and determination to check their corruption. On the 16th of October, the officers were deprived of all authority. Bussy had by that time, through his extraordinary address, led his division to Arcot, when hearing of the still further proceedings of the mutinous army which he had left behind, he halted. The French soldiers were, however, pacified by six months' pay, and a general amnesty. But the pretender to the nabobship had exhausted his resources, was observed by an English corps, and was solicited to give up his alliance with Bussy, by Nizam Ali, the chief of the successful revolutionary party in the Deccan, and then the ostensible viceroy. The negotiation between the pretender to the Carnatic and Bussy was broken off. The latter continued somehow to support his troops, and to increase his division by four hundred superior horsemen of the Deccan. Lally, no longer able to feed his army, was obliged to separate it into two divisions, and send each in a different direction to collect the rents, and assert generally the sovereignty of those districts. This was perilous in the presence of so great a force as the English now possessed, but all parties agreed that there was nothing else which could be done, and preserve the soldiers alive.

On the 20th of November, the division which took the southern direction seized upon

the island of Seringham, the garrison of Trichinopoly being too weak to offer resistance. Unfortunately for Lally, Colonel Coote, with the remainder of his force, had landed a few weeks before, and, on the 21st of November, reached Congeveram, where the English troops were cantoned. He pretended to concentrate his attention on Arcot, and deceived the French, threw them off their guard at Wandiwash, and then, suddenly assaulting that place, carried it on the 29th. This gallant *coup* of Coote compelled Lally to abandon Seringham for the defence of Arcot. He was joined by Bussy, with the force at the head of which he had been fruitlessly wandering about, for the first time in his Indian experience. Bussy recommended a cunning and effectual course of strategy to his chief—that of using his superiority of cavalry to act upon the English communications. Lally found that the temper of his Irish soldiers would not be satisfied with expeditions which only harassed the enemy, and that some bold exploit—some obvious and tangible advantage, was necessary to satisfy their daring enterprise and their protracted disappointments. Bussy's plan was the best in itself, but was unsuited to the condition of the troops. The count, anxious to secure food and ammunition, by clever stratagem diverted the attention of the English, and seized Congeveram, where he found nothing of importance. The English were fed by paying ready money daily at a high rate to the country people, who, finding them to be good customers, provided them with supplies; but Bussy's Mahratta horsemen often interfered with these operations, to the injury and embarrassment of the British. Lally next attempted the recapture of Wandiwash. Surprise was impossible: he laid siege to the place; but his genius was baffled by the professional etiquette of the engineers, who insisted upon carrying on the siege according to established rules, instead of obeying the orders of their chief, whose keen military eye saw that such rules were unnecessary in the case. Before he could do anything, a superior English army came to raise the siege. Bussy advised his superior officer to resort to the stratagem of cutting off the English supplies; but Lally, scorning to retreat, prepared to give battle to the approaching foe. The English manœuvred admirably, and formed their line with one wing in communication with the fort, and resting upon it so as to be covered by its fire. The European force of the French was superior to that of the English, being 2250 against 1900. The native force of the British was the stronger, being 2100 sepoys and 1250 cavalry against 1300 sepoys. The Mahratta horse in the French service would

not approach the field within several miles. The English had twenty-six field pieces, which were admirably officered and manned. Lally's engineers and artillery were inferior: his sole reliance was upon his Irish infantry; although a portion of his French force were cavalry, and from them he also expected some service. These cavalry were the first troops tested, and they behaved basely. The British advanced; and Lally, believing their left wing wavered from the fire of his artillery, which there is good reason for believing was an error, bravely put himself at the head of his horsemen, and ordered a charge; but neither men nor officers would follow him. He suspended the commanding officer, and ordered the next in seniority to take the command: he refused to obey. Lally addressed the men, appealing to their patriotism and courage. A junior officer cried out that it was shame to desert the general in the midst of battle, and this produced the effect. The general led them, however, but a short distance when some artillery fire beginning to take effect, the whole turned and fled, and the intrepid soldier stood alone to dare for France what Frenchmen were unwilling to brave. Lally then brought up his French infantry, who, wretchedly supported by the artillery, and altogether deserted by the cavalry, European and native, saw the hopelessness of success, and fired at random. The English, who perfectly obeyed their orders, were commanded not to fire a shot, but advance steadily, which they did, as if a mass moved by a single will. The infantry on their extreme right being Lally's own, threw themselves into column, and rushed madly forward to meet the English, who were ordered to reserve their fire until the enemy was close. The English receiving the columns in line, the battle assumed a form similar to that of so many of the Duke of Wellington's in recent years: as he said of Waterloo, in his letter to Marshal Beresford—"They came on in the old way, and were beaten off in the old way." The fire of the British line fell with deadly certainty upon the front and flank of their opponents, tearing open the column in a manner the most sanguinary and terrible. Yet these dauntless men, true to Lally when all else forsook him, broke through this terrific fire, and, charging with the bayonet, in the same spirit as the English afterwards became accustomed to do, broke the British line, and, as Mill describes it, "bore down what was opposed to it." Its victory, won so well—and never was victory won more bravely—was of short duration. The French cavalry had galloped off the field; the native cavalry, their allies, had not appeared upon it; the sepoy fired irregularly and at a distance: the handful of heroes of Lally's own

corps was left to do battle with the British army. The English infantry, cavalry, and artillery fell upon their unprotected flanks: yet still they fought until the field was ensanguined with their blood, and the tired remnant were swept before the repeated charges of overwhelming numbers, as the monsoon scatters the surges of the sea. Bussy put himself at the head of the French infantry, and led them to a bayonet charge. His horse was pierced by a British bayonet, and his soldiers forsook him on the field, leaving him a prisoner in the hands of the English. Lally ordered the sepoy to charge: they would not, and soon turned from the field. The Irish suffered dreadfully, and were left alone to combat and to die, winning for themselves an honour scarcely inferior to that of Pontenoy, even in defeat. The sieur acted the part of a skilful general in bringing his beaten army off the field; and the French cavalry, who behaved so cowardly, with the brave remnant of Lally's own regiment, so gallantly covered the retreat, that the army, demoralized although it was, was preserved from annihilation. He even halted at a short distance, the native cavalry in the English service not daring to pursue; and the British infantry, having become exhausted in the conflict, were unequal to a task with which the sepoy could not be entrusted. Lally awaited the junction of his detachment at Wandiwash, and carried off his wounded and his light baggage in the face of his enemy. He then proceeded to Chittapet, and thence to Gingee.

Coote was a brave, cool, and active officer. He did not allow the war to slumber, and sent forward a detachment for the reduction of Arcot. Hearing that the French fort of Chittapet, was almost defenceless, Coote determined to attempt its reduction before besieging Arcot. Both forts were reduced with trifling loss and labour, the enemy offering but a feeble resistance.

Lally withdrew his troops from Gingee to Vellore, lest the English should intercept his communications with Pondicherry, and in order to protect the districts from which he had then any chance of obtaining provisions. Finding that all his attempts to obtain any pecuniary assistance from Pondicherry, or supplies of any kind were unavailing, he proceeded to that place, and stormed with his usual unrestrained passion against the delinquents whom he accused of embezzling the property of the company, and betraying their country. They in return accused him of folly, rashness, incompetency, and to these charges, which might have had some show of reason, except as to any impeachment of incompetency in the field, they added the absurd taunt of cowardice. The result of these

recriminations was to paralyse still further all hope of conducting the war against the English successfully.

The destitution and disorganization of the French army was now fearfully increased, and had the English marched at once boldly upon Pondicherry, it must have fallen; but they were deficient in information, and believing that the resources of the French at Pondicherry were ample, and that in other directions also they exceeded the reality, the policy was adopted of attacking the various minor places in detail, and then of gradually closing upon Pondicherry, and reducing it by blockade. This plan was acted upon with slow, but ultimate success. It would be tedious to recount the various actions which took place, or to give an account of the relative consequence of the successes which the English obtained. M. Auber* gives the following correct summary, which is, although closely condensed, sufficiently ample for the reader's purpose, possessing the exactness which that writer's peculiar opportunities enabled him to observe:—"The army, after the surrender of Arcot, moved towards Pondicherry, to cut off supplies, while Admiral Cornish blockaded it by sea. The district of Trincomalee was reduced by Captain Smith. On the 5th of March, Permacoil surrendered to Colonel Coote, Carical to Colonel Monson and Admiral Cornish on the 5th of April, and Chellumbrum to Colonel Monson on the 12th. On the same day, Colonel Coote took Waldour, where the camp was formed previously to operations against Pondicherry; for which purpose, a large supply of gunpowder had been sent from Bengal and Bombay, accompanied by three companies of the king's artillery from the latter presidency. The Mahrattas had gained a considerable victory over Salabat Jung, who ceded to them districts of the value of sixty lacs of rupees, and the fort of Dowlatabad, at that time the strongest in the country. M. Bussy and other French prisoners on parole, at Pondicherry, were ordered to Madras, as several of them had borne arms by order of M. Lally. Considerable apprehension being entertained that the Mahrattas would enter the province and demand the *chout*, and, if joined by the Mysoreans and the French, that they would impede the designs against Pondicherry, a member of the council was deputed, for the purpose of inducing them to refrain from advancing towards the Carnatic. In the month of September, the president, Governor Pigot, accompanied by Colonel Coote, visited Admiral Stevens, on board the *Norfolk*, and, after much solicitation, ob-

tained his consent to the marines of the squadron being landed, to aid the troops in preventing supplies being thrown into Pondicherry. During the preparation for attacking Ariancopang, orders were received from Bengal for divesting Colonel Coote of the command, and placing it in the hands of Colonel Monson. The latter officer, in an attack on the enemy's outposts, having had both the bones of his leg broken by a shot, recommended that Colonel Coote should again receive the command. It was some days, however, before Coote would consent to return to the camp, having made preparations to proceed to Bengal. The French blew up Ariancopang, and retreated to Pondicherry. The marines being re-embarked by the desire of Admiral Stevens, he sailed in October with the greater part of his fleet to Trincomalee, leaving five of his ships to prevent the enemy affording aid by sea. The king (as he was then styled) of Mysore having supported the French, a diversion was made into his country, and the fort of Caroor taken by Captain Smith. It was supposed to have been the first instance of any European troops having advanced so far inland westward. The king subsequently addressed letters of friendship to the president, and the nabob of the Carnatic, stating that it was his prime-minister, Hyder Naigue, who had rebelled against him, and sent his troops to assist the French. This appears to have been the first mention of Hyder, who became so formidable an enemy to the company, both in his own person and that of his adopted successor."

By the 1st of May, 1760, the French had lost all their possessions in the Carnatic, except the strong fort of Gingee, and the fort commanding an important pass called Jhiager, and were shut up in Pondicherry, blockaded by land and sea.

Lally had, however, continued to negotiate with the Mysoreans, and they consented to afford him food, munitions of war, and a body of three thousand horse, and five hundred infantry. They falsified all his expectations. They, indeed, advanced their troops, defeating an English detachment in their progress, and encamped near Pondicherry, but finding the affairs of the French desperate, they decamped in the night, after lingering about the place for a month. They were probably influenced by the arrival of six of the company's ships at Madras, with royal troops to the number of six hundred. This was the 2nd of August, Pondicherry having been three months blockaded, and no impression made upon the place. A month later (September 2), several other ships of the company arrived, three ships of war, and a wing of a

* *British Power in India*, vol. i. chap. iii. p. 102.

Highland regiment. The reinforcements of troops had now been considerable, and the fleet consisted of nineteen sail of the line, with one or two frigates, and several lesser ships, besides several heavily armed ships of the company:—"Lally had now, and it is no ordinary praise, during almost eight months since the total discomfiture of his army at Wandiwash, imposed upon the English so much respect, as deterred them from the siege of Pondicherry; and, notwithstanding the desperate state of his resources, found means to supply the fort, which had been totally destitute of provisions, with a stock sufficient to maintain the garrison for several months. And he still resolved to strike a blow which might impress them with an opinion that he was capable of offensive operations of no inconsiderable magnitude. He formed a plan, which has been allowed to indicate both judgment and sagacity, for attacking the English camp by surprise in four places on the night of the 4th of September. But one of the four divisions, into which his army was formed for the execution of the enterprise, fell behind its time, and disconcerted the operations of the remainder."*

Early in December, the English converted the blockade into a close siege, erecting batteries which fired upon the place, from the end of the first week to the 30th; on that day a tempest of extraordinary violence stranded three of the English ships in the road, and injured almost all the others. The camp also suffered damage, the tents of the soldiers being torn up and driven away, and the ground flooded. It was a storm, which in its intensity and the character of its effects, bore a close resemblance to that which smote the besieging fleets and armies before Sebastopol, on the memorable night of the 14th of November, 1854. As in the latter case, so in the former, the storm and deluge only delayed the siege, the English repaired the damages, and pressed on the works throughout the first days of January. About the 12th of the month, Lally, exhausted with anxiety and fatigue, became ill, and the management of affairs devolved upon the council, which was torn with dissensions. Whatever Lally ordered was disobeyed. The provisions which that general had, with so much talent, energy and self-sacrifice, laid in, were squandered. Lally, perceiving their total want of competency and principle, ordered them to make terms with the besiegers; they deceived him, and went on squandering the means of defence. In the evening of the

14th, a commissioner from Lally, and a deputation from the council, entered the English camp. Lally claimed the benefit of a cartel which had been concluded between the two crowns, and which, the deputation from the council urged, rendered it impossible to propose a capitulation. Coote, who commanded the British, alleging that a dispute being still open as to the meaning and extent of the cartel, he could not recognise it, and would accept nothing but an unconditional surrender. There remained nothing for the French but immediate surrender; they had only two days' provision left, and no proper material of war to resist a siege. The council of Madras levelled the town and fort; all the French were borne away prisoners. Dupleix had boasted that he would serve Madras so, and the council of the presidency determined to make the King of France feel that the retribution was as complete as it was deserved. Theagar and Gingee surrendered almost without resistance, completing the English conquest of the Carnatic.

In the meantime important transactions between the French and English had occurred elsewhere, the result of which, taken with the events in the Carnatic, was that the French had lost all their possessions in India, when Gingee surrendered.

The fate of Lally was sorrowful: when liberated by the English and restored to France, he was cast into the Bastille, thence he was taken to a common prison, accused of high treason, dragged through the streets of Paris in a dung-cart, and then executed,—forming one of the most disgraceful pages of French history. Never was a man more true to France, more loyal to her king, more zealous or honest in the public service of any country. His vices were a hasty temper, a despotic will, religious bigotry, and a hatred to the English, both national and religious, which amounted almost to monomania. His services to France were great; his requital murder, as Orme, the English historian, designated his execution—"a murder committed with the sword of justice:" he might have more properly said, with the sword of law. The French monarch and ministry, anxious to appease the hostility which rose around them, sought and found a noble victim. Lally was subsequently amply avenged. His son was the Lally Tollendal whose eloquence in the constituent assembly contributed so much to destroy the bigoted, tyrannical, sanguinary, and treacherous monarchy of the Bourbons. Thus national, like individual retribution, forms a striking feature in the moral government of the all-wise and just God, whose long suffering and patience hinder not, but illustrate and

* *History of British India.* By James Mill, Esq., book iv. chap. iv. p. 182.

enforce, the impartial and sure justice of His administration.

The English were now masters of the Carnatic, over which they ruled through their nominee, Mohammed Ali, who had probably the most equitable claim to the title of nabob. The soubahdar of the Deccan, whom the English called viceroy or nizam, professed to be their ally; and although the nabob of the Carnatic was tributary to him, the latter was left wholly under the direction and control of the English. This was the first *great* war in which the English were engaged in India, and was one so bloody, protracted, and involving such lasting consequences, as to deserve an extended narrative.

It required, however, a few years to consolidate the government of the Carnatic; and during that process, fresh events tended to alter its relations to surrounding territory, and to give the English a still wider preponderance in Southern India, through the necessary effects and sequences of the war in the Carnatic, which they had so successfully waged. The nabob was still disturbed by refractory polygars, and at the same time by intrigues conducted from Mysore by Hyder, who, early in 1766, was in ostensible revolt against his sovereign.* The English were much occupied in negotiations with the court of the Deccan, and with an expedition to Manilla, which left Madras on the 29th of July, 1762; but still they gave attention to the nabob's affairs, mediated between him and the Mysoreans, and aided in subduing the polygars. At the end of the year 1761 Vellore surrendered to the nabob, which was a source to him of great satisfaction; and during 1762, the most rebellious and powerful of the polygars made submission.

The various parties contending in the Deccan, especially that of Salabat Jung, sought English aid soon after the surrender of the French, offering for it large territorial concessions, which were refused, the council informing the directors, "we are not anxious to grasp more than can be held,"—which showed as much policy as moderation.

In 1764 tidings of peace in Europe between England and France arrived in Madras. The council were as much averse to French settlements in India as ever; alleging, in their correspondence with the directors, that the French could never support settlements by trade; that in order to obtain means to keep up troops and grand establishments, they would be sure to seek territory by means involving all around them in frequent recourse to arms. Governor Pigot had left

for England at the latter end of the previous year; these views he affirmed in London. The successor of Mr. Pigot was of the same mind. French settlements and peace were regarded by the English as not likely to exist long in India together.

In the early part of 1763, the fort of Madura was invested by the British; in October it surrendered to Major Campbell. By this conquest, the nabob was enabled to occupy a strong post in the midst of a large district ruled by insurrectionary polygars. The most important consequence of the conquest of the Carnatic was the acquisition by the English of the Northern Circars. This was, however, not wholly the result of the expulsion of the French from the Carnatic, although chiefly so: the events in Bengal which were occurring at the same time, contributed their quota to the influences which enabled the English to become masters of territory so desirable.

By the treaty of peace, Pondicherry was restored to the French; and M. Law, who had formerly distinguished himself as an opponent of the English, had returned to Pondicherry under that treaty. The English at Madras became alarmed lest he should lay claim to the Northern Circars, which had been conceded to the French in 1657. The territory was of great extent and importance, commanding a vast range on the Coromandel coast, fertile in a considerable portion of its area, and occupied by an industrious population. The French were no sooner settled in Pondicherry, than disputes were raised about the treaty between England and France, and between France and the soubahdar in the Deccan, on the ground of which the French might claim it. The English having expelled the French during the late war, were disposed to stretch to the utmost the rights of their nominee, the Nabob of the Carnatic. The French assumed a tone irritating, consequential, and assuming; they wrote and talked as if they felt it to be their right and duty to resume their old authority—to deprive them of which the war had been waged so fiercely, and they were intent upon pursuing their old courses as far as was possible in their altered circumstances. The council of Madras would have probably held the Circars against their claims upon the nabob for expenses incurred on his account, but the Mahrattas were now jealous of the rising dominion of the English, and were too powerful for the English to provoke them. It was accordingly proposed to rent the Circars from the nizam (or viceroy) of the Deccan, in order to prevent the claims of the French. The nizam was willing to cede the territory; but the English, doubtful of his authority, preferred

* *Letter from the Council of Madras to the Court of Directors, March, 1761.*

paying a rent. The nizam had, however, no sincerity in his offers, either of friendship or territory; and the English were obliged, throughout the greater part of 1765, to maintain an armed observation of his movements. The following account of the issue of these transactions is brief and clear:—"At this period, however, events had laid the King or Mogul under overwhelming obligations to the English, whose power alone upheld him on the ancient but decaying throne of Delhi. He granted them, upon application, a firman, by which they became, without conquest, lawful possessors of the Northern Circars.* Like the rest of India, this tract had been held by rajahs and polygars, who farmed the revenue, and exercised a sort of independent authority within the limits of their states. The imperial firman released them from tribute to the soubahdar of the Deccan, as well as to the nawab (or nabob) of the Carnatic, and transferred their allegiance to the English. Since the success of the company's arms, indeed, those powers had exercised little more than a nominal influence in the Northern Circars, and some new authority was called for to rescue them from the anarchy by which they were overwhelmed. The imperial grant, conferring a legal right,† placed them at the disposal of our countrymen; all that remained to confirm them in the territory, was annexation. The advantage of acquisition was apparent. It would give them possession of all the coast from the mouths of the Ganges to the Coromandel settlements,‡ excepting the province of Orissa, which, though included in the British dewanee, was held by the warlike Mahrattas.§

"When the English proceeded to take possession of their new acquisition, the nizam, rebelling openly against the imperial authority, pretended to feel exasperated at their acts,* and prepared to make war upon them. Though entitled to enforce their privilege by arms, they preferred to negotiate peace, and agreed to rent from the nizam, for an annual sum of nine lacs of rupees, the Circars of Rajamundry, Ellore, Mustephanegur, Chicacoole, and Murtezanegur; while the Guntoo Circar was allotted to Salabat Jung, the old soubahdar of the Deccan, who had been dethroned by his brother. It was, perhaps, an excess of delicacy or timidity, which induced the company to offer such liberal terms; but it may have been, at that juncture, wiser than the policy of war. One stipulation in the treaty was, however, imprudent. The English agreed to assist the soubahdar with a military force, whenever he should require it; thus bringing on themselves the chance of dangerous and destructive wars, which might be equally profitless to themselves and ruinous to their allies.† This article of the treaty excited severe displeasure among the court of directors.‡ However, the territory was now included in their growing empire, and the soubahdar, with shrunken dominions, was left to exercise his versatile talent for treachery by intriguing with the enemies of his allies. His power, indeed, had otherwise diminished. The Nawab of the Carnatic, once his tributary, was now, by an imperial firman, created his equal."§

The English were now virtually masters of the Northern Circars, the coast of Coromandel, and the whole Carnatic.

CHAPTER LXXI.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN WESTERN INDIA AFTER THE BREAKING OUT OF WAR BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS IN 1744—CONQUEST OF THE PIRATE ANGRIA.

AT Tellicherry and Myhie, as has been shown in former chapters, the English and French were most frequently engaged in conflict on the coast of Western India. When tidings arrived in the former place, that Madras had submitted to Labourdonnais in 1746, the utmost consternation was felt, and the chief valuables of the settlement were removed

elsewhere. The council and garrison were in daily expectation of a visit from the fleet of the conqueror, when their fears were relieved by learning that a storm had wrecked the proud ships whose thunder they expected so soon to hear.

* Sutherland's *Historical Sketch of the Princes of India*, p. 82.

† Mill's *British India*, vol. iii. p. 455.

‡ *Letter to Bengal*, 1768.

§ *History of the British Conquests in India*. By Horace St. John, vol. i. p. 106.

* Mill's *British India*, vol. iii. p. 452.

† Penhoen's *Empire Anglais*, vol. ii. p. 456.

‡ Mill's *British India*, vol. iii. p. 453.

§ Wilson's *Notes*, *ibid.*

On the 30th of March, 1748, the *Exeter* and *Winchester*, British men-of-war, attacked the French ship *St. Louis*, as she lay in the river of Myhie. She escaped by being hauled into shoal water, but so damaged as to be beyond repair.

When, in 1751, Dupleix was filling the Deccan with his fame, the council at Bombay was informed by certain spies of the King of Travancore, that the French chief had formed a comprehensive plan for the destruction of the British settlements on the coast of Malabar.* Throughout the year 1751 demonstrations and minor conflicts took place between the French of Myhie and the English of Tellicherry, without any decided advantage on either side. The conflicts which each had with the native chiefs, and the intrigues carried on with these chiefs by the two hostile European nations, have been noticed in previous chapters on the affairs of Western India. The garrisons both of Myhie and Tellicherry were after this time much reduced; the latter garrison so much, that they were unable to repress the insolence of Cuny Nair, a most contemptible antagonist. As for the French, they were in a still worse plight, fearing an attack from the Canarese, distressed for want of provisions, and unable to meet the expenses of their forts to the northward. Officers and men, tired of waiting for their arrears of pay, deserted in large numbers, and in one day a captain, ensign, engineer, mate of a man-of-war, and five other Frenchmen sought refuge in the English factory.†

Up to the end of the year 1753 the English had continued to incur great expenses for fortifications at Tellicherry and other places in Malabar; nearly 100,000 rupees had been expended, and yet the forts were reported by Sir J. Foulis to be in a ruinous condition.

In 1756 a sort of "armed neutrality" was established between Tellicherry and Myhie, both parties expecting that the war which had slumbered in Europe for a season would burst forth again with renewed fury. The French chief visited the English factory for the purpose of establishing neutrality, "a dodge" which the chiefs of Myhie constantly practised when they felt themselves comparatively weak. The English on some occasions followed this example; but although the French had repeatedly profited by their generosity, it was not reciprocated. When Fort St. David was captured, the guns of Myhie thundered their salutes, and the offer of neutrality then made by the alarmed English was scornfully rejected; but when, in 1760, French arms suffered in Tanjore, and the Circars

and their fleets were chased by the English, the chief of Myhie was eager to represent the advantages of neutrality. Again, when Louet, the French chief of the factory, supposed that Admiral Cornish and Sir Eyre Coote were approaching the coast of Malabar, his earnest importunities for neutrality, by one who had refused it when it might have been accepted with a good grace, were humiliating. The English chief on that occasion made answer, that he would refer to the president at Bombay for instructions; but he, meanwhile, prepared for action should the British force be strengthened on that coast.

From 1756 until the final subjugation of the French on the Malabar coast, the operations of both nations were desultory, and on the part of the French mainly offered through their native alliances. The English were, however, strengthening such alliances, while the French, by their arrogance, tyranny, and above all, their bigotry, were rapidly losing influence. Meanwhile, the English were busy in supplying a petty prince and zealous partizan of theirs, styled the third King of Nelleasaroon, with stores and ammunition, which he used so effectually as to capture in September the French fort of Motally, mounting twenty-two guns; although he afterwards restored it, at the intercession of the Prince of Cheral. War was not actually proclaimed until the 7th of October, when the English had the good fortune to find themselves with several warm and lukewarm friends amongst the native princes, but no avowed enemy save the Boyanore. The French, on the other hand, had many and bitter enemies; the Prince of Cheral gave up their cause, and concluded a treaty with the English; the Cotiote was exceedingly incensed against them, because they had compelled his prime-minister, from fear of his life, to profess himself a Christian; and the chief of Nelleasaroon, equally hostile to them, offered to take their forts with his own men, if the English would only garrison them afterwards—an offer which the English chief was compelled to decline, so small were the number of European troops at his disposal. Between the principals, however, of the two factories there was only an exchange of courtesies. An English picket seized a French boat laden with pepper captured from the English, on which the chief of Tellicherry, although of course detaining the cargo, sent the boat with the letters found on her, unopened, to Myhie. M. Louet, in return, released English boats seized by a captain of a French man-of-war, sent back slaves that his men had lured away, and permitted his surgeon to render medical aid at the English factory. But when a native

* *Bombay Diary*, 14th of November, 1751.

† *Bombay Quarterly Review*, October, 1857.

officer of a French ship was detected in raising recruits on British territory, and carried before the chief in council, they behaved to him more like brigands than generous enemies. After a solemn consultation they decided upon setting him at liberty, first confiscating his silver-headed cane and picking his pocket of 380 fanams.*

While these events transpired in the neighbourhood of Tellicherry, others connected with the war occupied the attention and care of the factors of Ajengo. From the breaking out of the war in 1744, to the peace, and again after the short peace, until the end of the resumed war, the traders of this petty place were kept in alarm by the appearance of French ships of war in the offing. Their neighbour, the King of Travancore, assumed to be their protector, and threatened very often the utter extermination of all Frenchmen, should any land near Ajengo, or offer molestation to its people. His majesty, however, never did anything to assure the factors, but very much to add to their disquiet:—

“For a series of years this warlike prince was continually making application to the British for supplies of ammunition, small arms, and cannon, offering in payment captives taken in war, which the British accepted with reluctance, although admitting that they were cheaper than their slaves imported from Madagascar. With his other offers they closed most cheerfully. He had compelled his subjects to yield him a monopoly of all pepper grown in the country, and the factors were as glad to receive that as ready cash. He ceded to them also for a term of years the province of Tinnivelly, which they leased to a merchant; and it would have been of great value to them, had not the neighbouring polygars disturbed it, until reduced to order by a force sent from Madras under Captain Calliaud.† This liberality kept the victorious monarch on excellent terms with the British, and though a tyrannical oppressor of his subjects, he seems never but on one occasion, when his emissaries beat and plundered a helpless woman within the company’s limits, to have molested the factory of Ajengo.”‡

The notice taken of Captain Calliaud’s services in a previous chapter, bore upon the

* *Tellicherry Diary*, 28th of April, 15th of September, 15th of October, 9th of November, 1756. *Bombay Diary*, 28th of April, 8th of May, 30th of August, 15th of December, 1757; 30th of November, 1758. *Ives’s Voyage. Bombay Quarterly*, October, 1857, p. 221.

† As shown in previous chapters.

‡ *Bombay Quarterly. Ajengo Diary. Diary of the Select Committee. Orme’s History*, vol. i. book v. *Forbes’s Oriental Memoirs*, vol. i.

policy of the Madras council, the relations of the English with the Nabob of the Carnatic, of the French with the Nizam of the Deccan, and of the issue of the policy initiated by Dupleix; it is here only necessary to say that the conduct of Calliaud ensured peace to the little factory at Ajengo, and to a certain extent along the coast of Malabar. The Tanjore monarch, grateful for the subjugation of the polygars, and always apprehensive of being subdued by the French, whom he so often boasted he would annihilate, offered no insults thenceforth to the comparatively helpless settlements of the English upon that part of the coast to which his power extended. Thus the effective operations in the war waged in the Carnatic, from Madras and St. David’s, told upon Western India, as in fact they also influenced the fortunes of Bengal. Whatever was done in the Carnatic, affected the court of the Deccan and the heart of French influence in Southern India, so that along the whole shores of Malabar and Coromandel, the wave of power was felt as it ebbed and flowed from the impulses within, as the waves that wash those shores are agitated by the heaving of the ocean upon the verge of which they rise or sink.

An event occurred with which the name of Clive was connected, which much influenced the peace and prosperity of the English settlements in Western India, and strengthened them against the French, although itself not connected with that enemy. When Clive had received the honours conferred upon him in England, after the glories he had won in India, he entered parliament, was ejected on petition, distributed his resources among his relatives to whom he was much attached, lived in much style, and so reduced his temporal means that he was desirous to return again to India to recruit them, just at the moment when it suited the company to employ his services, which they were anxious to do, because they expected a renewed war with France after a brief and hollow peace.

The directors appointed him to an important office in the government of Fort St. David.* The king made him a lieutenant-colonel in the royal army. He embarked on board the *Streatham* in March, 1755, and arrived in Bombay just as the pirate Angria had received a severe chastisement from Commodore James, then commanding the company’s military marine in India.

* Lord Macaulay says he was appointed governor. M. Auher represents him as being nominated a member of council at Fort St. David. The *Bombay Quarterly* of April, 1857, on the authority of the *Bombay Diary*, calls him deputy-governor of that place.

The council of Bombay were desirous of following up the victory of James by a more decisive blow. A royal fleet, accompanied by the company's navy, under Commodore James, the whole under orders of Admiral Watson, set sail for Gheria. The troops on board were commanded by Clive. In February, 1756, the armament arrived in the river, and at once attacked the stronghold of piracy in Western India. Watson succeeded in burning the whole of the enemy's ships. Clive attacked the fortress by land, which fell before his skill and valour. Prize money to the extent of £150,000 was divided among the conquerors.

The consequences of this victory were very great. The coast of Malabar was delivered from the presence of a nest of pirates, who, in resources and power, were more formidable than any piratical forces which had ever troubled the Eastern seas, or, perhaps, ever before or since ranged the ocean anywhere.

On the 12th of the October following, a treaty was formed with the Mahrattas, by which Gheria was given them by the English in exchange for Bancote and various villages. A clause was also inserted, that the Dutch should never be permitted to settle in the Mahratta dominions. The rajahs holding territory along the Malabar coast were so awed, that they made haste to sign treaties conferring privileges of trade. The Mogul himself was pleased with the subjugation of the pirates, by whom his own ships were frequently captured, and the event, joined with other transactions of subsequent occurrence, conduced to the granting of a firman by the Mogul in 1759, conceding to the company the government of Surat.

After Clive accomplished the reduction of Gheria, Lord Macaulay represents him as "having proceeded to his government of Fort St. David." This is an error: he returned to Bombay, and remained there some time, supposing that his services might be again required in connection with that presidency—a fact incompatible with the assertion that he had been designated to the *supreme* government of Fort St. David.

That Lord Macaulay is wrong in the above assertion is plain enough, for Clive became involved in a dispute with the governor and council at Bombay on a question as to his own military position, after the destruction of the pirate keep of Gheria. He returned to Bombay with the artillery, for the purpose of joining an expedition against the French, intended to be directed from that presidency, but which had been abandoned for another object. The Bombay council was

peculiarly supercilious to military men, and Clive, notwithstanding all his glory, was not particularly beloved by them.

A Captain de Funck, a Swedish officer who had experienced much tyranny and injustice from the president and council, was tried by court-martial, because he had refused to submit to a humiliation which the tyrannical president sought to impose upon him. The council appointed Sir James Foulis as president, an officer of ability and fairness. Clive was indignant that any officer but himself should have presided over the court, and remonstrated in angry terms. He protested to the council that he was "reduced to the necessity," as he observed, of reminding the president and council that he was commander-in-chief of his majesty's forces, that he bore other distinguished titles, and had not been treated by the Honourable Richard Bouchier, Esquire—who, indeed, was never remarkable for civility—with proper courtesy. His letter was as follows:—

Bombay, 15th of April, 1756.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRs,—It is with much concern I find myself reduced to the necessity of delivering this letter on the subject of the general court-martial lately held on Captain De Funck.

Your honour and co. cannot be ignorant of the late Articles of War, which empower none but the commander-in-chief of his majesty's forces for the time being to order a general court-martial; and your honour and co. must be sensible that, if I had interfered, no such court-martial could have sat. However, in this and indeed in everything relating to the honour, reputation, and welfare of the Honourable Company, I should gladly have acquiesced, and if your honour and co. had thought me worthy of the delegation given to Sir James Foulis, I would with pleasure have acted in obedience thereto, whom I apprehend had no right to be deemed commander-in-chief of his majesty's forces, without the king's brevet of major can be proved superior to that of lieutenant-colonel.

Neither do I complain against your honour and co. for ordering the general court-martial, but against the governor only, who never thought proper to ask my advice or opinion, or even to inform me himself, or by any other person whatever, with one syllable relating thereto, and considering the rank I bear of lieutenant-colonel in his majesty's service, of Deputy Governor of St. David's, of a member of the committee of this place, I do not think I have been treated by the Honourable Richard Bouchier, Esq., agreeably to the intention of the Honourable the Court of Directors, who, I flatter myself, will do me justice herein, when they come to hear thereof.

I am, with respect, honourable sir and airs,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

ROBERT CLIVE.*

This letter of Lieutenant-colonel Clive was answered by Daniel Draper, secretary to government, who, in the name of his superiors, tried to check the spoilt hero's arrogance by a little delicate satire. He could not, of course,

* The above letter does not appear in any of the memoirs of Clive, and was first published in the *Bombay Quarterly* of April, 1857.

pretend to instruct *such* an officer in his military duties, but he would venture to refresh his memory on a few points which all knew, save those who were wilfully ignorant. Officers did not always attain to command by seniority, as the young colonel well knew. That depended upon the pleasure of the supreme authority. The rank of such as had been appointed for a particular service had no efficacy when that service was performed, and they were without employment. The government of Bombay fully acknowledged the respect due to his majesty's commission, but they were at liberty to choose whether they would engage Colonel Clive's military services or not. The lieutenant-colonel wrote as if he was the only bearer of this commission in Bombay; but many other officers bore it, and all concurred in the propriety of the arrangements made for this court-martial. In conclusion, the government assured him that they had no wish to insult him, as he supposed, and they would refer the question in dispute to the court of directors. The ardent spirit of Clive was pining for action. It would seem as if from very *ennui*, he complained that he could not enjoy the little excitement of sitting on a court-martial, and relieved the monotony of inactive life by opening a controversial correspondence with the government. In a little time worthier occupations were found for him, and, quitting Bombay for ever, he entered a new field of fame on the other side of the continent.*

In a chapter on the rise of the navy and army of the company, it was remarked that the troops of Bombay occasionally served in the other presidencies, and that Captain Armstrong, serving under Major Lawrence, had been tyrannically and unjustly treated by Clive.

In 1754 Captain Forbes's company of Europeans, and some Swiss and native troops, served under this Captain Armstrong with ability and bravery. Both men and officers complained of ill-treatment. Immediately after the tragedy of the black hole of Calcutta, Captain Armstrong again served with the Bombay artillery and some other troops from that presidency. He made many representations to his government of the injustice and oppression of Clive. Besides his letters to his own presidency of Bombay, "he had brought to the notice of the president in Bengal what he considered an unfair distribution of prize money, and his letter had been favourably received. Clive, offended at this, ordered him to resign his command, although no charges of misconduct had been brought against him, and to lead some aged and infirm topasses

back to Bombay. Armstrong remonstrated, and was brought to a court-martial. As he was honourably acquitted, we may suppose that he had, as he said, been harshly and unjustly treated. Clive added one more instance of his malice and disregard of law, by refusing to insert his acquittal in general orders. But none of these acts, so discreditable to the Indian hero, are recorded by his biographers, who, with the exception of a bitter and libellous foreigner, seem anxious to prove that modern biography is little more than systematised eulogy."*

In 1760 a reinforcement was sent from Bombay to Madras, consisting chiefly of a company of European infantry and three companies of royal artillery. Thus Bombay lent considerable assistance to the other presidencies, having so little territory of its own to defend. After the destruction of the pirates, the presidency were occupied with their affairs at Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, through Bussorah with Persia, and in Carnara. These engagements were altogether commercial, although some insubordination occurred among the military at Gombroon, provoked by the neglect and arrogance of the council.

In 1760 a report reached the presidency that the Mahrattas were conspiring with the French, which was true; but it did not suit Nannah, the Mahratta chief, to avow it when the agents of the company arrived at Poonah; and whatever schemes he had in view were soon extinguished by his death. The successor of Nannah was his son Mbaderao; and a deputation was sent by the council of Bombay to condole with him on his father's death. The chief turned the occasion to diplomatic ends, and sought to draw the English into an engagement to aid him against the viceroy of the Deccan. This the council declined; but they interposed by good offices, and appeased the wrath of the nizam. While this peaceable intercourse proceeded between the Bombay presidency and the Mahrattas of Poonah, other bodies of that strange people were harassing the borders of Bengal, so that the English president there addressed his brother of Bombay in 1761, proposing a general attack upon the Mahratta nation. The Bombay council wisely replied that the Mahrattas of Poonah regulated their affairs in such a way as not to be compromised by the conduct of their brethren further east; that it was very desirable to humble the Mahratta power, but the state of that nation and its relation to Bombay rendered the time for any attack upon it inopportune. This clear and decisive opinion prevented the attempt projected in Bengal.

* *Bombay Diary*, April and July 20th, 1756. *Bombay Quarterly*, April 1857.

* *Bombay Quarterly*, April, 1857, p. 299.

Subsequent events proved the wisdom of this decision, for the Mahrattas and the nizam became friends, although such friendship was like the summer cloud, which the slightest breeze bears away. Thus, while the affairs of the French pressed heavily on Madras and Bengal, Bombay felt little of this pressure, except in the constant warfare which was maintained by a single settlement of the presidency of Tellicherry, with a single settlement of the French, Myhie. That conflict, like every other between the two nations in India, was destined to be brought at last to a close in favour of the English. After the fall of Pondicherry, the English at Tellicherry resolved upon a grand attack on Myhie. The French had hopes of securing its neutrality, and, before the fall of their capital, used renewed and suppliant efforts with the factors of Tellicherry, to secure to Myhie a neutral position. Their object was to make it a storehouse for the goods which they supposed were at Pondicherry, and might be brought thence for safety. After the fall of the capital it was hoped that Myhie might be permitted to remain as a gate to Southern India. The council at Tellicherry politely, but steadily, refused compliance with the request, reminding the petitioners that similar requests, under reasonable and justifiable circumstances, when made by the English, were insolently and haughtily repulsed, and that France had sent out orders with Lally to level all the fortified places, and even open cities where the English had any interest in India. It so happened that the council of Tellicherry sent out an expedition against Nettore, which was unsuccessful, through the treachery, bigotry, and inhumanity of native allies. A severe loss in killed and wounded was the result. The French took occasion, before the troops returned, to press for a final answer, whether Myhie might calculate on neutrality. The English governor, fearing an attack on the settlement during the absence of the main body of his troops, appeared to acquiesce, while to confirm matters, as it were, he referred the proposition to Bombay. The French governor was thus led to hope that his scheme would at last succeed. The English chief was cognizant of the fact that Admiral Pococke was preparing a descent on Myhie, and he preserved an attitude of negotiation until his garrison returned from Nettore, and further, until the "pear was ripe" in the plans and projects of the naval and military authorities.

In the beginning of 1761, Major Piers, and Major, afterwards Sir Hector Munro, with detachments of royal infantry, arrived with the purpose of reinforcing Coote, in the

siege of Pondicherry; but, discovering that they were too late, they proposed to the presidency of Bombay, the reduction of Myhie. Their plan received the sanction of the council. There was one, Captain Keir, who had been a fellow passenger to India with the wife of the French engineer on duty at the fort of Myhie. This lady had given the captain an invitation to call and see them. It was resolved that he should accept the invitation, and act as a spy. He was received in a friendly manner, and made such a report as encouraged the intended assailants. Means were taken to intercept any reliefs arriving to the garrison. The native chiefs were all or nearly all engaged in the affair, for, with the exception of Boyanore, they avowedly hated the French; and it was generally believed that that fickle chief owed them no goodwill. On the second of February English boats closed around the fortress. Louet, the commander-in-chief, pretending not to understand their object, intimated, when the first came within range of his fire, how painful the duty imposed upon him was of sinking the boat, unless it drew off, his orders being to allow no boat to approach his batteries. The reply was instantaneous and decisive, a summons to surrender. For six days the French chief refused to surrender; but, knowing that Pondicherry had fallen, and that there was no hope of succour, he offered to surrender, if but his garrison were allowed the honours of war, and that the liberty of Roman Catholic worship in the place should not be interrupted, and the churches remain the property of the clergy. All these conditions were granted. The garrison marched out with drums beating, colours flying, and with their field artillery. It was stipulated that they should not be detained as prisoners of war, but sent to the Isle of Bourbon, the Cape of Good Hope, or France, as opportunity allowed, and that the private personal property of military and civilians should be respected. All these conditions were conceded on condition that the other French forts dependent upon Myhie should be surrendered. The French factory at Calicut it was agreed should remain neutral, as that was not a place of arms, or one that the French could use for the subjugation of the natives. All these stipulations were faithfully agreed to by the English. When the garrisons marched out, the officers surrendered their swords, which were instantly returned. The captives were made the objects of the most generous kindness and respect. When Louet arrived at Tellicherry he was saluted by fifteen guns. One lady, whose husband had broken his parole, was alone detained, for some time, in imprisonment.

The fortifications of Myhie were destroyed, and in a manner formally to show that it was in consequence of the orders issued from France, to level the cities and forts of the English. The work was not, however, heartily set about, and was very imperfectly performed.* The subordinate fortresses of Motaly, Nelleasaroon, and Veremala were faithfully evacuated by the French, but immediately occupied by some Nairs, under a chief with the high-sounding title of Kapoo, Prince of Cheral, and nephew of Badenkalampur, King Regent of Colastry. Without loss of time, Munro marched against them, at the head of three hundred and eighty Highlanders, some of the company's regular and irregular troops, and two guns—a twelve and nine-pounder. Captain Nelson, late engineer of the French garrison at Myhie, joined the expedition as a volunteer, with other French officers, "keen for revenge against their black allies." Thus fell the last bulwarks of French power and influence in India. It was on the Malabar coast that the first contentions began; and when the rumble of warlike preparation was hushed, and the tap of the French drum was silent along the Coromandel shores, and in the Deccan, the din of battle was heard, and the mournful parade of vanquished and disarmed captives seen on the shores of Malabar.

The incidents of the French war were not, for a few years, followed by any of a martial nature in Western India. In 1765 another nest of sea robbers, the Malwar pirates, was rooted out, who had begun to show some activity. But a new storm was soon portended. The famous Hyder had gained ascendancy in Mysore, and laid the foundation of a military dynasty. Bombay regarded with astonishment and apprehension his growing power, which indicated that a day must soon come when war with a fierce people, ably commanded, in a difficult territory, would ensue, or the presidency of Bombay, and the Carnatic, be overrun by perpetual predatory incursion, or a permanent conquest, by a barbaric race. In future pages, the rise and fall of the new power in Mysore will be treated; but in the interval of the wars which issued in such fortunate results, Bombay experienced much alarm and trouble. The possession of supreme power at Surat—where first the English name became great in India, and where first English valour won victory from a European rival—gave great satisfaction to the presidency at Bombay and to the directors in London. Bombay was, for a time, the most tranquil of the English governments in India, and its commercial prosperity was developed with peace.

CHAPTER LXXII.

EVENTS IN BENGAL AFTER THE BREAKING OUT OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE IN 1744—
MASSACRE OF ENGLISHMEN IN THE BLACK HOLE OF CALCUTTA—EXPULSION OF THE
FRENCH.

The chief interest of the French lay in the Carnatic. In Bengal their settlements were of small importance, although at Chandernagore they made considerable efforts to establish a trade. During the short war which broke out in 1744, no events of importance between the French and English occurred in their extreme eastern settlements; nor until in 1757 it became known that, after the short peace, war again raged in Europe between the two great countries. The English were, therefore, engaged in Bengal in the quiet prosecution of their trade, as far as the intrigues and exactions of the nabobs and the incursions of the Mahrattas allowed.

In the year 1747, the directors hoped that their agents in Bengal would be able to render assistance in weakening the power of the

* *Bombay and Tellicherry Diaries. Bombay Quarterly.*

French in other directions, for they thus addressed them on the 16th of October:—

"Par. 3. Upon our strenuous application his majesty hath been graciously pleased to send a strong squadron of men-of-war, under the command of the honourable Rear-Admiral Boscawen, with these our ships whereon this letter is sent.

"7. In case Rear-Admiral Boscawen, or the commander-in-chief of his majesty's forces, should require your assistance in attacking the enemy anywhere near you, we hereby order you to give it him to the utmost of your power, and to put under his command what military, marine, or other force, you can possibly procure or spare consistent with the safety of your place."

So far from being able to render any assistance to the company or to the crown, the directors of affairs at Calcutta were crouching

in their factory under the influence of the most abject cowardice. It is sorrowful to relate to what a degree of tameness and timidity Englishmen could have sunk in the persons of the traders at Calcutta.

The directors at home became at last so sensible of the poltroonery of their representatives in Bengal, that they wrote them a long letter on June 17, 1748, which, in two paragraphs, the second and sixth, reproaches their want of courage, and stimulates their manliness so as to do what in them lay for their own defence. These paragraphs throw an interesting light upon the character of the Anglo-Bengalese, and the spirit of the times in England relating to Indian affairs:—

“Par. 2. It is plain from the apprehension you was under on the loss of Madras, lest the French should destroy you next, that you neither thought your own strength, though supported at that time by six of his majesty’s ships, nor the neutrality of the country, a sufficient security, and you at all times stand so much in awe of the country government that they easily and shamefully raise immense contributions upon you at the company’s expense, though almost always under pretence of abuses in carrying on private trade.

“6. If you do not prevail upon the nabob to acquiesce in your setting about the works and fortifications without molestation, you are to let him know in a proper manner. You have our orders to make Calcutta as secure as you can against the French, or any other European enemy; and that if he obstructs you in following those orders you are forbid to issue any money for trade, and must do the best you can to fulfil them. Tell him that you shall be sorry to be obliged to take such measures as may be ruinous to his revenues and the trade of the country in general; and you may add, the King of England having the protection of the company greatly at heart, as they may perceive by the strong force he hath sent to the East Indies to meet the French, his majesty will support the company in whatever they think fit to do for their future security; for though a peace is now making with France, no one knows how long it may last, and when war is broke out it is always too late to make fortifications strong enough to make defence against an enterprising enemy; as appears from what happened at Madras, where strong works were erecting, but could not be half finished before the French attacked and took the place.”

Events to the year 1756 were in harmony with the state of things indicated by the letters of the directors in 1747-8. Upon the advent of the government of Suraj-ad-Dowla as soubahdar or viceroy of Bengal, which

began on the death of his grandfather, Ali Verdi, the 9th of April, 1756, the English experienced increased oppressions, and were harassed by augmented fears. The soubahdar was a wicked young prince, voluptuous, avaricious, cruel, treacherous, and hated the English, of whose growing power his grandfather had conceived a jealousy which the grandson inherited. On various pretexts of too little interest to relate, he sought a quarrel with the English at Calcutta. His chief object was to rob the presidency, concerning the riches of which he had formed absurdly exaggerated notions. He marched against Calcutta, and on his way seized Cossimbazar, to the garrison of which he offered the alternative of indiscriminate slaughter, or immediate surrender.

On the 18th of June he attacked the outposts of Calcutta. The factors had neither skill, courage, nor adequate means of defence. They had, however, vast shipping accommodation in the river, by which an orderly and easy escape was practicable. Instead of system and coolness, extreme disorder prevailed, and a cowardice utterly shameless. On the morning of the 19th, the women, children, and effects were to be sent to the ships by a decision of council formed the previous night, while the male inhabitants were to defend the place until succour might be obtained. Such was the confusion during the embarkation of the women and children, that a panic ensued, which communicated itself to the seamen, so that the ships began to move down the river, increasing the panic on shore. The chief persons in the place fled with the women, abandoning their comrades in arms and their duty, preferring dishonour to danger. The governor, Drake, whose want of capacity gave the soubahdar an excuse for the war, was among the fugitives. He was accompanied in his ignominy by Mr. Machel, Captain Commandant Minchin, and Captain Grant. Messrs. Manningham and Frankland, members of council, were the persons who set the example of cowardice, for they “dropped down the river in the *Dodally* on the night of the 18th.” The president followed with his companions, in the morning. It appears that these infamous men were the means of creating the panic in the fleet, and so anxious were the council, president, commandant, and other civil and military persons of note, for their personal safety, to the disregard of all other considerations, that they ordered the company’s vessels, on board of which they were, to pass down the river, abandoning their comrades to their fate. When the flight of the government and commanders were ascertained by the rest of the

company's servants, their alarm was only exceeded by their anger. They, however, determined to defend the place, and elected Mr. Holwell to be their governor, who conducted himself with much spirit and ability in a situation for which he had no previous preparation. He afterwards wrote an account of the transactions in which he had taken so prominent a part.

John Cooke was secretary to the governor and council, and remained to share the fate of his companions in the chances of war. He was examined in 1772, by a committee of the House of Commons appointed to "inquire into the nature, state, and condition of the East India Company," and gave the following evidence:—"Signals were now thrown out," says Mr. Cooke, "from every part of the fort, for the ships to come up again to their stations, in hopes they would have reflected (after the first impulse of their panic was over) how cruel as well as shameful it was, to leave their countrymen to the mercy of a barbarous enemy, and for that reason we made no doubt they would have attempted to cover the retreat of those left behind, now they had secured their own; but we deceived ourselves; and there never was a single effort made, in the two days the fort held out after this desertion, to send a boat or vessel to bring off any part of the garrison." "Never, perhaps," says Mr. Orme, "referring to the catastrophe which subsequently took place, was such an opportunity of performing an heroic action so ignominiously neglected; for a single sloop, with fifteen brave men on board, might, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy, have come up, and, anchoring under the fort, have carried away all who suffered in the dungeon."

Mr. Holwell endeavoured by throwing letters over the walls to open negotiations with the enemy for favourable terms of capitulation; but those efforts were in vain, for while waiting for an answer to one of these communications, having suspended the fire of the garrison until the reply should arrive, the enemy treacherously approached the walls and stormed the place. The garrison was not given over, after Mohammedan fashion, to indiscriminate slaughter. Most of those who composed it were taken prisoners, among whom were some ladies who were not able to escape. Mr. Holwell was bound and brought before the viceroy, who immediately ordered him to be unbound. He assured him upon the faith of a soldier that no harm should happen to him or his people. When evening came, it was a question with the guards where the prisoners should be disposed of for the night, and it was resolved to place them in a

narrow chamber insufficient to hold them. The result was the destruction of most of their number before morning. This event has been memorable in Indian and in English history as the massacre of "the Black Hole of Calcutta."

The space of this apartment was only twenty feet square; it was not a den or hole, but a comparatively airy prison suitable to a small number of persons. Mill, who loses no opportunity to lower his own countrymen, from his desire to blacken the reputation of the company, treats this horrid event as one of providential retribution upon the English for using so vile a dungeon for their common prison; adducing the fact, with others, as proof of their cruelty to prisoners. He particularly adduces the state of the prison of Calcutta in 1782, as exemplifying the indifference of the English to the sufferings of prisoners, and he refers to certain allegations of cruel indifference to the lives of sepoy. There can be no doubt that the prison of Calcutta during the eighteenth century was pestilential and filthy. It is not to be denied that the English, as a nation, were apt to disregard the sufferings of inferiors, but they were never cruel to men of their own rank, when prisoners, and to enemies they had always borne the reputation of generous conquerors. Such the French have always acknowledged them to be, and no other nation has had an equal experience of them in that capacity. The whole treatment of this subject by Mill is disingenuous and unjust. Professor Wilson, always eager to do justice upon Mill himself, seizes this occasion of his unfair narrative to reply with much severity and effect as follows:—"The spirit in which this transaction is noticed, in this and the preceding note, as well as in the text, is wholly unjustifiable. It extenuates a deliberate act of wanton cruelty by erroneous assumptions and inapplicable analogies. The Black Hole was no dungeon at all; it was a chamber above ground—small and ill-aired only with reference to the number of persons forced into it, but affording abundant light and air to many more than it had ever lodged under the English administration. According to Holwell,* it was a room eighteen feet square, with a door on one side, and two windows on another. In 1808 a chamber was shown in the old fort at Calcutta then standing, said to be the Black Hole of 1756: its situation did not correspond exactly with Mr. Holwell's description of it, but if not the same, it was a room of the same description and size, such as is very

* Letter to Dr. Davis, 28th February, 1757; published in Holwell's *India Tracts*.

common amongst the offices of both public and private buildings in Calcutta, and no doubt accurately represented the kind of place which was the scene of this occurrence. It bore by no means the character of a prison. It was much more light, airy, and spacious than most of the rooms used formerly by the London watch, or at present by the police, for purposes of temporary durance. Had a dozen or twenty people been immured within such limits for a night, there would have been no hardship whatever in their imprisonment, and in all probability no such number of persons ever was confined in it. The English, then, in the objectionable sense in which the author chooses to understand the 'Black Hole,' never had such a prison. The state of the Calcutta jail, in 1782, like that of the common jails in England or in Europe, was, no doubt, bad enough; but it is not said that its inmates had ever died of want of air, or that one hundred and twenty perished in a single night. Even if the excuse of inconsiderateness might be urged for driving the prisoners into a space so utterly inadequate to their numbers, there was abundant opportunity to correct the mistake, when it was seen what suffering it occasioned. The whole transaction admits of no defence: it was an exemplification of Mohanmedan insolence, intolerance, and cruelty; and in contemplating the signal retribution by which it has been punished, a mind susceptible of reverence, though free from superstition, can scarcely resist the impression, that the course of events was guided by higher influences than the passions and purposes of man."

The horrors of the massacre itself mock description. When the unfortunate victims were but a short time within the precincts of their prison, their sufferings became intense, and their cries for mercy were as vehement as the agonies of despair could make them. Their guards mocked them, some of their keepers holding up lights to the gratings for the others to have the satisfaction of witnessing the struggles and poignant sufferings of those doomed to death. A general rush for the neighbourhood of the windows added to the horrors of the occasion, and the desperate efforts to obtain a position near the apertures for air, caused many of the weaker to be trampled to death by the stronger. This also afforded amusement to their callous hearted keepers. Mr. Holwell, who obtained a place near a window with some others, offered money to the sentinels to procure water, some received the bribe, and did not perform the stipulated service, others were more merciful. One benevolent soldier brought water repeatedly, and showed by the expression of

his countenance as he held up his hand, a kind and pitying disposition.

To the appeals which were made by Mr. Holwell, for some one to convey to the viceroy a knowledge of their condition, the reply was that he slept, and no one dare awake him. In the morning, when he did awake, and sent for the prisoners, twenty-three men, and one woman alone remained alive, and most of these were found insensible among the already putrifying dead. Such was the case with the governor. The lady who was amongst the living, the viceroy took to his harem. The poorer prisoners, from whom no money could be extorted, were dismissed: the principal persons among the survivors were kept standing in chains before the tyrant soubahdar, and threatened with death, if they did not disclose where treasure was hid. As no treasure was obtained, they were sent, loaded with irons, to Moorshedabad. No clemency was shown to the survivors, who were fed with rice and water, in quantities insufficient. The tyrant did everything short of murdering his victims.

Mr. Mill thinks that the tragedy of "the Black Hole" might have been averted, if the persons incarcerated had offered a bribe to one of the superior officers of the soubahdar, and adds, "to no one does it appear that this expedient occurred." Of course, it was impossible for them to reach any "officer of high authority," except through the medium of their keepers, whom it is not at all likely the imprisoned failed to urge by every persuasive, money included, to take the steps most likely to secure them a more lenient place of confinement. Hugh Murray, Esq., in his *History of British India* (p. 317), declares that what Mr. Mill represents the English as too stupid to think of, was actually tried, without success, by Mr. Holwell. His language is, "The jemautdars, or Indian guards, were walking before the window, and Mr. Holwell, seeing one who bore on his face a more than usual expression of humanity, adjured him to procure for them a room in which they could breathe, assuring him next morning of a reward of 1000 rupees. The man went away—but returned, saying it was impossible. Thinking the offer had been too low, the prisoners tendered 2000 rupees. The man again went,—and returned, saying that the nabob was asleep, and no one durst awake him;—the lives of one hundred and forty-six men being nothing in comparison to disturbing for a moment the slumbers of a tyrant." Not only the confinement in "the Black Hole," but the whole of the siege and capture of Calcutta is related by the historian Mill with the animus of one who desired to expose and inculpate his own countrymen as much as possible,

and extenuate the conduct of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, meriting the indignant protest which was written by Horace St. John, in his work on Indian history:—"The ingenuity, not to say the eloquence, of a British historian has been perverted to fabricate, or at least to suggest, a defence of this celebrated crime. It might appear to him heroic to defend what all the rest of mankind declared infamous; but that act is justly condemned as susceptible of no palliation. It was the cruelty of a Mohammedan despot.* A hint is, indeed, insinuated by another writer, on the authority of native accounts, that Suraj-ad-Dowlah was innocent of the deed, and that stupidity, not wickedness, caused the misery which ensued to the victims.† The ferocious character of the prince, however, renders this a weak plea for his reputation. It appears certain that by his will such vengeance was dealt on the English, and the blood of a hundred and forty-three unhappy men cried for punishment upon their murderers. This is no illiberal interpretation of history, for, clear Suraj-ad-Dowlah of this crime, and he is still a monster. It was as notorious to the Europeans as it was to his own people, and his inhumanity was persevering.‡ If ever a nation had cause of war, Great Britain then had. That people would have been unworthy of an empire which did not rise to punish the author of such a crime."§

When tidings of these events arrived in Madras and Fort St. David, the feeling produced among the English was one of intense indignation, and a determination, if possible, to regain their lost position and avenge their murdered countrymen. Colonel Clive had remained at St. David's after he left Bombay. Admiral Watson was upon the coast with a very considerable navy, so that there was no want of able commanders, and there existed tolerable resources to avenge the injury that had been sustained. Meanwhile, Suraj-ad-Dowlah made ostentatious triumph, tidings of which reached the British, and still further deepened their resentment. The brutal soubahdar informed his master, upon the tottering throne of Delhi, that he had expelled the English from Bengal, forbid Englishmen for ever to dwell within its precincts, purged Calcutta of the infidels, and, to commemorate the event, called it by a new name—Alinagore, the Port of God. It was in August that the dreadful news of the fall of Calcutta, and the murder of so many Englishmen, reached Madras; and Lord Macaulay ex-

presses his admiration of the fact that so inflamed was the military ardour of the garrison, that in forty-eight hours they determined upon an expedition up the Bay of Bengal and the Hoogly. It was the universal desire out of the council that Clive should have the command of the army, which eventually consisted of nine hundred English infantry and fifteen hundred sepoys. These set forth, as Lord Macaulay has written, "to punish a prince who had more subjects than Louis the Fifteenth or the Empress Maria Theresa."

The fitting out of the expedition was not as prompt as the determination to accomplish it. It was not until October that it set sail against adverse winds, which kept it beating about in the bay until December. The cause of this delay was highly discreditable to the English. The following account of it by Mill, is too true for the honour of the president and council of Madras:—"It was resolved, after some debate, that the re-establishment of the company's affairs in Bengal should be pursued at the expense of every other enterprise. A dispute, however, of two months ensued, to determine in what manner prizes should be divided; who should command; and what should be the degree of power entrusted with the commander. The parties, of whom the pretensions were severally to be weighed, were Mr. Pigot, who had been Governor of Madras since the departure of Saunders, but was void of military experience; Colonel Aldercron, who claimed as senior officer of the king, but was unacquainted with the irregular warfare of the natives; Colonel Lawrence, whose experience and merit were unquestionable, but to whose asthmatical complaints the close and sultry climate of Bengal was injurious; and Clive, to whom none of these exceptions applied. It was at last determined that Clive should be sent. It was also determined that he should be sent with powers independent of the presidency of Calcutta. Among his instructions, one of the most peremptory was, that he should return, and be again at Madras with the whole of the troops, in the month of April; about which time it was expected that in consequence of the war between France and England, a French fleet would arrive upon the coast. It was principally, indeed, with a view to this return, that independence of the Calcutta rulers, who might be tempted to retain him, was bestowed upon Clive."

The viceroy was enjoying the pastime of torturing flies and other animals, imprisoning and executing human victims, and revelling in every debauch at his capital of Moorshedabad. He revelled, too, in security as to enemies domestic and foreign. He was not

* See Sraffon's *Account*, p. 52.

† Stewart's *History of Bengal*, p. 505.

‡ Pethoen's *Empire Anglais*, vol. ii. p. 33.

§ *British Conquests in India*, chap. ix. p. 73.

much better or worse than many other Mohammedan princes, to whom "the faithful" rendered a conscientious and even contented allegiance. His ideas of European powers were the most unenlightened. He had, it is true, been jealous of the English, but he supposed that if their power in India were once broken, they had no resources behind to press forward again their beaten Indian forces. In all his views he was flattered by his minions, for none dare call in question the opinions of the sanguinary voluptuary.

Before the tardy English had consumed the many intervening months, there was time for the tyrant to miss the revenues their commerce yielded. His ministers were compelled to disclose the unwelcome intelligence that the gains of his treasury were much diminished since the traders were expelled, and as he encouraged the expression of their views, he was informed that the only remedy was to allow them to return, to tax them heavily, so as to obtain for himself a large portion of their profits, but otherwise to allow them to trade in peace and with security to their persons and their property. He was convinced by these arguments, and was in the frame of mind which they were calculated to produce, when he was astounded by the intelligence that a force of armed Englishmen and a proud war-fleet were in the Hoogly. He had not heard of the preparations against him, and if his ministers had, they did not deem it politic to inform him. However vexed, he was not alarmed. He expected to annihilate in a short time the feeble force which landed, and gave express orders to his generals to perform that feat. He drew in his forces to Moorshedabad, and marched at their head to Calcutta. But before he had collected his troops for the accomplishment of his design, Clive, with his usual rapidity of action, had inflicted defeat and humiliation upon the soubahdar's garrisons. The fleet was moved up the river to the vicinity of Moidapore, the admiral intending the next morning to attack the fort of Budge-Budge, about ten miles below the town. Clive, not aware that the enemy were encamped in the vicinity, landed and ordered his men to lie down to rest. In thus acting Clive committed a rashness, which might have terminated the war. Orme describes him as having placed his men in a position which left a surprise possible, and as having neglected the precaution of outposts and sentinels. The result was what might have been expected—a sudden attack of the enemy, who came on timidly, and were led by a coward. Still the attack was perilous, and it required all Clive's courage and address to avert a catastrophe. The cavalry of the enemy held back; had they

charged, Clive would have found it impossible to have presented a formation which would have issued in a repulse. This was an exemplification of the rashness and fearlessness of the man. Repeatedly, in the Carnatic, when serving under Lawrence, and when in chief command, he exposed himself and his soldiers, and the cause for which they fought, to imminent danger of destruction, by a foolhardy contempt of foes, and indifference to death. The surprise effected by the enemy enabled the garrison to penetrate the plan of the commander, which was, to intercept its flight when the cannonade of the fleet should drive it from the fort. The native force, however, abandoning the fort in the night, stole away in a direction which Clive could not have supposed probable, and baffled his designs. His generalship was, and not for the first time, at fault. Clive marched along by land; Watson sailed up the river. The enemy retreated from the various positions which they occupied, almost without firing a shot. The valour and discipline displayed by the Europeans in the surprise taught the enemy a salutary lesson.

On the 2nd of January, 1757, the armament was before Calcutta. A few broadsides from the fleet expelled the garrison. The merchandise was found in the condition it was left when the English council fled, as the viceroy had ordered it to be reserved for himself. All the private dwellings had been sacked.

Upon the capture of the place, jealousies sprung up between the admiral and Colonel Clive. The admiral desired to exclude the company's troops from the garrison. Clive insisted that they were the proper portion of the armament to assume that duty. They also differed as to who should appoint a governor of the city. Clive vindicated his claims with determination. The bickerings which commenced between the admiral and colonel continued throughout the whole time of their co-operation in the service. Captain Coote was ordered with a detachment to attack Hoogly, which was captured, the enemy offering a poor resistance. Prize-money, to the extent of £15,000, fell to the forces by this capture.

The viceroy, alarmed at these successes, opened negotiations. According to most historians, overtures were made by Clive, who, whatever his boldness in actual battle, was liable to be awed by the magnitude of a great undertaking before actually entered upon. He had now the whole army of the viceroy of Bengal before him, and a handful of troops to combat that great army. Lord Macaulay maintains that the overtures were

made by the soubahdar, and that he offered to restore to the English their settlements, and make compensation for the injuries which he had inflicted. Admiral Watson was opposed to overtures for peace being either made or accepted by the British. As to the places previously in the possession of the English, they had just captured them; as to compensation, they could take it. On the whole, the admiral thought that until Suraj felt that his viceroyalty itself was in danger, and was obliged to sue for peace after severe losses and defeats, he would remain a treacherous although flexible foe, ever ready to make war when an opportunity arose. By striking a bold and decisive blow, the admiral believed permanent peace might be secured.

Clive hesitated: in the language of Mr. Murray, "He was not yet fully aware of the weakness of Indian potentates, and was by no means forward to rush into a contest with the ruler of twenty millions of men." It was plain in these differences that Watson had not confidence in either the intelligence or stability of Clive, although placing the utmost reliance upon his audacity and presence of mind in the most appalling danger, and in his fertility of invention in all sudden emergencies. Lord Macaulay gives a view of Clive's relation to these transactions somewhat different to this. He says, "Clive's profession was war, and he felt that there was something discredit-able in an accommodation with Suraj-ad-Dowlah. But his power was limited. A committee, chiefly composed of servants of the company who had fled from Calcutta, had the principal direction of affairs; and these persons were eager to be restored to their posts and be compensated for their losses. The government of Madras, apprised that war had commenced in Europe, and apprehensive of an attack from the French, became impatient for the return of the armament. The provinces of the nabob were large, the chances of a contest doubtful; and Clive consented to treat, though he expressed his regret that things should not be concluded in so glorious a manner as he could have wished." His lordship adds, "With this negotiation commences a new chapter in the life of Clive. Hitherto he had been merely a soldier, carrying into effect with eminent ability and valour the plans of others. Henceforward, he is chiefly to be regarded as a statesman; and his military movements are to be considered subordinate to his military designs."

Mill says that the anger of the viceroy was influenced by the capture of Hoogly, which the English attacked solely for plunder, and therefore he ordered his army to march against Calcutta. These statements are not borne out

by the facts as related by Mr. Mill himself, when received as a whole. The expedition of Coote to Hoogly was a fair and lawful operation of a war of reprisals, and the fact that after the capture of Hoogly the soubahdar temporised and pretended to be desirous of peace is indisputable.

Hugh Murray says, referring to the different views of Clive and Watson, that the former prevailed so far that a mission was sent to the soubahdar, who received it honourably, and even proposed terms that were considered admissible; but the writer adds, concerning the prince, "He did not, however, discontinue his march, and by various evasions avoided bringing the treaty to a conclusion." Lord Macaulay takes the same view of the nabob's conduct. The French at Chandernagore, at this juncture, according to Mill, proposed neutrality, even although their respective nations were at war in Europe. This, however, was a feint, for the French at that station could not but know the design of their countrymen to drive the British out of India, and the policy of rejecting proposals of neutrality whenever they were strong enough to make war. Professor Wilson remarks upon this alleged offer, and the time at which Mill represents it to have been made:—"There is some contradiction in the statements of different authorities on this subject, which can be reconciled only by a consideration of dates and circumstances. It appears probable, that the French were not informed of the war in Europe, until after the march of the nawab to Calcutta, and the negotiations for peace with the English. They could not, therefore, have joined him sooner, and to prevent that junction taking place, was one of Clive's reasons for agreeing to the treaty more readily than was thought advisable by Admiral Watson. He writes to the chairman, 'I know there are many who think I have been too precipitate in the conclusion of the treaty, but they never knew that the delay of a day or two might have ruined the company's affairs, by the junction of the French with the nawab, which was on the point of being carried into execution.*' With the conclusion of the treaty, the French lost their opportunity of co-operating with the nawab. Their negotiations for a neutrality were subsequent to the nawab's retreat; and if Clive's account of the matter be correct, the English had not much reason to be grateful for their forbearance."

The soubahdar, after making many pretences of negotiation, appeared on the 3rd of February before Calcutta, immediately investing it. Clive's resolve the next morning to attack this camp have been severely criticised, and

* *Life*, i. 179.

with justice. A thick mist also obscured his operations. Nevertheless, he succeeded in cutting through the camp, and returned, having suffered as well as inflicted heavy loss. The nabob was terrified at so audacious an act of courage, and became earnest in his overtures for peace, and on the 9th of February a treaty was concluded. The terms were the same as he at first offered, with an additional article that the English might fortify Calcutta. Two days afterwards, he proposed a treaty offensive and defensive, to which the English acceded, and which was concluded on the same day.

Clive was anxious to attack the French factory of Chandernagore; but the soubahdar, willing to see the French in his dominions, as a counterpoise to the too powerful English, resisted, and made such a demonstration of force as deterred the English from the attempt. Clive maintained that either a treaty of neutrality with that French station, or an immediate attack upon it, was essential to the security of English interests, and he proposed one, which the French said they must refer to the president at Pondicherry, but which Clive signed definitively. Watson, who always found scruples for refusing to do that upon which Clive was bent, or reason for performing what Clive hesitated to undertake, refused his signature. When Clive was for attacking Chandernagore, Watson refused, without the consent of the viceroy, which he knew would not be given. Large reinforcements arrived at this time for the English, and they refused to ratify the treaty with the French of Chandernagore. While the English were uncertain how to act in reference to Chandernagore, they became apprised of the facts that the government of Pondicherry was opposed to neutrality, and merely desired, by negotiation, to gain time, while they were instigating the viceroy to rely on them, and forming an alliance to expel the English at last. The prince, however, was alarmed by the invasion and capture of Delhi by Ahmed Shah, the Abdallee, and the rumour that the invader had determined to march against Bengal. In his consternation, he sent to the English, entreating their aid, and showing his desire to gain it on almost any terms. A council was called, at which the feeble Mr. Drake, who had run away from Calcutta, presided: Mr. Becher, Major Kilpatrick, and Colonel Clive were the other members. It was then debated whether an attack should be made on Chandernagore. Clive gives the following amusing account of the way in which the council argued and voted:—"Mr. Becher gave his opinion for a neutrality, Major Kilpatrick, for a neutrality; he himself gave his opinion for the attack of

the place; Mr. Drake gave an opinion that nobody could make anything of. Major Kilpatrick then asked him, whether he thought the forces and squadron could attack Chandernagore and the nabob's army at the same time?—he said, he thought they could; upon which Major Kilpatrick desired to withdraw his opinion, and to be of his. They voted Mr. Drake's no opinion at all; and Major Kilpatrick and he being the majority, a letter was written to Admiral Watson, desiring him to co-operate in the attack on Chandernagore."

Drake was a man without patriotism or honour. His sole object was to be allowed to preside quietly in Calcutta, at the head of the council, and turn the trading affairs of the company to some account, and his own to results more profitable. He was jealous of Clive, intrigued with the directors in London and the council in Madras, to have Clive's independent command withdrawn, and for that officer either to be placed under his orders, or removed from Bengal. Incredibly as it may seem, that any man who had deserted his duty and dishonoured his country, as Drake had done, could desire to remove the only officer capable of making head against the enemy, such was the fact. He, therefore, opposed all Clive's movements; and Admiral Watson, seeing that the counsels on shore were so divided, had the more scope for his perpetually recurring conscientious scruple against any measure either for negotiation or arms proposed by that able and indomitable man. The following statement of Clive's instructions, and of extracts of Drake's letters for the suppression of Clive's independent authority, will account to the reader for all the difficulties which arose among the English themselves whenever Clive proposed any new undertaking:—"The orders given to the admiral and Colonel Clive when they left Madras were, to obtain full reparation of all injuries, and eventually to attack the tyrant in his capital. The council, on the 8th of January, advised the court of directors of the recapture of Calcutta, and, on the 31st, of the success against Hoogly. In the latter despatch, they adverted to the instructions from the president at Fort St. George, directing that Colonel Clive, as commander of all the forces, might be furnished with plans for a treaty with the nabob, having placed four lacs of rupees at his command, and empowered him to deviate from the whole or part of such plans, should he consider them to be inconsistent with the company's interests. The council at Calcutta appeared to view with strong feelings of jealousy the position in which Clive stood towards them by virtue of those instructions. They remarked, in their letter

to the directors, that 'the authority the select committee at Fort St. George have assumed, in appointing Colonel Clive commander-in-chief of the forces in Bengal, is so unaccountable, that we cannot avoid taking notice of it as an encroachment of the rights and trusts invested in us.' Notwithstanding the important services Clive had already rendered, and the probability of the nabob's advancing towards Calcutta, the council added, 'We have required of Colonel Clive to recede from the independent powers given him by the select committee, but he has refused to surrender that authority; we must therefore leave it to you, honourable sirs, to take notice of so injurious a conduct in your servants on the coast.'" Adverting to the powers which he possessed, he stated to the court of directors, in a letter dated "the camp near Calcutta:" "All propositions the council make will be attended to; and, for my part, you may be assured that, notwithstanding my independent command, I shall endeavour to maintain a perfect harmony with them, and act throughout with their participation. They thought proper, some time ago, to demand a surrender of my commission as commander-in-chief, and that I would put myself under their orders. While I looked upon myself as obliged to refuse, in justice to those who had entrusted me with such powers, I represented that I had no intention of making use of any independent powers, unless they induced me to it by necessity, for we had but one common interest to pursue, which was that of the company, and as long as that was kept in view, they would always find me ready to follow their instructions.' Colonel Clive's communication appears to have been governed by a just sense of the position in which he was placed, and to have manifested every disposition to act in harmony with the council, who felt aggrieved at their power having been set aside. At such a juncture, all personal feeling should have been waived for the common good, especially in favour of an officer who had evinced such qualifications."²

This correspondence, thus quoted and commented upon, shows that from the first moment of his success at Bengal, the old council thwarted him, anxious for any compromise, so that they might pursue their private gains. The men who fled with the women when Calcutta was besieged, leaving the supreme posts of government and military direction vacant, were not likely to consent to any course of action of a bold and vigorous nature

² Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. i. chap. ii.; pp. 56—59.

to avenge the murder of their countrymen, or vindicate the honour of their country. They longed for a money compromise which they should largely share, and of the division of which they should have the patronage. Patriotism and honour were words of no meaning to them. Having from the beginning of Clive's expedition acted in that spirit, they looked with much animosity upon the projected attack at Chandernagore, that expedition and all other military undertakings tending to keep Clive with his independent commission in the province, and to increase his renown, influence, and perhaps his direct power, which was ultimately the case. Clive, however, had made up his mind to drive the French from Bengal, and he lost no time in carrying his purpose into effect. The intrigues which followed the events just related, and which surrounded the indomitable Clive, who was the life and soul of English enterprise, were complicated, intricate, and unprincipled. The native powers, the French, and the English, all endeavoured to deceive one another, and all were unscrupulous in the means which they employed. It has become the fashion among English writers—a fashion set by Mill—to traduce the character of the British on all occasions of temptation during the trials which at that period beset them. Much injustice is done to the Anglo-Indians of that day, by their countrymen of the present age. Impartial justice demands at all events a verdict in their favour when they are compared with either French or natives. The French showed far less honour and political morality than the English, and the conduct of natives of all ranks, sects, and classes was profoundly corrupt, treacherous, venal, and cruel. Princes, diplomatists, generals, merchants, and people were utterly without honour or principle, with rare exceptions. The course of conduct generally pursued by them was so perfidious and wicked, that where a simple and direct procedure would have better served their purposes, they preferred chicanery, meanness, cowardice and folly. They exemplified the truth of the saying, "*Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*" They reaped as they sowed, nabob, soubahdar and people: a judicial vengeance politically befel them. It would be an endless task to unravel the many skeins of artifice which were spun around the policy of natives, French, and English at this time. Let it suffice, to observe that Clive's skilful manœuvres and bold schemes defeated the coalesced French and natives, and that, finally, the French were driven from Bengal.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

DETHRONEMENT OF SURAJ-AD-DOWLAH—BATTLE OF PLASSEY—THE ENGLISH MASTERS OF BENGAL.

THE defeat and humiliation of the French left the British no European rivals in Bengal. There were still other European factories and settlements, but there was no prospect, and scarcely any possibility of their possessors rising to great power, or of even attempting to dispute the position and influence of the English. The agreements entered into by the latter with the soubahdar upon the expulsion of the French, and in connection with that event, were not fulfilled by the native government to the satisfaction of the conquerors, and hence disputes arose which led to war, and to the final conquest of Bengal by the British. Modern writers, especially upon the continent of Europe, allege that these quarrels were fomented by the English, in order to find a pretext for pushing their conquests; and Clive is especially accused of having been the evil genius of this policy. In support of this view, much reliance is placed upon the statement of Clive, which he made to the House of Commons, that, "after Chandernagore was resolved to be attacked, he repeatedly said to the committee, as well as to others, that they could not stop there, but must go further; that, having established themselves by force, and not by consent of the nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, many upon record; and that he did suggest to Admiral Watson and Sir George Pococke, as well as to the committee, the necessity of a revolution; that Mr. Watson and the gentlemen of the committee agreed upon the necessity of it; and that the management of that revolution was, with consent of the committee, left to Mr. Watts, who was resident at the nabob's capital, and himself; that great dissatisfaction arising among Suraj-ad-Dowlah's troops, Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the person to place in the room of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, in consequence of which a treaty was formed." Clive never intended to intimate, by what he thus stated, that the idea of deposing the soubahdar arose with the English: the fact was otherwise. The English only took up a suggestion made by certain of the soubahdar's subjects; and, as Lord Clive intimates in his statement just quoted, and as he elsewhere declared, he was actuated, in falling in with the plans of the conspirators, by the necessity of the case. The soubahdar never intended to fulfil any of his agreements: he hated and feared the

English too much ever to be at ease while they held power and influence in Bengal. Lord Macaulay describes his state of minds and proceedings at this period in terms as correct as expressive:—

"The French were now vanquished; and he began to regard the English with still greater fear and still greater hatred. His weak and unprincipled mind oscillated between servility and insolence. One day he sent a large sum to Calcutta, as part of the compensation due for the wrongs which he had committed. The next day, he sent a present of jewels to Bussy, exhorting that distinguished officer to hasten to protect Bengal 'against Clive, the daring in war, on whom,' says his highness, 'may all bad fortune attend.' He ordered his army to march against the English. He countermanded his orders. He tore Clive's letters. He then sent answers in the most florid language of compliment. He ordered Watts out of his presence, and threatened to impale him. He again sent for Watts, and begged pardon for the insult. In the meantime, his maladministration, his folly, his dissolute manners, and his love of the lowest company, had disgusted all classes of his subjects—soldiers, traders, civil functionaries, the proud and ostentations Mohammedans, the timid, supple, and parsimonious Hindoos. A formidable conspiracy was formed against him, in which were included Rojdullub, the minister of finance; Meer Jaffier, the principal commander of his troops; and Jugget Seit,* the richest banker in India. The plot was confided to the English agents, and a communication was opened between the malcontents at Moorshedabad, and the committee at Calcutta. In the committee there was much hesitation; but Clive's voice was given for the conspirators, and his vigour and firmness bore down all opposition. It was determined that the English should lend their powerful assistance to depose Suraj-ad-Dowlah, and to place Meer Jaffier on the throne of Bengal. . . . 'The odious vices of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, the wrongs which the English had suffered at his hands, the dangers to which our trade must have been exposed had he continued to reign, appear to us fully to justify the resolution of deposing him.'"

"The odious vices of Suraj," in spite of Lord Macaulay's opinion to the contrary, afforded

* Properly, "Set."

no justification whatever to the English for the part they took, neither did they rest their conduct on any such foolish ground. "The wrongs which the English had suffered at his hand," would have afforded as little justification for their connection with the conspiracy as his odious vices. Suraj had compensated these wrongs, and placed himself not only on terms of amity, but alliance with those whom he had so foully injured. Neither did the British rest their procedure upon any wrongs endured by them in the previous war. "The dangers to which our trade must have been exposed," is too vague an allegation to justify an ally for entering into a conspiracy; but there is no doubt a conviction that such dangers impended, influenced the committee at Calcutta. Clive, by whose advice the overtures of the conspirators were entertained, based his policy upon the facts that the faithless tyrant had broken treaty with the British, and intrigued for their overthrow with the French in the Carnatic, and at the court of the Deccan; and Clive also rested his policy on the obvious truth that a man so vindictive, foolish, and capricious as Suraj, could never be a safe ally, and would always prove a treacherous foe as he had already proved himself to be. The clear evidence afforded that the infatuated prince was resolved to attempt the expulsion of the English at the first favourable moment, and had already set on foot traitorous designs, thereby violating all his engagements, afforded better justification for the desire and purpose to depose him than that which Lord Macaulay urges in Clive's defence. The first ostensible cause of dispute was the refusal of Suraj to deliver up certain French who had collected at Cossimbazar. The nabob furnished Mr. Law,* the chief of the French factory there, with arms, ammunition, and even money, and sent him and his people to Bahar. Clive detached a part of his army to intercept the fugitives, and incensed as well as alarmed the nabob by the boldness of such a measure. From this incident began open altercations between the British and Suraj, of such a nature as plainly portended not only a speedy breach of the alliance, but open war.

The plot referred to in the quotation from Lord Macaulay, was one of the fruits of this state of things. It was not the first conspiracy formed against Suraj by his own subjects and officers, nor were the proposals which arose out of it the first made to the English by the nabob's subjects against him; but the project of Meer Jaffier appeared to the British the most feasible, or possibly "the

pear was then ripe." Meer Jaffier was not actually in the employment of Suraj, as the quotation from Lord Macaulay would indicate, when he first opened communications with the English. He had been deposed, and in a manner likely to make him a rebel. That chief was, however, a person of too much consequence to remain long out of the public service, for he had held high rank in the army of Ali Verdi, to whose sister he had been married. His rank was that of an independent military chief, in which anomalous position he raised and paid his army, which nominally was in the service of the nabob, but really regarded as its chief the general who recruited and paid it.

When negotiations were fully opened between the conspirators at Moorshedabad and the English at Calcutta, co-operation was agreed upon in manner and on terms which have been much censured by historians. The English senate resounded during many sessions of the last century with denunciations of the venality and treachery of the committee at Calcutta during these transactions; and the English press threw forth innumerable sheets filled with reclamations and abuse of the British chiefs. Lord Macaulay, who vindicates the deposition of the nabob, and the coalition of the English and the native party in the revolt of the latter, condemns Clive for writing soothing letters to the nabob and keeping up the semblance of amity. It must be obvious to every reflecting reader, that if it were right for the English to co-operate in the conspiracy at all, it was necessary to carry out their project by preserving appearances until the hour arrived for throwing off the alliance openly. His lordship is obviously inconsistent in excusing the one part taken by the English and censuring the other. Whatever be the merits of the case, Clive did no more than English diplomatists, and all other diplomatists, European and Oriental, have done ever since—conceal the purpose of their governments to throw off an alliance until opportune occasion. Governments with which Lord Macaulay has been connected, and which have had all the service of his peculiar rhetoric, have shown as much laxity in the ethics of their diplomacy.

Probably no part of the conduct of the English has been so severely handled by moral critics, as the pecuniary bargain made with Meer Jaffier by the Calcutta committee. Jaffier readily undertook to pay large demands made by the English. In name of compensation for losses by the capture of Calcutta, 10,000,000 rupees were promised to the English company, 5,000,000 rupees to English inhabitants, 2,000,000 to the Indians, and

* For an account of whom see chapter on the "French East India Company."

700,000 to the Armenians. These sums were specified in the formal treaty. Over and beside this, it was resolved by the committee of the council—that is, the small number of individuals by whom the business was performed—that a donation of 2,500,000 rupees should be asked for the squadron; and another of equal amount for the army. “When this was settled,” says Lord Clive, “Mr. Becher (a member) suggested to the committee, that he thought that committee, who managed the great machine of government, was entitled to some consideration, as well as the army and navy.” Such a proposition, in such an assembly, could not fail to appear eminently reasonable. It met with general approbation. Mr. Becher informs us, that the sums received were 280,000 rupees by Mr. Drake, the governor; 280,000 by Colonel Clive; and 240,000 each, by himself, Mr. Watts, and Major Kilpatrick, the inferior members of the committee. The terms obtained in favour of the company were, that all the French factories and effects should be given up; that the French should be for ever excluded from Bengal; that the territory surrounding Calcutta to the distance of six hundred yards, beyond the Mahratta ditch, and all the land lying south of Calcutta as far as Calpee, should be granted them on zemindary tenure, the company paying the rents in the same manner as other zemindars.

Mr. Mill, with an impartiality and justice of which he is too often very sparing where the conduct of the company's servants is concerned, makes the following critique upon this pecuniary arrangement, on account of which Clive and the council have been so frequently stigmatised as venal and corrupt:—“These presents, which were afterwards made use of by the personal enemies of Clive, to effect his annoyance and attempt his ruin, detract much from the splendour of his reputation, and reflect discredit upon all who were parties to their acceptance. That general, admiral, and members of the select committee, were alike influenced by a grasping and mercenary spirit is undeniable, and they seized, with an avidity which denoted a lamentable absence of elevated principles, upon an unexpected opportunity of realizing princely fortunes. At the same time, many considerations may be urged in their excuse, and a more disinterested conduct would have exhibited in them, a very extraordinary exception to the prevailing practices and feelings of the times. The servants of the company had never been forbidden to receive presents from the natives of rank, and as they were very ill paid, it was understood that they were at liberty to pay themselves in any manner they could which

did not injure their employers. The making of presents was an established practice amongst the natives, and is one which they even yet consider as a necessary part of friendly or formal intercourse, and although, agreeably to their notions, it is most incumbent on the inferior to approach his superior with an offering, yet on great public occasions, and especially upon any signal triumph, the distribution of liberal donations to the army and the chief officers of the court is a natural result. There was nothing more than customary, therefore, in the gift of large sums of money by Meer Jaffier to those to whom he was indebted for his accession; and, as there was neither law nor usage opposed to the acceptance of his donations by the servants of the company, and as they were avowedly expected and openly received, there was nothing dishonest in the transaction. That the amount of the presents was excessive, may be attributed, in some degree, to the erroneous opinion entertained probably by Meer Jaffier, and certainly by the company's servants, of the great wealth in the treasury of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, which admitted of such deduction. With a just regard to circumstances and seasons, therefore, it is unjust to expect from the servants of the company a lofty disregard of personal advantage, although they would have merited more unqualified admiration had they disdained their private enrichment in the noble aim of promoting the public good: much unhappiness would have been avoided by themselves, much misery would have been spared to Bengal.” That many of the persons engaged in these arrangements were actuated by motives the most selfish and venal, the minor transactions connected with them incidentally reveal. The discussion which arose in the committee as to how much its inferior members were to receive, is a case in point. The distribution of 240,000 rupees each to Becher, Watts, and Kilpatrick, led to a dispute, which Clive thus accounted for and described:—“Upon this being known, Mr. Watson replied, that he was entitled to a share in that money. He (Clive) agreed in opinion with the gentlemen, when this application was made, that Mr. Watson was not one of the committee, but at the same time did justice to his services, and proposed to the gentlemen to contribute as much as would make his share equal to the governor's and his own; that about three or four consented to it, the rest would not.”

In order to carry out the compact, the English were to make open war, and advancing a small force, the General Meer Jaffier would join it at Cutwa with his own troops, and as many other detachments from the

nabob's army, as he might be able to gain over through the instrumentality of other military malcontents. Clive put himself at the head of a very small body of men, and marched to Cutwa, but on arriving at the rendezvous, he found no allies. This disquieted him, for he had but little confidence in the courage, capacity, or sincerity of the conspirators. His disquietude was increased by letters from Moorshedabad, informing some of the natives in his camp, that the conspiracy had been revealed to the nabob, and that Meer Jaffier had only saved his life, by promising to aid with his best endeavours the prosecution of the war against the English. These tidings were soon followed by a letter from Meer Jaffier himself, informing Clive that the nabob, suspecting some designs against his throne, had compelled him to swear fidelity upon the Koran. The general pleaded his oath as a reason for not having fulfilled his engagement so far, but declared that on the day of battle he would go over to Clive with his army. This epistle furnished an illustration of Mohammedan casuistry. The oath of fidelity upon the Koran preserved so far the fealty of the rebel chief, that he would not at once go over to his ally, but would, nevertheless, hold friendly communications with him, and propose new modes of destroying his master's interests, which on the day of battle he promised to betray. Clive no longer trusted Meer Jaffier, who was playing a double game. He had committed the English to an undertaking which they would not have ventured upon without his aid; yet his own purpose was to observe neutrality, and play off both the forces, that of the British and that of the nabob, against one another, and make his own terms with the ultimate conqueror. Clive, with all his impetuous and rash boldness, felt the desperate nature of his position, and was depressed. He afterwards admitted the depression he felt, and avowed that he "thought it extremely hazardous to pass a river which is only fordable in one place, march a hundred and fifty miles up the country, and risk a battle, when, if a defeat ensued, not one man would have returned to tell it."

Thus perplexed, he summoned a council of war which decided against passing the river. Clive declared that if he had followed its advice, the result would have been the ruin of the East India Company. It would not, however, have been reasonable on his part to expect the council to come to any other opinion than they did, which was in harmony with his own, a fact which he took unusual pains to let them know before they gave the decision. It is the custom in councils of war for the

junior officer to give his opinion first, so that, uninfluenced by the authority of his seniors, he may express his own conviction. On this occasion, Clive first declared his judgment against crossing the river, and so great was his influence that this decision was immediately concurred in, so that in fact it was not a council of war, but the opinion of Clive himself, echoed by his junior officers.

Orme relates that "after the council dispersed, he retired alone into the adjoining grove, where he continued an hour in deep meditation: and gave orders, on his return to his quarters, that the army should cross the river in the morning."* It is probable that Orme had this account from the lips of Clive himself. The next morning the army crossed the river, and at midnight arrived at Plassey. Before Clive had heard from Meer Jaffier that the soubahdar† had sworn him on the Koran, the faithless general was thus addressed by his English ally, through Mr. Watts, the English resident at the court of Suraj:—"Tell Meer Jaffier to fear nothing. I will join him with five thousand men who never turned their backs. Assure him I will march night and day to his assistance, and stand by him as long as I have a man left." Meer Jaffier was not brave, and the force of the great English captain was so inferior, that, notwithstanding, the mighty name already gained by its commander, Meer Jaffier was discouraged. Had the army of Clive been twice as numerous, the wily Mohammedan would have proved a more prompt ally. Some historians accuse Meer Jaffier of having himself awakened the suspicions of the soubahdar against others of the confederates, that he might, if necessary, for his own purposes betray them also, but it is not probable that a politician so timid, would venture upon so bold a procedure. The suspicions of the viceroy were actually aroused by M. Law, who was led to suspect the plot, through information connected with the French agents at the court. He consequently urged the prince to retain French troops about his person, but his cowardice and vacillation prevented his following such counsel, for he was afraid of exasperating the English, yet more afraid of offending his own people who were jealous of foreign troops, and he had not implicit confidence in the French themselves.

Before the battle of Plassey was fought, or the little English army had crossed their rubicon, while yet everything depended upon

* Vol. ii. p. 170.

† Suraj-ad-Dowlah is called soubahdar and nabob indiscriminately by historians, although the names are not synonymous; a nabob properly being deputy of the soubahdar, as the latter is viceroy of the Mogul.

the privacy with which the conspirators carried on affairs with their English allies, a danger threatened the whole scheme, of the most alarming nature. The secret negotiations between Clive and Meer Jaffier, and the ostensible diplomatic business between the council at Calcutta and the soubahdar, were carried on by Mr. Watts, the English resident at his court, and one Omichund, a Bengalee. He had been a merchant at Calcutta, and suffered heavy loss when the place was captured by Suraj, but, finding favour with the tyrant, he was brought to Moorshedabad and compensated for the losses he had sustained. Notwithstanding this unusual generosity on the part of Suraj, Omichund betrayed him. It was convenient both to the soubahdar and the English to have a person of Omichund's parts, experience, and knowledge of the English as a medium of transacting political business, especially as politics and commerce were so interwoven in the relations of the two powers. Omichund was rich, but exceedingly avaricious. He had no honour, no loyalty, and was ready to sell either prince or stranger to the other. He believed that the English could pay the better price, and would in the long run succeed, for he was far-sighted in politics, and a shrewd judge of character. He readily joined the conspirators; for, having a talent for intrigue, he thus found scope for it. Considering the English good paymasters, and more worthy of trust than his master, he was prepared to betray the latter for a price, which was agreed upon amongst the conspirators, and between him and them and the English. He accordingly assisted Mr. Watts in all the plots carried on at the court of Bengal, and was instrumental by his intimate knowledge of Suraj's mental habits and character, and by his own plausible manner and ingenious mind, in soothing the anger of the soubahdar, and lulling his suspicions of his own court, upon which the prince, utterly faithless himself, placed scarcely any reliance. Omichund appears to have gained more influence over him than any of his courtiers, and he wielded it in the interest of the projected revolution.

When all was ready for action, and Clive's little army was committed to the struggle, the mercenary and faithless Bengalee informed Mr. Watts that unless the English consented to pay him, as an additional bribe, the enormous sum—especially in those days, and in the circumstances of the English in Bengal—of three hundred thousand pounds sterling, he would disclose the conspiracy. Clive was appalled by the villainy of the wretch, for he had from the first been one of the most zealous advocates of a revolution, and was the person

through whom the proposals came to the English to aid in effecting that revolution. If the English refused, Mr. Watts, Meer Jaffier, and all concerned, natives or English, in the power of Suraj would be seized and visited with the extreme of torture. It was the opinion of Mr. Watts, and of Meer Jaffier, that Omichund would certainly fulfil his threat, unless the English gave him such security as satisfied him that he should receive the vast treasure he demanded, which, with his previous demands, would probably reach half a million sterling. Although he had been already compensated by the soubahdar for his losses at Calcutta, he contrived to conceal that fact from the English, and had already obtained a pledge of compensation from them. The committee at Calcutta were paralyzed, but the ready courage and resources of Clive never failed. He undertook the management of this apparently unconquerable danger, and succeeded in satisfying Omichund, so as to secure his silence, and yet of punishing the traitor, so as to deprive him of all for which he had dealt so greedy a bargain. All that Omichund required was accordingly done, without any dissatisfaction with his treachery having been expressed to him, either through the resident Mr. Watts or by direct correspondence. He was treated as if it were natural and proper that he should make the most of his secret, and be a chief sharer in the spoil. This disarmed him of all suspicion that the English had any plan for outwitting him. Supposing that they regarded his conduct as that which any individual among them would himself pursue, in like circumstances, he had no doubt that they would, on the score of his treachery, refuse to pay, or promise to be paid by the prospective nabob, all his demands. The security which Omichund sought was an article in a secret treaty between Meer Jaffier and the English, conferring upon him all he had required, and he demanded the perusal of the treaty itself. Clive drew up two treaties, one on white paper, the other on red. In the former, which was the real one, no mention was made of Omichund; in the latter, which was fictitious, the payment of his demands was made a stipulation. Lord Macanlay is very severe upon Clive in this instance, in which severity he is supported by nearly every writer of the day who touches this episode of Anglo-Indian conquest.

It is surprising that the conduct of Clive should be denounced so sternly, especially by politicians who uphold deeds far more questionable when a party object of modern times is to be served by so doing. Clive had always intended to act honestly by the perfidious Hindoo, nor had the council at Calcutta ever

for a moment contemplated an injustice to him. He was too useful and powerful to be the object of any meditated treachery by the English; but when they found him false, and that he was about to use the snares he had placed in their hands to catch the nabob for the purpose of their own destruction, they might well throw the meshes over himself. Even, after all, when the English had him at their mercy, they treated him with indulgence.

Before Clive could accomplish his purpose by means of the duplicate treaty, a difficulty arose in consequence of Admiral Watson's refusing to sign the fictitious one. For this the admiral is praised by most writers to the disparagement of Clive, but the admiral had always a point of conscience or of doubt whenever the bold and fertile spirit of Clive presented to him a grand conception or a manly enterprise. Watson had little responsibility beyond keeping his ships safe, driving off those of the enemy, then an easy matter, or bearing troops from one port to another. Upon the presidents and commanders on shore the real responsibility lay, and they often met with embarrassment from the tardy views and want of enterprise on the part of the royal naval commanders. Watson, although an able naval officer, showed no competency beyond that; and was a clog and impediment to the enterprise of Clive. Some of the panegyrists of Watson, whose praise was expended in that direction as indirect censure of Clive, doubt if he ever concurred in the intrigue for the deposition of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, but there is incontestable evidence that he approved of it. If the admiral felt no qualm of conscience in carrying on an intrigue with Omichund to dethrone his sovereign, thus countenancing, on the part of the wily Hindoo, treachery which admitted of no apology or palliation, it is strange that his conscience should become so tender when an expedient such as Clive resorted to, as a *protection against treachery*, was presented for his opinion. Probably if any other member of the council but Clive had contrived the subtle trick, Watson might have admired its ingenuity, and have considered it an appropriate mode, under the circumstances, of snatching from the hands of a double traitor the reward he had so ingeniously determined to clutch. One may fairly suppose this of the admiral when perusing his correspondence with Clive, expressing his good wishes for the success of a conspiracy which could only prosper by the English assenting to the treachery of Omichund against his own master. However influenced, Watson refused to sign the red treaty. Macanlay says that Clive forged his signature. Mill throws the imputation upon the whole com-

mittee. At all events, the treaty was presented in such form as to deceive the Hindoo, with all the sagacity for which Orme gives him credit. After the battle of Plassey and the triumphant progress of Clive through Bengal, Omichund was undecieved, and he found that his perfidy had overreached itself, and that in Clive he had encountered an intellect as subtle as his own. As this episode in British Indian history has given rise to much controversy, especially since the days of Mill, it will interest the reader to place before him the bitter animadversion of that writer, and the calm and candid reply to it of Professor Wilson. All the accusations against Clive and the council, from the days of Mill to Macanlay, are presented in brief in the following note to Mill's history: *—"Among the Hindoo merchants established at Calcutta was Omichund, 'a man,' says Mr. Orme, 'of great sagacity and understanding,' who had traded to a vast amount, and acquired an enormous fortune. 'The extent of his habitation,' continues Mr. Orme, 'divided into various departments, the number of his servants continually employed in various occupations, and a retinue of armed men in constant pay, resembled more the state of a prince than the condition of a merchant. His commerce extended to all parts of Bengal and Bahar, and by presents and services he had acquired so much influence with the principal officers of the Bengal government, that the presidency, in times of difficulty, used to employ his mediation with the nabob. This pre-eminence, however, did not fail to render him the object of much envy.' † When the alarm, excited by the hostile designs of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, threw into consternation the minds of Mr. Drake and his council, among other weak ideas which occurred to them, one was to secure the person of Omichund, lest, peradventure, he should be in concert with their enemies. He was seized and thrown into confinement. His guards, believing that violence, that is, dishonour, would next fall upon his house, set fire to it, after the manner of Hindoos, and slaughtered the inmates of his harem. Notwithstanding this, when Mr. Holwell endeavoured to parley with the nabob, he employed Omichund to write letters to his friends, importuning them to intercede, in that extremity, with the prince. At the capture, though his person was liberated, his valuable effects and merchandise were plundered. No less than four hundred thousand rupees in cash were found in his treasury. When an order was published that such of the English as had escaped the Black Hole might

* Vol. iii, book iv. chap. iii. p. 135.

† Orme, vol. ii. p. 50.

return to their homes, they were supplied with provisions by Omichund, 'whose intercession,' says Orme, 'had probably procured their return.' Omichund, upon the ruin of Calcutta, followed the nabob's army, and soon acquired a high degree of confidence both with the nabob's favourite, and with himself. After the recovery of Calcutta, when the nabob, alarmed at the attack of his camp, entered into negotiation, and concluded a treaty, Omichund was one of the principal agents employed. And when Mr. Watts was sent to Moorshedabad as agent at the durbar (court) of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, 'he was accompanied,' says Mr. Orme (ii. 137), 'by Omichund, whose conduct in the late negotiation had effaced the impression of former imputations, inasmuch that Mr. Watts was permitted to consult and employ him without reserve on all occasions.' He was employed as a main instrument in all the intrigues with Jaffier. It was never surmised that he did not second, with all his efforts, the projects of the English; it was never denied that his services were of the utmost importance. Mr. Orme says expressly (p. 182), that 'his tales and artifices prevented Suraj-ad-Dowlah from believing the representations of his most trusty servants, who early suspected, and at length were convinced, that the English were confederated with Jaffier.' When the terms of compensation for the losses sustained by the capture of Calcutta were negotiated between Mr. Watts and Meer Jaffier, three millions of rupees were set down to Omichund, which, considering the extent of his property, and that 'most of the best houses in Calcutta were his,* was probably not more than his loss. Looking forward to the rewards, which he doubted not that Jaffier, if successful, would bestow upon those of the English who were the chief instruments of his exaltation; estimating also the importance of his own services, and the risk, both of life and of fortune, which, in rendering those services, he had incurred, Omichund conceived that he too might put in his claim for reward; and, according to the example of his countrymen, resolved not to injure himself by the modesty of his demand. He asked a commission of five per cent. on the money which should be received from the nabob's treasury, and a fourth part of the jewels; but agreed, upon hearing the objections of Mr. Watts, to refer his claims to the committee. When the accounts were sent to Calcutta, the sum to be given to Omichund, even as compensation for his losses, seemed a very heavy grievance to men who panted for more to themselves. To men whose minds were in such a state, the great

* Orme, vol. ii. p. 128.

demand of Omichund appeared (the reader will laugh—but they did literally appear) a crime. They were voted a crime; and so great a crime, as to deserve to be punished—to be punished, not only by depriving him of all reward, but depriving him of his compensation, that compensation which was stipulated for to everybody: it was voted that Omichund should have nothing. They were in his power, however, therefore he was not to be irritated. It was necessary he should be deceived. Olive, whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never cost a pang, proposed that two treaties with Meer Jaffier should be drawn up, and signed, one, in which satisfaction to Omichund should be provided for, which Omichund should see; another, that which should really be executed, in which he should not be named. To his honour be it spoken, Admiral Watson refused to be a party in this treachery. He would not sign the false treaty; and the committee forged his name. When Omichund, upon the final adjustment, was told that he was cheated, and found that he was a ruined man, he fainted away, and lost his reason. He was from that moment insane. Not an Englishman, not even Mr. Orme, has yet expressed a word of sympathy or regret."

To this, Professor Wilson replies:—"In this statement some very material circumstances are omitted, which palliate, if they do not justify the deception that was practised. Before the attack upon Calcutta, Omichund was in friendly correspondence with the ministers and servants of the nawab, and upon its being taken, was treated with civility by Suraj-ad-Dowlah, whom he accompanied to Moorshedabad, and there obtained from him repayment of the money which in the plunder of Calcutta had been carried off from his house. Notwithstanding this, he was one of the first, through his connection, no doubt, with the Hindoo ministers, and Sets, the banker, to engage in the plot against Suraj-ad-Dowlah. The English had, therefore, no great reason to look upon him as their friend; and as it is evident that he was a stranger to every principle except love of money, there is nothing in his character to awaken any sympathy for his fate. Still it is undeniable that thus far he merited no treachery, and that his services were entitled to consideration. It was intended to reimburse his losses and remunerate his assistance; but his want of principle instigated him to enrich himself by the secret to which he had been admitted, and when all was prepared for action, he waited on Mr. Watts, the agent at Cossimbazar, and threatened to acquaint the nawab with the conspiracy, unless a donation was secured to him of thirty lacs of rupees, about £350,000. The demand was

exorbitant, and infinitely beyond the amount of any losses he could have sustained by the plunder of Calcutta, for which losses also, it is to be remembered, he had already received compensation. Mr. Mill thinks it probably not more than his loss, because the best houses in Calcutta, according to Orme, were his. But admitting that they were of great value, which is not very likely, they were still his. Calcutta was not razed to the ground; the buildings were still there, and on its recapture had of course reverted to their owners. The claim was wholly inadmissible, and its unreasonableness was aggravated by the threat of treachery with which it was enforced. What was to be done? To have rejected it at once would have been followed by the certain murder of the company's servants at Cossimbazar, and of Meer Jaffier, with all his family and adherents, and by the probable defeat of the British projects and their destruction. The menaced treason of Omichund, and its fatal consequences, are scarcely adverted to in the preceding account, although it was that, and not the mere demand of extravagant compensation, which was naturally enough denounced by the committee as a crime, and determined to be worthy of punishment. Clive, who had all along advocated his cause, and defended his character, 'received with equal surprise and indignation the incontrovertible proofs offered of his guilt. Viewing him as a public enemy, he considered, as he stated at the period, and publicly avowed afterwards, every artifice that could deceive him to be not only defensible, but just and proper.' There may be a difference of opinion on this subject, and it would have been more for the credit of the European character that, however treacherously extorted, the promise should have been performed, the money should have been paid; but there can be no doubt, that, in order to appreciate with justice the conduct of Clive and the committee, the circumstance of Omichund's menaced treason should not be kept out of sight. As to the reputed effects of his disappointment upon his intellects and life, there is good reason to doubt their occurrence, for in the month of August following, Clive recommends him to the secret committee of the court of directors, as 'a person capable of rendering great services, and, therefore, not wholly to be discarded.'**

The opinion of Professor Wilson is subscribed by many persons of eminence in connection with India, as the author of this history has means of knowing. In the esteem of others equally eminent, the learned

Professor conceded too much as to the ethical impropriety of refusing the demand of Omichund when victory crowned the English arms. Such men as Elphinstone, Prinsep, &c., among the most competent of living men to pronounce an opinion on Indian affairs, take this view. Upon some of the severer attacks of Mill, Lord Macaulay himself, sufficiently severe, has made the following strictures:—"We can by no means agree with Sir John Malcolm, who is obstinately resolved to see nothing but honour and integrity in the conduct of his hero. But we can as little agree with Mr. Mill, who has gone so far as to say that Clive was a man 'to whom deception, when it suited his purpose, never cost a pang.' Clive seems to us to have been constitutionally the opposite of a knave, bold even to temerity, sincere even to indiscretion, hearty in friendship, open in enmity. Neither in his private life, nor in those parts of his public life in which he had to do with his countrymen, do we find signs of a propensity to cunning. On the contrary, in all the disputes in which he was engaged as an Englishman against Englishmen, from his boxing-matches in school to those stony altercations in the India-house, and in parliament, amidst which his later years were passed, his very faults were those of a high and magnanimous spirit. The truth seems to have been, that he considered oriental politics as a game in which nothing was unfair. He knew that the standard of morality among the natives of India differed widely from that established in England. He knew that he had to deal with men destitute of what in Europe is called honour, with men who would give any promise without hesitation, and break any promise without shame, with men who would unscrupulously employ corruption, perjury, forgery, to compass their ends. His letters show that the great difference between oriental and European morality was constantly in his thoughts. He seems to have imagined, most erroneously, in our opinion, that he could effect nothing against such adversaries, if he was content to be bound by ties from which they were free; if he went on telling the truth, and hearing none; if he fulfilled, to his own hurt, all his engagements with confederates who never kept an engagement that was not to their advantage. Accordingly, this man, in the other parts of his life an honourable English gentleman and a soldier, was no sooner matched against an Indian intriguer, than he became himself an Indian intriguer, and descended, without scruple, to falsehood, to hypocritical caresses, to the substitution of documents, and to the counterfeiting of hands."

* See *Life of Clive*, vol. i. p. 289.

Lord Macaulay does justice to Clive in the above quotation, so far as he complains of Mill's unqualified denunciation; but, however plausibly expressed, the remainder of the passage is a reply to the former portion. The mode adopted to explain the contradictions in the separate parts of Clive's life is, like most of his lordship's casuistry, ingenious and imposing; but it is not founded upon facts. The description given of Clive's ideas of the necessity of descending into an arena of fraud, and playing a part there appropriate to the position, when in competition with native diplomatists, was never avowed, and, it may be fearlessly said, was never entertained by Clive. Lord Macaulay is indebted to his own dextrous fancy for this mode of reconciling what he describes as the discrepant parts of Clive's life. There was no such discrepancy of character in the man. He would outwit a thief, by setting a trap for him, or pretending to connive at his villainy until the moment of arresting him arrived. He would countervail the diabolical treachery of a man like Omichund, in whose hands the fate of himself and of his country's interests were, by appearing to acquiesce in his demands, and turning his own tricks into pitfalls for himself; but he would not substitute documents, forge names, or resort to dishonourable averments, in order to carry a point in diplomacy, deceive a confiding and faithful ally, accomplish a scheme of personal aggrandizement, or achieve any object in itself either corrupt or virtuous. He did not hold the principle of doing evil that good might come, as applicable to oriental politics; but he believed all means lawful to escape the clutches of an assassin and robber. He regarded Suraj-ad-Dowlah in no better light, and, therefore, entered into alliance with a revolutionary party in that sovereign's dominions, which had plotted the deposition of their tyrant. He regarded Omichund as a man who played the part of a foul traitor, who would have given up Clive's countrymen and allies to massacre, if demands, which the English could not have complied with in justice to themselves or their allies, were not apparently acquiesced in. He considered the promise he made like that which a man makes when the knife of a highwayman is at his throat, and he acted as most men would act when such a danger must be eluded. Had there been other passages in Clive's Indian career bringing out such principles and motives as Lord Macaulay attributes to him, there would be propriety in viewing the transactions with Omichund as his lordship represents them, in reference to the motives and principles by which they were governed; but there is no evidence in the facts of Clive's Eastern career

to sustain the theory by which Lord Macaulay accounts for his conduct. His lordship, at the time he wrote his review of Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, had evidently not made himself thoroughly acquainted with its contents, nor had he, from other sources, placed before his mind the Indian career of Lord Clive as a whole—military, diplomatic, and administrative. There is sufficient in each department of Clive's Indian history to prove that he never regarded what was false and dishonourable in Europe as otherwise in Asia. To deceive an enemy in war or diplomacy, when that enemy obviously intended treachery, he considered fair; and the same course has been pursued in European warfare and diplomacy so often as to make it absurd to single Clive out for indignation. He did wrong, as other generals and statesmen do, from allowing the aims he had in view—aims in themselves right—to blind his judgment, and from the errors and passions incidental to human judgment and feeling, under circumstances of temptation and peril; but he did not place himself on a level with oriental politicians in matters of principle and honour, and justify himself in the adoption of one standard of morality in India and another in England.

Such were the intrigues which preceded the battle of Plassey, an account of which is indispensable in a correct narrative of the conquest of Bengal by the British, for they influenced all the results of that victory.

These events passed rapidly on while Clive was preparing for his expedition, and after he set out on his march. Before he reached Plassey, he sent a message to the soubahdar, setting forth the treasons in which his highness had been detected, and the wrongs inflicted on the British. Clive offered to refer these disputes to the arbitration of Meer Jaffier, and meantime he and his army would wait upon his highness for an answer. Arrived at Plassey, Clive took up his position on the skirt of a grove of mango trees about two miles square*—one of those groves of fruit-trees so extensively planted by the natives in India. Near to Plassey there had been an entrenched camp of the soubahdar, and the evening previous to the arrival of Clive, Suraj-ad-Dowlah himself, with the main body of his army, arrived. These forces, united to the troops in camp, constituted a large army. It is difficult to state the precise number. Orme, who was there, represents the infantry as fifty thousand, the cavalry eighteen thousand, and fifty pieces of cannon. Lord Macaulay states the infantry to have been forty thousand in number, the cavalry fifteen thousand, and

* This grove is still in existence, but greatly reduced in dimensions.

the artillery the same as in Orme's computation, with the addition of a few field-pieces belonging to the French, and worked by them. Clive himself, in his letter to the directors, estimated the forces of the enemy still lower, representing the infantry as thirty-five thousand, and the cavalry and artillery as of the same force named by Lord Macaulay. With these forces were all the chief generals of Bengal, and among them Meer Jaffier, whose heart failed him when the hour for forming a junction with Clive arrived. The force which Clive had to oppose to this huge army was three thousand men; of these about one thousand were British, one hundred topasses, and the rest sepoy. All were commanded by British officers, some of them, such as Eyre Coote, men of distinguished ability; and the whole of the troops were well disciplined.

Clive passed an anxious night, pacing to and fro in the mango grove, or pondering in his tent; for he knew that the morrow must decide the destinies of Bengal, of its ruler, of himself and his little army, and of the English in Eastern India. All night he heard the din and bustle of an oriental camp, and felt the influence of the peculiar murmuring sound which the voices and motions of a host on the eve of battle were calculated to produce. His opponent spent also a night of anxiety; he had cast the issue of dominion upon the tide of war, and the morning's light would reveal whether his fortune would ebb or flow. He was naturally distrustful, and the apprehensions attendant upon such a condition of mind were heightened by the belief that treason lurked within his lines. By some misconduct, guards were not posted at his tent during a portion of the night, and a wandering camp follower, not knowing whither he strayed, found himself in the monarch's tent, who, apprehensive of assassination, cried aloud with fear, spreading alarm among his chiefs.

The host of the despot was not eager for battle—no loyalty kindled enthusiasm, and the troops of Meer Jaffier were alienated, considering themselves bound only to the chief whose salt they eat. The name of Clive was itself a spell, which palsied the heart of many of the vaunting braves of the ostentatious ranks of Suraj. Many of Clive's officers, perhaps all, were more confident of success than Clive himself. They had trust in his genius and valour. He felt the tremendous responsibility of his position—a bullet or an arrow might lay him low, and the mere fact of his fall would cause despair among his epoy, and inspire the enemy with confidence.

The sepoy of Clive's force felt no misgivings—they invested their leader with super-

human gifts, and expected to see some new phase of his power, before which the great host of the viceroy would disappear, as fallen branches and foliage swept onward by the inundations of the Ganges. The European soldiers were not confident of victory, but were resolute to deserve it. They looked wistfully forth for the eastern dawn to break. That dawn at last arose upon the unslumbering expectants of the conflict, and the battle of Plassey began, June 23, 1757.

Few native armies have appeared to the British so picturesque as that which advanced against the mango grove and the sheltering banks by which Clive's little band stood waiting for the onset. The infantry of Suraj was variously armed—some in the style of ancient India, others carried the weapons of European warfare. The bowmen formed their lines, as those of Cressy or Poitiers; but the turbaned heads and flowing drapery of these Eastern archers were far more picturesque. The musketeers carried their dusky weapons with less propriety and grace, and as men less skilful with their weapons. Many a line of swords and shields flashed in the morning's ray, and the sheen of lances displayed the pomp and reality of war.

The most singular sight presented to the British was the artillery. The guns were not only numerous but of heavy metal; they were all drawn by beautiful white oxen, whose movements were far more rapid than European nations would think likely with such animals yoked to field artillery. Behind every gun an elephant, well trained for the purpose, added to the celerity of the movement, by pushing with his great strength. These creatures were gaily caparisoned, and were magnificent specimens of their kind. The cavalry were mounted upon fine horses from upper Hindostan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The men of all the force, especially of the cavalry, were fine specimens of the well-formed, tall statured soldiers of Upper Bengal.

Forth came the brilliant host. Firm and undaunted the little band of British heroes awaited their approach. The enemy, instead of advancing to close combat, halted, and opened a heavy fire of cannon; but so badly were the guns worked, that scarcely a shot told. The light French field-pieces were skilfully directed, but were not brought into sufficient play, the native leaders relying upon the great execution they expected to be made by their own ponderous ordnance.

The English artillery replied with considerable effect, disabling the enemy's cannon by killing or alarming the oxen and elephants, and throwing the native gunners into conse-

quent confusion. It was, however, to silence the efficient French pieces, which were served as gallantly as skilfully, that the English fire was chiefly directed.

The army of Suraj wasted time upon a fruitless cannonade, during which several of the best officers fell by the well-directed aim of the English gunners. At last Meer Meden, a general upon whom his highness placed the utmost reliance, and whose fidelity deserved the esteem in which he was held, received a mortal wound from a cannon-ball. He was borne to the tent of his highness, who avoided danger, and while the faithful officer explained the arrangements by which he supposed victory might be gained, he expired. Suraj, frantic with despair and grief, called for Meer Jaffier, whose troops remained in a species of armed neutrality on one flank of the soubahdar's line. Suraj took off his turban, and placed it at Meer Jaffier's feet—the most abject act of humiliation to which a Mussulman can stoop; he implored him to avenge the death of the faithful Meer Meden, and to rescue from the perils that beset him the grandson of Ali Verdi, by whose favour Jaffier had grown great.

The conspirator, unmoved by Suraj's tears, or humiliation, turned the moment to account, and advised him to retreat to the intrenchments. Another general officer, Mohan Lall, pointed out the certain destruction which must ensue if such counsel were followed; but the helpless Suraj gave the fatal order. While one portion of the army consequently made a retrograde movement, that commanded by Meer Jaffier remained stationary. Clive perceived the true state of the case, and ordered his whole force to advance, the 39th British regiment of infantry leading, with imposing line and dauntless bearing. Suraj, dull as he was, understood at a glance the inaction of Meer Jaffier, and the well-timed advance of Clive. He fled. Mounting a swift camel, attended by two thousand of his choicest cavalry, he forsook the field. Meer Jaffier drew off his troops from the line of battle. The rest of the multitude took to precipitate flight, casting away their arms. The French, with a gallantry beyond praise, endeavoured to rally the panic-stricken crowd in vain, and alone faced the advancing English; but as the alarm, and rout of their allies increased, the French were swept from the field, as the mountain rock borne downward by the avalanche; and these brave men were merged in the crowd, whose mad flight bore everything before it. The battle was over; the Bengalees fled without feeling the point of British steel. The pursuit was short but decisive; five hundred of the enemy perished,

but they fell chiefly under the good artillery practice of the English. Of the British, only seventy-two were put *hors de combat*; and of these only twenty-two were slain: scarcely as many were mortally wounded.

The 39th regiment was the most conspicuous portion of Clive's troops—it still bears the name of Plassey on its colours, and is proud of the motto, "*Primus in Indis*."

Lord Macaulay says, "Meer Jaffier had given no assistance to the English during the action, but when he saw the fate of the day was decided, he drew off his division of the army, and when the battle was over sent his congratulations to his ally." This statement is astonishingly inaccurate. It is true that Meer Jaffier did not come over with his troops, which would have been difficult, but his treachery mainly conduced to the victory. There is no knowing how the battle would have issued, considering the disparity of forces, and the skill and bravery shown by the French, even with inactivity on the part of Jaffier's troops, if that officer had not given the fatal advice to the soubahdar to order a retreat to the trenches. When the retreat commenced, he remained stationary, but in such manner as betrayed his object so palpably that the prince immediately fled in despair, taking with him the *élite* of his army. Meer Jaffier accomplished all that his letter to Clive had promised. It was found after the battle, that while the cannonade was playing, he sent a letter to Clive advising the English chief to charge, and promising at that moment to withdraw his troops, which was probably all he could entrust his own soldiers to perform. The perfidy of Jaffier was the real cause of success; but for his assistance it is doubtful whether Clive would have brought away his little force from the field, far less was there a chance of victory. No battle fought by Clive gained him so much glory and emolument, in no battle in which he ever engaged, did the issue result less from any performance of his. It was the only battle in the preliminaries of which he showed hesitation, not merely hesitation of judgment, but want of confidence in his resources and his fortune, and the only one in which his chief reliance lay rather in the perfidy of a portion of the army opposed to him than in his own genius and the heroism of his troops. He doubtless did all that man could do in his circumstances, and everything he accomplished was performed well. The explanations between the two chiefs were mutually satisfactory. Clive urged Jaffier to hasten to Moorsshedabad (then the capital of Bengal), and prevent the possibility of Suraj rallying his forces, or

raising fresh levies. The revolutionary nabob followed this counsel and hastened forward. Meanwhile, the fugitive prince continued his flight to his capital. There, in a paroxysm of fear, he consulted all his courtiers, and followed the advice of none. Some urged him to surrender to the English, and throw himself on their mercy, as they were generous and relenting, as well as daring in war. Others appealed to his manhood and kingly pride, advising that he should assemble all that were faithful to him, place himself at their head, and fall upon the enemy, dying sword in hand or reconquering dominion and retrieving honour. His poltroon spirit shrunk from the manly counsel. A few advised him to place himself in the hands of the French in the Deccan, and to await the return of the tide of fortune to that nation, which they perceived would soon flow again, when he would be restored by their power, as they would always be the foes of a nabob friendly to the English. This counsel pleased him most, but was least popular among his friends. His indecision could resolve upon none of these schemes, until no course remained for his coward heart to choose, but ignominious flight once more. Meer Jaffier followed fast upon the fugitive, and when the besieging nabob entered Moorshedabad, Suraj was let down from a window of his palace. Accompanied, according to Orme, by one of his favourite concubines, and two attendants, with a casket of jewels in his hand, he entered a boat and rowed for Patna. Native writers describe his retreat as more leisurely, and having a train of elephants to bear his family and treasures. Clive arrived in a few days afterwards with a large escort, leaving his little army behind. He was received with great deference by Meer Jaffier and his confederates. A palace was assigned to the English captain, surrounded by beautiful grounds, and where there was camping accommodation for five hundred men, the number of his soldiers which accompanied him. The installation of Meer Jaffier as nabob of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa was his first care. He led the new ruler to the throne or chair of state, made the customary offerings, congratulated him on his exaltation, and then, through his interpreter, addressed the people, calling upon them to rejoice over the downfall of a tyrant, and the accession to power of a virtuous ruler.

The next care of the British chief was to demand from the regnant nabob the fulfilment of the treaty made during the period that the conspiracy was in progress. Up to this period, Omichund was ignorant of the artifice of the double treaty, and he presented himself

in high spirits, to obtain the sum, promise of which he had exacted under the threat of betraying the English to the viceroy. Mr. Scrafton was ordered by Clive to deceive him; the result has been related on a former page.

Meer Jaffier did his best to carry out the terms of the treaty, and disburse the sums which he had contracted to pay; but the treasury of Moorshedabad was far from full. The desolating wars carried on with the Mah-rattas by the predecessors of Suraj, the military expenditure of that prince against the English, and his profligate waste in the excesses and extravagance to which he was addicted, had, rich as Bengal was, reduced the treasury to a low degree. By various expedients, such as the disposal of jewels and making part payment in jewels, Meer Jaffier made up a portion of the money, and engaged, at certain intervals, to pay further instalments until the debt was liquidated. More than three quarters of a million sterling in coined silver was sent down the river from Moorshedabad to Calcutta. One hundred of the river boats were employed to convey the precious freight. The flotilla was conducted with much display—flags flying, drums beating, fireworks, brilliant as those of Bengal usually are, testified the satisfaction of the English, and the dissimulation of the courtiers of the new nabob, who regarded with horror and alarm the removal of so much treasure. It was remarkable that much of the coinage was European of an old date—such as the Venetians used when that people conducted the trade between Europe and India.

Clive was the object of adulation and homage such as can be rendered only by orientals. Presents of the most costly nature were lavished upon him. His temptations were great, and, although his share of the disbursements connected with the treaty was very large, his moderation was conspicuous: he literally walked between heaps of gold and silver, and piles of precious stones, in the treasury of Moorshedabad. He might have appropriated what he pleased: he was invited—even urged, to do so, probably with no sincerity, but it was the interest of the party of the revolution to gratify him, for he had been the only Englishman in Bengal capable of bringing it to pass. Calcutta witnessed a great accession of wealth: the company profited by the political and territorial advantages won by Clive's genius; the company's officers were enriched by the gifts. The craven creatures of the council of Calcutta, who had fled before the name of Suraj Dowlah, in the transactions which issued in such stupendous results, were as grasping as

they were cowardly. They ruined English interests in Bengal; they impeded Clive in his gigantic efforts to retrieve them; they envied, hated, and feared him, and, while jealous of his renown, and indifferent to the glory of their country's arms, they were ready to take to themselves the credit of wisdom and statesmanship for what was effected, and considered no amount of money which they could appropriate sufficient for their services.

While the revolution bore Meer Jaffier to a throne, sent the treasures of Moorshedabad to Fort William, and spread terror of the name of Clive and of the English all over India, it brought new and fatal calamities upon him whose shameless cupidity and iron oppression provoked it. The fugitive Suraj was betrayed by a Hindoo, whose family he had oppressed, and brought back to Moorshedabad a few days after his flight, while yet his treasures loaded the galleys on the river, and the English were celebrating their success with festivity, music, and Bengal lights. The English drums beat merrily, and the coruscations of the fireworks rendered the sky lurid, as the captive prince, shorn of his glory, no man so mean as to do him homage, was borne to the footstool of him who had once feared his frown. Meer Jaffier resolved, or pretended to resolve, upon consigning the unfortunate prince to a humane and even luxurious captivity. But the new nabob had a son, a youth of seventeen, as ferocious as Suraj himself, and as despicable a coward. This aspirant for the honours of an Indian Mohammedan throne murdered the captive while under the guardianship of his father's honour. Such were the Mohammedan princes and rulers of India—*semper eadem*—changeless in their sanguinary treachery and despotism to the last. Meer Jaffier became uneasy lest this

tragedy should incense his masters, which the English virtually were, and his protestations and apologies were profuse. Clive was indignant at this brutality; but the council at Calcutta, while expressing their horror of the deed, had no pity for its victim, and would not trouble themselves to demand any investigation into the matter. Thus perished Suraj-ad-Dowlah, under circumstances of striking retribution. He had, by his oppressions and wrongs, driven his chief general into rebellion, and suffered in turn the most cruel indignities and punishment from him. He had caused, or at least occasioned, the murder of Englishmen, under circumstances the most inhuman and revolting, in a room at Calcutta; through the instrumentality of the English, he became himself a captive, and suffered a fate similar to that he had permitted to go unpunished, if he did not directly inflict.

The new nabob lived and moved under the control of the English: the council at Calcutta reigned—he administered. The vast and rich regions of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa lay at the feet of the company. Regions more extensive, and abounding in more natural wealth than all western Europe, were expanded before the power and enterprise of the adventurous strangers. They began their career of arms in a naval battle at Surat, in which, against odds the most deterring, they bore away victory, astonishing and filling the native mind with admiration; they had now, at Plassey, achieved a victory on land as signally, closing that portion of their career which they had fulfilled, in the subjugation of the largest and richest provinces of India to their dictation. Yet they were destined to enter upon new phases in their Indian political existence, and to tread new paths of greatness and of glory.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

OPPOSITION TO THE SOUBAHDARSHIP OF MEER JAFFIER—INTRIGUES OF THE NABOB OF OUDE, AND OTHER NATIVE PRINCES, INSTIGATED BY THE FRENCH—INVASION OF BENGAL BY THE DUTCH, AND THEIR DEFEAT AND DESTRUCTION BY COLONEL FORD—INVASION OF BENGAL BY SHAH-ZADA—HIS REPULSE AND FLIGHT—DEFEAT OF THE NAIB OF POORANIA BY CAPTAIN KNOX—DEATH OF THE HEIR OF THE SOUBAHDAR BY LIGHTNING, AND CONSEQUENT TERMINATION OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The glorious issue of Clive's short campaign, and the rejoicings at Moorshedabad and Calcutta, were the immediate preludes of further troubles. M. Law had hastened to the succour of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, when that prince requested his presence for the defence of Bengal. Having, however, received infor-

mation of the battle of Plassey, he halted until further intelligence should reach him from Suraj.* He soon learned from other sources

* "Had he immediately proceeded twenty miles further, he would, the next day, have met and saved Suraj Dowlah, and an order of events very different from those which we have to relate would have ensued."—*Orme*, vol. ii. p. 185.

that all was lost, and that assistance from him was impossible. A part of Clive's army, under the gallant and skilful Coote, hung upon the rear of the enemy, compelling them to retire from Bengal. The French abandoned all thought of directly interfering with English policy in that province, but still hoped to thwart it through the government of Oude and the court of the Mogul.

While various intrigues were conducted in that quarter, Meer Jaffier found his newly-attained power rest heavily upon him. According to some writers he was unwilling, when the moment for assuming regal state arrived, to take upon him the dignity, and Clive was obliged to use gentle force, and something more, to cause his protégé to go through the ceremony of installation. Other writers aver that this was only a well-acted scene between the two principal performers, to which the other actors were accessories without penetrating the motives of the chiefs.

Meer Jaffier was scarcely left to himself a week after the withdrawal of Clive from Moorshedabad, before he discovered that many of the zemindars were unwilling to recognise his title, that portions of his army were mutinous, that his chief civil functionaries were disgusted by the large sums withdrawn from the treasury by the English, and that most of the chief persons in his province were reluctant to acknowledge a soubahdar who derived his appointment, not from the grand Mogul, but a foreign conqueror.

Meer Jaffier made the exhaustion of his treasury by the English a ground for levying further taxes, and at the same time for neither paying his troops nor civil functionaries. Most English writers maintain that his treasury was really exhausted, and that those who placed him on the "musnid" deprived him of the means of government. Continental writers, especially French, persist in alleging that he outwitted the British, the latter never suspecting there was an inner treasury within the zenana, where eight crores of rupees, equivalent to eight millions sterling, were stowed away. They bring plausible proofs for this assertion from documents possessed by M. Law, the statements of natives of influence at the court of Moorshedabad, and the fact that the widow of Meer Jaffier was ultimately possessed of enormous wealth, to be accounted for on no other supposition than that of a reserved treasury, of which the English had neither knowledge nor suspicion. Clive knew so little of the habits of oriental courts, that, notwithstanding his strong sense, he might in such a matter be deceived.

The disaffection of Meer Jaffier's army rapidly increased; the atrocities and tyranny

of Suraj-ad-Dowlah appeared to be forgotten in the universal pity excited by his assassination, and abhorrence of the perpetrator. Besides, Surajah, in his better moments, was capable of kindness, and he made politic use of that parade and pomp so necessary in an Eastern prince. His person was regal and imposing, although his intellect was weak. He was but twenty-five years of age when assassinated, and, according to native historians, his features were regular, and his countenance expressed much sweetness. If this last assertion be a fact, it controverts the theories of physiognomists, who describe the countenances of men as expressing the habitual passions and emotions: there is evidence enough to prove, that those of Suraj were cruelty, avarice, and sensuality. The soldiery and people of Moorshedabad, however, made comparisons between the deposed prince and the deposer, to the disadvantage of the latter in many, if not in all respects; and the increase of insubordination and disaffection soon awakened Meer Jaffier to a sense of the insecurity of his newly acquired throne. Hence arose a new source of uneasiness to the governor of Calcutta.

No plots of the French, of the Nabob of Oude, of the Mogul emperor, or of any other aspirant to power, did so much to weaken the government of Meer Jaffier as the conduct of himself and his son, Meeran. The former sunk into contemptible sloth, disgracing the "musnid" by incessant intoxication. His son, Meeran, was full of youth and energy, and his vigour was employed in every description of wickedness, which his father, and the Begum (his mother), who were devotedly attached to him, not only tolerated but encouraged. Assassinations as ruthless as that of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, were frequently perpetrated by him. His father had been indebted for everything to Ali Verdi Khan, yet the princesses, the granddaughters of that monarch, were murdered by him, on the pretence that it was necessary to get rid of the disloyal, if he would enjoy repose. The infant brother and infant nephew of Suraj-ad-Dowlah were also murdered by him in a manner as coarse as it was cruel. The Mohammedan people were not averse to the bloody deeds of Meeran, so long as they were directed to supposed or ostensible enemies. Sympathising in their own minds with bloodshed, they were gratified by the execution of rich Hindoos, especially such as held any confidential communication with the English, and many such suffered in their persons or properties, and not a few were slain. Meeran was the chief support of Meer Jaffier. The whole family of Suraj Dowlah was seized. His widow, mother,

daughter, aunt, and an adopted boy, were seized at midnight, with seventy persons of inferior note: all of the latter were drowned, and some of the former; but it has never been clearly ascertained which were destroyed and which sent back to prison.

The feeling between Meer Jaffier and the British was very bad, and that between his son and them much more hostile. The British soon regarded the successor of Suraj-ad-Dowlah as no better than that unfortunate prince. He governed his people badly, showed that he regarded the English alliance as merely a convenience, and that as soon as he could throw it off he would. Meeran openly declared his hatred of it, and was in constant fear of being seized by Clive as an open enemy. The young prince was ready to join any enterprise, however hazardous, not involving the exposure of his own person to danger, that afforded the slightest hope of driving the English out of Bengal. Of these things the English were early apprised, and directed their measures accordingly. Clive soon regarded his protégé with distrust and dislike, and young Meeran with aversion. He began to vindicate the final assumption, on the part of the company, of the soubahdarship of Bengal. Other enterprising English officials entertained similar views. Clive declared that the Prince Meeran could not be allowed to ascend the throne of the nabob, as was originally stipulated with Meer Jaffier, because of his hatred to the English. By degrees, Clive and all the British came to the conclusion that the sooner the nabob himself ceased to reign, the better for English security and the good government of Bengal.

The relations of the English and the nabob were complicated by the general supervision which the former exercised in government affairs. They considered themselves the real masters of Bengal, and Meer Jaffier as virtually a minister to carry out their wishes. The nabob could with less difficulty be brought to regard his position in that light, than his turbulent and tyrannical son, his soldiery, or his people. When the British remonstrated with Meeran for the murder of the mother of Suraj-ad-Dowlah, whom many writers believe to have been at the time alive, the prince did not deny the deed, as these writers allege he might have done, but inquired with astonishment, rage, and grief, "What! can I not kill an old woman that goes about in her dooly to excite the zemindars against my father?" He was indignant that the English should assume the right to interfere in such cases. They were without the power to interfere efficiently. They might denounce the atrocities and robberies perpe-

trated by the reigning nabob and his son, but could not prevent them. The remonstrances and even threats of the English only caused them to be more hated without being obeyed. The people and troops of the nabob, not conscious of the sources of British power, considered the perpetual interference of the English agents as the result of the nabob's weakness, whom they hated for allowing the infidels to dictate to the followers of the true faith. Such was the general state of the relations of the parties whose alliance promised so much and effected so little for the welfare of Eastern India, the quietness of the English settlements, and the prosperity of the English trade. Individual Englishmen of influence and authority realized vast riches, but the company found that the increase of its wealth by the alliance with Meer Jaffier, in one way or another, increased its expenses. In consequence of Clive's representations of the brilliant success achieved, and the vast advantages realized by the events of 1757, the company resolved to send out no more money for two years; but, in their correspondence, stated that the treasures deposited at Calcutta should provide for the entire expenses of the three presidencies, and also furnish the investments for the Chinese trade. The opinion of the company that the results of the Bengal conquest should be sufficient for such purposes was reasonable, although the mode in which they attempted to carry out such a decision, in the face of the state of things existing in the Carnatic, the rapid revolutions and sanguinary wars which prevailed at this time in India among princes and Europeans, was absurd.

In this condition of affairs, Clive was the overruling genius by which order was preserved, while all around was sinking into chaos. He was considered by the English as the only officer who could keep Meer Jaffier to his engagements, and awe his son Meeran. Meer Jaffier regarded him as his only reliance amidst a mutinous army, seditious people, and intriguing neighbours in Oude, Agra, and Delhi; with any or all of whom the French were ever ready to form an alliance. Meeran considered him as the tyrant of himself and his father, and the only man who stood between the family of the nabob and the exercise of unlimited power to rob and kill all who withheld what they demanded, or resisted their tyranny and caprice. Lord Macaulay describes Clive's relations to all parties thus:—"Meer Jaffier could be upheld on the throne only by the hand which placed him on it. . . . The recent revolutions had unsettled the minds of men. Many chiefs were in open insurrection against the new nabob.

The viceroy of the rich and powerful province of Oude, who, like the other viceroys of the Mogul, was now in truth an independent sovereign, menaced Bengal with invasion. Nothing but the talents and authority of Clive could support the tottering government. While this state of things existed, a ship arrived with despatches which had been written at the India-house, before the news of the battle of Plassey had reached London. The directors had determined to place the English settlements in Bengal under a government constituted in the most cumbrous and absurd manner; and, to make the matter worse, no place in the arrangement was assigned to Clive. The persons who were selected to form this new government, greatly to their honour, took on themselves the authority of disobeying these preposterous orders, and invited Clive to exercise the supreme authority. He consented, and it soon appeared that the servants of the company only anticipated the wishes of their employers. The directors, on receiving news of Clive's brilliant success, instantly appointed him governor of their settlements in Bengal, with the highest marks of gratitude and esteem. His power was now boundless, and far surpassed even that which Dupleix had attained in the south of India. Meer Jaffier regarded him with slavish awe. . . . It is but justice to say, that Clive used his power ably and vigorously for the advantage of his country. He sent forth an expedition to the track lying to the north of the Carnatic. In this track the French still had the ascendancy; and it was important to dislodge them. The conduct of the enterprise was entrusted to an officer of the name of Forde, who was then little known, but in whom the keen eye of the governor had detected military talents of a high order. The success of the expedition was rapid and splendid.*

Meer Jaffier's dubious relation to the English, and the still more doubtful position of his idolized son, were not his only, and scarcely even his chief difficulties. He had scarcely mounted the throne, and felt himself at once in possession of the treasures, and surrounded by the intrigues of French, Oudean, and Bengalee zemindars, as stated in the first pages of this chapter, than he was obliged to prepare against the invasion of his dominions by a competitor for his throne. The shah-zada, heir-apparent of the throne of Delhi, had obtained from his father the appointment of Soubahdar of Bengal, a richer prize than even the appointment of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. He immediately put forth a procla-

amation, announcing himself as viceroy of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and collected an army to assert claims in a more substantial manner.

The nabobs of Oude and Allahabad at once tendered their support as an act of loyalty to the Mogul, and Meer Jaffier utterly despaired of encountering these nabobs, and the irregular army collected from every quarter by his competitor. His resource was Clive. He could trust no one else. He was profuse in his promise of future good behaviour and large grants of money, although at the time his own troops were defrauded of their pay, while he and his dissipated son lived in scandalous and foolish luxury and excesses. While claiming the protection of the English, and promising everything to them, he was, after the fashion of Indian princes, opening negotiations with his enemies unknown to his allies, and resorting to the desperate, and in his case foolish expedient, of bribing them off. Clive soon discovered this, and remonstrated; but the cowardly Jaffier could not see the force of these protests. All his predecessors had purchased immunity from invasion in a similar manner. Clive became more energetic in his tone, and wrote:—"If you do this, you will have the Nabob of Oude, the Mahrattas, and many more, come from all parts of the confines of your country, who will bully you out of money until you have none left in your treasury. I beg your excellency to rely on the fidelity of the English and of the troops that are attached to you." Clive, concluding that his advice would not be followed by his protégé, unless the chief officers of the latter showed some determination, wrote to the governor of Patna in a still more energetic tone:—"Come to no terms; defend your city to the last. Rest assured that the English are staunch and firm friends, and that is they never desert a cause in which they have once taken a part."

The enemy advanced by forced marches to the investiture of Patna, in order to anticipate Clive, who, he had heard, was also advancing with the utmost rapidity, to save that important city. Clive's little army consisted of less than three thousand fighting men, of which less than five hundred were Europeans. The enemy numbered forty thousand men, besides large forces in support from Oude and Allahabad. There was also a considerable number of French officers among them, who were eager for battle with the English. These assured the native prince that, if the vast army would press the siege of Patna, and attack the force of Clive, under their directions, the British and their allies should be

* *Critical and Historical Essays*. By Thomas Babington Macaulay, vol. ii. p. 103-9.

scattered as the dust by the storm, and the city, with its riches, fall into the hands of the besiegers. In vain the gallant Frenchmen urged battle upon the prince and his generals; they fled before Clive's force came in sight. Probably no Indian army ever so much disgraced itself. The flight of the army was not, however, as Lord Macaulay represents, wholly caused by terror of Clive and his British. The Nabob of Oude had proved treacherous: he had seized the capital of his ally, the Nabob of Allahabad, who withdrew his forces from before Patna, to save his own territories. M. Law and a detachment of French met this nabob with his troops, and urged his return to the siege, offering his aid, and afterwards effecting the restoration of the territory seized by the nabob of Oude. The Allahabad nabob was too much in earnest to save his treasures and territory to think any more of Patna and the alliance. M. Law, instead of advancing and rallying the army of the invader, as Clive would have done in like circumstances, retired in despair, and the heterogeneous masses of the shah-zada dissolved as snow flakes in the river. The vicinity of Patna was cleared of intruders, and Clive returned to Moorshedabad in triumph as complete as when he entered it after the battle of Plassey. The Mogul, or, at all events, the pretender to the soubahdarship of Bengal acting in his name, negotiated for the cession of his claims. A small grant of money was given to him, on condition that he signed a treaty conferring *the nominal rank* of soubahdar of Bengal upon another son, and, by patent, confirming Meer Jaffier in the actual vicereignty.

The viceroy seemed now secure against all enemies, having the sanction of the Mogul himself for his government, and so great was his gratitude that he conferred the jaghire of Calcutta and the surrounding territory upon Clive. Thus the East India Company became his tenants, and the rent they paid to the soubahdar was in future to be paid to him. This amounted to £30,000 a year. He was at the same time made "a lord" of the Mogul empire, by the Mogul. The East India Company recognised the privileges conferred upon Clive, and paid their rents to him. From their subsequent conduct, it was evident they were influenced in this by a view of their own interests. This princely fortune rendered it unnecessary that they should confer upon him large pecuniary rewards for the great services he had rendered, and if at any time they thought it expedient to become rent free, it would be probably easier to make themselves so if Clive or his successor was landlord, than if the Mogul or his viceroy

held the jaghireship. There was nothing in the conduct of the company at the time that was unfair to Clive, but afterwards efforts were made to deprive him of his rights by some of the very men who were forward in recognising them when they were acquired. Lord Macaulay, who questioned the propriety politically and ethically of Clive's reception of the previous donations of Meer Jaffier, considered his acceptance of this gift proper. His lordship assigns no reason for this discrepancy of opinion, except that this donation, from its nature, could not be secret; yet he admits that Clive made no secret, and never intended to make any, of the previous acquisitions from Meer Jaffier. If the reception of money in the one case were right, it requires a casuistry more subtle, and a logic more profound than even his lordship's, to make it appear wrong in the other. The East India Company's recognition was equally extended to both. Clive did not represent the British government, but a trading company which favoured any acquisitions made by its servants which did not infringe its rights or emoluments. This must be kept in view in all arguments that are maintained upon the subject.

Scarcely had Meer Jaffier conferred honours and endowments upon Clive, than he began a series of intrigues, of a daring nature, against the English themselves. He knew that he could obtain no absolute power in Bengal while the English were there, and he formed the design of allying himself to the Dutch for the purpose of driving them out. There was no other European state to which he could apply. The Dutch were supreme in the Archipelago, and their fame was still great in India. The viceroy did not know that the power of Holland had much decayed in Europe, the wars with the English having issued in reducing the United Provinces from the position of first naval power. By the instrumentality of the Dutch, Meer Jaffier determined to play this new game, and incur the peril of losing all or driving the English away. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the Dutch would in turn have become his masters, and that the only true reliance for a prince or a people, where independence is to be sought and won, should be on

"Native swords and native ranks."

It is probable that this treacherous and feeble prince would not have ventured upon so daring a scheme, had he not believed that the recognition of his actual vicereignty by the Mogul, secured him against all danger of insurrection in his own territories, or invasion by his Mohammedan neighbours. Clive soon discovered that some intrigue was proceeding,

but does not appear to have had the least suspicion that a European power was concerned, or even contemplated by Meer Jaffier. He lost all confidence in his protégé, and began to regard it as politic to prepare for the assumption of English power in Bengal, without the intervention of a nabob. In January, 1759, he addressed a letter to Mr. Pitt, requesting him to send a sufficient force "to open a way for securing the soubahdarship to ourselves." His plan was to enter into a treaty with the Mogul, and receive from him the supreme authority in Bengal, subject to the payment of fifty lacs of rupees yearly, which could easily be spared out of the Bengal revenues. Clive, who hated Mohammedanism, and distrusted all Mohammedans of whatever rank, assured Mr. Pitt that Meer Jaffier would break with the English as soon as he found it his interest, no matter under what obligations they laid him; and as to his son and probable successor Meeran, he represented him as "so apparently the enemy of the English, that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession."

The intrigues of Meer Jaffier and his infamous son were successful in gaining over the Dutch. They determined on an expedition to Bengal; a large fleet was fitted out at Batavia, and a considerable body of troops put on board. Their destination was Chinsurah, where the Dutch had a factory, with the chiefs of which Meer Jaffier had conducted his intrigues. Suddenly the presidency at Calcutta was alarmed by the arrival of seven of the largest Dutch ships in the Hoogly, having on board fifteen hundred men; seven hundred of whom were Europeans, and the rest Malays. Holland and England were at peace, and Clive knew that no danger menaced the Dutch settlements, requiring such military reinforcements, and the presence of so powerful a fleet. He therefore determined on intercepting them, so as to prevent the arrival of the troops at Chinsurah. He perhaps never found himself in a more anxious situation. At that time, it would have been a serious matter to the English government to be at war with Holland, added to its other European difficulties; the ministry might disavow his acts, notwithstanding the obvious justice and necessity of the course taken by him in such an emergency. Should the English ministry disavow him, and offer compensation to Holland for any injury sustained by the Dutch armament or settlement, it was probable that Clive's great wealth would be seized to make good the amount. The English government had always been rapacious and unjust in its conduct to the company, and seldom allowed justice in the righteous claims of an individual

to stand in the way of its policy. Probably no government in Europe had proved itself so indifferent to individual losses and suffering as the English, when a political purpose was to be served or the exchequer spared, unless indeed the claimant had aristocratic pretensions or influence. Clive doubted much whether his influence or that of the company, or his past services, or his popularity in England, or all these sources of power together, would prove sufficient to deter the English ministry from sacrificing him, if to do so answered a party end, or relieved the court from any embarrassment. A large portion of his money having been sent to Europe through the Dutch East India Company, that company would, in all probability confiscate his deposits, and thus another consideration was added to those of a political as well as personal nature to prevent him from beginning the war, by intercepting the Dutch armaments. On the other hand, so large was the force, so faithless the soubahdar, and so few the English troops then disposable for service in Bengal, that if the Dutch once gained a footing, they could hold their position until new and powerful reinforcements to their navy and army should arrive from Batavia, and these, acting with the native army of the soubahdar, might effect the expulsion of the English from Bengal. The soubahdar declared that he knew nothing of the schemes of the Dutch, of which he had received timely and accurate information, and whose agents were actually recruiting in Bahar, Patna, and even Moorshedabad. The Dutch Company had always acted with an ostensible independence of its government, but as constantly with its connivance, and Dutch policy in India and the Eastern seas was piratical. To force a commerce by destroying the ships and settlements of all competitors was the simple policy of the Batavians. It would have been impolitic in the extreme to allow this great force to menace the interests of the English in Bengal. Clive ordered as strong a detachment as he could spare, under Colonel Forde, an officer in whom he placed implicit confidence, to act as an army of observation. Forde endeavoured to prevent the advance of the Dutch troops by remonstrance and expostulation, which were of no avail. Hesitating to proceed to extremities, he sent to Calcutta for positive orders, representing the persistence of the Dutch as only to be overcome by force. Clive was playing cards when the message arrived. He tore off a piece of Forde's letter, and wrote upon it in pencil—"Dear Forde,—Fight 'em immediately, and I will send an order of council to-morrow." Forde did "fight 'em imme-

diately," although with forces much inferior as to number, and so justified Clive's confidence that the Dutch were completely defeated, of the seven hundred Europeans, not more than fourteen reached Chinsurah. An attack upon the fleet was also successful, the ships were all made prizes.

The results of these signal defeats were satisfactory, the Dutch at Chinsurah submitted to such terms as Clive thought proper to impose, which were that no fortifications should be erected, and no armed persons to be retained in connection with their factory, except for police purposes; and, upon violation of either of these terms, expulsion from Bengal was mutually recognised as a just penalty. Clive restored the ships at the end of December, 1759.

The fate of Meer Jaffier would have been sealed by these events had policy allowed. He made vehement protestations of fidelity, and declared his entire ignorance of the proceedings of the Dutch; but while the English did not deem it then discreet to act against the soubahdar for what he said or did, they had already resolved in their own minds to allow matters to take their course as regarded him, and await patiently the moment most opportune for setting aside his authority. It is probable from the subsequent conduct of Meer Jaffier, that he penetrated the purposes of the English, and like a true Mussulman, resigned himself to the fate the future might reveal, continued to enjoy his debauches, and to accumulate precious stones, rich apparel and coin, against the probable crisis which awaited him.

Upon the fortunes of Clive these events produced such effects as might be expected. His name and presence awed his own countrymen, and were a terror to every native prince in India. The sepoys idolized him, the native populations of India listened with eagerness to the wandering story-tellers who recounted his feats of arms, embellished by additions of deeds more or less than human, as suited the oriental fancy. The belief was concurrent among the native populations, that the devil's inspiration had much to do with the military genius of the great commander. In England his glory was the common subject of conversation, and the universal boast of his countrymen, amongst whom, for so long a time, so few eminent generals had been raised up. Before the Dutch were humbled, Pitt in one of his thrilling orations had passed upon him the highest eulogies, calling him "the heaven-born general, a man, who, bred to the desk, had displayed a military genius which might excite the admiration of the King of Prussia." Upon this Lord Macanlay remarks:—

"There were then no reporters in the gallery; but these words, emphatically spoken by the first statesman of the age, had passed from mouth to mouth, had been transmitted to Clive in Bengal, and had greatly delighted and flattered him. Indeed, since the death of Wolfe, Clive was the only general of whom his countrymen had much reason to be proud." The minds of the people of England were thus prepared to hear of great exploits from Clive, and to appreciate them, and as the Dutch were unpopular, the humiliation which he inflicted upon them filled his countrymen with wild delight. It was Forde who really accomplished the feats of battle, but he acted under the inspiration of Clive, who carried away the palm. Clive, however, did justice to the gallant Forde; he was always liberal in praise to the brave, although strict even to tyranny upon all under his command who dared to dispute his will. Forde's previous service in command of a detachment sent to the Northern Circars by Clive, at the instigation of one of the leading polygars in that district, and in opposition to his own council, had been brilliant. Forde met the rajah's troops, and in a pitched battle inflicted upon them as signal defeat as he afterwards gave the Dutch near Chinsurah. This was the means of troubling the French much, and of influencing, favourably to the British, the war in the Carnatic, as already noticed in a more appropriate place. It does not appear, notwithstanding the high opinion of him entertained by Clive, that either the company or his country appreciated the military genius and valour of Forde.

Clive having remitted large sums of money to England, was anxious to see to their security. The Dutch Company held £180,000, the English Company £40,000, and probably £80,000 had been remitted through private hands. He, therefore, in February, 1760, returned to England. His departure was at an unfortunate juncture for Bengal. Before the Dutch invasion, a new invasion by the Mogul prince was threatened, and scarcely had the Dutch episode terminated by the restoration of the captured ships and treasures in December, 1759, than intrigues were discovered among the native princes, and at the court of Moorshedabad, likely to embroil Bengal with surrounding nabobs, and to expose it to insurrectionary movements. Clive, Forde, and other influential officers who were in good health persisted in returning home, in the face of a state of affairs which were perilous, and have not escaped censure for leaving Bengal to its fate. Colonel Calliand, however, was re-called from the Carnatic, and as he was a man of superior military

parts, it was believed by Clive and the council, that he would be able to maintain the interests and honour of the company in military affairs.

Towards the end of November, 1759, Colonel Calliaud arrived in Bengal with reinforcements, and he was at once engaged in active operations to avert the threatened dangers. Clive himself determined to support him, and, if possible, settle matters at Moorshedabad before he departed from India.

The danger immediately impending was a new invasion by the shah-zada. Clive was determined that his highness should, if possible, be severely chastised for his breach of the treaty made upon his former defeat, and he therefore placed at Calliaud's disposal three hundred European infantry, six pieces of cannon with fifty European artillerymen, and one thousand sepoy, and sent him forward at once to Moorshedabad; other forces were to join him, and Clive himself was to follow as soon as his attention to other affairs allowed. Mr. Mill blames the determination of the British to uphold Meer Jaffier against the shah-zada as an encouragement of rebellion, and a participation in it, and he denounces both the morals and policy of Clive's course. Professor Wilson gives the following brief but complete reply to this:—"It was not a question of policy, but one of good faith. By the treaty with Meer Jaffier, as well as by the nature of their connection with him, the English were pledged to assist him against all enemies whatever, and few of the governors of the provinces would have scrupled to consider the emperor as an enemy if he had sought to dispossess them of their soubahs. Even, however, if the theory of obedience to a monarch, who at the very seat of empire was no longer his own master, could be urged with any show of reason, it would not be applicable in the present instance, for the shah-zada was not appointed by the emperor to be his deputy in Bengal, and as Clive pleaded to the prince himself, no communication of his movements or purposes had been made from Delhi. On the contrary, the prince was there treated as a rebel to his father. He could not plead, therefore, the emperor's authority for his incursion, and no other pretext could have afforded him the semblance even of right."

After the shah-zada set out upon his second invasion, various events occurred which complicated the state of affairs. Mr. Mill describes them with so much beauty and accuracy, that his description will admirably convey the position and relation of parties, as events rapidly presented new phases in the general political condition:—"The powerful king of the Abdallees was again on his march

for the invasion of Hindostan. Excited by the approach of formidable danger, the vizir, in a fit of exasperation or despair, ordered the murder of the emperor, the wretched Alumgeer; and the news of this tragical event reached the shah-zada, just as he had passed the Caramnassa into the province of Bahar. He was advised to assume immediately the state and title of emperor; to confer the office of vizir upon Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, and to confirm Nnjeeb-ad-Dowlah in the office of Amcer-ul-Omrah. The majesty of the imperial throne, and his undoubted title, had an influence still upon the minds of men. It was now clear and immediate rebellion to resist him; and whatever guilt could be involved in making war upon their rightful sovereign, must be incurred by those who carried arms against him. The English had already familiarized themselves with the idea of rebellion in India; and the consideration of legitimate sovereignty, though the sovereign would have purchased their protection by unlimited grants, appears not to have excited a scruple in a single breast. The new dignity, however, of vizir, called on the Nabob of Oude for some exertions in favour of his sovereign; and the fascination of the imperial title was still of force to collect around him a considerable army. The march of the English was retarded by the necessity of settling terms with the Nabob of Poorania, who had encamped on the left bank of the river between Moorshedabad and Patna, and professed a desire of remaining obedient to Jaffier, provided the English would engage for his security. This negotiation wasted seven days; and in the meantime the emperor advanced towards Patna. Ramnarain, whom the sagacity of Ali Verdi had selected to be deputy-governor of Bahar, on account of his skill in matters of finance, was destitute of military talents: and considering his situation, under the known hatred of Jaffier, as exceedingly precarious, he was unwilling to lay out any of the wealth he had acquired, in providing for the defence of the country. He was still enabled to draw forth a respectable army, reinforced by seventy Europeans and a battalion of English sepoy, commanded by Lieutenant Cochrane; and he encamped under the walls with a view to cover the city."

Colonel Calliaud had united his forces with those of Meeran, who was at the head of fifteen thousand men and twenty-five pieces of cannon. The British colonel enjoined upon Cochrane defensive measures, and to avoid giving battle until he and Meeran should come up. Cochrane was either unwilling or unable to obey those commands,

and a battle was fought, in which a signal defeat was sustained by Cochrane and his native coadjutor, Ramnarain, the governor of the province, who was a good financier and a bad soldier. The chief officers of Ramnarain behaved faithlessly, and endeavoured to bring over the troops to the service of the Mogul. The English never fought better, and, few as they were, cut their way through the enemy, or rather the enemy, awed by their undaunted bearing, gave way before them, not daring to interpose. Finally, the detachment arrived safely at Patna.

The following curious account of this transaction was given by a Mogul nobleman, and is interesting, as disclosing the light in which the English appeared to men of his class:—“What remained of their people [the English] was rallied by Doctor William Fullerton, a friend of mine, and possibly by some English officers, whose names I know not, who ranged them in order again; and as one of their guns was to be left on the field of battle, they found means to render it useless and of no avail, by thrusting a large needle of iron into its eye. The other being in good condition, they took it with them, together with its ammunition; and that handful of men had the courage to retire in the face of a victorious enemy, without once shrinking from their ranks. During their journey, the cart of ammunition chanced to receive some damage; the doctor stopped unconcernedly, and, after having put it in order, he bravely pursued his route again; and it must be acknowledged, that this nation's presence of mind, firmness of temper, and undaunted bravery, are past all question. They join the most resolute courage to the most cautious prudence; nor have they their equals in the art of ranging themselves in battle array, and fighting in order. If to so many military qualifications they knew how to join the arts of government; if they showed a concern for the circumstances of the husbandman and the gentleman, and exerted as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving and easing the people of God, as they do in whatever concerns their military affairs, no nation in the world would be preferable to them, or prove worthier of command. But such is the little regard which they show to the people of these kingdoms, and such their apathy and indifference for their welfare, that the people under their dominion groan everywhere, and are reduced to poverty and distress. Oh God! come to the assistance of thine afflicted servants, and deliver them from the oppressions they suffer.”

The people of God here referred to were the Mohammedans: the privileges they desired, the power to oppress the Hindoos.

Mill says, “Had the troops of the emperor pushed on with vigour, immediately after this victory, when Ramnarain was severely wounded, his army panic-struck and dispersed, and the city without defenders, they might have taken Patna with the greatest ease. But they employed themselves in ravaging the open country, and in receiving messengers and overtures from Ramnarain, till the 19th of February, when they learned that Meeran and the English were distant from them but twenty-eight miles. The resolution was taken to march and engage them; the next day the two armies approached. Colonel Calliaud urged immediate attack; but Meeran and his astrologers found that the stars would not be favourable before the 22nd. Early on the morning of that day, Calliaud was in motion; but before he could reach the enemy, the day was so far spent ‘by the insufferable delays,’ as he himself complains, of ‘Meeran's march,’ that, wishing to have time before him, he was unwilling to engage till the following morning. The enemy, however, advanced, and Calliaud drew up his men between two villages which covered both his flanks, advising Meeran to form a second line, the whole of which, except the two wings, would have been covered by the English and the villages. But, though this was agreed upon, ‘he crowded his army upon the right, and, in spite of the most pressing and repeated solicitations, presented to battle a body of fifteen thousand men, with a front of scarcely two hundred yards, in a tumultuous unformed heap.’ With a feigned appearance of directing the main attack upon the English, the enemy advanced, with the best part of their army, upon Meeran, who, in about ten minutes, began to give way. Colonel Calliaud, however, marched with a battalion of sepoy to his aid, and immediately decided the fate of the day.”

Calliaud in vain endeavoured to induce Meeran to pursue the enemy, or place a body of cavalry at his disposal, with which, in conjunction with his sepoy infantry, he would himself give chase. Meeran preferred enjoying himself at Patna, in his usual dissipations. This he continued to do until the 29th of January, 1760. Meanwhile, the emperor, who had retreated to Bahar, gathered courage, and resolved, if possible, to gain some days' march between the allies and Moorshedabad, and seize the viceroy and the capital before the self-indulgences at Patna terminated. When Meeran consented to move, the emperor was on his march to execute the stratagem he had projected. Calliaud, by forced marches and by sending swift boats with troops up the river, was enabled so to menace the emperor's flank as to cause him to change his route,

still vigilantly followed by Calliaud. The viceroy meantime became apprised of the danger, mustered what forces he could, and received two hundred men from Calcutta. This army formed a junction with that under Meeran and Calliaud, and, in the face of a meditated attack, the emperor burned his camp, and retreated. Calliaud was of opinion that, by better concerted movements and more celerity, the imperial army might have entered Moorshedabad. Once more Calliaud proposed the pursuit of the retreating foe; but neither the viceroy nor the hope of his house had the courage to adopt his advice. He again urged upon them the necessity of placing some cavalry at his own disposal for the purpose. It was refused. At this juncture, M. Law, at the head of a French force, passed near Patna, which had been left without means of defence; but Law was ignorant of the fact, and proceeded to Bahar, to await the arrival of the emperor. Had the emperor's own army turned aside to Patna with celerity, he would have entered it unopposed. That city had a third piece of good fortune, in escaping the Nabob of Poorania, who, at the moment, declared for the emperor. Patna was within an easy march of his forces; but he neglected the opportunity. Patna, through the bad generalship of all parties, was saved from a *coup* before which it must have fallen. The emperor, however, when the opportune moment had passed away, advanced against it. The English factors and the native governor had thrown up defences and organized a force. Calliaud, with his usual sagacity and promptitude, had dispatched two hundred European soldiers—the *élite* of his army—and a battalion of sepoys. Before this force could arrive, the emperor, joined by M. Law and the French, pressed the siege, and, having demolished part of the ramparts, assaulted the place. Dr. Fullerton, the English surgeon, with that courage which the medical men attached both to the company's and the royal army have so frequently shown, at the head of such force as he could collect, repulsed the assailants. In two days, Law, with his Frenchmen, renewed the assault, and succeeded in scaling the broken ramparts. Again Dr. Fullerton, and one Rajah Shitabroy, succeeded in repelling the assailants. It was, however, expected that the whole French force, supported by the emperor's best native troops, would the next night renew the assault, and the citizens had no reliance upon themselves, and no hope of again repelling the stormers. While all was despair and confusion in the city, Captain Knox, with the light companies of his force, was seen from the walls rapidly approaching. He had, by forced

marches, reached Patna in thirteen days, himself and his men having endured terrible hardships from fatigue and heat. That evening he reconnoitred the enemy, who were deterred from offering an assault to the city. Next day, at the usual hour of temporary repose in India, Knox surprised the enemy while the troops were asleep, entered their works, and made havoc of those who occupied them. The main army retired.

The Nabob of Poorania, who still lingered in the neighbourhood, at last began his march to join the emperor. Knox proposed to the governor of Patna to cross the river, and so harass the nabob as to detain him until Calliaud and Meeran should arrive. The governor assented; but when the hour for action came, none of the native troops or citizens would venture upon an expedition which appeared to them so full of peril. Rajah Shitabroy had three hundred men in his pay, who had caught the fire of their master's spirit: these joined Knox, and the little army crossed the river. It was the captain's plan to effect a night surprise; but his guide deceived him, and kept him and his troops uselessly wandering about until morning, when, wearied, he and his men lay down upon their arms. At that moment, the advanced guard of the enemy approached. Knox took up his position with skill, and a battle ensued, which lasted for six hours. The enemy's troops numbered twelve thousand men, and again and again surrounded the little bands of Knox and the rajah, but were repulsed with heavy slaughter. At last disheartened, the enemy began to show symptoms of disorder. The English commander charged with his whole force. The rajah's troops were cavalry, and were most efficient in the charge. The enemy was pursued until dark.

During the terrible contest, the citizens crowded the ramparts, their minds alternating between hope and fear; but, on the whole, their coward hearts yielded to the latter. They saw the ebb and flow of battle, and trembled with alarm, and were, no doubt, ready to welcome any victor who might approach from the contested field, if only they could secure their goods.

The glorious conduct of Knox and his brave native colleague, Rajah Shitabroy, was thus oddly noticed by a native author already quoted:—"When the day was far spent, a note came to Mr. Amyatt from Captain Knox, which mentioned that the enemy was defeated and flying. The intelligence was sent to all the principal men of the city, and caused a deal of joy. I went to the factory, to compliment the gentlemen, when, in the dusk of the evening, Captain Knox himself crossed

over, and came with Shitabroy and his party. They were both covered with dust and sweat. The captain then gave some detail of the battle, and paid the greatest encomiums on Shitabroy's zeal, activity, and valour. He exclaimed several times, 'This is a real nabob; I never saw such a nabob in my life.' A few moments after, Ramnarain was introduced. He had in his company both Mustapha Koollee Khan, and the cutwal of the city, with some other men of consequence, who, on hearing of the arrival of these two men, had flocked to the factory; and, on seeing them alone, could not help believing that they had escaped from the slaughter; so far were they from conceiving that a few hundreds of men could defeat a whole army. Nor could they be made to believe (impressed as they were with Hindoo notions) that a commander could quit his army so unconcernedly, unless he had indeed run away from it: nor would listen to what Mr. Amyatt repeatedly said, to convince Ramnarain and others of their mistake.*

The immediate consequence of the victory was that the nabob gave up his idea of marching to join the emperor, but turned his course northward; Calliaud and Meeran arriving, they crossed the Ganges in pursuit, and soon overtook him, because of the encumbrances of baggage and heavy guns of position by which his army was attended. The nabob drew up in battle array, but with no disposition to fight. He merely sought time to place his treasures and women on camels and swift elephants, and then, calling in his skirmishers, left his baggage and guns in the hands of the English, and precipitately retreated.† The conduct of Meeran was dastardly in the extreme on this occasion. Calliaud‡ thus describes it:—"The young nabob and his troops behaved in this skirmish in their usual manner, halting above a mile in the rear, nor ever once made a motion to sustain the English. Had he but acted on this occasion with the least appearance of spirit, and made even a semblance of fighting, the affair must have proved decisive; nor could Cuddum Houssein Khan or his treasure have escaped." Calliaud pursued the nabob, and the reluctant Meeran joined in the pursuit.

Many months of 1760 had now been consumed in repelling the invasion of the shahzada, and many defeats were inflicted upon him and his coadjutors; yet adherents among the native chiefs, of various ranks, still joined his standard; and his attainment to the throne of empire rendered it very likely that this

would continue to be the case, unless blow after blow were struck by the British and their ally with rapidity and severity. It was the month of July: the rains were falling; and the nabob would soon be beyond reach of his pursuers, unless rapid advance was made, in spite of the tempests which now impeded the march of bodies of men in northern Bengal. Meeran reluctantly struggled forward, under the pressure of remonstrance and entreaty from the vigorous and active Calliaud. On the night of the 2nd of July, after four days of severe pursuit, an event occurred which materially altered the prospects of the war. The night was one of fierce and uninterrupted storm: thunder shook the allied camps, and the forked lightnings played amid the tents like incessant showers of fiery darts. Many of the natives believed that the gods bent their bows and discharged their arrows among the helpless host, and the invisible world fought against their cause. Meeran, always solicitous for his own safety and harassed with superstitious fears, forsook his tent, which was a rich and wide-spread pavilion of light texture, for one of less dimensions and superior strength. He was attended by only two persons—a domestic slave, a favourite, who chafed his limbs to induce slumber, and a story-teller, to amuse his wakeful hours, after the manner of the East. The thunder-storm poured its successive peals along for hours over the country, and the fierce lightnings searched the camp. When, at last, the fury of the elements abated, the guards of Meeran, who crouched without, entered his tent for orders, when they found their master and his two attendants stiffened in death, their bodies scathed with lightning and their costume singed or burned. Six holes were numbered on the back part of the commander's head, and his body was streaked as if with the marks of a whip. A scimitar, which lay on the pillow above his head, was also perforated, and the point melted. The tent-pole was charred. A single stroke of the electric fluid had blasted the life of the prince and his attendants. The French afterwards raised a rumour in India that the English had assassinated Meeran. Edmund Burke alluded to this rumour in his celebrated speech opening the charge against Warren Hastings. The imputation was not only unfounded, but absurd. The English had no interest in so acting at that moment, but strong interest to the contrary, as the conduct of Calliaud immediately showed. That officer saw that further pursuit of the enemy was, by the event, rendered impossible. Native armies generally disperse when a chief falls; and, should the like then happen, the peril of the English troops would indeed be great. Calliaud

* *Seer Mutakhareen*, vol. ii. p. 123.

† *Scott's History of Bengal*, pp. 392–397.

‡ *Calliaud's Narrative*, p. 34.



WARREN HASTINGS.

GOVERNOR GENERAL OF BENGAL.

From a Painting by Sir J. Reynolds.

LONDON JAMES B. VIRTUE

concealed the death, and had the prince placed upon an elephant, as if alive. He then proceeded by forced marches to Patna, alleging that Meeran was ill, to account for his not appearing on the march. Calliaud placed his troops in what the English in India called "winter quarters." Most of the Bengalees attributed the death of Meeran to the retribution of the gods upon his crimes. The

Mohammedans entertained an opinion that God had sent the stroke in consequence of the dying curse of the widow of Suraj-ad-Dowlah. The campaign with the emperor had, however, terminated, not to be renewed in favour of Meer Jaffier, and, at this juncture of affairs, Mr. Vansittart arrived in Calcutta from Madras, as the successor of Clive in the government of Bengal.

CHAPTER LXXV.

WARREN HASTINGS PROMINENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF BENGAL—GOVERNOR VANSITTART OPPOSED BY THE COUNCIL—WAR WITH THE EMPEROR—DEFEAT OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY, AND OF THE FRENCH, WITH THE CAPTURE OF M. LAW, THE FRENCH CHIEF—ESTABLISHMENT OF MEER COSSIM IN THE SOUBAIDARSHIP BY THE ENGLISH.

IN the events which had occurred in Bengal up to the period of the arrival of Mr. Vansittart as governor, a young man took part who was destined to play a prominent part in the history of India. That young man was Warren Hastings.

Miss Martineau, reviewing this period of the history of Bengal, pithily observes:—"Where was young Hastings during these years? He had joined Clive's expedition with enthusiasm when it came up from Madras in December, 1756. But Clive soon discovered that Hastings had abilities which marked him out for political business; and he appointed him resident agent at the new nabob's court. Soon after Clive's departure in 1760, Hastings was wanted at Calcutta, as a member of council. He was in full training for his future work." To the influence of Clive much of the holdness and persistence of the policy of Hastings may probably be attributed. They admired one another, and the elder and more active man was likely to leave the traces of his strong mind and will upon the versatile, susceptible, and impressible youth who watched the intrigues of the court of Moorshedabad, and informed the governor of Bengal of the policy pursued there. Clive depended much upon the genius of Hastings for correct information and useful suggestions, for already the subtle and penetrating mind of the diplomatist gave proof of its fine edge and polished surface.

It will be appropriate in this place to take some notice of the life of Warren Hastings up to the time at which our history has arrived. Lord Macaulay* thus writes of his origin:—"Warren Hastings sprang from an

ancient but illustrious race. It is affirmed that the pedigree can be traced back to the great Danish sea king, whose sails were long the terror of both coasts of the British Channel, and who, after many fierce and doubtful struggles, yielded at last to the valour and genius of Alfred. But the undoubted splendour of the line of Hastings needs no illustration from fable. One branch of that line wore, in the fourteenth century, the coronet of Pembroke. From another branch sprang the renowned chamberlain, the faithful adherent of the white rose, whose fate has furnished so striking a theme both to poets and historians. His family received from the Tudors the earldom of Huntingdon. . . . The lords of the manor of Daylesford, in Worcestershire, claimed to be the heads of this distinguished family. The main stock, indeed, prospered less than some of the younger shoots. But the Daylesford family, although not ennobled, was wealthy and highly considered, till, about two hundred years ago, it was overwhelmed by the great ruin of the civil war. The Hastings of that time was a zealous cavalier. He raised money on his lands, sent his plate to the mint at Oxford, joined the royal army, and after spending half his property in the cause of King Charles, was glad to ransom himself by making over the greater part of the remainder to Speaker Lenthall. The old seat at Daylesford still remained in the family, but it could no longer be kept up, and in the following generation was sold to a London merchant. Before the transfer took place, the last Hastings of Daylesford presented his second son to the rectory of the parish in which the ancient residence of the family stood. The living was of little value, and the situation of the poor clergyman after

* *Critical and Historical Essays.* Contributed to the *Edinburgh Review*, vol. ii. p. 182.

the sale of the estate was deplorable. He was constantly engaged in law-suits about tithes with the new lord of the manor, and was at last utterly ruined. His eldest son, Howard, a well-conducted young man, obtained a place in the Customs. The second son, Pynaston, an idle, worthless boy, married before he was sixteen, lost his wife before he was two years married, and died in the West Indies, leaving to the care of his unfortunate father a little orphan destined to strange and memorable vicissitudes of fortune."

Warren, the son of Pynaston, was born on the 6th of December, 1732. His mother died a few days later, and he was left dependant on his distressed grandfather. Such was the origin and early history of one of whom the same writer also says, "No cloud could overcast the dawn of so much genius and so much ambition. The very ploughmen observed and long remembered how very kindly little Warren took to his book." It was while at school in the rustic village at Daylesford, and while the playmate of its rustic children, that young Hastings pondered the idea of ultimately becoming the lord of his ancestors' estates. His uncle Howard took charge of him in his ninth year, and he was sent to school in London. In his eleventh year he was sent to Westminster school, where he was the fellow student of various youths who, like himself, became men of note.

On the death of his uncle, Howard Hastings, a distant relative or connection, to whose care he had been consigned by his uncle, procured him a writership in the company's service. In October, 1750, when only in his seventeenth year, he arrived in Bengal. He remained two years in the secretary's office at Calcutta, and was then sent to Cossimbazar. In that place he remained several years, making bargains for stuffs with native brokers. He was thus occupied when the sanguinary Suraj-ad-Dowlah seized upon the English there. The compassion felt by some Dutch merchants for one so young, delicate, and intelligent, induced them to plead for him, and he was released from confinement and was a sort of prisoner at large at Moorshedabad. He thence secretly corresponded with the English council when they fled from Calcutta, and he displayed such courage, capacity, and diligence in obtaining information, and such judgment and talent in the opinions he expressed, as to surprise the council, and excite their admiration of his abilities.

When Clive arrived in the Hoogly with the expedition from Madras, Hastings contrived to join it as a volunteer, and by his heroism and sagacity secured the high opinion and confidence of Clive. Immediately after the

battle of Plassey, Hastings was appointed agent for the company at the court of the new soubahdar; where he continued an invaluable servant, until the honour of member of council at Calcutta was conferred upon him. During the administration of Mr. Vansittart, Hastings was deprived of the influence to which his genius entitled him by the corrupt council. The period between Clive's first government of Bengal, the history of which has been recorded in foregoing pages, and his second government of Bengal, the history of which is yet to be related, was one of maladministration on the part of the English, and it is proper to anticipate somewhat our narrative, by quoting what Lord Macaulay, in his criticism of Gleig's *Life of Hastings*, has said of our hero's conduct during that interval:—"Of the conduct of Hastings at this time little is known; but the little that is known, and the circumstance that little is known, must be considered as honourable to him. He could not protect the natives; all that he could do, was to abstain from plundering and oppressing them, and this he appears to have done. It is certain, that at this time he continued poor, and it is equally certain that by cruelty and dishonesty he might have become rich. It is certain that he was never charged with having borne a part in the worst abuses which then prevailed, and it is almost equally certain that if he had borne a part in these abuses, the able and bitter enemies who afterwards persecuted him would not have failed to discover and to proclaim his guilt. The keen, severe, and even malevolent scrutiny to which his whole public life was subjected, a scrutiny unparalleled, as we believe, in the history of mankind, is in one respect advantageous to his reputation. It brought many blemishes to light, but it entitles him to be considered pure from every blemish which has not been brought to light. The truth is that the temptations to which so many English functionaries yielded in the time of Mr. Vansittart were not addressed to the ruling passion of Warren Hastings. He was not squeamish in pecuniary transactions, but he was neither sordid nor rapacious. He was far too enlightened a man to look on a great empire, merely as a buccaneer would look on a galleon. Had his heart been much worse than it was, his understanding would have preserved him from that extremity of baseness. He was an unscrupulous, perhaps an unprincipled statesman; but still he was a statesman and not a free-booter."

In 1764 Hastings returned to England. He had realized only a very moderate fortune, and that moderate fortune was soon

reduced to nothing, partly by his praiseworthy liberality, and partly by his mismanagement. "Towards his relations he appears to have acted very generously. The greater part of his savings he left in Bengal, hoping, probably, to obtain the high usury of India. But high usury and bad security generally go together, and Hastings lost both interest and principal." During the four years Hastings remained at home, as well as the four years he remained in India after Clive resigned the governorship of Bengal, many momentous events occurred in India, which prepared the way for the exalted position Hastings ultimately held, and which were of themselves of magnitude and deep importance; to them it is necessary now to turn. The departure of Clive threw the affairs of Bengal into much confusion. It has been already shown that under the heroes, Calliaud and Knox, British valour was as triumphant as if Clive himself led the soldiers; but the civil concerns of the presidency were too complicated to be set or kept in order by a genius less commanding than Clive himself. There existed much discontent on the part of the English officials, even in high places, with the neglect shown by the company to men of parts, and the partialities evinced in the promotions, civil and military. To such an extent did the dissatisfaction with the company spread, that the following extraordinary document was sent home before Clive took his departure, who had himself, although the company's chief officer in Bengal, taken an active part in its production:—"Having fully spoken to every branch of your affairs at this presidency, under their established heads, we cannot, consistent with the real anxiety we feel for the future welfare of that respectable body from whom you and we are in trust, close this address without expostulating with freedom on the unprovoked and general asperity of your letter *per Prince Henry* packet. Our sentiments on this head, will, we doubt not, acquire additional weight, from the consideration of their being subscribed by a majority of your council, who are, at this very period, quitting your service, and consequently independent and disinterested. Permit us to say, that the diction of your letters is most unworthy yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants, or gentlemen to gentlemen. Mere inadvertencies, and casual neglects, arising from an unavoidable and most complicated confusion in the state of your affairs, have been treated in such language and sentiments, as nothing but the most glaring and premeditated faults could warrant. Groundless informations have, without further scru-

tiny, borne with you the stamp of truth, though proceeding from those who had therein obviously their own purpose to serve, no matter at whose expense. These have received from you such countenance and encouragement, as must most assuredly tend to cool the warmest zeal of your servants here and everywhere else; as they will appear to have been only the source of general reflections, thrown out at random against your faithful servants of this presidency, in various parts of your letter now before us,—faithful to little purpose,—if the breath of scandal, joined to private pique or private or personal attachments, have power to blow away in one hour the merits of many years' services, and deprive them of that rank, and those rising benefits, which are justly a spur to their integrity and application. The little attention shown to these considerations in the indiscriminate favours heaped on some individuals, and undeserved censures on others, will, we apprehend, lessen that spirit of zeal so very essential to the well-being of your affairs, and, consequently, in the end, if continued, prove the destruction of them. Private views may, it is much to be feared, take the lead here, from examples at home; and no gentlemen hold your service longer, nor exert themselves further in it, than their own exigencies require. This being the real present state of your service, it becomes strictly our duty to represent it in the strongest light, or we should, with little truth, and less propriety, subscribe ourselves."

The company's reply to this was resolute, stern, and uncompromising. It was as follows, dated the 21st of January, 1761:—"We have taken under our most serious consideration the general letter from our late president and council of Fort William, dated the 29th of December, 1759, and many paragraphs therein containing gross insults upon and indignities offered to the court of directors; tending to the subversion of our authority over our servants, and a dissolution of all order and good government in the company's affairs: to put an immediate stop therefore to this evil, we do positively order and direct, that, immediately upon receipt of this letter, all those persons still remaining in the company's service, who signed the said letter, viz., Messieurs John Zephaniah Holwell, Charles Stafford Playdell, William Brightwell Sumner, and William M'Guire, be dismissed from the company's service; and you are to take care that they be not permitted, on any consideration, to continue in India, but that they are to be sent to England by the first ships which return home the same season you receive this letter."

Mr. Vansittart had from the first been opposed by a faction in the council, and "the dismissal of which this letter was the signal, not only gave a majority in the council to the party by whom he was opposed, but sent Mr. Ellis, the most intemperate and arbitrary of all his opponents, to the chiefship of the factory at Patna. He treated the nabob with the most insulting airs of authority, and broke through all respect for his government. So early as the month of January he gave his orders to the commander of the troops to seize and keep prisoner one of the nabob's collectors, who had raised some difficulties in permitting a quantity of opium, the private property of one of the company's servants to pass duty free as the property of the company. This outrage the discretion of the officer avoided, by suspending obedience to the order, and sending a letter to the nabob, to redress by his own authority whatever might appear to be wrong."*

This Mr. Ellis continued, with indomitable energy and violence, to contravene the orders of Mr. Vansittart; and his disobedience and insults to the governor received such a measure of support from the opposition in the council, as to render nugatory all attempts on the part of the governor to enforce discipline and order. The factious spirit of the council was not without provocation, and, strangely, that provocation was supplied mainly through Clive's instrumentality, in the very way against which he and his brother officials so strongly protested when the company, without his intervention, acted in a similar manner.

Vansittart was appointed governor of Bengal at Clive's suggestion. This offended Holwell, who had rendered more service in the civil department than any of the company's officials, who bravely battled when the council of Calcutta fled, who, during Clive's government, was the most efficient civilian in high office, and upon whom the great dictator devolved important duties. When Clive left India, the government rested upon Holwell *pro tempore*, and he was undoubtedly better fitted for the post than any other member of the council. Mr. Amyatt, a man reckoned by his fellow councillors of consequence, claimed the office on the ground of seniority, and the council and civilians generally regarded it as unjust to place a gentleman from Madras over his head. Clive, for reasons that appeared weighty to himself, recommended Vansittart, who, from the above-named causes, was obstructed, from the moment of his entering office, by those who felt themselves aggrieved. This was not the only cause of their opposition. A large number of the company's ser-

* Mill, book iv. chap. v.

vants were trading on private account in such a manner as to be ruinous to the company. They interfered with the native transit trade in a manner, which, through the various revolutions in the soubahdarship of Bengal that ensued, drew forth the remonstrances of each successive nominee of the British in the native government, while the people of Bengal in vain besought the intervention of their soubahdar. Oppression and plunder were rampant amongst the bullying and imperious English officials everywhere. Mr. Vansittart had not the requisite capacity and energy to put a stop to these things; and when a decided majority of the council was obtained against him, he became almost powerless. Lord Macaulay says of him and his position:—"Mr. Vansittart, the governor, was at the head of a new and anomalous empire. On one side was a band of English functionaries, daring, intelligent, eager to be rich. On the other side was a great native population, helpless, timid, accustomed to crouch under oppression. To keep the stronger race from preying on the weaker, was an undertaking which tasked to the utmost the talents and energy of Clive. Vansittart, with fair intentions, was a feeble and inefficient ruler. The monster caste, as was natural, broke loose from all restraint, and then was seen, what we believe to be the most frightful of all spectacles—the strength of civilization without its mercy. To all other despotism there is a check—imperfect, indeed, and liable to gross abuse, but still sufficient to preserve society from the last extreme of misery. A time comes when the evils of submission are obviously greater than those of resistance—when fear itself begets a sort of courage, when a convulsive burst of popular rage and despair warns tyrants not to presume too far on the patience of mankind. But against misgovernment, such as then afflicted Bengal, it was impossible to struggle. The superior intelligence of the dominant class made their power irresistible. A war of Bengalees against Englishmen was like a war of sheep against wolves, of men against demons. The only protection which the conquered could find, was in the moderation, the clemency, the enlarged policy of the conqueror. That protection at a later period they found. But at first English power came among them unaccompanied by English morality. There was an interval between the time when they became our subjects, and the time at which we began to reflect that we were bound to discharge towards them the duty of rulers. During that interval the business of a servant of the company was simply to wring out of the natives a hundred or two hundred thousand pounds, as speedily

as possible, that he might return home before his constitution had suffered from the heat, to marry a peer's daughter, buy rotten boroughs in Cornwall, and to give balls in St. James's Square."

This description is not so overdrawn as not to describe generally the condition of things, and show how helpless was the governor in the transactions which took place under his government, financial and military, among the English themselves in their relations to native princes and states, and to the unfortunate Bengalees who groaned beneath their rapacity and oppression. In the narrative of Mr. Vansittart himself, published after his resignation of the government of the presidency, there is at once the clearest and most concise account that has ever appeared of its real condition, and of the English interest in Bengal at the period of Mr. Vansittart's arrival. It is fortunate that the statements of Mr. Vansittart himself are still in existence, as they describe with truth and simplicity a period amongst the most remarkable and eventful epochs in the history of the British empire in India. The events of that time, and the part taken in them by our countrymen, are amongst those most discussed by critics and historians of the present day. The originality and importance of the document excuse its length. The condensation of its style, and the authority of the writer, alike forbid abridgment. Mr. Vansittart states:—"It is foreign to my purpose to enter into any detail of the transactions of Meer Jaffier's government, from the time of his being raised to the soubahdarship till the month of July, 1760, when I came to Bengal, to succeed Colonel Clive. It is enough if I give a plain and distinct view of the situation in which I found his affairs, and the company's. The greatest part of the nabob's and the English forces was at Patna, to oppose the shah-zada, who, for three years successively, had invaded the province, and at this time was more powerful than ever, by the number of disaffected zemindars who had joined him, or espoused his interest, in different parts of the country. The nabob's army consisted as usual of a great number of undisciplined people, who were never regularly paid, but were kept together by the promises of Saddoc Allee Cawn,* the nabob's son, who commanded them, that he would be answerable for their arrears one time or other. Being disappointed of these hopes by the death of the nabob's son, who was killed by lightning, the 3rd of July, their clamorous demands could no longer be restrained, and a general plunder and desertion was daily expected. Colonel Calliaud, who commanded the English

* Commonly called the Chuta nabob.

forces after Colonel Clive's departure for Europe, stopped these clamours for a moment, by his promises to secure the payment of their arrears from the nabob; but the English troops were in little better condition than the nabob's; they had two or three months' arrears due to them, the nabob having failed in the payment of the sum stipulated for their maintenance, which was a lac of rupees a month, and the low state of the treasury at Calcutta not admitting of the deficiency being supplied from thence. The effects of this were seen by the desertion of many of our men; and the army, thus situated, was within thirty miles of the shah-zada's whole force. The situation of affairs at Moorshebadad, where the nabob resided, was still more alarming. Far from being in a condition to pay off the arrears of his troops at Patna, he had a large number of the same undisciplined rabble about his person, and was no less in arrears to them; these also losing their best dependence, by the death of the nabob's son, could no longer be satisfied with promises, but insisted, in a most tumultuous manner, on immediate payment. More than once they surrounded the palace, abused the principal officers in the most opprobrious language, and daily threatened the nabob's life; through the weakness of his government, and the general disaffection of the people, the revenues of most parts of the province were withheld by the zemindars, and the nabob had so little attention to, or capacity for business, that what little was collected was, in a great measure, appropriated by his favourites to their own profit. The Beerboom rajah, whose country is situated within a few miles of the capital, Moorshebadad, had declared for the shah-zadab, and had raised a force, with which he threatened to attack the city; and the nabob had so little power of opposing him, that a body of troops, which were ordered out against him in the month of June, refused to march, and were yet in the suburbs, when I arrived there in the month of October. Upon the whole, there was the greatest reason to apprehend, that the disorderly troops would lay waste and plunder the city, and put an end at once to the nabob's government and life. At Calcutta, the treasury was so low, and our resources so much drained, that we were obliged to put an entire stop to the investment, and it was with the utmost difficulty the current expenses of the settlement could be provided for. The lac of rupees, which the nabob was to pay monthly for the field-expenses of our troops, remained, as I before observed, two or three months in arrears; and even supposing it to have been regularly paid, was very insufficient for the intended

use; so that the company, upon this footing, would have suffered a considerable loss by their alliance with the nabob, as often as the situation of affairs required their troops to be in the field, of which the appearance of troubles on every side afforded no prospect of an end. The Burdwan and Nuddea countries had been assigned to the company, from April, 1758, to April, 1760, for the payment of the sums stipulated in the treaty, for the restitution of the company's and private losses by the capture of Calcutta. Of that amount about twenty lacs remained due, at the time of my arrival, although the term of the assignment had been expired some months; and the nabob, at the same time that he could find no means of discharging this balance, insisted on the lands being restored to him, offering a security of jewels in their stead. He sent the Royrojan, one of his principal officers, to Calcutta, to make this demand, and at the same time to request the loan of a sum of money to assist him in his distress. The last was a proposal we had it not in our power to comply with; but the first could not in justice be refused, as he was willing to give other security, in lieu of the lands before assigned; so that we were absolutely left without any resources for money, and the company sent out none from Europe. To add to our difficulties, Madras and Bombay were told that they must depend on supplies from Bengal; and in the midst of this distress, not only the dangerous state of the province obliged us to keep all our forces in the field, at an immense expense, but a still more interesting object for the English nation in India, I mean the success of the undertaking against Pondicherry, which was then invested, depended, in a great measure, on a supply of money. The nabob, through an habitual indolence, was quite incapable of managing his government in such critical circumstances; and the sudden and unfortunate death of his son had thrown him into such a state of dejection that he would not even try to exert the little strength which his faculties had left. Unable as the nabob was to help himself, it was the universal opinion, founded on the experience of his former conduct, that he would rather have seen himself and the province involved in one general ruin, than have given us the means of saving him, by putting more power and more resources of money in our hands. The Dutch director's letters to him, and his behaviour at the time their forces came into the country, are a public testimony of his desire to reduce our power, instead of augmenting it: I asked a small favour of him for the company, a little after my arrival, as much with a view of sounding his disposition,

as through a desire of obtaining it. It was the grant of the Chittagong province, in farm to the company, on the same terms as it was held by the then feugedar, or if that was disagreeable, the leave only of establishing a factory there for trade; but he positively refused to admit of either. I determined not to suffer the affairs of the nation and the company to fall under the ruin they were threatened with, without making an attempt to save them, and far from intending any injury to the nabob, I considered the preservation of his life and government as equally depending with our own interests, on the immediate prosecution of some methods for remedying the difficulties with which we were surrounded. One principal circumstance of the impending evils suggested the first hopes of a reformation. The death of the nabob's son had cut off the heir-apparent of the government: he had two sons by concubines, and a grandson, the child of his deceased son, by a concubine also; the eldest of his two sons was little above ten years old, and his grandson an infant of a few months, so that they were incapable of taking care of the business, supposing the objection of their illegitimacy to be of no weight. In these circumstances, the whole province seemed to turn their eyes on Meer Cossim, who was married to Meer Jaffier's daughter, his only surviving legitimate child; was esteemed a capable man of business, and had been the means of preserving the city from plunder, and the nabob from destruction, by an immediate payment of three lacs of rupees to his troops, and becoming a security for their arrears at the time of their tumultuously surrounding the palace; and this he did, upon promise of being appointed to the vacant offices of his deceased son, and declared his successor. I found Mr. Holwell and the select committee had strongly recommended to the nabob to perform this promise; on the other hand, Mr. Amyatt and Colonel Calliaud had wrote to him in favour of his infant grandson, representing that the troops at Patna insisted on his being named to the vacant offices, and that the Raja Rajebullub, late dewan to the nabob's deceased son, should have the management of them during his minority. The nabob seemingly acquiesced in both recommendations, but continued wavering in his choice, in such a manner, as showed that the increase of the English influence was the event that he most dreaded in the appointment of either. This is the only clue which can lead to the motives of the many opposite resolutions which were taken up by the nabob, upon this affair, in the small space of time in which it was suspended. His inclinations first led him to

accept the advice offered him by Colonel Calliaud, in favour of his grandson; but when that advice was urged in more pressing and peremptory style, and Rajebullub, by his emissaries and friends at Durbar, too solicitously laboured to bring about the same design, the nabob became jealous of his growing power, and suddenly declared his resolution to support Meer Cossim in his pretensions, as will appear by the letter he wrote Mr. Holwell and Colonel Calliaud upon this subject. On the other hand, the nabob perceiving that Meer Cossim was warmly supported by Mr. Holwell, appears to have formed the wild scheme of shaking off both, by throwing all the chief offices of the government into the hands of a stranger, named Mirza Daoud, who had for some years enjoyed the protection of this court in the character of a prince of the royal blood of Persia. Him the nabob formally contracted to the natural daughter of his deceased son, but a few days after the declaration made in favour of Meer Cossim, who, apprehensive of being disappointed in his hopes, by the jealousy and irresolution of the nabob, formed the pretence of negotiating the restoration of Burdwan, and the other assigned lands, to obtain his leave to come down to Calcutta. He arrived there about the middle of September. As he came down with these fears and suspicions of the nabob's disinclination to him, for the favour already shown him by the English, it naturally led him to fall in with any measures which might be proposed by them, as a means of securing the continuation of the same interest in his behalf."

In the foregoing narrative, events are referred to which were not recorded in former pages of this history—those connected with a new revolution in Bengal, and the dethronement of Meer Jaffier. This was effected in the manner and temper recorded in the narrative of Mr. Vansittart. Meer Jaffier refused to hold any mere nominal possession of the soubahdarship, and retired to Calcutta, there to live under the protection of the English. He declared that Meer Cossim was a man of too ambitious a character to be bound by treaty, or ties of affinity, and would not trust himself within the limits of his power. This estimate of his son-in-law's character proved ultimately too true.

Among the difficulties which beset the new British governor was a jealousy among the military commanders. Major Carnac arrived to succeed Colonel Calliaud. The army then chiefly lay at Patna, after the death of Meeran. Mr. Vansittart was unwilling to disturb Colonel Calliaud in his command, at a juncture which still seemed critical, seeing

that the colonel was well acquainted with men and with affairs at Patna, of which the major was necessarily ignorant. That officer, however, burned to be in command. Ellis, ever ready for violent measures and complaints, made this a matter of discussion in the council, and Vansittart was tormented by his own officers, at a time which required the exercise of their united powers for the common good. All these persons entered into fiercer discussions with one another, and with the governor, concerning the deposition of Meer Jaffier, and the eligibility of his successor.

It is difficult to see what other course was open to the governor than that which he took. Professor Wilson thinks it was impolitic, and thus expresses his views:—"Objections to the removal of Meer Jaffier were made not only by those whose personal feelings might be suspected. The scheme was originally Mr. Holwell's, who communicated in April, to Colonel Calliaud, his anticipation of the necessity of deposing Meer Jaffier. The colonel, in reply, observes, 'Bad as the man may be whose cause we now support, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the risk of much greater inconveniences attending on such a change than those we now labour under. I presume the establishing tranquillity in these provinces would restore to us all the advantages of trade we can wish, for the profit and honour of our employers, and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquillity about by our present influence over the soubahdar, and by supporting him, than by any change that can be made.* The removal of Jaffier was an ill-advised measure; there was no absolute impossibility in his performing his engagements with the English, or paying his own troops, for both objects were speedily accomplished by his successor, and he created no new resources. The same means of acquitting his obligations, were in Meer Jaffier's reach. There only wanted such support as should enable him, and such control as should compel him, to discharge those demands to which he had rendered himself liable, and the due acquittance of which was essential to the maintenance of that English force upon which his own power, and even his existence depended. Had Clive remained in Bengal, there would probably have been no revolution."

Whatever might have been the policy of Clive, that of Cossim was soon made intelligible, "For, aware that money was the pillar by which alone he could stand, he made so great exertions that, notwithstanding the treasury of Meer Jaffier was found almost empty, he

* Scrafton's *Observations on Vansittart's Narrative*, p. 12.

paid in the course of a few months the arrears of the English troops at Patna; so far satisfied the troops of the soubahdar, both at Moorshedabad and Patna, that they were reduced to order, and ready to take the field; and provided six or seven lacs in discharge of his engagements with the company, insomuch that the presidency were enabled in November to send two lacs and a half to Madras, whence a letter had been received, declaring that without a supply the siege of Pondicherry must be raised. In the month of January, Major Carnac arrived at Patna, and took the command of the troops. The province of Bahar had suffered so much from the repeated incursions of the emperor; and the finances both of the nabob and of the company were so much exhausted by the expense of the army required to oppose him, that the importance was strongly felt of driving him finally from that part of the country. The rains were no sooner at an end than the English commander, accompanied by the troops of Ramnarain, and those which had belonged to Meeran, advanced towards the emperor, who was stationed at Gyah Maunpore. The unhappy monarch made what exertions he could to increase his feeble army; but Carnac reached his camp by three days' march; forced him to an engagement, and gained a victory.**

This engagement redounded greatly to the glory of the English. Law, the French commander, was made prisoner, and his forces entirely dispersed. The following graphic account of incidents connected with the capture of M. Law, is from the pen of a native and a Mohammedan:—"When the emperor left the field of battle, the handful of troops that followed M. Law, discouraged by his flight, and tired of the wandering life which they had hitherto led in his service, turned about likewise, and followed the emperor. M. Law, finding himself abandoned and alone, resolved not to turn his back; he bestrode one of his guns, and remained firm in that posture, waiting for the moment of his death. This being reported to Major Carnac, he detached himself from his main body, with Captain Knox and some other officers, and he advanced to the man on the gun, without taking with him either a guard or any Talingas (sepoys) at all. Being arrived near, this troop alighted from their horses, and pulling their caps from their heads, they swept the air with them, as if to make him a *salâm*: and this salute being returned by M. Law in the same manner, some parley in their language ensued. The major, after paying high encomiums to M. Law for his perseverance,

* Mill, vol. iii. book iv. chap. v.

and bravery, added these words:—"You have done everything which could be expected from a brave man; and your name shall be undoubtedly transmitted to posterity by the pen of history: now loosen your sword from your loins, come amongst us, and abandon all thoughts of contending with the English." The other answered, 'That if they would accept of his surrendering himself just as he was, he had no objection; but that as to surrendering himself with the disgrace of being without his sword, it was a shame he would never submit to; and that they might take his life if they were not satisfied with that condition.' The English commanders, admiring his firmness, consented to his surrendering himself in the manner he wished: after which the major, with his officers, shook hands with him, in their European manner, and every sentiment of enmity was instantly dismissed on both sides. At the same time the major sent for his own palankeen, made him sit in it, and he was sent to camp. M. Law, unwilling to see or be seen, shut up the curtains of the palankeen for fear of being recognised by any of his friends at camp; but yet some of his acquaintances, hearing of his being arrived, went to him. The major, who had excused him from appearing in public, informed them that they could not see him for some days, as he was too much vexed to receive any company. Ahmed Khan Koteishsee, who was an impertinent talker, having come to look at him, thought to pay his court to the English by joking at the man's defeat; a behaviour that has nothing strange, if we consider the times in which we live, and the company he was accustomed to frequent; and it was in that notion of his, doubtless, that with much pertness of voice and air, he asked him this question; 'And Biby (Lady) Law, where is she?' The major and officers present, shocked at the impropriety of the question, reprimanded him with a severe look, and very severe expressions: 'This man,' they said, 'has fought bravely, and deserves the attention of all brave men; the impertinences which you have been offering him may be customary amongst your friends and your nation, but cannot be suffered in ours, which has it for a standing rule, never to offer an injury to a vanquished foe.' Ahmed Khan, checked by this reprimand, held his tongue, and did not answer a word. He tarried about one hour more in his visit, and then went away much abashed; and although he was a commander of importance, and one to whom much honour had been always paid, no one did speak to him any more, or made a show of standing up at his departure. This reprimand did much honour to the English;

and, it must be acknowledged, to the honour of those strangers, that as their conduct in war and in battle is worthy of admiration, so, on the other hand, nothing is more modest and more becoming than their behaviour to an enemy, whether in the heat of action, or in the pride of success and victory; these people seem to act entirely according to the rules observed by our ancient commanders, and our men of genius.*

After the battle, Major Carnac opened negotiations with the emperor, through Rajah Shitabroy, and subsequently visited the im-

perial camp. The emperor accompanied him thence to Patna. Meer Cossim regarded the good terms, upon which the emperor had entered with the English, dangerous to his own power. He arrived at Patna, but embarrassed the imperial alliance in every way he could devise, and refused to pay his respects to the emperor, until Major Carnac effected a compromise. Finally, having received an imperial investiture of the soubahdarship, he agreed to pay as tribute to the court of Delhi, twenty-four lacs of rupees annually.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL—VIOLENT AND FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH—DISPUTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF CALCUTTA—REVENUE CONTESTS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS OF THE COUNCIL AND THOSE OF THE SOUBAH DAR—COMMENCEMENT OF WAR BY THE BRITISH—SERIES OF VICTORIES—MASSACRE OF THE ENGLISH AT PATNA—EXPULSION OF MEER COSSIM FROM BENGAL.

ON the return of the emperor towards his capital, he was escorted by Major Carnac, to the limits of Bahar, where he tendered to the English the dewance of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa, and promised firmans, as soon as "petitions" for them should be formally presented. Meer Cossim, offended by these proceedings, soon showed that he was not less hostile at heart to the English than any of his predecessors. His whole attention was divided between disputes with the British officials, and extortion of money from his own. He was restrained by no sense of the injustice of such deeds, and spared none who refused to find money when he chose to demand it. It would occupy many volumes to describe the rapid passage of events during the government of Mr. Vansittart. The deterioration of the English was rapid. This, with the intrigues and efforts made against British influence by the nabobs, involved terrible consequences.

One prominent incident in the history of the times was the defiance of law, both English and native, which characterised the British traders. The company's servants trading on their own account, and native merchants buying the authority of the company's officers, carried on a system of smuggling, of fraud, and of oppression, which no pen could adequately describe. In order to terminate, if possible, the disputes between the soubahdar and the English traders, Mr. Vansittart, accompanied by Mr. Hastings, sought an interview with the former: through-

out these contentions Mr. Hastings had displayed a strong sense of justice. By his lucid statements and arguments he convinced the governor of the injustice offered to the soubahdar by the English agents, supported by the higher officials and members of council, and he aided the governor in his efforts to induce the council to put a stop to the lawlessness of the company's servants. On the last day of November, 1762, these three important persons met at Mongheer. The soubahdar laid the long list of grievances inflicted upon him by the company's servants before the governor, who soon satisfied the prince that, so far as he and Mr. Hastings were concerned, the insults, indignities, and pecuniary injuries of which the prince complained were unequivocally condemned. It was agreed that all memory of these transactions should be obliterated, and that mutual efforts should be made to put a stop to their recurrence. The soubahdar demanded that the inland trade should be wholly given up by the English. Mr. Vansittart proposed that the trade should be open to all upon a duty payable alike by natives and English. To this the soubahdar showed extreme aversion, but at last gave his sanction. A treaty was accordingly drawn up by Hastings, fixing the duty at nine per cent. on all articles; and Mr. Vansittart returned to Calcutta in January, 1763. On arriving at his seat of government, he found the English in great commotion, denouncing all that he and Hastings had performed. The council passed a resolution that the treaty was null, and that they would pay

* See *Mutakhareen*, vol. ii. pp. 165, 166.

no duties except $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on salt, as a compliment to the soubahdar. They also resolved that their agents should no longer be amenable to the native tribunals, but that the native officers and traders should be amenable to the English agents in the nearest factory. The spirit and procedure of the council was, in various respects, unjust and fraudulent; but they complained that the governor had made concessions not demanded by justice, and which were injurious to their interests. They considered that the various firmans of the Mogul entitled them to a free trade in the provinces, although the soubahdars and nabobs, where the English forces were weak, had withheld the privilege, and imposed duties contrary to it. Neither Mr. Vansittart nor Mr. Hastings gave, on that occasion, satisfactory replies to these allegations, which were supported by able arguments on the part of several members, especially Mr. Hayes.*

Meer Jaffier, then resident at Calcutta, authorized the governor's opponents in the council to state that his interpretation of firmans and treaties accorded with theirs. This was said by him to inflame the dispute with Meer Cossim, for his own purposes, for he had never acted upon his own interpretation when he had the opportunity; and when his intrigues issued in his being once more promoted to the sumnid, he was as eager as Meer Cossim had been to exclude the English from the country trade, or to levy duties when that could not be effected. The result of the disapproval of the governor's treaty and correspondence with the soubahdar was to render all accommodation impossible, and to throw the whole of Bengal into a state of alarm. The soubahdar's servants were lying, fraudulent, and tyrannical wherever the English were weak; the conduct of the English was similar, and thus a sort of civil war between both was maintained, before any appeal to arms was made by their governments.

A faithful historian can scarcely have a more painful task than to wade through the voluminous correspondence carried on between Mr. Vansittart and his officers, and between him and the soubahdar, or, as Mr. Vansittart, in his correspondence, always called him, the nabob. Still more painful is it to peruse the voluminous debates and minutes of the council of Calcutta upon the subjects of this correspondence, and the complaints and recriminations of the officers of the company, and those of the soubahdar. So discreditable was the conduct of the English in Bengal during the year 1763, that it leaves

* *A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, from 1760 to 1764*, vol. ii. By Mr. Henry Vansittart.

a lasting stain upon the name of our country. The soubahdar, by vigorous efforts, succeeded at last in suppressing violent and fraudulent conduct on the part of his own servants, as far as, perhaps, any governor, British or native, has ever succeeded in doing in that country. Notwithstanding his exactions on coming to the throne, the firmness and equity of his administration were soon felt everywhere among his own people, and, whatever were his faults at first, he redeemed them by the most sedulous care, to leave the dishonest English no pretext for plunder or war. All his fidelity, activity, and intelligence, did not avail him. Mr. Vansittart was well satisfied with his conduct, but the governor obtained no support in the council, except from Mr. Hastings, whose conduct was humane, just, and honourable in these transactions. The English gradually threw off all disguise, refused to pay the revenues sanctioned by the treaty, plundered the native cultivators and merchants, beat, and often murdered the native officers of justice, police, and revenue; insulted, and defied the person of the soubahdar openly, and regulated their whole conduct as if the council and its agents were a banditti organized under the pretence of trade. The plunder thus accumulated was not passed to the account of the company, whose zealous servants the perpetrators professed to be, but was grasped for their private advantage, while the company's affairs were wholly neglected, and heavy expenses incurred in its name. Mr. Vansittart being always in a minority, himself and Hastings being alone on the side of treaty and integrity, he was obliged to write letters to the nabob in the name of the council, of which he and Hastings totally disapproved. The following specimens of the correspondence will enlighten the reader as to the character of the English at that period. They are written by the nabob (properly soubahdar) to Mr. Vansittart, as governor, containing extracts from the correspondence of the latter to which they were in reply. They disclose a dignity, mingled with despair and indignation, on the part of the soubahdar, which gave to his protests and complaints a tone and manner that commanded the sympathy of the governor and of Mr. Hastings.

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob to the Governor. Dated March 5, 1763.

I have had the pleasure duly to receive three of your favours, dated the 7th and 8th of Shaahan, and understand the particulars mentioned in them.

At a time when this government was loaded with a balance of revenues due to the king, the arrears of the troops, and debts owing to the English, I marched out of Bengal, and repaired to the extremity of the province of

Bahar, in order to settle these matters. That country being thus left without a ruler, every village and district became ruined by the oppressions of the English agents and gomastahs, an entire stop was put to collecting the revenues, and the merchants, and the poor, and all my officers, and mutsaddces of the public and private receipts of custom, were distressed, and deprived of their daily bread; and I am a sufferer in the revenues due to my administration, by near a crore of rupees. I have in the meanwhile made continual complaints and representations of this injustice, and informed you particularly and circumstantially of all matters: nevertheless, you have been pleased to observe that my officers are to blame.

When you favoured me with a visit at Mongheer, I laid before you all my concerns. You were very earnest in settling all disputes between my government, and the English company and gentlemen, and their gomastahs; and you in some measure comforted me, and persuaded me that "from that time business would be carried on in a proper manner, and my government neither injured, oppressed, or damaged." Afterwards, on your return to Calcutta, contrary to your agreement with me, you detached forces, to carry on the business of the company and English gentlemen by compulsion, and to beat and chastise my officers, if they offered to speak a word. For these three years I have not got a single rupee, nor a thousand rupees; nor one piece, nor ten pieces of cloth; nor a bundle of broad cloth, nor ten bundles; nor a pair of scissors, nor so much as a clasp-knife, from the English gentlemen, or their gomastahs; at the same time, they have by violence levied fines and penalties, and sums for losses in their trade, on my officers, and still continue to levy them; and if any of my officers refuses to submit to this, they pour a storm of complaints on his head.

Lately you have repeatedly ordered me "to let the business of the company, and the English gentlemen, and their gomastahs, go on as was customary heretofore in the different parts of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar; to suffer the money and bullion of your factories to be coined into siccas in my mints; and to have the wicket and intrenchments in the city of Patna opened." I not having it in my power to refuse, have given you the free use of my mint, and directed the wicket to be opened, and a stop to be put to collecting customs upon traffic in the commodities of my country, from all merchants, pykars, and dilhalls, in the provinces of Bahar and Bengal; and I have had all gauts and chokeys, both in the city and country round about, entirely removed.

All these my losses are owing entirely to the favour and indulgence of the council; because that my being like the nabob Meer Jaffer indebted to his majesty, and embarrassed by my troops, and reduced to his situation, is what they approve of. However, I can never approve of my people and merchants being distressed, my country oppressed, myself despised, and subjected to daily insults, and my officers and servants ill-treated. I have therefore chosen to give up all those points to you. Now I am in expectation of your answer, to inform me if my life is safe; or if there is anything else to be done?

From the Nabob to the Governor. Dated March 5, 1763.

Your friendly letter, dated the 8th of Shaaban, is arrived, and I am happy with the news of your welfare.

You write that the opinion of the council is as follows:—"They are all very desirous of assisting and supporting me in my government, but cannot bear with patience, that my officers should impede or damage their commerce; that the report of your setting up another nabob is the weak insinuation of designing men; that the resolution of the board is, to make such an agreement in pursuance of the royal firman, and the rules of equity, as may leave

no room for dispute in future, between my officers and their gomastahs." How can I bring myself firmly to credit this, since Mr. Ellis is one of the council, who, for these two years past, has been endeavouring all in his power to hurt my affairs, and make me appear little in the eyes of the world; nay, is at this time taking pains daily to involve me in trouble, parading his companies of sepoys to provoke me; and omitting no opportunity of depreciating me both in this my own country, and to Suraj-ad-Dowlah, and other great men at court, sending all whatever he can devise to my discredit, by means of Shitabroy, to Suraj-ad-Dowlah, &c., and saying also whatever comes uppermost in his mind to my prejudice in public assemblies?

In regard to what you write concerning the royal firman, and your having in view the preparation of another treaty; when you favoured me with your company at Mongheer, I told you frequently, that "the power of your people was great, but I had little to oppose it. I desired you to consider, nor entertain the notion, that any agreement would be binding with people accustomed to acts of oppression." Is not this an instance of oppression, that the saltpetre farms, which I have allowed unto you gentlemen, upon the produce of which you used to pay formerly three, and three and half rupees per maund, you now forcibly hold at one and three-fourth of a rupee, plundering and injuring my people? In this manner my country is to go to ruin, and I may not utter a word. Besides all this, you write, that it is my own officers who create these disturbances, exercise oppression, and injure the saltpetre farm. This being the case, how can any treaty stand good between us? And how can it take effect, if such oppression continues? Besides, as you have dispatched the company's troops to chastise my officers, if they but murmur at these evils, why need you trouble yourselves to make any other treaty? In my service, there is not one who can prejudice me against you in any affair. Under you there is Mr. Ellis, who fails not to prejudice you with evil insinuations against me, as you must see and be sensible, though you connive at it, and say nothing on the subject; but you are pleased to think (I do know upon what grounds) that I have evil-minded people in my service.

I am at a loss how to act under these censures, and must own myself insufficient, if regulations of this nature take place. Be pleased, therefore, to set me free from the uselessness of such an administration; and set up a person for conducting it, whom the council may better approve.

Full well I know, that they will both condemn me, and injure your good name, and bring this about at last. Why do they wait for a charge against me? It is not the part of honest men, to bring an unjust charge against any one, with a view to compass other designs; it is better that you do it at this time.

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob to the Governor. Dated March 14, 1763.

It has been owing solely to the friendship and regard which I bear to you, that I have hitherto constantly borne in my mind the marks of your favour; and, for the friendship and kindness which you have shown to me, I have put up with everything until now that my patience is quite exhausted. Whatever is to be done, do you, sir, do it yourself; why should you cause my authority to be insulted, and my honour injured, by your servants, and people of low character? One man may easily continue in friendship to one man; but to be dependent upon ten people, is beyond the power of man.

I have, in no wise, been deficient in the observance of the treaties which you made with me, but, from the he-

gining, have scrupulously complied with all my agreements.

At this time, that you have been pleased to write to me to keep open the wicket, and intrenchment in the city of Patna, and for trade to go on as usual, I paid all due respect to your letter, and immediately complied with its contents. I had sent for Mohammed Allee Beg from Dacca, and I was on my way from Patna towards Rajemahl, and had reached Barr, when Mr. Ellis sent three companies of apcoys, with two guns, in order to surround my fortresa of Taaajpoor, besides other compauies towards Darbuoga, Mow, Teegra, Sircar Sarum, Tekarry, and other districts in different parts of the province, by which my affairs have been so much hurt, that an entire stop is put to the collection of my revenues.

I knew not in what light to consider all these disturbances, plunderings, and ravages; so, upon information of this news, I dispatched Mohammed Ameen Cawn, one of my jemmatdars, towards Taaajpoor, that he might inquire particularly, and bring me intelligence of the cause of so much disorder. He had not reached the place, before the companies above-mentioned had taken hold of Achur Allee, Naib of Sheer Zaman, my amuil at Taaajpoor, and carried him away to Patna. My jemmatdar wrote me these particulars; in answer to which, I sent him orders to bring your gomastah, raiding at the factory of Taaajpoor, to me, that I might inquire of him, why my amuil had been seized and carried away.

When Mohammed Amcer Cawn drew nigh to the factory, your apcoys there, by order of the gomastah, fired upon him without challenging him. My jemmatdar, having no other resource, made use of the force that he had, seized your gomastah, and brought him to me. I examined into this affair in the best manner, and then dismissed your gomastah. I found from him, that my amuil was by no means in fault; but Ellis, having fixed the blame of all these tumults and disorders upon my amuils, under pretence of the aalpetre, merely from his own hatred to me, and violence of temper, has created these disturbances, and perseveres in them. You wrote me heretofore, that by keeping the wicket in the city of Patna shut, a report would in all probability prevail amongst the people, that the company and I were at variance. Ellia for two years past has been making all these disturbances, in order to demean me, and injure my affairs. Ought I not to be informed, how I am to consider these proceedings, and what is the reason of them? You are my friends, bound to free me from all these insults, which I never can bear with. Since the said gentleman has proceeded to acts of violence against my officers, should my officers, for the sake of their characters, stand upon the defensive, you are not to reproach me with it; but if you are inclined to allow of Mr. Ellis's actions, you will do well to give the country to him, that you and I may be freed from the vexations of it; for I am convinced, that the council will not put an end to these disputes.

I have halted here at Barr two days, on account of this affair; to-morrow I shall march towards Mongheer.

The soubahdar, in order to deal justly with his own people, and, as he hoped, remove all complaints on the part of the British, ordered the entire remission of duties upon the inland trade to English and native merchants alike. This threw the English into a state of panic and rage. They declared it was ruinous to their trade, and meant by the soubahdar to be so. That he had no right, without permission of the emperor, to remit the duties levied upon the native merchants, and no right to levy any duties upon the English. This amounted to a demand for the exclusive trade of the

soubahdar's dominions; and as the East India Company did not profit at all by the inland trade, the demand was in favour of the company's servants, by those servants to be enforced at the expense of the company. It is difficult to conceive a more entire blindness to justice. Yet the council, without shame, inveighed against the governor and Mr. Hastings, because they pointed out the absurdity of such claims, and the monstrous oppression of enforcing a monopoly of trade against the soubahdar's own subjects in his own dominions.

Meantime, violence and outrage on the part of the English increased, and nothing was left for Meer Cossim and his servants but to oppose violence by authority, and force by force. Whatever the bad conduct of the English, more especially of their chief officers, and the majority by whom the governor was opposed in council, the policy of many of the soubahdar's chief officers was aggravating and unjust. As illustrating this, a single case may be named. At Luckypoor, one Mohammed Gazy had been employed in the service of the English factory. To punish this person for his attachment to the English, and probably also with the view of insulting the English themselves, the soubahdar's officer, Syed Buddul Cawn, placed a guard upon his house. Mr. Middleton, chief of the factory, remonstrated upon the oppression thus practised upon a person whose only offence was his intimate service with the English. The native officer refused to release the person so flagrantly wronged, and pleaded that his doing so would be against superior orders—those of Mohammed Allee, who had offered many provocations to the English, and always managed badly his part in those disputes when the English were the aggressors. The council ordered Mr. Middleton to cause Syed Buddul Cawn to be seized and sent a prisoner to Calcutta, where he arrived the latter end of March, 1763. He exculpated himself when before the board, by producing the orders on which he had acted. Mohammed Allee's letter was of such a nature as left no doubt of his desire to bring matters to an extremity. Whether this arose from some interested speculation, or from the vanity which led the native chiefs, notwithstanding innumerable defeats, to believe that they could contend with the English, his motives were sufficiently powerful to induce him to defy the company and impose upon the soubahdar by giving him false information. That this was the true state of the case, the orders issued by him to Syed Buddul Cawn sufficiently prove. They were in the following terms:—

From Mohammed Allee to Syed Buddul Cawn.

Your agreeable letter is arrived. I fully understand the particulars contained therein, and from the hircarra likewise, I learned the account of the villainies of the English in Luckypoor. I have written pressingly to Aga Mohammed Nizam, and Samadan, and Aumur Sing, and Jungul Sing, to repair all of them with their people unto you. I have also sent perwannahs, with the utmost dispatch, unto the zemindars of Bilwat, Baboopoor, &c., and I have taken engagements from every zemindar's vakeel, about Luckypoor, that their masters, the zemindars, will attend upon you, and act as you shall direct them. It behoves you, with the utmost dispatch, to repair thither immediately, and blockade the passages for going in and coming out on all sides of Luckypoor; and place strong sentinels, that no person whatever may pass or re-pass to and from Luckypoor, and that a soul does not escape. Of those who claim the English protection, and make use of their name, take two or three and crucify them, and seize their houses and effects. Lay hold of their wives and children, and send them straightway to me. Be sure not to fail in this respect, his excellency having honoured me with his orders to this purpose, as you must be informed from the copy of the governor's engagement, and of his excellency's perwannah, in consequence, which I heretofore sent you; and do not entertain the least diffidence. Regard this my short letter in the light of a thousand letters, and act accordingly. Moreover, let guards be placed to keep a good look-out about Luckypoor, and the parts adjacent, until the nabob's orders arrive, when they will proceed to act as I shall write to you. At present surround it on all sides, and keep a constant watch.

You will take extraordinary good care of the Europeans at Luckypoor, that they get no intelligence from any of their dependents, either by land or water; and for security you will send two hundred men, with a commander whom you can rely upon, and direct them, above all things, to be ready for action both night and day.

The consequences of such proceedings were thus noticed by Mr. Vansittart himself, in the *exposé* of his motives and conduct in these affairs, afterwards given by him:—"Such a declaration of his inveteracy to the English, as was expressed in these letters of Mohammed Allee's, and the many instances which he had given of it throughout his whole conduct, from his first appointment, justly excited the indignation of the whole board. The most violent readily seized this occasion, to infer a fixed resolution in the nabob to break with us; and that the appointment of such a man as Mohammed Allee, with such extraordinary powers, and his conduct in the execution of them, were only in consequence of that resolution. It was, therefore, warmly urged to prevent the nabob's designs, by declaring immediate war against him. This sentiment, however, was opposed by a majority of the board, who judged it most proper, in the present circumstances, to regard the insults as proceeding personally from Mohammed Allee, and to chastise him for it ourselves; since the nabob, to whom we had repeatedly complained against him, had hitherto afforded us no re-

dress; and that the chief and council at Dacca should be ordered to seize, and send him down prisoner to Calcutta. In this alternative I easily joined, as well in the hopes of yet preventing a ruinous and unjustifiable war, as from the conviction of the violent and incendiary spirit of Mohammed Allee; who, if suffered to act longer with impunity, I saw would put it out of my power, or even of the nabob's, to preserve peace between us. It is true, that the nabob, in answer to the demand of the board for his dismissal, declared that he had removed him from his employment, and summoned him to his presence; but as he still continued at Dacca, and the nabob had always endeavoured to vindicate his conduct, it was much to be feared that he would not only escape the punishment he deserved, but perhaps be continued in his authority, and have his hands strengthened with such fresh powers, as might make it dangerous to attempt afterwards to call him to an account. The nabob's behaviour upon this occasion may be easily accounted for, from the precarious situation in which he stood with the English. When I was with him at Mongheer, he assured me that if the complaints which were then alleged against Mohammed Allee, upon inquiry, proved true, he would both dismiss him from his service, and severely punish him. The same assurance he gave me with respect to Sheer Allee, the fougedar of Poorneea, who had been guilty of the like enmity and misbehaviour to the English dependents in that district; and it is very probable that he was sincere in this declaration at that time, since his interest was most materially concerned in removing every cause of disagreement from between us. But when he perceived the strong opposition, formed against him by the general assembly of the council, and that the design of his enemies was levelled openly against his person and government, it is not to be wondered at, that he should be cautious of depriving himself of the assistance of persons the most capable of serving him, and on whose zeal he had so much reason to depend in case of a rupture with the English. In a word, it appears from the nabob's whole behaviour, from the time that the general council was assembled, that he believed his own ruin to be the object of that assembly; and every step taken by the board served but to confirm him the more strongly in that fatal persuasion. Fatal I call it, since, with such a mutual distrust, every accident, however trifling, was easily construed into an intentional act of hostility; and even the necessary precautions of self-defence served but to make the breach irreparable. I believe it will be needless to point out instances of the effects of these pre-

possessions, amongst the many which occur in the minutes of the council, and the nabob's letters which I have already inserted. To the latter I shall add one, as it shows how easily the nabob was led away by every groundless report, and how naturally his apprehensions disposed him to co-operate with the very measures which tended to an open rupture.*

A deputation was sent by the council from Calcutta to wait upon the soubahdar, and come, if possible, to a mutual understanding. His highness declined receiving the deputation, unless the council recalled the troops which he alleged had been marching from various directions towards his capital. At that time, Mr. Vansittart declared not a soldier had moved from his quarters. The soubahdar had been inspired by his officers, who vainly supposed that by a vigorous effort the English authority might be shaken off. This they were the more readily led to believe, because it was supposed by them that the sepoys in the English service were disloyal, and that the people were so exasperated by the bad conduct of the company's servants, that they were ripe for insurrection.

While the soubahdar was giving implicit credit to every story to the disparagement of the English, the latter, Mr. Vansittart declared, were quite as credulous. Even the council believed representations made to them that the soubahdar had issued orders for all the mulberry-trees to be cut down, in order to destroy the silk trade; and for all the cotton plants to be uprooted, in order to destroy the trade in white cloths. This belief was grounded upon the supposition, that as the English refused to pay duties except on salt, the trade with them was valueless to his highness, and no motive for desiring their presence in India any longer remained. The governor treated those rumours as idle and absurd, but the council resolved to act upon them, and to adopt violent measures, which the governor could only restrain to a certain degree by his authority. The whole behaviour of the council in these matters appears upon the evidence of the minutes in council to be what the governor described it, "scandalous and indecent." In fact, the interest of the company, national honour, the faith of treaties, were all lost sight of in order to accomplish what the grasping avarice of the majority of the council desired. One thing only may be alleged as plausible in behalf of the majority of the council. The president himself (Mr. Vansittart) traded on his private account, and the council believed

that in matters of revenue the soubahdar favoured him, and therefore it was his private interest that the company and individual members of council should be subject to duties from which he, by private management, was able to have himself exempted. The president solemnly denied the truth of these imputations. There were various circumstances which, at all events, naturally led the council to suspect that the private interests of the governor were adverse to those of the council.

Mainly, by the governor's influence, the soubahdar consented to receive the deputation from the council, notwithstanding his previous refusals. He, however, intimated plainly his opinion that the interview could result in no good, as it would be impossible for him to exercise any authority as soubahdar of Bengal while the company treated his orders with contempt, and plundered and ill-used his people as they pleased. His highness could see nothing to negotiate about, for he declared that the English had not left him anything worth the trouble. If they wished to seize upon what belonged to some one else, they had better do so without a deputation to him; or, if the appearance of negotiation was a formality necessary to English measures, he thought they might find somebody else with whom to go through that form, and spare him the torment. Such was the reasoning of his highness, and the bitter irony it contained vexed the English excessively. The nabob, however, met the deputation; but, meanwhile, Ellis, the chief of the English factory at Patna, and the other agents of the company there, did everything in their power to bring on a war for their own private objects, so that the interview began under most inauspicious circumstances. The deputation conducted itself haughtily; the soubahdar petulantly. His highness equivocated and evaded, and it afterwards appeared that he preferred the chances of war to compliance with the demands made to him. The deputation effected nothing. They showed no disposition to concede anything to conciliate the nizam, as he liked to call himself, and his exasperation was increased by their visit. While they were yet at the court of the soubahdar, some boats with arms arrived on their way to Patna for the use of the English troops there. These were seized, and his highness refused to release them, grounding his refusal on the alleged belief that the arms and ammunition were intended to enable the garrison near Patna to attack that city. He also refused a new demand, that an English agent should reside permanently at his durbar, to prevent disputes from arising for the future. The

* *Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, from 1760 to 1764.*

grand point of difference was the demand of the English that no native merchant should be exempted from heavy duties, while they should be exempt from imposts of every kind except such as they chose to grant.

It soon became evident that the soubahdar had been quietly, but vigorously, making preparations for war, but had resolved not to begin the conflict; his purpose being to enter upon hostilities as soon as he was attacked. The council eagerly seized the occasion presented by the irritated and ill-advised conduct of the soubahdar, to force matters to an extreme pass. The governor disapproved of these proceedings, but did not display either the wisdom or decision requisite for counteracting them. Warren Hastings alone withstood the self-assertion, insolence, and aggrandizement of the council. At every meeting he was eloquent on the side of moderation and justice, and his protests against the folly and tyranny of the council are masterpieces of Indian policy and statesmanship. While yet the deputation remained at the court of the soubahdar, he began to offer a series of vindictive provocations which could not fail to issue in war. His "chokies" insulted the deputation of council. Bodies of horse were thrown out for the purpose of intercepting their departure, and finally the sepoy in the English service were tampered with by the soubahdar's agents, until they deserted by hundreds; and the native officers, so much relied upon by the English of that day, were amongst the first who yielded to seduction. This last circumstance compelled the English at once to take measures which the soubahdar considered as nearly tantamount to a declaration of hostilities. He demanded that the English troops should be removed from Patna to Calcutta, or to his own immediate neighbourhood, and informed the deputation that peace or war depended upon compliance with that demand. It became obvious that he had never seriously intended to negotiate on the subject of the duties, and that his compliant policy was merely to gain time to secure his military position and ally to himself the talookdars and zemindars of his own and contiguous territories. His next step was to seize Mr. Hay, as security for certain monies which he insisted the English possessed, but which belonged to him. After this, he proposed in a letter to the governor, that if Mr. Ellis were removed from the chiefship of the factory at Patna, he would negotiate. Before the governor would introduce the subject to the council, Mr. Ellis commenced hostilities, and soon after the chiefs of other English factories adopted aggressive measures, on the plea of necessity. It was now plain that

war had begun. Mr. Ellis, the chief at Patna, backed by the majority of the council at Calcutta, had begun it. The next step was to depose Meer Cossim by order of council, and proclaim another soubahdar in his room. The choice of the council fell upon their old friend and enemy, Meer Jaffier. The whole council favoured this action, except the governor and Mr. Hastings. Advices arrived from Mr. Amyatt from Mongheer, where the soubahdar was, that an Armenian general had marched at the head of a strong reinforcement of "horse, foot, and cannon," to Patna, and that "the Armenians solely managed the soubahdar, and urged the disputes." Mr. Amyatt left the court of the soubahdar under passport, and advised the council of his arrival at Sootee *en route* for Calcutta, where he was daily expected. Soon after a letter reached the governor from Cossimbazar, informing the council that as Mr. Amyatt was passing the city of Moorshedabad, he was attacked by the soubahdar's forces and killed, with several other gentlemen; his escort having been made prisoners. The day after this intelligence was received, some servants and soldiers who had escaped during the skirmish of Moorshedabad arrived at Calcutta. They brought the information that the English at Patna had begun the war, and the attack on Mr. Amyatt at Moorshedabad was in reprisal. The council at once, July 7th, 1763, nominated Meer Jaffier to the soubahdarship, declaring war against Meer Cossim.

On the 8th of July, a letter from Meer Cossim confirmed the rumours of active hostilities at Patna. On the 24th of June, the English suddenly attacked the city of Patna at night, and took it by surprise. As soon as the capture was made, a plunder of the city commenced, and so great was the disorder of the British, that a small body of the soubahdar's troops entered the city at noon next day and retook it, putting the plunderers to the sword. The gentlemen of the factory, with the scattered remains of the army, retired across the river, and were all destroyed or captured. The letter of the soubahdar was one of sneering irony, in which he makes the defeat of the violent gang of robbers who managed the affairs of the company at Patna, a ground for demanding the restitution of all the lands of the soubahdarree surrendered by him to the company on his accession to power. His highness conceived himself to be strong enough to make any demands, as the force at Patna constituted the chief English garrison of Bengal, and formed a considerable portion of the whole of the English army in that presidency.

The following extract from the letter of the

soubahdar showed how hopeless it would have been to maintain any further relations with him:—

Copy of a Letter from the Nabob Cossim Allee Cawn to the Governor. Dated June 28, 1763.

In my heart I believed Mr. Ellis to be my inveterate enemy, but from his actions, I now find he was inwardly my friend, as appears by this step, which he has added to the others. Like a night robber, he assaulted the Kella of Patna; robbed and plundered the bazar, and all the merchants and inhabitants of the city, ravaging and slaying from the morning to the third pahr (afternoon). When I requested of you two or three hundred muskets laden in boats, you would not consent to it. This unhappy man, in consequence of his inward friendship,* favoured me, in this fray and slaughter, with all the muskets and cannon of his army, and is himself relieved and eased from his burthen. Since it was never my desire to injure the affairs of the company, whatever loss may have been occasioned by this unhappy man to myself, in this tumult, I pass over: but you, gentlemen, must answer for any injury which the company's affairs have suffered; and since you have unjustly and cruelly ravaged the city, and destroyed the people, and plundered effects to the value of lacs of rupees; it becomes the justice of the company to make reparation to the poor, as formerly was done for Calcutta. You, gentlemen, are wonderful friends; having made a treaty, to which you pledged the name of Jesus Christ, you took from me a country to pay the expenses of your army, with the condition, that your troops should always attend me, and promote my affairs. In effect, you keep up a force for my destruction; since from their hand, such events have proceeded, I am entirely of opinion, that the company should favour me in causing to be delivered to me the rents for three years of my country. Besides this, for the violence and oppressive exercised by the English gomastahs for several years past, in the territories of the Nizamut, and the large sums extorted, and the losses occasioned by them, it is proper and just that the company make restitution at this time. This is all the trouble you need take; in the same manner as you took Burdwan and the other lands, you must favour me in resigning them.

Mr. Vansittart observes in his narrative, that "This was followed by a note from the gentlemen at Cossimbazar, dated the night of the 4th of July, informing us, that the factory was surrounded by a numerous force, and that they expected an attack the next morning."

Mr. Hastings had been so disgusted with the trickery, selfishness, and injustice of the council, that he had resolved to resign his high and honourable place as a member of council. His patriotism, however, became influenced by what he called "the unparalleled acts of barbarity and treachery" with which, on the part of the nabob, the war had opened; and he resolved to give his energies to carry the conflict to a successful issue. It is surprising that Mr. Hastings should consider the acts of Meer Cossim, however barbarous and treacherous, unparalleled in Indian warfare; they were

* This language is used sarcastically, and betrays the intense bitterness of the soubahdar.

simply in character with Mohammedan usages in war in India and everywhere else. Meer Jaffier left Calcutta on the 11th of July, 1763, to join the army. The detachment he accompanied was commanded by Major Williams. On the 19th, the soubahdar's army engaged the British, for the purpose of defending the Fort of Kutwal, which, it was supposed, might be best defended in the open field. The troops of his highness were defeated, and Kutwal was abandoned. On the 26th the British stormed the lines of Moote-gil, and captured Moorsheadabad; about fifty pieces of cannon were among the trophies. On the 2nd of August a perilous exploit was performed by the English. They crossed a dangerous ravine defended by strong outposts of the enemy. These outposts were driven back, and the British, advancing, found the grand army of the soubahdar drawn up in line of battle upon the plains of Geriah, near Sootee. The British attacked with their usual spirit, and the enemy resisted with unusual obstinacy. For a time the battle appeared to be equal. In a desperate charge by the Bengalees, the English line was broken, and some of their cannon captured. The Rajah Shitabroy distinguished himself with his accustomed gallantry on the side of the English, encouraging the native troops in their service. The British having recovered the temporary reverse, which had nearly cost them the loss of the day, they renewed their assaults with persevering valour, until at last the exhausted enemy fled, leaving the field covered with their slain, and all their cannon and baggage as prizes to the victors. An immediate result of the victory was the capture of a hundred and fifty boats freighted with grain and rice.

The soubahdar's forces continued their disorderly flight to Ouhannulla, a fort between the river and a chain of hills. This place was defended by an intrenchment, upon which were mounted a hundred pieces of cannon. The ditch was more than fifty feet wide, of considerable depth, and full of water. In front was a quagmire. The only ground upon which an assaulting force could approach was near the river, for the space of one hundred yards. The English there planted batteries and raised works, with the most studied appearance of conducting a regular system of approaches. The object of these proceedings was to draw off the enemy's attention from the real plan of attack. On the 5th of September a fire was opened from the false attack, and such demonstrations made as drew away a large body of the besieged to that quarter; while the English in another direction began the assault. There were

troops enough in that quarter to make an obstinate defence; and only after a furious and sanguinary contest were the English masters of the fort and all its appurtenances of war.

The British have made few conquests in India so creditable to their arms. Their entire force scarcely exceeded three thousand; the enemy were many times that number, and the English officers computed them at sixty thousand. The English having secured the place, advanced to Mongheer. After every victory, they obtained some native adherents to their standard, as they professed to fight for the restoration of a former sovereign, who, although not popular, had adherents.

Meer Cossim fled, leaving a garrison to defend his capital. Here he proved himself to be as bloody-minded as his predecessors, and as Mohammedan rulers generally are. He put to death several of his own relations, who, he supposed, might be made instruments in the hands of the English in consolidating a rival authority. Ramnarain was drowned with a bag of sand round his neck.

As the soubahdar fled to Patna, his thirst for blood increased. The two bankers, Set or Seit, the richest men in India, were both murdered in a manner horribly vindictive. His vengeance pursued their dead bodies, which were given to wild beasts and birds of prey, lest their friends should raise for them a funeral pyre, after the manner of the Hindoos. When the English army advanced, their bones were found in a retired apartment of a house, where they had been secreted by some of their co-religionists.

The English conquered Mongheer, but not until a practicable breach was made. The war under Adams had been conducted humanely. After the victory at Oodwa Nulla, in which the abettors of the soubahdar were so signally defeated, one thousand prisoners were made, among whom were many Mohammedan gentlemen, officers in the army of his highness. The whole of these Adams generously released.

On the 9th of September, as the major advanced to Patna, the soubahdar wrote to him thence, threatening to kill all the English who had fallen into his hands, if the major did not abandon the war. That officer replied that the war must be carried on whatever were the consequences, and that it rested with his highness whether it should be waged humanely or become a war of sanguinary reprisals. The governor wrote to the same effect, but neither the mild remonstrance of the latter nor the threats of the commander had any weight with Cossim. He ordered all the prisoners in his power to be massacred. Ellis,

by whom the war had been provoked, and who signally merited retribution, with fourteen of the company's civil and military servants, various other gentlemen, and a hundred private men, were murdered. On a previous page the gallantry of Dr. Fullerton was recorded. This officer was the only person who escaped the massacre. He saw Meer Cossim immediately afterwards, and he wrote to the board a letter, from which the following is an extract:—"Mr. Ellis, with the rest of the gentlemen, were inhumanly butchered by Shimroo,* who came that evening to the place with two companies (he had the day before sent for all the knives and forks from the gentlemen); he surrounded the house with his people, and went into a little outer square, and sent for Messrs. Ellis, Hay,† and Lushington, and with them came six other gentlemen, who were all terribly mangled, and cut to pieces, and their bodies thrown into a well in the square, and it filled up; then the sepoy were sent into the large square, and fired on the gentlemen there, and, rushing upon them, cut them into pieces, in the most inhuman manner, and they were thrown into another large well, which was likewise filled up. On the 7th, the nabob sent for me, and told me to get myself in readiness to go to Calcutta, for that though he had been unlucky in the war (which he asserted with great warmth, had not been of his seeking, nor had he been the aggressor, reproaching the English with want of fidelity, and breach of treaty), yet he said, he had still hopes of an accommodation; he asked me what I thought of it. I told him, I made no doubt of it. When some of his people, who were present, mentioned the affair of Mr. Amyatt's death; he declared that he had never given any orders for killing Mr. Amyatt; but, after receiving advice of Mr. Ellis's having attacked Patna, he had ordered all his servants to take and imprison all the English in the provinces, wherever they could find them; he likewise added, that if a treaty was not set afoot, he would bring the king, the Mahrattas, and Abdallees, against us, and so ruin our trade, &c. He had finished his letters, and ordered boats, and a guard to conduct me; when, upon the advice of some of his people, he stopped me, and said there was no occasion for me to go. After his sending for me at first, he ordered the sepoy, in

* A Frenchman in Meer Cossim's service. His highness had engaged with the English to keep no French in his service.

† This gentleman had been one of the deputation from the council; his detention and murder was an act of barbarous perfidy; which classes the name of Meer Cossim with Suraj-ad-Dowlah, Meeran, and others of the most bloody and barbarous Mohammedan rulers in India.

whose charge I was, to go to their quarters; two moguls, and twelve hirearras to attend me, but to let me go about the city where I pleased. I then applied for liberty to stay at the Dutch factory, which was granted. I applied to Mehdee Allee Khan, for his interest in behalf of the gentlemen in the Chelston, who were seven in number, and were not killed till the 11th of October; but when he was petitioned about them, he gave no answer; but still sent orders to Shimroo, to cut them off. I likewise applied to Allee Ibrahim Cawn, who interceded for them; but he gave him no answer either, though I was present when Ibrahim Cawn petitioned for them. On the 14th of October, on the approach of our army, Cossim Allee decamped with his troops in great confusion, and marched as far as Fulwarree, five coss to the westward of the city. The hirearras that were with me, having no orders about me, I gave them some money, which made them pretty easy. On the 25th, after giving money to a jemautdar, that had the guard to the westward of the Dutch factory, by the river side, I set out in a small pulwar, and got safe to the boats, under command of Captain Wedderburn, that were lying opposite to the city, on the other side of the river, and at eleven o'clock that night arrived at the army, under the command of Major Adams, lying at Jonsy."

Of course nothing can be written in extenuation of this foul and wholesale murder, resembling so much the sanguinary horrors of Cawnpore, when, in 1857, the Nana Sahib committed a similar massacre; but the soubahdar had much to provoke revenge. His hoarded wrongs found an escape when the very persons who were the chief instruments in inflicting them were in his power. He well knew that through his enemy the Rajah Shita-

broy, Mr. Ellis, and Major Carnac, without the knowledge of the governor, had carried on secret correspondence with the emperor, and his vizier, with the object of the soubahdar's dethronement. For this purpose Ellis's complaints of fictitious grievances were made to the council; and temptations were created by him for the soubahdar, or his officers, to do some precipitate acts which would necessitate war. It is difficult not to believe that Ellis and others, his equals in rank, were bribed by the Nabob of Oude, to bring about, if possible, a rupture between the English and the soubahdar, that the latter might be committed to hostilities, and some members of the house of Delhi, or the vizier himself, he enabled, through the turmoil, to reach the musnid. He was, at all events, anxious for his own purposes, both to weaken the power of the English and keep the soubahdarree of Bengal disturbed. Mr. Ellis, and his confederates in intrigue, had known this well, but all considerations seemed to be lost sight of by them, except the accumulation of money by whatever means.

Patna was stormed on the 6th of November, and the war against Meer Cossim was prosecuted with renewed ardour. The British, under Major Adams, met with their usual success. In five months, after the formal commencement of hostilities, Meer Cossim was driven beyond the Caramnassa. The loss of the British in accomplishing this success was very small, except at the massacre at Patna. Several gallant officers, however, fell in different places, and the senior member of council, Mr. Amyatt, perished at Moorshedabad, as already related, with several other civilians of position. Meer Cossim, accompanied by the odious Shimroo, sought the protection of the Nabob of Oude.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

WAR WITH THE NABOB OF OUDE—RUIN OF MEER COSSIM—DEATH OF MEER JAFFIER—THE ENGLISH PLACE NUJUM-AD-DOWLAH UPON THE MUSNID OF BENGAL—HUMILIATION OF NUNDCOOMAR, THE MINISTER OF JAFFIER—DISORGANIZATION OF ENGLISH AFFAIRS IN BENGAL—CORRUPT PRACTICES OF THE COUNCIL—APPOINTMENT OF CLIVE AS GOVERNOR—NEW SETTLEMENT OF AFFAIRS IN BENGAL.

MEER JAFFIER was now once more upon the musnid of the soubahdarree. It is important to review the terms upon which he was reinstated. Before he left Calcutta to join the army, upon which devolved the task of expelling his son-in-law, and exalting himself, considerable negotiations were necessary to induce him to comply with some of the

demands which had been previously made upon Meer Cossim. At heart the former approved the policy of the latter. Meer Jaffier regarded the conduct of the English throughout as unjust, and contrary to the treaty. After all his intrigues with the council, he betrayed no eagerness to reach the throne of which his relative was so soon to be deprived.

The council, pressed by the exigencies of the crisis, gave way to his demands, and a treaty was finally made. As this formed the basis of the relations of the English to the soubahdar of Bengal, so long as such an officer was permitted to exist, it will throw light upon the future proceedings of both parties on the part of the company.

We engage to reinstate the nabob Meer Mohammed Jaffier Cawn in the soubahdarree of the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, by the deposit of Meer Mohammed Cossim Cawn; and the effects, treasure, jewels, &c., belonging to Meer Mohammed Cossim Cawn, which shall fall into our hands, shall be delivered up to the nabob afore-named.

On the part of the Nabob.

First, That the treaty which I formerly concluded with the company, upon my accession to the nizamut, engaging to regard the honour and reputation of the company, their governor, and council, as my own, granting perwannahs for the currency of the company's trade, the same treaty I now confirm and ratify.

Secondly, I do grant and confirm to the company, for defraying the expenses of their troops, the chuelas of Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, which were before ceded for the same purpose.

Thirdly, I do ratify and confirm to the English the privilege granted them by their firman, and several husbulhookums, of carrying on their trade by means of their own dustnecks, free from all duties, taxes, and impositions, in all parts of the country, excepting the article of salt, on which a duty of two and a half per cent. is to be levied on the Rowana or Hoogly market price.

Fourthly, I give to the company half the saltpetre which is produced in the country of Boorneea, which their gomastahs shall send to Calcutta, the other half shall be collected by my fougadar, for the use of my offices; and I will suffer no other person to make purchases of this article in that country.

Fifthly, In the chuels of Silhet, for the space of five years, commencing with the Bengal year 1170, my fougadar, and the company's gomastah, shall jointly prepare chnaam, of which each shall defray half the expenses; and half the chnaam so made shall be given to the company, and the other half shall be for my use.

Sixthly, I will maintain twelve thousand horse and twelve thousand foot in the three provinces; and if there should be occasion for more, the number shall be increased proportionably to the emergency. Besides these, the force of the English company shall always attend me when they are wanted.

Seventhly, Wherever I shall fix my court, either at Moorsshedabad or elsewhere, I will advise the governor and council; and whatever number of English forces I may have occasion for, in the management of my affairs, I will demand them, and they shall be allowed me; and an English gentleman shall reside with me, to transact all affairs between me and the company; and a person shall also reside on my part at Calcutta, to negotiate with the governor and council.

Eighthly, The late perwannah issued by Cossim Allee Cawn, granting to all merchants the exemption of all duties, for the space of two years, shall be reversed and called in, and the duties collected as before.

Ninthly, I will cause the rupees coined in Calcutta to pass in every respect equal to the pieces of Moorsshedabad, without any deduction of hatta; and whosoever shall demand hatta shall be punished.

Tenthly, I will give thirty lacs of rupees to defray all the expenses and loss accruing to the company from the

war and stoppage of their investment; and I will reimburse to all private persons the amount of all such losses, proved before the governor and council, as they may sustain in their trade in the country; if I should not be able to discharge this in ready money, I will give assignments of land for the amount.

Eleventhly, I will confirm and renew the treaty which I formerly made with the Dutch.

Twelfthly, If the French come into the country, I will not allow them to erect any fortifications, maintain forces, or hold lands, zemindarrees, &c., but they shall pay tribute, and carry on their trade as in former times.

Thirteenthly, Some regulations shall be hereafter settled between us, for deciding all disputes which may arise between the English agents and gomastahs in the different parts of the country, and my officers.

In testimony whereof, we the said governor and council have set our hands, and affixed the seal of the company to one part hereof; and the nabob afore-named hath set his hand and seal to another part hereof; which were mutually done and interchanged at Fort William, the 10th day of July, 1764.

HENRY VANSITTART,	WARREN HASTINGS,
JOHN CARNAC,	RANDOLPH MARRIOT,
WILLIAM BILLERS,	HUGH WATTS.
JOHN CARTIER,	

Demands made on the part of the Nabob Meer Jaffier, to the Governor and Council, at the time of signing the Treaty.

First, I formerly acquainted the company with the particulars of my own affairs, and received from them repeated letters of encouragement with presents. I now make this request, that you will write in a proper manner to the company, and also to the King of England, the particulars of our friendship and union; and procure for me writings of encouragement, that my mind may be assured from that quarter, that no breach may ever happen between me and the English; and that every governor and councillor, and chief, who are here, or may hereafter come, may be well disposed and attached to me.

Secondly, Since all the English gentlemen, assured of my friendly disposition to the company, confirm me in the nizamut; I request, that to whatever I may at any time write, they will give their credit and assent, nor regard the stories of designing men to my prejudice, that all my affairs may go on with success, and no occasion may arise for jealousy or ill-will between us.

Thirdly, Let no protection be given, by any of the English gentlemen, to any of my dependents who may fly for shelter to Calcutta, or other of your districts; but let them be delivered up to me on demand. I shall strictly enjoin all my fougadars and aumils, on all accounts to afford assistance and countenance to such of the gomastahs of the company as attend to the lawful trade of their factories; and if any of the said gomastahs shall act otherwise, let them be checked in such a manner as may be an example to others.

Fourthly, From the neighbourhood of Calcutta to Hoogly, and many of the pergunahs, bordering upon each other, it happens, that, on complaints being made, people go against the tslookdars, reists, and tenants of my towns, to the prejudice of the business of the eircar; wherefore, let strict orders be given, that no peons be sent from Calcutta on the complaint of any one, upon my tslookdars or tenants; but on such occasions, let application be made to me, or the naib of the fougadarree of Hoogly, that the country may be subject to no loss or devastation. And if any of the merchants and traders which belonged to the buxbunder and azimgunge, and have settled in Calcutta, should be desirous of returning to Hoogly, and carrying on their business there as formerly, let no one molest them. Chanderungore, and the

French factory, was presented to me by Colonel Clive, and given by me in charge to Ameer Beg Cawn. For this reason, let strict orders be given, that no English gentlemen exercise any authority therein, but that it remain as formerly, under the jurisdiction of my people.

Fifthly, Whenever I may demand any forces from the governor and council for my assistance, let them be immediately sent to me, and no demand made on me for their expenses.

The demands of the nabob Shujaool Moolk Hissam, o Dowla Meer Mohammed Jaffier Cawn Behader Mohabut Jung, written in five articles. We the president and council of the English company do agree, and set our hands to, in Fort William, the 10th of July, 1763.

* Signed, &c.

Mr. Vansittart, as governor, carried out the policy of the committee. That policy, although successful, brought several members of their own body to a miserable end, and involved their chief partizans in similar destruction. Mr. Vansittart resolved to leave Bengal, but was detained by the dangerous intrigues of Meer Cossim beyond its borders, and the desire of the council that he should remain until the province was settled down in orderly government and external peace. When Meer Cossim crossed the Caramnassa, the emperor and his vizier were encamped near Allahabad. Thither the expelled viceroy repaired, and was ostentatiously received. He importuned his majesty to make war upon the English, but the vizier did not immediately act upon such counsel. He then begged the vizier himself, as Nabob of Oude, to make a grand effort for the expulsion of the English. His highness excused himself on the ground of disturbances in Bundelcund. Meer Cossim adroitly offered to put them down. His offer was accepted, and he was more fortunate than in his war with the English. So pleased was the nabob with the courage and energy of the exiled prince, that he agreed to march upon Babar, and endeavour to deprive the English of that province. Meanwhile, the emperor and vizier pretended to the English that Meer Cossim should be formally stripped of his power by an imperial decree, and his person surrendered to the governor of Bengal. The English, doubtful of the good faith of the native princes, marched troops to the banks of the Caramnassa. Several complications arose of a serious nature to frustrate their military plans. Major Adams resigned his command, and soon after died. Major (late Captain) Knox was compelled also to resign by ill health. Major Carnac at last was placed in charge of the army. The sepoy, who had for some time shown a mutinous spirit on occasions when their grievances were imaginary, or if real, before there was time for their investigation and redress, deserted in

* Majors Adams and Carnac absent.

great numbers to the enemy, and had the cause of the Nabob of Oude more at heart than those whose salt they eat. Open disobedience of orders was common on the part of those who did not desert. This caused extreme trepidation at Calcutta, and means were taken to soothe the irritation of the hiring soldiery. There were, however, a number of French deserters in the English pay, and these fomented the disturbance, so as almost to destroy the British sepoy contingent. It was found that Meer Jaffier was as much disinclined to go to war for English purposes as Meer Cossim himself could have been, and was in fact a less manageable instrument against foreign aggression. Major Carnac was ordered by the council to cross the Caramnassa and attack the enemy; but with his disaffected French and sepoy, he could not pursue a bold policy, and therefore acted only upon the defensive, which tended to dishearten such of the sepoy as remained obedient, who had been accustomed to see the English strike boldly for power. At length Carnac retreated to Patna. The enemy followed, and on the 13th of May, 1764, attacked the British. A long conflict ensued, and at the close of day the enemy was repulsed. The emperor offered to negotiate on the basis of Meer Jaffier's surrender of Bahar. The English not only refused, but demanded that Meer Cossim should be given up, the French (or Swiss as he was supposed by some to be) murderer Shimroo, and the sepoy deserters. Nothing came of these mutual demands. Major Carnac menacing the enemy's flank, he precipitately retired into Oude.

The council at Calcutta, mischievous and incompetent as ever, censured Major Carnac because he did not lead the army, which had fought so well on the 13th of May, into the enemy's territory. That experienced commander declared that only by expedients and extraordinary vigilance could disaffection in his ranks be subdued, and had he led his army into Oude it would have disbanded. The fact was, the Mohammedan sepoy regarded both the Emperor and Nabob of Oude with a religious reverence, which made them unwilling to fight against them; yet, on the day of battle, the *esprit de corps* common to soldiers kept them in action until victory was obtained: many who fought well deserted after. Major Carnac was unjustly and unwisely superseded, and the command given to Major Munro. Happily this officer was competent to the duty imposed upon him, but it might have been otherwise, and the injustice to Major Carnac, like other acts of the council, might have been followed by a speedy retribution. Major Munro found the whole of the

native force at Patna mutinous. The major adopted the policy of his predecessor, by first endeavouring to subdue the mutinous state of his own forces before attacking those of the enemy. The day he assumed the command, a battalion of sepoy with their arms and accoutrements set out to join the enemy. One hundred Europeans, a company of sepoy, whose officers reported them trustworthy, and two field-pieces were sent in pursuit of the deserters. They were overtaken by night while asleep, and not having placed sentinels, were surprised, disarmed, and taken prisoners. Fifty were selected for execution, and were blown away from guns. This deprives them of caste, and is regarded as a most severe punishment. The native troops in garrison refused to allow more than four of the men to be executed, but Munro loaded his guns with grape, drew up his Europeans in the intervals between his ordnance, and commanded the sepoy to ground their arms; the whole party originally sentenced were executed, and the mutiny was completely quelled. Thus early in the history of our occupation of India was mutiny displayed, and thus early was it shown by a man of vigour how to suppress it.

On the 15th of September, active operations commenced. The enemy disputed the passage of the Soam, but were dispersed in a masterly manner by Major Champion, an officer acting under Munro. At Buxar, Major Munro came up with the enemy in full force. A grand battle was fought, and a glorious victory obtained by the British. As the enemy retreated, a small river, the passage of which was covered by a bridge of boats, lay in the line of march. Before the rear of his army had crossed, the vizier destroyed the bridge and sacrificed two thousand of his men. Munro's opinion of this act was afterwards given in the following terms:—"The best piece of generalship Sujah-ad-Dowlah showed that day; because, if I had crossed the rivulet with the army, I would either have taken or drowned his whole army in the Caramnassa, and come up with his treasure and jewels and Cossim Ali Khan's jewels, which, I was informed, amounted to between two and three millions."* Besides those lost in the river, the battle of Buxar cost the imperial army two thousand men left dead upon the field of battle, many wounded prisoners, and one hundred and thirty-three pieces of cannon. The strength of the army was variously estimated from forty to sixty thousand men. The British numbered 7772 men, of whom more than eight hundred were placed *hors de combat*. The English acted with compassion to the wounded. On the

day after the battle, the major received a letter from the emperor congratulating him on his victory, declaring that the vizier held him in constraint, and imploring the major to lend him his assistance. Great was the astonishment of the British commander at the receipt of such a communication. Munro marched towards Benares; the emperor marched in the same direction. He found means to communicate with the English commander, offering to depose the Nabob of Oude and confer his territory upon the English, if the latter would only assist him against the nabob, who, as his vizier, had the real direction of affairs. He craved an interview. The major received from Calcutta directions favourable to the emperor, and avoided any molestation of his own personal guards. Meer Cossim was also anxious to escape the vizier, who demanded payment of subsidy, and also the emperor's tribute, neither of which the ex-soubahdar could pay. To convince his inexorable persecutor of this, he laid by his state and assumed the garb and mode of life of a Mohammedan devotee. As this was a reflection upon the hospitality of a Mohammedan prince, the vizier besought Meer Cossim to re-assume his princely style. Meanwhile, the troops which had followed the fortunes of the latter became clamorous for pay, and his highness parted with his hoarded gold for the purpose, but resolved to get rid of an army which could be of no use to him. Shimroo, the French or Swiss mercenary, who had been the executioner at the massacre at Patna, headed the rioters. This general and the troops went over to the vizier, taking their arms and artillery with them. Thornton represents this transfer as having taken place before the battle of Buxar; other writers describe it as one of the consequences of that battle.

The vizier deliberately plundered the unfortunate Cossim of all his valuables, except some jewels which he secreted, and sent by a trusty servant into the Rohilla country. Thus one Mohammedan prince was ever ready to rob and oppress another, while perpetually uniting in prayers and denunciations against the infidel. The vizier refused to fulfil his promise of giving up Meer Cossim to the English. When Major Munro reached Benares, an agent of the virtual governor of the Delhi empire waited upon the English officer, and opened fresh negotiations. He refused, in his employer's name, to deliver up Meer Cossim, Shimroo, or any of the fugitives, but offered to make peace and indemnify the English for the losses they had sustained, and for the expenses of the war. Munro refused. Subsequently, the vizier offered to

* Evidence of Major Munro, First Report.

connive at Meer Cossim's escape from his own custody, in such a way as that the English might make sure of catching him. He also offered to have Shimroo assassinated at an entertainment; but would not surrender him, it being contrary to the Koran. His excellency had no objection to a foul and sanguinary act of treachery, provided it was not brought under any especial prohibition of Mohammedan casuistry — exemplifying the way in which Mohammedanism hardened the heart, and prepared the hands for murder, while it made hypocrites and fanatics of its professors.

It was found impossible to make terms, and active hostilities were again renewed. The English laid unsuccessful siege to Chumnughur; but no battle of consequence occurred, and Major Munro resigned his command, and quitted India. Meanwhile, the occupation of the musnid of Bengal by Meer Jaffier was not productive of satisfaction to those who placed him there. He sent to Calcutta complaints, similar to those with which Meer Cossim had tormented the council; and the same sort of contests between the officers of the soubahdar and of the company continued. Meer Jaffier protested that it was impossible to govern Bengal while the English asserted rights and privileges subversive of all native government. The disputes with his highness were terminated by his death, which took place in February, 1765.

There were two competitors for the vacant government; the second son of the deceased prince, named Nujum-ad-Dowlah, and the infant son of the deceased Meeran. The English recognised Nujum-ad-Dowlah, although they had very little confidence in either his integrity or ability. They therefore took measures to insure their power, and, if possible, secure peace, in connection with the accession of the new sovereign. One of their methods for accomplishing these objects, was to take upon them the defence of the three provinces, on condition of the new soubahdar paying five lacs of rupees per mensem for the support of the army thus employed. Meer Jaffier had done this for several months previous to his death; but the English desired to have a public sanction connected with its future performance. The next care was to obtain proper persons for the management of the chief offices of state. This created difficulty. Meer Jaffier had been singularly attached to a man named Nundcoomar, a most treacherous enemy to the English. To him, well knowing that fact, Meer Jaffier had confided the chief management of his affairs. Mr. Van-

sittart opposed the elevation of this man by Meer Jaffier, but the latter made it a *sine qua non* to his own acceptance of power, at a moment when the English were glad to obtain some influential prince to set up in opposition to Meer Cossim. The governor and council deemed it expedient to yield; but the governor's misgivings were powerful as to the probable result.

The remarks of Mr. Vansittart, when he reluctantly gave his consent to the exaltation of Nundcoomar, were as follow:—"As to Nundcoomar, he had hitherto made himself remarkable for nothing but a seditious and treacherous disposition, which had led him to perpetrate the most atrocious acts against our government, having been detected and convicted by the voice of the whole board, in encouraging and assisting our enemies in their designs against Bengal; taking the opportunity of the indulgence granted him, of living in Calcutta, under the company's protection, to make himself the channel for carrying on a correspondence between the Governor of Pondicherry, and the shah-zada, then at war with us. During the soubahdarship of Jaffier Allee Cawn, he had distinguished himself by fomenting quarrels between him and the presidency. After the promotion of Cossim Allee Cawn, he became as active, but with greater success, in inventing plots, and raising jealousies against him. This gave him an ascendancy over some of the members of the board, and made him a party object; by which, and an unparalleled perseverance, he was enabled to set the whole community in a flame. Such was the man whom the nabob chose for the administration of his affairs, and whose exaltation to this rank, he made a condition of his acceptance of the soubahdarship."

It was doubtless because Nundcoomar was likely to work skilfully in undermining the English that he was such a favourite with Meer Jaffier, who, at heart, hated them, and desired to have appropriate instruments at hand should opportunity for their expulsion ever arise.

During the second government of Meer Jaffier various circumstances occurred to increase the suspicions which the English entertained of his chief advice, and they resolved that this man should not stand near the throne of Nujum-ad-Dowlah. They accordingly selected Mahomed Reza Khan for the post of chief minister to the new soubahdar. Nundcoomar's talents for intrigue were immediately set to work. He, unknown to the English, opened communications with the court of Delhi, and obtained thence a sumnid for the new soubahdar, before the English had com-

pleted their arrangements; thus making it appear that his highness ascended the throne not by English power or influence, but through the grace of the emperor; this was a means in the eyes of the multitude of depriving the English of the prestige they were so ambitious to maintain. After various skilful and successful manœuvres, this gifted but vicious man was unable to do more than thwart somewhat the designs of the English, who ultimately carried all their arrangements into effect. The council succeeded in gaining considerable power in the appointment of revenue officers, and thus hoped to guard against the quarrels, which during successive reigns had disturbed the peace of Bengal. Concerning these arrangements and others into which the English afterwards entered, a distinguished historian* of British empire in India thus writes:—"All these arrangements may fairly be supposed to have had their origin in an honest zeal for the benefit of the company by whose servants they were made, and of the country to which they belonged. The same favourable view cannot be taken of their conduct in another instance. They renewed with Nujum-ad-Dowlah the agreement contained in the last treaty made with his father for continuing to the English the privilege of carrying on the inland trade free from duties, excepting the two and a half per cent. paid on salt. Not only was this unreasonable and unjust in itself, but it was in direct contravention of positive orders from the company at home. The court of directors, by letters dated 8th February, 1764, had required the inland trade to be discontinued. The court of proprietors shortly afterwards, recommended a reconsideration of the subject, with a view to its regulation in such a manner as should 'prevent all further disputes between the *soubahdar* and the company.' The court of directors accordingly, in a letter dated 1st June, 1704, desired the council of Fort William to form, with the approbation of the nabob—in the language of the despatch, 'with his free will and consent, and in such a manner as not to afford any just grounds of complaint'—a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the private trade: but it is to be remarked, in giving these directions, the court took occasion to express their disapprobation of those articles in the treaty with Meer Jaffier which provided for the immunity of the company's servants from custom duties except on salt, while the general exemption granted by Meer Cossim was to be reversed. The court write, 'these are terms which appear to be so very injurious to the nabob

* Edward Thornton, Esq. *British Empire in India*, vol. i. chap. vi. p. 470, &c.

and to the natives, that they cannot, in the very nature of them, tend to anything but the producing general heart-burnings and disaffection; and consequently there can be little reason to expect the tranquillity in the country can be permanent: the orders therefore in our said letter of the 8th of February'—the orders directing the entire abandonment of the inland trade—'are to remain in force, until a more equitable and satisfactory plan can be formed and adopted.' In the face of these orders, the council of Calcutta inserted in their treaty with Nujum-ad-Dowlah, an article reserving to the servants of the company the privilege of continuing to trade upon the same terms as had been granted by Meer Jaffier—terms which the directors declared injurious to both prince and people, and incompatible with the tranquillity of the country. Well might the authority whose orders were thus set at nought, address those by whom the new treaty was framed and concluded, in language of severe and indignant reproof. In expressing their opinion upon the treaty, the court, after advert- ing to this article and to their previous orders, say, 'we must and do consider what you have done as an express breach and violation of our orders, and as a determined resolution to sacrifice the interests of the company and the peace of the country to lucrative and selfish views. This unaccountable behaviour puts an end to all confidence in those who made this treaty.'*

"While the private trade was thus secured for the benefit of the company's servants in general, those who had been instrumental in placing the new nabob on the throne had the usual opportunities of promoting their own special interests. Presents of large amount were tendered, and though for a time the members of council displayed a decent coyness, they were not unrelenting: as usual on such occasions, their scruples gave way before the arguments of their tempters. The nabob dispensed his wealth with a liberality becoming his rank. The gratitude of Mahomed Reza Khan was manifested by the earnestness with which he pressed a participation in his good fortune upon those who had bestowed it on him; and Juggut Seit, † anxious for the support of the British council in aiding his influence with the nabob, was ready, in the spirit of commercial speculation, to purchase it. Mr. Vansittart had retired from the government before the death of Meer Jaffier, and the chair was occupied by Mr. Spencer,

* *Letter to Bengal*, 19th of February, 1766.

† A banker, relative of the two unfortunate persons murdered by Meer Cossim, and successor to their vast trade and wealth.

a gentleman who, most opportunely for himself, had been brought from Bombay just in time to improve his fortune to the extent of two lacs of rupees.*

The members of council obtained large sums by these nefarious transactions. While these things occurred in Bengal, the war with the vizier, as Nabob of Oude, was still waged to the advantage of English arms. The unprincipled members of the council having obtained such treasures by the accession of the new soubahdar, and feeling themselves secure against anything the deposed soubahdar could do, offered to make peace with the Nabob of Oude, if he would, *as an act of justice*, execute Meer Cossim and Shimroo. This proposal shocked all who heard of it, except those most concerned in the infamy. The court of directors in London were aware of the proper conduct of Major Munro in refusing to be a party to any treacherous act on the part of the nabob towards these culprits, and had approved of his principles and policy. When they heard of this proposal coming from the council, they believed, or affected to believe, that the council could not have been in earnest, and observed, in reply, "If the law of hospitality forbid his delivering them up, surely it forbid his murdering them."*

Nothing seems to have come of this vile project, so worthy of the men who then ruled Bengal. The war went on. Chumnugur, which had so long resisted the English, surrendered in February. Allahabad fell before their arms the same month. The emperor, who professed to desire the success of the British, took up his residence in that imperial city. The Nabob of Oude fled to his capital, but after a short time abandoned Lucknow, and sought refuge in Rohilcund. Meer Cossim made his escape, and went in quest of his jewels. Shimroo abandoned the vizier when his cause was no longer prosperous, nor his service profitable. The ultimate fate of the nabob trembled in the balance; but the incompetent and unsteady council knew not what course to take, and were so occupied with their usual occupations of plunder and oppression within the limits of Bengal, as to have little leisure for great questions beyond its confines, which only affected the company in whose employment they were, the poor people of the country which they oppressed, or the honour of their own country, which they never consulted.

Bengal was nearly ruined. Repeated revolutions had unsettled the minds of men. Trade and industry fled affrighted from such a realm of conflict. The council, and the native rulers,

* *Letter to Bengal*, 19th of February, 1760.

together, had, by their unprincipled ambition, turned it into a vast Aceldama. The directors in London knew all this, and sought and found a remedy. Lord Macaulay thus depicts the state of affairs at this juncture:—"A great and sudden turn in affairs was at hand. Every ship from Bengal had for some time brought alarming tidings; the internal misgovernment of the province had reached such a point that it could go no further. What, indeed, was to be expected from a body of public servants, exposed to temptation such as that, as Clive once said, flesh and blood could not bear it, armed with irresistible power, and responsible only to the corrupt, turbulent, distracted, and ill-informed company, situated at such a distance, that the average interval of sending a dispatch, and the receipt of an answer, was above a year and a half? Accordingly, during the five years which followed the departure of Clive from Bengal, the misgovernment of the English was carried to a point such as seems hardly compatible with the very existence of society. The Roman proconsul, who, in a year or two, squeezed out of a province the means of rearing marble palaces and baths on the shores of Campania, of drinking from amber, of feasting on singing birds, of exhibiting armies of gladiators, and flocks of camel-leopards,—the Spanish vice-roy, who, leaving behind him the curses of Mexico, or Lima, entered Madrid with a long train of gilded coaches, and of sumpter horses, trapped and shod with silver, were now undone. Cruelty, indeed, properly so called, was not among the vices of the servants of the company. But cruelty itself could hardly have produced greater evils than sprang from their unprincipled eagerness to grow rich. They pulled down their creature, Meer Jaffier. They set up in his place another nabob named Meer Cossim. But Meer Cossim had parts, and a will; and though sufficiently inclined to oppress his subjects himself, he could not bear to see them ground to the dust by oppressions which yielded him no profit; nay, which destroyed his revenue in the very source. The English accordingly pulled down Meer Cossim and set up Meer Jaffier again; and Meer Cossim, after revenging himself by a massacre surpassing in atrocity that of the Black Hole, fled to the dominions of the Nabob of Oude. At every one of these revolutions the new prince divided among his foreign masters whatever could be scraped together in the treasury of his fallen predecessor. The immense population of his dominions was given up as a prey to those who had made him a sovereign, and could unmake him. The servants of the company obtained, not for their employers, but for themselves, a monopoly of

almost the whole of the internal trade. They forced the natives to buy dear and sell cheap. They insulted with impunity the tribunals, the police, and the fiscal authorities, of the country. They covered with their protection a set of native dependents who ranged through the province spreading desolation and terror wherever they appeared. Every servant of a British factor was armed with all the power of his master; and his master was armed with all the power of the company. Enormous fortunes were thus rapidly accumulated at Calcutta, while thirty millions of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness. They had been accustomed to live under tyranny, but never under tyranny like this. They found the little finger of the company thicker than the loins of Suraj-ad-Dowlah. Under their old masters they had, at least, one resource—when the evil became insupportable, the people rose and pulled down the government. But the English government was not to be so shaken off. That government, oppressive as the most oppressive form of barbarian despotism, was strong with all the strength of civilization. It resembled the government of evil genii, rather than the government of human tyrants. Even despair could not inspire the soft Bengalee with courage to confront men of English breed, the hereditary nobility of mankind, whose skill and valour had so often triumphed in spite of tenfold odds. The unhappy race never attempted resistance. Sometimes they submitted in patient misery. Sometimes they fled from the white man as their fathers had been used to do from the Mahratta; and the palanquin of the English traveller was often carried through silent villages, which the report of his approach had made desolate. The foreign lords of Bengal were naturally objects of hatred to all the neighbouring powers, and to all the haughty race presented a dauntless front. The English armies, everywhere outnumbered, were everywhere victorious. A succession of commanders formed in the school of Clive, still maintained the fame of our country. It was impossible, however, that even the military establishments of the country should long continue exempt from the vices which prevailed in every other part of the government. Rapacity, luxury, and the spirit of insubordination, spread from the civil service to the officers of the army. The evil continued to grow till every mess-room became the seat of conspiracy and cabal, and till the sepoys could be kept in order only by wholesale executions. At length the state of things in Bengal began to excite uneasiness at home. The general cry was that Clive, and Clive alone, could save the empire which he had founded."

As the result of the public feeling so strongly expressed at home, Clive was appointed "governor and commander-in-chief of the British possessions in Bengal," and he set sail the third time for India, arriving at Calcutta in May, 1765. Scarcely had he reached the seat of his new government when he vigorously set about the reform of abuses. He met the council, and expressed his determination to carry out a thorough and searching reform. A vague expectation existed among them that he would fall in with their views, yet rumours had reached them that Clive came out for the specific purpose of putting down their delinquencies. Johnstone, who was as bold as he was hypocritical and venal, "bearded the lion;" but while proceeding with his oration, Clive suddenly stopped him, and inquired, with his characteristic hauteur and decision, if the council intended to question the power of the new government. The orator murmured apologies, and the awed and baffled conclave of robbers, which were then dignified by the name of the council of Bengal, remained silent and submissive, each member alarmed as to the consequences which might ensue to himself if Clive were resisted, or his opinion disputed.

The reader will probably inquire where, during the period of the serious transactions from the restoration of Meer Jaffier to the arrival of Clive as governor, was Warren Hastings?—he who so eloquently and pertinaciously asserted the true interests of the company, as compatible with the honour of England and the rights of the Bengalee. His manly protests, and the restraint of his influence, were renewed in 1764, when, as stated before, he returned to England, where he resided during the whole of the transactions which had occurred. His representations in England had great weight with the company in showing them the true state of matters in Bengal, and the importance of a new and vigorous government of that presidency. Other and important events were destined to transpire before Warren Hastings trod again the soil of India, and took up his abode once more in the city of palaces.

Clive, having been made an Irish peer while in England, entered upon his duties as governor and commander-in-chief in Bengal with increased dignity, his new rank greatly promoting his influence both among his countrymen and the natives. He had also the advantage of being assisted by a body of men called the select committee. The person among them upon whom he had most reliance was General Carnac, the same who, as Major Carnac, had distinguished himself so well in Indian warfare. The council regarded the

select committee with great jealousy, but Clive overbore insubordination and held on his course.

The first subject of reform was the private trade, which he put down. Soon after, a complaint from the new nabob against his chief minister, that the latter had utterly exhausted the treasury to bribe or satisfy the demands of the council, led to an investigation which was marked by many stormy scenes, and issued in an exposure of the corruption of the council greater than had ever been alleged against them, or could have been supposed. The total disobedience of the company's orders were proved by these investigations to have been as flagrant as the corruption which prompted it.

Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, having formed an alliance with Mulhar, a Mahratta chief, made preparations for renewed hostilities against Bengal. Brigadier-general Carnac made such arrangements as prevented the junction of the allied forces, and by this means defeated the scheme of the alliance. The general fell upon a division of the Mahratta army unexpectedly, and cut it to pieces. Intimidated by the boldness and energy of the exploit, the whole Mahratta force retired towards the Jumna, whither Carnac proceeded, attacked, and routed them. The Nabob of Oude losing all hope of contending successfully with the English, threw himself upon their generosity. He came over for that purpose to the camp of Carnac.

Lord Clive quitted Calcutta on the 24th of June, 1765, and proceeded to the north-west, in order to negotiate in person with the nabob and with the emperor. On the 16th of August, at Allahabad, a treaty was signed.* This was the beginning of a connection with Oude, which, to the present day, has been fruitful of trouble to the English. This connection was forced upon the English by the aggressive policy of Sujah-ad-Dowlah. The English then acted in the case of Oude with moderation, and since then greater forbearance has been shown to it than to any of the tributary native states of India, so long as it remained in that category. The nabob resisted the insertion of any clause in the treaty for the introduction of "factories" in his dominions, but a stipulation for a right to trade was, nevertheless, insisted upon. The emperor confirmed by treaty all previous privileges possessed by the English, granted the company a reversionary interest in Lord Clive's jaghire, and conferred upon it also the dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. The company henceforth held the provinces on a footing superior to their previous occupancy. The com-

* Vide *Printed Treaties*.

pany became in fact the soubahdar, while they still upheld one nominally invested with the office. Previously, the power of the English was greater than that of the soubahdars, but the latter still held great authority, and a direct command over the resources of the country, financial and military; henceforth all real power rested with the English. The opinions of the select committee on this subject were thus expressed in a letter to the court of directors:—"The perpetual struggles for superiority between the nabobs and your agents, together with the recent proofs before us of notorious and avowed corruption, have rendered us unanimously of opinion, after the most mature deliberation, that no other method could be suggested of laying the axe to the root of all these evils, than that of obtaining the dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa for the company. By establishing the power of the Great Mogul, we have likewise established his rights; and his majesty, from principles of gratitude, equity, and policy, has thought proper to bestow this important employment on the company, the nature of which is, the collecting of all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the nizamat, to remit the remainder to Delhi, or wherever the king shall reside or direct."

The directors adopted the views of the select committee, and conveyed their approval, with instructions for future policy, in the following terms:*

"We come now to consider the great and important affair of the dewanee. When we consider that the barrier of the country government was entirely broke down, and every Englishman throughout the country armed with an authority that owned no superior, and exercising his power to the oppression of the helpless native, who knew not whom to obey, at such a crisis, we cannot hesitate to approve your obtaining the dewanee for the company.

"We must now turn our attention to render our acquisitions as permanent as human wisdom can make them. This permanency, we apprehend, can be found only in the simplicity of the execution. We observe the account you give of the office and power of the king's dewan in former times was—the collecting of all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the nizamat, to remit the remainder to Delhi. This description of it is not the office we wish to execute; the experience we have already had, in the province of Burdwan,

* *Letter to Bengal, 17th of May, 1766.*

convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to conduct the collection of the revenues, and follow the subtle native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country, to perplex and to elude the payments. We therefore entirely approve of your preserving the ancient form of government, in the upholding the dignity of the soubahdar.

"We conceive the office of dewan should be exercised only in superintending the collection and disposal of the revenues, which office, though vested in the company, should officially be executed by our resident at the darbar, under the control of the governor and select committee, the ordinary bounds of which control should extend to nothing beyond the superintending the collection of the revenues and the receiving the money from the nabob's treasury to that of the dewannah, or the company.

"The resident at the darbar, being constantly on the spot, cannot be long a stranger to any abuses in the government, and is always armed with power to remedy them. It will be his duty to stand between the administration and the encroachments always to be apprehended from the agents of the company's servants, which must first be known to him; and we rely on his fidelity to the company to check all such encroachments, and to prevent the oppression of the natives. We would have his correspondence to be carried on with the select committee through the channel of the president. He should keep a diary of all his transactions. His correspondence with the natives must be publicly conducted; copies of all his letters sent and received be transmitted monthly to the presidency, with duplicates and triplicates, to be transmitted home, in our general packet, by every ship."

Mr. Auber observes upon the last paragraph:—"This was the introduction of the system of recorded check, which has since prevailed in conducting the home administration of the India government."

Reformations were as much required in the military as in the civil affairs of the presidency. In attempting to carry out these, Lord Clive met with a more formidable opposition than ever from the council. At the instigation of a general officer, Sir Robert Fletcher, all the officers of the company's army conspired to resign their commissions on a single day; so that by depriving the army of officers, the governor would be compelled to submit to their terms. By amazing vigour, ability, and resolution, Clive put down this mutiny without bloodshed. General Fletcher, and some of the chief delinquents, were cashiered; and the rest were

pardoned, on profession of repentance, and permitted to return to their duty.

While Clive was reducing the army to discipline, an opportunity was afforded to him of showing his zeal for their welfare. A large legacy was left to him by Meer Jaffier, consisting of five lacs of rupees. Clive made over this sum to the company, for the formation of a military fund for invalided officers and soldiers, and their widows. The company accepted the trusteeship, and passed resolutions complimenting his lordship's generosity. This act has been censured, as contrary to the covenants insisted upon by the company with their servants, after the government of Mr. Vansittart, that no presents were to be received from the native governments by any of the company's officers. The directors having been assured by their legal advisers that the legacy would be received by Clive without violating the covenants, they passed resolutions of approval of his lordship's conduct. Clive displayed all his former activity during his government. He visited the upper parts of Bengal personally, investigating all the company's affairs.

The health of his lordship began to suffer from his exposure to the climate, and this made him desirous to return. Another motive for that wish he confessed to be, that having a numerous family, he desired to superintend the education and conduct of his children. His great wealth, which he desired to enjoy in England, was probably as influential as any other cause of his desire to return home. The company sent an express overland, by way of Bussorah, to induce him to remain another season. He reluctantly consented, and devoted his vast energies to the great work of consolidating the power of the company.

During Lord Clive's stay in Bahar, while investigating the company's affairs there, a congress was held at Chupra. His lordship, General Carnac, Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the emperor's chief minister, and some Jaut and Rohilla chiefs, assembled there. A treaty, for mutual security against the Mahrattas, was there formed, in case those marauders should invade the dominions of any of the states united in the alliance. Deputies from the Mahratta chiefs also attended at Chupra, who made ardent protestations of peace, and proved that what had been construed into hostile demonstrations was the work of the emperor himself, who had foolishly engaged them to escort him to Delhi.

In May, 1766, the soubahdar died. It was well that the native government had been recently placed on a new footing, as already

described, for otherwise the death of the soubahdar would have caused new intrigues and disturbances. Clive concerted with the governments of Bombay and Madras such operations against the Mahrattas, as would in case of fresh invasions from them effectually check their power. Clive's health now seriously gave way, and his anxiety to return home greatly increased. He, however, believed that the object for which he had returned to Bengal had been accomplished, and that the consequences of his departure, apprehended by the company would in all probability not occur.

The private trade, which Lord Clive had apparently suppressed, was soon after renewed, and it is scarcely to his honour that he became participator in it, realizing large profits, which he divided among his relations and friends. He justified himself on the ground that he personally received no benefit; but if it enabled him to provide for his brother-in-law and other adherents, even to his valet, the excuse is not valid.

He quitted Bengal on the 29th of January, 1767. The career of Clive as a soldier was now ended. Even as a statesman he had already numbered his days; for although in England he took a large part in parliamentary and India-house concerns, and was put upon his defence by bitter and powerful enemies, so as to compel him to be very active in public life, he never again saw India, and could only influence affairs there by his opinion, given to the directors or to the public. Probably the best estimate of his character as a soldier and statesman, and of his general services in India, ever made, was that expressed by Mr. Thornton in the following passages of his Indian history:—
 "The reader who looks back upon the scenes through which he has been conducted, will at once perceive that it is on his military character that Clive's reputation must rest. All the qualities of a soldier were combined in him, and each so admirably proportioned to the rest, that none predominated to the

detriment of any other. His personal courage enabled him to acquire a degree of influence over his troops which has rarely been equalled, and which in India was before his time unknown; and this, united with the cool and consummate judgment by which his daring energy was controlled and regulated, enabled him to effect conquests which, if they had taken place in remote times, would be regarded as incredible. Out of materials the most unpromising he had to create the instruments for effecting these conquests, and he achieved his object where all men but himself might have despaired. No one can dwell upon the more exciting portions of his history without catching some portion of the ardour which led him through these stirring scenes; no one who loves the country for which he fought can recall them to memory without mentally breathing honour to the name of Clive. In India his fame is even greater than at home, and that fame is not his merely, it is his country's.

"As a statesman, Clive's vision was clear, but not extensive. He could promptly and adroitly adapt his policy to the state of things which he found existing; but none of his acts display any extraordinary political sagacity. Turning from his claims in a field where his talents command but a moderate degree of respect, and where the means by which he sometimes sought to serve the state and sometimes to promote his own interests give rise to a very different feeling, it is due to one to whom his country is so deeply indebted, to close the narrative of his career by recurring once more to that part of his character which may be contemplated with unmixed satisfaction. As a soldier he was pre-eminently great. With the name of Clive commences the flood of glory which has rolled on till it has covered the wide face of India with memorials of British valour. By Clive was formed the base of the column which a succession of heroes, well worthy to follow in his steps, have carried upward to a towering height, and surrounded with trophies of honour, rich, brilliant, and countless."

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF MR. VERELST AND MR. CARTIER—
ARRIVAL OF WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR.

CLIVE's last act before his departure from Bengal was to continue the select committee, the company having empowered him either to abolish or continue it as he deemed the wiser course. He nominated Mr. Verelst to succeed him as governor, assisted by Mr. Cartier, Colonel Smith, Mr. Sykes, and Mr. Beecher. On the 17th of February, 1767, Mr. Verelst took the oath as governor. Scarcely had Clive departed when matters again fell into the former train of corruption and insubordination. Mr. Mill gives the following picture of the condition of the province:—"For the benefit of certain false pretences which imposed upon nobody, the government of the country, as far as regarded the protection of the people, was dissolved. Neither the nabob nor his officers dared to exert any authority against the English, of whatsoever injustice and oppression they might be guilty. The gomastahs, or Indian agents employed by the company's servants, not only practised unbounded tyranny, but, overawing the nabob and his highest order, converted the tribunals of justice themselves into instruments of cruelty, making them inflict punishment upon the very wretches whom they oppressed, and whose only crime was their not submitting with sufficient willingness to the insolent rapacity of those subordinate tyrants. While the ancient administration of the country was rendered inefficient, this suspension of the powers of government was supplied by nothing in the regulations of the English. Beyond the ancient limits of the presidency, the company had no legal power over the natives: beyond these limits, the English themselves were not amenable to the British laws; and the company had no power of coercion except by sending persons out of the country; a remedy always inconvenient, and, except for very heinous offences, operating too severely upon the individual to be willingly applied. The natural consequence was, that the crimes of the English and their agents were in a great measure secured from punishment, and the unhappy natives lay prostrate at their feet. As the revenue of the government depended upon the productive operations of the people; and as a people are productive only in proportion to the share of their own produce which they are permitted to enjoy; this wretched administration could not fail, in

time, to make itself felt in the company's exchequer."*

Mr. Verelst's administration, and that of Mr. Cartier, by whom he was followed, were chiefly occupied by internal arrangements, revenue, and trade.† The Mahrattas did not perpetrate their usual raids, and the weak soubahdar did not give himself up to political intrigue after the fashion of his predecessors.‡ This period of peace did not bring commercial prosperity to the company. Their servants invented new systems of cheating them, and of harassing the people. The company's servants still returned rich from Bengal after a few years' service, and the poverty of the province itself increased. The condition of the company's interests in Bengal was deplorable and disheartening.§ While, however, Bengal was at peace within its own borders, there were causes at work beyond its limits, to engage the presidency in the work of war. The "Goorkhas" had invaded the territory of the Rajah of Nepaul, who was friendly, and between whose people and the subjects of the soubahdar and the English there was trade. He claimed the assistance of the soubahdar, and the English united with his highness in affording it. The council and the select committee had the usual assumption of those bodies, and the weakness and incompetency for warlike undertakings which had hitherto characterised the former body. Their plans were expensive, yet inadequate; rash, yet not bold; time-serving, but neither cautious nor prudent. The expedition against the Goorkhas was abortive.

Hyder Ali, of whom the reader will be informed in another chapter, became formidable at this time, and carried war and desolation

* Governor Verelst, in his letter to the directors, immediately before his resignation, dated 16th of December, 1769, says: "We insensibly broke down the barrier betwixt us and government, and the native grew uncertain where his obedience was due. Such a divided and complicated authority gave rise to oppressions and intrigues, unknown at any other period; the officers of the government caught the infection, and, being removed from any immediate control, proceeded with still greater audacity. In the meantime, we were repeatedly and peremptorily forbid to avow any public authority over the officers of government in our own names," &c.

† *English Government in Bengal*. By Harry Verelst, London, 1772. *Thoughts on our Acquisitions in Bengal*, London, 1771.

‡ Stewart's *History of Bengal*, 1813.

§ *History of the East India Company*, London, 1793.

into the Carnatic. The Madras government applied for aid to Bengal. The urgency of the case was greater than the invasion of Nepal by the Goorkhas, and assistance was sent to such an extent as to tie the hands of the Bengal council from aggressive proceedings elsewhere. The council was more troubled from the scarcity of money than from any other means. This they attributed to the Chinese investments, which were generally made from the Bengal revenues. Mr. Mill accounts for it by the large sums drained from the country in various ways by the company's servants. These they, to a great extent, sent home through the Dutch and French Companies.*

On the 23rd of October, 1768, the deficiency reached 663,055 rupees. The correspondence between Fort William and Fort St. George at this period presents a pitiable picture of bad financiers, incapable administrators, and traders ignorant of commercial philosophy. Mr. Mill attributes the poverty of the English exchequer in Bengal mainly to the absorption of their revenues in the expenses of governing their newly acquired territory. Professor Wilson denies this in the following terms:—"This is not warranted by the facts: a slight examination of the general accounts of receipts and disbursements exhibited in the accounts of the Bengal presidency published by the select committee shows, that the financial difficulties experienced there arose not from the political, but the commercial transactions of the company. From 1761 to 1772 there was a surplus on the territorial account of about £5,475,000 (the smaller figures are purposely omitted). The whole produce of the import cargoes was £1,437,000, the cost value of the goods remitted to England, £5,291,000, of which, therefore, £3,854,000 had been provided out of the revenue. Besides this, large remittances for commercial purposes had been made to other settlements, and to China, exceeding those received by £2,358,000, and consequently, exceeding the whole territorial receipt by £737,000. It is not matter of surprise, therefore, that the territorial treasury was embarrassed, nor is it to be wondered at that the resources of the country were in progress of diminution; the constant abstraction of capital, whether in bullion or goods, could not fail in time to impoverish any country however rich, and was very soon felt in India, in which no accumulation of capital had ever taken place, from the unsettled state of the government, and the insecurity of property, and the constant tendency of the population to press upon the means of subsistence."

* Mill, book iv. chap. vii.

On the 24th of December, 1769, Mr. Verelst left the three provinces in perfect peace, and with a less amount of jealousy between the soubahdar and the council than had at any previous time existed.*

The greatest danger of Verelst's government was an event which passed harmlessly away, but which, at the beginning of his presidential career, seriously menaced the peace of Bengal. Shah Abdallah—instigated, it was believed, by Meer Cossim—advanced with a powerful army towards Delhi. The council made demonstrations in favour of "the king," as his imperial majesty was then frequently styled. The cause of his majesty was, in fact, the cause of the soubahdar. His majesty was unable to cope with the Shah Abdallah; and was on the point of submission, when English interposition compelled a compromise. The shah, however, did not return to his capital of Lahore without exacting an indemnity from his majesty of Delhi. The return of the marauder was harassed by the Sikhs, who were then rising into power, and were destined to hold Lahore itself as their capital at a period not remote.

The danger of a war beyond the frontier, as the ally of the emperor, caused the council to urge the company at home to complete the military establishment recommended by Lord Clive. Mr. Verelst exerted himself in treating with the Jauts, Mahrattas, and other native powers; the policy upon which he proceeded having been dictated from home, the object being to form a complete chain of the company's influence and dominion, from the banks of the Carannassa to the extremity of the coast of the Coromandel.† The vizier (Nabob of Oude) maintained a formidable army; and notwithstanding the terrible defeats endured by him under the government of Mr. Vansittart, and his humiliated position to Lord Clive, he began a new system of intrigues almost as soon as Mr. Verelst was called into power. He first endeavoured, by intimidation, to compel the King of Delhi to surrender to him the fortress, city, and district of Allahabad. His majesty refused to do so, rightly judging that any attempt on the part of his rebellious vizier to seize the coveted territory, would bring the English upon him. The vizier apprehending the same result should he seize the place, had the audacity to attempt the corruption of a British officer. Colonel Smith had remained with a British brigade at Allahabad since the Lahore rajah had made his incursion upon the King of

* *English Government in Bengal.* By H. Verelst, London, 1772.

† *British Power in India,* Auber, vol. i. chap. iv. p. 182.

Delhi's dominions. The vizier repaired to the colonel, offering a large reward, and to swear eternal fidelity upon the Koran, if that officer would co-operate in delivering the fortress into his hands. The colonel, of course, communicated these facts to his government; and measures were taken to compel the vizier to reduce the army which he maintained as the Nabob of Oude. This purpose was effected after troublesome negotiations; and menaces which, if not executed, would have exposed the British to contempt, but the execution of which, had the nabob resisted, would have involved much expense and bloodshed, and probably new warlike combinations against the British.

There was a disposition to negotiate with the native princes under menaces, which exposed the council to alternatives similar to those which depended upon their failure with the Nabob of Oude, had they been so unfortunate as not to engage him to their demands. There was also a disposition on the part of the council at Calcutta to mix in petty disputes, in the hope by dispossessing one weak rajah after another of his territory, to grasp more for the company. Among minor instances of this, there was one which concerned the Rajah of Hindooput, which very unfavourably impressed the company at home.

In view of the diplomatic meddling which so much engaged the council and Mr. Verelst, the directors wrote a despatch which was one of the most enlightened ever directed to India. It is probable that the opinions of Clive and Hastings found expression in these documents. One was written on May the 11th, 1769, the other in June. The following are extracts:—"We have constantly enjoined you to avoid every measure that might lead you into further connections, and have recommended you to use your utmost endeavour to keep peace in Bengal and with the neighbouring powers; and you, on your part, have not been wanting in assurances of your resolution to conform to these our wishes. Yet, in the very instructions which you have given to the deputies sent up to Sujah Dowlah with professions of friendship, you have inserted an article, which will not only give fresh cause of jealousy to Sujah Dowlah, but engages you likewise in disputes with powers still more distant. We mean the article whereby they are directed to apply to the king for a grant of two or three circars, which belonged, you say, originally to the Eliabad province, but were unlawfully possessed, some time since, by the Hindooput rajah. Is it our business to inquire into the rights of the Hindooput rajah, and the usurpations he may have made upon others? And,

supposing the fact to have been proved, does such an injustice on his part give us any claim to the disputed districts? If the districts in question belong to the Eliabad province, they are a part of Sujah Dowlah's undoubted inheritance; and, supposing him to waive his right, you cannot send a man nor a gun for the defence of these new acquisitions without passing through his country, which will be a perpetual source of dispute and complaint. Nor does the mischief stop here. The Hindooput rajah, who, by all accounts, is rich, will naturally endeavour to form alliances, to defend himself against this unexpected attack of the English. Then you will say your honour is engaged, and the army is to be led against other powers still more distant. You say nothing in your letters of this very essential article of your instructions to the deputies. In several of our letters, since we have been engaged as principals in the politics of India, and particularly during the last two or three years, we have given it as our opinion, that the most prudent system we could pursue and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to our possessions, would be to incline to those few chiefs of Hindoostan who yet preserve an independence of the Mahratta power, and are in a condition to struggle with them; for so long as they are able to keep up that struggle, the acquisitions of the company will run the less risk of disturbance. The Rohillas, the Jauts, the Nabob of the Deccan, the Nabob of Oude, and the Mysore chief, have each in their turn kept the Mahrattas in action, and we wish them still to be able to do it; it is, therefore, with great concern we see the war continuing with Hyder Naigue, and a probability of a rupture with Sujah Dowlah and Nizam Ally. In such wars, we have everything to lose, and nothing to gain: for, supposing our operations be attended with the utmost success, and our enemies reduced to our mercy, we can only wish to see them restored to the condition from which they set out; that is, to such a degree of force and independence as may enable them still to keep up the contest with the Mahrattas and with each other. It would give us, therefore, the greatest satisfaction to hear that matters are accommodated, both at Bengal and on the coast: and in case such a happy event shall have taken place, you will do your utmost to preserve the tranquillity."

In July, 1769, the bad faith of the French involved the council in anxieties. The French at Chandernagore opened a deep ditch around the town, under the pretence of repairing a drain. This work was followed by others, which were intended to put the place in a position of defence, in contravention of the

eleventh article of the treaty of peace. The English government at Calcutta remonstrated and protested. The French carried on the works with greater energy. The council ordered their destruction. The French government made representations to the court of London, that the works were sanitary and not warlike, and complained bitterly of the unreasonable jealousy of the company's servants. Either these representations were hypocritical and false, or the French government was imposed upon by the French East India Company. The latter supposition is not probable. The French government pretended to have causes for complaint, as it had determined, upon the first favourable opportunity, to endeavour to regain its lost ground in the East. In the letter of the court of directors to the council of Bengal, dated the 27th of June, 1770, the result of the complaint of the French court to that of St. James is thus stated:—"His majesty has constituted Sir John Lindsay his plenipotentiary for examining into the supposed infractions of the late treaty of peace: you will afford him the necessary information and assistance, whereby he may be enabled to answer the complaints of the French plenipotentiary, to justify your conduct, and to defend those rights of the British crown which were obtained by express stipulation in the treaty of Paris, and which appear to have been invaded by the proceedings of the French at Chandernagore."

Sir John Lindsay was not disposed to regard matters in a light unfavourable to France, and much unseemly discussion between the servants of the company and the servants of the crown arose out of the appointment of Sir John. The council was undoubtedly justified in complaining of an infraction of treaty, and in enforcing the observance of it, results proved that the opinion they formed of the temper and intentions of the French from their proceedings in the matter of dispute, was well founded. The year 1770 opened with important changes in connection with Bengal, and with the surrounding states intimately related to it. Mr. Cartier began his career as president. Brigadier-general Smith resigned his command in December, 1769, and Sir Robert Barker took his place. Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, who had lost the king's confidence, was, by a series of ingenious intrigues on his part, reinstated in favour, and was again in full power as vizier of the empire. One of the imperial princes married the nabob's daughter, still further promoting the vizier's power. These official and political changes took place, not noiselessly, but without war. There were commotions at Allahabad, and mutinies of the

troops of the empire and of Oude; yet these important transactions were accomplished without battle, and the collisions of thrones and states. Amidst the rapid vicissitudes thus brought about, Meer Cossim, so long hidden from the observations of the different governments, emerged from his obscurity. The Rancee of Gohud invited him from the Rohilla country to Gwalior. The vizier knew his movements, and supported them. He committed the foolish king to a correspondence with him. Mahrattas, Jauts, Sikhs, and Rajpoots, were engaged in a confederacy to support the part of the new actor upon the great political stage. Motions of the various parties were like the moves upon a chess-board, where the players are equal and the game is drawn. There were demonstrations which portended the accomplishment of the views of each of the various parties in turn, but none obtained the advantages meditated. The French were unostentatiously influencing all parties against the English, but their position was one of such commanding strength that none dared to strike the first blow. The English remained firm and unyielding. As the rock, flinging back the rays of the torrid sun, frowning upon the angry waves breaking against it, and silent and settled while the tempest sweeps around, so English power in Bengal presented a sturdy, noiseless front to the combination of distinct but blended, or concussing, elements of political ambition and power which were gathered around. Band after band of Rohilla, Rajpoot, Mahratta, Sikh, and Jaut, moved about in concert, or in conflict, as waves tossed upon waves in a storm-smitten sea, to be confused and broken.

In March, 1769, the soubahdar of Bengal died of small-pox, and a younger brother, ten years of age, reigned in his stead. Later in the year Rajah Bulwant Sing died at Benares, and was succeeded by Cheyt Sing.

In 1770, the rapid and victorious movements of the Mahrattas caused much uneasiness in Bengal. The menacing attitude which they assumed brought out circumstances which afforded fresh proofs of the weakness and folly of the king, and the perfidy of his vizier. Partly through the good faith of some of the Mahratta generals, and probably as much from the fear which the English inspired among the rest, no inroad was made upon Bengal. The spirit displayed by the French in fortifying Chandernagore in the early part of the previous year pervaded their conduct during that of which we write. They seemed anxious to bring about a rupture between France and England in the hope that, if the English were distracted by a European war, the French in India might form such alliances

with the native governments as would turn the scale of power against the English.

The Mahrattas, however, unwilling to attack the English, harassed their real and pretended allies, and at last seized upon portions of the King of Delhi's territories and of those of the Nabob of Oude. The council at Calcutta resolved to interfere. The force at Dinagapore was ordered to march to the banks of the Caramnassa, and the garrison at Allahabad was reinforced, while two of the king's battalions quartered there marched to the points most in danger from the enemy. The Mahrattas laid siege to Ferokabad, but being deficient in material, they turned the siege into a blockade. The arrangements of the English caused the blockade to be raised without a blow being struck. The Mahrattas, however, departed in many separate bodies, taking various routes, as if determined to fall upon many different places at once, and, by a series of masterly movements and rapid marches, all these divisions converged upon Delhi, which was captured by a *coup de main*. The English afterwards received tidings which proved to be true, that this feat was not quite so brilliant as it appeared to be: the king himself having conspired against his own government, incredible as such a policy may appear. His majesty, fearing that the victorious marauders would proclaim shah-zada in his room, adopted this strange course to prevent such a catastrophe. He even hoped that, when in the power of the Mahrattas, they would find it their interest to act in alliance with him, and that his intricate measures would issue in the fulfilment of his long-cherished and romantic desire of reigning in Delhi instead of Allahabad, and of sitting upon the throne of his ancestors unmolested. The vizier, opposed to this measure, deemed it politic to concur, and joined his forces as Nabob of Oude to those of his majesty. The king and his vizier having come to terms with their enemies in a manner so unprecedented even in the fickle policy of Indian states, the company's territory not being attacked, and his majesty and the vizier declaring not only peace but friendship, the English had no pretence for war, but endeavoured by negotiation to obtain various strong posts, which they represented to his majesty were rendered necessary to their security by his majesty's own strange proceedings.

In the month of April, 1772, Mr. Cartier retired from the government of Bengal, and Warren Hastings, then a member of council at Madras, was appointed to the government. There was no other man in India so fit for the important post, nor in England, except Clive.

Before noticing the events of Mr. Hastings' government, some notice of his career since he had left Bengal is here appropriate. It has been already shown that his conduct in India had been most honourable and humane, although his temptations were at least as numerous and pressing as those before which so many fell degraded. Lord Macaulay, in his celebrated essay on Warren Hastings, strangely asserts that little was heard of him up to the period of his leaving India with Mr. Vansittart. Had little been heard of him during that time, he probably never would have become governor of Bengal; certainly he would never have been the ruler of British India. During the whole period of his residence in Bengal he had been a noticeable person. In every meeting of council, while Mr. Vansittart administered the government, Mr. Hastings distinguished himself by the purity of his motives, the soundness of his policy, and a remarkable foresight. He had read the native character profoundly, had acquainted himself with the literature of the East extensively, and had studied political and administrative science *con amore*. He was well known to the native governments and the company's servants in India as a man of genius, and the directors and proprietary at home considered him to be a man of superior capacity before he had left Bengal.

When he returned to England, his time was chiefly occupied in retirement, meditation, liberal studies, and in recruiting his health. He did all in his power to encourage the study of oriental literature in England; and engaged the celebrated Dr. Johnson to some extent in his views; at all events, he left impressions of his own genius and learning upon the mind of that great man, to which the latter afterwards referred with pleasure.

As Hastings had not enriched himself like other "returned Indians," his pecuniary resources were small; and he became so embarrassed that he was compelled to solicit employment from the East India Company. They were very glad to make such valuable services available; and having paid the highest tribute to his talents and integrity which language could convey, they appointed him member of council in Madras. All his little savings had been invested for the benefit of his poor relatives, to whom, like Clive, he manifested the most noble generosity and ardent affection. He was from this circumstance compelled to borrow money to enable him to depart in a manner sufficiently respectable to the high post to which he was designated.

In the spring of 1769 he embarked for

Madras. The voyage was replete with romantic incident, which left a lasting impression upon the mind and heart of Hastings. It is doubtful whether the connexion of an amatory kind—so much to his discredit—formed on board the *Duke of Grafton*, did not exercise an unfavourable influence over his whole moral nature, and over his future career. His character certainly never afterwards appeared in so favourable a light as it had before, although his talent shone out more conspicuously. His moral delinquency could not obscure the brilliancy of his genius—even the sun has spots upon its disc. When Hastings arrived at Madras, he found the company's affairs in a seriously disorganized condition. Lord Macaulay describes with perfect precision the state of things, and the relation which Hastings bore to them, when he wrote, "His own tastes would have led him to political rather than

to commercial pursuits; but he knew that the favour of his employers chiefly depended upon their dividends, and that their dividends depended chiefly on the investment. He therefore, with great judgment, determined to employ his vigorous mind for a time to this department of business, which had been much neglected since the servants of the company had ceased to be clerks, and had become warriors and negotiators. In a very few months he effected an important reform. The directors notified to him their high approbation, and were so much pleased with his conduct, that they determined to place him at the head of the government of Bengal."

In this position matters must be left in the chief presidency, while the reader's attention is turned once more to the Carnatic, and to the regions of Mysore, whose prince then filled so large a space and held so great a name in Indian reputation.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

BOMBAY AND MADRAS—EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THOSE PRESIDENCIES TO 1775.

DURING the period the history of which in Bengal has been already related, Bombay was the scene of comparatively few incidents of importance, except those which were connected with Hyder Ali, whose exploits will be the subject of a separate chapter. After the destruction of the pirates of Gheria, by Commodore James and Colonel Clive, in 1756, the presidency experienced comparatively little trouble from marauders of that description for some years. By degrees the Malwar pirates acquired strength and boldness, causing alarm to the merchants, and injury to their commerce. In January, 1765, it was resolved to put an end to those apprehensions and injuries by an attack upon the robbers in their stronghold, which was successfully executed; and the fort of Raree, in the southern Concan, was captured. By this conquest security was obtained for mercantile ships, and country boats for many years. The vicinity of the Mahrattas, and the increasing power of that confederacy, made them especially formidable to Bombay, although Madras and Bengal were also much harassed by their fitful and predatory movements against surrounding native states. The Bengal government was disposed to unite with those of the other presidencies in a combined attack upon the Mahratta power, but the Bombay council wisely represented that the Mahrattas on the

Bengal frontier acted independently of the government of Poonah, that an attack upon any would constrain a combination of all the Mahratta chiefs, and that such a combination would prove far too formidable for the English to attack it with any hope of success, especially as it was likely other native forces would join the enemy. These arguments prevailed, and the formidable Mahrattas were allowed to develop their resources and power unchecked by the English, except when aggressions upon native governments in alliance with the English brought the troops of the latter into the field, or their political agents into action.

In May, 1763, Hyder Ali, or Hyder Naigue, as he was frequently then called, attracted the very serious attention of the Bombay government. Previous to this date he had put forth considerable power. He had taken Bednore, Mangalore, and Onore, and his advance into Concan, had struck the country with terror. The obvious aim of Hyder was to bring the sea forts into subjection, and in doing so he professed to act in conformity with the interests of the company, by putting down piracy, preventing its revival, and offering new points for the conduct of legitimate trade. On the 27th of May, he made a treaty* with the council of Bombay, by which they were

* *Printed Treaties*, p. 518.

allowed to erect a factory at Onore, a place afterwards rendered famous by a siege. He also afforded them various valuable commercial privileges. In return he demanded seven thousand stand of arms. This placed the council in great difficulty, for the company had issued strict orders against supplying the country powers with arms; yet, if the council had refused compliance, Hyder would have inferred that they distrusted and feared him, or that they had ultimate designs against his territory or power. The council endeavoured by half measures to avoid the difficulty; they supplied him with five hundred stand of arms, and by so doing dissatisfied both him and the company. The latter rebuked the council, and renewed, in stern language, their previous prohibitions against affording arms to native princes on any grounds or pretexts, except when allies in actual war. Hyder was disgusted at receiving about one-fourteenth of the number of muskets which he had requested, and being vindictive and suspicious, he cherished a bad feeling to the council, which he deemed it politic to suppress, although he took no trouble to conceal his disappointment and his doubts of the friendliness of the Bombay government. Hyder, however, still pressed for arms from the council, and his demands were complied with. The directors, in referring to their objections to providing native powers with musketry that might prove ultimately hostile, were very particular and authoritative in ordering that no cannon should be given or sold to them, and that none of the coast powers should be aided in obtaining ships of war. The council of Bombay was nearly as prone as that of Bengal to set the judgment of the company at defiance, where vanity, interest, or ambition, prompted a course opposed to the directors. Notwithstanding the most distinct, and even angry orders, from the directors to the contrary, the council permitted Hyder to purchase ordnance, and to build a ship of war at Bombay, to enable him to check the Mahrattas, and other freebooters. Hyder was himself the greatest freebooter in India, and soon made the council to understand that they had armed him for their own injury. The Mahrattas—who were as eager to rob Hyder, as they were to rob every one else, and he was to rob them and all others—were intensely indignant at the conduct of the council. Thus this body, by its short-sighted policy, armed actual enemies under the guise of friendship, and in doing so raised up new enemies. Their proceedings towards this powerful man were full of contradiction. At one time they encouraged the Mahrattas against him, and at another supplied him with arms against

them, notwithstanding renewed orders from the directors, in the most specific terms, not to do so. After all, they wrote to Madras in 1766, while professing friendship with Hyder, requesting the council there to join them in attacking him.* The Madras government was unwilling to incur such a risk, because of the advantageous military position held by Hyder, and from fear that Nizam Ali would form a junction with him. The Madras council were also of opinion that Hyder acted as a useful check to the Mahrattas. Upon learning the opinions prevalent at Madras, instead of an attack upon the bold adventurer, the Bombay government proposed a treaty of peace. According to this treaty he was to receive annually between three or four thousand muskets, the council persisting in its defiance of the company's orders. The council demanded payment of all monies due to it by the rajahs which he had conquered, and especial trading privileges, of course, to the exclusion of all other European nations. Hyder eagerly grasped at one of the proposals—that he and the English should mutually furnish troops when the territory of either was menaced. It is probable that the council never intended to fulfil all their part of this stipulation, and supposed themselves to be the ingenious fabricators of a very clever trick. At all events, subsequent facts give colour to this supposition.

In 1768, after war between Hyder and the English in India had been for some time waged, they had to renew the treaty under certain modifications,—Hyder still stipulating for warlike stores, the council repeating its concessions on this point, and the directors in London disallowing and protesting against all acts performed by their servants which involved grants of arms and ammunition to native powers. The ground of objection taken by the honourable court in this particular case was, that by such a treaty stipulation Hyder was enabled to add to his military means, and thereby prepare for the first moment favourable to himself to act against the English, alone, or in alliance with other native powers. The views of the directors at home were wise and far seeing; generally they were so when opposed to their servants at the presidencies. Except in cases where men of great or extraordinary genius, such as Clive and Hastings, represented the company's interests in India, the judgment of the directors at home was far more sagacious than that of their governors or councils.

On the 23rd of February, 1771, Mr. Hodges, the president of Bombay, died, and was succeeded by Mr. Hornby. On the 7th of March,

* *Consultations*, June 1766.

Hyder was beaten in a sanguinary conflict with the Mahrattas; and he applied to the council for help. They were unable to afford it. He felt that he was deceived, and cherished a feeling of vengeance in his heart against those whom he considered his betrayers. The council declared that, although without men or money to spare, they would send him five hundred muskets and four twenty-pound guns. Subsequently, the council acknowledged itself willing to aid him with five hundred Europeans and twelve hundred sepoy, if he paid five lacs of pagodas for them, thus exasperating him yet more. Triumphant over his Mahratta foes, so far as to make it their interest to accept tribute and depart from his dominions, he repeatedly declared that a day of reckoning between him and the English, who had so often deceived him, would yet come.

In July, 1771, the Nabob of Baroch, unsought, repaired to Bombay, and concluded a treaty with the council, by which they were entitled to have a factory at his capital. This treaty was not signed until the last day in November, and it amounted to an alliance offensive and defensive. The nabob had gone to Bombay, for the purpose of engaging the council in his interests; and with the intention, at the same time, of betraying them whenever his interests in so doing might appear. He soon violated all the stipulations of the treaty, and the council recalled their resident from his court. This step was followed up by a military expedition against him, which was dispatched from Bombay under Mr. Watson, "the superintendent of marine," and Brigadier-general Wedderburn. The troops departed from Bombay November the 2nd. On the 14th, General Wedderburn reconnoitred the place, and was killed while so doing. On the 16th, batteries were opened against it, and on the 18th it was taken by storm. The loss of the English was considerable, especially in officers, of whom five were killed, exclusive of the general and a cadet, and six were wounded.

The council having concluded a treaty with Futty Sing Guicowar, the spoils were divided between that chief and the company. Besides the prize of the city, the revenues amounted to seven lacs of rupees.

In the year 1772, special negotiations were opened with the court of Poonah, for the acquisition of Salsette, Bassein, and Caranga. These were of extreme importance, as their possession by an enemy endangered Bombay itself. Mhade Rao, who then governed the Mahrattas, knew the value of these places as well as the English, and refused to cede them at any price. That chief died in November, and was succeeded by his brother Narrain Rao. In August, 1773, Narrain was

murdered in his palace of Poonah, by the agents of Ragoba, his uncle, who was at once proclaimed. This chief determined to make war upon the Carnatic, not, it would seem, to make a permanent conquest, but "to carry chout." Upon proceeding for this purpose with his army, a revolution took place in his capital, which he had to hurry back and suppress. The council resorted to means which were at least of questionable policy and justice, to induce Ragoba to cede Salsette and Bassein, but were again defeated. The feuds then existing among the Mahratta chiefs caused the negotiations of the English and their apparent support of Ragoba in several of his misdeeds, to be regarded with prejudice by various powerful chiefs, and laid the foundations of troubles to come. During the negotiations with Ragoba, the council learned that the Portuguese contemplated the conquest of Salsette. The council resolved to seize the island, or, as they represented the matter, to make available the disposition of the inhabitants to surrender it to them. On the 12th of December, 1774, the forces left Bombay. On the 28th, the fort of Tannat was taken by storm, but not without great loss, Commodore Watson being numbered among the slain. The Mahrattas fought desperately, but British skill and valour conquered. A monument was erected at Bombay to the memory of the gallant Watson.

The first matter of great concern to the council of Madras, during the period which has been already noticed in reference to Bengal and Bombay, was the settlement of the Northern Circars. The French having resumed their possessions in India, in consequence of the treaty of peace in Europe, the president of Madras, in 1765, suggested to Clive, then in Bengal, the desirableness of procuring from the Mogul sunnids for the circars of Rajah, Mundry, Ellore, Mustaphanagur, Chicacole, and Condavir or Guntoor. On the 14th of October, the council of Madras informed the directors, that at the request of Mr. Palk, president of Fort St. George, Lord Clive had obtained the sunnids from the Mogul. Differences arose with the soubahdar of the Deccan as to the occupation of the circars, and a treaty was formed with his highness, by which he recognised that occupation, on condition of military aid in the defence of his own territory, or of war occurring between him and any other potentate. Clive appears to have acquiesced in this arrangement, and even to have promoted it, although it was contrary to the policy the directors had ordered to be pursued. The councils of the three presidencies had now involved themselves in treaties with all

the surrounding chiefs which were incompatible, and impracticable, involving the constant peril of war, and of breach of faith. It was next to impossible that the English could either engage in any of the native disputes, or refrain from doing so, without loss of honour. By disobedience to the simple and honest policy imposed by the court of directors, the agents in India had involved the company in complications which were inextricable. The letters from the directors on receipt of the intelligence of the treaty with the soubahdar of the Deccan, are full of sense and spirit, and lay down principles that are indisputably just, for the conduct of their servants in all dealings with the native powers.

The council at Madras was exposed to great anxiety during 1766 from the progress and ambition of Hyder Ali. His troops commanded all the passes from the upper country into the Carnatic. His cavalry hovered about like birds of prey, and it was reported that he had obtained a sunnid from the soubahdar of the Deccan for his own possession of the Carnatic. Hyder's manœuvres were as treacherous as those of the soubahdar, and as cunning as those of that ruler were weak. The Madras council was now obliged to adopt vigorous measures in regard to Hyder. They sent troops into various refractory districts where his agents had excited the polygars to revolt. They formed a new covenant with the soubahdar of the Deccan, in virtue of which he consented to dismiss his army, called by the directors "a useless rabble," and to allow his places of strength to be garrisoned by the British. It is probable that his highness had no intention of acting upon this covenant beyond a certain show of doing so in the first instance, for the stipulation was never properly carried into effect. The soubahdar was without honour or principle, and was ready to unite with Hyder or the Mahrattas against the company, as either might offer him the higher pecuniary inducement. Hyder, having settled for the time his differences with the Mahrattas, found means of inducing the soubahdar to join him in hostilities against the English. A war now broke out of a most formidable nature, in which the Mysorean freebooter made able use of the vast amount of arms and military stores with which the Bombay council, probably in view of their own profit, had supplied him, in spite of the company's orders to the contrary. The war itself must be treated in a separate chapter. The council of Madras opened a correspondence with that of Bombay for consultation as to mutual defence, as well as the separate action of each presidency upon a

common plan. The policy of the Madras government, and its opinion of the crisis, were set forth in its despatches to the directors. It urged upon the company the absolute necessity of subduing Hyder, if the peace of the Carnatic were to be secured. The chief apprehension of the Madras government as to Hyder was thus expressed:—"It is not only his troublesome disposition and ambitious views now that we have to apprehend, but that he may at a favourable opportunity, or in some future war, take the French by the hand, to re-establish their affairs,—which cannot fail to be of the worst consequence to your possessions on the coast. He has money to pay them, and they can spare and assemble troops at the islands, and it is reported that he has already made proposals by despatches to the French king or company in Europe."*

Meanwhile, the indefatigable Hyder threatened Madras itself, when the council thus wrote to the directors:—"The continual reinforcements we had sent to camp had reduced our garrison so low, we were obliged to confine our attention entirely to the preservation of the Fort and the Black Town, for which purpose it was necessary to arm all the company's civil servants, the European inhabitants, Armenians, and Portuguese." On the 29th September, when the enemy moved off, the council again wrote:—"As it is uncertain when the troubles we are engaged in will end, and as we must in the course of the war expect to have many Europeans sick, we must earnestly request you to send out as large reinforcements as possible." This letter reached the court by the *Hector* on the 22nd April, 1768. The reply was one of the most masterly despatches ever sent to India. The principles and policy it expresses do honour to the company, and refute many calumnies as to their territorial aggrandizement. The company was not served by men able or honest enough to carry out the views of the directors, who thus wrote:—

"The alarming state of our affairs under your conduct, regarding the military operations against the soubahdar of the Deccan, joined with Hyder Ali, and the measures in agitation with the Mahrattas in consequence thereof, requiring our most immediate consideration, we have therefore determined on this overland conveyance by the way of Bussorah, as the most expedient way of giving our sentiments to you on those important subjects.

"In our separate letter of the 25th March, we gave you our sentiments very fully on your treaty with the soubahdar of the Deccan.

"After having for successive years given it as your opinion, confirmed by our appro-

* Letter to Court, 21st September, 1767.

bation, that maintaining an army for the support of the soubahdar of the Deccan was endangering the Carnatic, and would tend to involve us in wars, and distant and expensive operations, and the grant of the circars was not to be accepted on such terms, you at once engage in that support, and send an army superior to that which, in the year 1764, you declared would endanger your own safety.

“The quick succession of important events in Indian wars puts it out of our power to direct your measures. We can only give you the outlines of that system which we judge most conducive to give permanency and tranquillity to our possessions.

“We should have hoped that the experience of what has passed in Bengal would have suggested the proper conduct to you: we mean, when our servants, after the battle of Buxar,* projected the extirpation of Sujah Dowlah from his dominions, and the giving them up to the king. Lord Clive soon discerned, the king would have been unable to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the strongest barriers against the Mahrattas and the northern powers, and therefore wisely restored Sujah Dowlah to his dominions.† Such, too, should be your conduct with respect to the nizam‡ and Hyder Ali, neither of whom it is our interest should be totally crushed.

“The dewanee of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, with the possessions we hold in those provinces, are the utmost limits of our views on that side of India. On the coast, the protection of the Carnatic and the possession of the circars, free from all engagements to support the soubahdar of the Deccan, or even without the circars, preserving only influence enough over any country power who may hold them, to keep the French from settling in them; and, on the Bombay side, the dependencies thereon, the possessions of Salsette, Bassein, and the castle of Surat. The protection of these is easily within the reach of our power, and may mutually support each other, without any country alliance whatever. If we pass these bounds, we shall be led on from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose us the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan.

“Much has been wrote from you and from our servants at Bengal, on the necessity of checking the Mahrattas, which may in some

* Recorded in a previous chapter.

† An account of these transactions has been given in a previous chapter.

‡ The word nizam is used interchangeably with soubah and soubahdar in Indian despatches and state papers.

degree be proper; but it is not for the company to take the part of umpires of Hindostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance of power among themselves, and their divisions would have left you in peace; but if at any time the thirst for plunder should urge the Mahrattas to invade our possessions, they can be checked only by carrying the war into their own country. It is with this view that we last year sent out field-officers to our presidency at Bombay, and put their military force on a respectable footing; and when once the Mahrattas understand that to be our plan, we have reason to think they will not wantonly attack us.

“You will observe by the whole tenour of these despatches, that our views are not to enter into offensive wars in India, or to make further acquisitions beyond our present possessions. We do not wish to enter into any engagements which may be productive of enormous expenses, and which are seldom calculated to promote the company's essential interests. On the contrary, we wish to see the present Indian powers remain as a check one upon another, without our interfering; therefore, we recommend to you, so soon as possible, to bring about a peace upon terms of the most perfect moderation on the part of the company, and when made, to adhere to it upon all future occasions, except when the company's possessions are actually attacked; and not to be provoked by fresh disturbances of the country powers to enter into new wars.”*

The die was cast as to hostilities with Hyder; both the Madras and Bombay governments were in collision with him, and Bengal sent such assistance as was deemed judicious and practicable.

When, at last, a treaty was made with Hyder, the Circars, which had never been fairly brought under the company's management, were placed by the council under its sole control, the zemindars and other great landholders offering violent opposition. In 1769, however, the subjugation of this refractory spirit was effected, and the company made such arrangements as to its lands as suited its own interests. The introduction of English law to Madras proved a source of contest and confusion, the natives utterly detesting it, and the English using it against the natives as a means of oppression. M. Auber describes the folly displayed in working English institutions, and the turmoil attending it, in the following terms:—“At a moment when the company's affairs on the coast demanded the utmost attention of the council;

* Court's Letter, dated the 13th of May, 1765.

when the whole of the country from Tinnevely to the Kistna was involved in troubles, and when the enemy were ravaging the Carnatic, the council were harassed by the violent and litigious proceedings of some members of the grand jury, who obstinately persevered in pressing matters and presentiments, which threw the settlement into contentions and embarrassments; whilst, on other occasions, they declined to make a return to any of the bills of indictment brought before them. The jurisdiction of the mayor's court, under the charter, became matter of doubt and dispute; the one party constring the word *factory* in the most extensive latitude, the other taking it in its literal and strict sense."

Suspicious began to be entertained that the French were instigating Hyder and the nizam against the English. As soon as the peace with France restored to that nation its Indian possessions which had been conquered, symptoms of a preconceived determination to gain power were evinced. These were slowly, but surely, developed: still the company's servants felt no apprehensions, the French being relatively weak; moreover, the rapid passage of events between the English and the native princes diverted the councils of Bombay and Madras from noticing the procedure of their old competitors for power.

In 1769 the French made various demonstrations of a nature to lead to the conclusion that hostile movements against the English were contemplated. Pondicherry was fortified, under the pretence of its being in danger from the country powers. Pretexes for fortifying the factories in Bengal were also put forward, as noticed in a previous chapter. These simultaneous efforts to strengthen their positions, when there was really no enemy, awakened the suspicions of the English. Two French transports, of large capacity, had proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope for provisions. Tidings came from the Mauritius that French ships, full of men and military stores, had been seen there. A new settlement was made on the eastern coast of Madagascar, which, from the accounts forwarded of it to Madras, was intended as a military depot, both for men and munitions of war destined for employment in the East. From the Archipelago, French ships of war were reported as cruising about suspiciously, and as having on board troops.

While the council's attention was drawn by so many rumours to the French, the perpetual conflicts among the native powers threatened to involve the company in innumerable wars. The Mahrattas desired the virtual conquest of Mysore. Hyder resolved to resist their demands for chout. The Nabob of Arcot

favoured the pretensions of the Mahrattas. The nizam watched vigilantly for any opportunity which might arise for plunder, by those powers exhausting one another. All these royal robbers sought the aid of the company, pleading the different treaties in which the shallow policy of the councils of Bombay and Madras had involved that body.

Hyder refused the Mahrattas chout in 1770: they made war upon him. He demanded the aid of the company, on the ground of the treaty made the previous year. The council of Madras considered themselves absolved from any obligations of alliance, as Hyder was himself the aggressor. He well knew that they were only eager to escape all obligations on their part, and yet to secure all advantages of the treaty from him. An incurable resentment against the English name and race seized possession of his mind.

Both the councils of Madras and Bombay were entangled in fresh difficulties by the arrival of Sir John Lindsay at the latter place. That officer, besides his influence and rank as an admiral, had received extraordinary powers from the English government, of which the directors disapproved. He declared to both the councils that he was minister plenipotentiary from the royal government. In virtue of this office, he inquired into the causes and conduct of the late war with Hyder. He brought a letter to the Nabob of the Carnatic, from the king, and demanded all the company's papers and documents as he might require them. The council of Madras determined to resist these demands, having no instructions from "their constituents," as they termed the directors on that occasion. The English government had acted without proper concert with the company, and the result was dangerous to the English interests in India. Lindsay treated the council with contempt. The latter body, strong in experience, knowledge of local relations, and sure of obedience from all the company's servants, was resolute in resisting the alleged powers of Sir John. He entered into private correspondence with the nabob, who artfully treated him as a superior authority, and faithlessly intrigued with him against the company. The council was at this time involved in so many disputes, that it is surprising they could attend, in any measure, to the company's trade. Among other quarrels, they had one of serious magnitude with the celebrated Eyre Coote, at this time major-general, and appointed commander-in-chief of the company's forces in Madras by the directors. Sooner than submit to the jealous dictation of the council, General Coote returned to England, and the court of directors censured the council. Examination

of the folly and disobedience of the councils of the three presidencies, and passing votes of merited censure upon them, might have occupied the whole time of the honourable court.

The Nabob of Arcot raised claims upon the Nabob of Tanjore, which during 1770 gave the council of Madras much occupation. The Tanjore nabob gave the English a reluctant support during the Mysorean war, and refused to contribute to the Nabob of Arcot's expenses in connection with that contest, although Tanjore was a rich territory, and the English, acting in the name of the government of Arcot, preserved the peace of the country. Hyder Ali fomented this dispute. It was also discovered that he carried on a correspondence with the French at Pondicherry, while they carried on the new works there.

Sir John Lindsay was succeeded, in 1770, by Admiral Sir Robert Harland, with the same powers. The fleet on the Indian station was much strengthened under the command of Sir Robert. The new admiral had received instructions from the king to treat the company's representatives with careful respect, and to uphold their dignity before the native rulers. When Admiral Harland arrived, he found affairs in great confusion, the result of his predecessor's wrong-headedness. The Nabob of the Carnatic had, with the concurrence of Sir John Lindsay, invited the Mahrattas to join in a confederacy against Hyder, contrary to treaty, and as the council believed, contrary to reason.

Major-general Coote had been prevailed upon to return to India, and the crown conferred upon him the honour of a Knight of the Bath. This was before Sir John Lindsay returned home, and at the same time the same honour was conferred upon him also. The royal government took a most extraordinary course on this occasion, sending the insignia to the nabob, with directions for the investiture. Whether this was the result of some joint intrigue of Lindsay and Coote to spite the council does not appear, but the humiliation it inflicted upon the president was very acceptable to those chiefs. Differences between the nabob and certain rajahs having arisen, an appeal to arms was made, and Brigadier Smith, at the head of a British force, marched against them in April, 1771. Operations were conducted until the 27th of October, when peace was made without the intervention of the council. It appeared as if Lindsay, Coote, and the nabob had entered into a confederacy to ignore the company:—"Sir Robert Harland reached Madras, in command of a squadron of his majesty's ships, on the 2nd of September. He announced

his arrival to the council, whom he met assembled on the 13th, and he informed them that he possessed full powers, as the king's plenipotentiary, to inquire into the observance of the eleventh article of the treaty of Paris; and that he had a letter from his majesty to the nabob. The letter was delivered to his highness by the admiral, the troops in the garrison attending the ceremonial. On the 1st of October, having intimated to the council his readiness to be of any use in the progress of their affairs, he quitted the roads, in order to avoid the approaching monsoon, and retired to Trincomalee, dispatching a vessel to ascertain the state of the French force at the Mauritius, which was reported to be very considerable.*"

Sir Robert Harland soon fell into the snares of the nabob, who induced him to favour an alliance with the Mahrattas against Hyder. The council refused to obey the plenipotentiary, declaring themselves ready to obey all constitutional authorities, such as parliament or the courts of law, but refusing to recognise the admiral in any other capacity than as commander of the king's ships, in which office they would co-operate with him. They persisted in refusing to violate the treaty with Hyder. The alliance offered by the Mahrattas was one which he sought to force upon the nabob, as the admiral himself admitted, by the threat of fire and sword. They refused finally to accept the alliance, and advised the admiral, by a diversion on the Malabar coast, to distract the Mahrattas, while the council would take such care of the Carnatic as their experience suggested, and their power allowed. The alliance proposed by the Mahrattas, obliging the nabob to send troops to their aid, had a significance the admiral did not see. The nabob in accepting a forced alliance, and sending troops into the field to avert the menace of the power thus making itself an ally, accepted conquest, and would be regarded in future by the Mahrattas as dependant upon them.

Matters became worse between the admiral and the council, until they issued in an open rupture. The conduct of the admiral was in violation of the company's charter, and the council resolutely maintained the rights of their employers.

During the year 1772 various expeditions were made, all of them successful, against various polygars who refused to comply with the requisitions of the nabob. Brigadier-general Smith, having accomplished the military enterprises referred to, returned to Madras, and resigned his command. Sir Robert Fletcher was nominated to take it.

* Auber, vol. i. p. 308.

Immediately, violent altercations arose between him and the council, discord between commanding officers and councils seldom ceasing in any of the presidencies. Sir Robert was obliged to resign, and Brigadier Smith resumed the command.

On the 31st of January, 1773, Mr. Dupré resigned the office of president, which was assumed by Mr. Wynch. The Rajah of Tanjore refusing all allegiance to the Nabob of the Carnatic, Brigadier-general Smith marched to Tanjore, took it by storm, and made prisoners of the rajah's family. It was soon discovered that the Dutch were the chief instigators of the rajah. He had, contrary to his allegiance, as a tributary of the nabob, made over various strong positions to the Dutch, who were compelled by the British ships, and troops acting in conjunction with the forces of the nabob, to abandon them, under circumstances of much humiliation. The conduct of the Dutch was marked by prevarication and bad faith.

Throughout the year 1774, the council was troubled by the caprice of the nabob, whose views were constantly changing; who

regulated his policy towards others by his relative power; the resources of whose country were exhausted, while his avarice still craved; whose ambition was as large as his means were inadequate for even the feeblest enterprise. It was scarcely possible for the council not to perceive that the time was fast approaching, when the English must assume the entire control of the nabob's dominions, or see the Carnatic overrun by Hyder, the Mahrattas, or the nizam.

During the period to which this chapter refers, Warren Hastings, for several years held the high post of member of council. It is probable that to him chiefly, if not exclusively, the credit of every bold and firm measure taken, was due. Yet less is known of Hastings' conduct during his membership of council at Madras than of any other period of his history. His novel career in the capital of the presidency was much to his credit. His duties to the company were discharged with such ability, that he was nominated to the most important office in India, the presidency of the council of Bengal.

CHAPTER LXXX.

WAR WITH HYDER ALI OF MYSORE.

IN previous chapters, especially the last, reference has been made to Hyder Ali, the Rajah, or, as he preferred being called, the Nabob of Mysore. In the geographical portion of this work descriptions will be found of every part of Southern India, and very particular descriptions of the highlands, and the whole region of the Deccan. A military writer, who made various campaigns in the Deccan during the last century, describes the climate as very favourable for military operations:—"Especially in the high country of Mysore, it is temperate and healthy to a degree unknown in any other tract of the like extent within the tropics. The monsoons, or boisterous periodical rains, which, at two different periods, deluge the countries on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, have their force broken by the ghauts or mountains, and from either side extend to the interior in fertilizing showers, and preserve both the verdure of the country and the temperature of the climate almost throughout the year; inso-much that the British army remained in tents and never went into cantonments throughout the whole year."

In this country of Mysore there arose a man of eminent daring and ability, already repeatedly before the reader as Hyder Ali. It is unnecessary to relate his history; no number of volumes could comprise the story of every able and daring Indian adventurer, native and European, whose sword or whose intrigues have been felt in India. It is sufficient to tell that Hyder was of obscure origin, and in one of the wars of which the great table-land of the Deccan had been the theatre time out of mind, he distinguished himself as a volunteer. He was then twenty-seven years of age. His daring courage made him a conspicuous person, and he gradually attached to himself a body of freebooters. It was not uncommon in India to begin a war-like career as leader of banditti, and end it as a powerful rajah or nabob. Hyder was one of the most remarkable instances of such a gradation. By robbery he became enriched, and he used his riches for the purpose of becoming a plunderer on a grander scale. While yet he was no more than a great robber, he fell in with a holy Brahmin, by whose cunning he was much assisted, and who probably gave

him the first notions of political intrigue. Chiefs and monarchs in India honoured riches more than high-born persons in any other country. Hyder's reputation for riches, no matter how acquired, gained him much admiration; and his well-known ability to defend what he had acquired, added to that admiration. He became recognised as a chief by chiefs, and was known as the fougedar of Dindigul. He soon put down all refractory neighbours, either by artifice or the sword; it was difficult to decide in which way he was the greater. His friend the Brahmin obtained access to the court of Mysore, and apprised his colleague in former predatory adventures of all political matters that might any how be turned to their joint account.

A mutiny broke out in the army of Mysore. Hyder bravely and promptly put it down, earning and receiving royal gratitude. His beloved Brahmin accused the richest chiefs of Mysore as the instigators of the revolt. They were seized, punished in person, and deprived of their estates. Hyder and the Brahmin profited largely by the forfeitures. He had become a chief, high in royal favour, but he was still a robber. He had as little indisposition to kill as to steal. Murder, as an accessory to plunder, was simply regarded as a necessary means towards a very unobjectionable end. He gradually became a rebel, as well as a robber. He took advantage of certain mutinies of the troops for pay, to quiet or quell the disturbances, and gain the unlimited confidence of the monarch, that he might ultimately the more securely dethrone him. After a variety of ingenious and infamous stratagems, in concert with the Brahmin, he succeeded. He and the Brahmin eventually betrayed one another, and this cunning adversary nearly ruined Hyder more than once. The courage of the bold bandit never forsook him, and his competition with his wily antagonist so sharpened his wits that he at last excelled the Brahmin, and all other Brahmins in Mysore, however wicked and acute in the arts of cunning, dissimulation, and far-sighted intrigue. Koonde Row (such was the crafty Brahmin's name) was at last destroyed. The Rajah of Mysore himself became a victim, and Hyder had no more rivals in that country either as to craft or power. Once established on the throne, he scented all disaffection afar off, and soon tried the value of his sabre in suppressing it. He became rich exceedingly, little by little extended his territory, and who could extend territory in India, in his time, without coming into collision with the English? When he became rich, the Mahrattas invaded his country. He fought them with great gallantry, but their cavalry

came as the locusts and eat up every green thing. Hyder purchased them off again and again, when all the resistance of valour and genius was useless against equal valour, perhaps equal genius, and far superior numbers.

Mr. Thornton says the politics of the Decan at this period (1763) presented "an entangled web, of which it is scarcely practicable to render a clear account." Probably Hyder had a clearer view of them than any one else, not even excepting Clive or Hastings. Previous to this time Hyder had intercourse with the Bombay government, which was not always complimentary, but not on the whole unfriendly. The government of Madras had however, formed a league with Nizam Ali against him. The various events rapidly occurred already related in previous chapters, and Hyder had his part in them, or watched them with the vigilance of a statesman. He could neither read nor write, but his memory was wonderful, and his agents were everywhere. His spies overran the country. The French possessed Hyder's sympathy, and to the designs of Lally he was especially no stranger.

In 1766, the Mahrattas, Nizam Ali, and the Madras government were allied against Hyder. The Mahrattas were, of course, first in the conflict. They overran half the Mysore territory before their allies were ready. He bought them off just in time to avert their junction with the other allied forces. The army of the nizam, supported by the British, advanced to the northern limits of Mysore. The English commander, Colonel Joseph Smith, suspected both the nizam and the Mahrattas. Hyder Ali bought off the nizam, as he had already obtained the neutrality of the Mahrattas. The stupid council of Madras would not pay attention to Colonel Smith's information, nor adopt any measures of defence. Their conceit and impertinence disgusted the army, and nearly brought ruin upon the presidency. The nizam joined Hyder. Their combined forces pressed upon the English. Colonel Smith was intelligent and brave, but ignorant of the country. He guarded passes which were not likely to be penetrated; he left unguarded those, more especially one, by which the troops of Hyder poured down like a torrent, sweeping away the outposts, baggage, cattle, and supplies of the English. Hosts of wild horsemen thundered down with the violence and rapidity of a cataract upon the English. Colonel Wood was dispatched from Trichinopoly. Smith directed his energies to form a junction with him, but was attacked by an immensely superior force, which he defeated, slaying two thousand men, himself losing but

one hundred and seventy in killed and wounded. The Mysoreans came on with their hosts of cavalry eddying like a flood, and sweeping away rice-earts, bullocks, and stragglers. Smith, after his men had fought, and marched, and hungered for twenty-seven hours, at last formed the desired junction with Wood. Smith and Wood joined their forces at Trincomalee, where they expected to find adequate stores. The council had, however, thought of nothing but the grandeur of their own policy; no preparations were made for the support of armies in the presence of powerful invaders. Smith was obliged to move away eastward in quest of provisions, leaving his stores, sick, and wounded in Trincomalee. The enemy prepared to assault the place, but Smith, having found some supplies, returned opportunely for its relief. After a short time, another march to gather provisions was necessary; the whole army was occupied in foraging. Forty thousand horsemen of the allies flew around the English, crossing every rice-swamp or corn-field, occupying the tracts which served as roads, desolating the villages, devouring hidden stores of edibles, ravaging everywhere and everything. As vultures gathered upon a field of carrion, the Mysorean troopers found nothing too mean for their prey.

Still the reputation of English valour awed back the savage hordes, and Hyder hoped only to conquer when the English, worn out by fatigue and hunger, could no longer march or fight. In the terrible emergency of the English, relief was found by the discovery of some hidden hordes of grain. The English were fed, and could therefore fight. Hyder knew of their distress, but not of the discovered supplies and the recruited strength which they brought.

On the 26th of September, 1767, the foe opened a distant cannonade against the left of the English lines. Smith moved round a hill, which arose between him and the main body of the opposing forces. He hoped to take them in flank upon their left. The enemy perceived his movement, but did not understand it. They made a movement to correspond with their idea of that of Smith, which they believed to be a retreat. At the same moment both armies were moving from opposite directions round the hill, but the collision coming soon was unexpected by either. Both armies saw the importance of gaining the hill. Captain Cooke succeeded in obtaining it, but not without a close competition. The enemy ascended to a range of crags facing a strong position. Taking them in flank, Cooke gallantly and skilfully carried the post. A regular battle then ensued. The English had

fourteen hundred European infantry, and nine thousand sepoy. Their cavalry consisted of fifteen hundred wretchedly conditioned men, miserably mounted, belonging to the nabob, and a small troop of English dragoons. The enemy numbered forty thousand cavalry, and an infantry force a little less numerous. The enemy had a vast number of useless guns, and about thirty pieces fit to bring into action; the English had as many. The allies formed a crescent, and manœuvred to enclose the small English force. The battle opened by a cannonade, the enemy firing with eagerness and rapidity, but no judgment. The English fired slowly until they found the range, and then served their guns with great quickness as well as deadly aim. The ordnance of the allies was soon silenced. The English then suddenly opened their whole cannonade upon the thick columns of the cavalry, which were arranged in a manner exposing them to such a casualty. The troopers, eager to charge, bore for a few minutes this galling fire, while great numbers fell. No orders were given, the columns broke, and the vast masses of ill-posted horsemen dispersed upon the field. Hyder, with the sagacity of his keen intellect, perceived that the battle was lost, in time to draw off his guns. He exhorted his ally to retire, but the nizam became furious with disappointment and rage, and refused to leave the field. Smith ordered his whole line to charge, the nizam became panic-struck, and ordered a retreat. A curious incident is recorded as having then occurred. The nizam had posted a long line of elephants in the rear of his army, bearing his harem and other adjuncts to his pleasure. The ladies were invited to view the destruction of the English, as, long after, the Russian general, Prince Menschikoff, with oriental taste and similar fortune, invited the Russian ladies to do at Alma. When the nizam directed that his elephants should be moved from the field, a lady called out, "They have not been so taught; they have been trained to follow the standard of the emperor." That standard was soon in the advance, while English bullets flew among the bearers of the palanquins, and many fell for whom these missiles were not designed. The nizam, on a swift horse, attended by a chosen body of cavalry, fled with the utmost precipitation, leaving Hyder to draw off his army as best he could. The wearied English rested on the field of victory.

Next day, the army of Hyder was observed in good formation and regular retreat. The English pursued, and captured forty-one pieces of cannon, in addition to nine which

were left upon the field; sixteen more were abandoned on the march, and fell into the hands of the English. Nearly five thousand men were numbered among the dead upon the field of battle or in the line of pursuit. The English had one hundred and fifty put *hors de combat*. The fugitives continued a hasty flight far beyond the probability, or even possibility, of pursuit. The English withdrew into cantonments as the rainy season approached.

Hyder Ali, ever indefatigable, even in defeat, continued in action, combating the monsoon and the skill of England, warring boldly with nature and science. He captured several small places belonging to the nabob, and then proceeded to attack Amboah, a place peculiarly situated, being built upon a mountain of smooth granite. Hyder laid regular siege to this place, and in five days rendered it no longer tenable, except the citadel, to which the garrison retired. The defenders were five hundred sepoys and a few Europeans, under the command of a brave and scientific officer named Calvert. The native governor was, what native governors usually were, faithless. He was detected, and confined; his guards were disarmed. Hyder's previous success having been through the information supplied by the traitor, he now knew not how to proceed. He accordingly made a breach in an inaccessible place, which was in vain attempted again and again, his troops reeling back after every attack discomfited, and leaving many of their comrades slain. Hyder sent a flag of truce, with eulogistic references to the bravery of the commander, who replied that Hyder had not yet come close enough to enable him to deserve the compliment. Another flag arrived with a large bribe, and the offer of the highest military honours in Hyder's service, if Captain Calvert would surrender the place. The reply was that the next messenger proposing dishonour would be hanged in the breach. From the 10th of November, to the 7th of December, all the efforts of Hyder were in vain. Colonel Smith left his cantonments and hastened to the relief of his brave brothers in arms. Great was his joy when he saw the British flag flying as he approached. Hyder perceiving the advance of Colonel Smith, raised the siege. The government directed that the sepoy regiment which defended the place should bear the rock of Amboah upon its colours.

Smith followed Hyder, but was compelled to give up the pursuit from the deficiency of his commissariat,—an impediment which has since often obstructed British military enterprise, when disgrace was still more reflected upon those in authority, to whom the

real derangement or neglect was attributable. Colonel Smith was joined by Colonel Wood, who advanced from Trichinopoly. Hyder was too much daunted by recent defeats to make any bold attempt to prevent this junction. Not that he wanted courage personally, but he knew that his troops were not of a quality to face the English after such signal and shameful defeats. Hyder was, however, vigilant and active as ever. He attempted various surprises upon convoys, but was defeated by the courage and constant watchfulness of the English officers.

At the close of the year 1767, he ascended the ghauts, leaving strong detachments of cavalry to watch and harass the English army, which was in the deepest distress from want of provisions, the government having wholly left it to itself, and the officers displaying but little talent in commissary affairs, although by skill and bravery in breach and battle, having won for themselves a glorious renown. Hyder Ali now began to fear the English power. Forces from Bengal threatened Hyderabad. His ally, the nizam, now prepared to betray him, as both had betrayed everybody else that trusted them. Hyder was not to be deceived. He represented to the nizam that the latter had adopted a wise course, and pretended to believe that it was done to deceive the English, until affairs took a more favourable turn. He, however, intimated that in future the nizam's army and his own had better operate separately. The nizam affected to agree with all Hyder said, withdrew his army, and the next day openly offered alliance to the English against the man with whom he acted in the field the day before. This was perfectly in keeping with Mussulman faith on the part of one prince to another throughout Indian history. In the diplomatic game which followed, the English played as foolishly as was their custom. The nizam granted everything, on the condition that the English should pay him tribute, which placed matters pretty much as they were before: the English gained nothing but glory. The nizam also granted to the company the dewannee of Mysore, on the condition that *when they conquered it*, he should receive a tribute. The nizam was beaten in battle, but reaped, through the vain and dull council of Madras, all the fruits of victory.

The chiefs on the Malabar coast, who had been reduced by Hyder, now revolted; and the government of Bombay took the field against him. Mangalore was captured at once; the commander of Hyder's fleet surrendered it. Various other places on the coast fell into the hands of the Bombay

officers. Canarese was attacked, but the British were repulsed even with slaughter. Hyder hastened to the coast, with large forces. He approached with such rapidity and skill, and the English exercised so little vigilance, that he was upon them suddenly. In May he was before Mangalore. The English fled in boats, and with such precipitation and confusion that many were slain, and all their artillery and stores were ingloriously captured. Neither Smith nor Calvert were there. Eighty Europeans, and one hundred and eighty sepoy, sick and wounded, remained in the conqueror's hands. Hyder won the whole coast. He then proceeded to Bednore, whither he had summoned the zemindars and other holders of territorial possessions. He informed them that he knew they were more favourable to the English than to him, and that he would punish their disaffection by pecuniary fines.

Mr. Thornton thus describes what then took place:—"A list of the criminals was then produced, and against the name of each an enormous fine appeared. The conduct of Hyder Ali's affairs was marked by great precision; for every purpose there was a distinct provision. Among other establishments nicely contrived so as to contribute to the progress of the great machine of his government, was a department of torture. To this the offenders present were immediately consigned till their guilt should be expiated by payment of the sums in which they were respectively mulcted, and orders were issued for taking similar proceedings with regard to those whose fears had kept them away."

Hearing that the government of Bombay was making preparations to scour the coast of Malabar with a naval and military force which he could not resist, his genius suggested an expedient by which he might retire with some degree of military reputation, and with pecuniary advantage. The author last quoted thus describes his procedure, to this intent:—"With the Malabar chiefs Hyder Ali adopted different means, but not less characteristic, nor less conducive to his interests. It was intimated to them that their Mysorean lord was tired of his conquests in Malabar, which he had hitherto found a source of charge rather than of profit; that if he were reimbursed the expenses incurred in their attainment, he was ready to abandon them; and that it was his intention that the territories of those who refused to contribute to that purpose should be transferred to those who acceded to the proposal. Not one incurred the threatened forfeiture, and Hyder Ali's officers retired from Malabar laden with the offerings of its chiefs."

The Madras government had organized no efficient means of gaining intelligence, and, therefore, were unable to apprise their officers of the route taken by Hyder. Colonel Wood reduced Baramahal, Salem, Coimbatore, and Vindigul, but was unable to retain his conquests, from the fewness of his troops and poverty of material. He attempted to guard the passes, but the enemy eluded his vigilance without difficulty, for he was wholly ignorant of the country, as were all his officers. The duty of providing guides—a task which the nabob could have easily accomplished—occurred to no one, or, at all events, was performed by none. Hyder wrested from Colonel Wood all the conquests the latter had made. Having at his command large bodies of cavalry, Hyder was enabled to confuse the English commander, so as to deprive him of all benefit arising from a well-concerted plan of action. The natives also constantly betrayed the English, surrendering strong places without a blow.*

Colonel Smith was engaged in operations to the north. On the 2d of May, Kistnagherry capitulated to him. In June he laid siege to Mulwagul, a strong place, from which he apprehended a protracted resistance. It was betrayed by the killadar. A brother of Mohammed Ali had married the sister of this person, and the former being fongedar of Arcot, had appointed his brother-in-law to exercise under him the fiscal administration of Trincomalee. The principal was removed from office, and the dependent, to avoid giving in his accounts to Mohammed Ali, went over to Hyder Ali. He was now desirous of a change, and offered to betray his trust, on condition that his accounts should be considered closed. Mohammed Ali consented; but there was still a difficulty—the garrison were faithful, though their commander was not. It happened, however, that the killadar had been instructed to raise as large a number of recruits for his master's infantry as was practicable, and to give special encouragement to men who had been disciplined by the English. The killadar informed his officers that he had succeeded in obtaining two hundred such recruits, being two complete companies, and that on an appointed night they were to arrive with their native officers. At the specified time, a party of English sepoy appeared ascending by a prescribed route. They were led by a European officer, Captain Matthews, not only dressed, but painted, so as to re-

* Of late years much has been written about the fidelity of the native troops previous to 1857, except in occasional defections. The truth is, the English in many wars suffered from the treasons of native auxiliaries and sepoy.

semble a native. At daylight the mask was thrown off, and the place was soon in the possession of the English.* Colonel Smith followed up these successes by several others. An important accession to his strength was obtained by an alliance with the Mahrattas under Morari Rao. On the day when Smith formed his junction with the Mahrattas, Hyder entered Bangalore with the advanced guard of his grand army. He heard of the junction of the Mahrattas with Smith, and knew the locality of their encampment, for his spies were everywhere. He formed the daring resolution of sending a few hundred light cavalry that night into the Mahratta camp, with orders to penetrate to the tent of Morari Rao, and to return with his head, when the infantry would at once storm his camp, which, thrown into confusion by the loss of its chief, would be routed with slaughter. Morari Rao, like Hyder himself, had organized a spy system, which was nearly perfect. He became aware of the intended attack, and, as so small a body of cavalry were to conduct it, he gave strict orders that none of his troops were to mount, but that his cavalry should remain each man stationed at his horse's head. The orders to the whole force were, to be on the alert and attack all mounted men, without accepting any pass-word or explanation. This order was executed with precision, and had one unfortunate result in the death of Captain Gee, Colonel Smith's aide-de-camp, who, riding into the Mahratta lines, was mistaken for an enemy, and cut down. Hyder's cavalry were followed so close by his infantry that the camp of Morari Rao would have been attacked in force, but for a curious incident. The state elephant of Morari received an accidental wound: irritated by this circumstance, and the alarm which raged around him, he broke loose, and rushed wildly through the camp, dragging the huge chain by which he had been picketed. Seizing this chain with his trunk, he hurled it furiously at the advancing cavalry of Hyder. They, supposing that the army of the Mahrattas were charging, broke, and rushed back over a column of infantry which was marching in support. The infantry, becoming alarmed, took to flight, and, before they could be rallied, morning dawned, revealing the sheen of the English bayonets as their lines of infantry were in motion.

The council of Madras sent civilian deputies to the camps of Smith and Wood, in a manner similar to that afterwards adopted in Europe by the French Convention, and with similar results. These delegates from the council

* Thornton's *British India*, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 557, 558.

were arrogant and self-sufficient, overruling the conduct of the officers in matters beyond the comprehension of the meddlers. The English who occupied Mulwagul were removed by these "field deputies," and some of Mohammed Ali's troops placed there. The Mohammedan commandant sold the place to Hyder, as a previous Mohammedan commandant in Hyder's service had sold it to the nabob. Colonel Wood's strategy proved very deficient, and Smith's superior military talent was by this means, and the pompous interference of the "field deputies," rendered nugatory. When Mulwagul was betrayed, Wood made a movement for its recapture or relief. He was too late for the latter, and unable to accomplish the former. He attempted to take the rock by an escalade, which had nearly proved successful, through the activity, presence of mind, and bravery of an English officer named Brooke. The next day, some light troops of Hyder appeared in the distance. Wood proceeded to reconnoitre, but soon perceived that an army of three thousand horse, and at least an equal number of infantry, with a powerful artillery, were making dispositions to surround his little band. With great presence of mind, more than his usual skill, and the most heroic courage, he forced his way through one body of the enemy after another, and united his little army in a regular retreat. Hyder's forces, increased by fresh accessions, hotly pursued. Although his cavalry were numerous, he used his well-appointed artillery, which was moved rapidly in front. The ground becoming less favourable for either cavalry or artillery, the infantry of both armies skirmished, and so closely pressed were the English, that a general action was inevitable, and as soon as the retreating force could find ground at all favourable, they took it, and stood on the defensive. The positions of the contending forces, and the mode of combat which was necessitated by the peculiar character of the ground, has been described with military accuracy by Colonel Wilks, in the following passage:—"The whole extent of the ground which was the scene of the farther operations of the day, consisted of a congeries of granite rocks, or rather stones of unequal heights and dimensions, and every varied form, from six to sixteen feet diameter, scattered 'like the fragments of an earlier world.' at irregular intervals over the whole surface of the plain. Obliquely to the right, and in the rear of the situation in which the advanced troops were engaged, was a small oblong hill, skirted at its two extremities with an impenetrable mass of such stones, but flat and covered with earth at the top to a suffi-

cient extent to admit of being occupied by rather more than one battalion: the rocky skirts of this hill extended in a ridge of about three hundred yards towards the plain of stones, and under its cover the Europeans had been placed in reserve until the action should assume a settled form. Hitherto, amid a mass of cover and impediment, which bade defiance to a regular formation, the intervals between the rocks, and sometimes their summits, were occupied by troops; the smaller openings were converted into embrasures for guns; and support successively arrived from each army to those who were engaged. It was a series of contests for the possession of rocks, or the positions formed by their union, without any possibility of the regular extension of a line on either side, so that a rock was sometimes seen possessed by Mysoreans within the general scope of English defence, and by the English among the Mysoreans." The overwhelming numbers of Hyder gave him the advantage, in spite of the intrepidity of Wood and his soldiers. The English were giving way, and there was danger of confusion among the sepoy, who seldom behaved even tolerably well in retreat. The tide of victory which set so strongly against the English was suddenly turned by Captain Brooke, the officer who distinguished himself so much in the escalade on the previous day. Brooke had then been wounded, but, notwithstanding his sufferings, fought with a lion heart throughout the conflict which it was now his fortune to terminate. His position was with the baggage, which, with the sick and wounded, he guarded. His troops consisted of four companies and two guns. He perceived a flat rock, which was unoccupied, but which, strategically, afforded a good position. He ascended it, as it was approached easily by a route circuitous and covered with crags and foliage. His wounded men drew up, leaning on such support as they could find. The guns were dragged up and placed in position, and directed upon the enemy with charges of grape, making havoc in their ranks. The position commanded the left flank of the enemy, upon which, if any aid arrived from Smith, it would have appeared. Hyder, perceiving suddenly on his extreme left a body of men which he supposed he had not seen before, believed that some detachments from Smith's division had arrived upon the field. This impression became a conviction, when suddenly, after the first terrible discharge of grape, Brooke and his whole force—even the sick and wounded—all who could raise their voice, suddenly shouted, "Hurrah! hurrah! Smith! Smith!" The British, not being aware of the stratagem, were also imposed upon, and,

repeating the hurrahs and cries of "Smith!" returned with such confidence to the battle that Hyder, believing Smith's whole army was upon him, ordered a retreat. The trick was soon discovered by the acute Hyder, and he again returned to the attack; but his troops were not convinced that new forces had not joined the English, and they came on cautiously. The British had, in the meantime, chosen strong ground, and made such new dispositions of their force as greatly increased their strength. Hyder forced his legions upon the English lines; but they were found to be impregnable. Night closed around the combatants, the English remaining possessors of the field. The rocks, behind which the few British found repeated refuge, saved them. There were not three hundred men put *hors de combat*. Hyder's loss was two thousand.

A conflict of generalship began the next day between the two commanders. Hyder could handle large bodies of men with an intuitive genius. He out-manceuvred the British commander, avoiding a battle, and swooping suddenly upon garrison after garrison, capturing forts, and making prisoners. Among other places he fell upon Bangalore, having, by superior strategy, diverted Wood's attention in another direction. Wood, leaving his baggage and heavy guns in "the Petat" of that city, hastened to encounter Hyder, where the wily chieftain was not to be found, having adroitly misled the British colonel. Hyder seized the whole baggage of Wood's army, the guns, stores of provisions, with merchandise, and some treasure. The inhabitants rushed to the fort for security. The garrison closed the gates to prevent that confusion and over-crowding which would have left the citadel indefensible. The crowd strained forward to save themselves, and their treasures, from the ravages of Hyder's army, until two thousand men, women, and children, were crushed or trampled to death. Wood hastened from Oosoor just in time to find that Hyder was gone, and had taken with him everything of value in the place. The English were obliged to wander about for supplies, the council of either Madras or Bombay appearing to be only concerned in keeping up their dignity, and securing the chief cities of their presidencies. Hyder intercepted Wood's foraging expeditions, drove in his outposts, cut off his stragglers, tore away his newly acquired supplies, and day and night harassed his worn out troops. In one of these harassing attacks, after a running fight of several days and nights, and when Hyder was making the fiercest efforts to cut off the division of Wood, the English were relieved by his

sudden and unaccountable retreat. Major Fitzgerald and Smith's division were at hand. Hyder's scouts brought the intelligence; Wood was ignorant of it, until the roll of the English drums came with welcome and cheering music to his ear. Smith had gone to Madras, to bring the council to a proper appreciation, if possible, of the crisis, and Major Fitzgerald having assumed the command, with praiseworthy energy took measures to relieve Wood. Fitzgerald had very imperfect information of the colonel's condition, but he inferred, from a variety of minute indications, and from what he could gather of the movements of Hyder, that Wood, overpowered, was gallantly struggling in an unequal contest. Fitzgerald might have long wandered in quest of Wood, but for the heavy and in part useless cannonade kept up by Hyder, who, having captured the heavy guns at Bangalore, seemed desirous of annoying, or perhaps hoped to discourage the English by perpetually firing them. Fitzgerald, following the report, arrived in the nick of time to save Wood and his truly gallant little army. Warm were the congratulations of officers and soldiers when they met, and high rose their exultation as their enemy, although still many times outnumbering them, dared not to give them battle.

Fitzgerald found Wood in a state of great depression, which, after the first burst of joy upon their unexpected meeting, returned again. Fitzgerald wrote to Smith, informing him of this, who immediately presented the letter to the council, and Wood was ordered to be sent to them under arrest. This was very cruel, for, however incompetent to contend with such a soldier as Hyder, he was a brave soldier and good officer. He was not adapted to so important a command, but when it devolved upon him, he did his utmost to discharge its duties.

Fuzzul Oola Khan, one of the best of Hyder's generals, entered the province of Coimbatore, and with facility captured one fort after another, until he subjugated the province. An English sergeant named Hoskin, was the only person in any command that showed adequate courage or ability. He was in command of an advanced post, with two companies of native infantry, and one gun. This little force occupied a mud fort, and defended it heroically and cleverly. The fort was not taken, until it was thrown down and lay in rubbish around its defenders. Even then Hoskin disputed inch by inch of its ruins with the aggressors. The contest was sanguinary, and the greater part of the defenders perished before superior numbers. There are no records of Hoskin's fate; his

humble rank, in those days, would prohibit any notice of his ability or heroism, except such as the historian may gather from fragmentary references.

In other provinces the success of Hyder was as swift, and as shameful to the army of the nabob, and the arrangements of the English, as in Coimbatore. In several instances the valour and talent of obscure English officers delayed the progress of the conqueror for a little, but that was all that the English and their allies were able to effect. As Hyder himself marched upon Eroad, he encountered suddenly Captain Nixon, with a force of fifty Europeans and two hundred sepoy. Hyder attacked them with two divisions of infantry numbering probably ten thousand men, and a cavalry force still more numerous. Nixon drew up his small band in good position, and quietly awaited the approach of the enemy to within twenty yards, when they delivered a volley with such coolness that every shot told. The Europeans charged with the bayonet, an instrument of which the Mysoreans were much in dread. Hyder's infantry reeling under the well-directed volley, and charged with such impetuosity at the point of the bayonet, broke and turned from the field. Under another commander, the native army would probably have moved away; but Hyder knew what could be effected; he ordered his cavalry to charge the sepoy's flank and rear, and they were sabred to a man. Poor Nixon was among the slain. An officer was the only man who escaped, Lieutenant Goreham. He was fortunately able to speak the language, and claimed the humanity of a native officer.

Hyder Ali made use of Goreham to translate into English a summons to the garrison of Eroad to surrender; and to write a letter to its commander, Captain Orton, to come to his camp, and negotiate terms, promising a safe return if they could not agree. Orton trusted to the honour of a man who had no conception of it. He came. The officer next in command to Orton, was one Robinson, whom Hyder had released on parole, but who broke his parole, and was permitted by the council of Madras to break it. Hyder declared that he was absolved from his obligation to Orton, by the knowledge that Robinson was serving against him. Hyder offered to spare the garrison, and permit them to march out and proceed to Trichinopoly, if Orton would order Robinson to surrender. Orton gave the order, Robinson obeyed it; Hyder walked into the place, triumphing alike over the stupidity and dishonour of the English officers, who acted like men demented. Robinson was clearly a man without personal scruple or military pride. Wilks explains the

conduct of Orton on the supposition that he was a drunkard. Hyder, who kept no faith, did not permit the garrison to go to Trichinopoly, but sent them prisoners to Seringapatam, where he cast them into a loathsome dungeon, and deprived them of adequate subsistence. He hated the English with a keen and unpitying animosity, and burned for every opportunity of gratifying and displaying his vindictiveness. The English had by tergiversation, time serving, and unsteadiness of policy merited his wrath and contempt. Had the councils of Madras and Bombay followed the honourable and wise policy pointed out by the directors, had they obeyed orders given repeatedly, and as often violated, the humiliations inflicted by Hyder would never have been visited upon them.

Hyder next proceeded to Caveriporam, and summoned the garrison to surrender, offering the release of the officer and garrison on parole. The conditions were accepted; Hyder seized the place, and violated as usual the terms of capitulation. The garrison, with Captain Frassain, their commander, were sent to the dungeons of Seringapatam, where already several of the prisoners, among whom Captain Robinson, as the first victim, had already perished. The career of Hyder and his generals was one of complete success, the country everywhere within the sphere of operations being desolated or held by his forces. The council at Madras was terrified, and having provoked the war by their uncertain and arrogant policy, after having armed the enemy they thus provoked, they were glad to sue for peace. Hyder requested that an English officer should be sent to negotiate, and the choice of the council fell upon the gallant Captain Brooke, who had repeatedly distinguished himself by talent and valour in the field. Mr. Thornton thus describes the diplomatic occurrences which ensued:—"Hyder Ali requested that an English officer might be sent to confer with him, and Captain Brooke was dispatched thither in compliance with his wish. Hyder Ali expatiated on the aggressions of the English, and on his own desire for peace; on the exertions he had made to promote that object, and on the unreasonable manner in which his overtures had been rejected; on the wrongs which he had received from Mohammed Ali, and on the evil effects of that prince's influence in the councils of the English. He referred to the advantage of maintaining Mysore as a barrier to Arcot against the Mahrattas, and, adverting to a threatened invasion by that power, intimated that he could not oppose both them and the English at the same time, and that it remained for the latter power to determine

whether he should continue to shield them from the former as heretofore, or whether he should unite with the Mahrattas for the destruction of the English. Captain Brooke, in reply, pointed out the superior advantages of an alliance with the English to one with the Mahrattas, to which Hyder Ali assented, and expressed a wish that Colonel Smith should come up to the army invested with full powers of negotiation. Captain Brooke suggested that Hyder Ali should send a vakeel to Madras. This he refused, on the twofold ground that it would give umbrage to the Mahrattas, and that at Madras all his efforts for peace would be frustrated by Mohammed Ali. Before taking his leave, Captain Brooke suggested to Hyder Ali that there was one proof of his friendly and pacific disposition which might readily and at once be afforded: the discontinuance of the excesses by which the country was devastated, and the defenceless inhabitants reduced to the extremity of wretchedness. The proposal met probably with all the success which the proposer expected. Of friendly professions Hyder Ali was profuse, but of nothing more. He answered that his treasury was not enriched by the excesses complained of, but that he had been compelled to accept the services of some volunteers whose conduct he could not control. The report of this conversation was forwarded to Madras, and Mr. Andrews, a member of council, was deputed to negotiate. He arrived in the camp of Hyder Ali on the 18th of February, 1769, and quitted it on the 21st, with proposals to be submitted to the governor and council, having previously concluded a truce for twelve days. The governor of Madras had every reason to desire peace: so great was their distress that the company's investments were entirely suspended, and it was stated that their resources were insufficient to carry on the war more than four months longer.* Hyder Ali's proposals were, however, rejected, and hostilities recommenced. Colonel Smith, who had returned to the field, watched the movements of Hyder Ali with unceasing vigilance, and frequently counteracted them with admirable skill. The manœuvres of the two armies had brought them about one hundred and forty miles to the southward of Madras, when suddenly dismissing nearly the whole of his infantry, the greater part of his cavalry, together with his guns and baggage of every description, Hyder Ali, with six thousand horse, advanced rapidly towards that place, and on the 29th of March appeared before it. A small party of infantry joined him on the following day.

* Separate Letter from Fort St. George, 8th March, 1769.

He immediately caused a letter to be addressed to the governor expressing a desire to treat for peace, and requesting that Mr. Dupré, a member of council and next in succession to the chair, might be deputed to attend him. The character of the man who made this demand, the place from which it was made, and the circumstances under which he had arrived there, all contributed to secure attention to the message. Mr. Dupré proceeded to the camp of Hyder Ali on the morning of the receipt of his letter, and, after a series of conferences, the terms of a treaty were agreed upon. The treaty was executed by the governor and council on the 3rd of April, and by Hyder Ali on the 4th. With reference to the circumstances under which the peace was concluded, Hyder Ali may be regarded as having displayed much moderation. A mutual restoration of captured places was provided for, and Caroor, an ancient depen-

dency of Mysore, which had been for some time retained by Mohammed Ali, was to be rendered back. After the conclusion of the treaty, difficulties arose from a demand of Hyder Ali for the liberation of some persons kept prisoners by Mohammed Ali, and of the surrender of some stores at Colar. With much persuasion the nabob was induced to comply with the former demand, and the latter was yielded by the British government, probably because it was felt to be vain to refuse.*

Thus terminated the war with Hyder Ali—a war which was needlessly and improvidently commenced, and conducted, on the part of the Madras government, with singular weakness and unskilfulness. Its conclusion was far more happy than that government had any right to expect either from their own measures, or from the character of their enemy.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

HOME AFFAIRS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM 1750 TO 1775—IMPEACHMENT AND ACQUITTAL OF CLIVE—CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMPANY.

THE history of events in India having been brought down to a considerably later period than that of the home incidents by which they were influenced, it is necessary to relate what happened in the company's proceedings as the tidings reached England of so many and great vicissitudes in the East. In relating those changes, such frequent reference has been made to the directions received in India from the company, and to the general policy of the directors, that it will not be necessary to recount the minutæ of the company's proceedings, nor to go much into detail in describing their fluctuating fortunes.

When the second half of the eighteenth century began, the company's affairs were much tried at home by the too great eagerness of the proprietary for large dividends. So long as there was prosperity in that respect, the proprietors of India stock did not much trouble themselves as to how events went in India. The successes of Clive, however, excited so much public attention, that from that period a more enlarged interest in the affairs of India was felt by the proprietary. During the year 1754 he was "a lion" in England, and popular opinion marked him out for future achievement.

In March, 1755, when he was appointed a member of council for Madras, the directors were nearly as much influenced by the general

feeling of the proprietors as by their own convictions that he was "the right man in the right place." The French were at this period the rivals most dreaded by the company and the country, and all measures adopted by them to curb French power in the East were regarded by the people of England as patriotic. This general sentiment strengthened the hands of the directors, and enabled them to supply men and material of war in a measure that would otherwise have been impossible, while the company was an object of such extensive commercial jealousy. One cause of much of the anxiety of the directors, and of a large amount of the mal-administration and confusion in India, was the complicated forms of government contrived in London for the regulation of the presidencies. Various attempts to remove and to modify this evil were made by the independent proprietors; Clive himself pointed it out with his usual vigour and clearness of expression, but no change found favour either with the directors or the councils in India. The difficulties under which the directors laboured from the slowness of communication, and their imperfect maritime arrangements, were then very great; while the rapid occurrence of great events in India baffled all their efforts to keep pace with them

* *History of the British Empire in India*, Thornton, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 570—575.

in their arrangements. The councils at the presidencies, not fully appreciating these difficulties, constantly complained of neglect. They perpetually demanded men and stores, which they often recklessly employed on enterprises not contemplated nor approved of by the directors. The sense which the court entertained of their arduous difficulties from all these causes, is well expressed in their letter to Bengal, 1760:—"The forces that went abroad last year and are now destined for India, will demonstrate that your employers labour incessantly to strengthen and protect their settlements, the glorious successes at home having enabled the government to grant us large succours, and we must gratefully confess the ministry's care of this company. The many remonstrances in almost every letter would have been spared, if you had reflected properly on our cruel and dangerous situation; our mercantile concerns always giving place to men and stores, when we could possibly obtain them; ever distressed for tonnage, as we carry abroad for the government seldom less than one thousand tons annually, exclusive of their men and baggage. The heavy demorage incurred by ships detained by accident or otherwise in India; the immense expenses at Madras, with very scanty returns; your own charges very great, those of Bombay beyond all bounds; our settlements in Sumatra, at the same time, requiring large sums to put them in some state of security against enemies and dangerous neighbours; if these considerations had been duly weighed, your injurious insinuations of being neglected must have been turned into praise, that your employers could do so much under such untoward circumstances. We ourselves look back with wonder at the difficulties we have surmounted, and which, with our contracted capital, must have been impossible, if the proprietors, generously and without a murmur, had not consented to reduce their dividend twenty-five per cent.; but with all our economy and care, unless our servants studiously attend to lessen their charges and increase our advantages, the burthen will be too great for us to bear much longer."

The gratitude expressed towards the ministry in that letter was deserved, for upon the increase of the company's military forces, and especially when intelligence arrived that the French and other European rivals held out every temptation to the sepoy and other mercenaries in the English service to desert, measures were taken by the government to extend and enforce the company's military authority. An act was passed which enabled them to hold courts-martial for the punishment of mutiny and desertion.

When Clive returned to England the second time, he received personally, July 16th, 1760, from the directors, their "unanimous thanks for his many eminent and unparalleled services." It is a sad illustration of the corruption of human nature, that a few years later, when no further advantages were expected from Clive's military and administrative genius, these "many eminent and unparalleled services" were so little regarded, that the court of directors endeavoured to strip him of his property and appropriate it to themselves.

In 1760, however, it was the policy of the company to praise him; accordingly, in September of that year, the proprietors marked their sense of Colonel Clive's services by a public resolution of thanks to him, Admiral Pococke, and Colonel Lawrence. They also resolved unanimously, "that the chairman and deputy chairman, when they wait upon Vice-admiral Pococke, Colonel Clive, and Colonel Lawrence, will desire those gentlemen to give their consent that their portraits or statues be taken, in order to be placed in some conspicuous parts of this house, that their eminent and signal services to this company may be ever had in remembrance." Thus the proprietary at large rivalled the directors in eulogising and conferring honours upon him: a few years later, and their rivalry was as signal in vituperating him, and endeavouring to wrench from him property which he had acquired with the sanction of the honourable court. Clive was, however, destined to render further services to the company, and to be still more an object of their panegyric before ingratitude and persecution marked him for their victim. In 1764, after the unfortunate government of Mr. Vansittart in Bengal, Clive, as has been already shown in the history of that presidency, was appointed governor and commander-in-chief. The circumstances attending his appointment were of considerable home interest to the company, and excited much attention from all classes in the country.

There was a person in the direction of the company named Sullivan, by whose influence a series of injuries and annoyances to Clive were set on foot. Among other acts of hostility to him, they refused to recognise his jaghire, which had been conferred on him as already related with the company's approval. As this landed estate was worth £30,000 a year, and the company was his tenant, it was deemed a good prize, and of easy attainment. Clive was compelled to take leading proceedings for the recovery of his rights, the lawyers having declared that his claims were legal and equitable. The company had no ground for re-

sisting them except that to appropriate to themselves Clive's property would be an advantage. Sullivan was perhaps actuated as much by jealousy of Clive's influence as by cupidity. The latter motive was that which chiefly prevailed with the rest of the directors.

When the advices from Bengal, dated September 3rd, 1763, were received by the directors, great excitement was produced in the honourable court, and among the public. These advices were received on the 4th of February, 1764, and informed the directors of the war with Meer Cossim, and the death of Mr. Amyatt in the conflict at Moorshedabad. On the 8th of February, an advertisement appeared in all the London newspapers, conveying the intelligence that had been received. A special grand court was called on the 27th of February, according to that provision in the constitution of the company, under which nine proprietors might call such a meeting. On the 29th of February, the 1st of March, and the 12th of that month, the court also assembled. All the revolutions which had taken place in Bengal since the first English acquisitions were made, became subjects of discussion. Long and angry debates ruffled the usually smooth surface of the company's meetings. The appointment which the directors had made of making Mr. Spencer governor of Bengal was "referred back again to them," and an outcry for the re-appointment of Clive arose which could not be stifled. He was then Lord Clive. His lordship was present at the meeting on the 12th of March, and expressed his willingness to serve the company, if he were assured that the court of directors were well disposed towards him; but he declined coming to any resolution at that moment.

It soon transpired that Clive believed the deputy-chairman, Mr. Sullivan, was his enemy. That gentleman almost controlled the direction. He was a man of vast influence and energy, and pertinacious in the extreme. He and Clive were at constant variance; and Clive resolved never to serve abroad if Sullivan ruled at home. In a letter addressed to the court of directors, March 28th, he expressed his resolution in terms firm, but modest and polite. He declared that he considered the measures of Mr. Sullivan utterly destructive to the interests of the company; but expressed himself as ready, if that gentleman were deprived of what was called "the lead" in the company's affairs, to accept the appointment, even if the affairs of Bengal should prove to be in a worse condition than during the time of Suraj-ad-Dowlah. To this letter the directors made no reply. The annual election for the directory took place

on the 12th of April. On the 13th "new chairs were chosen, and Mr. Sullivan returned into the body of the court."

On the 18th, the directors renewed their correspondence with Lord Clive, who attended there for the purpose of a conference, at their invitation, the next day. He then started new objections to his acceptance of the honours proffered to him. These were the presence in Bengal of Mr. Spencer, with whom he alleged many of the company's agents would no longer serve; and the disadvantage to himself personally of proceeding to India, while a law-suit in reference to his jaghire continued.

On the 27th, the court rescinded the nomination of Mr. Spencer to the council of Bengal, and re-appointed him to Bombay. This appears to have conciliated Clive, who, knowing of the intention of the directors as to Spencer, prepared proposals of a concessive nature concerning his jaghire. Without waiting for the company's acquiescence in these, he accepted their nomination, and was sworn in, on the 30th of April, as president of Fort William and commander-in-chief of the company's forces there.

On the 5th of May, the general court granted to his lordship the income of the jaghire for ten years—that is to say, they made him a present for ten years of an income which was his own for ever; and this was done with a show of magnanimity, and consideration for his "eminent and unparalleled services." The results of these proceedings have been recorded in their proper place in a previous chapter. The comments of Mr. Mill upon the whole of these transactions are inaccurate, and expressed in a spirit unjust to the company and to Clive. Whatever Mr. Mill has written, receives currency to a greater extent among liberal persons not well informed on Indian subjects, than the statements of any other writer obtain; it is therefore important to draw attention to instances in which he allowed his peculiar opinions to sway his mind, to the prejudice not only of the East India Company, but against the reputation of his own country. In the history of the East India Company, there were unhappily too many episodes discreditable to that body and to Englishmen; but it is unworthy of a great writer and able man to subserve his peculiar commercial, economical, or political opinions, by seizing upon every apparent error, and twisting it into a crime, and by perpetually turning aside from the true line of fact to attribute motive, and misconstrue the intention of those to whose opinions and principles he is opposed.

On the proceedings between Clive and the

company, related above, Mr. Mill thus animadverts:—"During the military and political transactions which so intensely engaged their servants in India, the courts of directors and proprietors remained for several years rather quiet spectators and warm expectants, than keen and troublesome controllers. When they had been agitated for a while, however, by the reports of mismanagement which were mutually transmitted to them by Vansittart and his opponents; and, at last, when they were alarmed by the news of a war actually kindled with the nabob, of the massacre of so many of their servants, and the extensive spirit of mutiny among the troops, their sense of danger roused them to some acts of authority. Though Clive had quitted India with an act of insult towards his employers, which they had highly resented; though the directors had disputed and withheld payment of the proceeds of his jaghire, for which he had commenced a suit against them in the Court of Chancery; he was now proposed for governor, as the only man capable of retrieving their disordered and desperate affairs. Only thirteen directors, however, were found, after a violent contest, to vote for his appointment; while it was still opposed by eleven. Yet the high powers which he demanded, as indispensable for the arduous services necessary to be performed, though strongly opposed, were also finally conferred. He was invested with the powers of commander-in-chief, president, and governor in Bengal; and, together with four gentlemen, named by the directors, was to form a select committee, empowered to act by their own authority, as often as they deemed it expedient, without consulting the council, or being subject to its control." Almost every line of that passage makes a misstatement, or conveys by implication some misrepresentation.

It is not true that the court of directors remained quiet spectators rather than troublesome controllers. No impartial person can read the correspondence between the councils and the directors without coming to an opposite conclusion. A very cursory inspection of documents and authorities at the India-house must assure any honest mind that the directors showed activity and vigilance, answering all correspondence with promptitude, and furnishing such means as they could against contingencies. So frequently was the company deceived, by both intentional and unintentional misstatements from the councils, that the measures they took did not correspond with eventualities. It is not true that there was any indisposition to control their servants, when clearly aware that those servants were doing wrong. There

were instances in which some want of energy was, in this particular, displayed, as has been noticed in previous chapters. But the time it required to receive intelligence and send back orders was so great as frequently to paralyse the power of the directors, and enable the councils to answer their masters with promises which they did not intend to perform. As soon as the directors knew that Spencer, Amyatt, and others, had perversely disobeyed their orders and committed their honour, these persons were either removed to other spheres or dismissed. In the case of several, more especially Aymatt, the penal resolutions of the directors failed to take effect, as these persons had already paid the penalty of life, for their impolicy or oppression, upon the field of their errors. By the expression "warm expectants," Mr. Mill evidently means that the directors awaited eagerly for such tidings of revolution and plunder as would fill the treasury at home. If this be not the meaning, the whole tone of the context is such as to convey the impression. M. Auber* remarks upon this passage:—"There is nothing which authorizes the inference, that they were, at that period, 'warm expectants,' (it is presumed) either of new acquisitions or exorbitant gains. They desired the means of meeting the heavy expenditure which the operations in that country had entailed upon the company. They advised and directed, where advice and direction could be safely given; and, although they wisely abstained from controlling any measures which the exigency of circumstances might have called for on the part of the council, they communicated their sentiments and wishes thereon to their servants." The course taken by the directors in this last respect was the only rational one. The sphere of operation was too remote for a direct control; the only plan was to entrust their servants with a large discretion, and hold them personally responsible. M. Auber meets the allegation of Mill; that the directors were only at last roused to a sense of their danger to resort to some acts of authority, by the hostilities against the nabob, the massacres of so many of their servants, and the extensive spirit of mutiny among their troops, in the following terms:—"The directors had exercised the acts of authority referred to before any such news had reached England. The death of Mr. Amyatt was not known to the court until three weeks after he had been removed from the service; the account of the massacre did not arrive until three months, and that of the mutiny until six months, after the appointment of Lord Clive; and, instead

* *British Power in India*, vol. i. chap. iv. pp. 129, 130.

of its having been considered an extensive mutiny, the court of directors, on the 11th of October, 1764, caused the following notice to be issued through the daily papers: 'We can, with good authority, assure the public, that although by the last advices from Bengal (7th February), the East India Company were informed there had been a mutiny among the troops, instigated and encouraged by some French soldiers, about one hundred and fifty in number, who had enlisted in the company's service, yet the same, at the time of dispatching those advices, was quelled, without the loss or desertion of a single European, except those Frenchmen above-mentioned.'" M. Auber also remarks:—"The appointment of Lord Clive was that of the court of proprietors, and not of the court of directors. With regard to the high powers stated to have been 'demanded,' it would be inferred from the statement that they formed one of the stipulations under which his lordship accepted the office of president; whereas he was sworn in on the 30th of April, and it was not until the 25th of May that the recommendation of the committee of correspondence which was agreed to in personal communication with, and not in consequence of any demand from his lordship, was adopted by the majority of the court. It was on that occasion that the eleven directors dissented, not from his appointment, but from the resolution conferring such powers on the select committee, which was to consist of four members besides his lordship; and so far from the act conferring such powers being unusual, the principle had obtained of appointing a select committee to act irrespective of the council, since February, 1756. In the instance of the expedition to Madras, under Colonel Forde, in 1758, the select committee acted under such powers, as appears by the consultations of the 21st of August in that year. In the instance of Mr. Vansittart, in February, 1764, only three months preceding the proposition for conferring the powers in question on Lord Clive, and the committee, full powers had been given by the court to Mr. Vansittart, 'with authority to pursue whatever means he judged most proper to attain the object. He was in all cases, where it could be done conveniently, to consult the council at large, or, at least, the select committee, though the power of determining was vested in him alone!'"

While Clive was engaged in Bengal, the company at home was much chagrined and scandalized by the communications which he made of the corruption of the court of Bengal. It is much to be wished that the conduct of the company to Clive himself in pecuniary matters had been as honourable as it was

upon receipt of his communications, and as they insisted the conduct of their councils ought to be in their dealings with native peoples and princes. The subject of presents from native princes to the servants of the East India Company, upon any revolution or great political change, was a difficult subject to adjust. Mr. Mill, in his history, places the lists of recipients before his readers, and shows the aggregate amount which in less than ten years, as was proved before a committee of the House of Commons, was received. This list, with the prefatory remarks of Mr. Mill, will interest our readers:—

"The practice which prevails in all rude governments of accompanying an application to a man in power with a gratification to some of his ruling passions, most frequently to the steadiest of all his passions, his avarice or rapacity, has always remarkably distinguished the governments in the East, and hardly any to so extraordinary a degree as the governments of the very rude people of India. When the English suddenly acquired their extraordinary power in Bengal, the current of presents, so well accustomed to take its course in the channel drawn by hope and fear, flowed very naturally, and very copiously, into the lap of the strangers. A person in India, who had favours to ask, or evil to deprecate, could not easily believe, till acceptance of his present, that the great man to whom he addressed himself was not his foe. Besides the sums, which we may suppose it to have been in the power of the receivers to conceal, and of the amount of which it is not easy to form a conjecture, the following were detected and disclosed by the committee of the House of Commons, in 1773:—

"Account of such sums as have been proved or acknowledged before the committee to have been distributed by the princes and other natives of Bengal, from the year 1757 to the year 1766, both inclusive; distinguishing the principal times of the said distributions, and specifying the sums received by each person respectively."

Revolution in favour of Meer Jaffier, in 1757.

	Rupees.	Rupees.	£
Mr. Drake (Governor)		280,000	31,500
Colonel Clive as second in the select committee	280,000		
Ditto as commander-in-chief	200,000		
Ditto as a private donation	1,600,000*		
		2,080,000	234,000

* It appears, by the extract in the appendix, No. 102, from the evidence given on the trial of Ram Churn before the governor and council in 1761, by Roy Dulip, who had the principal management in the distribution of the treasures of the deceased nabob, Suraj-ad-Dowlah, upon the accession of Jaffier Ali Cawn—that Roy Dulip then

	Rupees.	Rupees.	£
Mr. Watts as a member of the committee . . .	240,000		
Ditto as a private donation	800,000		
	<u>1,040,000</u>		117,000
Major Kilpatrick	240,000		27,000
Ditto as a private donation	300,000		33,750
Mr. Maningham	240,000		27,000
Mr. Beecher	240,000		27,000
Six members of council one lac each	600,000		68,200
Mr. Walsh	500,000		56,250
Mr. Scrafton	200,000		22,500
Mr. Lushington	50,000		5,625
Stipulation to the navy and army		600,000	600,000

1,261,075

Memorandum.—The sum of two lacs to Lord Clive, as commander-in-chief, must be deducted from this account, it being included in the donation to the army

22,500

Lord Clive's jaghire was likewise obtained at this period*

1,238,575

Revolution in favour of Cossim, 1760.

Mr. Sumner		28,000	
Mr. Holwell	270,000		30,937
Mr. M'Guire	180,000		20,625
Mr. Smyth	134,000		15,354
Major Yorke	134,000		15,354
General Calliaud	200,000		22,916
Mr. Vansittart, 1762, received seven lacs; but the two lacs to General Calliaud are included; so that only five lacs must be counted for here	500,000		58,333
Mr. M'Guire 5000 gold molirs	75,000		8,750
			<u>200,269</u>

Revolution in favour of Jaffier, 1763.

Stipulation to the army	2,500,000		291,666
Ditto to the navy	1,250,000		145,833
			<u>437,499</u>

Major Menro† in 1764 received from Bulwan Singh		10,000	
Ditto from the nabob		3,000	
The officers belonging to Major Moaro's family from ditto		3,000	
The army received from the merchants at Bonares	400,000		46,666
			<u>62,666</u>

Nujum-ad-Dowlah's accession, 1765.

Mr. Spencer	200,000		23,333
Messieurs Pleydell, Burdett, and Gray, one lac each	300,000		35,000

received, as a present from Colonel Clive, one lac, 25,000 rupees, being five per cent. on 25 lacs. It does not appear that this evidence was taken on oath.

* This, as noticed by Sir J. Malcolm, *Life of Clive*, vol. ii. p. 187, is incorrect. The jaghire was not granted till the end of 1759, two years after Meer Jaffier had been seated on the throne.

† It appears Colonel Moaro accepted a jaghire from the king, of £12,500 a-year, which he delivered to the Nabob Meer Jaffier, the circumstances of which are stated in the Journals of the year 1825.

	Rupees.	£
Mr. Johnstone	237,000	27,650
Mr. Leyeester	112,500	13,125
Mr. Scioir	172,500	20,125
Mr. Middleton	122,500	14,291
Mr. Gideon Johnstone	50,000	5,833

*139,357

General Carnac received from Bulwan Sing in 1765	80,000	9,333
Ditto from the king	200,000	23,333
Lord Clive received from the Begum in 1766	500,000	58,333

90,999

Restitution—Jaffier, 1757.

East India Company	1,200,000	
Europeans	600,000	
Natives	250,000	
Armenians	100,000	

2,150,000

Cossim, 1760.

East India Company	62,500	
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Jaffier, 1763.

East India Company	375,000	
Europeans, Natives, &c.	600,000	
	<u>975,000</u>	

Peace with Sujah-ad-Dowlah.

East India Company	5,000,000	583,333
Total of presents, £2,169,665.		
Restitution, &c., £3,770,833.		
Total amount, exclusive of Lord Clive's jaghire		£5,940,498

Memorandum.—The rupees are valued according to the rate of exchange of the company's bills at the different periods."†

Mr. Mill wisely and eloquently remarked upon these facts—"That this was a practice presenting the strongest demand for effectual regulation, its obvious consequences render manifest and indisputable. In the first place, it laid the nabobs, rulers, and other leading men of the country, under endless and unlimited oppression; because, so long as they on whom their whole power and influence depended were pleased to desire presents, nothing could be withheld which they either possessed or had it in their power to ravage

* These sums appear by evidence to have been received by the parties; but the committee think proper to state that Mohammed Reza Cawo intended a present of one lac of rupees to each of the four deputies sent to treat with Nujum-ad-Dowlah upon his father's death; viz. Messrs. Johnstone, Leyeester, Senior, and Middleton; but Mr. Middleton and Mr. Leyeester affirm that they never accepted theirs, and Mr. Johnstone appears to have tendered his back to Mohammed Reza Cawo, who would not accept them. These bills (except Mr. Scioir's for 50,000 rupees) appear to have been afterwards laid before the select committee, and no further evidence has been produced to your committee concerning them. Mr. Scioir received 50,000 rupees of his, and it is stated against him in this account.

† *Third Report on the Nature, State, and Condition of the East India Company, 1772, pp. 20—23.*

and extort. That the temptations under which the servants of the company were placed, carried them to those heights of exaction which were within their reach, is far from true. They showed, on the contrary, a reserve and forbearance, which the education received in no other country, probably in the world, except their own, could have enabled men, in their extraordinary circumstances to maintain."

On the 17th of July, 1767, Lord Clive presented himself before the court of directors, upon his return from Bengal, after his brief but successful career there. The court congratulated him in terms of energetic praise, declaring that his conduct "exceeded the court's most sanguine expectations, not only in the very eminent services he had rendered the company by his wise and judicious administration of their affairs during his residence in Bengal, but also by that prudent and well-formed plan which he had suggested for the regulation of the plan of the select committee; and that it was impossible by force of words to represent to his lordship the high sense of gratitude the court entertained for the constant attention given by his lordship to the company's interests."

"On the 23rd of September, the general court, in consideration of the important services rendered to the company by Lord Clive, recommended to, and authorized, the court of directors to make a grant, under the company's seal, to his lordship, and his personal representatives, of a further term of ten years on his jaghire. The indenture granting the same was approved and engrossed in October following."

The court of directors were probably well pleased with their judgment upon Clive's services, upon receiving a despatch from the council of Bengal, conveying a good account of the company's prospects, and attributing it to the genius of Clive. The council must have been much impressed with the overwhelming ability of the great general and statesman, when, in spite of his reforms, and resolute and even haughty conduct to themselves, they could make up their minds to lavish compliments upon him in this fashion:—

"We should be wanting in the just praises of superior merit, and in gratitude for the essential services performed by Lord Clive, if we failed to acknowledge that, to the prudence and vigour of his administration, you are chiefly to ascribe the present flourishing condition of your affairs. Firm and indefatigable in his pursuits, he joined, to the weight of personal character, a zeal for your service, and a knowledge of your interests, which could not but insure success.

"We beheld a presidency divided, headstrong and licentious; a government without nerves; a treasury without money, and a service without subordination, discipline, or public spirit. We may add that, amidst a general stagnation of useful industry and of licensed commerce, individuals were accumulating immense riches, which they had ravished from the insulted prince and his helpless people, who groaned under the united pressure of discontent, poverty, and oppression.

"Such was the condition of this presidency and of these provinces. Your present situation need not be described. The liberal supplies to China; the state of your treasury, of your investment, of the service, and of the whole country, declare it to be the strongest contrast to what it was.

"We repeat," added the committee, "what we have already declared to Lord Clive, that no motive, no consideration, shall ever induce us to depart from that system of politics which has been recommended to us by precept and example, unless some very extraordinary event and unforeseen change should occur in the posture of your affairs."

On the 6th of April, 1770, the committee of the military fund carried into effect an agreement between Lord Clive and the company, in respect to the legacy left to his lordship by Meer Jaffier, referred to in a previous chapter. This sum amounted to £62,833. Meer Jaffier's successor added to this sum £37,700. There was also an additional sum of £24,128, due by the company for interest at eight per cent. on those amounts. Mr. Mill sneeringly observes that "to this ambiguous transaction the institution at Poplar owes its foundation." This is one of the many errors into which that able man was betrayed by the animus which he cherished towards the company. The institution at Poplar, under the designation of "Poplar Hospital," was founded for the relief of those who had belonged to the company's maritime service, or who might at any future time have belonged to it. Lord Clive's fund was for the benefit of those who had been in the military service, or who, in after times, might have served in the company's army. Poplar Hospital was instituted nearly a century before Clive was born, in 1627.

The conquests of Hyder Ali, which occasioned such tumults and alarms in the presidencies of Bombay and Madras, excited great concern in the court of directors. The following despatch to the council of Madras sets the affairs between Hyder, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the Madras council, in their true light, and proves that the directors clearly understood how so many dangers and dis-

tresses were brought about, notwithstanding the advantageous light in which the council placed their own conduct, and their petulant accusations, against the nabob, and every one else whom their own ignorance, incapacity, and apathy involved in their abortive projects and disputes. The date of the despatch was March, 1770 :—

“ In your letter to the nabob, dated the 16th July, 1767, you say that it has been your intention, ever since 1761, to embrace the first favourable opportunity of securing the several passes into the Carnatic. That you then had a favourable opportunity, because the Mahrattas had already struck a terror into Hyder's forces; therefore, you urged the nabob to exert his utmost to get this accomplished. You afterwards promised him the government of the Mysore country. Your field deputies pompously appointed him fougedar thereof; and then you accuse him of having an insatiable desire of extending his dominions. He finds himself, by following your advice, reduced, disappointed, and almost despised; and then you blame him for want of temper.

“ You have attempted to explain away the value of almost everything for which you have ventured to plunge us into a war with a view to obtain. To such a degree of irresolution and disability had your ill-conduct of the war reduced you, that necessity obliged you, at last, to give Mr. Andrews, in his instructions to treat with Hyder, a very extraordinary *carte blanche*, nearly to this effect: ‘ If Hyder will not relinquish places taken, we must relinquish pretensions thereto.’

“ You say the nabob has the Bengal transactions always in his mind :—we wonder not at it. You have, contrary to our express injunctions, afforded but too much reason for all the country powers around you to suspect us of encroaching designs against their possessions and tranquillity, and gained no one advantage thereby.

“ In the first article of your treaty with Hyder, you include, in general words, all the friends and allies of the contracting parties, ‘ provided they do not become aggressors;’ but if they become aggressors, they lose the benefit of such treaty.

“ Now, as by the treaty with the soubahdar, Bazalet Jung is prohibited expressly, at any time, from yielding Hyder the common formal civilities necessarily practised by country powers who are at peace with each other, we cannot conceive how Bazalet Jung can fulfil the condition by which he holds his circar, and yet continue on good terms with Hyder, as all our allies must do, if they act conformably to the first article of your treaty with him.

“ By your letter to the president and council of Bengal, 21st March last, and their reply thereto, of the 31st of the same month, we find a plan has been concerted between you, for establishing a fund for military resources, by a reduction of the investments on which we had so much reason to depend. However salutary it might be to provide against future exigencies, after your investments shall have been carried to their full extent, yet it is with the utmost astonishment we see that our servants (apprised, as they are, of the obligation the company is under to pay £400,000 annually to government, exclusive of the indemnity for tea, which may be estimated at near £200,000) could entertain an idea of depriving us of the only means we could have to discharge the same, together with such dividends as the proprietors might reasonably expect from our late acquisitions, and at the same time enable us to provide for the payment of bills of exchange, or our common and necessary consignments, and the other important occasions which must indispensably be complied with.”

The reference made in the foregoing despatch to the annual payment of £400,000 a year to the British government arose from an act passed to that effect in June, 1757, compelling the company to pay that sum for permission to hold the sovereignty of their territorial possessions in India for two years. This was another instance of the flagrant manner in which the crown and parliament were ever ready to rend from the company money on any pretext. After the resources of the company had been drained in formidable wars, and territory was conceded to them, by the revenues of which they hoped to cover the expenses incurred, the crown and parliament were ready to seize as much of these revenues as possible, leaving the company to meet its onerous pecuniary obligations as best it could. The government and parliament found an opportunity for enacting this piece of rapacity, in consequence of the turbulent proceedings of the proprietors of Indian stock, who looked for the most exorbitant dividends, under allegations of the wealth of their newly-acquired provinces, which raised the envy and cupidity of the governing classes in England. They at once proclaimed that subjects should not become territorial lords, or make conquests, except for the weal of the entire nation. The company protested that some of these cessions were in payment of expenses actually incurred, and that for most, if not all, of their accessions of land they paid a rent, and, in many cases, equal to that upon which zemindars and polygars held their tenures, and far

more surely paid. The legislature cared for none of these arguments, nor for any representations that might be made, the object of its members being to relieve themselves from taxation, and place money at the disposal of government, for its own purposes, however unjustly taken from the company. The king of England and his ministers were as ready as the Emperor of Delhi, his *soubahdars*, and their nabobs, to seize what might, under their especial circumstances, be taken. The Mahratta chiefs were not the only royal personages who took "chout" from the Indian lands. The East India Company had to pay a "chout" to the Mahrattas of their own legislature upon the lands from which they hoped to acquire a revenue. The Act compelling the company to pay £400,000 a-year expired in 1769, but was then renewed* for five years. The act in 1767, besides exacting the tribute, compelled the company, whether it suited their business or not, to export a given value in British produce.

Closely following the renewal of the tribute act, government passed measures giving to their admirals on the coasts of India extraordinary powers, which were used stupidly and obstinately, as the reader has seen in the relation of the absurd interference of Admirals Lindsey and Harland in affairs for which they had neither intelligence, experience, nor capacity. Three commissioners sent out by the company in 1769 never reached their destination. This was one cause of the assumption of absolute supervision by the admirals, whose powers would have been held in check by the authority conferred on the commissioners with the consent of the crown.

In 1772 the directors were obliged to represent to the ministers that, in consequence of the imperfect power allowed to the company for the punishment of its servants, the directors were unable to enforce their authority; that the recent wars, which they neither desired nor occasioned, had absorbed their revenue; that the expenditure for troops and stores had increased; and that the investment upon the "out-tun," upon which they relied for means to meet their expenses, was actually suspended, from the absorption of their capital. It might have been expected that the ruinous tribute of £400,000 a-year would, under such circumstances, have been remitted; but the minister of the day showed no disposition to relax demands, or in any way favour the company. The directors and proprietors did not themselves adopt prudent courses. They had not long before declared a dividend of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., with the full knowledge of their embarrassments; but

* 7 Geo. III. cap. 57.

the £400,000 demanded by government was not paid. A public opinion was rapidly created against the company and its servants. Forgotten matters were sought out, refuted accusations were revived, sins forgiven or passed lightly over by the public, were dragged to light again; "returned Indians" were ridiculed in the newspaper and comic press, caricatures of those persons as "nabobs" were exhibited in the printshops, while eager crowds approvingly gazed upon them; and, in fine, a widespread hostility existed towards the directors and their agents. Had the company paid its way and made good dividends, had new accounts of glorious victories, instead of the intelligence concerning the defeats and disgraces attending the war with Mysore arrived, the mob would have cheered, the nation would have been proud of its heroes, the company's nabobs and the holders of East India stock would have been the most respectable of citizens. A cloud came upon the face of the great luminary, and every vulgar eye looked fearlessly upon it. The very persons that had courted the patronage of the company only a short time before, when in the heyday of its power, were amongst the pamphleteers and accusers who detracted its fair and legitimate fame. Lord Clive, instead of being a popular idol, became a popular victim. The families of those whom he had deprived of place and power, when in 1765 he uprooted so many maladministrators, as well as so much maladministration, had hated him from that time, and virulently calumniated him; but the public mind was not then prepared to listen to them: now it was ready to believe as well as to hear every fiction, as well as every fault which flowed from the tongues of his vituperators. The circumstances under which his lordship had entered upon that arduous trust were forgotten, whilst the most distorted views were given of his measures. Lord Clive was not a recognised servant of the state; he derived no authority from law: he was placed over a presidency, divided, headstrong, and licentious; the treasury was without money, and the service without subordination, discipline, or public spirit; the subordinate functionaries being aware that they were only amenable to punishment within the precincts of the Mahratta ditch. Such a state of things was alone to be met and overcome by the firm and resolute line of conduct which his lordship adopted. The effect on the interests of the individuals who suffered under the well-merited rebuke their conduct had drawn upon them, led to the strong opposition evinced at the time towards his lordship,—a feeling which was fomented by some of the leading members of

the direction, who were personally indisposed towards him.*

A select and a secret committee were moved for in parliament. The members were generally adverse to the company, and many were envious of the reputations and fortunes which had been made in India, by which persons originally obscure, towered above "old families." They were denounced in and out of parliament as upstarts, as if it were criminal of them to be either braver, wiser, or more clever than the gentry at home. Those who had grown rich by legitimate means, were the objects of as much acrimonious jealousy as those who brought home their stores of plunder; nor were the former free from calumny, any more than the latter from just censure. As many who had grown rich in India did so by plundering their own employers as well as vanquished princes and peoples—men who had dared nothing, and done nothing for the good of the company or the honour of their country, and as these were a vast majority of all that had grown rich in India, the "wealthy Indians" were as a class liable to suspicion and exposed to abuse. A perfect hurricane of obloquy and invective raged round the heads of all connected with the East India Company. How strange the fortunes of this anomalous society—one year the pride of an empire, and conquering empires, its servants statesmen and generals, whose names filled the world; in another year, not remote, none so poor as to do it homage. Its fortunes were like flashing meteors, attracting every eye, and passing swiftly on into darkness. Fitful and glorious were the episodes of its progress. Every season of renown was followed by one of obloquy. Now gorgeous Eastern kings poured forth their treasures before it, as offerings to its valour, wisdom, and power. Anon, the street-rabble mock its directors as they pass; and the most stupid country gentlemen that ever slumbered and voted upon the benches of the commons, deem themselves of too much consequence to associate with its returned ministers and soldiers, men who had

"Made the earth to tremble,
And did shake kingdoms."

The general feeling against the company and its servants was promoted by an event in which they had no share, except as sufferers. In the year 1770 the rains failed in Bengal. Upon them depended the rice crops—upon these the sustenance of thirty millions of human beings. A famine ensued, such as often was known in India, especially in the rice

* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. i. p. 338.

districts. The loss of human life was terrible. The Ganges rolled down day by day numbers of dead bodies—they had perished of hunger. Nothing excites so much sympathy in England as a famine. Englishmen hear of desolating wars with an excitement, which, in admiration of the results, and of the feats performed, counteracts the disgust which bloodshed would otherwise create. But in a famine there is no room for any emotions but pity and horror, unless where human instrumentalities are engaged in producing the ruin, and then the English character fires up in rage against the oppressors. This was the case at the period of which these pages treat. The tidings of famine and death from India exasperated the multitude. It was believed that the company's agents had hoarded and forestalled the rice, and in their eagerness for gain, allowed multitudes of their fellow-creatures to starve. Commensurate efforts to disabuse the public mind were not made; and perhaps no efforts would have been successful in correcting the prejudice which was greedily received. As Macaulay wrote, "These unhappy events greatly increased the unpopularity of Lord Clive. None of his acts had the smallest tendency to produce such a calamity. If the servants of the company had traded in rice, they had done so in direct contravention of the rule which he had laid down, and while in power had resolutely enforced. But in the eyes of his countrymen he was *the nabob*—the Anglo-Indian character personified; and while he was building and planting in Surrey, he was held responsible for the effects of a dry season in Bengal." Clive, as the writer last quoted also remarked, "Had to bear the double odium of his bad and his good actions, of every Indian abuse, and of every Indian reform." Clive had himself a seat in parliament; his enemies desired to have a sentence of expulsion passed upon him; they sought the confiscation of his estates, and demanded that he should be deprived of his rank in the army. Clive's conduct in the house was as intrepid as in the field. He astonished even the great Chatham by his clear statements, lucid arrangements, sound argument, manly eloquence, and bold, defiant declamation. He bore himself as haughtily and bravely to the senate of England, as to the corrupt council of Calcutta, or before the throne of the Mogul. As soon as his fortunes were on the wane, nearly all his professed friends, and even those whom he had loaded with benefits, forsook him. It was the common belief that all his property would be seized, and his person incarcerated, after being stripped of all his well-won honours. Men supposed that nothing would remain to him but his genius and his

glory; and with these his former parasites, acquaintances, and colleagues had least sympathy. They thought more of his palace in Shropshire, his splendid mansion at Claremont, his seat in parliament, and his title, than of the renown of Arcot and Plassey, the conquest, salvation, and effective administration of an empire.

The committees examined and cross-examined him. Frank, manly, great in his humiliation as when he gave law to India, he met all inquiries with openness and truth. He justified acts for which he has been since generally condemned by writers who feared to encounter public opinion in our own times by defending him, but who were by no means certain that his conduct deserved denunciation. Some of the worst acts attributed to him, were performed under circumstances which open up questions of the nicest casuistry, and such as no man of honour and virtue, who was enlightened and experienced, would hastily decide. The committee did not conclude its inquiries the first session, but in the next having still further prosecuted them, it came to a conclusion. Before the verdict was announced, it was made apparent to all, and to the horror of those whom Lord Macaulay justly calls, "the low-minded and rancorous pack who had run him down, and were eager to worry him to death," that Clive had found one faithful and sympathising friend—his king. George III., who, with all his faults, had such signal virtues, determined to stand by his loyal and magnanimous, even if erring, servant. While yet they were questioning and cross-questioning him, the king had him installed in the Order of the Bath, with great pomp, in the chapel of Henry the Seventh. He had been before elected to this dignity, but the king chose the occasion of his persecution thus to honour him. Shortly afterwards he made him lord-lieutenant of Shropshire; and when, kissing his majesty's hand upon occasion of his appointment, he ventured to refer to his dangers and services, and sufferings, the king betrayed much emotion. His majesty gave him a private audience, and took occasion to converse intimately with him on Indian topics.

Notwithstanding the king's favour, and the transparent corruption of his accusers, Burgoyne, the chairman of the committee, became his accuser before the house. Lord Macaulay gives this man too much credit for both his parts and his honour. Clive found another friend; Wedderburn, the attorney-general, eloquently and ably defended him. Clive replied to Burgoyne and his other assailants with courage and dignity, but there was a tone of plaintiveness in his address never be-

fore known as he recounted his wrongs and his sorrows: it was the first echo of a breaking heart. The concluding paragraph of his address was striking, in which he reminded them that not only his honour, but their own, was to be decided. He then left the house.

The commons passed a series of resolutions, several of which related to Clive personally. The first declared that he had, when in command of the troops in India, received large sums of money from Meer Jaffier. The house would not affirm Burgoyne's eagerly-pressed conclusion, that they were received corruptly. A substantial motion was then made, that Clive had abused the power he possessed, and set a bad example to the public servants; the "previous question" was put and carried, the house thus refusing to entertain the question at all. Wedderburn adroitly took advantage of the temper of the house, and moved that Lord Clive had rendered great and meritorious services to his country. This was hotly debated. The truth of the proposition was evident, but if carried, Clive would go forth more triumphant than ever. It was tantamount to a vote of thanks of the house. His enemies struggled fiercely against it, speaking against time, and endeavouring to weaken the numbers on his side by exhaustion. The night wore away, and when the morning shone clear and bright upon St. Stephen's, Clive's antagonists conceiving that there was too much patriotism in the commons of England to refuse a great man so just a tribute, shrank from a decision, and the resolution was carried *nemine contradicente*. This was a terrible blow for Clive's enemies out of doors, and especially among the corrupt, cowardly, and envious clique within the circle of the directors themselves.

Clive's success brought crowds of flatterers around him, who had forsaken him when the thunder-cloud was yet dark above his head, and seemed ready to discharge its bolts upon him. He was no longer deserted. He sought the society of a few attached friends, he basked in royal favour, he surrounded himself by luxury; but, amidst all, he pined—his heart was broken. The king and the senate of his country had stood by him, but the ignorant masses were prejudiced, and regarded him with superstitious horror; the venal among the proprietary of India stock and their friends kept up an incessant attack upon him still. The company, whose favour he had fought and lived for, and for which he had conquered kingdoms, looked coldly on him; and his sensitive heart soon sank into a depression deeper than death, and from which he sinfully sought death as a relief. On the 22nd of November, 1774, he committed suicide, having just

arrived at the age of forty-nine. His enemies trod upon his ashes, chased his memory through every avenue of the past, vituperated the dead. His country slowly came to a juster appreciation of his errors and of his sins, of his greatness and of his glory.

The proceedings of the commons in connection with the inquiry which secured Clive from the power of his enemies, were harsh and stern to the company. A resolution was passed, that all territory won by the arms of the state belonged to the state, and that the East India Company had violated that principle. The company had but little aid from the state in its acquisitions, and paid for that aid vastly more than its value. The principal issue of the inquiry was "the regulation act."* This act increased the value of the qualification demanded from a director, prescribed a new oath, and made various regulations of a purely administrative nature in connection with the directory. It decreed that Bengal should be governed by a governor-general and four councillors, each to continue in office for five years. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay were to obey the government of Bengal. The directors were to send to the secretaries of state copies of all advices, but no control was to be exercised by the ministry.

Warren Hastings was nominated in the act itself as the first governor-general of India. Lieutenant-general Clavering, the Honourable George Monson, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, Esqrs., the first members of the supreme council. A supreme court of judicature was to be established at Calcutta. The company's monopoly was made more stringent than ever. Another act* granted the company £1,400,000 on loan for their relief. The nation was to forego for a time all participation in territorial profits. The dividend to proprietors was fixed at six per cent. The amount of merchandise in English commodities, to be annually exported by the company, should be to the value of £380,837. The crown was to appoint officers to conduct the civil and military affairs. The company objected to most of these provisions, and the court of proprietors refused to recognise the appointment by the crown of General Clavering to command their forces. Ultimately they gave way. The members of the supreme council, Sir Elijah Impey the new chief justice, and various other persons of distinction, embarked at St. Helen's on the 1st of April, 1774, and from this period commenced a new phase of the existence of the East India Company.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

AFFAIRS IN BENGAL DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS—TERRITORY WRESTED FROM THE MOGUL AND GIVEN TO THE NABOB OF OUDE—ALLIANCE WITH THE NABOB FOR THE CONQUEST OF THE ROHILLAS—EXECUTION OF NUNDCOOMAR—VAST SUMS OBTAINED BY HASTINGS FOR THE COMPANY FROM THE NATIVE PRINCES.

It is important to glance at the relations of the British to surrounding powers, and of those powers to one another, at the period when the government of Bengal, and by consequence the government of India, devolved upon Warren Hastings.

The emperor's government was in a very feeble condition. He had been for a number of years dependent by turns upon the Nabob of Oude, the Mahrattas, and the English. Even the nizams of the Deccan, and the soubahdar of Bengal, were not too feeble to give him uneasiness or offer affront to his authority. The major part of the princes of India had shaken off the imperial authority. Vassals, or officials of the supreme power, took advantage of the general decay of the Mogul power to exalt themselves by force or fraud. Mahrattas, Sikhs, Affghans, and the stronger and richer of the nabobs constantly menaced

the territories that surrounded them, over which they had themselves usurped the authority which belonged legitimately to the Delhi emperor. With such a state of affairs around them, it required on the part of the English a constant vigilance, and they were as anxious to maintain the balance of power in Hindostan, as the English at home were solicitous to maintain it in Europe. It has become the custom among politicians of a certain school in recent times to deride this principle, but it is founded in the nature of things, for if any one state gains a preponderance of power, by attacking weaker states in detail, the independence of all will be infallibly destroyed. It is therefore the interest of every other power, to limit that, which to the desire of encroachment adds the power of effecting it, unless checked by a combination of all or some of the governments,

* 13 Geo. III. cap. 16.

* 13 Geo. III. cap. 94.

which believe themselves endangered. The wars of the English in India had hitherto arisen mainly from the necessity of preventing any other power, native or European, from becoming so strong that the existence of the English in India would be at its mercy. When in April, 1772, Hastings became the successor of Mr. Cartier, as governor of Bengal, and virtually the governor of India, he saw around the British territory, and bordering upon those states which were contiguous to it, states and peoples who were desirous of maintaining a constant warfare, either to acquire territory or plunder. Some of the chiefs of those countries were ambitious of extended dominion, others only sought tribute or temporary spoil, while another class of chiefs were alike avaricious of immediate plunder, and permanent occupation of territory. The court of directors considered Allahabad as the great central position from which, as from a watch-tower, the English could look around upon the greedy and restless powers that prowled around. From that position, support could be rendered to the emperor, so long as it suited English policy to pay respect to his nominal power, and, under its prestige, themselves exercise the reality. From Allahabad, the territories of Sujah-ad-Dowlah, the Nabob of Oude, and of the Mahrattas, Rohillas, and Jauts, could be observed. The directors had ordered the council at Bengal, previous to the arrival of Hastings, to maintain a strong brigade, at what they deemed the key position of India.

The Nabob of Oude reigned on the north of the Ganges. If an enemy, he, from his position and resources, would prove a formidable one; if an ally, and under the influence of the company, they could by his means make themselves the umpires of Hindostan. They had laid that chief under great obligations, by restoring to him his dominions, when the right of conquest, always recognised in India, enabled them to deprive him of princely dignity and power. The Rohilla chiefs were numerous, but all held their sway in detached lands in the vicinity of the emperor, and Sujah-ad-Dowlah, so as to be unable to make any movement separately, or combined without the knowledge of the king and his vizier. These Rohillas were wild chieftains, and when acting in unison could pour an army of eighty thousand men chiefly cavalry, upon any point in their vicinity. There was generally a good understanding between them and the Nabob of Oude, to whom they looked up as having a certain prescriptive authority even in Rohilcund. The Rohillas were among the best soldiers in India. As mere horsemen they

were not superior to the Mahrattas, who were probably the best light cavalry, for marching and outpost duty in the world; but they were by far their superiors in close combat, being among the best swordsmen in India. The Rohillas were also famous for their use of rockets in war. The Jats, or Jauts, extended from Agra to within a few coss of Delhi. Their revenue was about two crores of rupees, and they held three forts which were deemed by other native powers impregnable. They were also reputed to have a splendidly-appointed and numerous artillery. The country of the Mahajah Madhu, lay south-west of Delhi. He ruled over various tribes, but his people were chiefly Rajpoots. These were proud of their lineage, as it was universally held that they were descended from kings, as their name of Rajpoots implied. They were considered the proudest and bravest warriors in India. They could not forage like the Mahrattas, they were not gigantic in stature like the Oudeans, they were not rocket-men like the Rohillas, nor artillerymen like the Jats, but they even surpassed the Rohillas as swordsmen, and were by all warriors of Hindostan accounted the bravest of the brave. It was reported that they never retreated in battle. In a war with the Jats, with whom they were often at war, their cavalry charged through the fire of ninety pieces of cannon, were thrice repulsed, each time only retiring to re-form, and at the fourth charge gained the victory. In stature, they were rather below the middle size, but their persons were finely proportioned, and their countenances handsome and expressive of dignity and courage.

The Sikhs then held the lands from Sirhind to Attock, a country exceedingly fertile; they were rapidly rising to political importance, but the distance of their settlements caused them to be placed out of the computations of the English, when reckoning upon opposing or allied forces. As, however, these Sikhs soon rose to be a powerful power, their position at this juncture is noticed. They were brave, energetic, and industrious, in the opinion of the peoples of Northern and Western India. The Mahrattas, their power, position, and policy, have been so frequently the subjects of remark in foregoing pages, that it is only necessary to say here that of all the tribes of India they were the most likely to give the English trouble, excepting, perhaps, the Mysoreans, whose importance chiefly depended upon the skill and genius of their chief. They were of kindred race with the Mahrattas, inhabiting contiguous territory, and of similar habits, military and social. The policy recommended by the court of directors was for their governors and coun-

cils to be on friendly terms, and commercial intercourse with all these nations, to avoid the incumbrance of alliances with them, either offensive or defensive, especially the former, but not to allow any of them to obtain so overwhelming a preponderance by the conquest of the rest, as to become too formidable to the English. This policy was not carried out intelligently and prudently by the councils of presidencies up to the time of Hastings. How far it was then observed will be seen from future pages.

“When Warren Hastings took his seat at the head of the council board, Bengal was governed according to the system which Clive had devised—a system which was perhaps skilfully contrived for the purpose of facilitating and concealing a great revolution, but which, when that revolution was complete and irrevocable, could produce nothing but inconvenience. There were two governments, the real and the ostensible. The supreme power belonged to the company, and was in truth the most despotic power that can be conceived. The only restraint on the English masters of the country, was that which their own justice and humanity imposed on them. There was no constitutional check on their will, and resistance to them was utterly hopeless. But though thus absolute in reality, the English had not yet assumed the style of sovereignty. They held their territory as vassals of the throne of Delhi, they raised their revenue as collectors appointed by the imperial commission; their public seal was inscribed with the imperial titles, and their mint struck only the imperial coin. There was still a Nabob of Bengal, who stood to the English rulers of his country in the same relation in which Augustus stood to Odoacer, or the last Merovingians to Charles Martel and Pepin. He lived at Moorshedabad, surrounded by princely magnificence. He was approached with outward marks of reverence, and his name was used in public instruments. But in the government of the country he had less share than the youngest writer or cadet in the company's service. The English council which represented the company at Calcutta, was constituted on a very different plan from that which has since been adopted. At present, the governor is, as to all executive measures, absolute. He can declare war, conclude peace, appoint public functionaries, or remove them, in opposition to the unanimous wish of those who sit with him in council. They are indeed entitled to know all that is done, to discuss all that is done, to advise, to remonstrate, to send protests to England. But it is with the governor that the supreme power resides, and on him

that the whole responsibility rests. This system, which was introduced by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Mr. Burke, we conceive to be on the whole the best that was ever devised for the government of a country where no materials can be found for a reproductive constitution. In the time of Hastings, the governor had only one vote in council, and in case of an equal division, a casting vote. It therefore happened not unfrequently, that he was overruled on the gravest questions, and it was possible that he might be wholly excluded for years together from the real direction of public affairs. The English functionaries at Fort William, had yet paid little or no attention to the internal government of Bengal. The only branch of politics about which they much busied themselves was negotiation with the native princes. The police, the administration of justice, the details of the collection of revenue, were almost entirely neglected. We may remark that the phraseology of the civil servant still bears the traces of this state of things. To this day they always use the word ‘political’ as synonymous with ‘diplomatic.’ We could name a gentleman still living who was described by the highest authority as an invaluable public servant, eminently fit to be at the head of the internal administration of a whole presidency, but unfortunately quite ignorant of all political business. The internal government of Bengal, the English rulers delegated to a great native minister who was stationed at Moorshedabad. All military affairs, and with the exception to what pertains to ceremonial, all foreign affairs, were withdrawn from his control; but the other departments of the administration were entirely confided to him. His own stipend amounted to near £100,000 sterling a year. The personal allowance of the nabob amounted to near £300,000 a year, passed through the minister's hand, and was to a great extent at his disposal. The collection of the revenue, the administration of justice, the maintenance of order, were left to this high functionary; and for the exercise of this immense power, he was responsible to none but the British masters of the country.”*

The first business of importance which devolved upon Hastings, was in connection with certain instructions of the court sent out by them in August, 1771, and which arrived only ten days after he succeeded to the chair. These instructions referred to Mohammed Reza Khan, who at that time administered the revenue affairs of the soubahdar, and in part of the British. When the infant brother of the former soubahdar came to the

* Lord Macaulay's *Essay on Warren Hastings*.

musnid, Nundcoomar, the infamous Brahmin to whom reference was made when recording the events of Mr. Vansittart's government, was competitor for the post of chief minister with Mohammed Reza. The latter was preferred. The writer last quoted thus describes the result:—"Nundcoomar, stimulated at once by cupidity and malice, had been constantly attempting to hurt the reputation of his successful rival. This was not difficult. The revenues of Bengal under the administration established by Olive, did not yield such a surplus as had been anticipated by the company, for at that time the most absurd notions were entertained in England respecting the wealth of India. Palaces of porphyry, hung with the richest brocade, heaps of pearls and diamonds, vaults from which pagados and gold mohurs were measured out by the bushel, filled the imagination even of men of business. Nobody seemed to be aware of what was nevertheless the truth, that India was a poorer country than countries which in Europe are reckoned poor,—than Ireland, for example, or than Portugal. It was confidently believed by lords of the treasury and members for the city, that Bengal would not only defray its own charges, but would afford an increased dividend to the proprietors of India stock, and large relief to the English finances. These absurd expectations were disappointed, and the directors, naturally enough, chose to attribute the disappointment rather to the mismanagement of Mohammed Reza Khan, than to their own ignorance of the country entrusted to their care. They were confirmed in this by the agents of Nundcoomar, for Nundcoomar had agents even in Leadenhall Street. Soon after Hastings reached Calcutta, he received a letter addressed by the court of directors, not to the council generally, but to himself in particular. He was directed to remove Mohammed Reza Khan, to arrest him with all his family, and all his partizans, and to institute a strict inquiry into the whole of the administration of the province. It was added that the governor would do well to avail himself of the assistance of Nundcoomar in the investigation. The vices of Nundcoomar were acknowledged. But even from his vices, it was said, much advantage might, at such a conjuncture be derived; and though he could not safely be trusted, it might still be proper to encourage him by hopes of reward. The governor bore no goodwill to Nundcoomar; many years before they had known each other at Moorshedabad, and then a quarrel had arisen between them, which all the authority of their superiors could hardly compose. Widely as they differed in most points, they resembled each other in this, that both were men of un-

forgiving natures. To Mohammed Reza Khan, on the other hand, Hastings had no feelings of hostility. Nevertheless, he proceeded to execute the instructions of the company with an alacrity which he never showed, except when instructions were in perfect conformity with his own views. He had wisely, as we think, determined to get rid of the system of double government in Bengal. The orders of the directors furnished him with the means for effecting his purpose, and dispensed him from the necessity of discussing the matter with his council. He took his measures with his usual vigour and dexterity. At midnight, the palace of Mohammed Reza Khan at Moorshedabad was surrounded by a battalion of sepoys. The minister was aroused from his slumber, and informed he was a prisoner. With the Mussulman's gravity he bent his head, and submitted to the will of God."

With Mohammed Reza another man of mark was arrested, Shitabroy, or Schitab Roy. His daring courage and skilful conduct at the battle of Patna, under Captain Knox, introduced him so favourably to the council of Bengal, that he had been appointed minister of revenue in Bahia, an office in reference to that province similar in character to that which was held by Mohammed Reza in reference to all the dominions of the soubahbar. This heroic and honest man was another object of hatred to the atrocious Nundcoomar, and also fell, so far, a victim to his wiles. The members of council know nothing of these proceedings until the prisoners arrived in Calcutta, or, at all events, approached that city. Hastings acted with a secrecy and promptitude which by no means pleased the council. "The inquiry into the conduct of the minister was postponed on different pretences. He was detained in an easy confinement during many months. In the meantime the great revolution which Hastings had planned was carried into effect. The office of minister was abolished. The internal administration was transferred to the servants of the company. A system, a very imperfect system, it is true, of civil and criminal justice under English superintendence was established. The nabob was no longer to have even an ostensible share in the government, but he was still to receive a considerable annual allowance, and to be surrounded with the state of sovereignty. As he was an infant, it was necessary to provide guardians for his person and property. His person was entrusted to a lady of his father's harem, known by the name of the Munny Begum. The office of treasurer of the household was bestowed on a son of Nundcoomar named Goordas. Nundcoomar's services were wanted, yet he could

not be safely trusted with power, and Hastings thought it a master stroke of policy to reward the able and unprincipled parent, by promoting the inoffensive son.

"The revolution completed, the double government dissolved, the company installed in the full sovereignty of Bengal, Hastings had no motive to treat the late ministers with rigour. Their trial had been put off on various pleas, till the new organization was complete. They were then brought before a committee over which the governor presided. Shitabroy was speedily acquitted with honour. A formal apology was made to him for the restraint to which he had been subjected. All the Eastern marks of respect were bestowed on him. He was clothed in a robe of state, presented with jewels, and with a richly harnessed elephant, and sent back to his government at Patna. But his health had suffered by confinement; his high spirit had been cruelly wounded; and soon after his liberation he died of a broken heart.

"The innocence of Mohammed Reza Khan was not so clearly established. But the governor was not disposed to deal harshly. After a long hearing, in which Nundcoomar appeared as the accuser, and displayed both the art and the inveterate rancour which distinguished him, Hastings pronounced that the charges had not been made out, and ordered the fallen minister to be set at liberty. Nundcoomar had purposed to destroy the Mussulman administration, and to rise on its ruin. Both his malevolence and his cupidity had been disappointed. Hastings had made him a tool; had used him for the purpose of accomplishing the transfer of the government from Moorsheadabad to Calcutta, from native to European hands. The rival, the enemy, so long envied, so implacably persecuted, had been dismissed unhurt. The situation so long and ardently desired had been abolished. It was natural that the governor should be from that time an object of the most intense hatred to the vindictive Brahmin. As yet, however, it was necessary to suppress such feelings. The time was coming when that long animosity was to end in a desperate and deadly struggle."⁴

As soon as the intrigues, falsehoods, forgeries, briberies, and other villainies of Nundcoomar, had triumphed, and the company had been so far imposed upon as to suspect, arrest, and incarcerate two honest men, Nundcoomar began a new series of infamous schemes. Although a cruel and heartless villain, he had a zeal for the Brahminical religion, and was desirous of uprooting the Mohammedan influence altogether in the Bengal provinces.

* Macaulay's review of Gleig's *Life of Hastings*.

He accordingly sent to his son, then occupying the chief place of ministerial influence in the court of the soubahdar, under the auspices of the English, letters which he desired to be copied by the Begum, the regent of the infant soubahdar, which were to be addressed as if from herself to the council of Bengal. These letters were complaints of infractions of treaty by the English, of encroachments upon the rights of the soubahdar, and containing demands for the removal of such encroachments, and the restoration of such rights. The object of Nundcoomar was to create such a feud as would rouse the English to destroy all the privileges and influence of the Mohammedan government. By this means he would humiliate a rival creed, and, probably, in the confusion which must ensue, he would acquire fresh wealth or power. At all events, he hoped for new modes of gratifying his horrid malignity against both the Mohammedans and the English. The governor discovered his intrigues, but knowing how extensive the influence which this rich and ingenious Brahmin had gained at the India-house, Hastings thought it prudent to take no step until he had informed the directors. They, instead of ordering the arrest of Nundcoomar, made no reply for a long time, and then filled their communication with unmeaning platitudes, affecting to think Nundcoomar a very bad man, but not worse than most other natives. It is impossible to account for the way in which the influence of this bad Brahmin prevailed in London, except by supposing that he had gained partizans in very high quarters by the use of money in a way which disgraced the recipients, nothing could sink Nundcoomar himself into deeper infamy than he had already reached. One of the objects contemplated by Nundcoomar by his intrigues, both in India and in England, was the destruction of Mr. Hastings, who had foiled his wiles on a previous occasion. Hastings foresaw this, and warned the directors in his despatch that he could hope for no security, and Bengal for no quiet, while any heed was given to the representations of Nundcoomar, either concerning the council, the soubahdar, particular officers in the service of either, the politics of the native princes, or the condition of the country. While the governor's despatch was on its way, other events transpired of much importance in their influence upon the future.

The Mahrattas exercised a dangerous influence over the weak Mogul, and so active were their raids that they became the tormentors of all India. The vizier besought the aid of the English. The king summoned the vizier to Delhi; the latter, having no reliance upon the monarch's steadiness, and fearing that his

majesty would, perhaps, make over some of the Oude territory to the marauders, refused to go. The Mahrattas were preparing an invasion of Rohilcund, which would bring them upon the confines of the nabob's own dominions, and endanger their independence. He also feared, or affected to fear, that the Rohillas, to save themselves, might unite with the Mahrattas against him. He resolved to open a negotiation with the Rohillas, and besought the English general at Allahabad, Sir Robert Barker, to accompany him. The council, hoping for peace through Barker's intervention, gave their consent. The main object of the nabob was, however, soon shown to be to extort some portion of Rohilcund, and he hoped the presence of the English general would so alarm the chiefs as to cause them to accede to his wishes. They consented on condition that he would aid Zabita Khan, the Rohilla chief, then at Succurtaul, guarding the fords of the Ganges against the approach of the Mahrattas, who were assisted by the king, as the Mogul emperor was at this time most frequently called. While these negotiations went forward Madajee Scindiah, the Mahratta chief, forced the passage of the Ganges with bravery equal, and skill superior, to that displayed by the Rohillas. Zabita Khan fled; Scindiah pursued the flying Rohillas to the very heart of Rohilcund. The vizier was obliged to open negotiations with the conquerors, and such were his fears that he would have submitted to the most abject terms but for the presence of General Barker. The mutinous disposition of the nabob's troops, partly from irregular pay, and partly from sympathy with whatever cause the Mogul espoused, unmanned the nabob. By the councils of the English general, the nabob put his frontier in a good state of defence, while the general ordered the first brigade of the English army, then at Patna, to cross the Caramnassa, passing the bounds of the company's territories. The council were displeased because they had not been consulted, for which step there was no time, as the Mahrattas were quick of foot and hand. The council were also angry at the expense incurred without any agreement with the nabob to refund it.

The Mahrattas had no intention of waiting upon the slow movements of the English. They plundered Rohilcund, and retired, as usual, laden with booty. The Rohilla chiefs had, on the whole, behaved badly, either surrendering to Scindiah, or seeking refuge in the north. They then entered into a convention with the nabob that, upon paying to him forty laes of rupees, he would aid in defending their territory. The Mahrattas characteristically offered to him a portion of the

Rohilla lands nearest to his own, if he would only see that the chout, or tribute, was regularly paid to them. They announced, at the same time, their intention to appropriate to themselves lands formerly conceded by the Rohillas to the king. In fact, matters assumed the aspect of a convention between the vizier and the Mahrattas, to partition Rohilcund, each seizing a portion. The Mahrattas had at this time broken all their agreements with the king, and were rapidly despoiling him, while professing to uphold the dignity of his name. They had even forced from him a sumuid for the district of Meerut. The king endeavoured to betray them to the vizier and the English, and while doing so betrayed these to the very power from which he besought his old allies to save him. The Rohillas and the vizier made at last a defensive league. The Mahrattas no sooner heard of it than they marched against the confederates, making ruinous demands from Sujah-ad-Dowlah.

The vizier besought the company's interposition, and Hastings wrote to the Mahratta chiefs, showing them that they were making aggressions upon an ally. The first brigade of the British army advanced to the headquarters of the nabob. The king, who had confederated himself with the Mahrattas, now unaccountably opposed them, drew on a general battle, and, as every one concerned foresaw, incurred a total defeat. He was at the mercy of these banditti. The Mahrattas attacked the Jats next, who, being betrayed by an Englishman in their service, named Maddox, were as unsuccessful as the Rohillas had been. Colonel Champion and fresh forces joined the vizier, who undertook to defray their charges while employed in his defence. The Mahrattas had obtained grants of Corah and part of Allahabad from the vizier, under the menaces they held out. The English had conferred these districts upon him, they reoccupied them. It was now evident that the nabob's territory alone stood between the Mahrattas and the company's provinces, and that the time had arrived when some definite and permanent means for his defence against these marauders must be made. The nabob sought for an interview with Hastings, which he granted with the advice of the council. The council placed no restraint upon the liberty of the president as to his negotiations, except that Sujah-ad-Dowlah must bear the expenses of troops sent to defend him, and that as the king had committed himself as an instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas, their engagements with him should terminate. The council, however, would reopen with him fresh negotiations, upon new

conditions, one of which was that the tribute of twenty-six lacs of rupees from Bengal and Bahar should be surrendered.

Mr. Hastings, during his journey to Oude, requested the king to send some person to negotiate with him. He took no notice of the president's despatches, but sent menacing demands for the payment of his tribute, and subjection to his authority, which was nothing less than subjection to the Mahrattas. "Mr. Hastings reached Benares on the 19th of August, and, on the 7th of September, concluded a final treaty with the vizier, by which the districts of Corah and Allahabad were ceded to him, on condition of his paying fifty lacs of rupees to the company; twenty in ready money, and the remaining thirty lacs in two years, in two equal payments; and defraying the charges on account of any of the company's forces which he might require, the same being fixed at two lacs ten thousand per month for a brigade. The vizier, at the instance of Mr. Hastings, renewed with Cheyte Sing the engagements made with his father Bulwunt Sing, in 1764, excepting the additional tribute of two and a half lacs of rupees, to which Cheyte Sing had agreed on his accession to the Raj, in 1770. Application was again made to the vizier for the dismissal of M. Gentil, although Mr. Hastings was of opinion that 'the man' had acquired importance from the notice taken of him, rather than from his real power to effect our interests. It was arranged that a resident should be appointed to the court of the vizier from the presidency. The vizier left Benares the 10th September, on which day Mr. Hastings departed for Chunar, where he fixed the boundary of the lands appertaining to the fort. He then proceeded to Patna, for the purpose of acquiring information respecting the saltpetre manufactories; and resumed his seat at the board on the 4th of October, when he submitted a detailed report of his proceedings, and adverted to what had passed between the vizier and himself, as to the appointment of a resident at the court of Oude, from the governor in council."

The council were pleased with the arrangements, and empowered Mr. Hastings to appoint a resident at the court of Oude, to hold communications only with himself, and to be dismissed at his pleasure.

The English general, Sir Robert Barker, caused much trouble and anxiety to the governor and council, by making it a point of honour to resist all directions given him by civil servants. This conduct was unwarrantable, for, although the civil officers gave him directions what to do, they left it entirely to his own judgment as to the mode of performance.

When the Mahrattas were induced to withdraw from Rohilcund, it was upon condition that the Rohilla chiefs should pay by instalments forty lacs of rupees, and that the nabob guaranteed the payment. He did so upon receiving the bond of the chief sirdar, who was himself guaranteed by the confederated sirdars. They never paid their quota. The chief paid to the nabob five lacs instead of forty, and he paid none at all to the Mahrattas.

On the 18th of November, 1773, the council received a letter from the vizier, in which he complained of the non-payment by the Rohillas of the money for which he had given a guarantee to the Mahrattas, while the chiefs of Rohilcund were themselves invading the territories of the Mahrattas in the Doab, which would, of course, bring these marauders back again, to the danger of the nabob's own dominions, and with imperative demands for the payment of the forty lacs. The nabob's proposal, under these circumstances, was brief and pertinent:—"On condition of the entire expulsion of the Rohillas, I will pay to the company the sum of forty lacs of rupees in ready money, whenever I shall discharge the English troops; and until the expulsion of the Rohillas shall be effected, I will pay the expenses of the English troops; that is to say, I will pay them the sum of 2,10,000 monthly." This demand excited protracted discussions at Calcutta; but, at last, Colonel Champion's brigade was ordered to advance and assist the vizier. The policy of the council was, that it had become absolutely necessary to strengthen Oude, as a barrier against the Mahrattas, and that the Rohillas, fearing the vizier more than they did those more distant freebooters, would be more likely to join them in plundering his territory, to the danger of Bengal, and involving the English in expensive operations of defence.

Champion's army and that of the nabob encountered the Rohillas on the 22nd of April, 1774, when a sanguinary battle was fought. In personal appearance the people of Oude were then, as they are now, the finest and most soldier-like in India. Their average stature is far superior to that of the English, as well as of every other race in India to the frontier hills of Affghanistan. Their courage, however, never bore any proportion to their gigantic appearance—Rohillas, Rajpoots, Jats, and other races, much lower in stature, having always proved superior to them in the field. Champion soon found that the Oudeans and their ruler were cowards together; they fled from the field, leaving the English to maintain unaided a conflict with desperate men in overwhelming numbers. Victory decided for

the English, chiefly through their artillery, the Rohillas again and again charging the guns with desperate valour, attacking the English on both flanks, which their superior numbers enabled them to do with prospect of advantage, while such a fire was directed upon the British front as might distract attention from the attacks upon the flanks. The chief sirdar, Hafiz Rhamet, was slain, also one of his sons, after behaving with magnanimous heroism. When the battle was over, the nabob and his cowardly followers appeared on the field, to plunder the fallen and assassinate the dying.

According to Mr. Mill, and Lord Macaulay, who follows Mr. Mill slavishly in his reviews of the memoirs of Clive and Hastings, the utmost cruelty was perpetrated upon the people of Rohilcund, and upon the family of the fallen chief. The statements of Mill appear to have been based upon the communications of Colonel Champion to the council. That gallant soldier, scorning the cowardly Oudeans, and admiring the chivalry of the Rohillas, was ready, without sufficient evidence, to make such representations as unauthenticated reports brought him. The council replied to his communications, directing him to protect the conquered, and calling for proofs of his allegations: these were never given. The statements of Mill, and the glowing pictures portrayed by Lord Macaulay, representing British troops as partaking of the cruelties perpetrated, or, at least, standing by reluctant witnesses of burning villages, plundered houses, and ravished women, are denied by writers far better acquainted with the history of the period than either Mr. Mill or his lordship. The former quotes Colonel Champion as stating in his despatches instances of cruelty and plunder witnessed by the whole army. The colonel, no doubt, did witness such acts, and would have witnessed many more, and worse in their character, if it were not for the moral pressure exercised by him against the vizier's misdeeds; but many of the colonel's statements were made upon hearsay, and were false. Mr. Hastings was denounced by Mill for justifying or palliating such deeds by the custom of oriental warfare, and the admission that even English armies in India had previously, in that very country, misconducted themselves in a manner similar to that of the vizier's army: yet these statements of Mr. Hastings were true, and the real explanation of what did occur, stripped of the false representations which Mill too readily credited, as did Colonel Champion himself. Professor Wilson's comment upon Mill's statements is as follows:—"The words 'extermination,' 'extirpation,' and the like,

although found in the correspondence, are here [in Mill] put forward so as to convey erroneous impressions. The only extirpation proposed was that of the power of one or two Rohilla chiefs. It was not a war against the people, but against a few military adventurers who had gained their possessions by the sword, who were constantly at war with their neighbours and with each other, and whose forcible suppression was the legitimate object of the King of Delhi, or the Nabob of Oude. So far was the contest from being national, that the mass of the population of Rohilcund consisted of Hindoos, hostile both in religion and policy to their Affghan rules, to whom the name Rohillas is somewhat incorrectly confined. Even amongst the Affghans, however, there was but a partial combination, and several of the sirdars joined the vizier. One of the many pamphlets put forth by the virulent enemies of Hastings (*Origin and authentic narrative of the present Mahratta and late Rohilla War*. Lond. 1781), unblushingly affirms that 500,000 families of husbandmen and artists had been driven across the Jumna, and that the Rohilla provinces were a barren and uninhabited waste. An equally false representation is cited from the parliamentary register, 1781, by Hamilton, according to whom, the numbers expelled were about 17,000 or 18,000 men with their families, none being included in the spirit of the treaty, *excepting such as were actually found in arms*. The Hindoo inhabitants, consisting of about 700,000, were no otherwise affected by it than experiencing a change of masters, to which they had been frequently accustomed.* These statements all proceeded from personal hostility to Hastings, and had no foundation in genuine humanity. It is evident that the son of Hafiz, although the most grievous consequence of hostilities was his father's death, entertains no suspicion that there was anything atrocious in the transaction, and he expresses no personal resentment towards the chief actors in the revolution."†

M. Auberj notices the allegations put forth by Mill, and repeated by Macaulay, in the following terms:—

"Accounts of severity of conduct, on the part of the vizier, towards the family of Hafiz Rhamet, reaching the council, they intimated to Colonel Champion that it had been an invariable maxim in the policy of the company's governments, in the execution of any enter-

* Hamilton's *History of the Rohilla Affghans*, p. 268.

† Wilson's notes on Mill's *British India*, book v. chap. i. pp. 403, 404.

‡ Auberj's *British Power in India*, vol. i. chap. vii. pp. 407—409.

prises undertaken in behalf of their allies, to interpose their protection in favour of the conquered princes, for the security of their lives and honour: that it was the intention of the council to adhere to a maxim which had so greatly contributed to the reputation of the British name, and to perform what might be incumbent on them on the occasion in question. They accordingly desired to be informed of the nature and instances of the ill-treatment alluded to, in order that they might judge of the measures proper to be adopted. In the interim, the commander-in-chief was to urge such remonstrances to the vizier as occasion might require; and to point out how entirely abhorrent the council were to every species of inhumanity. No instances were, however, adduced in proof of the allegations of cruelty, which appeared to have been made upon general rumour."

M. Anber adds, in reference to these transactions:—

"The vizier having intimated to Colonel Champion, in the month of May, that he had no further occasion for the services of the troops in the field before the rains, preparations were made to canton them at Bareilly. The whole of the country lately possessed by Hafiz Rhamet, with Ouly and Bessouly, belonging to the son of Dndney Cawn, had been acquired by the vizier."

The following was the letter of the council, making known these events to the directors:

"Every circumstance that could possibly favour this enterprise, by an uncommon combination of political considerations and fortuitous events, operated in support of the measure.

"1st. Justice to the vizier for the aggravated breach of treaty in the Rohilla chiefs.

"2nd. The honour of the company, pledged implicitly by General Barker's attestation for the accomplishment of this treaty, and which, added to their alliance with the vizier, engaged us to see redress obtained for the perfidy of the Rohillas.

"3rd. The completion of the line of defence of the vizier's dominions, by extending his boundary to the natural barrier formed by the northern chain of hills and the Ganges and their junction.

"4th. The acquisition of forty lacs of rupees to the company, and of so much specie added to the exhausted currency of these provinces.

"5th. The subsidy of two lacs ten thousand rupees per month, for defraying the charges of one-third of our army employed with the vizier.

"6th. The urgent and recent orders of the company for reducing charges, and procuring the means to discharge the heavy debt at

interest, heightened by the advices of their great distresses at home.

"7th. The absence of the Mahrattas from Hindostan, which left an open field for carrying the proposed plan into execution.

"8th, and lastly. The intestine divisions and dissensions in their state, which, by engaging them fully at home, would prevent interruptions from their incursions, and leave a moral certainty of success to the enterprise.

"These were the inducements which determined us to adopt this new plan of conduct; in opposition to which, one powerful objection, and only one, occurred, namely, the personal hazard we ran, in undertaking so uncommon a measure without positive instructions, at our own risk, with the eyes of the whole nation on the affairs of the company, and the passions and prejudices of almost every man in England inflamed against the conduct of the company, and the characters of their servants. Notwithstanding which, we yielded to the strong necessity impressed upon us by the inducements abovementioned, in spite of the suggestions and the checks of self-interest, which set continually before our eyes the dread of forfeiting the favour of our employers and becoming the objects of popular invective, and made us involuntarily rejoice at every change in the vizier's advices, which protracted the execution of the measure. At length, however, his resolution coinciding with our opinions, the enterprise was undertaken; and, if our intelligence be confirmed, it is now finally closed, with that success which we had foreseen from the beginning. We shall then again return to the state of peace from which we emerged, when we first engaged in the Rohilla expedition, with the actual possession or acknowledged right (which the power of this government can amply and effectually assert) of near seventy lacs of rupees, acquired by the monthly subsidy and the stipulation: and it rests with you to pass the ultimate judgment on our conduct.*"

M. Anber, referring to this communication, says:—

"This letter had scarcely been dispatched, when the troops were again called into the field, in consequence of intelligence that matters were accommodated between the Mahratta chieftains. The vizier was, therefore, anxious to complete the total reduction of the Rohillas without delay, by which the designs of the king and the Mahrattas, to be executed after the rains, would be defeated. The king had taken into his service Shimroo, the notorious assassin of the unfortunate prisoners at Patna."

* Letter to Court, 17th of October, 1774.

The vizier had been punctual in his payments of the monthly subsidy for the brigade, and had given an assignment on his treasury for the fifteen lacs due by the treaty of September, 1773,* for the second payment on account of the cession of Corah and Allahabad.

Colonel Champion, under all the circumstances, consented to advance, and soon quelled all disturbances, finally and completely establishing the authority of the nabob.

The king and the vizier entered into negotiations, by which they satisfied or pretended to satisfy one another. Colonel Champion was directed by the council to be present, to abstain from committing the British to any new engagements, and to watch proceedings generally. This he did with vigilance and suspicion, having been disposed to attribute too much importance to the petty intrigues of Indian courts. The colonel considered the ally of the company to be just as dangerous as their enemies.

When peace was established, Hastings directed his attention to the revenue. He abolished the office of supervisor, and established that of collector, a name which has ever since continued in the revenue system of India. Means were taken to guard against the trickery and frauds of the native occupiers of land, and at the same time to remove all hardships and inequalities, as far as it was possible to do so, without destroying those customs of the country to which the natives so tenaciously clung, even to their own disadvantage. The administration of justice next claimed the care of the indefatigable governor, whose keen and polished intellect penetrated all subjects. The information given by him to the directors on the laws, usages, and various offices and officers connected with the administration of law, was more accurate and complete than the court of directors had ever before received. The suppression of Dacoittee offered many difficulties, but the governor persevered with such skill and energy to accomplish it, that a great effect was produced, and a commensurate relief afforded to both people and government.

On the 11th of May, 1774, a measure abolishing the right to buy or sell slaves who had not previously been known as such, was carried into effect. The object was to prevent child-stealing for the purposes of slavery, a practice which the Dutch and French, more especially the latter, had encouraged.

Mr. Halked, of the civil service, made an English translation of the Mohammedan and Hindoo codes of laws. This book was published in March, 1775, dedicated to Mr. Hast-

* Vide printed Treaties.

ings, to whom the translator attributed the original plan, and the result of its execution.

Peace was not permitted to continue long in India. The restlessness of the native chiefs led them perpetually to make war upon one another, and the English were mixed up with so many of them by treaties, or agreements which had all the effect of regular treaties, that it was impossible to keep the sword sheathed. Bhotan, a mountainous district on the borders of Bengal (described in the geographical portion of this work), made war upon Cooch Bahar. The Cooch rajah claimed the protection of the English, offering to place his territory under the dominion of the Bengal government, and to pay to it half the revenues, if he were preserved in the peaceful enjoyment of the remainder, without being exposed to the depredations of his neighbours. As Cooch Bahar ranged along the British district of Rungpoor, the governor acceded to the proposal. The "Deb rajah," at the head of the Bhotans, was ravaging the country of Cooch Bahar with fire and sword, never supposing that the English would interfere. The operations of a few British troops threw his highness into alarm, and the consternation spread to the remotest recesses of Bhotan. The sovereign implored the interposition of Teshoo Lama,* who addressed to Mr. Hastings the most remarkable communication probably ever presented by any native power in India to a representative of England. The document is so curious, that it cannot fail to interest the reader.

"The affairs of this quarter in every respect flourish, and I am night and day employed for the increase of your happiness and prosperity. Having been informed by travellers from your quarter of your exalted fame and reputation, my heart, like the blossom of spring, abounds with gaiety, gladness, and joy. Praise! that the star of your fortune is in its ascension—praise! that happiness and ease are the surrounding attendants of myself and family. Neither to molest or persecute is my aim: it is even the characteristic of my sect to deprive ourselves of the necessary refreshments of sleep, should an injury be done to a single individual. But in justice and humanity I am informed you surpass us. May you ever adorn the seat of justice and power, that mankind may, under the shadow of your bosom, enjoy the blessings of happiness and ease! By your favour I am the rajah and lama of this country, and rule over numbers of subjects, a particular with which you have no

* Accounts of the Lamas, their religion, and the state of Thibet will be found in the geographical portion of this work, which the reader will do well to consult when perusing the historical chapters.

doubt been acquainted by travellers from these parts. I have been repeatedly informed that you have been engaged in hostilities against the Dah Terrea, to which, it is said, the dah's own criminal conduct in committing ravages and other outrages on your frontiers, has given rise. As he is of a rude and ignorant race, past times are not destitute of instances of the like misconduct which his own avarice tempted him to commit: it is not unlikely that he has now resumed those instances, and the ravages and plunder which he may have committed on the skirts of the Bengal and Bahar provinces have given you provocation to send your vindictive army against him; however, his party has been defeated; many of his people have been killed, three forts have been wrested from him, and he has met with the punishment he deserved, and it is as evident as the sun, your army has been victorious; and that if you had been desirous of it, you might in the space of two days have entirely extirpated him, for he had not power to resist your efforts. But I now take upon me to be his mediator, and to represent to you, that as the said Dah Terrea is dependant upon the Dalce Lama, who rules this country with unlimited sway (but on account of his being in his minority, the charge of the government and administration for the present is committed to me), should you persist in offering further molestation to the dah's country, it will irritate both the Lama and all his subjects against you. Therefore, from a regard to our religion and customs, I request you will cease all hostilities against him, and in doing this you will confer the greatest favour and friendship upon me. I have reprimanded the dah for his past conduct, and I have admonished

him to desist from his evil practices in future, and to be submissive to you in all matters. I am persuaded that he will conform to the advice which I have given him, and it will be necessary that you treat him with compassion. As to my part, I am but a fakeer, and it is the custom of my sect, with the rosary in our hands, to pray for the welfare of mankind and the peace and happiness of the inhabitants of this country; and I do now, with my head uncovered, entreat that you cease all hostilities against the dah in future. It would be needless to add to the length of this letter, as the bearer of it, who is a Goseign, will represent to you all particulars, and it is hoped that you will comply therewith. In this country worship of the Almighty is the profession of all. We poor creatures are in nothing equal to you. Having a few things in hand I send them to you by way of remembrance, and I hope for your acceptance of them."

A treaty, consisting of ten articles, was agreed to on the 25th of April. Some lands were restored to the Deb Rajah, who was to pay to the company for the possession of the Chitta Cotta province a tribute of five Tauzan horses: the Bhotan merchants were allowed to send a caravan annually to Rungpore. Mr. Hastings saw that the communication from the Teshoo Lama opened an opportunity for effecting regular intercourse between Thibet and Bengal, and he proposed that Mr. Bogle be sent by the council to the Lama, with a letter and presents, accompanied by a sample of goods, with the view of ascertaining which might be made objects of commerce. The council concurred in the views of the president. Mr. Hamilton accompanied Mr. Bogle as assistant-surgeon.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL UNDER WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, TO THE DEATH OF GENERAL CLAVERING—ARRIVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE NEW COUNCIL.—DISPUTES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL—A CONSPIRACY AGAINST HASTINGS, AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS CONTRIVED BY NUNDCOOMAR—THE BRAHMIN CONVICTED OF FORGERY, AND HANGED BY SENTENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT—MARRIAGE OF HASTINGS—DEATH OF MONSON AND CLAVERING LEAVING HASTINGS IN A MAJORITY AT THE COUNCIL BOARD.

IN the last chapter on home events connected with the company, it was related that in consequence of parliamentary interposition various new regulations were made for the government of India, and that among these, Mr. Hastings, president of the council of Bengal, and governor of the Bengal provinces, was to be designated governor-general of

India, that the other presidencies and provinces should, to a certain extent, be subjected to the governor-general's superintendance; and certain new councillors were nominated, who proceeded to Bengal. On the 19th of October, 1774, the new council, with the exception of Mr. Barwell, who was in the country, arrived at Calcutta, and were received

with public honours. Next day a council was held. Proclamation was ordered, announcing that the new government, under "the regulation act," began that day. Various new and useful regulations were made under the auspices of the new council; among these one was especially beneficial,—the establishment of a board of trade, by which commercial affairs should be exclusively the object of attention.

The decrees upon which the directors and the royal government had agreed, were placed before the governor-general and council, which may be thus summed up:—A commission was issued to the governor-general, constituting him governor and commander-in-chief of the fortress and garrison of Fort William and town of Calcutta.* Lieutenant-general Clavering was granted a commission as commander-in-chief of all the company's forces in India. If the governor-general and council should at any time think proper to issue orders, under their hands, or by their secretary, to any officer in the army, thereby suspending or superseding the specific commands of the governor-general or military commander-in-chief, such orders were to be implicitly obeyed. The military commander-in-chief was not to leave Bengal without the sanction of the governor-general and council. Whenever the commander-in-chief in India was at either of the other presidencies, he was to have a seat as second in council; but to vote only on political and military affairs. His allowances, as commander-in-chief, were fixed at £6,000 per annum, and his salary, as a member of council, at £10,000 per annum. Copies of the commission to Mr. Hastings and to Lieutenant-general Clavering, and of the court's instructions, were to be forthwith published in general orders at Fort William. In addition to the foregoing instructions, a general letter was addressed to the governor-general and council. The measures of the president regarding Cooch Behar were approved, although the court by no means departed from the rule laid down, of confining their views to the possessions thus acquired. Whenever General Clavering could be spared from his duties in Bengal, he was to proceed to Madras and Bombay, to review the troops, and to make a strict examination into the state of the company's armies at each presidency, and to assist the presidents and councils in forming such regulations as might be necessary for rendering the forces respectable. A revision of the coinage was to be made in Bengal, a treatise thereon, by Sir James Stuart, Bart., being forwarded for the infor-

mation of the council.* At the instance of Mr. Hastings, the council adjourned from Thursday, the 20th October, until the Monday following, on which day, Mr. Barwell having arrived at the presidency, the oaths of office were administered, and the commissions to the governor-general and the commander-in-chief promulgated. In order to place the leading branches of the public affairs before the council, a minute was delivered in by Mr. Hastings, reviewing the revenue system and the political state of the provinces.

Discussions arose upon the minute of Mr. Hastings, which threatened to assume important consequences, so far did the views of the new council and the governor-general diverge.

Upon discussion of the treaty of Benares, and the Rohilla war, General Clavering called for the original correspondence between the resident at the vizier's court and the president. Mr. Hastings objected to produce private correspondence, but was ready to lay public documents before the council. A majority resolved that *all* ought to be produced. He maintained that the usage of the Bengal government was in harmony with his views, that he was willing in future transactions to be guided by the council, but would not submit to an *ex post facto* law, suddenly formed. The council ordered the agent down to Calcutta, and to bring the whole correspondence with him, Colonel Champion to act as political agent in the meantime. General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, were determined to restrain the power of the governor, and to assume among themselves the authority. Mr. Francis was much the most intellectual person of the three new councillors; he was a man of keen discrimination, of a critical habit, insubordinate, ambitious, persevering, tenacious, bitter, and unrelenting. He was in some respects well fitted to cope with Mr. Hastings in the intellectual arena where they met. This will be readily believed by all readers, when they recognise in Mr. Francis the celebrated "Junius," whose political writings had previously made such a noise in the world, and around the authorship of which so much mystery and interest has remained to the present day. The light of recent investigations leaves no possibility of doubt that Mr. Philip Francis, the refractory colleague of Hastings in the council of Bengal, was the "Junius" whose

* This gentleman composed, for the use of the East India Company, in 1772, a work entitled, *The Principles of Money applied to the present State of Bengal*. It was printed, and the court presented him with a ring, of one hundred guineas value, with a suitable inscription, in testimony of their sense of this service. M. Anber, vol. i. p. 449.

* The object of this was to prevent disputes about authority with the commander-in-chief.

political criticism, satire, and invective have excited so large an amount of political and literary interest.

Clavering, Monson, and Francis perpetually complained to the directors that their dignity and consequence had not been considered sufficiently by Mr. Hastings. Mr. Barwell sided with the governor-general. Each party sent home its own reports. Clavering, Monson, and Francis sought to grasp the government, and make the governor-general a mere puppet in their hands. The replies of Hastings to their complaints are admirable specimens of logical and eloquent writing, and are pervaded by a manliness and dignity which could not have failed to impress the directors.

While these painful discussions rent the council, and this adverse correspondence concerning the vizier and the policy which had been pursued towards him was going on, that remarkable person died, and his son, under the title of Asoff-ul-Dowlah, succeeded to Oude and its dependencies. Previous to his death the vizier had paid fifteen out of the forty lacs of rupees stipulated.

The council considered that the treaty with Oude terminated with the nabob's life, and proposed another treaty with his successor, of a purely defensive nature. The council contrived to make the new treaty a means of fresh acquisitions, and accordingly the zemindaree of Benares was made over to them, without being encumbered with any new engagements or loading them with additional expenses. The revenues amounted to rupees 1,23,72,656, and were to be paid by the Rajah Cheyte Sing in monthly payments, as a net tribute, without rendering any accounts of his collections, or being allowed to enter any claim for deductions. The nabob agreed to pay 2,60,000 rupees per month for a brigade of the company's troops, which was an addition of half a lac to the former allowance. The important point was gained of his consenting to dismiss all foreigners from his service, and his engaging to deliver up Cossim Ally Cawn, and Shimroo, the assassin of the English at Patna, should they ever fall into his hands. The provinces of Corah and Allahabad were to remain with the nabob.* Instructions were sent to Colonel Galliez to continue with the brigade in the territories of Oude for their defence, and for that of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, should the nabob require it. Hostilities had for some time been carried on between Nudjiff Cawn, the Rajpoots, and Jats, and they had alternately sought an alliance with the nabob in support of their

respective views. The latter, jealous of Nudjiff Cawn, had evinced a disposition to join his opponents. The grand object of the council was to preserve a good understanding between the vizier and the other neighbouring powers, for which purpose Mr. Bristow was ordered to take the necessary measures, and at the same time to urge the nabob to attend to the good government and improvement of his dominions.

Conflicts and treaties appeared now to have been terminated so far as Oude was concerned, although the young nabob had manifested an indisposition to concede much that the English required, but he chiefly showed dislike to their insisting upon good government in Oude as absolutely essential to the peace of the English territory and the alliance. If Oude were ill-governed, insurrections in Oude proper, and in the Rohilla country, would break out, and Jats, Rajpoots, Malharrattas, and Affghans, were all ready to swoop down upon any country of Hindostan that was torn by internal strife. The presence of these marauding hordes on the confines of Bengal caused expense and alarm to the English; it was, therefore, vital to them that Oude should be so governed as to leave no apprehension of a border warfare. His majesty had a firm conviction that he might do as he pleased with his own, without being careful for the consequences to his neighbours; and he submitted with a surly and dubious acquiescence to the terms imposed upon him.

When the affairs of Oude were brought to what appeared to be a happy termination, the opinion of the directors upon past events reached Calcutta. They agreed in the main with Mr. Hastings, and where they differed gave him credit for doing what he did with the best intentions. On some points they agreed with his opponents, but not at all with the spirit and temper of the opposition. Mr. Barwell's view, urged from the moment of his arrival in India, that the new council had nothing to do with past transactions, the responsibility of which rested with Mr. Hastings and the former administration, was evidently that which the directors espoused; but they so framed their despatch as to induce, if possible, the two parties to coalesce for the common good. Had the directors known the men of whom the council was composed, they would never have expected compliance with any such instructions. Hastings was a man of undoubted genius; he was conciliatory, and had much self-control. All this the directors knew, and hoped the best from that knowledge. During Mr. Vansittart's government he was in opposition, as has been shown, to

* The treaty was concluded by Mr. Bristow, whose conduct on the occasion was highly applauded by the supreme government.

the majority of the Bengal council ; but while discharging his duty faithfully and firmly, he bore himself in a manner so gentlemanly and urbane as to deprive the council of any opportunity of showing ill-will personally to him,—even the vehement and unabashed Johnstone, the worst of as bad a set of men as ever administered the government of an English dependency, treated Hastings with decorum. During the time Mr. Hastings had served on the Madras council, the follies of that body were innumerable. Unable to control or influence them; he took little part in the active politics of the period, and devoted himself to the prosecution of the trade of the company, and with such success as to ensure his promotion to Bengal. But the directors did not know that with the *suaviter in modo*, Hastings united in so extraordinary a degree the *fortiter in re*. They had no experience of his indomitable will and strenuous persistence of purpose in all dangers and against all odds. It was their belief that the good manners, graceful language, accomplished scholarship, and gentle self-respect of the governor-general, added to the influence of his high position, would gradually dissolve a hostile party, and attach it to himself.

Mr. Barwell had long resided in India, and was a valuable servant, of industrious habits, and great experience in the company's business. The company reposed confidence in his integrity, propriety of conduct, and peaceful, co-operative disposition. Clavering they did not know. He was a man of intense prejudices, to which he was always ready to sacrifice the public interests. A king's officer, he disdained the military service of the company, although more than once he was constrained to compliment the talent displayed by its officers. He and Colonel Monson went out to India determined to thwart the company's civil servants, especially the governor-general, believing that by so doing they would be sustained by public prejudice in England, and by the ill-will to the company then prevailing in the House of Commons. There was a large party of politicians in England desirous of destroying the company, and handing over to government their territorial possessions. These were the leading party men who sought the power and patronage which would accrue to their parties respectively, if the dominions of the company were governed under the immediate control of the English ministry. Francis was turbulent tyrant, haughty, arrogant, and malignant. The directors had no knowledge of his peculiar temperament, nor of his peculiar parts. Lord Macaulay exhibits the disappointed and bitter spirit of Francis at that time, and ex-

plains the circumstantial causes of the peculiar intensity of the bitterness and discontent he manifested, in a characteristic manner, and with accurate statements, in the following terms: "It is not strange that the great anonymous writer should have been willing at that time to leave the country, which had been so powerfully stirred by his cloquence. Everything had gone against him. That party which he clearly preferred to every other, the party of George Grenville, had been scattered by the death of its chief; and Lord Suffolk had led the greater part of it over to the ministerial benches. The ferment produced by the Middlesex election had gone down. Every faction must have been alike an object of aversion to 'Junius.' His opinions on domestic affairs separated him from the ministry; his opinions on colonial affairs from the opposition. Under such circumstances he had thrown down his pen in misanthropical despair. His farewell letter to Woodfall bears date the 19th of January, 1773. In that letter he declared that he must be an idiot to write again; that he had meant well by the cause and the public; that both were given up; that there were not ten men who would act together on any question. 'But it is all alike,' he added, 'vile and contemptible. You have never flinched that I know off; and I shall always rejoice to hear of your prosperity.' These were the last words of Junius. In a year from that time Philip Francis was on his voyage to Bengal."

The directors, although they did not know the temper and talent of Francis, knew enough of his antecedents to be aware that no post would satisfy his ambition, no courtesy conciliate his temper, and that his combative spirit would eke out a cause of quarrel in any affairs of which he had only in part the management. He had served in various departments of state, in all cleverly, and in none with satisfaction to those who employed him.

One of the first proofs afforded of how little the advice of the directors prevailed with the new members of council, was the mode in which the latter interfered with the revenues of Bengal. Hastings had with great care and skill amended the fiscal system, and reorganized the civil staff of the company. The new council forming a majority of one, undid much of what Hastings had done. They were utterly ignorant of the laws, customs, and views of the people, but with rash hands they pulled down, and with unskilful hands they built up. They put new cloth into old garments, and new wine into old bottles, verifying the aptness of the scripture

illustration. They threw the minor presidencies of Madras and Bombay into confusion by ignorant meddling, for Francis (or "Junius," if he may be so distinguished) considered himself as having a natural title to rule everybody, and a natural gift to govern everything. His imperious commands, endorsed by Clavering and Monson, were let loose as a curse upon India. Lord Macaulay describes the effects of this administration to have been that "all protection to life and property was withdrawn, and that gangs of robbers, slaughtered and plundered with impunity in the very suburbs of Calcutta. Hastings continued to live in the government house, and to draw the salary of governor-general. He continued even to take the lead at the council board in the transaction of ordinary business; for his opponents could not but feel that he knew much of which they were ignorant, and that he decided both surely and speedily, which to them would have been hopelessly puzzling. But the higher powers of government, and the most valuable patronage had been taken from him." While affairs were growing gradually into confusion, and three members of council, Philip Francis and his two military adherents, were destroying the usefulness and the influence of Hastings, Nundcoomar, so often upon the scene as an evil spirit before, appeared again. He determined to destroy Hastings by charges of corruption sustained by perjury and forgery, and thus be avenged personally for the defeat of previous schemes of villainy discovered and denounced by Hastings. He hoped also to raise himself on the ruins of the great Englishman, and perhaps to enrich himself in any general confusion that might arise out of his schemes. He was destined once more, and for the last time, and fatally, to find that Hastings, with all his mildness of manner, was more than his match in a grand conflict of intellectual acumen; at all events, when there was also scope for resolute and determined action. Four men of master intellect were now about to play a game upon which honour, reputation, and life itself might depend. These men were Warren Hastings, Philip Francis, Sir Elijah Impey the chief-justice, and, scarcely inferior to any of them in astuteness, Nundcoomar, the great Brahmin. Nundcoomar set on foot the mighty tournament of intellectual strength and political chicane, in which all were to suffer, but he most of all.

In the presence of a number of natives of distinction, probably brought together for the purpose, Nundcoomar placed in the hands of Philip Francis, a sealed packet addressed to the council, with the request that it might be opened and read in their presence as it

was for the good of the company and the country, and of vital consequence. Francis introduced it to the council and read it. It was an impeachment of the governor-general, for putting offices for sale, receiving bribes, suffering offenders to escape, and other crimes similar in kind. The morning the paper was read by Francis before the council, Lord Macaulay says "Hastings complained in bitter terms of the way in which he was treated." It is astonishingly strange that his lordship should so characterise the tone or terms of the governor's remarks. He spoke with a calm and lofty dignity free from all bitterness and passion. He did not even betray emotion, but bore himself with a manly self-possession, and expressed himself in words free from contempt of others, except the oft convicted and unprincipled Nundcoomar. The language of Hastings was a noble illustration of the sentiment "*Nec timeo nec sperno.*" Hastings denied the right of the council to sit in judgment upon him; and, recording his protest, retired. At the next assemblage of the council, another packet from Nundcoomar was unsealed by Francis, who admitted that although he had not seen the first packet, he knew substantially what it contained. There was in fact a conspiracy suggested by Nundcoomar, patronised and encouraged by Francis, worked out by the crafty Brahmin, supported by the stupid military adherents of Junius, now finding full scope for his great talents and malignant passions. Nundcoomar petitioned for leave to appear before the council, in order to sustain his charges. Hastings protested against such a course, alleging that the supreme court was the proper place. The three opposing councillors thought otherwise. Nundcoomar was heard, not indeed by the council, for the president dissolved it, but by the three members who were themselves conspirators, and called themselves the council for the occasion.

The events in the council chamber have been described with brevity by Lord Macaulay, thus:—"Nundcoomar not only adhered to the original charges, but, after the fashion of the East, produced a large supplement. He stated that Hastings had received a large sum for appointing Rajah Goordas, treasurer of the nabob's household, and for committing the care of his highness's person to the Munny Begum. He put in a letter purporting to bear the seal of the Munny Begum, for the purpose of establishing the truth of his story. The seal, whether forged, as Hastings affirmed, or genuine, as we are inclined to believe, proved nothing. Nundcoomar, as everybody knows who knows India, had only to tell the Munny Begum, that such a letter

would give pleasure to the majority of the council, in order to procure her attestation. The majority, however, voted that the charge was made out; that Hastings had corruptly received between thirty and forty thousand pounds; and that he ought to be compelled to refund."

There were important points brought out in the investigation of these accusations which proved that Nundcoomar had either committed, or suborned some one to commit, a forgery for the purpose of ruining Hastings. The letter alleged to be written by the hand of the Munny Begum, which Nundcoomar delivered in, was compared with one received from her by Sir John D'Oyley, from the Persian department. The seal was pronounced to be the same on both letters, the handwriting to be different. M. Auber, noticing what followed, says:—"The majority observed that the letter to Nundcoomar had been written a year and a half before, and the letter produced by Sir John D'Oyley within a few days. In either case there was sufficient proof of the delinquency of Nundcoomar. If its authenticity be admitted, its contents established the fact of a conspiracy on the part of the Begum and Nundcoomar. If its authenticity be denied, the guilt of forgery against Nundcoomar is placed beyond doubt."

On the 11th of April, Nundcoomar was accused before the judges of the supreme court, of being party to a conspiracy against the governor-general and others, by compelling a man to write a petition injurious to their characters, and sign a statement of bribes, alleged to have been received by his excellency and his servants. Next day an examination was instituted before the judges. A charge on oath was exhibited against Nundcoomar, one Radaehum, and an Englishman named Fowke. The accused were bound over to take their trial at the following assizes.

General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, accompanied by Fowke, one of the accused, went the next day to Nundcoomar's house, to pay him a formal visit. They also, both in Calcutta and in London, took means to influence public opinion by publishing the alleged vices of the governor. In Calcutta, where circumstances and men were known and understood, these efforts utterly failed, and a strong tide of indignation set in against the three members of council. In England their efforts were more fortunate, and prejudice was circulated in the court of directors and in parliament, as well as in the country, against Hastings. Hastings, aware of their exertions, also struggled to maintain the justice of his

own cause. In a letter written to the directors at this juncture, the following passage occurs, in which, in respectful, dignified, and feeling terms, he appeals to the public opinion of his countrymen in India, as to the rectitude of his conduct and the malevolence of his persecutors:—"There are many men in England of unquestioned knowledge and integrity, who have been eye-witness of all the transactions of this government in the short interval in which I had the chief direction of it. There are many hundreds in England who have correspondents in Bengal, from whom they have received successive advices of those transactions, and opinions of the authors of them. I solemnly make my appeal to these concurring testimonies, and if, in justice to your honourable court, by whom I was chosen for the high station which I lately filled, by whom my conduct has been applauded, and through whom I have obtained the distinguished honour assigned me by the legislature itself, in my nomination to fill the first place in the new administration of India, I may be allowed the liberty of making so uncommon a request, I do most earnestly entreat that you will be pleased to call upon those who, from their own knowledge or the communications of others, can contribute such information, to declare severally the opinions which they have entertained of the measures of my administration, the tenour of my conduct in every department of this government, and the effects which it has produced, both in conciliating the minds of the natives to the British government, in confirming your authority over the country, and in advancing your interest in it. From these, and from the testimonies of your own records, let me be judged, not from the malevolent declamations of those who, having no services of their own to plead, can only found their reputation on the destruction of mine."

Meanwhile Nundcoomar and the majority of the council were shamelessly and openly identified in their efforts to annihilate the reputation and the power of Hastings. On the 6th of May, however, the Brahmin was arrested upon a charge of forgery, by a merchant of Calcutta. That this imputation was a *bond fide* one no one doubted, for all knew that there was no villainy which the dishonest and perjurious Brahmin would not perpetrate. On the 9th of May, the majority of the council displaced Munny Begum, the guardian of the infant nabob, on the ground of peculation of the revenues. This was the person on the accusation of whose letter the majority of the council had accused Hastings! Either they never believed her, or discovered, after the accusation was made that her testimony was

worthless, or they knew, from the first, that the letter, alleged to be in her handwriting, had not been written by her. The conduct of the council in deposing her, after having a short time before paraded her as a witness against Hastings, scandalized all Calcutta; but the scandal was far greater when, immediately after, a son of Nundcoomar, a person of notorious incapacity, was placed virtually in her stead. Thus the repeatedly convicted perjurer, forger, and treason-monger was publicly honoured, while yet under the impeachment of another added to his many well-known crimes. It is not credible that Francis and his two military coadjutors would have dared to proceed to such lengths if not encouraged by private correspondence with the ministerial party in parliament anxious to wrest the government of India from the company, for sake of the patronage, their eagerness to seize which was too great for them to disguise. While Nundcoomar was in prison, he petitioned the council that he could not perform the ablutions necessary for him as a Brahmin while in a state of such confinement. The council addressed the judges on the subject, thinking to make the circumstance a ground for Nundcoomar's release. The judges replied that they had taken thought of the matter, and appointed certain learned pundits to report upon the case, whose report was to the effect that the accommodation was sufficient; that caste would not be lost by the prisoner. The judges, however, in spirited and indignant terms, insisted that the council should not again presume to interfere with the course of British justice; that if the prisoner was aggrieved, the judges, not the council, were the persons to whom to appeal; that they understood their duty without any monitions from a portion of the council; and that as the natives sought everything from power and nothing from justice, the judgment-seat must be preserved from even the appearance of government interference. Nundcoomar remained in prison until the assizes, and his trial came on in the routine of its business. He was arraigned before an English jury, and his trial was conducted with the strictest impartiality and fairness; a verdict was returned in the usual manner, after the deliberation customary with British juries, and that verdict was *Guilty*. Never was a verdict more in accordance with truth and justice. Sir Elijah Impey, the chief-justice, sentenced the guilty man to death. Great was the consternation of the council; they protested, but no notice was taken of their protest. Public opinion sustained that of the jury: Englishmen and natives believed that he was guilty. Colonel Clavering

vowed that Nundcoomar must be saved, even from the foot of the gallows; but he knew well that Hastings was determined that justice should have its course, and that Sir Elijah Impey, the chief-justice, was also determined to vindicate the law, and the independence of the judges, at all costs. The natives would not believe that any judge would dare to sentence a Brahmin, or that judges or governor would permit one so sacred to be executed for any crime. They knew he was as bad a man as ever fell by the executioner; but he was a Brahmin, and the priestly caste was sacred. On the day of his execution, vast multitudes crowded to Calcutta, still unbelieving as to the fate of the chief Brahmin of Bengal. Whether from the impression that, at the last moment, he would be forcibly rescued by the council, or respited by the administrative authorities, or from the strange indifference to death which characterises his caste, he approached his fate without any sign of fear or reluctance. He ascended the scaffold calmly, and, to all appearance, fearlessly, and was hanged. The lamentations of the people were such as not merely to astonish, but to awe the British. They detested and yet revered Nundcoomar; they lamented because their religion was outraged by the ignominious execution of a Brahmin, a caste which sinned with impunity so far as Hindoo law and custom were concerned. Neither Nundcoomar nor the natives had any idea that there was among the English a power greater than that of a governor-general, or a council, or a general of an army,—the power of law as seen and administered in the courts and from the tribunals of law. This was to them a new idea, and struck universal terror into their hearts. The effect, as it regarded Hastings, was immediate. There were no more forgeries and perjuries manufactured to please the more powerful council: the dread of the mysterious tribunal appalled a whole nation of liars and perjurers. Nothing could prove more fully the turpitude and cowardice of the native character than these disgraceful transactions had done. When to accuse the governor-general pleased those more powerful than he, numbers were ready to meet their wishes by accusations; but when it was seen that there was an authority higher than governor-general and council combined—that of English law—their hearts were stricken with fear, and none dared to resort to the arts of knavery and treachery, so much their practice and delight.

Much blame has been thrown upon the judges, especially Chief-justice Impey. Lord Macaulay doubts the legality of the proceeding, and describes Sir Elijah Impey as the

tool of Hastings. There was nothing in the conduct of Sir Elijah in trying Nundcoomar, or in accepting the verdict of the jury, to justify this language. Whether Sir Elijah had authority to pronounce the sentence which he did pronounce, was open to discussion, was discussed, and many men fit to determine such a question have decided in his favour. The whole case has received a clear and impartial statement from the pen of Professor Wilson. He thus puts it:—"It is true, that no circumstance in the administration of Hastings, has been so injurious to his reputation as the execution of Nundcoomar—whether rightfully so is a different question. From the moment that Nundcoomar became the object of judicial investigation, it would have ill become the governor to have interfered—it was not for him to interpose his personal or official influence to arrest the course of the law, nor would it have availed. The supreme court was new to its position, strongly impressed with a notion of its dignity, and sensitively jealous of its power. The judges would have at once indignantly resisted any attempt to bias their decision. For the fate of Nundcoomar, they are alone responsible. It is presently admitted, that they decided according to law, and the attempt to impeach the chief-justice, Sir Elijah Impey on this ground, subsequently failed. It is therefore to be concluded, that the sentence was strictly according to law, and there can be no doubt that the crime was proved. The infliction of the sentence, however, upon a native of India, for an offence of which his countrymen knew not the penalty, and which had been committed before the full introduction of those laws which made it a capital crime, was the assertion of law at the expense of reason and humanity: with this Hastings has nothing to do—the fault, and a grievous one it was, rests with the judges. The question, as it concerns the governor, regards only the share he had in the prosecution. Did he in any way instigate or encourage it? The prosecutor was a party concerned, a native, unconnected with the governor. He may have thought he was doing a not unacceptable act in prosecuting a personal antagonist of Hastings, but that was his feeling. There is no necessity to suppose that he was urged on by Hastings: he had wrongs of his own to avenge, and needed no other instigation. There is no positive proof that he acted in concert with Hastings; we are therefore left to circumstantial proof, and the only circumstance upon which the participation of Hastings in the persecution of Nundcoomar, is, its following hard upon the latter's charges against him. These were preferred on the 11th of March, 1775. On the 6th of May following,

Nundcoomar was arrested under a warrant of the court at the suit of Mohun Persaud. Here is certainly a suspicious coincidence—but is there no other way of accounting for it than by imputations fatal to the character of W. Hastings? In truth, it seems capable of such explanation as acquits Hastings of having exercised any influence over it. Proceedings in the same cause did not then commence. They had been instituted before in the Dewanny Adaulut, and Nundcoomar had been confined by the judge, but released by order of Hastings. The suit had therefore been suspended, but it had not been discontinued. The supreme court sat for the first time at the end of October, 1774. The forged instrument had been deposited in the mayor's court, and could not be recovered until all the papers had been transferred to the supreme court, and without it no suit could be proceeded with. At the very first opportunity afterwards, or in the commencement of 1775, at the first effective court of Oyer and Terminer and gaol delivery, held by the supreme court, the indictment was preferred and tried. It is not necessary to suspect Hastings of having from vindictive motives suggested or accelerated the prosecution. It had previously been brought into another court, where it was asserted the influence of the governor-general had screened the criminal, and it was again brought into an independent court at the first possible moment when it could be instituted. The coincidence was unfortunate, but it seems to have been unavoidable; and in the absence of all possible proof, the conjectural evidence is not unexceptionable enough to justify the imputation so recklessly advanced by Burke, and seemingly implied in the observations of the text, that Hastings had murdered Nundcoomar by the hands of Sir E. Impey.*

Upon the effect of this event on the fortunes of Hastings, and upon the government of Bengal, Lord Macaulay remarks as follows:—"The head of the combination which had been formed against him, the richest, the most powerful, the most artful of the Hindoos, distinguished by the favour of those who then

* The learned doctor deduced his opinion from the following sources of information:—"For the preceding charges against Mr. Hastings, and the proceedings of the council, see the Eleventh Report of the Select Committee, in 1781, with its Appendix; Burke's Charges against Hastings, No. 8, and Hastings' Answer to the Eighth Charge, with the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial, pp. 953—1001; and the Charges against Sir Elijah Impey, exhibited to the House of Commons by Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1787, with the Speech of Impey in reply to the first charge, printed, with an Appendix, by Stoekdale, in 1788. For the execution and behaviour of Nundcoomar, see a very interesting account, written by the sheriff who superintended, and printed in Dodsley's *Annual Register* for 1788, Historical part, p. 157."

held the government, fenced round by the superstitious reverence of millions, was hanged in broad day before many thousands of people. Everything that could make the warning impressive,—dignity in the sufferer, solemnity in the proceeding,—was found in this case. The helpless rage and vain struggles of the council made the triumph more signal. From that moment the conviction of every native was, that it was safer to take the part of Hastings in a minority, than of Francis in a majority, and that he who was so venturesome to join in running down the governor-general might chance, in the phrase of the Eastern poet, to find a tiger while beating the jungle for a deer. The voices of a thousand informers were silent in an instant. From that time, whatever difficulties Hastings might have to encounter, he was never molested by accusations from natives of India."

The calm resolution of Hastings, under the most trying circumstances, was proved by his conduct throughout these trying and harassing affairs, especially in the episode of the execution of Nundcoomar. Miss Martineau draws from the calm resolve of the governor of Bengal proof of his want of feeling, and of an indurated heart. This opinion is undoubtedly severe, and probably unjust. The discussion, however, of such questions belongs rather to the task of the biographer than the historian. Lord Macaulay was struck with the coolness of the English governor on this occasion, and truly observes:—"It is a remarkable circumstance that one of the letters of Hastings to Dr. Johnson bears date a very few hours after the death of Nundcoomar. While the whole settlement was in commotion, while a mighty and ancient priesthood were weeping over the remains of their chief, the conqueror in that deadly grapple sat down, with characteristic self-possession, to write about the *Tour to the Hebrides*, Jones' *Persian Grammar*, and the history, tradition, arts, and natural productions of India."

When tidings of all these events reached England, there was commotion in the cabinet and the court of directors. The majority in the council of Bengal had powerful interest at home. Lord North was adverse to Hastings, and endeavoured to procure from the company an address, upon which, by virtue of "the regulation act," under which Hastings was appointed, the minister would be empowered to remove him. Lord North was anxious to put Clavering in the place of Hastings, as the general was the minister's nominee, and the confederate of the other two members of council constituting the factions majority, for a majority may be factious as well as a minority. This is not the appropriate place in which to

depict the peculiar features of the contest among the directors, the court of proprietary, and the cabinet ministers; suffice it to say that Lord North was defeated, and never did a minister show less dignity under a political defeat than did his lordship on that occasion. Hastings, having foreseen this contest, had provided against it. He had placed in the hands of his agent, Colonel Maclean, his resignation, with directions to present it to the court only when a moment of such emergency should arise as imperatively to demand such a course. Menaced on all hands as Hastings was, notwithstanding his recent victory over Lord North, and the ministry, Maclean felt that there was no means of saving his friend from expulsion and degradation but by an opportune use of the power entrusted to him, and he accordingly presented the resignation. The directors eagerly accepted it, and nominated one of their own body, a Mr. Wheeler, to the vacated post, at the same time writing to General Clavering to assume the government of Bengal *pro tempore*.

While these things were proceeding in London, events were passing in rapid succession in Bengal, which had an equal, or even greater influence upon the fortunes of Hastings, and enabled the intrepid and self-collected man to overbear all obstacles and all hostilities. Monson died, and left Hastings only two opponents in the council—Clavering and Francis. His casting vote enabled him to determine all matters in favour of his own policy. Thus after two years of persecution, and while bearing the insignia of office, holding only the semblance of power, he became absolute, for Barwell, although a clever man, and far better acquainted with the administration of Indian business than Clavering or Francis, was yet completely under the influence of Hastings. The governor now seized upon the patronage of the province, displacing the officials who were appointed by the late majority, and reversing all their partizan decrees. In order to mark more signally that a new era had commenced, Hastings ordered, in the name of the council (by power of his casting vote), a valuation of the lands of Bengal, in order to form a basis for a new plan of revenue. All correspondence was ordered to be under his sole control, and the whole inquiry to be directed by him. He next laid down vast schemes for the aggrandizement of the company's interests, for which, and not for any venal purposes, he thought and toiled. The plans he projected were realized, and within his own lifetime, although it was not reserved for his own administration to carry them out. While he was thus engaged the intelligence arrived

in England of the proceedings in the cabinet, the court of directors, and the court of proprietary, in which he was so deeply interested.

Hastings had in the meantime, by the sheer force of his genius, industry, and intelligence, as well as by the concurrence of events, gained such a personal ascendancy in India, that he was unwilling to surrender his high functions, especially, even for a season, to his rival—Clavering. He refused to surrender the presidential chair. Clavering essayed to occupy it by force, and a fierce struggle ensued. Clavering, with much show of reason, appealed to the orders of the directors. Hastings replied that the orders were based upon a mistake, which, when the directors discovered, they would themselves of necessity abrogate. He declared that he had not resigned his office. His own account long afterwards of the transaction was, that Maclean had exceeded and misapprehended his powers; but that nevertheless he would have resigned the government of Bengal had not Clavering made offensive haste and insulting demonstrations, in his eagerness to grasp the office.

Clavering, immediately on the arrival of intelligence, seized the keys of the fort, important papers, books, and documents, and formed Francis and himself into a council. Hastings sat in another apartment of the fort with Barwell, and continued to issue the orders of government, which none dared to disobey, so completely had the master mind of Hastings asserted itself. The English in Bengal unanimously, or all but unanimously, supported him; and the Bengalees had trembled at his name ever since the rope had put an end to the intrigues of Nundecoomar. Either Hastings felt that his cause was just, or that he had the formalities of law on his side, for he offered to abide by the decision of the supreme court of Calcutta. This met the approbation of the English in Bengal, who saw no other way of averting a

civil struggle, which might be attended with bloodshed, and ruinous to English interests. Clavering was compelled to succumb to public opinion, although he and Francis were averse to any arbitration of matters, legal or otherwise.

The decision of the court was that the resignation presented by Colonel Maclean was invalid, and that Hastings, according to the letter of the "Regulation Act," was still governor-general. After this, Clavering and Francis lost all hope of offering an effectual resistance.

Immediately upon these transactions Hastings married a foreign lady, the divorced wife of a foreigner, with whom he had lived on terms of illicit intimacy for years, and under circumstances the most singular, romantic, and reprehensible, furnishing to his biographers ample material for exciting narrative, and ingenious speculations as to his character. It does not speak well for the morality of English society at Calcutta at the time, that the wedding was celebrated with great splendour by the whole community. Hastings, elated with the success of all his schemes, in love and politics, invited General Clavering to the wedding. The general was at the time broken in spirit and in health; he was in fact dying. Making the state of his health his only excuse for not affording his presence to the festivities, Hastings went personally to him, and insisted upon the oblivion of past differences being thus publicly proved. Clavering was brought captive, as it were, to the brilliant festivities; but he drooped there, and retired to die. In a few days he expired. Francis now alone remained to oppose Hastings. His proud and arrogant spirit could not be quelled. He struggled for a time with dogged and spiteful pertinacity, and then went home, where he lived long enough to be a thorn in the side of Hastings, when, at the greatest crisis of his history, he stood impeached before the senate of England.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

GOVERNMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL (*Continued*)—ARRIVAL OF MR. WHELER TO ASSUME THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL—REFUSAL OF HASTINGS TO SURRENDER IT—OPPRESSIVENESS OF LEGAL ADMINISTRATION IN BENGAL—DUEL BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND PHILIP FRANCIS—FRANCIS LEAVES INDIA—ANARCHY IN OUDE—WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS.

WHEN Mr. Wheeler arrived at Calcutta, he found Hastings in the full possession of authority, and likely to retain it. The disappointed governor was, however, a member of council, and united with Francis in opposition to the governor *de facto*. Their opposition was of little avail. Hastings continued to rule, and with such personal tact, administrative capacity, and comprehensive genius, that the directors at home veered round in his favour, and Lord North dared not to displace him. Events in Europe favoured the uninterrupted possession by Hastings of the presidency of Bengal. England had to maintain a fearful struggle with foreign enemies, and her own colonial fellow-citizens in America became disaffected. Wars abroad, and bad government at home, placed England in imminent danger. The cabinet, instead of assailing Hastings, were glad to have a governor who knew so well how to govern. The English ministry had no leisure to attend to India.

Although Hastings had undisputed authority, his difficulties were great, and scarcely was one danger encountered, and conquered by his genius, than another sprung up. War in regions beyond the province of Bengal, blunders by his own officers, civil and military, and the harassing opposition of Francis and Wheeler, occupied his industry and vigilance incessantly. Before noticing the war-like events of his government, not already related, it is desirable to glance at the civil impediments to his sway with which he had to contend. Sir Eyre Coote, who had distinguished himself so much in Indian warfare, from the battle of Plassey, to that of Wandiwash and the capture of Pondicherry, and after the warfare of the Carnatic, elsewhere, was appointed commander-in-chief of the company's armies. This appointment gave him a seat at the council board, and being naturally obstinate, haughty, and self-willed, he frequently disputed the authority of Hastings, and sided with Francis and Wheeler. When this was the case, Hastings was in a minority, and his views were overruled. The vigilance of Francis never slept. His bitterness was as lasting as his vigilance was wakeful. There were, therefore, many occasions on which he succeeded, with due management of Coote, in

putting Hastings into a minority. Hastings, however, practised the arts of management better than Francis, and by gratifying Coote's love of "allowances," in a majority of instances secured his vote. Besides, Coote more generally agreed with Hastings than with Francis. The latter was ignorant of India, but the commander-in-chief, like the governor-general, knew it well. Moreover, the soldier was often in the field, and then the governor had his own way without any chance of being disturbed. These contingencies in the constitution of the council, gave uncertainty to their decisions, and frustrated some of the best administrative measures of the president.

A singular state of things arose under the pretensions of the judges. English law was hated by all classes of the natives, and it was administered proudly and oppressively. Its slowness and expensiveness were ruinous to the natives, who groaned under its oppressions. Sir Elijah Impey, as chief of the supreme court, had the highest possible notions of his own official authority, and the respect due to all the forms of law. He was supported by the other judges in a system of legal administration which evoked the curses of the whole community, English and natives. No man felt safe from the tyranny of the courts. The civil servants were constantly unable to carry out the orders of the government from their interference; and Hastings, who had himself done so much to recognise the power of the courts, was almost driven to despair by the way in which that power was wielded. Words could not describe the misery, conflict, and disaffection which ensued, as far as the supreme court extended its authority, and probably no problem in the government of Hastings presented itself as so hard of solution, as that of the true province of the English courts. Lord Macanlay ascribes the evil in this case to the indifference of the legislature in forming "the regulation act:"—"The authors of the regulating act of 1773, had established two independent powers, the one judicial, and the other political; and, with a carelessness scandalously common in English legislation, had omitted to define the limits of the other." The same author depicts the

results of the consequent efforts of the judges to define the limits of their own authority in the most extensive manner, and amongst others gives the following descriptions:—"Many natives highly considered among their countrymen, were seized, hurried up to Calcutta, flung into the common gaol, not for any crime imputed, not for any debt that had been proved, but merely as a precaution till their cause should come for trial." "There were instances in which men of the most venerable dignity, persecuted without a cause by extortioners, died of rage and shame in the gripe of the vile alquazils of Impey." "No Mahratta invasion had ever spread through the province such dismay as this inroad of English lawyers. All the injustice of former oppressors, Asiatic and European, appeared as a blessing when compared with the justice of the supreme court."

It is not to be supposed that Sir Elijah Impey acted illegally. Many of the acts of the courts which spread terror and despair through Bengal, were tamely submitted to in England, and supposed to be a becoming "part and parcel" of a most just code, the pride of England and the envy of surrounding nations. The laws and the courts were terrible oppressions in England, to all but the rich and powerful; but they were oppressions to all alike in India, and probably rich natives more than any other felt them. Some of the most inequitable charges and decisions, delivered with party or personal feeling, and in terms illogical as well as offensive, have been delivered in England by English judges, without exciting much indignation, so strong has been the prejudice and pride of the English people in behalf of their laws, and those who administer them; but in India no such feelings were entertained, and the whole system of English jurisprudence, and its mode of administration, was regarded as barbarous and atrocious.

It was probably the intent of Hastings to keep Sir Elijah Impey in his interest, but he resolutely resolved to oppose the system of legal administration adopted by the learned judge. The governor stood firmly on the side of the people, and for once he received the unanimous support of his council. The judges served the council with writs to answer in court for their acts! Hastings ridiculed the summons, forcibly dismissed various persons wrongfully accused, and opposed the sword to the writs of the sheriff's officers. Hastings, however, contrived to avert a conflict between the crown and the company. Impey had £8000 a year as chief of the supreme court, Hastings offered him another £8000* a

* Lord Macaulay names this sum, Auber £6000.

year as a judge in the service of the company, dismissible at the governor's pleasure; but the office was conferred on the condition, privately stipulated, that he would cease to assert the disputed powers of the supreme court. He accepted the bribe. Bengal was freed from the turmoil which had been created, and Hastings from the difficulty which it presented to his government.

For a short time a sort of truce had been formed between Hastings and Francis. Barwell promoted a peace between the two great opponents, because he wanted to leave India, and had pledged himself that he would not do so, if the result would place the governor in a minority. The truce did not last long; Francis was opposed to Impey, and was exasperated that his old enemy should have a new honour and splendid emolument conferred upon him, simply to prevent his doing mischief. Lord Macaulay justifies Hastings in buying off Impey's adverse power, seeing that it inflicted so much evil upon the inhabitants of Bengal, on the principle that justifies a man in paying a ransom to a pirate to obtain a release of captives. His lordship's reasoning and illustration are alike unhappy in this case. The conduct of Hastings was censurable. Where he believed punishment was deserved, he conferred honour. He bribed the judge either to forego what was due to law and justice, or to give up an abuse of power. To induce a judge by any means to forego what law and justice required would be clearly wrong; to induce him by a bribe to forego the improper use of his authority could hardly be less wrong. An appeal to the crown and the company was the obvious duty of Hastings, and if they refused to redress the evil, he should have resigned his government, on the ground that he could not as an honourable man administer it under the circumstances. Unhappily, it is too probable that Hastings, having little confidence in the wisdom of either crown or company, and no confidence at all in the integrity of the English cabinet, chose the way by which he might best serve himself, and serve Impey also, while he stopped the mischief. Francis found a good opportunity for damaging Hastings in this transaction, and it is difficult not to prefer the logic of the malignant accuser of the governor in this case, than that of his eloquent defender. It is probable that Francis merely accepted the compromise effected by Barwell, to induce the latter to leave India. Such was the opinion of Hastings afterwards, and he indignantly charged Francis with the imputation of faithlessness and dishonour in this respect.

After various stormy meetings of council,

Hastings inflicted an insult on Francis which was provoked, and probably deserved, but which Francis was unable to endure. The governor in a minute recorded on the consultations of the government, inserted the following expressions: "I do not trust to Mr. Francis's promises of candour, convinced that he is incapable of it. I judge of his public conduct by his private, which I have found to be void of truth and honour." When the council rose, Francis placed a challenge in the hands of the governor, who accepted it. A duel took place, in which Francis was severely wounded. Hastings was kind, inquired daily for him, and desired permission to call and see him. Francis refused, acknowledging the politeness of the offer, but declining to meet Hastings any where except in council. When he did return to council, his implacable hatred still raged. Lord Macaulay gives Francis credit for patriotism; to whatever degree he cultivated that virtue, his conduct in India did not display it. His patriotism was never seen to less advantage than after his recovery from the wound inflicted by Hastings. At that juncture Hyder Ali, to whom reference has been repeatedly made on former pages, swept all before him, penetrating to Madras. The governor of that presidency proved himself incapable, and Hastings afforded many and fresh proofs of his genius by the way in which he encountered this vast peril. During all those efforts, so worthy of his great reputation, he was impeded by Francis, whose sulky and malevolent opposition never ceased, until at last, finding all his animosity powerless, and recoiling upon himself, he left India. Wheeler, his coadjutor in opposition, tamed down into a quiet and acquiescent follower of Hastings, who was thus left as a sovereign whose sway was undisputed, to govern Bengal, and direct the affairs of India generally.

While such were the distractions and vicissitudes in the council, events were taking place in every direction requiring unanimity and energy. No doubt the governor-general, if not obstructed by either a majority in the council or by an obstinate minority, who consumed time uselessly, and impeded public business, would have exercised an efficient control everywhere. As it was, he proved equal to every emergency.

During 1775, Oude was in a state of perpetual turmoil; the nabob squandered the resources of the state in folly and debauchery, and left public affairs to his chief minister—an enemy of the English, without whose support the nabob could not stand. The king of Delhi constituted the nabob his vizier, as his predecessor had been—this was supposed to have

been a spontaneous act of the Mogul. After his appointment to the dignity of vizier, the nabob became worse than before, both in his personal conduct and his government. Assassinations of some of the most distinguished persons in his dominions were laid to his account; murders were committed in his presence by courtiers, men of equal rank being the victims. Nearly all the talented persons at the head of the civil and military services were treacherously slain or obliged to fly beyond the territory of Oude. Revolts of the troops and massacres repeatedly occurred. British officers were appointed to discipline the nabob's soldiers, which led to a conspiracy and wide-spread mutiny: some of the officers were slain by the mutineers, others escaped, many with wounds, while a portion of the officers succeeded in subduing their soldiers and restoring order.

Apprehensions of the projects of the French were very generally received at this period among the English in India. French officers were observed in various parts of the country as if suspiciously engaged. A report of this was made to the government. It was also stated that the force at Pondicherry was considerable, amounting to one thousand Europeans, and a nearly equal number of black soldiers.

The connection of the three presidencies under a governor-general worked well, and gave scope for the business talents and comprehensive plans of Hastings.

Ragoba and the Bombay government entered into negotiations under the advice of Hastings, which issued in his cession to the company of Bassein, Salsette, Jambooseer, and Orphad, with the Islands of Caranga, Canary, Elephanta, and Hog Island; thus affording to Bombay Island a security never before possessed. The Bombay government, in virtue of the treaty with Ragoba, received him when a fugitive in their territory, and assisted him with arms and men to regain his ascendancy as chief of the Mahratta nation. While embarked in this undertaking, orders arrived from the supreme council at Calcutta revoking everything done at Bombay, and in terms haughty and arrogant. This was the work of the majority of the council opposed to Hastings. The Calcutta council even sent an officer to Poonah to treat with the enemies of Ragoba, thus humiliating utterly the council of Bombay. Madras was ordered not to assist the policy initiated at Bombay. The measures of the Bengal council failed, and, after all, that factious body were compelled to commit the transaction of a treaty to the council of Bombay, which acted in conformity with the opinion of Hast-

ings. Still, so unsteady and inconsistent were the directions of the supreme council, that confusion and dishonour ensued; and much injury to the company's interests would certainly have happened had not the directors at home revoked the orders of the supreme council, and censured the whole of its conduct to that of Bombay.

In 1777 the French gained some ascendancy over the government of Poonah, in consequence of the continued feuds of the Bombay and Bengal councils. The arrogant spirits of Clavering and Francis wrought mischief everywhere. The conclusion of these diplomatic squabbles, and of the conflicts at the Mahratta capital, is thus briefly recorded by Auber:—"In March, 1778, a revolution broke out at Poonah in favour of Ragoba, in whose name a proclamation was issued for restoring peace and order. In July, the Bombay council declared that the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton had been violated by the Durbar proceedings; and that they were consequently freed from its obligations. They also declared that measures had become imperatively necessary to defeat the intrigues of the French, who had been long exerting themselves in schemes hostile to the English.* They proposed to place Ragoba in the regency at Poonah, and that he should conduct the government in the name of the Peishwa. This latter arrangement appeared to be in consonance with the views of the court of directors.† The necessary operations consequent upon this determination could not be commenced until the month of September. In October a treaty was concluded with Ragoba, by which the company were to assist him with four thousand troops to conduct him to Poonah."‡

The affairs of the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore still continued to give uneasiness to the company. Lord Pigot having assumed the government of Madras at the close of 1776, set about adjusting the relations between the nabob, the rajah, and the company; but jealousies between the civil and military officers as to their respective dignities, embroiled the presidency in disputes, and delayed the execution of Lord Pigot's plans. His lordship's temper, however, was the greatest of all impediments to his projects. To such a length did he carry his idea of his own authority, and so arbitrary was he in his government, that at last the majority of the council arrested him. The admiral on the station demanded his release, in the king's name; the council refused with-

out the king's order. The supreme government at Calcutta supported the council of Madras. The death of Lord Pigot terminated the dispute. The English were unable to undertake almost anything at that time without violent discussions among themselves.

The conflicts between Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas, and the feuds among the Mahratta chiefs, in which the Bombay government was to some extent involved, led the council of Bengal to send troops overland to Bombay in 1778. Colonel Leslie, and this force, began their march on May 4th, but it proceeded so slowly, and with such little military judgment, that it was necessary to supersede the commander.

In November, Captain Stuart seized the pass of Boru Ghaut, which opened the way to Poonah; it was held and fortified. He was followed from Bombay by a considerable force in November, consisting of about four thousand men, of whom six hundred and thirty-nine were Europeans. On the 1st of January this army, under Colonel Egerton, began its march upon Poonah, but had to retreat fighting before a superior force. Fearful of a fresh attack, the English opened negotiations, but the Mahrattas refused unless Ragoba were surrendered. A disastrous treaty, consenting to everything the Mahrattas demanded, was the result of the expedition. This treaty the council of Bombay refused to ratify, and that of Calcutta approved of their policy. Brigadier Goddard, with a force from Bengal, reached Surat, and, being joined by Ragoba after the latter had made gallant and desperate efforts to effect the junction, the combined forces attacked the confederated Mahratta chiefs, and gained various decisive victories, until the close of the year 1780, when they went into quarters. So well did Hastings provide the sinews of war, that he remitted a crore of rupees to the governments of Madras and Bombay.

Many transactions took place in the interests of the company during the government of Hastings, of which little notice has been taken in history, but which had influence upon the general condition of the English territory. The treaty of the 2nd December, 1779, with the Rana of Gohud, is an instance. The Rana of Gohud, then described as "a chief south of Agra," made overtures for effecting a treaty with the company, to secure himself against the Mahrattas. The terms were agreed to and signed on the 2nd of December. The company were to furnish a force for the defence of his country on paying 20,000 Muchildar rupees for each battalion of sepoys; nine-sixteenths of any acquisitions were to go to the company. The rana

* Secret Letter from Bengal, April, 1778.

† Letter to Bombay, July, 1777.

‡ Vide Printed Treaties.

was to furnish ten thousand horse, whose combined operations might be determined on against the Mahrattas. Whenever peace took place between the company and the Mahrattas, the rana was to be included, and his present possessions, with the fort of Gwalior, were to be guaranteed to him.

As war was apprehended with France in 1778, Hastings made vast and skilful efforts to prepare the territories he governed against all contingencies, as he concluded that some alliances with native powers would be effected by the French. The declaration of war in London was sent by the secret committee of the court of directors, overland *via* Cairo, and orders were issued to the supreme council to reduce Pondicherry.

Mohammed Reza Cawn now ceased to act as regent in Bengal, and the young nabob took upon himself the full responsibilities of his government.

Mr. Auber bears the following testimony to the labours of Hastings at this time:—"Mr. Hastings, in the midst of his other varied and important avocations, did not lose sight of the interests of science and literature. A copy of the Mohammedan laws had been translated by Mr. Anderson, under the sanction and patronage of the government, and sent home to the court, together with the Bengal grammar prepared by Messrs. Halhed and Wilkins, five hundred copies being taken by the government at thirty rupees a copy, as an encouragement to their labours. Mr. Wilkins* was also supported in erecting and working a press for the purpose of printing official papers, &c. The Madrissa, or Mohammedan college, for the education of the natives, was established by the government. In order to open a communication by the Red Sea with Europe, the government built a vessel at Mecha, having been assured that every endeavour would be made to secure the privilege of despatches, with the company's seal, being forwarded with facility; the trade with Suez having been prohibited to all British subjects, on a complaint to the king's ministers by the Ottoman Porte."

During the close of the year 1779, the Carnatic was seriously disturbed, and the cares of that province now fell upon the supreme council, although its immediate superintendence belonged to the Madras presidency. In 1780 struggles took place in which the existence of the company, in the Madras presidency, was seriously menaced. The great war with Hyder must form the subject of a separate chapter. It is here desirable to follow the general events of the government

* Afterwards Sir Charles Wilkins, librarian to the court of directors.

of Mr. Hastings. The conflict with the Mysorean chief was too extensive and important to be brought within the records of a chapter so general in its subjects as the present. It may here, however, be observed that almost every occurrence connected with the management of affairs in Madras itself at this period, complicated the relations of that presidency to the Carnatic, and those of the supreme government to Hyder Ali and the Mahrattas. Indeed, the government of Madras seemed alike to set at defiance the directions of the supreme council of Calcutta, and of the court of directors in London. Sir Thomas Rumbold, Mr. Whitehill, and Mr. Perring, the three principal members of the Madras council, set an example of insubordination. The first-named was governor, but, finding that his proceedings excited so much displeasure in Calcutta, and in London, he resigned the government in January, 1780, and was succeeded in the presidential chair by Mr. Whitehill, the senior councillor. The party in the council to which these gentlemen belonged had, with other eccentric proceedings, abolished "the commission of circuit," which had been established by the express orders of the directors, to prevent the hardship incurred by the rajahs and zemindars, in being obliged to have all their disputes adjudicated in the chief city of the presidency, however great the distance at which they resided.

M. Auber describes other freaks and absurdities of this party in the following terms:—"They had also entered into an agreement with Sitteram Rauze, for renting the havilly lands for a term of ten years, and had appointed him dewan of the Vizianagram district, a measure which the directors considered to inflict a cruel and unnecessary degradation on his brother. They had likewise disposed of the Guntoor circar to the nabob for a term of ten years. This circar had, by treaty, been delivered to the company by Bazalet Jung, in 1779, he receiving from them a permanent rent, equal to what his amils had paid to him." As to the effect of such conduct at home and at Calcutta, M. Auber adds:—"These proceedings were diametrically opposed to the orders of the directors. The motives and principles by which the parties had been governed in their adoption appeared so very questionable, that Sir Thomas Rumbold, Mr. Whitehill, and Mr. Perring were dismissed the company's service;* and on the 17th of January, 1781, Lord Macartney was appointed governor of Madras. His lordship, as was then customary, expressed his acknowledgment to the court of directors, and to the company, in a general court of pro-

* Letter to Madras, 10th of January, 1781.

prietors. On the 18th of January, the proprietors being met to consider the conduct of Mr. Paul Benfield, Mr. Burke, as proprietor, delivered in a paper, entitled heads of objections to be inquired into before Mr. Benfield should be allowed to return to India. Leave was ultimately granted for that purpose, by a vote of 368 to 302. The supreme government were equally opposed with the directors to the conduct of Mr. Whitehill. The government were represented to have countenanced the treaty concluded by that gentleman with Bazalet Jung, whether to the extent alleged by the Madras council was not apparent, but it was clear that orders had been subsequently sent from Bengal for relinquishing the circar. The Madras government were accused of pertinaciously refusing to obey such orders, and of retaining the circar in defiance of the peremptory instructions from Calcutta. On a previous occasion, in a matter connected with the nizam, the council at Fort St. George disputed the controlling power attempted to be exercised by the supreme government, and had expressed an opinion that the latter possessed only a negative power, and that confined to two points, viz., orders for declaring war, or for making treaties, and not a positive and compelling power, extending to all political affairs. Considerable jealousy had been created in the minds of Hyder and the Nizam by the treaty; both Bazalet Jung and Hyder manifested decided intentions of hostility."

Hyder made such demonstrations of hostility, and had such means of making that hostility formidable, that the supine council might have been awakened from their apathy in time to avert the terrible consequences about to spread like a devouring flame over the fair provinces of the presidency. The nabob of the Carnatic was still more supine, if possible, than the council: nothing was either performed or attempted by him to strengthen the hands of the Madras government, or in any way prepare himself for an encounter with his formidable foe. The nizam was able to afford to Hyder such a supply of French officers and troops ostensibly in his own service that it ought to have been an object of intense concern with the government of Madras, by negotiation or money, to prevent such a junction. No real efforts to accomplish so important an object was made, and when the moment arrived for action, the

Mysorean adventurer was able to add to the elements of strength possessed by his vast and well-organized armies, this new and most dangerous one of French troops led by officers skilful in engineering and artillery, and with all the prestige of being the best disciplined troops in Europe or in Asia. The difficulties of Hastings at this juncture pass description. The company's funds in India were exhausted; the servants of every grade were in arrears for pay; the exigencies of the war in the Carnatic were exorbitant; the petty rajahs were everywhere displaying symptoms of disaffection; the insubordinate polygars of Tanjore had gone over to Hyder Ali; the vizier and other powerful native princes were murmuring and at heart disloyal; the company was importunate for money; the councils of the presidencies despaired of finding means for the annual investment. Such was the condition of India in 1781-82.

It seems to be one of the strange conditions upon which providentially the English dominion in India has depended, that it should, after the most signal seasons of prosperity and triumph, be suddenly brought to the verge of ruin, and yet emerge from danger and disaster more glorious than ever. This has so often happened as to assume the appearance of a law, and challenge the investigation of statesmen. At the period to which reference is now made, such was the state of the English power in India. After all its prestige and glory, a wild and lawless man, thrown up by the ever surging sea of Indian life, put the empire founded by Clive and consolidated by Hastings in the utmost peril; and when successive victories rolled back the tide of his conquests, the pecuniary resources of the company in India were exhausted, the native chiefs were preparing to throw off the yoke of England, and the English themselves were weakened by dissensions in their presidential councils. The genius of Hastings retrieved affairs so desperate. Where his own hand could not reach, and his own mind direct, he nominated agents adapted to the work he desired to see accomplished. Had the appointment of the men, or the procuring and management of the means, been left, at this juncture, to either the councils in India or the directors at home, all had been lost.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

GOVERNMENT OF HASTINGS (*Continued*)—HIS EFFORTS TO RETRIEVE THE FINANCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE COMPANY IN INDIA—TRANSACTIONS WITH CHEYTE SING, THE VIZIER, THE BEGUMS OF OUDE, ETC.—CENSURES PRONOUNCED BY THE DIRECTORS AND THE ENGLISH PUBLIC.

For a time, after the occurrence of the events recorded in the last chapter, Hastings directed his whole attention to finance, and made efforts of the most ingenious but daring nature to provide funds for the government.

Few of the transactions by which large sums of money were brought to the coffers of the company have been more canvassed than the expulsion of Cheyte Sing, Rajah of Benares. Lord Macaulay describes Hastings as having deliberately meditated a robbery (on behalf of the company) on this prince, whom the same authority represents as having paid regularly his tribute up to 1780-1. His lordship is very severe upon Hastings for treating a sovereign rajah in the manner he did, and for demanding money for the company for which there was no legitimate claim upon the rajah. His lordship in this case, as in almost every other to which he refers in his essays upon Clive and Warren Hastings (which are in fact essays upon Indian affairs during their governments), follows Mill, and he does so even when the means of correcting Mill by more authentic sources of information were abundantly open to him. The gist of the affair is in the real relation held by the rajah to the English government, and his own actual rights, whether implied by the title of rajah or the power or authority which he exercised. The truth was, the rajah perceived with pleasure the difficulties by which the company was surrounded, and hoped out of the dismemberment of its territories to derive for himself a sovereignty to which he had no claim. He had engaged to assist the English during the struggles with the Mahrattas and Hyder, by a body of cavalry,—a force, of which Lord Macartney declared in his correspondence with the directors, that when he assumed the government of Madras in 1781, the presidency was totally destitute. The English were especially deficient in that military arm, and relied generally for support in it upon their native allies. The people of Benares being, as compared with lower Bengal, warlike—but by no means so warlike as Lord Macaulay describes them, and as the inhabitants of Oude, Rohilcund, Delhi, and the north and north-west districts generally are—it was reasonable for the English to expect that the rajah would keep faith with them in furnishing

cavalry contingents. This he did not do. He was also expected to aid the general government in any extraordinary crisis, as the very existence of his position as a prince depended upon the protection of the English. Cheyte Sing thought otherwise. He had no disposition to lend them aid in their hour of peril, and counted upon their necessity as his opportunity. Hastings was not a governor to be so treated. He determined that Benares should afford its full proportion of assistance to the general want, and he resolved to make his highness, the rajah, an example to other rajahs of the reality of English power, and the necessity of rendering a full, efficient, and zealous support to the supreme government—of, in fact, sharing its dangers as well as enjoying of its protection. The governor-general accordingly proceeded to Benares, and after undergoing desperate perils, expelled the rajah and seized the revenue. The light in which the transaction is placed by Auber is sustained by the documents upon the authority of which a historical record must be based. It is with singular brevity recorded by him in the following terms:—

“Under the treaty concluded with Sujah-ad-Dowlah in August, 1765, it was stipulated that Bulwunt Sing, a tributary of the vizier, and Rajah of Benares, should be continued in that province. On Sujah-ad-Dowlah's death in 1775, a treaty was concluded by Mr. Bristow, with his successor, Asoff-ul-Dowlah, by which all the districts dependant on Rajah Cheyte Sing, the successor of Bulwunt Sing, were transferred in full sovereignty to the company, an arrangement which had apparently given great satisfaction to Cheyte Sing and his family.

“When intelligence reached India, in 1778, of the war with France, Spain, and America, the supreme government were constrained to devise every means to augment the financial resources of the company, in order to meet the unavoidable increase of charge. As the rajah's provinces derived the advantage of the company's protection, to whom he had, in point of fact, become tributary, he was called upon to aid in the general exigency. He very reluctantly assented to a contribution of five lacs. This indisposition created an unfavourable impression on the mind of the government.

"Having been again applied to for aid during the war in the Carnatic, in the prosecution of which the government of Bengal had drained their treasury in supplies to Madras, he evinced a decided disinclination to come forward; and although he promised to contribute some aid in cavalry, not one man was forthcoming. These and other circumstances arising out of the deputation of a party from the rajah to Calcutta, determined Mr. Hastings to make known his mind to Cheyte Sing, for which purpose he proceeded to Benares on his route to meet the vizier, where he arrived on the 14th of August, 1781. It was the rajah's wish to have paid the governor-general a visit that evening, but he desired it might be postponed until a wish to that effect was communicated to the rajah.

"In the interim, the governor-general caused a paper to be forwarded to Cheyte Sing, recapitulating the points upon which he felt it necessary to animadvert. The reply of the rajah was so unsatisfactory, that orders were given to Mr. Markham, the resident, on the 15th, at ten at night, to place him in arrest the following morning: should opposition arise, he was to await the arrival of two companies of sepoys. Mr. Markham, with the troops, the following morning executed his orders: The rajah addressed a letter to Mr. Hastings, asking 'what need there was for guards? He was the governor-general's slave.' In consequence of the desire of the rajah, Mr. Markham proceeded to visit him; previous to his arrival, large bodies of armed men had crossed the river from Ramnagar. Unfortunately, the two companies who were with the resident had taken no ammunition with them. They were suddenly attacked by the assembled body of armed men and fired upon; at this moment the rajah made his escape, letting himself down the steep banks of the river, by turbans tied together, into a boat which was waiting for him. Those who effected his escape followed him. Of the two companies commanded by Lieutenant Stalker few remained alive, and those were severely wounded; Lieutenants Stalker, Scott, and Simes lying within a short distance of each other. The rajah fled from Ramnagar with his zenana to Lateefgur, a strong fort ten miles from Chunar, accompanied by every member of the family who could claim any right of succession to the raj.

"In this state of affairs, Mr. Hastings selected Baboo Assaum Sing, who had been dewan under Bulwunt Sing, to take charge of the revenues, in quality of naib, until it should be legally determined to whom the revenues belonged. The governor went to

Chunar, from whence requisitions were issued for succour from all quarters. Little aid could be effectually given, as the whole of the country was in arms, the provinces of Benares, Ramnagar, and Patceta being in a state of war. Troops ultimately arrived under Major Popham from Cawnpore; the exertions and gallantry of that officer rescued the zemindary of Benares from the power and influence of the disaffected rajah and his adherents. His last strong fortress of Bejiegur, from which he had escaped, was reduced and brought under subjection to the company. Baboo Narrain, a grandson of Bulwunt Sing, was proclaimed rajah in the room of Cheyte Sing."

This statement, supported by all existing documents of the rajah's position, prerogatives, and conduct, and the ground on which the claims of the governor-general rested, do not agree with the account given by Mill, upon whose authority it is obvious Lord Macaulay solely rests his estimate of the conduct of Hastings. Mr. Mill, assuring his readers of the sacred and indefeasible rights of the rajah, says:—"Whether till the time at which Benares became an appanage of the Subah of Oude, it had ever been governed through the medium of any of the neighbouring viceroys, or had always paid its revenue immediately to the imperial treasury, does not certainly appear. With the exception of coining money in his own name—a prerogative of majesty, which, as long as the throne retained its vigour, was not enfeebled by communication, and that of the administration of criminal justice, which the nabob had withdrawn, the Rajah of Benares had always, it is probable, enjoyed and exercised all the powers of government within his own dominions."

With views based upon such representations, Lord Macaulay would naturally describe any demands for assistance made by Hastings, beyond the ordinary tribute, as a robbery. Professor Wilson has, with his usual research, examined the statements of Mill, and gives the following confutation:—"This is an adoption of one of those errors upon which the charge against Mr. Hastings in regard to his relations with Cheyte Sing was founded, and which commences with the second report of the select committee, who talk of 'the expulsion of a rajah of the highest rank from his dominions.' In point of fact, however, no rajah had enjoyed and exercised the powers of government in the province of Benares since the middle of the eleventh century, at the latest. At the period of the Mohammedan conquest, it was part of the kingdom of Kanauj. It was annexed to

Delhi by the arms of Kutteb, early in the thirteenth century, and in the fourteenth was included in the Mohammedan kingdom of Jonpur. In the reign of Akbar, it was comprised in the subah of Allahabad, and in that of Aurungzebe it was comprehended in that of Oude. In all this time no mention is made of a Rajah of Benares. The title originated in the beginning of the eighteenth century, or A.D. 1730, when Mansa Ram, zemindar of Gangapoor, having, in the distracted state of affairs, added largely to his authority, obtained a sunnud of rajah, from Mohammed Shah of Delhi—a mere honorary title, conferred then, as is it now, by the British government, without any suspicion of its implying princely power or territorial dominion. Mansa Ram procured the title for his son, Bulwunt Sing, who succeeded him in 1740; so that even the title was only forty years old at the time of Cheyte Sing's removal. It had never conferred independence, for the rajah had still remained a zemindar, holding under the soubahdar of Oude. It is true, that the minutes of council of various dates speak of the rajah as a sort of king, tributary, but reigning in his own right, and by the position of his supposed kingdom, calculated to be a valuable feudatory or ally of the British government. Some of this was merely vagueness of expression, some of it ignorance. The word rajah seems to have imposed even upon Hastings; certainly it did upon Clavering and his party; and language was used in allusion to Cheyte Sing, which exposed Hastings to the charge of contradiction and inconsistency. There is no vagueness or inconsistency, however, in the document upon which Cheyte Sing's whole power and right depended. The sunnud 1776, granted to the rajah by the governor and council, and which, it is to be observed, 'causes all former sunnuds to become null and void;' confers no royalties, acknowledges no hereditary rights, fixes no perpetual limit to the demands of the supreme government; but appoints him zemindar, aumeen, and fougedar of Benares and other districts. All these terms imply delegated and subordinate offices, and recognise in him nothing more than receiver of the rents, and civil and commercial judge. In the kaboolet, or assent to this sunnud, Cheyte Sing acknowledges the sovereignty of the company, and promises to pay them a certain sum, the estimated net revenue, and to preserve peace and order. Whatever, therefore, may be the fluctuating and contradictory language of the minutes of council, there is not the slightest pretext for treating the zemindar of Benares as a sovereign, however subordinate or tributary, to which he held whatever power he enjoyed. It is true that the genu-

ineness of this document was disputed by the prosecutors; and they affirmed that the sunnud was altered in compliance with the representation of Cheyte Sing, who objected to the insertion of the term 'muchulka,' and the clause annulling all former sunnuds. They could not prove, however, that any other sunnud was ever executed; and whatever might at one time have been the disposition of the council to accede to the rajah's wishes, it does not appear that any actual measure ensued. Even, however, if the omissions had been made, of which there is no proof, it is not pretended that any clause, exempting the rajah for ever from all further demands, was inserted; and this was the only material point at issue.*

It was obvious that, in the mode which Hastings adopted in carrying out the punishment inflicted upon Cheyte Sing, and in the extent to which it was pushed, he was influenced by personal resentment. Cheyte Sing had deserved resentment; but Hastings carried it out vindictively. There can be no doubt that his policy and sense of justice were independent of his vengeful feeling, but that gave a bitterness to all he did in the transaction.

"The spirit which Hastings manifested towards Cheyte Sing was so intensely bitter, as almost to force an inquiry whether the public delinquency of this man could be the sole cause of the governor-general's hatred. This is a question which could not have been satisfactorily answered had not Hastings himself afforded the means. In enumerating the crimes of the rajah, Hastings accuses him of having entertained an intention to revolt. 'This design,' says he, 'had been greatly favoured by the unhappy divisions of our government, in which he presumed to take an open part. It is a fact, that when these had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence, by an attempt to wrest from me my authority, in the month of June, 1777, he had deputed a man named Sumboonaut, with an express commission to my opponent, and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when, hearing of the change of affairs which had taken place at the presidency, he stopped, and the rajah recalled him.† Here, then, is the key, furnished by Hastings himself, to the feelings under which he carried on his proceedings against Cheyte Sing. While the contest between himself and General Claver-

* Minutes of Evidence, p. 60.

† Hastings's *Narrative*, printed in the Appendix to the Supplement to the Second Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Administration of Justice in India, 1782; and also in the Minutes of Evidence on the Trial of Hastings, vol. i.

ing was raging, the presumptuous rajah had ventured to dispatch a messenger to the opponent of the man who was eventually to be master of his fortunes. For four years the hatred engendered by this act had burned in Hastings's heart, when an opportunity occurred for gratifying at once the claims of public justice and of private revenge. Such an opportunity Hastings was not the man to pass by. It is not necessary to ascribe the whole of his proceedings with regard to Cheyte Sing to personal hatred. Independently of this feeling, he would probably have called upon the rajah for assistance towards carrying on the war, and he would have been justified; he would probably have visited his numerous failures with some punishment; and in this, too, he would have been justified: but in the absence of the dark passion which had so long rankled in his breast, he would have proceeded with more calmness, more dignity, and more regard to the courtesy which the rank and position of the zemindar demanded. To humble to the dust the man who had offended him was a triumph which it was not in the nature of Hastings to forego, when circumstances threw in his way the opportunity of enjoying it. He set his foot on the neck of his enemy, and was happy.

"With the explanation afforded by himself, the conduct of Hastings towards Cheyte Sing appears perfectly in accordance with his general character; but the indiscreet revelation of his feelings is remarkable, as being in striking opposition to that character. Disguise seemed to be natural to him. On all occasions he surrounded himself and his motives with mystery. Here is a striking exception. A degree of frankness, which few men in such a case would have manifested, for once marks a communication from Warren Hastings. How is this to be accounted for? By the strength of the passion which had waited years for gratification, and by the overwhelming sensation of triumph consequent on gratification when attained. Powerful must these feelings have been to overcome the caution of a man with whom concealment was not so much a habit as an instinct; which could induce him for once to lift the veil which on no other occasion was ever removed; which could lead him, unabashed and undismayed, to expose to the public eye motives and feelings of which the suggestions of the most ordinary prudence would have dictated the concealment—and this, too, at a time when, under the avowed consciousness that some parts of his proceedings required explanation, and under the humiliating sense of disappointment at the failure of his financial specula-

tions, he was seeking to disarm hostility by apology."*

The conduct of Hastings throughout the unfortunate events at Benares, was characterised not only by his usual courage, but by an amount of cool and dauntless fortitude, such as the world has seldom witnessed. When the disaster occurred to the two companies, Hastings, with about fifty soldiers, was shut up in the residency, which the mob surrounded, cutting off all communication. The too forward valour of some English officers with Hastings, nearly brought on a conflict which would have probably issued in the destruction of his little garrison and of himself. The whole country for many miles around was in arms, and the insurrectionary spirit extended into Oude, the most turbulent part of India. Volunteers from Oude, from among the less warlike part of the population, especially hastened to join the Benares insurgents. The ruling class of Oude, the Mohammedans took little part in the disturbance, but the Brahminical devotees considered it a holy war, and nearly thirty thousand of them crossed the borders into the Benares province. Hastings, beleaguered in his little temporary fortress, not only remained perfectly calm, but acted with the cool assurance and audacity of one in a position to dictate. The fugitive rajah sent to him, beseeching, in humiliating terms, pardon and friendship, but in the meantime made no efforts to withdraw the armed rabble that beset the governor. Hastings treated with haughty disdain the rajah's overtures. He contrived to send letters, placed in the ears of certain of the natives as ear-rings, to the nearest cantonments of the British army. The troops idolized Hastings, as all the English did, and officers and men made desperate and enthusiastic efforts to hasten to his rescue. Meanwhile, Hastings wrote with the greatest coolness despatches to his agents in connection with the negotiations then going on with the Mahrattas. These despatches show the most wonderful self-reliance and self-possession. While a multitude thundered at the gates of his residence, and bullets whistled around, this indomitable man wrote with as much collectedness as if sitting in his study at government house, or dictating a revenue minute in the council chamber. The efforts of the British troops soon turned the tide of affairs, the vast mob of armed fanatics melted away, and the liberated governor with wisdom, promptitude, and stern repression, reduced to a perfect calm the anarchical elements that had raged so fiercely around him.

* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton.

Cheyte Sing had placed himself beyond all hope of mercy while these events were passing. He was lifted up by the sight of the whole population of the province of Benares in arms, the thronging volunteers from Oude, and the preparation for revolt in Bahar, so that he threatened to "drive the white faces out of Bengal," and made high and peremptory demands upon Hastings. When he saw the feeble resistance made by multitudes of his co-religionists to a few English soldiers and sepoy's commanded by British officers, he became panic-struck, and fled, abandoning for ever the regions he had thrown into so sudden a convulsion. The result to the company was an increase of its revenue to the amount of £200,000 sterling per annum, and a more complete dominance in the regions that had so suddenly revolted. A quarter of a million sterling was found in the treasury of Cheyte Sing, which was distributed to the troops as prize money. When tidings of the occurrences at Benares reached the directors, the court passed a resolution, that the treaty of 1775, confirmed in perpetuity to the company the zemindaree of Benares, that Cheyte Sing was to have the management of the province on paying a certain tribute; that the governor-general and council had recommended the rajah to maintain two thousand horse, but that in the opinion of the court, there was no obligations resting upon Cheyte Sing to comply with that recommendation; that the conduct of the governor-general towards him, while at Benares was improper, and that the imprisonment of his person was unwarrantable and highly impolitic, and would probably tend to weaken that confidence in the moderation and justice of the English government, which it was desirable the princes of India should feel. These tidings reached the governor-general just as he had concluded a glorious peace with Hyder, and when flushed with the success of all his enterprises, he was unlikely to endure the language of censure with his usual good temper and self-command. He at once wrote a respectful but indignant despatch to the directors, a few extracts from which will at once show the merits of the whole question as they appeared to Hastings, and the views which he took of the policy and proceedings of the directors. He considered the judgment pronounced to have issued from a party in the directory, under the influence, no doubt of the cabinet, which, anxious to grasp the patronage of India, laboured incessantly to prejudice the minds of the English public against the company's servants, believing that such prejudice would ultimately be directed to the company itself.

Hastings does not express so much in the language he employed, but his allusions and tone convey it:—"I understand that these resolutions regarding Cheyte Sing were either published or intended for publication; the authority from whence they proceed leads to the belief of the fact. Who are the readers? Not the proprietors alone, whose interest is immediately concerned in them, and whose approbation I am impelled, by every motive of pride and gratitude, to solicit, but the whole body of the people of England, whose passions have been excited on the general subject of the conduct of their servants in India; and before them I am arraigned and prejudged of a violation of the national faith in acts of such complicated aggravation, that, if they were true, no punishment short of death could atone for the injury which the interest and credit of the public has sustained in them."

M. Anber,* condensing the letter of Hastings, thus describes and quotes its contents:—"With respect to the two thousand horse, it was not stipulated that Cheyte Sing should furnish any given number, but that what were maintained should be for the defence of the general state. He denied that Cheyte Sing was bound by no other tie than the payment of his tribute, for he was bound by the fealty of obedience to every order of the government which he served, his own letters being referred to as affording proofs. He denied that Cheyte Sing was a native prince of India, for he was the son of a collector of the revenue of that province, which his acts, and the misfortunes of his master, enabled him to convert to his own permanent and hereditary possession. 'The man whom you have just ranked among the princes of India will be astonished when he hears it—at an elevation so unlooked-for; nor less at the independent rights which he will not know how to assert, unless the example you have thought it consistent with justice, however opposite to policy, to show, of becoming his advocate against your own interests, should inspire any of your own servants to be his advisers and instructors.' Mr. Hastings referred to his narrative as explanatory of all the circumstances, and then dwelt upon the injury likely to arise from the support of a native against the government; remarking, 'it is now a complete period of eleven years since I first received the nominal charge of your affairs; in the course of that time I have had invariably to contend, not only with ordinary difficulties, but with such as most naturally arose from the opposition of those very powers

* *Rise and Progress of British Power in India*, vol. i. chap. xi. pp. 642—644.

from whom I primarily derived my authority, and which were required for the support of it. My exertions, though applied to an unwearyed and consistent line of action, have been occasional and desultory; yet I please myself with the hope that in the annals of your dominions which shall be written after the extinction of recent prejudice, this term of its administration will appear not the least conducive to the interests of the company, nor the least reflective of the honour of the British name. Had sufficient support been given, what good might have been done! You, honourable sirs, can attest the patience and temper with which I have submitted to all the indignities heaped upon me in a long service. It was the duty of fidelity which I essentially owed to it; it was the return of gratitude which I owed, even with the sacrifice of life, had that been exacted, to the company, my original masters and most indulgent patrons. There was an interval during which my authority was wholly destroyed; but another was substituted, and that, though irregular, was armed with the public belief of an influence invariably upholding it, which gave it a vigour scarcely less effectual than that of a constitutional power. Besides, your government had no external danger to agitate and discover the looseness of its composition.

“The case is now widely different; while your executive was threatened by wars with the most formidable powers of Europe, added to your Indian enemies, and while you confessedly owed its preservation to the seasonable and vigorous exertions of this government, you chose that season to annihilate its constitutional powers. You annihilated the influence of its executive members. You proclaimed its annihilation—you have substituted no other, unless you suppose it may exist, and can be effectually exercised in the body of your council at large, possessing no power of motion, but an inert submission to your commands. It therefore remains for me to perform the duty which I had assigned myself, as the final purpose of this letter, to declare, as I now most formally do, that it is my desire that you will be pleased to obtain the early nomination of a person to succeed me in the government of Fort William; to declare that it is my intention to resign your service so soon as I can do it without prejudice to your affairs, after the allowance of a competent time for your choice of a person to succeed me; and to declare that if, in the intermediate time, you shall proceed to order the restoration of Rajah Cheyte Sing to the zemindaree, from which he was dispossessed for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your

council shall resolve to execute the order, I will instantly give up my station and the service. I am morally certain that my successor, whoever he may be, will be allowed to possess and exercise the necessary power of his station, with the confidence and support of those who, by their choice of him, will be interested in his success.”*

The affairs of the Madras government led to various differences between it and the supreme government; the directors supported the Madras council against Hastings, objecting to the appointment of Mr. R. J. Sullivan by the governor-general to Hyderabad, a person whom he had nominated solely on account of his abilities and qualifications. Finally, the court supported Mr. Bristow at Oude, in opposition to the governor-general. These circumstances led Mr. Hastings to address the court in the following terms, in a letter written after that already quoted had been dispatched:—“At whatever period your decision may arrive, may the government fall into the hands of a person invested with the powers of the office, not disgraced, as I have been, with an unsubstantial title, without authority, and with a responsibility without the means of discharging it. May he, at least, possess such a portion of exclusive control as may enable him to interpose with effect on occasions which may tend to the sacrifice of your political credit.”†

In reference to Mr. Sullivan, he, in a letter of still later date, observed:—“Among the many mortifications to which I have been continually subjected, there is none which I so severely feel as my concern in the sufferings of those whom my selection for the most important trusts in your service has exposed to persecution, and to censures, fines, deprivations, and dismissal from home. It is hard to be loaded with a weighty responsibility without power, to be compelled to work with instruments which I cannot trust, and to see the terrors of high authority held over the heads of such as I myself employ in the discharge of my public duties.”‡

From the period when he heard of the disapproval of his conduct in reference to Cheyte Sing, Hastings was discontented, and his letters constantly breathe a sense of injury. He felt that his great services were not appreciated. Alluding, in the letter last quoted, to the helplessness of the other presidencies, and to the fact that he had saved India, he remarked:—“We have supported the other presidencies, not by scanty and ineffectual supplies, but by an anxious anticipation of all

* Letter to Court, 20th of March, 1783.

† October, 1783.

‡ November, 1783.

their wants, and by a most prompt and liberal relief of them. We have assisted the China trade, and have provided larger investments from the presidency than it has ever furnished in any given period of the same length, from the first hour of its establishment to the present, and ample returns of wealth have been sent to England at a time when all the company's possessions in India were bearing with accumulated weight on Bengal for support against native and European enemies."

He complained bitterly of the miserable state of affairs in Oude, which he attributed to the impolicy of the company interfering with his measures.

The nature of the differences between the governor-general and the Madras government, the way in which they proceeded, and their influence upon the ultimate retirement of Hastings, are thus summed up by Edward Thornton:—"Between the governor-general and Lord Macartney there had never been much cordiality of feeling, and the difficulties in which the government of Madras was placed, tended to multiply the points of difference. The governor-general had a plan for surrendering to the nizam the Northern Circars, in consideration of a body of cavalry to be furnished by that prince. This was opposed by Lord Macartney, and was never carried into effect. Lord Macartney had, with much difficulty, obtained from the Nabob of Arcot an assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic for the support of the war. This was disapproved by the government of Bengal, and the assignment ordered to be rescinded. Before these orders were received at Madras, orders of a contrary character arrived from the court of directors. The government of Bengal, however, stubbornly refused to yield, and Lord Macartney was equally immovable. The treaty with Tippoo Sultan afforded other grounds of difference. It was disapproved by the government of Bengal, among other reasons, because it did not include the Nabob of Arcot; and a new ratification, declaring it to extend to that personage, was directed to take place. Lord Macartney again resisted; and had the governor-general possessed confidence in the stability of his own authority, some violent measures might have resulted from these disputes. But Hastings was now tottering in his seat—heavy charges were in circulation against him in England, and he had dispatched an agent (Major Scott) thither for the defence of his character and interests. The influence of Lord Macartney at home appeared to be rising as that of Hastings was declining; he continued to exercise his authority without impediment, until, in consequence chiefly of

the revocation of the orders of the court of directors relating to the assignment from Mohammed Ali, he voluntarily relinquished it, and was ultimately appointed to succeed to the office of governor-general."

When Hastings appointed Major Scott as his agent, he intimated to the directors his having done so, and at the same time declared to them that he "would suffer no person whatever to perform any act in his name that could be construed to imply a resignation of his authority, protesting against it, as on former occasions, as most unwarrantable."

Out of the transactions at Benares arose differences with Oude. The nabob vizier had so badly governed his dominions, or so faithlessly fulfilled the duties of alliance, that the insurrection in Benares derived great importance, and caused great danger by the number of his subjects that joined the masses of the insurgents. Hastings was inflamed with anger, and determined to make the nabob pay dearly for any damage caused by his neglect. Unfortunately for the nabob himself, he chose this critical juncture to urge the withdrawal of the British troops from Oude, which his father and himself had engaged the English to place there. His real object was not the removal of the troops, but as it was policy on the part of the English to keep a force in Oude, he concluded that they would still do so, even if he violated the treaty, and refused to pay for them. Hastings saw through this, and remonstrated, demanding the payment of all arrears, and the regular disbursement of the stipulated subsidy. The nabob declared that he had no money, and that his kingdom would not endure further taxation. Hastings reminded him that if his revenues were exhausted, the fault lay in the extravagance and debauchery of which the nabob had set so bad an example to his people, and hinted that if a native ruler could not make ends meet in Oude, the English could; but that the latter would never suffer Oude to be overrun by the Mahrattas, as would be the case almost as soon as the English troops disappeared, neither would he impose the cost of preserving that frontier of the British territory from foreign enemies. Oude should bear the burden of its own defences. The vizier nabob sought an interview with Hastings. He proceeded to Chunar to meet the governor-general, and arrange with him as to the payment of the troops, which, according to treaty, he was bound to maintain. The governor-general was not now satisfied, but increased his demands, on the grounds of the nabob's duty to defend the empire, the protection of which he enjoyed, and on the ground, also, that his previous delinquencies deserved punishment.

This interview between the governor-general and vizier took place on the 11th of September, 1781, and they remained for a fortnight in the picturesque fortress, discussing the condition of India, and of Oude especially; but still more especially debating the means by which the British treasury at Calcutta might be furnished with money. It was finally arranged that the nabob should pay a large sum to meet the present emergencies of the English, and, on the other hand, he was to be spared the stated expense of a large portion of the British contingent, then stationed in his dominions. The infantry brigade, and three regiments of cavalry, were to be withdrawn, a very large saving to the annual expenditure of the nabob's government. One regiment of sepoys (infantry) was to be stationed at Lucknow, but the charge to the nabob was not to exceed 25,000 rupees per mensem. The army at Cawnpore was to be stately kept up to the strength prescribed by the treaty of 1773. All British officers, and all English pensioners upon the state of Oude, whatever their claims, were to be withdrawn. The nabob was also to resume certain jaghires, of which the English had previously possessed themselves, the united value of which was very considerable. On his part the nabob consented immediately, to supply fifty-five lacs of rupees to the company, and subsequently twenty lacs in entire liquidation of the debt due by him to the company. On the 25th of September, the vizier re-entered his capital, gloomy and dissatisfied. Every trick of negotiation to which he had resorted had been turned against him. Hastings had foiled his most cunning vakeels and subordinates with their own weapons. The conduct of Hastings in these negotiations has been much censured. The English were bound by treaty to Fuzzul Oola Khan, the Rohilla chief, who had some years before protracted the war in that country. The chief had stipulated place at the service of the English government two or three thousand men "according to his ability." Hastings now demanded five thousand, but reduced finally the mandate to three thousand cavalry, which the khan pleaded that he did not possess, but would send two thousand cavalry, all he had, and one thousand infantry. This offer was considered contumacious. It is possible that Hastings believed it to be so, but the grounds of suspicion are strong that he was anxious for a quarrel, in order to hand over the jaghires of the khan to the nabob, as compensation for the ready money required from the latter to meet the exigencies of the Bengal treasury, then drained of its resources by its supplies to the other presidencies in their dangerous mismanagement and desperate

wars. At all events, the lands of Fuzzul Oola were made over upon paper to the vizier, on the ostensible ground that the khan had broken the treaty. Fuzzul Oola had no doubt in various ways departed from its strict letter, but the pretext or reason announced for his deposition was his refusal to supply the military force agreed upon. Hastings had actually no wish that this concession to the vizier should be of use to him. He took means to impede the execution of this clause of the treaty with the nabob, while he was actually making it; and ultimately he frustrated its fulfilment, accepting from Fuzzul Oola a fine as a substitute for confiscation.

The resumption of the jaghires by the nabob involved the ruin of his mother and grandmother, called the begums. These princesses were immensely rich, and Hastings believed that the property they held had been improperly conferred upon them by the previous nabob—that, in fact, it belonged to the reigning prince. However that might have been, the English had, by treaty, recognised the rights of the begum mother, both to her jaghires and her treasures. So ostensibly was this recognition made, that when the nabob had previously sought to plunder his relations, the English government interfered for the protection of the mother, on the ground of treaty obligation, while only remonstrating with the vizier for his treatment of the elder lady. The nabob was very desirous of obtaining the wealth, but shrunk from the odium of entirely dispossessing the royal ladies. He suggested to Hastings the propriety of leaving them in possession of their jaghires, and of accepting their treasures instead. Hastings decreed that they should lose all. This stern, hard, and un pitying decree was executed, but not until after a gallant resistance on the part of the retainers of the royal ladies. Their affairs were in the hands of two eunuchs: these, with other of the begum adherents, were incarcerated, loaded with irons. Lord Macaulay says that torture was also applied; but this is not borne out by fact. He quotes a letter written by the British resident to the officer in charge of them, to allow the nabob's agents to inflict corporal punishment upon them. But this, as Thornton shows, was never executed, and probably never intended to be so. That author, more severe on Hastings than most historians who have animadverted upon his misdeeds, conjectures that the order was intended to act merely *in terrorem*, so as to induce the incarcerated men to comply with the requisitions of their persecutors. Torture, as the term is employed, was not applied; but great severity was inflicted. Hastings justified

his conduct throughout this last class of transactions by the allegation that the begums were enemies of British power in India, that they abetted Cheyte Sing, and assisted the insurrection in Benares. When public discussion was raised in England concerning his conduct towards the princes of Oude, Sir Elijah Impey suggested to him the importance of supporting the allegation of political intrigue against the begums by affidavits. Hastings gladly availed himself of this suggestion, and of the active services of Sir Elijah in taking the depositions. These were rendered in a remarkable manner. The judge hurried off to the provinces which had been the scenes of the alleged misconduct of the begums, and took the affidavits in the forms of Mohanmedan, Brahminical, and Christian attestation, according to the religion of the witnesses. A vast pile of documents, most damnatory to the begums, was thus procured; nor would there have been any difficulty in obtaining any number of sworn testimonies which the governor deemed necessary to his object. It does not appear, however, that Hastings countenanced any methods to obtain false testimony, and it is possible that he credited the evidence upon which he made the allegations originally. The facts contained in the affidavits were at the time notorious, although they were years after denied in the British parliament by men who were seeking to ruin Hastings, for the means he employed to save the Indian empire. Public opinion in England treated the whole affair as an imposture—a corrupt contrivance between the judge and the governor to bolster up a case from first to last guilty and disgraceful.

Another circumstance connected with the interview between the vizier and the governor-general at Chunar has been made the occasion of severe reflections upon the latter. The nabob offered his excellency a present of ten lacs of rupees; he accepted it, and passed the money to the company's account.* This, however, he did not make known to the company for some months after, which Lord Macaulay considers as a ground for suspicion as to the integrity of his motives. Mr. Thornton attributes the concealment to the love of mystery with which he thinks Hastings invariably enveloped all his transactions. Motives of policy probably induced the temporary concealment; but Hastings never intended to apply it to his own use. He, however, felt that the close of his power was approaching, that public prejudice in England was fast rising to a dangerous pitch against

* He had previously acted in a similar manner in the case of Cheyte Sing.

the company's servants in India, and that he, probably, would be made the scape-goat, and he was anxious to secure this sum for his own defence upon his return to England, if the directors could be induced to concede it. Possibly this circumstance had some influence in the delay which attended his communication to the company, that this sum had been paid to their account. He, at last, in a letter to the secret committee, asked permission to keep it. This they refused. His mortification was intense, for he was not rich, and no governor had ever enriched his sovereign by his measures, in any age, as Warren Hastings had enriched the Indian treasury of the company. Like Clive, he had saved India for them, and they grudged him both the glory and what he considered equitable pecuniary reward. It was from Patna, in January, 1782, that he addressed the court on the subject of this donation, in the following letter:—"I accepted it without hesitation, and gladly, being entirely destitute both of means and credit, whether for your service or the relief of my own necessities. It was made, not in specie, but in bills. What I have received has been laid out in the public service, the rest shall be applied to the same account. The nominal sum is ten lacs of rupees, Oude currency. As soon as the whole is completed, I shall send you a faithful account of it, resigning the disposal of it entirely to the pleasure of your honourable court. If you shall adjudge the disposal to me, I shall consider it as the most honourable apportionment and reward of my labours, and I wish to owe my fortune to your bounty. I am now in my fiftieth year: I have passed thirty-one years in your service. My conscience allows me boldly to claim the merit of zeal and integrity, nor has fortune been unpropitious to their exertions. To these qualities I bound my pretensions. I shall not repine if you shall deem otherwise of my services; nor ought your decision, however it may disappoint my hope of a retreat adequate to the consequence and elevation of the office which I now possess, to lessen my gratitude for having been so long permitted to hold it, since it has, at last, permitted me to lay up a provision with which I can be contented in a more humble station."

On the 22nd of May, from Calcutta, he again wrote, accounting for the money which he had received for the company, and applied to its use, from the month of October, 1780, to August, 1781, amounting to nineteen lacs sixty-four thousand rupees (nearly £200,000). Unfortunately, the ship *Lively*, by which this letter was intended to have been dispatched to Europe, was delayed, and necessarily the

letter also, which turned out to the subsequent disadvantage of the writer.

On the 15th of January, 1783, the directors wrote to the governor-general, stating that they were prevented, by a prohibitory act of parliament, from applying the ten lacs in the way he requested. "The directors may have so interpreted "the regulation act;" but there was no claim which hindered their giving the money to Hastings: they chose to accept it themselves. The answer of the directors was an evasion and a mean one. In Gleig's *Life of Hastings*, a letter is published addressed by him to his agent, Major Scott, in which the following passage sets forth fully the views and feelings of the writer on this matter:—"I am neither a prude nor a hypocrite. Had I succeeded, as I had reason to expect, in the original objects of my expedition, I should have thought it, perhaps, allowable to make some provision for myself when I had filled the company's treasury; but I am disappointed. I have added, indeed, a

large income to the company's revenue, and if Mr. Middleton (resident at Lucknow) does his duty, I have provided for the early payment of the debt due from the nabob vizier to the company. But these are not acquisitions of *éclat*. Their immediate influence is not felt, and will not be known at all until long after the receipt of these despatches. It will be known that our receipts from Benares were suspended for three months, and during as long a time at Lucknow. It will be known that the pay and charges of the temporary brigade have been thrown upon the company, and that all the nabob's pensioners have been withdrawn; but the effect of my more useful arrangement, thanks to Mr. Middleton, yet remains to be accomplished. I return to an empty treasury, which I left empty. I will not suffer it to be said, that I took more care of my own interests than of the public, nor that I made a sacrifice of the latter to the former."*

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

GOVERNMENT OF HASTINGS (*Concluded*)—TREATY WITH THE MAHRATTAS—INSUBORDINATION OF THE COUNCILS OF BOMBAY AND MADRAS—DISSENSIONS IN SUPREME COUNCIL—HASTINGS RESIGNS THE GOVERNMENT—SCHEMES OF THE MAHRATTAS—PREPARATIONS FOR THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTURE—HASTINGS LEAVES INDIA.

WHILE Hastings was at Chunar, communications reached him from Madagee Scindiah, which led to a better feeling with the Mahrattas. Colonel Muir was ordered by Hastings to form a treaty with Scindiah, which he effected on the basis of instructions sent by Hastings on the 13th of October. That chief acted as mediator between the English and Hyder Ali, but the time was not ripe for the full development of events between the powers of Mysore and Calcutta. Peace, however, was concluded with the Mahrattas by the treaty of Salbey, May 17th, 1782,* Scindiah having been the means of bringing to pass this desirable event, Ragoba, concerning whom the conflict arose, had an allowance of 25,000 rupees per month guaranteed to him. By the treaty of Salbey, the Peishwa bound himself on behalf of the whole of the Mahratta states not to tolerate the erection of factories by any European nations except the English. The two men who held at that time chief power among the Mahrattas, was Scindiah, and Nana Furnavese, the prime minister of the Peishwa.

The treaty of Salbey did not give satisfaction at Bombay; the council was jealous of that of Bengal as supreme council, and pointed out to the directors that the abridged power of the Bombay presidency in deference to that of Bengal, and the diminution of territory caused by the treaty, would enfeeble and impoverish that presidency, and require remittances from England or from Bengal annually. They also intimated that as Bombay was contiguous to the most powerful Mahratta tribes, it was the most suitable of the three presidencies in which to maintain a large military force.

The differences between the councils at Madras and Bengal were still more prominent than those between Bengal and Bombay. From the arrival of Lord Macartney to the retirement of Hastings, those feuds became more and more bitter. It was intended by the company to nominate his lordship governor-general, upon the retirement of Hastings.

* *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings first Governor-General of Bengal.* Compiled from original papers by the Rev. G. R. Gleig, A.M., vol. ii. p. 438.

This had been communicated to him, and had the effect of making him insubordinate and ambitious. He seemed to think it necessary to prove his qualifications for his future post by contravening all the acts of its present possessor, which in any way came within the scope of his resistance. As Hastings was not a man to be trifled with, his modes of procedure were energetic, prompt, and summary, so that Madras and Bengal resembled two independent European settlements, between which a state of peace was barely maintained by the authority of the country they represented.

The proceedings in England during the parliamentary discussions of 1783 upon the introduction of Fox's India bill, re-acted upon the insubordinate presidencies of Bombay and Madras, strengthening their disposition to defy or thwart the supreme council, and more especially the governor-general, who, although he had the faculty of attaching strongly to himself the great mass of the civil servants, military, and other European residents, was hated by the class of servants occupying the highest posts. His fertile and active mind was continually engaged upon some expedient to correct their imperfect transaction of public business, or to avert the consequences of their want of political aptitude. This, of course, placed him in the position of a censor perpetually, no matter how graceful the courtesy with which he endeavoured to carry out his re-arrangements and counter orders. Hence this class of civil servants, and sometimes the superior military and naval officers, were constantly reminded of their own mediocrity and of his statesmanship, intelligence, and marvellous acquaintance with Indian affairs. However these men loved their country and wished its success, and even were ready to die for it on the field, they were not disposed to see their ideas of their own consequence and dignity so completely ignored, as they were when Hastings quietly undid performances of which they were proud, or listened with an indifference scarcely concealed by politeness to opinions which he knew to be worth no consideration. His calm resolution to overrule all imperfect administration and unwise political contracts and decisions, and carry out government in a way adapted to native prejudice, and deal with surrounding states on broad principles of policy, such as the existing state of things required, was not comprehended by these men, and they considered their rights infringed by usurpation, and the councils set at nought by the dominancy of a single will. Hastings was always really solicitous to please and soothe the mediocrities, and often succeeded won-

derfully: if he had not, he could not have conducted the government of India at all. It was impossible, however, to do so when these men had all their own prejudices fostered and encouraged by such able men as Francis, such energetic men as Clavering, or such an ambitious and influential person as Lord Macartney. Such men were intellectually and by position too powerful not to collect around them and enlist under their banner all the nonentities of the upper ranks of Indian civil and military life, by flattering their prejudices and appearing to espouse their cause against an autocrat who, however eminent, was not always successful, and, at all events, was not infallible. When the news reached India of the comments made upon the conduct of public affairs in India by Hastings, every petty consequential member of the presidential councils affected an air of wisdom, and made a point of moralizing upon those transactions in which the equity of Hastings had been questioned before the bar of public opinion in England. The directors generally censured the policy of Hastings, without setting it aside. They wished to profit by its results, for it was obviously in their interest, but at the same time they were anxious to stand well with the public in England, which took superficial views of the events in which Hastings had been engaged. The directors had also to study the wishes and opinions of government, ever on the watch to grasp if possible the patronage of the government of India. Dreading the encroachments of the crown and parliament, the directors were constantly trimming between their own direct interests in the East, and the necessity of conciliating the ministry of the crown. They were secretly pleased with what Hastings had done to increase or ensure their annual investments and enlarge their sphere of territorial revenue, yet they affected to condemn his measures, lest the government should make their approval a pretext for depriving them of power. Some of the directors were in the interest of the cabinet, and hardly disguised the fact. Hastings, like Clive, had a far better chance of fair play, justice, and support from the proprietary of the company, than from the directors. Many of his opponents in India acted from what they supposed to be the wish of the directors, which they represented Hastings as controlling, unlawfully, by his arrogant will and overbearing abilities. Under such circumstances, it was no wonder if, upon receipt of the tidings of attack upon Hastings in the English press and parliament, the self-sufficient and empty men in India who had crept up to high office by seniority, should take advantage of the encouragement afforded them not only to

oppose but to revile the governor-general, although the only man in India in the English interest thoroughly acquainted with its multifarious peculiarities, its governments, languages, the modes of thinking of its peoples, the policy of its princes, and the relations of the company to all the intricate and complicated interests prevailing within and around the Indian possessions.

During 1782-3 the council of Bengal sometimes assisted Hastings heartily; but at other times they displayed a spirit of opposition, according as tidings reached them from home of the fluctuating influence of Hastings there. It is difficult to account for the apparently capricious opposition or support sometimes displayed by this strangely composed group of men. The senior was Mr. Wheler; next to him was Mr. Macpherson, formerly agent to the Nabob of Arcot; then Mr. Stables, who had been, like Mr. Wheler, a director—and who, like that gentleman, brought with him to the council exaggerated ideas of his own importance from that circumstance. The opinions entertained by Hastings concerning this trio are upon record, and may well afford instruction, as well as amusement, to the curious in Anglo-Indian history. In a letter to his English agent, Major Scott, he wrote: "You will wonder that all my council should oppose me; so do I. But the fact is this; Macpherson and Stables have intimidated Wheler, whom they hate, and he them most cordially. Macpherson, who is himself all sweetness, attaches himself everlastingly to Stables, blows him up into a continual tremour, which he takes care to prevent from subsiding: and Stables, from no other cause that I know, opposes me with a rancour so uncommon, that it extends even to his own friends, if my wishes chance to precede his own in any proposal to serve them. In council he sits sulky and silent, waiting to declare his opinion when mine is recorded, or if he speaks, it is to ask questions of cavil, or to contradict, in language not very guarded, and with a tone of insolence which I should ill bear from an equal, and which often throws me off the guard of my prudence; for, my dear Scott, I have not that collected firmness of mind which I once possessed, and which gave me such a superiority in my contests with Clavering and his associates."* In the same letter, Hastings writes:—"I stay most reluctantly on every account, for my hands are as effectually bound as they were in the year 1775, but with this difference, that there is no lead substituted to mine."†

That the minds of the council were influ-

* Gleig's *Memoirs of Hastings*, vol. iii. pp. 121, 122.

† *Ibid.* p. 129.

enced by the attacks made upon Hastings at home, he assured Major Scott, in his correspondence, that he had unequivocal proof. These men, instead of doing their duty to the company and their country, as the governor did according to his views of duty, merely managed their own interests and prospects so as to be compromised in no way by Hastings, however just his views or conduct. A manly, patriotic view of their obligations to stand by their chief, when according to their conscience he did right, does not seem to have actuated them at all. Wheler confessed to the president that he dared not support him from fear of the prejudice against him in England, which was worked up by the ministry, and such as hoped to profit by tearing the government of India from the hands of the company. Hastings, in one of his letters, tells Scott what Wheler had admitted, and then adds:—"As to the other two, they received an early hint from their friends not to attach themselves to a fallen interest, and they took the first occasion to prove that if I was to be removed, their removal was not to follow as a necessary consequence of their connection with me, by opposing me on every occasion, on the most popular grounds, on the plea of economy and obedience of orders, which they apply indiscriminately to every measure which I recommend, and Mr. Stables with a spirit of rancour which nothing can equal but his ignorance. His friend, with the most imposing talents and an elegant and unceasing flow of words, knows as little of business as he docs, and Mr. Wheler is really a man of business; yet I cannot convince him of it, nor persuade him to trust to his own superiority. He hates them, and is implicitly guided by them, and so he always will be by those who command him, and possess at the same time a majority of voices."*

Towards the close of 1783, Hastings proposed the abolition of the British residency in Oude, and the surrender of all interference there with the government of the vizier. It is not easy to see the motive of this. The reasons assigned by Hastings are not convincing. Probably there were motives of a public nature beneath the surface which influenced him, but it was at the time generally attributed to personal resentments against men employed in the British agency at the court of Oude. The council opposed his plan, but he prevailed and immediately adopted means to carry out his purpose. The governor, for some reason, was desirous of meeting the vizier, and proposed to the council to go in person. This proposal was resisted by them, but at last conceded, and on the 17th of February, 1784, he proceeded on his journey. The

* Gleig's *Memoirs of Hastings*, vol. iii. pp. 145, 146.

necessity of coming to some arrangement with the vizier for the payment of his obligations to the company was urgent, for he had incurred fresh debts by arrears, to the amount of half a million sterling. His country was in danger of famine, and the financial affairs of his government were utterly embarrassed. The governor gave him sound counsel—formed plans for his extrication, and withdrew all interference on the part of the company with the government of Oude. He caused to be given back to the begums the jaghires which had been wrested from them at his own instigation; and it is a curious circumstance, that in a letter to Mrs. Hastings, published in Gleig's *Memoirs*, he describes the begums as in his interest, yet they had originally been denounced by him as enemies and traitors, as a ground for depriving them of their property. This has been severely commented upon by various writers, and almost bitterly by Edward Thornton; but so rapid were the changes of policy among oriental princes and politicians, that an enemy in one year, or month, might be a fervent ally in the next. Hastings may have been right on both occasions in the contradictory accounts given of them.

While at Lucknow, he was met by Prince Mirza Jear Lehander Shah, heir-apparent of the Mogul. The object of the prince in seeking the interview, and the conduct of Hastings towards him, are thus described by M. Auber:†—"His object was to be enabled to return to his father's court with suitable attendants, and to have a jaghire equal to the amount granted to him during the administration of Meerza Nudjiff Cawn, and to be employed against the Sikhs. In order to preclude the appearance of a distinction to which the Mogul's known affection for his younger son, Meerza Ackbar Shah, might raise some objection, he requested his brother might be employed in a similar service in some other quarter. Mr. Hastings being constrained to quit Benares, left his body-guard to support the prince. The vizier also agreed to allow him four lacs per annum. It appeared that the Mogul had received but one lac and a half for his support in the preceding year, and that it was the object of the prince to obtain some increase of allowance for his father. Mr. Hastings then explained the feelings which had operated on his mind. He was persuaded that the court would have experienced the same."

The letter of the governor-general to the directors is beautiful and touching, display-

ing the deep susceptibilities which lay beneath the cold surface of the astute politician. The way in which he puts a transaction which might be censured by the calculating directors is eloquent and persuasive, justifying the opinion of his old enemy Francis, that there was no resisting the pen of Hastings. Having reasoned with his employers on the righteousness of acting as he had done to the heir of the Mogul throne, he adds:—"Or let it be, if it is such, the same weakness of compassion that I did when I first met the prince on the plains of Mohawer, without state, without attendance, with scarce a tent for his covering, or a change of raiment, but that which the recent effect of hospitality had furnished him, and with the expression of a mind evidently struggling between the pride of inherent dignity, and the conscious sense of present indigence and dependence. Had his subsequent conduct developed a character unworthy of his high birth, had he appeared vain, haughty, mean, insolent, or debased by the vices which almost invariably grow on the minds of men born to great pretensions, unpractised in the difficulties of common life, and not only bred, but by necessity of political caution familiarised to the habits of sloth and dissipation, I could have contented myself by bestowing on him the mere compliment of external respect, and consulted only the propriety of my own conduct, nor yielded to the impulse of a more generous sentiment. I saw him almost daily for six months, in which we were either participators of the same dues of hospitality, or he of mine. I found him gentle, lively, possessed of a high sense of honour, of a sound judgment, an-uncommon quick penetration, and a well-cultivated understanding, with a spirit of resignation, and an equanimity of temper almost exceeding any within the reach of knowledge or recollection."

On the 22nd of November, 1784, Hastings, worn out by opposition, his mind wearied, and his body enfeebled, wrote, requesting to be relieved from his cares of office. He alluded to his letter of the 30th of March, 1783, when he made a similar request. The court of proprietary in London had overborne both the court of directors and the house of commons, in a firm determination to retain and support him in his authority. This, however, neither secured him from attack at home, nor opposition from his colleagues in government. He accordingly addressed a letter to the directors, which throws a full light upon the state of English interests in India at that time, his own relation to them, and the causes by which both were produced:—"If the next regular advices shall contain either the express acceptance of my resignation of the service, or

† *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. i. pp. 682-3.

your tacit acquiescence, I shall relinquish my office to the gentleman who stands next to me in the prescribed order of succession, and return to England as soon as the ship *Berrington* can be made ready to sail. My constitution, though naturally not of the strongest texture, yet for many years retained so uniform an exemption from positive disorder as not to require one day of grace from my official employment, is now so much enfeebled by the severe illness with which I was attacked in the year 1782, that it is no longer capable in any degree of those exertions to which it was formerly equal, and which were at no time sufficient for the discharge of all the duties which my place exacted of me. Nor am I the only diseased part of it. It is itself dis-tempered. Witness the cruel necessity which compelled me for nine months to abandon the seat of government itself (referring to his visit to Lucknow), and all the weighty occupations of it, to attend to one portion of its charge, which, under a sounder constitution, might have been better conducted and with fuller effect by orders known to proceed from competent authority to enforce them. I do not believe this government will ever be invested with its proper powers till I am removed from it, nor can it much longer subsist without them. I am therefore a hurtful incumbrance on it, and my removal, whenever or however effected, will be a relief to it."

Before he could execute his determination to quit the country, various occurrences took place which exercised considerable influence over the future. Madagee Scindiah, the great Mahratta, obtained from the Mogul, for the Peishwa, the high imperial office of Vakeel-ul-Mulluck, which gave him a supreme control in the foreign administration of the empire. This had long been an object of ambition with the Mahrattas. Scindiah himself sought the appointment of grand naib or deputy of the Vakeel-ul-Mulluck.

In consequence of the perpetual complaints of the directors as to the charges for the government of Bengal, the governor-general organized efficient means of retrenchment. One of the most interesting incidents connected with the close of his government was his review of the sepoy troops which had returned from the war in the Carnatic. Twice, under circumstances which made the act adventurous, Hastings sent sepoys from Bengal to make war in South-western India. It has been already shown how he dispatched to the Bombay presidency a force of sepoys. That wise and adventurous act was performed against the opinion of his council. Not less than seven thousand men, attended by more than thirty thousand camp followers, began

that memorable march, which they prosecuted with persistence and fidelity. Hastings knew that they would never consent to go by sea, in consequence of their class prejudices, and he determined to launch them forth upon the sunburnt plains of Bengal, and to send them through the rocky ravines of the Deccan, and across the great southern rivers, until they poured forth their force with effect upon the shores of Malabar. On the second occasion, when Madras was in imminent danger of falling before Hyder Ali, he sent five regiments eleven hundred miles along the coast of Coromandel, and opposed them to the disciplined troops of France with success. They returned in four years, just before the governor-general's departure. They were called out for review; and as the governor-general rode down the lines, he was received with an enthusiasm such as European soldiers have not surpassed when some great chief, who had often led them to battle and to victory, presented himself to inspect their lines. Hastings, dressed as a civilian, rode along the ranks, his head uncovered, while wild acclamations of attachment rose in the course of his progress. The address of Hastings, on that occasion, was characteristic, displaying his capacity to adapt himself to all classes of natives. It was received by his sable soldiers with almost frantic delight, and its language was transmitted, with astonishing accuracy, from father to son among the Rajpoot sepoys, for many years. Even yet the old sepoys of Bengal talk of Hastings, and his address to the native heroes who went forth to the wars in the Carnatic, with delight and pride; just as the native women all over Bengal, from the remotest parts of the upper provinces to the marshy shores of the Bay of Bengal, sing to their children of the great sahib Warren Hastings, the number of his horses and his elephants, the richness of his trappings, and the splendour of his train.

The success of the sepoy brigades which the governor sent to Western and Southern India is often quoted as a proof that the Bengal sepoys do not deserve the reprobation which many modern writers pour upon them, and the authority of Hastings is quoted as justifying the unreasoning reliance placed upon the sepoys who, in 1857, revolted in a mutiny so extensive and determined. The cases have no parallel. Hastings chose his black soldiers from among the Rajpoots, the most gallant and high-spirited race in India, a military class, faithful to the military chief or government they serve, so long as that government preserves its compact with them. The Bengal army which mutinied in 1857 was more Brahminical than military. It was an army of

religious fanatics, whether Brahmin or Mussulman; and in India, the more religious the man, the worse he is as a soldier or a servant. The religions of the Brahmin and the high Mussulman constrain to acts which unfit them for faithful officials or constant soldiers. The Bengal army of 1857 had been chosen mainly from Oude and Agra, from certain Mohammedan and certain Brahminical districts, where the fanaticism of the people, from various causes, is more intense than anywhere else in India. So far from these soldiers being like the sepoy of Hastings—the gallant Rajpoots of 1780-85—there exists a hatred to the latter among the Oude sepoy, even marriage connection with them being forbidden, except to the members of two small Rajpoot tribes, who are contiguous to Oude.

A writer of some popularity, and who, at the time he wrote, had no such comparison as is here instituted before his mind, thus describes the sanguinary bigotry and fanaticism of the Oudeans in one particular aspect of it, which exemplifies the assertion that the sepoy of 1857 and those of 1781 were men of different mould:—"A respectable landowner of this place, a Sombunsie, tells me, that the custom of destroying their female infants has prevailed from the time of the first founder of their race; that a rich man has to give food to many Brahmins, to get rid of the stain, on the twelfth or thirteenth day, but that a poor man can get rid of it by presenting a little food in due form to the village priest; that they cannot give their daughters in marriage to any Rajpoot families save the rhatores and chouhans; that the family of their clan who gave a daughter to any other class of Rajpoots would be excluded from caste immediately and for ever; that those who have property have to give all they have with their daughters to the chouhans and rhatores, and reduce themselves to nothing, and can take nothing from them in return; as it is a great stain to take 'kuncea dan,' or virgin price, from any one; that a Sombunsie may, however, when reduced to great poverty, take the 'kuncea dan' from the chouhans and rhatores for a virgin daughter, without being excommunicated from the clan; but even he could not give a daughter to any other clan of Rajpoots without being excluded for ever from caste; that it was a misfortune, no doubt, but it was one that had descended among them from the remotest antiquity, and could not be got rid of; that mothers wept and screamed a good deal when their first female infants were torn from them, but after two or three times giving birth to female infants, they became quiet and reconciled to the usage, and said, 'do as you like;' that some poor

parents of their clan did certainly give their daughters for large sums to wealthy people of lower clans, but lost their caste for ever by so doing; that it was the dread of sinking in substance from the loss of property, and in grade from the loss of caste, that alone led to the murder of female infants; that the dread prevailed more or less in every Rajpoot clan, and led to the same things, but most in the clan that restricted the giving of daughters in marriage to the smallest number of clans."*

These were not the men from whom the sepoy of Hastings were enlisted. He knew better than to put so high a confidence in men of the stamp that committed, in 1857, the atrocities of Delhi and Cawnpore.

On the 10th of January, 1785, Hastings wrote to the directors, apprising them that his advices from England rendered it essential for him to retire from the government. In this letter occurs the following remarkable, it may perhaps be called extraordinary passage, when all the antecedents of Hastings as governor-general are considered:—"I conceive it now to be impossible for your commands to require my stay on the terms which I might have had the presumption to suppose within the line of possibility: were such to be your pleasure, it is scarcely possible for your commands, on any subject which could concern my stay, to arrive before the season required for my departure. I rather feel the wish to avoid the receipt of them, than to await their coming; and I consider myself in this act as the fortunate instrument of dissolving the frame of an inefficient government, pernicious to your interests and disgraceful to the national character, and of leaving one in its stead, such as my zeal for your service prompts me to wish perpetual, in its construction to every purpose efficient."

Hastings now made energetic preparations for departure. Mrs. Hastings had been sent before, and it was reported that she retired from the shores of India burdened with the most costly presents: jewels, the rarest and most brilliant, the most exquisite carvings in ivory, the gold work of Benares, and even specie, were said to have been lavished by rich natives and the Indian princes upon one whose influence over Hastings was so great. It was generally believed that he knew but little of these magnificent gifts, the reception of which, it was believed by the English at Calcutta, he would have prevented. When the period for his departure arrived, the consternation of some of the native princes surpassed the joy of those who were enemies of England, and even the astonishment of all. The sepoy idolized the great sahib as they

* Sleeman's *Journey through Oude*.

had previously adored Clive. The English regarded Hastings with a profound affection and respect, and they now gave vent to these feelings in the most demonstrative manner. Mr. Hastings delivered up the keys of Fort William and of the treasury to Mr. Macpherson, in the council-chamber, on the 1st of February. That gentleman succeeded as governor-general, under the provisions of the acts of the 13 and 21 Geo. III., and took his seat on the 3rd. From motives of respect to Mr. Hastings, the council determined that the ceremonial of secession should not take place until the *Berrington* had sailed. A letter from Mr. Hastings, dated on board, the 8th of February, announcing her departure, having been received at Calcutta, the proclamation of the new government was made with the usual formalities.

When Hastings was about to retire, numerous addresses were presented to him both by English officials, military men, and residents; the natives vied with the British in the mode of marking their respect. When he proceeded to the place of embarkation, an immense crowd lined the way which his carriage and suite traversed. Numerous barges attended his departure down the Hoogly, and it was not until the pilot left the ship, and the coasts of Bengal were dim in the distance, that some of the attached followers of Hastings returned to the Hoogly. During the voyage his active mind employed itself in his favourite pursuit—literature. He read much during the long voyage, and produced several compositions, one of which obtained much notoriety and some praise—an imitation of Horace's *Otium Divos rogat*. This was dedicated to Mr. Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, one of the most useful and gifted public men who had served the company in India, and who, after a most laborious and skilful organization of the revenue in Bengal, and long years of statesmanlike labour, had returned to Europe only a month before his friend. The ex-governor-general, who landed in June, 1785, at Plymouth, proceeded at once to London, where he was received by crown and company with high distinction. In another chapter his home perils and vicissitudes, which were imminent and extraordinary, will be recorded; it is here only necessary to give a brief and general view of the estimation in which his services in India, and his character as developed by those services, are held in the present day. Probably, Miss Martineau has, with more brevity, and in terms more expressive than any other writer, conveyed the general estimate of this great man, and of his fortunes, in the following passage:—"He committed

crimes, and inflicted misery, as unnecessarily (according to modern opinion) as wickedly. But, these crimes apart, he was a great benefactor to both countries by amalgamating them to a greater extent than any other man had done, or than any other could have done. He was the first governor of India who could and did converse with any natives in their own tongue. He was the first who opened the potent and mild resources of intellectual sympathy, by cultivating and honouring oriental literature, and interesting the best minds of Europe in the history of our native subjects in Hindostan. He made the way easier for future governors, and finished with his own strong hand the revolutionary period which perhaps no other could have brought to a close. It is impossible to esteem him, and it is impossible not to admire him. Without any appearance of a conscience, and with nearly as little indication of a heart, he had a most effective understanding, and deserved whatever praise can be commanded by vigorous and patient resolution, and a life of strenuous purposes carried out in unfaltering action. He could hardly have been a happy man at any time; but he was strong and collected enough to keep his foes at bay, and win a final victory over them in the form of an acquittal from charges for which he had in fact undergone a protracted punishment of disgrace and suspense. He won royal favour, and a good deal of popular admiration; was made a privy councillor and the idol of the street; and he died, Hastings of Daylesford. He would probably have confessed in some soft hour of sunset, under the old oaks, that he did not enjoy them so much after the heavy price he had paid for them as when, in his childhood, he dreamed of possessing them, without a thought of guilt to be risked in the acquisition of them."

However eloquently correct this expression of the views taken of Hastings generally in the present day may be, there is just ground for exception to many of the dicta pronounced. It is not true that Hastings committed crimes for which he saw no necessity. No necessity of state, or of the individual; can, of course, justify a crime; but in some of the instances in which Hastings sinned, and sinned grievously, he was deceived by his own casuistry; he believed that a great necessity at least extenuated his guilt. He did evil that good might come. He supposed, in some cases, that the vast benefits to be ensured by a policy which was not equitable or moral, compensated for the misdeeds. This unrighteous, and because unrighteous impolitic, principle has been avowed by many statesmen and divines who

have been ready enough to censure the conduct of Warren Hastings. They have themselves, under far less temptation and less pressure of difficulty and danger, pursued a similar policy, and adopted a similar justification with an effrontery of which Hastings had set no example; for while it is evident that his mind was beguiled by the idea that the end sanctified the deed, he did not suppose himself wholly under the influence of such a principle. He always acted upon an avowal of abstract justice, and where no principle of equity was involved, he supported his policy by its utility to the government, and its beneficial influence upon the governed. It is impossible to wade through the debates and minutes in council, in which Hastings participated, especially when he was the chief support of Governor Vansittart, as the author of this History has done, without perceiving that the mind of Hastings was ever open to an appeal founded upon justice. Miss Martineau deems it impossible to esteem him; yet no Englishman in India ever excited an esteem so universal. Nor is it true that he was "without any appearance of a conscience, and with nearly as little indication of a heart," as his resistance to tyranny during the government of Vansittart proves against the one accusation, and his devoted friendships and home attachments prove against the other. One of the last acts of Hastings was an act of touching friendship. His last letter, written only a few hours before death, was worthy of a man both of heart and conscience.

When at Daylesford, he enjoyed the *otium cum dignitate*. There are no facts known connected with the life of Hastings to prove the probability of Miss Martineau's supposition, that he looked back with such pain upon his public acts as disturbed the quietude of his repose—a supposition in itself absurd on the part of a writer who believed he had no conscience. Miss Martineau follows too closely in the train of Lord Macaulay, from whom her views, favourable and unfavourable, of Hastings were too implicitly drawn: just as his lordship accepted too easily the statements and opinions of Mill, which—however softened and qualified by him—he in the main followed. Hastings, although a great man, was probably not quite so great as he is generally supposed to have been; and was certainly a better man than it is now the fashion to depict him. It would be impossible in a religious or even merely ethical acceptation to call him a good man; but posterity will doubtless mitigate the stern judgment of the present generation upon him, while, to the latest times, his government of India, his self-reliance, courage, energy, and talents will be an admiration and a wonder. It may be long before the moral portrait of him, painted by one (Lord Macaulay) whom Bulwer* calls "the Titian of English prose," shall cease to fill the mind of the reading public; but a time will arrive, when in spite of all that is reprehensible in him, a more agreeable as well as just conception will be formed.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

WAR WITH HYDER ALI OF MYSORE—HIS INVASION OF THE CARNATIC—HIS DEVASTATIONS, VICTORIES, CRUELTY, AND DEATH.

ON former pages the imbecility of the governments of Bombay and Madras, especially of the latter, during the time when Warren Hastings was governor-general of India, has been depicted; and it was stated that in consequence of the insubordination of the council of Madras to the supreme council, Hyder and the French were permitted without opposition, and to a great extent without suspicion, to form an intimate alliance—the former organizing a vast army, to a considerable extent on French principles of tactics and discipline, and with the aid of French officers. He was also allowed, without being impeded by any countervailing address on the part of the council, to negotiate alliance with the Mah-

rattas, and thus to engage on his side the most powerful people among the natives of India. The object of Hyder was not simply ambition; vengeance had also a place in his motives. He had made various stipulations with the English, who had injured and insulted him almost in every case with scandalous breach of treaty. Notice has been taken on previous pages of the bad faith of the English, who were mainly influenced in deserting Hyder by fear of provoking the powerful Mahrattas, and by a reluctance to incur the censure of the directors at home, who were constantly anxious lest their councils should

* *What will he do with it?* vol. i. p. 91. By Pisisstratus Caxton.

embroil them with the native potentates by alliances and treaties, offensive and defensive. In 1767 the council of Madras made a treaty of this nature with Hyder, after he had passed in swift conquest over the Carnatic, and threatened Madras itself. When next he was at war with the Mahrattas, the English refused to fulfil their agreements, and he from that hour hated them. In 1778, when again menaced by the Mahrattas, Hyder appealed to the English to fulfil their treaty, they again violated their honour, and inflamed the hatred of the prince they had thus betrayed, to an almost intolerable degree. He declared that no terms could be kept with a nation whose officers were perpetually changed, each new council disclaiming the acts of that which had preceded it.

When the English threatened the French settlement of Myhie, Hyder remonstrated with them, declaring that he considered that place his own, and the French occupying it under him. The English disregarded his remonstrance, and drove the French out. They could not have done otherwise. Myhie could not have been permitted as a *point d'appui* for the French in the close neighbourhood of the English settlement of Telli-cherry. The French never acknowledged Hyder practically as the lord of Myhie; they consulted no master but the French governor at Pondicherry. The remonstrance of Hyder was, therefore, unreasonable; and it is obvious that he merely claimed the sovereignty of the place because he was anxious to keep the British within bounds, and to use the French as a counterpoise to the English on the coasts of Western India. The English were resolved to brave all dangers in expelling rivals so dangerous and troublesome as the French, and consequently alike disregarded the threats and arguments of Hyder. From the moment Myhie was seized by the English, Hyder, already their relentless and aggrieved enemy, prepared himself for war, and his preparations were on a scale of stupendous magnitude, such as in numbers of men and military material might excite the envy and admiration of some of the first military nations in Europe. It consisted of 28,000 cavalry, 15,000 regular infantry, 40,000 peons, 2,000 rocket-men, 5,000 pioneers, 400 Europeans, and a wild host of fanatical and half armed followers. The council of Madras wrote to the council of Calcutta that affairs were of a warlike complexion, and then with an infatuation only to be accounted for by the ignorance, pride, and obstinacy, which were so generally displayed by the Madras government, they neglected all precaution, and even addressed the directors in London in

terms which only became men whose affairs, political and commercial, were in a state of perfect security. When the Madras government was lulled in the torpidity which conceit and stupidity are sure to beget in the minds of public men, Hyder suddenly rushed forth with the force and dash of a cataract through the passes, precipitating a vast army from the table-land of Mysore upon the seagirt plains of the Carnatic.

On the 19th of June, the council was aware that Hyder had left Seringapatam to join the grand army assembled at Bangalore, marshalled under the direction of officers of France; his army having been consecrated by the Mohammedan ecclesiastics, and the Hindoos having performed the solemn ceremony of jebbum for its success. Ten days later it was known at all the presidential capitals that Hyder was marching upon the Carnatic at the head of one hundred thousand men, and that his army was such as never before had been commanded by a native sovereign of India. Miss Martineau has as beautifully as truly said—"Then ensued that invasion of the Carnatic which is as celebrated an event as any in the history of India. The mighty host poured down from the breezy table-land of Mysore upon the hot plains of the Carnatic through the passes, and especially through that one which Sir James Mackintosh found so safe for the solitary traveller seven-and-thirty years later—as wild with rock and jungle in the one case as the other, but witnessing within one generation the modes of life which are usually seen five centuries apart. Mysore was rising under Hyder to the stage of improvement which a vigorous Mohammedan ruler can induce upon an exhausted Hindoo state; but, under British superintendence, the best policy of Hyder had been left far behind for many years, when the recorder of Bombay made his philosophical observations on the security of life, property, and industry, on the very road by which Hyder had descended to lay waste the Carnatic." Descending from Chamgana, he dealt destruction with remorseless hand. Fire and the sword spread a wide circle of desolation; and the slightest hesitation on the part of the miserable inhabitants, in obeying his orders to withdraw from their homes, was followed by horrible barbarities. He commanded that ears should be cut off, noses slit, and other mutilations practised upon men and women, although it must be admitted that the latter were frequently spared when the former were savagely treated. Colonel Wilks confutes most modern writers as to the extent of the desolation made by Hyder, affirming that it only comprised such a circle

around Madras as would, in Hyder's opinion, deprive it of supplies, while he found forage and food in the Carnatic generally.

At last, arrangements for defence were made by the feeble president and council of Madras. Sir Hector Monro commanded in chief, but he was detained in the capital by the governor for the benefit in council of his military knowledge and experience. Colonel Macleod, a good officer, was appointed to command in the Carnatic. Sir Hector was of opinion that the English forces should assemble near Congeveram. Colonel Macleod declined carrying out that plan, on the ground that, although at an earlier period it might have been an effective defensive position, it was now too late to make it the point of convergence. Sir Hector, still relying upon his own plan, determined on carrying it out himself, and on the 29th of August, 1780, took the command at Congeveram of his little army of five thousand men. This force was to have been speedily augmented by troops then under the command of Colonel Baillie, which had been the previous year dispatched to protect Bazalet Jung, who had been menaced by Hyder. Meanwhile, Hyder, with extraordinary promptitude, surprised various British posts of strength, and by bribery secured the surrender of others. On the part of the British, the first object was to secure different strong places now held by the troops of the nabob, who, it was not doubted, would surrender them to the enemy on the first attack. Several fell; but two were saved by the exertions of very young British officers. Lientenant Flint, with a company of one hundred men, having proceeded to Wandiwash, was refused admittance by the killadar or governor, who had already arranged the terms on which the fortress was to be given up. Flint, however, having with four of his men procured access, seized the commandant, and, aided by the well-disposed part of the garrison, made himself master of the stronghold. Baillie, however, remained with his troops at Guntoor. Hyder's information was perfect; the people, even those whom he dispossessed, sympathised with him, if they were Mohammedans; and natives of the high caste heathen were desirous to see the English driven out by any native prince. Hyder determined on preventing the junction of Baillie and Monro, and in order to effect this purpose, placed a large *corps d'armées* under his son Tippoo, whose hatred to the English, if possible, exceeded his own. Hyder himself had laid siege to Arcot, but leaving a corps sufficiently numerous to invest it, he, with his main army, took post within six miles of the encampment of Sir Hector Monro. On the same day,

Tippoo attacked Colonel Baillie, and was repulsed. This was the first real battle of the campaign, and the English had the advantage in arms. Tippoo, although defeated, was not discomfited. He harassed Baillie's little force incessantly, hovering upon his flanks with clouds of cavalry, and constantly menacing a renewed attack. Baillie informed Monro that he was unable to join him with his troops, thus impeding by a superior force. Monro, unable to take the offensive while his army was thus separated, sent a detachment of one thousand men, the pick of his troops, to form a junction with Baillie, who might, by this accession, be enabled to break his way through the corps of Tippoo. Officers experienced in Indian warfare* have denounced the strategy of Monro in this instance, as exposing not only the detachment of Fletcher, but the main army under his own command to the danger of being attacked in detail and destroyed. Monro, however, by a happy audacity, proved his superior skill in the face of native armies. These rules of warfare, applicable when Europeans meet Europeans, are frequently of little importance when Europeans contend with native armies. More battles have been gained by the British in India by a daring yet intelligent neglect of the rules of campaigning received in Europe, than by adherence to the laws of military science. Tippoo, who had the English spies and agents in his pay, was apprised of the expedition of Fletcher, but, instead of attacking the head-quarters of the British, with his main army, he manoeuvred to intercept Colonel Fletcher, and was baffled by the superior military skill of that officer. Fletcher, deceiving his own guides, succeeded in deceiving Hyder. On the 9th he joined Baillie. The French officers on Hyder's staff did not penetrate the designs of Monro, but supposed that he intended to effect a separation of the corps of Tippoo from the grand Mysorean army, and then to fall upon the latter. Tippoo had correct information, and acted accordingly. His French advisers counselled retirement. Hyder believed that the moral and military effect of a retreat would be disastrous, and he determined to maintain the positions which he already occupied, and observe the movements of the English, until chance should give his vigilance an advantage. Baillie, strengthened by Fletcher, began his march. Hyder, by a series of masterly movements, endeavoured to bring his army into action in such way that his whole strength might be directed against his opponents. Baillie, by a series of blunders, the chief of which was an intolerable self-confidence, played into Hyder's hands. An obstinate conflict en-

* Colonel Wilkes' *History of the Mahrattas*.

sued. The British soldiers fought with a heroism that could not be surpassed; the sepoys broke and fled, and Baillie having displayed dauntless courage, seeing all hope gone of saving his European soldiers by battle, advanced, waving his handkerchief as a flag of truce, and surrendered. Scarcely had the English laid down their arms than the soldiers of Hyder fell upon the defenceless men, and perpetrated one of the most cowardly and infamous massacres recorded in the annals of even Indian war. The sick and wounded, women, and children, were hacked and hewn in pieces with savage delight by the younger soldiers of Hyder's army especially.* The barbarity of the troops was, if possible, exceeded by the barbarity of their chief. The heads of the slain were heaped at his feet, as he sat within his tent, and the prisoners were paraded before him as they were made the objects of every conceivable indignity, and the victims of many atrocious cruelties. The efforts of the French officers to mitigate the horrors to which the captive English were exposed, were honourable to their nation, but Hyder was deaf to their persuasions and remonstrances. Even after the fury of battle and exultation of victory were long past, the prisoners were subjected to a cruel incarceration. One of the sufferers thus describes it:—"We were often told, and through other channels we knew it to be the fact, that actual force had been used on the persons of many of our countrymen in other prisons, with the expectation that when they bore the indelible mark of Mohammedanism they would apostatize from God, and abjure their earthly sovereign. The same abhorred expedient recurred to our minds as intended for us whenever a stranger of rank visited the prison, especially if he seemed to cast a scrutinizing eye on our persons. In such a state of complicated mental distress nearly four years of the prime of life were consumed; and during this sad period our corporeal sufferings were not inferior in their degree to those of our minds. Our couch was the ground, spread with a scanty allowance of straw; the same wretched covering which shielded our limbs from nakedness by day served to enwrap them also by night. The sweepings of the granary were given us in any dirty utensil or broken earthen pot. Swarms of odious and tormenting vermin bred in our wounds, and every abomination to the sight and smell accumulated around us, till its continuance became intolerable to our guards."†

During the conflict of Baillie, Sir Hector Monro exhibited as few qualities of a commander as the colonel. His efforts to relieve

Baillie were not only inefficient but absurd, and his conduct afterwards not less so. He fell back to Chingleput, losing nearly all his stores and baggage; there he was joined by a reinforcement under Captain Cosley, but there was no commissariat. By forced marches he brought his army to Mount St. Thomas, near Madras, on the 14th of September. In three weeks the army had been nearly destroyed, and disgrace inflicted upon British arms in spite of the most dauntless courage on the part of officers and men, in consequence of the inordinate self-esteem, obstinacy, and ignorance of the officers in command. When the experience and ability of Sir Hector Monro are considered, his incompetency throughout this brief and fatal campaign is truly astonishing. On the 15th the English army changed its position, taking post at Mermalong, where a river flowed along its front.

During this short period of shame and disaster, the council of Madras were as disunited, haughty, and incapable as ever. When they saw their army driven back upon Madras itself, and thick volumes of smoke by day and columns of fire by night darkening or brightening the horizon where the brands of Hyder's soldiery were busy, their hearts sunk within them, and they gave vent to the language of despair and dismay. Hastings, however, was busy far away in Calcutta. His fertile mind and busy industry took care of Madras when its own council was paralysed with fear.

Hyder was as active on the theatre of war, as was Hastings in the chamber of the chief presidency. The Mysorean immediately laid siege to Arcot, which he reduced in spite of a gallant defence. It, however, held out until the 3rd of November, seven weeks after the fugitive English took up their position at Mermalong. Arcot would hardly have been captured before relief arrived, had it not been for the usual treachery of the Brahmins. The governor was a distinguished person of that caste, and was captured by Hyder's troops in an assault. Hyder bribed him, and invested him with his previous office. The traitor continued to sap the fidelity of the Brahminical sepoys. The Mohammedan sepoys already sympathised with the invader, and thus the town was lost. Whenever an opportunity occurred for influencing the fanaticism of the sepoys, no matter how loyal they had previously proved themselves, they were ready to espouse the cause of the enemy who shared their religious sympathies. The victory of Hyder also enabled him to lay siege to Wandiwash, Vellore, Chingleput, and other places of strength in the Carnatic, where he inspired the garrisons with the

* Colonel Wilks' *History of the Mahrattas*.

† Lieutenant Melville's *Narrative*.

most gloomy apprehensions, and pressed them with desperate pertinacity and boldness.

Hastings had sent Coote to take the place of Monro, and the gallant old general arrived a few days after the fall of Arcot. Hastings sent with him five hundred and sixty European troops. It was at this juncture that he determined to dispatch his sepoy army to march along the coast as soon as the rainy season terminated. He suspended the president of Madras, placing the senior member of council in his place. Money was sent with Coote, but its disposal remained in his own hands.

The reinforcements brought by Coote raised the shattered army of the presidency to the number at which the force under Monro had been computed, irrespective of that commanded by Baillie. About one thousand seven hundred Europeans and more than five thousand sepoys obeyed the orders of the new general. The reputation of Coote inspired confidence, and the fifteen lacs of rupees committed to him by Hastings gave him the means of marching his army from the vicinity of Madras, and, small as it was, of taking the offensive. Hastings counselled such a course, and prepared with all his available resources to aid the general by further supplies of men and money. It was at this juncture that the Rajah of Berar excited apprehensions at Calcutta by the dubious part he played, and involved Hastings in intrigues which met with subsequent censure in England, the real merits of the case having been misunderstood both by the company and the British parliament. The first care of Coote was to put Madras in a state of defence, which the council had neglected, each thinking only for his own safety, maturing plans of flight to Bengal or to England. Fortunately it was the rainy season, so that the true cause of the inactivity of the English army was concealed from Hyder. At the end of the year 1780, Coote called a council of war, and it was determined at once to march against the hosts of Mysore. Mr. Murray thus describes the views and prospects of General Coote when setting out with his little army against odds so great, and the progress of affairs until Hyder was brought to the first general action in which Coote encountered the Mysorean forces:—

“What he dreaded was the harassing warfare carried on by Hyder in a country which he had already converted almost into a desert. The English army, when it left Madras, was like a ship departing on a long voyage, or a caravan preparing to cross the deserts of Arabia. Everything by which life could be supported must be carried along with it; and the soldiers, continuing to depend on the

capital alone for supply, were in danger of absolute famine. As they moved in a close body through this desolated region, never occupying more than the ground which they actually covered, clouds of the enemy's cavalry hovered round them; who, finding that they did not choose to waste their ammunition on individual objects, even rode up to the line, and held an occasional parley, uttering from time to time a fierce defiance or an invitation to single combat. Dallas, an officer of great personal prowess, successfully encountered several of the Indian chiefs, and his name was called out by the most daring of the champions. In this mode of fighting, however, the natives in general had the advantage. Harassing as such a warfare was, and though the Mysorean chief continued to refuse battle, he was obliged to raise the siege of every place upon which the English directed their march. In this manner the important fortresses of Wandiwash and Pernacoi were relieved, and a stop was thereby put to the career of the enemy. The British commander, however, in following the rapid movements of this indefatigable adversary, found his troops so exhausted, and reduced to such destitution, as left no prospect of relief except in a general action, which he scarcely hoped to accomplish. But Hyder at length, encouraged by the appearance of a French fleet on the coast, and by a repulse sustained by our countrymen in attacking the pagoda of Chillumbrum, entrenched his army in a strong post near Cuddalore, where he at once maintained his communication with the sea, and cut off the supplies of his opponent.”

The same author, with well expressed brevity, thus describes the battle which ensued when Coote was enabled to initiate an attack:—“This station was extremely formidable; but Sir Eyre Coote skilfully leading his men through a passage formed by the enemy for a different purpose, drew them up in the face of several powerful batteries as well as of a vast body of cavalry, and finally carried all before him. The rajah, seated on a portable stool upon an eminence in the rear of the army, was struck with amazement at the success of the attack, and burst into the most furious passion; refusing for some time to move from the spot, till a trusty old servant almost by force drew the slippers on his legs, and placed him on a swift horse, which bore him out of the reach of danger.”

Previous to the foregoing victory, the English fleet gained a decided advantage at sea. The French naval force referred to in the foregoing summary of events, fearing the approach of an English fleet, left the roads of Pondicherry, somewhat relieving Coote from

the distressing dangers, which at that time cast a gloom over his hopes. Sir Edward Hughes attacked the ships of Hyder in his own ports of Calicut and Mangalore, and utterly destroyed the hope of forming a maritime power, which was one of the chief objects of Hyder's ambition. On the 14th of June the British admiral, having performed this signal service, returned to Madras, bringing with him a reinforcement from Bombay. These circumstances greatly encouraged Coote in the offensive operations which were so bravely carried out. The consequences of this action were most important, the English were for the second time enabled to relieve Wandiwash, then besieged by Tippoo. Both armies retired to the neighbourhood of Arcot. Hyder abandoned all hopes of conquering the southern provinces.

The sepoy force which Hastings sent by land did not arrive until August, and when it formed a junction with the Madras army, it was with greatly reduced numbers, many of the sepoys having perished on the line of march from physical incapacity to endure its hardships, and many having deserted. In the last chapter, notice was taken of the review of these troops upon occasion of their return to Bengal by Hastings, and of the lavish praise he bestowed upon them. By many of these brave Rajpoots, the panegyrics of the great governor-general was deserved; but that class of historians by whom the sepoys are too lavishly commended, have not only overlooked (as before stated) that the returned victors were Rajpoots, not Oudeans or Bengalees, but also the fact that the march of the force was disgraced by desertion, and at times when the temptations to forsake their colours were few, and of no extraordinary force. The project of sending them was a bold one. Hastings knew that, and made the most of his success. It was politic in him to conceal any impressions of an unfavourable nature which he might have entertained, but a correct relation of the facts demands the statements that more of the soldiers sent by Hastings from Bengal to Madras died from disease, or were lost by desertion, than fell in battle. Too much was made of the achievement by Hastings himself, who had a strong motive for acting as he did, and by those who since have followed him, in the excessive praise bestowed upon the instruments of a scheme of which he was so proud. The events which followed the first conflict, so fortunate for the British, are thus summed up by Murray:—"After sundry marches and countermarches, Hyder once more took the field, and waited battle in a position chosen by himself, being no other

than the fortunate spot, as he deemed it, near the village of Polilloor, where he had gained the triumph over the corps of Colonel Baillie. Here General Coote led his troops to an action which proved more bloody than decisive; for though he placed them in various positions, he found them everywhere severely annoyed by a cross-fire from the enemy. Mr. Mill's authorities even assert, that his movements were paralyzed by a dispute with Sir Hector Monro, and that had the Mysorean captain made a vigorous charge he would have completely carried the day. But he at length yielded the ground on which the battle was fought, and the English reached it over the dead bodies of their yet unburied countrymen, who had fallen in the former action. The natives, according to some accounts, boasted of this encounter as a complete victory; but Colonel Wilks says they represented it merely as a drawn battle, which was not very far from the truth."

This representation, so far as it is unfavourable to the British, rests upon the authority of Mill alone. There was no occurrence between Coote and his second in command, Sir Hector Monro, which could be construed into a dispute delaying the progress of the battle. The conduct of Sir Hector was, as usual, obstinate, self-sufficient, and he undoubtedly disobeyed orders, but the action went on uninfluenced by the fact. There could be no dispute, according to the laws of war, as to which side had the victory. Hyder, notwithstanding the amazing advantages of his position, was driven off the field utterly discomfited. The account of the action given by an officer afterwards distinguished as Sir Thomas Munro, was as follows, and is at variance with the picture of confusion and disaster depicted by Mill:—"The position of Hyder was such, that a stronger could not have been imagined. Besides three villages, which the enemy had occupied, the ground along their front, and on their flanks, was intersected in every direction by deep ditches and water-courses; their artillery fired from embasures cut in mounds of earth, which had been formed from the hollowing of the ditches, and the main body of their army lay behind them. The cannonade became general about ten o'clock, and continued with little intermission till sunset, for we found it almost impossible to advance upon the enemy, as the cannon could not be brought, without much time and labour, over the broken ground in front. The enemy retired as we advanced, and always found cover in the ditches and behind the banks. They were forced from all before sunset, and after standing a short time a cannonade on open ground, they fled in

great hurry and confusion towards Congeveram."

The English now suffered severely from want of provisions. Sir Eyro Coote was in continual alarm lest from this cause he should lose his whole army. Hyder had so denuded the country of provender, cattle, corn, and rice, that the English army was reduced to the greatest straits. Madras was itself in danger of famine; and Vellore, upon the support of which the preservation of the Carnatic strategically depended, was nearly in a starving state. Coote anxiously hoped for battle, as affording him the only prospect of extricating him from his difficulties.

The enemy took post at the pass of Sholingar, on the Vellore road; and on the 27th of September the advanced guard of Coote approached their pickets. According to Mill, Hyder occupied a favourable position, which he had skilfully chosen to give battle to the English once more: according to Colonel Wilks, the British surprised him, and the chief object of Hyder was to withdraw his guns in safety, to effect which he resolved upon the sacrifice of his cavalry as the only alternative. Sir Thomas Munro (not Sir Hector), then an officer of inferior rank, supposed that Hyder hoped by successive charges of cavalry, given on different parts of the English line, to break it. He accordingly thus gives the main features of the battle:—"He divided his best horse into three bodies, and sent them under three chosen leaders to attack as many parts of our army at the same time. They came down at full gallop till they arrived within reach of grape, when, being thrown into confusion, the greater part either halted or fled, and those that persevered in advancing, were dispersed by a discharge of musketry, except a few who thought it safer to push through the intervals between the battalions and their guns, than to ride back through the cross fire of the artillery; but most of these were killed by parties in the rear. This attack enabled Hyder to save his guns. Except the escort with the artillery, every man in the Mysorean army shifted for himself. The loss of the enemy was estimated at five thousand, that of the English fell short of a hundred."

General Coote was unable to follow up his victory. His chief object was to find supplies. He obtained a large quantity of rice, sufficient to afford a supply to his army, and to provision Vellore, so as to enable it, for a short time, at all events, to maintain itself.

After the conquest of Myhie, the Madras portion of the army employed against that place was quartered at Tellicherry, but in May it was ordered to join the army on active service in the Carnatic, and its place was sup-

plied by Bombay troops, under the command of Major Abingdon. One of Hyder's best generals, aided by the Nairs, besieged the place. The major in vain sent to the Bombay presidency for provisions, money, and men; and he was at last ordered to give it up. He refused to do so, and so effectually remonstrated upon the impolicy and disgrace of such a step, as well as upon the cruelties to which the garrison would be subjected, that he received counter orders, and reinforcements were sent to him. The major was an officer of great enterprise and courage: he immediately determined upon a sortie with his whole force. So well were his plans laid, that he surprised the enemy's outposts, stormed and captured them, and at dawn drove them in panic from their camp. He gave them no chance of re-collecting, so sudden was the attack, that they were scattered in every direction, like the fragments of an exploded shell. Abingdon reinstated the native chiefs whom Hyder's lieutenant had deposed, and deposed those whom he had appointed; and then, by forced marches, advanced upon Calicut. The place was prepared for a powerful resistance; but by accident, the day after Abingdon's arrival, the chief powder magazine exploded, spreading destruction throughout the garrison, and opening a practicable breach in the walls, which Abingdon instantly prepared to storm. The terrified enemy surrendered at discretion.

The English were so hampered by want of money and provisions, that they could not accomplish anything against the enemy during the autumn of 1781. Coote was therefore obliged to withdraw his army to cantonments in the month of November, fixing his head-quarters in the immediate vicinity of Madras.

Lord Macartney had now arrived as governor of Madras; and whatever his abilities, they were lost to the cause by his ambition to oppose Hastings in everything, and make his government virtually independent of the governor-general and the supreme council. Mill thus describes the spirit with which his lordship entered upon his government, his general objects, and the projects which immediately engaged his attention:—"He landed at Madras on the 22nd of June, 1781, and then first obtained intelligence that the country was invaded. He came to his office, when it undoubtedly was filled with difficulties of an extraordinary kind. The presence of a new governor, and of a governor of a new description, as change itself under pain is counted a good, raised in some degree the spirits of the people. By advantage of the hopes which were thus inspired, he was en-

abled to borrow considerable sums of money. Having carried out intelligence of the war with the Dutch, and particular instructions to make acquisition of such of their settlements as were placed within his reach, he was eager to signalise his arrival by the performance of conquests, which acquired an air of importance, from the use, as seaports, of which they might prove to Hyder or the French. Within a week of his arrival, Sadras was summoned, and yielded without resistance. Pulicat was a place of greater strength, with a corps in its neighbourhood of Hyder's army. The garrison of Fort St. George was so extremely reduced, as to be ill-prepared to afford a detachment. But Lord Macartney placed himself at the head of the militia; and Pulicat, on condition of security to private property, was induced to surrender. Of the annunciation which was usually made to the princes of India, on the arrival of a new governor, Lord Macartney conceived that advantage might be taken, aided by the recent battle of Porto Novo, and the expectation of troops from Europe, to obtain the attention of Hyder to an offer of peace. With the concurrence of the general and admiral, an overture was transmitted, to which the following answer was returned, characteristic at once of the country and the man:—'The governors and sirdars who enter into treaties, after one or two years, return to Europe, and their acts and deeds become of no effect; and fresh governors and sirdars introduce new conversations. Prior to your coming, when the governor and council of Madras had departed from their treaty of alliance and friendship, I sent my vakeel to confer with them, and to ask the reason for such a breach of faith; the answer given was, that they who made these conditions were gone to Europe. You write that you have come with the sanction of the king and company to settle all matters; which gives me great happiness. You, sir, are a man of wisdom, and comprehend all things. Whatever you may judge proper and best, that you will do. You mention that troops have arrived, and are daily arriving, from Europe: of this I have not a doubt. I depend upon the favour of God for my succours.' Nor was it with Hyder alone, that the new governor interposed his good offices for the attainment of peace. A letter signed by him, by Sir Edward Hughes, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commanders of the sea and land forces, and by Mr. Macpherson, a member of the supreme council, was addressed to the Mahrattas, in which they offered themselves as guarantees of any treaty of peace which might be contracted between them and the governor-general and council of Bengal: and declared their willingness to accede to

the restoration of Gujerat, Salsette, and Bassein."

Lord Macartney followed up these proceedings by other active measures, which do not fall within the province of this chapter to relate. The governor and council of Bengal, believing that the Nabob of the Carnatic had the means of aiding the council in the war with Hyder, and yet withheld them, intimated that, as his highness's territory was then overrun by a powerful enemy, his authority was virtually gone, and that it might be necessary for the supreme council to collect and apply the entire revenues of the state in the military operations necessary to expel the foe. They were, however, unwilling to resort to that extreme measure, and expressed a willingness to accept of several lacs of pagodas as a temporary supply. The nabob would not, and Mill maintains that he could not, grant this sum. He, moreover, pleaded that limitations had been set by the supreme council upon his liability to contribute money. It was soon discovered by the Madras council that the nabob had secretly negotiated with Hastings, and had entered into arrangements with him, of which Lord Macartney and the Madras council heartily disapproved. Thus the council of Madras was not only at war with Mysore, but was set at defiance by its ally, the nabob—was overruled by the supreme council in matters which involved both councils in disputes, and, to complete the picture of confusion, the members of council were divided amongst themselves. To all these disorders another was soon added: the commander-in-chief of the army and the president became irreconcilably at variance. The general had independent authority, which he was proud to exercise, and was testy if the slightest remonstrance was expressed by the council. He would take offence even at the most polite request. The council, in consequence of the independent authority of the general, had no control over the military expenditure, and this, in the eyes of the natives, brought the council into contempt. Rich natives refused to make loans, although, in former periods of trouble, they were prompt to do so, feeling content with government security and a moderate interest.

The claims of the creditors of the nabob introduced a fresh source of trouble. When they—Europeans and natives—found that the Bengal government insisted upon an assignment of the nabob's revenues, they naturally urged that the private debts of his highness should first be satisfied, or that the government should secure their payment out of the revenues of the Carnatic. Both the councils of Bengal and Madras, timid of the effects of

such a measure on the court of directors at home, were reluctant to make such an undertaking, yet felt the difficulty of seizing upon his revenues, and neither liquidating his debts nor leaving himself the means of even paying the interest. Upon the settlement of the financial questions connected with the nabob, which afterwards created so much discussion in England, Mill observes as follows:—"On the point, however, of the assignment, the situation of affairs, and the sanction of the Bengal government, appeared to the president and council sufficient authority for urging the nabob forcibly to concur with their views. With much negotiation it was at last arranged—that the revenues of all the dominions of the nabob should be transferred to the company for a period of five years at least; that of the proceeds one-sixth part should be reserved for the private expenses of himself and his family, the remainder being placed to his account; that the collectors should all be appointed by the president; and that the nabob should not interfere. By this deed, which bore date the 2nd of December, 1781, the inconveniences of a double government, which by its very nature engendered discordance, negligence, rapacity, and profusion, were so far got rid of; though yet the misery and weakness to which they had contributed could not immediately be removed."

Upon this paragraph Dr. Wilson thus comments:—"This is evidently the main object of the agreement projected, not executed, with the nabob, by the government of Bengal. In the reply of Hastings to the objections of the government of Madras, he first apologises for the interference by the character of Lord Macartney's predecessors. 'Your lordship,' he says, 'will not ask why we thought our intervention on this occasion necessary, and why we did not rather refer the accommodation to the presidency of Fort St. George, which was the regular instrument of the company's participation in the government of the Carnatic; but I will suppose the question. I might properly answer it by another. Why did the company withdraw their confidence from the same ministry, to bestow it on your lordship?' He also declares that had he known of Lord Macartney's nomination, he should have referred the nabob to his government. He urges the enforcement of the agreement as being the act of the government of Bengal, and having been done by them; but he lays stress only on the 8th, 10th, 11th, and 12th articles; the two first insisting upon the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic and Tanjore, and their application to the purposes of the war; and the two last proposing the consolidation of the nabob's debts, and

arrangement with the creditors. The whole matter was, however, left finally to the decision of the Madras presidency."

Such was the condition of affairs, in prospect of a campaign against Hyder, in 1782. The army had a short repose in cantonments. Before the monsoon had spent its strength, the fall of Chittore was made known at Madras; and it was declared, by messages sent from Vellore, that that place could not hold out beyond the 11th of January. It was absolutely necessary, at all costs, to save Vellore. General Coote, whatever his excellent qualities in the field of battle, was a bad purveyor, and his system of transport was cumbrous, burthensome, and defective. No other officer could, so encumbered, effect such rapid marches; but he required such an amount of baggage, and, consequently, carriage with his army, as to entail vast charges upon the treasury, and to defy all resources of commissary arrangement. The general had no idea of economy in any direction; but in the matters of cattle, carriages, servants, and material, his extravagance was beyond all bounds. The exorbitant demands for equipment and conveyance were the principal source of difficulty and alarm. "To carry the necessaries of thirty-five days for twelve or fourteen thousand fighting men, the estimate of the quarter-master was 35,000 bullocks. Not to speak of the money wanted for the purpose, so great a number could not be procured; nor was it easy to conceive how protection could be afforded from Hyder's force, to a line of so many miles as the march of thirty-five thousand bullocks would of necessity form. The number of bullocks now in store was eight thousand. With these and three thousand coolies, or porters, whom he could press, it appeared to the president that the army might convey what was absolutely necessary. The urgency of the case made the general waive his usual objections."*

Coote at once proceeded to the relief of Vellore, on the 2nd of January, 1782. The events which followed, in the task which he proposed to himself, displayed his genius as a strategist, and the courage and perseverance which characterised the gallant veteran. He was ill when he joined the army; old age had already laid its burthens on his head, and he was exhausted by the fatigues which he had undergone. To all these causes of depression was added the anxiety resulting from the impoverished resources of the government, and his perpetual differences with Lord Macartney and the council. Notwithstanding, he displayed an energy which he had never previously surpassed, and an indomitable deter-

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

mination to accomplish the undertaking upon which he set out, which neither illness, enemies, nor difficulties of any kind could conquer. His proceedings in this expedition, and the fortunes which befel him, have been related with admirable brevity and correctness in the following passage:—"Though with broken health, he joined the army on the 2nd of January; but on the 5th he suffered a violent apoplectic attack, and the army halted at Tripassere. On the following day, he was so far revived as to insist upon accompanying the army, which he ordered to march. They were within sight of Vellore on the 10th, and dragging their guns through a morass, which Hyder had suddenly formed by letting out the waters of a tank, when his army was seen advancing on the rear. Before the enemy arrived, the English had crossed the morass; when Hyder contented himself with a distant cannonade, and next day the supply was conducted safely to Vellore. As the army was returning, Hyder, on the 13th, again presented himself on the opposite side of the morass, but withdrew after a distant cannonade. On the evening of the 15th, the enemy's camp was seen at a distance; and a variety of movements took place on both sides on the following day: after mutual challenges, however, and a discharge of artillery, the contenders separated, and the English pursued their march to the Mount."*

While Coote was executing his gallant task at Vellore, a detachment of reinforcements, which arrived under General Meadows, landed at Calicut. This body of troops was under the command of Colonel Humberstone. The troops under Major Abingdon, with that officer himself, were now ranged under the colonel, who at once marched against a detachment of Hyder's army. The disproportion of numbers was such as to compel Humberstone to make a speedy retreat, after losing two-thirds of his men. Coote hearing of this disaster, sent Colonel Macleod to take the command, which he had scarcely done when Tippoo Sultan made a night attack which the colonel repulsed with much skill

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

and spirit. Admiral Sir Edward Hughes cooperated with the colonel. A variety of skilful movements took place on both sides, when suddenly Tippoo withdrew his army. This arose from tidings having reached him of Hyder Ali's death. Upon this event, Edward Thornton observes:—"He closed his ruffian life at an age not falling short by many years of that of Aurungzebe. To avert confusion, it was important to conceal his death until his successor was on the spot to maintain his claim. The body was accordingly deposited in a chest filled with aromatics, and sent from the camp under an escort in a manner similar to that in which valuable plunder was conveyed. All the business of the state went on as usual, and inquirers after the health of the chief were answered, that, though extremely weak, he was in a state of slow but progressive amendment. Of the few persons entrusted with the secret, one only, named Mohammed Ameen, proved faithless. This person, who commanded four thousand horse, formed a project, with some others, to take off by assassination those who provisionally administered the government, and to assume their power in the name of Hyder Ali's second son, a young man of weak intellect, in whose hands empire would have been but an empty name. The plot was detected, the conspirators seized and sent off in irons; the belief that Hyder Ali still lived being encouraged by these acts being represented as the consequences of his personal orders. The army marched in the direction of Tippoo Sultan's advance, and the palanquin of Hyder Ali occupied its accustomed place, care being taken to restrain too close approach, lest the repose of the royal patient should be disturbed and his recovery impeded by noise or interruption. At length the illusion was dispelled by the arrival of Hyder Ali's successor, who assumed the sovereignty which awaited him with an extraordinary affectation of humility and grief."

It was on the 7th of December, 1782, that Hyder expired. On the 2nd of January, 1783, his son, Tippee, privately entered the capital, and was at once recognised as sovereign of Mysore.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

THE WAR WITH TIPPOO SAHIB—WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CARNATIC—CONQUESTS IN WESTERN INDIA—SIEGES OF MANGALORE AND ONORE—VICTORIES OF COLONEL FULLARTON AND GENERAL STUART—DEFEAT OF BUSSY AND THE FRENCH—PEACE WITH FRANCE—PEACE WITH TIPPOO.

THE death of Hyder Ali afforded the British a good opportunity for military enterprise, which was lost chiefly through the supineness or ignorance of General Stuart. That officer succeeded Coote, whose health compelled him to retire for repose to the more peaceful and secure capital of Calcutta. He had been, like Clive, the idol of the soldiery; his departure at such a crisis was unfortunate for the interests of the army and the company. His age, and the infirmities attending upon age, rendered such a course imperative. Probably no commander at his time of life, and under such severe and repeated visitations of illness, ever bore up so well, or so pertinaciously persisted in the discharge of such onerous military duties. General Stuart was not a man of equal purpose, although capable of an obstinacy ruinous to his army and his government. This general refused to move his troops on the death of Hyder. He even refused to believe that event, or as was suspected, pretended not to believe it, for when at last it was impossible to affect incredulity, he refused to march because his army was badly provided with material, and because he believed it incompetent to face the enemy.

Meanwhile, Tippoo Sultan placed himself at the head of his army, which, after all his conflicts and losses, possessed a numerical strength equal to that which it presented to Hyder Ali, when he led it forth from Seringapatam for the invasion of the Carnatic. The treasure left by Hyder exceeded three millions sterling, besides great store of jewels, and the magazines and arsenals of Mysore were filled with provisions and appurtenances of war. The power of Tippoo Sultan was truly formidable, and he proceeded to make a formidable use of it. General Stuart could not be induced to march until Hyder Ali had been two months dead, and Tippoo had more than a month to mature his plans, and stimulate the enthusiasm of his soldiery, which he did by every possible means. General Stuart made one movement previous to that time, which was for the purpose of bringing provisions to the depot of Trepassore, situated at no great distance from the cantonments. Lord Macartney would not allow the general to assume the extraordinary

powers of his predecessor, but undertook himself to direct military affairs, leaving to the general's discretion the *modus operandi*. The first plan of Macartney was one in which Stuart fully concurred,—the destruction of the forts of Carangoly and Wandiwash.

Sir Eyre Coote having speedily recovered his health in Bengal, was requested by Hastings to return to Madras, which the daring old soldier was most ready to do. On the passage by sea, the vessel in which he sailed was pursued for two days and nights by a French line-of-battle ship. Coote was so excited that he remained on deck during the whole of this time. The anxiety, fatigue, and exposure to climate brought on a renewal of his disorders, and he merely arrived in Madras to die. This event was most dispiriting to the English army, especially to the sepoys, who lamented his death in a manner that proved their strong attachment to him. This circumstance left General Stuart and Lord Macartney in full opportunity to mismanage a struggle, for participation in which nature had not endowed them.

In the meantime, Tippoo Sahib used every exertion to strengthen his army. He was joined by a French force late in the year 1782. This reinforcement consisted of nine hundred Europeans, two hundred and fifty Caffres and topasses, and two thousand sepoys. At the commencement of 1783, the whole British force in the Carnatic was not twelve thousand sepoys and topasses, and not more than three thousand Europeans, if quite so many.

General Stuart, after blowing up the fortifications of Wandiwash and Carangoly, and having withdrawn the garrisons, felt himself strong enough to offer battle, which he did on the 13th of February; but the enemy, awed by the appearance of his army, retired with precipitation and some confusion. The English followed up their success, and the retreat of the enemy became almost a panic. Soon after the general received intelligence that Tippoo was retiring from the Carnatic. Arcot was evacuated by the enemy, and two sides of the fort blown up. The object of Tippoo's withdrawal from the Carnatic was not fear of General Stuart. He had heard of the enterprise and success of the Bombay

troops under Major Abingdon, Colonel Humberstone, and afterwards General Mathews; and, alarmed at the perils to which his dominions were exposed in that direction, he determined to concentrate his strength there. Stuart was bewildered by this movement, and, after some marching without any definite object, he returned to the Mount.

The proceedings which took place on the western side of the peninsula, while General Stuart remained inactive, were interesting and eventful. General Mathews was ordered by the Bombay council to push forward with energy against the important city and fortress of Bednore. This command he executed with an impetuosity the force and audacity of which carried all before it. He ascended some of the steepest of the ghauts, where the enemy never for a moment supposed that the British would venture. He literally stormed some of the most formidable passes at the point of the bayonet, and with a rash and daring valour threw his force against vastly superior bodies of the enemy, astounding them by the rapidity and fearlessness of his attacks. Finally, he laid siege to Bednore, which surrendered without a blow. This city was reputed to be rich, and a large amount of treasure was supposed by the troops to have been seized by General Mathews, and applied to his own use. Professor Wilson, in commenting upon the remarks of Mill, as to the disappointment in the army upon the reports of General Mathews appropriating money which they expected to be prize, and upon the remarks of Mill upon the sudden surrender of Bednore, thus wrote:—"As far as they originated with the disappointment of the army, they were unfounded. No such amount of treasure could have been collected in Bednore. The circumstances of the surrender of that place to the English, which General Mathews thought little less than providential, considering the defective state of his equipments, have been fully explained by Colonel Wilks, from original documents. Bednore was yielded without resistance, from the treason of the governor, Ayaz (Hyat) Khan, one of Hyder's military pupils or slaves, who had always been in disfavour with Tippoo, who apprehended disgrace or death upon that prince's accession; and who had intercepted orders for his destruction. He therefore at once ceded the province and capital to the English, and upon its investment by Tippoo, made his escape to Bombay. He probably stipulated for the preservation of what treasure there was in the fort, and he claimed compensation for what was lost, when the place was recaptured. His claim was but 1,40,000

pagodas, and the accounts of the finance minister of Mysore state the embezzlement to have been upwards of one lac, not eighty-one, as particularized in the text. As usual, therefore, the English were deceived by their own unreasonable expectations, and as the negotiation between Ayaz and the general was kept a profound secret,—indeed Colonel Wilks supposes it possible that General Mathews himself was not aware of the motives of the governor, which is by no means probable,—they were at a loss to understand why they were deprived of even so much of their booty as was to be divided. The conduct of the general after the occupation of Bednore, when the withdrawal of the positive orders of the Bombay government left him free to fall back on the coast, exhibits as great a want of military judgment, as his disputes with his officers manifested irritability of temper. Colonel Wilks has given a very copious and interesting account of the whole of this calamitous transaction, vol. ii. 448, et seq."

Notwithstanding the fortunate issue of the campaign, the strictures made upon the subsequent generalship of Mathews by Colonel Wilks and Dr. Wilson were as just as severe. His capacity appeared to consist in sudden dash, in comprehending at once in the midst of action the boldest measure practicable, and, in defiance of all danger, executing it.

After the surrender of Bednore, nearly all the forts and cities of the province surrendered. A few held out, and one of these offered a protracted, obstinate, and dishonourable resistance. The town and fort of Anapore fired twice upon flags of truce; and when, after all, surrender was offered, and a party was sent to take possession, it was attacked at disadvantage in a mode which justified any retaliation afterwards. The English commander ordered all men found in arms when Anapore and Onore were stormed to be put to the sword. The order was to some extent carried out, and a terrible slaughter resulted.

After these victories, contentions the most fierce and disgraceful took place among the superior officers of the English army. Macleod, Humberstone, and Shaw proceeded to Bombay, and complained of General Mathews to the council. He was superseded, and the command given to Colonel Macleod, with the rank of brigadier-general. Macleod was a rash man, with less ability for command than Mathews. He had scarcely received his new commission, when he disclosed his want of prudence. Mill thus relates the circumstance and its consequences:—"Colonel Macleod, now brigadier-general and commander-in-chief, returning to the army with the two other officers, in the *Ranger* snow, fell in with

a Mahratta fleet of five vessels off Geriah, on the 7th of April. This fleet was not, it appears, apprized of the peace; and Macleod, full of impatience, temerity, and presumption, instead of attempting an explanation, or submitting to be detained at Geriah for a few days, gave orders to resist. The *Ranger* was taken, after almost every man in the ship was either killed or wounded. Major Shaw was killed, and Macleod and Humberstone wounded; the latter mortally. He died in a few days at Geriah, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, and was lamented as an officer of the most exalted promise; a man, who nourished his spirit with the contemplation of ancient heroes, and devoted his hours to the study of the most abstruse sciences connected with his profession."

The English army was distributed in the conquered provinces without any regard to military science. Tippoo Sahib, well informed of all that had taken place, and having brought his powerful army across from the Carnatic, now entered upon the theatre of British triumph and folly. Mathews still remained in command, in consequence of the misfortune which had befallen Macleod. He was not prepared for an invasion of his newly-acquired conquests by Tippoo Sultan in person. He believed that his highness was in the Carnatic, contesting for its mastery with General Stuart. Mr. Murray thus describes the inroad of Tippoo and the conduct of Mathews:—"Tippoo was greatly annoyed on learning the fall of this important place [Bednore], and the near advance of the enemy towards his capital. Mathews was soon informed that successive corps were throwing themselves on his rear, and surrounding him with a force against which he would be unable to cope. He had by this time obtained permission from the Bombay government to act according to his own discretion; but he was now so elated by his easy victory, that he placed blind confidence in fortune, and even, according to certain statements, believed himself aided by some supernatural power. Thus, reposing in full security, he allowed his communications with the sea to be intercepted, while his troops were surrounded by Tippoo's whole force, aided by the science of Cossigny, a French engineer. The garrison were driven into the citadel, and, after a brave defence, were reduced to the necessity of capitulating, though on favourable terms, receiving a promise that they should be safely conducted to the coast. When the Indian prince obtained admission into Bednore, he proceeded to the treasury; but, to his rage and dismay, found it empty. Orders were then given to search the persons of the English officers, on which unhappily

was found a large sum both in money and jewels, considered always in that country public property. Upon this discovery he considered himself absolved from all that he had stipulated; the prisoners were thrown into irons, and committed to the most rigorous durance in the different fortresses of Mysore."^{*}

To the south, the skill and vigour of a civil servant of the company, named Sullivan, in connection with Colonels Fullarton and Lang, secured great advantages. Caroor and Dindigul, Palgaut and Coimbatore were captured. Fullarton was so successful, that towards the end of the war he thought of marching against Seringapatam, and was preparing to carry that project out when peace was proclaimed. While these events were going on in the west of the peninsula, Stuart remained unwilling to undertake anything in the east. The importunities of Lord Macartney, and the irritation of his own officers, had at last some effect, and in June he began a march which was intended to support the efforts of the forces in Bombay. While Stuart was doing nothing, M. Bussy, who had before distinguished himself so much during the war in the Carnatic between the English and French, arrived from the Isle of France with large reinforcements. By the 13th of June, Stuart took post to the south of Cuddalore; Bussy, confronting him, occupied strong intrenchments defended by formidable redoubts. The English attacked him, stormed a portion of the French works, and captured a number of guns. Stuart, who had proved so incompetent in the general and comprehensive movements of a campaign, showed himself a master of his profession on the actual field of combat. This circumstance confirmed the belief entertained in Madras, that the inactivity of Stuart had arisen from jealousy and dislike of Lord Macartney, and the refusal of that governor to allow the general the extraordinary powers which had been held by Sir Eyre Coote. However this may have been, the general battled bravely and wisely with Bussy and his French army at Cuddalore.

While the English were storming the French lines, the fleet of Admiral Suffrein appeared, and after the battle took on board twelve hundred of Bussy's troops. Soon after the English fleet encountered Suffrein; a long engagement ensued, issuing in a drawn battle, a very common case in those days when the fleets of England and France met off those coasts. Sir Edward Hughes, who commanded the English navy, endeavoured to bring Suffrein to action again on the following day, but

* *History of British India.* By Hugh Murray, Esq., F.R.S.E., p. 379.

that admiral successfully evaded these efforts. Sir Edward then bore away for Madras roads; Suffrein, expecting such a course, cruised about until opportunity was afforded of re-landing the 1200 men he had received, and with them he also landed 2400 more.

Bussy was now strong, and, selecting the most efficient portion of his troops, he made a well-planned and desperate sortie against the English lines. The fight raged long and fiercely, but never for a moment did the English give way on a single point. Stuart maintained his position everywhere unfalteringly, and repulsed the French so decisively, that the flower of their troops were left dead before the English trenches. Certain Hanoverian troops in the English service distinguished themselves on the occasion by coolness and discipline, which effectually supported the more forward and fiery valour of the British, and gave confidence to the passive performance of duty by the sepoys. Colonel Wilks relates an interesting anecdote connected with this battle, in which the Hanoverian commander had an honourable part:—"Among the wounded prisoners was a young French sergeant, who so particularly attracted the notice of Colonel Wangenheim, commandant of the Hanoverian troops in the English service, by his interesting appearance and manners, that he ordered the young man to be conveyed to his own tents, where he was treated with attention and kindness until his recovery and release. Many years afterwards, when the French army, under Bernadotte, entered Hanover, General Wangenheim, among others, attended the levee of the conqueror. 'You have served a great deal,' said Bernadotte, on his being presented, 'and, as I understand, in India.' 'I have served there.' 'At Cuddalore?' 'I was there.' 'Have you any recollection of a wounded sergeant whom you took under your protection in the course of that service?' The circumstance was not immediately present to the general's mind; but, on recollection, he resumed: 'I do, indeed, remember the circumstance, and a very fine young man he was. I have entirely lost sight of him ever since; but it would give me pleasure to hear of his welfare.' 'That young sergeant,' said Bernadotte, 'was the person who has now the honour to address you, who is happy in this public opportunity of acknowledging the obligation; and will omit no means within his power of testifying his gratitude to General Wangenheim.' The sergeant had become one of the most distinguished of the generals of France: it is almost unnecessary to remind the reader that he subsequently attained the exercise of sovereign power in Sweden."

Bussy had suffered so much in his sortie for the relief of Cuddalore that he was in no condition to make further efforts, and Stuart would in all probability have destroyed his army, or compelled it to surrender, had not intelligence been received by both commanders of peace in Europe. Previous to the cessation of hostilities between the English and French, Tippoo Sahib continued his conquering career in the west. It is probable he would have overrun all Western India, so incompetent were the council of Bombay, and the commanders-in-chief appointed by them, had not the skill and bravery of some inferior officers, in charge of fortified positions, resisted his progress. This was the case on the coast of Malabar, where several British forts held out, but the most glorious and obstinate resistance he encountered was at Mangalore and Onore. Two British officers of comparatively humble rank, so directed the defence of those cities that Tippoo and his lieutenants were baffled and hindered in their general measures. Finding it impossible to conquer British valour, when directed by competent command, whether in the field or the breach, Tippoo directed the investment of all places having English garrisons, and the cutting off of all supplies, so as to compel the garrisons to surrender from famine. The numerous army of the Mysoreans rendered this strategy safe and expedient.

Soon after Bednore surrendered so ignominiously to Tippoo, he laid siege to Mangalore and Onore. The garrison of the former was commanded by a brave and skilful officer named Campbell; that of the latter by Torriano, whose courage and skill had seldom been surpassed even in the annals of British warfare. During the period which elapsed from the time Tippoo laid siege to Mangalore to the arrival of the news from Europe which stopped hostilities at Cuddalore between Stuart and Bussy, the garrison of Mangalore behaved with the greatest intrepidity, Campbell animating the troops by his wisdom and conduct. At that juncture the garrison was full of hope, although surrounded by vast numbers of the enemy. Tippoo himself by his presence encouraged the besiegers in every way he could devise; but in vain. When the intelligence of peace arrived, it was announced to Tippoo, and an armistice proposed, as one of the articles of the treaty enjoined that the native powers should have four months given to them to adjust differences and fall in with the treaty of concord between the two great European powers. Tippoo was in a situation to refuse any overtures for peace, had not the French in his service immediately prepared for departure on the reception of commands

from Bussy to do so. Tippoo stormed and raved with passion, and even threatened personal indignity to the French; but as they firmly refused co-operation, he was obliged to allow them to depart. Fearing that both French and English would unite against him, if he refused the four months' armistice, he reluctantly consented. The armistice extended also to Onore and the forts of Malabar. According to the terms of the armistice Mangalore, and the other places in the hands of the British, were to be periodically supplied with provisions. Tippoo considered that no faith was to be kept with the English, who had so basely betrayed and broken faith with his father. It is not probable that, under any circumstances, Tippoo would have observed any treaty or armistice longer than superior force constrained. At all events, in this instance he resolved to render the armistice virtually inoperative. He did all in his power to prevent it. His lieutenants at Onore and the other forts were instructed to pursue the same tactics. Works of offence against all these places were carried on, while the English conscientiously, in this and every other particular, observed the agreement into which they had entered. The gallant officer in command at Mangalore besought relief from Bombay; but the incompetent council did nothing for his relief. It was in vain he protested that the sufferings of his troops passed human endurance; the council still remained inactive. There were means which might have been used for his relief, but the council subsequently justified itself for neglecting them, by alleging that they could not send aid in face of the agreement of the armistice. This plea was obviously a mere cover for their supineness, because it was plain they could not be bound by an armistice which was broken by the power with which it was made. Even when the four months of the armistice expired, nothing was performed by the authorities of Bombay to relieve the enduring and noble garrison. It is remarkable that, in the history of British power in India, through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the civil servants of the company generally, and the most favoured admirals and generals, were utterly incompetent to meet the duties and emergencies of their position. A miserable mediocrity characterized the vast majority of those who should have been selected to occupy the posts they held by the tests of high intelligence and practical ability. England always found some few men like Clive, Hastings, Coote, &c., in her moments of peril; and Campbell at Mangalore was a man of the class who, in spite of the mediocrities, gained England her renown.

The history of his achievements, and those of his brave soldiers, with the result of their devotion under circumstances of shameful neglect, has been given by Mill in summary, but yet in terms sufficiently comprehensive and complete for the purpose of a full knowledge of the facts:—"At last a cessation of hostilities, including the garrisons of Onore and Curwar, was concluded on the 2nd of August. Of this agreement one important condition was, that the English garrison should, three times a week, be furnished with a plentiful market of provisions, at the rate of Tippoo's camp. This was evaded, and prices were daily in such a manner increased, that a fowl was sold at eight, and even twelve rupees; and other things in a like proportion. At last the market was wholly cut off; and horse-flesh, frogs, snakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice, were greedily consumed. Even jackals, devouring the bodies of the dead, were eagerly shot at for food. The garrison had suffered these evils with uncommon perseverance, when a squadron appeared on the 22nd of November, with a considerable army under General Macleod. Instead of landing, the general, by means of his secretary, carried on a tedious negotiation with Tippoo; and having stipulated that provisions for one month should be admitted into the fortress, set sail with the reinforcement, on the 1st of December. Even this supply was drawn from damaged stores bought of a navy agent, and of the beef and pork not one in twenty pieces could be eaten, even by the dogs. Another visit, with a similar result, was made by General Macleod, on the 31st of December. The desertion of the sepoys, and the mutiny of the Europeans, were now daily apprehended; two-thirds of the garrison were sick, and the rest had scarcely strength to sustain their arms; the deaths amounted to twelve or fifteen every day; and at last, having endured these calamities till the 23rd of January, the gallant Campbell, by whom the garrison had been so nobly commanded, offered, on honourable terms, to withdraw the troops. The sultan was too eager to put an end to a siege, which, by desertion and death, had cost him nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so firm a foe; and they marched to Tellicherry, with arms, accoutrements, and honours of war."

The defence of Onore was, if possible, still more intrepid, and was more fortunate, if fortune be a term to apply to what came to pass in the result of the extraordinary wisdom, perseverance, and heroism of Captain Torriano. The character of this hero may be illustrated by a few preliminary facts connected with his relation to Onore during the

war. When General Mathews commenced his operations in Malabar, while yet Hyder lived, and his army ravaged the Carnatic, Torriano was ordered by the general to attack Onore, then garrisoned by the troops of Mysore. He laid siege to it, and, although it was defended by a powerful garrison, furnished with all the appurtenances of war, he was in six days in a condition to make the assault. This he did with so much skill, that the place was captured with little loss of life on either side. The victor was as humane as he was brave; he set the garrison at liberty, except the principal officers, and treated them and the sick with the kindest consideration and care. This he did while Hyder was loading English officers, his captives, with irons, and consigning them to pestiferous and gloomy dungeons. Mathews appointed the conqueror of Onore its commandant. He soon made it a magazine for the English in that part of the newly-conquered territory, and he besought the council of Bombay, through his general, to strengthen the garrison, provide it with supplies, and furnish such means as he knew were available for increasing its defensive strength. He foresaw that Hyder or his son Tippoo would never allow the English to retain their conquests without a struggle, and would seek to reconquer the shores of Malabar and the west country, even if obliged to sacrifice the Carnatic in the attempt. The Bombay council sent no supplies; very moderate aid in food and men would have enabled Torriano to accomplish his plans; but no notice was taken of his good reasoning or his importunity. His masters were conceited, arrogant, and vulgar men.

Soon after Torriano was installed as commandant of Fort Onore, he discovered that "the killadar" of Hyder had hid his jewels during the siege by the English. He restored them to the owner, and sent him away free. The traders of the place had followed the example of the killadar, and hid their valuable effects deep in the recesses of the neighbouring jungle. He brought them thence, and restored them to their owners. His detractors, envious of his fame, and anxious to please the incompetent rulers of Bombay, afterwards endeavoured to create an impression that he had possessed himself of the jewels and merchandise.* The inhabitants who had fled returned, many of the natives of the surrounding country possessed of property took up their residence in the place, anxious to live under the government of one so equitable and generous.

An island at the mouth of the Onore river, called Fortified Island by the English, was

* *Oriental Memoirs*. By James Forbes, F.R.S. 4 vols., 4to. London, 1813.

still in the hands of the enemy. Torriano laid siege to it, and the garrison capitulated. His acts of generosity and justice there also, were such as have been already related in connection with his occupation of the more important fortress. He continued to govern the city in a manner which obtained the honour and respect of troops and people for the short time the authority of the English remained undisputed. But soon, like the approach of a thunder-cloud, silent and portentous, the army of Tippoo advanced; and then, as the pent-up thunders finding vent, it rolled the terrors of renewed war over all that portion of Western India. Tippoo found little resistance; imbecility, and even cowardice, dishonoured the arms of England. Torriano remonstrated against the military folly of his superiors, especially the surrender of Barcelore, from which the garrison fled in abject terror to Onore, which place they would hardly have been able to reach had he not taken measures to ensure their safe arrival. Yet, with these beaten and cowed soldiers, who, under stupid commanders, were so spiritless and discomfited, he maintained one of the most gallant defences recorded in history, so completely did his own heroism penetrate and inspire all around him. A committee of English civilians at Bednore ordered him, at this juncture, to abandon Onore, spike his guns, and destroy his stores. He replied that his general had ordered him to keep Onore, and he would keep it, and declined obedience to any orders but such as came from his commander-in-chief, informing the committee, in terms at once courteous and firm, that no British general could give such orders in reference to a place of such relative importance. He remained drilling his recruits and feeding the fugitives from Barcelore until the career of Tippoo led him to expect an early visit. He went out upon a reconnaissance with a portion of his troops, attended by one field-piece, and encountered the vanguard of a *corps d'armée* of Tippoo, under the command of Lutoph Ali Bey, a Persian who had served Hyder with distinction. It was then the middle of May. The assailants were ten thousand men. The Persian general sent in a flag of truce, demanding an unconditional surrender, and received a reply brief and defiant. Soon after a skirmish occurred, in which neither party had advantage: the English, however, fell back before the superior force of the enemy. A second flag of truce was sent in, renewing the demand for surrender, to which no reply was returned.

On the 10th of June, a breaching battery began to play upon the fort, which the author of *Oriental Memoirs* describes thus:—"The

rampart was narrow and bad; the high walls not more than three feet thick, generally more a mass of mud than of masonry, and through which an eighteen-pound shot easily passed." By field works and other defences the engineer officer supplied, as far as possible, the deficiencies of the old fortifications, and during the night the garrison and citizens worked hard to repair the damages done by the fire of the enemy during the day.

About the middle of June a sortie was effected, which tended much to increase the heart of the garrison, and to dispirit the enemy. Seven guns were spiked, and a considerable number of the enemy bayoneted, before they could prepare for defence, so sudden was the onslaught. Torriano had only six men wounded. One of these was left behind with both thighs broken. The Persian general, in admiration of the bravery displayed, sent him into the city. Torriano rewarded the bearers, and sent a present to the Persian chief, with thanks for his humanity and courtesy. The troops that effected this gallant sortie were British. A second sally was not so fortunate; the troops led out were sepoy, and they deserted their leaders. Torriano himself, with desperate resolution, but with great difficulty, rallied them in time to save the officers.

The enemy was now daunted, and the anger of the previously polite Persian increased to fury. Three countrymen, who had rendered services to the English foraging parties, were seized, their hands cut off, and, in this mutilated condition, sent within the English lines.

On the 1st of July the breaching batteries, strengthened by a number of very heavy guns, opened with decisive effect. The walls were really shaken; the loss of life was considerable; most of the officers were wounded, and among them Torriano himself. The Persian commander heard by his spies that the English commander was hit mortally, and he sent in an old woman to bring him more authentic tidings on the subject; determining, if her report should prove favourable, to storm the breach which his batteries had already made. The vigilance of Torriano soon detected the old woman. He sent her back with the message, "Should he on any future occasion send female emissaries, they might possess more youth and beauty; that they should be well received, and returned to his camp with as much safety as the antiquated duenna who was then conducted out of the garrison." The sufferings of the garrison from the fire of the besiegers now became great, and the sepoy shirked duty in every possible way. These men were mostly recruits from central India, fine looking, stalwart native soldiers; but they

had no manliness, nor loyalty to the cause which they were there to defend.

The want of provisions, and the appearance of fever, soon produced desertion among these men, which Torriano in vain endeavoured to stop by means of kindness, and by rewards. He at last caught one of the fugitives, and proclaimed that he would spare his life if no further desertions took place. His comrades cared not for his life: that night numerous desertions took place. The next day the native troops were paraded in front of the breach, and the apprehended deserter was blown through it from the mouth of a cannon. All means were taken to make this ceremonial impressive. The troops were marched to the slow measure of funeral military music; the drums rolled to the dead march, and the culprit was conducted with a stern and imposing solemnity to the place of execution. These proceedings produced no effect; the sepoy had no ear for any kind of music, cared little for human life, were inspired by no magnanimous sympathies, and were plotting desertion on a large scale, while the captain was hoping for important results from the appalling scene. That night a number of sepoy, officers and men, went over to the enemy.

Thus matters continued, the enemy trusting to their cannon, the English to their skill in repairing the demolitions effected, and to their gallant sorties; until at last, on the 24th of August, Captain Torriano was officially informed of the armistice by a messenger sent by the British agent from the sultan's camp before Mangalore. So far as Onore was concerned, it contained these stipulations:—

"A guard shall be placed in the fort from the sultan's troops, and one in the trenches, from the fort, to observe that no operations are carried on, nor any works erected on either side.

"A bazaar, or market, shall be daily supplied to the fort, containing all kinds of provisions, which the troops belonging to the garrison shall be allowed to purchase.

"Thirty days' provision may be received monthly from Bombay, but no military stores or ammunition will be allowed to enter the fort."

Lutoph Ali determined to render nugatory the armistice, just as Tippoo himself was prepared to do at Mangalore. The English commander, finding that all the stipulations for the suspension of arms were violated, except that the enemy did not open their batteries or attempt to storm the place, applied to the commander-in-chief of Tippoo's army, to whom Lutoph was second in command. The Persian pretended to send these communications, but retained the letters. Torriano had no means of sending any communications

from the city, but through the harcarrahs of the sultan.

Lutoph Ali effectually prevented the entrance of provisions. To the remonstrances of the English captain he returned the most polite answers, but in no way altered his proceedings. He had obviously resolved to starve the garrison. The Englishman managed, however, by threats of a sortie, to exact some attention to his demands for permission to secure supplies. Matters were in this state when, on the 27th of September, Mr. Cruso, a British military surgeon, arrived at the mouth of the river, and, after some detention in the camp of the besiegers, was permitted to enter the fort. He brought letters from Captain Campbell, the gallant defender of Mangalore, full of admiration of the defence of Onore conducted by its commander. The surgeon also brought letters from General Macleod, which, as might be expected from that officer, were satisfactory in no respect, excepting only that they expressed his esteem for the hero of Onore, and his admiration of the glorious defence that had been made. Torriano had written letters to Macleod, which Lutoph Ali pretended to forward; it now appeared that he had withheld the whole of this correspondence.

After all, there was no great improvement in the conduct of the enemy, or the condition of the besieged. Rumours of treachery also reached the ears of the English commandant, and he was obliged to use the most vigilant precautions, sleeping very close to the chief breach. Lutoph Ali was recalled by the sultan, or the chief commander of the Mysorean armies; and a Mysorean, a bigoted Mohammedan, assumed the command of the blockading force. Torriano immediately addressed this person, General Mow Mirza Khan, expressing the hope that the terms of the armistice would be loyally observed in future. Mirza professed acquiescence in all that the British officer required, and proffered his friendship in terms of lofty adulation. Mirza falsified all these fine professions almost the moment they were made. The blockade was more strict than ever. Mirza also sought, under various pretences, to get a large body of troops within the British lines; and especially insisted upon the necessity of sending four hundred men within the English works, to repair two of the sultan's ships which lay in the river. This was first demanded by his predecessor, and was now pertinaciously urged by Mirza. Torriano satisfied himself with cold refusals; but finding that Mirza persisted in the urgency of his suit, and hearing that force was to be employed, the English captain sent a peremptory refusal. The communication, as described by Forbes, is so characteristic,

that it will interest the reader, who cannot fail to admire the heroic and indomitable man:—"Captain Torriano, justly incensed, desired the second emissary to acquaint his master that, conceiving the request to have been first made in obedience to the sultan's commands, while his own mind reprobated his conduct, he had preserved great moderation in his answer, which he flattered himself would have been ascribed to its true source, a personal delicacy to Mirza. But since a repetition of the demand had been made, he deemed it an insolent puerility, so little becoming the character of Mirza, that he hoped he did not err in imputing it to the shortsighted policy and chicanery of the Brahmins by whom he was surrounded. That the proper time for restoring the ships would be when the sultan's troops were able to take the outworks in which they stood; until that event, the commander was determined not only to keep possession of the vessels, but if wood for fuel was not immediately supplied for the garrison, the ships would be broken up for that purpose."

After this Mirza became exceedingly hostile, and in various ways broke through the armistice in an ostentatious and violent manner. Torriano prepared to renew hostilities, when the Mysore commander alarmed at the possible consequence to himself of having provoked such a result, made apologies, but even while he made them was devising fresh expedients for depriving the garrison of opportunity to procure provisions. Among the various military qualities of Torriano, was the faculty of obtaining information of the purposes and proceedings of the enemy. He carried on communications with Mangalore through the medium of a spy, after he found that letters which the Mysorean general promised to convey were detained. The account given of the agent employed by Torriano for this purpose, by Forbes, is extremely interesting. He thus describes the *modus operandi* of this emissary, and the peculiar personage himself:—"Although the daring spy had to pass through the enemy's camps before Onore and Mangalore, he effected the purpose required by entering through a hole in the wall of the latter fortress, when strictly blockaded by Tippoo Sultan. The messenger returned with Colonel Campbell's answer, and being then desired to take whatever sum he thought proper, from a bag of venetians placed before him, he not only declined this mode of remuneration, but submitted it entirely to the generosity of the commandant; and further requested that he would become his banker, declaring that he would continue to serve him faithfully, and would never re-

ceive any reward until he might conceive that he was suspected by the enemy, when he should avail himself of the fruit of his labours to such an extent as, in his opinion, he could carry off free from molestation. . . . He was a squalid, meagre figure, without the smallest appearance of enterprise, but possessing great acuteness and firmness of character The period at length arrived when he called upon the commandant, and informing him that he had reason to conclude himself suspected by the enemy of holding an intercourse with the fort, he must consult his safety by a precipitate and secret flight. To this no objection could fairly be made. The garrison had essentially benefited in many instances by his firmness and fidelity, and he was entitled to trace out his own line of conduct whenever it seemed most advisable. On parting, Captain Torriano was not without anxiety for his safety; he told him the fate of Onore could not long remain undecided; that, should he survive until that period, it was his resolution to reward his services still further by settling on him a pension, provided he could contrive to join him in any of the company's districts. He was then desired to remunerate himself to the fullest extent of his wishes, and ample means set before him for the purpose. He was, however, satisfied with little, saying that, in the event of his being seized, and much money discovered upon him, the very circumstance would prove his destruction. He then took his leave, and passed the English posts; but whether he succeeded in effecting his escape into the interior part of the country, or was taken in the attempt and put to death, has never been known, no tidings having ever been heard of him since that period."

By some critics the opinion has been entertained that this spy was after all in the interest of the enemy, or that he ultimately became so. The opinions of Forbes are the most reliable, as he was well acquainted with the views of Torriano himself, who was his friend, and he had also the narrative of Surgeon Cruso to guide him in his memoirs, and Cruso was the diplomatist of the little garrison from the time of his arrival, until the war was over. Through the medium of the spy, Captain Campbell sent word from Mangalore that he had reason to believe an attack on the garrison of Onore was contemplated in spite of the armistice. Torriano took effectual measures to prevent its success, but such news much increased his anxieties. The next day a letter and some provisions came from General Macleod, whose conduct was precisely that which Mill, with such terseness,

describes:—"The Mysorean general, finding that all other modes had failed, of causing the garrison to depart during the armistice, adopted plans to seduce the allegiance of the sepoy. In this, he was successful; they were loyal only so long as fortune favoured the brave. The sepoy within had to be watched as vigilantly as the Mysoreans without. Thus the year 1783 closed over the still beleaguered and suffering garrison. Mirza, in defiance of all military honour, and of his own word, received the deserters, who, as the year 1784 began, became still more numerous." In January, pestilence spread rapidly. Mr. Cruso, the surgeon, thus described its effects:—"Disease was now so prevalent, that hardly one man in the fort remained untainted; eight or ten died daily, and so soon became offensive that a number of graves were constantly kept in readiness; but the dogs, savage with hunger, generally tore up the dead bodies at night, and strewed the outworks with their mangled remains."

At this juncture a British officer, an ensign, deserted to the enemy, and a numerous body of native soldiers accompanied him. This was the heaviest blow the suffering garrison had received, and not until then did the head of the noble Torriano droop. Still his gallant heart bore up against all calamities, his courage fell not. It soon became obvious by the proceedings of the enemy, that the English officer who had forsaken his country, and his honour, had given every information which his previous position enabled him to possess. This was a fresh task upon the vigilance of the unslumbering commandant. Before the month of January closed, the condition of the garrison and the town from disease and hunger became truly horrible. Forbes thus describes it, basing his description upon the account of Cruso:—"The fortress exhibited a dreadful scene; the hospitals overflowed with patients in every stage of the horrid disorder already mentioned. The bodies of the diseased were for the most part so distended by putrid air, as scarcely to leave a trace of the human frame; and it was with difficulty a feature could be distinguished in the countenance; while their laborious breathing indicated every appearance of strangulation. The ear could nowhere escape the groans of the dying, nor the eye avoid these shocking spectacles; but why should language attempt to describe distress, which the conduct of the sufferers paints in more vivid colours? These poor wretches, formerly subjects of a sovereign whose soul never knew mercy nor felt for human woe, when the victorious flag of Britain first waved on the ramparts of Onore, fled to it as an

asylum from the sultan's oppressions, and received protection; yet now did these devoted beings, snatching a transient degree of strength from despair, crawl into the public road, and waiting there until the commanding officer went his evening rounds, prostrated themselves at his feet, imploring permission to quit this dreadful scene, and, as a lighter evil, meet the vengeance of an incensed tyrant. Their prayer was granted, and the same principle of national honour, which originally ensured them protection, was now extended for their safety. Proper persons were appointed to see them go out in small parties after it was dark, hoping by this precaution that such as were not too much exhausted to reach the enemy's lines unperceived might, from their deplorable condition, excite the commiseration of the sentinels at the outposts, and ultimately reach the distant villages. The following morning presented a dreadful spectacle. On the preceding evening, eighty-eight of the inhabitants, men, women and children, had been permitted to leave the fort; but were so entirely exhausted that their route to the sultan's trenches was traced by a line of dead bodies, with the more aggravated spectacle of living infants sucking the breast of their dead mothers."

Even the horrors of Kars, during the Russian war of 1855-56, did not surpass in intensity those of Onore during this faithless and terrible blockade. With the increase of sickness came the increase of treason:—"All the sepoy's posted in the outworks, headed by their jemautdar, had agreed to desert to the enemy the following night. The guards were directly withdrawn from the outworks, and the guns brought into the fort. The jemautdar, suspected to be the ringleader, was put in irons, and sent into close confinement; where, conscious of his guilt, he committed suicide."

Torriano now addressed General Macleod, who still kept sailing about the coast, effecting no good, and doing much mischief. The letter is a touching memorial of the glorious soldier:—"Regardless of my own fate, I cannot but acutely feel the sufferings of my brave comrades, who, although now greatly reduced in number, a prey to disease, surrounded by death, and deceived by fruitless promises of relief, still adhere to me. Within the short period of six weeks, five hundred persons, soldiers and natives, have fallen victims to a cruel pestilence which rages within these walls. Desertion nearly keeps pace with death; so serious and so incredible is the former, that amongst the number lately gone over to the enemy is a British officer.

"Mirza is daily urging us, in the strongest terms and most threatening manner to capitulate. Every means in my power shall be exerted to defend this place while a grain of rice remains for subsistence; but I trust the British arms will not be so shamefully tarnished, as to admit this fortress unsupported to fall into the enemy's hands. Of my few officers, death has deprived me of one, desertion of another; my garrison is reduced to sixty effective men. The quantity of provisions remaining in the fort is very small, and great part of the rice is much damaged.

"The enemy have received a strong reinforcement, and the buxey informs me they are to be increased by ten additional battalions; on their arrival more hostile measures will be adopted.

"I have great reason to be apprehensive for the safety of Fortified Island.

"I will not relinquish the hope that I shall not be left to a capitulation, even though accompanied by the best terms, and originating in the most absolute necessity."

A form of disease new to the garrison, scurvy, broke out in the beginning of February; but this was checked by the skill of Cruso, and the sanitary measures of the commandant.

On the 4th of March, Fortified Island was attacked and taken by the foe. The sepoy's were enlisted in Tippoo's service; they always sympathised with the fortunate. The English officers were robbed. The capture of the island was contrary to the agreement existing; and when Torriano demanded redress and its restoration, the Mysorean commander forged a story which proves in a striking manner the utter faithlessness and falsehood of the native character in India in every grade of life among Mohammedans. Dr. Cruso thus relates the fabrication by which the Mohammedan general accounted for his having possession of the island, and of the British prisoners:—"Extraordinary as it may appear to those unacquainted with the duplicity and chicanery of the Indian character, Mirza positively denied having attacked the island; and gravely replied that the English officer commanding there had for some time given great disgust to his sepoy's, by refusing them proper provisions, whilst he luxuriously feasted upon poultry and liquors sent from time to time for the use of the gentlemen at Onore. At the time his people were thus disaffected, this imprudent officer endeavoured to seduce the wife of a naique, who was by caste a Brahmin, and at length had recourse to violence. On this outrage the husband flew to his comrades, interested them and their je-

mautdar in his cause, and they went in a body to the officer's quarters; where, remonstrating with a freedom which he construed into insolence, they were threatened with death. The aggrieved party had immediate recourse to arms, and attacked the officer, who was supported by half his garrison. This occasioned the irregular fire heard at Onore. While these mutual hostilities were pending, one of the sultan's boats, accidentally passing Fortified Island, was hailed by the mutineers, who entreated to be taken on board. This being reported to Mirza, he sent over a messenger to the English officer to represent the folly of continuing at his post with only eleven men, recommending him to leave the island, and offering him every accommodation in his camp, until an opportunity presented itself for proceeding to an English settlement. The officer declined quitting the island, but desired Mirza would send over a sufficient force to take charge of the fort: his request was complied with, and these were the men who had been seen from the ramparts of Onore. All this was related by Mirza in the gravest manner; and the jemautdar, the Brahmin naique and his wife, with five sepoys (tutored for the purpose, at the peril of their lives) were brought into the durbar, to corroborate Mirza's story. It is almost unnecessary to observe that the whole of this tale was a fabrication of the sultan's officer to deceive the commandant."

Famine, pestilence, and desertion within, perfidy and harassing blockade without, continued to afflict the suffering garrison and its heroic chief, when, on March 7th, General Macleod paid one of his flying visits on the coast. As usual, he made proffers of service which he made no attempts to perform. At last, deliverance came. The honour of the garrison and its intrepid commander were saved. Peace was concluded, and the Madras commissioners sent a ship to convey the garrison away, and orders to Torriano to deliver Onore to the nabob's officer. The commissioners, however, neglected to make any provision in the treaty for the protection of the inhabitants who had sided with the English, or for the removal of military stores. Torriano had by boldness and dexterity to secure these objects.

Mirza entertained his former enemy magnificently, and seemed quite unconscious of having merited reprobation by his cruelty and perfidy. Forbes describes the closing scene of this in the following paragraph:—"The guard was now ordered to leave the fort: while they were embarking, the Soubahdar Missauber, having locked the gates on the inside, at a signal made by Captain Torriano,

and coming through a sally-port, resigned the keys to the sultan's officer ordered to take possession; whose detachment waited without the outworks until this ceremony had taken place. The whole being now safely embarked, Captain Torriano followed with two chests of treasure belonging to the company. Night coming on, they were obliged to anchor under the guns of the fort until daybreak, when the *Wolf* gallivat and all the boats proceeded over the bar; the officers embarked on board the *Hawke* Indiaman, and the whole fleet sailed for Bombay." Torriano exhausted his means and his influence in rewarding his brave followers. As far as his power allowed, he made promotions, and distributed presents which were at all events valuable as coming from him. He was himself neglected. He obtained a brevet majority after considerable delay! The day in which he lived and fought, and served his country so well, was unfavourable to the reward of the meritorious. Interest with the government, not genius or devotion, advanced men in the path of military promotion. On the eastern side of the peninsula, the government of Madras seemed determined to exceed that of Bombay in folly and weakness. They placed reliance on the promises of Tippoo and his generals, who never kept faith themselves nor showed any confidence in the word of others. The English, Tippoo's father had too much reason to distrust; and the sultan himself was not disposed to forget the fact.

The Madras government, in May, 1783, appointed commissioners to treat with Tippoo, and these men acted with credulity and irresolution, betraying extreme ignorance of everything which the task imposed upon them demanded. Colonel Fullarton, who, in the south, had carried all before him, driving Tippoo's commandants from their strongholds, and possessing himself of a country fruitful and well cultivated, was ordered to give up his conquests, in order to appease Tippoo, and make peace (which the commissioners believed was sure) more satisfactory. In vain Fullarton resisted and remonstrated; the ignorant commissioners, worthy representatives of the Madras council, insisted upon obedience. The celebrated missionary, Schwartz, was interpreter to these gentlemen, and he also remonstrated upon the folly of the course pursued. "Is the peace so certain," said the astute and pious interpreter, "that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these rich countries would have kept Tippoo in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage the beast?" When, however, Fullarton had reluctantly and tar-

dily surrendered most of his conquests, the impracticable commissioners, in great alarm, ordered him to resume them.

The commissioners, having expended much useless time in preliminary negotiations with Tippoo's lieutenants and vakeels, at last proceeded to the head-quarters of the sultan's army, to arrange with him in person a peace based upon the principle of the *status quo ante bellum*. On their way to the camp of the sultan, they were treated with indignity, and their progress impeded in every way by the sultan's officers. On their arrival there, tents were assigned them and a gallows erected opposite each. Communications with their countrymen were prohibited. The first piece of intelligence they received was of the murder of General Mathews and many other English prisoners, some of them officers of merit and distinction. Mr. Schwartz, the missionary interpreter, was seized and sent away, and the commissioners were not acquainted with any of the languages of India. Colonel Wilks declares that those gentlemen meditated flight. He rests his authority on the testimony of Captain, afterwards Sir Thomas Dallas, who commanded the escort which accompanied them. According to that officer's testimony, their plan was to leave the officer and his escort in the hands of the enemy, who would have murdered them, and, by an ingenious stratagem, they hoped to escape to the ships. A native servant of the captain understood English, and had been employed as interpreter, in consequence of the impossibility of procuring an educated person. This man, while lying outside the tent of one of the commissioners, where they were all assembled, overheard a conversation amongst them and with a surgeon from one of the ships in the roads, who was the chosen agent of the project. The native servant, being attached to his master, revealed the danger to which he was exposed, who took successful measures to prevent the execution of the plot. In England, when this charge was made, such of the commissioners as were then alive denied the truth of the statement; but General Dallas affirmed it. Those who are curious as to the disputed points of Indo-English history in connection with the wars in Mysore, may see the narrative at length in the pages of Colonel Wilks.* Weighing the

* Wilks' *Sketches*, vol. ii. pp. 515—517.

evidence as produced by that gallant officer against the defence of Mr. Huddleston, the gallant colonel seems to make out a case too formidable for successful denial.

It was not until the 11th of May, 1784, that the treaty was signed. Probably Tippoo would have prosecuted the war, and placed the bodies of the commissioners on gibbets, had the folly and imbecility of these gentlemen as well as of the councils at Bombay and Madras determined matters; but Hastings, far off in Calcutta, extended his supervision to all the wide field of war and diplomacy in which the English were engaged, and the influence of his intellect and of his name was felt in the camp of the Mysoreans and the durbar of their king. The English prisoners who had been seized contrary to the armistice, received no compensation; nor did the relatives of the men whom Hyder had caused to die by incarceration, or of those who were assassinated by Tippoo's orders. It was characteristic of English politicians that the sufferings and wrongs of their countrymen, however nobly endured, and however serviceable to their country, were overlooked in negotiations when an end was to be accomplished. The diplomatists of the crown and of the company were alike in this respect; the wrongs of individual sufferers and the merit of particular servants were regarded with indifference, if the public object in view at the time could be promoted, or apparently promoted, by that indifference. Often, when a little attention and care would secure public objects, and protect or secure redress for the wrongs of individuals, there was such a want of feeling, sympathy, and justice among the ruling classes of Englishmen, that the claims of their less influential brethren were totally unheeded.

On the whole, Tippoo was a gainer by the treaty and by the war, but the revenues of the English were in such a condition as to make it imperative upon the governor-general to accomplish a peace with Mysore.* The desire of the directors at home for speedy terms of accommodation was, on the same grounds, intensely urgent.† From these causes, the proclamation of peace with Tippoo Sahib was regarded by Hastings as fortunate to his government.

* Stewart's *History of Bengal*, London, 1813.

† *History of the East India Company*, London, 1793.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE INDIAN SEAS DURING THE WAR WITH MYSORE, FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND—CAPTURE OF NEGAPATAM, TRINCOMALEE, ETC., FROM THE DUTCH—LOSS OF TRINCOMALEE TO THE FRENCH.

DURING a considerable portion of the time in which hostilities were waged with Mysore, it will be seen from the foregoing pages that war existed with France, and that the French were the active and efficient allies of Hyder and his son Tippoo. The war with France greatly complicated the relations of the English with both those sovereigns, and led to various independent actions, especially at sea. The English had the advantage on the ocean, but the battles fought were indecisive. The French for the most part evaded general engagements, and succeeded in landing troops and stores, or in bearing them away from one place to another. They were afraid of the English at sea, yet did not show such a decided inferiority as to justify the extreme respect which they entertained for the naval power of England. The French admirals were, in the Indian waters, far more active, vigilant, and wary than the English. The latter, by their slow movements and want of watchfulness, often allowed French squadrons to effect what they would not have dared to attempt had the English commanders been sufficiently on the alert. It has been already seen that the fleets under the command of the English admiral, Hughes, and the French admiral, Suffrein, had various skirmishes off the Coromandel coast. Suffrein, early in 1781, collected the elements of a maritime force in Brest, and the English at the same time organized a fleet. The supposition in England was, that the expedition was intended for the Spanish Main. The British government, however, intended it for the East: at all events, that was the direction ultimately given to it. It is probable that from the first the acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope, and the assertion of British ascendancy in the East, were the ends designed. "One ship of seventy-four guns, one of sixty-four, three of fifty, several frigates, a bomb-vessel, a fire-ship and some sloops of war composed the squadron; of which Commodore Johnstone, with a reputation for decision and boldness, received the command. A land force, consisting of three new regiments of one thousand men each, was placed under the conduct of General Meadows, who had procured fame in the action at St. Lucia with D'Estaing. On the 13th of March, in company with the grand fleet destined for the relief of Gibraltar, the armament sailed from St. Helen's, and,

including several outward-bound East Indiamen, with store-vessels and transports, amounted to upwards of forty sail. The secret, however, of this expedition had not been so vigilantly guarded as to escape the sagacity of the Dutch and the French. The armament under Suffrein was ultimately destined to reinforce the squadron now at the Isle of France; and to oppose the English fleet in the Indian seas. But the particular instructions of that officer were, in the first instance, to follow, and counteract the expedition of Johnstone, and above all, his designs upon the Cape of Good Hope. For the sake of water and fresh provisions, the English squadron put into Prava Bay in St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verde Islands; and, having no expectation of an enemy, cast their anchors as chance or convenience directed. A considerable proportion both of men and of officers, partly for business, partly for pleasure, were permitted to go on shore; and the decks were speedily crowded with water-casks, live stock, and other incumbrances. On the 16th of April, after nine o'clock in the morning, a strange fleet, suspected to be French, was seen coming round the eastern point of the harbour; and Suffrein, separating from the convoy with his five sail of the line, soon penetrated to the centre of the English fleet. The utmost dispatch was employed in getting the men and officers on board, and preparing the ships for action. The French ship, the *Hannibal*, of seventy-four guns, led the van, and coming as close to the English ships as she was able, dropped her anchors with a resolution which excited a burst of applause from the British tars. She was followed by the ship of Suffrein, of equal force. Another of sixty-four guns anchored at her stern. And the two other ships, of sixty-four guns each, ranged through the fleet, firing on either side as they proceeded along. The ships being extremely near, and the guns being played with unusual fury, much destruction was effected in a little time. After the abatement of the first surprise, several of the Indiamen brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect. Within an hour, the French ships at anchor had suffered so terribly, that the last of the three, having lost her captain, cut her cables and began to withdraw. Thus deserted astern, and despairing of success, Suffrein followed her example, and gave the

signal to retreat; the *Hannibal* alone remained, a mark for every ship the guns of which could be made to bear upon her; and displayed a resolution which may be compared with the noblest examples of naval heroism. She had lost her foremast and bowsprit; her cable was either cut or shot away; in the effort of hoisting more sail to get out of the fire, her main and mizen masts went overboard, and she remained, as it were, a hulk upon the water. Sustaining the weight of a dreadful fire, to which, enfeebled as she was, her returns were slow and ineffectual, she yet joined the rest of the ships at the mouth of the bay; and, being towed off, erected jury-masts, and proceeded with the fleet. An attempt on the part of the English to pursue was totally ineffectual. They sustained not any considerable loss, notwithstanding the closeness of the action, and the crowded situation of the ships. Their own steady and determined bravery counteracted the effects of surprise, and baffled the well-concerted scheme of the enemy. They remained to refit and provide till the 2nd of May, and on approaching the Cape, ascertained that Suffrein had arrived before them. Though previous to the arrival of Suffrein, that settlement, then supposed of great importance, was not in a condition to have offered any considerable resistance to Meadows and Johnstone, it was now accounted vain to make on it any attempt.*

At this juncture, a Dutch fleet of Esst Indiamen lay in Saldanha bay. The admiral resolved to cut them out, and the enterprise was attended with success. The commodore returned with his own ship and the prizes and frigates to Europe. The rest of the fleet, with the troops, proceeded to India. Suffrein strengthened the garrison at the Cape, so as to resist any attack from the English, and directed his course also to India. After various delays caused by winds and currents, the fleet arrived on the coasts of the peninsula on the 6th of December. The larger ships, with General Meadows and the principal part of the troops, went in quest of Admiral Hughes, then commanding on the Indian station; the smaller vessels, transports, and the remainder of the troops, arrived at Bombay on the 22nd of January, 1782. The troops which landed at Bombay, after refreshing and tarrying a few days, were dispatched for Madras, and arrived while that city and the Carnatic were in terror from the arms of Hyder. The arrival of these timely reinforcements enabled the British officers, in spite of the wrangling of the councils, to make head against the foe.

* Mill, vol. iv. book v. chap. v.

While these events proceeded in connection with the new expeditions from France and England, others were passing which it did not belong to the province of the last chapter to relate, but shall here be recorded.

During the time England was at war with Mysore, the Mahrattas, and the French, Spain and Holland were also her enemies. Fortunately, the contest with the Mahrattas was first closed, as seen in former pages; and peace in Europe soon after occurring, left the company free to direct its whole strength against Mysore, a perception of which made Tippoo Sultan, however reluctantly, come to terms.

Holland being at war with England, Lord Macartney determined to take some action against Dutch interests in India, notwithstanding the numerous demands which were made upon his time and resources as governor of Madras. Soon after his arrival, he drove the Dutch out of Sadras and Pulicat, and in October, 1781, he determined to reduce, if possible, the very important settlement of Negapatam. The command of the troops destined for this task, was given to Sir Hector Munro. The fleet under Sir Edward Hughes was to cover the operations. Colonel Braithwaite and his detachment were ordered to unite themselves to the force under Sir Hector Munro's command, swelling his little army to nearly four thousand men, which was dispatched on the enterprise. On the 21st, the seamen and marines debarked. On the 30th, the lines and redoubts were stormed. On the 3rd of November, trenches were opened to cover an approach against the north face of the fort. On the 6th, batteries for breaching were opened within three hundred yards.

The Dutch governor refused to surrender, it having been contrary to the military law of Holland for any officer to surrender a fortified place until a practicable breach was made. Between the 6th and 12th the breach was effected. The first use made of it was by the Dutch themselves, for the purpose of sorties, which were made with great spirit and determination. The English were prepared for this, and repulsed the attacks upon their trenches with their usual firmness. The governor offered to capitulate if honourable terms were conceded, which, not being refused, Negapatam was taken possession of without storm. The surrender of this place was not very honourable to Dutch courage. The number of prisoners far exceeded the number of assailants. The surrender of such an important place, the chief settlement of the Batavian Company on the Coromandel coast, commanding the southern boundary of Tan-

jore, proved how far Dutch spirit, as well as power, had fallen in India. The English made prize of a large quantity of warlike stores. It so happened that the investments had not been made for two years, so that a very great quantity of valuable merchandise was secured by the victors.

Negapatam was the basis of operations against all the Dutch settlements in Coromandel. They fell almost without a blow. This had an important effect upon the Mysore war, for Hyder Ali immediately evacuated the forts of which he had taken possession in Tanjore. The policy of Lord Macartney, although opposed strenuously by Sir Eyre Coote, answered his expectations, and probably produced an effect upon the war with Mysore, which his lordship did not contemplate.

On the 2nd of January the fleet sailed from Negapatam, taking on board five hundred soldiers, and proceeded against the Dutch settlements in the Island of Ceylon. Trincomalee was the chief of those settlements. On the 4th the fleet arrived off that harbour. Means were taken instantly to reduce the fortifications by which it was protected. On the 11th the last of these forts, and the strongest, was stormed, and Trincomalee fell to the possession of the victors. The Dutch were now completely humbled in India, and when tidings of the peace with that power and its European allies arrived in India, Holland had little to lose in the peninsula. The French fleet arrived on the Coromandel coast in January, and intercepted several English vessels; one British frigate of the largest class, separated from her companions in a fog, was surrounded and captured after a peculiarly gallant defence.

Sir Edward Hughes left Trincomalee on the last day of January, having performed his part in reducing that place. He was in want of stores, and many of his crews were sick. He arrived at Madras on the 11th of February, having had a very narrow escape of encountering a far superior force under Suffrein, a commander superior to any, except the gallant captor of Madras, who had commanded French naval forces in the East. In the open roads of Madras the danger of Hughes continued to be as great as it well could have been anywhere, for his ships were much impaired by long service, and consisted of only six of the line. The next day the squadron which brought General Meadows and his troops also arrived. This consisted of one seventy-four, one sixty-four, and one very large frigate, and had also a very narrow escape of being intercepted by the enemy. Twenty-four hours after, the French admiral

appeared, and passed Madras in line-of-battle. The above dates are given from Mill. Auber gives different dates, and is more particular in basing his information upon a comparison of documents. He relates the arrival of both admirals, and the results, in the following manner:—"On the 8th, Sir Edward Hughes arrived at Madras from Trincomalee, with the *Superb*, *Exeter*, *Monarch*, *Bedford*, *Worcester*, *Eagle*, and the *Sea-horse* frigate. On the 10th he was joined by Commodore Alms with three ships of the line, and one transport containing General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton, with four hundred king's troops. On the 15th the French fleet appeared off Madras, and on the 16th stood to the southward. The English admiral weighed, and followed the enemy till they were separated from their frigates and transports. Sir Edward Hughes made the signal for chasing the latter, on which the *Isis*, being the foremost, came up with and re-took the *Lauriston*, a large transport laden with military stores and three hundred troops, together with several English vessels with grain which had been captured by the enemy on the coast. The enemy's fleet bore down, and having the advantage of the wind, brought eight of their ships to engage five of the English, the other ships on either side not being able to get into action. The engagement lasted from four until half-past six, when the French ceased firing, and hauled their wind. The *Superb* and *Exeter* were much damaged, having many shot between wind and water. Sir Edward Hughes went to Trincomalee to refit, and returned to Madras on the 10th of March to renew the attack on the enemy, whose ships had been dispersed during the action. Their hospital ship, the *Duc de Toscane*, having come to anchor in the roads of Negapatam, in the belief that it was a friendly port, was captured by the *Chapman* Indiaman. On the 8th of April, Sir Edward Hughes came again in sight of the French squadron, then consisting of eighteen sail. On the 12th, the French, having the wind, engaged him; the action commenced at half-past one P.M., and ended at forty minutes past six. Both fleets anchored within five miles of each other until the 19th. In the interval, Sir Edward Hughes had refitted all his fleet, with the exception of the *Monmouth*, which had lost her main and mizen-masts, their places being supplied with good jury-masts. The enemy made a show of renewing the engagement; Sir Edward Hughes waited, with springs on his cables, but the enemy, after approaching within two miles, stood out to sea, and was seen no more. Sir Edward Hughes's force consisted of twelve ships, in

which there were two hundred and forty-seven killed, and three hundred and twenty wounded. The number in the French ship *Hero*, the flag-ship, killed and wounded, was two hundred, the admiral being obliged to shift his flag from her to the *Ajax*.*

Were it not for the jealousy which both Hyder and Tippoo entertained of the French, the latter would have been able to effect much more against the English during that war. Thus, when the French gained Cuddalore, as the ostensible allies of Tippoo, they immediately proceeded to act as if the place were their own, offering indignity to Tippoo's officers. The latter resisted, and Tippoo ordered his governor to turn them out. The French were strong enough to keep possession, but in doing so they would have separated themselves from the Mysore power, and have been beaten in detail by the English, they were, therefore, obliged to leave Cuddalore, and being denied by Tippoo's officers the means of carriage, and draft bullocks, they had to carry their own baggage and drag their own guns.

In July 1782, Hyder Ali having arranged with the French admiral a surprise upon Negapatam, both parties attempted to execute the concerted plan. Suffrein was to land troops close to the place, and their landing was to be supported by Hyder Ali. It was the object of the French admiral to effect his part of the arrangement without fighting, but his fleet having been descried by Admiral Hughes, that officer compelled him to give battle. The conflict was close and severe. Suffrein preferred close warfare, contrary to the general tactics of the French admirals. After maintaining for an hour and a half a fire which appeared to be equal, the French line showed symptoms of disorder, and a speedy victory for the English would have terminated the fight had not the wind suddenly shifted. This enabled Suffrein to cover the line of disabled ships by such as suffered least, and disconcerted the hopes and plans of Sir Edward. The French admiral was the better tactician. Notwithstanding the skill of the French commander, two of his ships struck their colours; he immediately fired into them, and continued to do so, until they again hoisted French colours. The battle was, on the whole, in favour of the British. The English occupied the roads of Negapatam. The French were unable to accomplish their purpose, and sheered off for Cuddalore. This was done, however, with such coolness as to amount to a challenge to renew the battle. This Hughes could not do, having suffered so much in the previous conflict. When Negapatam was secured, he went to Madras to

* Auber, vol. i. chap. xi. pp. 618, 619.

refit. Suffrein was more active and acute; he refitted at Cuddalore with admirable expedition, and was ready for sea before Sir Edward. Mill gives the following account of the energy and devotion of Suffrein:—"He was a man that when the exigency required, would work for days, like a ship's carpenter, in his shirt. He visited the houses and buildings at Cuddalore, and for want of other timber, had the beams which suited his purpose taken out. To some of his officers, who represented to him the shattered condition of his ships, the alarming deficiency of his stores, the impossibility of supplying his wants in a desolated part of India, and the necessity of repairing to the islands to refit; the whole value, he replied, of the ships was trivial, in comparison with the object which he was commissioned to attain; and the ocean should be his harbour, till he found a place in India to repair them."

On the 1st of August, Suffrein proceeded to sea, and reached Point de Galle, in the Island of Ceylon, where he was reinforced by two ships of the line from Europe, and met also military reinforcements. On the 25th, he anchored in the bay of Trincomalee. He attacked and conquered the English garrison, and on the 31st of August, the French flag waved upon the ramparts of the fort. All this time Hughes was at Madras, and conducting the refitting of his squadron in a very leisurely manner. Lord Macartney remonstrated with him on the 5th of the month, assuring him that the French fleet had steered southwards on the 1st. Hughes, in the spirit which the English admirals generally showed in India, piqued himself on the eminence of his profession, and his distinction as an officer of his majesty's navy, and would not be dictated to, nor advised by a servant of the company, nor by civilians of any sort. He stayed where he was, until, as so often happened with our admirals in the last war with Russia, when their services were urgently required, it was "too late." On the 20th of August he put to sea, three weeks after Suffrein left Cuddalore. The English admiral did not reach Trincomalee for a fortnight, and found the flag of France floating over the battlements. Hughes was then anxious to redeem his reputation by a naval victory. Suffrein, superior in force by the extent of one ship of the line and three frigates, as well as in the total number of guns, sailed out fearlessly. A long, fierce, and sanguinary conflict ensued, in which Suffrein displayed undaunted courage, first-rate seamanship, and an activity such as has seldom been surpassed. His captains neither showed skill nor courage; half their number were deposed

by him when the battle was over. Hughes also showed himself brave and skilful in his profession, and his officers and men proved themselves far superior to the enemy. A decisive victory crowned the efforts of the English, but night setting in soon after, and with that suddenness in which it descends so near the line, the enemy escaped. So anxious, however, were the French captains to get away, that several vessels were disabled, and some lost in the attempt. Suffrein brought in his shattered ships all but two, which Hughes neglected to make prizes, so that Suffrein sarcastically said, when he afterwards conducted them into port, "they are presents from the English admiral." Hughes, notwithstanding all the time he had taken to refit in Madras, was short of provisions, water, and ammunition, and was unable in consequence to attack, or even to blockade, Trincomalee, and sailed away to Madras, apparently incapable of forming any definite plan or purpose, for he was no sooner in Madras than he intimated his intention to proceed to Bombay.

At Madras he was urged to join in the expedition against Cuddalore, then projected, and where afterwards, General Stuart so severely chastised the French General Bussy; without assigning any reason, Hughes refused to assist the expedition. He was an admiral holding the king's commission, and was not to give account of his actions to such persons as the council of Madras, servants of the East India Company. He would neither take part in the attack on Cuddalore, nor stay on the coast during the ensuing monsoon, but would go to Bombay:—"If the coast," says Mill, "were left unprotected by a British fleet, while the harbour of Trincomalee enabled the enemy to remain, and while Hyder was nearly undisputed master of the Carnatic, nothing less was threatened than the extirpation of the English from that quarter of India. Beside these important considerations, the council pressed upon the mind of the admiral the situation of the presidency in regard to food; that their entire dependence rested upon the supplies which might arrive by sea; that the stock in the warehouses did not exceed thirty thousand bags; that the quantity afloat in the roads amounted but to as much more, which the number of boats demanded for the daily service of his squadron had deprived them of the means of landing; that the monthly consumption was fifty thousand bags at the least; and that, if the vessels on which they depended for their supply were intercepted (such would be the certain consequence of a French without an English fleet upon the coast), nothing less than

famine was placed before their eyes. The admiral was reminded that he had remained in safety upon the coast during the easterly monsoon of the former year, and might still undoubtedly find some harbour to afford him shelter. A letter too was received express from Bengal, stating that Mr. Ritchie, the marine surveyor, would undertake to conduct his majesty's ships to a safe anchorage in the mouth of the Bengal river. And it was known that Sir Richard Bickerton, with a reinforcement of five sail of the line from England, had already touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for Madras. The admiral remained deaf to all expostulations. In the meantime intelligence was received that the enemy was preparing to attack Negapatam. The president had already prevailed upon Sir Eyre Coote to send a detachment of three hundred men, under Colonel Fullarton, into the southern provinces, which, since the defeat of Colonel Brathwaite, had lain exposed to the ravages of Hyder, and were now visited with scarcity, and the prospect of famine. Within two days of the former intelligence, accounts were received that seventeen sail of the enemy's fleet had arrived at Negapatam, and that the place was already attacked. The most earnest expostulations were still addressed to the admiral in vain; and the morning of the 15th of October exhibiting the appearance of a storm, the fleet set sail, and disappeared. The following morning presented a tremendous spectacle to the wretched inhabitants of Madras; several large vessels driven ashore, others foundered at their anchors, all the small craft, amounting to nearly one hundred in number, either sunk or stranded, and the whole of the thirty thousand bags of rice irretrievably gone. The ravages of Hyder had driven crowds of the inhabitants from all parts of the country to seek refuge at Madras, where multitudes were daily perishing of want. Famine now raged in all its horrors; and the multitude of the dead and the dying threatened to superadd the evils of pestilence. The bodies of those who expired in the streets or the houses, without any one to inter them, were daily collected and piled in carts, to be buried in large trenches made for the purpose out of the town, to the number, for several weeks, of not less, it is said, than twelve or fifteen hundred a-week. What was done to remove the suffering inhabitants to the less exhausted parts of the country, and to prevent unnecessary consumption,—the governor sending away his horses, and even his servants,—could only mitigate, and that to a small degree, the evils which were endured. On the fourth day after the departure of Sir

Edward Hughes and his fleet, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived, with three regiments of one thousand each, Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, amounting to three hundred and forty, and about one thousand recruits raised by the company, chiefly in Ireland; but as soon as Sir Richard was apprised of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he immediately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bombay."

It is mournful to contemplate the representation of ignorance, pride, and obstinacy, on the part of a British naval commander, which is here made without any exaggeration. The terrible consequences are also depicted faithfully. If there were no proba-

bility that like causes in the constitution of our navy would produce like effects, such sad stories might be related without anxiety for the present or the future, if even with shame for the past. The admiral had no further opportunity to do much good or evil. Peace with France, Spain, and Holland, followed by peace with Hyder, left India in tranquillity as to foreign enemies, and the different councils, commanders, and governors, more leisure for those mutual bickerings in which they perpetually indulged. Hastings, having composed these, as far as genius and self-command could compose them, at last, as already related, retired from the scenes of his struggles and his fame.

CHAPTER XC.

HOME AFFAIRS—EFFORTS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO ASSIST THE CROWN IN THE WARS WITH FRANCE, SPAIN, AND HOLLAND—DISCUSSIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS IN REFERENCE TO THE COMPANY'S AFFAIRS—IMPEACHMENT OF HASTINGS—ACQUITTAL—RETIREMENT FROM PUBLIC LIFE—DEATH—THE COMPANY RESOLVE TO ERECT A STATUE TO HIS MEMORY.

FROM 1778 to the termination of the parliamentary prosecution of Hastings, the directors and the company were much engrossed with home matters, while the state of their affairs in India demanded also unremitting and serious attention.

In 1778-9 extraordinary exertions were made to resist the combination of France and Spain against British influence everywhere, but especially in the East. Instructions were sent overland to India for the reduction of Pondicherry, and the governors and councils were urged to prosecute the war with all their energy.

In April, 1779, the general court of proprietors voted unanimous thanks to the secret committee, for the spirited orders they issued for operations against Pondicherry and the French, and presented them with sums of five hundred, and three hundred guineas, for the purchase of plate. Thanks were also voted to Sir Hector Monro and Admiral Sir Edward Vernon, to each of whom was given a sword set with diamonds, valued at seven hundred and fifty guineas. Three guineas bounty to each was voted for the first two thousand able-bodied seamen, two guineas each for the first two thousand ordinary seamen, and a guinea and a half each for the first two thousand landmen who should volunteer to serve on board the fleets of his majesty. Resolutions were passed by the court of directors "to build three 74-gun ships, with masts and

yards, to be delivered over to such officer as his majesty might appoint to receive them."

The following *résumé* of the home events in which the company was interested at that time is as correct as it is brief:—"The affairs of the company at this time engaged much of the attention of parliament. In 1779, an act had been passed declaring that the £1,400,000 borrowed of the public had been repaid by the company, and that as their bond debt was reduced to £1,500,000, they were authorized to declare a dividend of eight per cent. The territorial acquisitions and revenues were also to remain with them for another year, and the persons who at the passing of the act were in the offices of governor-general and councillors in Bengal, were to hold the same during its continuance. In the following session Lord North acquainted the house that the company had not made such proposals for the renewal of their charter as were deemed satisfactory, and he therefore moved that the Speaker should give the three years' notice required by the act, previously to the cessation of their exclusive privileges of trade. Mr. Fox and Mr. Burke strongly opposed the minister, and asked whether he was not content with having lost America? Whether he could point out a single benefit which his motion was capable of producing, and whether he desired to behold those scenes of anarchy, confusion, distress, and ruin, which his idle

and impotent threats might produce in the company's possessions in India."*

Mr. Fox argued that the ministerial measure was impracticable, and that the government and the nation would prove themselves ungrateful to the country, if such a proposition were tolerated. He declared that the disputes between the minister and the company arose from the desire of the former to grasp the patronage of the latter.† In order to give time for deliberation, an act was passed continuing the same privileges to the company as in the preceding year, to be reckoned from the 5th of April, 1780.‡

On the 12th of January, 1781, a select committee of the house was appointed to inquire into the petitions of the company and the inhabitants of Bengal, against the constitution of the supreme court and the action of British law generally.

On the 27th of April, Lord North proposed the appointment of a *secret* committee to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. The celebrated Edmund Burke demanded that the committee should be open; but, as the foreign enemies of England would watch the progress of such inquiry in an open committee, and profit by the information to be obtained, Lord North carried his point. Lord North, throughout the session, displayed an open enmity to the company, the real source of which was, what Charles Fox charged upon him, a desire to grasp the patronage. Edmund Burke was not less an enemy, but he was insidious.

At length the two acts were passed: the one concluding an agreement between the public and the company;§ the other to redress and prevent the recurrence of the complaints against the supreme court at Calcutta.|| By the first-mentioned act the company's exclusive privileges were continued till 1791, with three years' notice; during which time the territorial acquisitions and revenues were to remain in their possession. After a dividend of eight per cent. on the capital of £3,200,000, three-fourths of the surplus profits were to go to the public, and one-fourth to the company. Accounts of the state of the company's affairs were to be laid before the lords of the treasury and the general court. During the war with France, Spain, and Holland, the company were to pay one-fourth of the expense of his majesty's ships in India. After peace, the company were to bear the

whole. The company were allowed to recruit, and to have two thousand men at one time ready for embarkation during war, but only one thousand in peace. The parties filling the offices of governor-general, commander-in-chief, and members of council, were to be removable only by the king on representation of the directors, who might appoint to vacancies on the approbation of the crown. The commander-in-chief, if appointed by the directors a member of council, was to take rank as two members, but was not to succeed to the government unless specially appointed. British subjects were not to reside more than ten miles from the presidency without leave from the government.

Two important provisions were also inserted. In addition to the enactment of 1773, which required the directors to send to his majesty's government copies of all letters from India relating to the political, military, or revenue affairs of the company, a provision was now inserted that copies of all letters proposed to be sent by the directors to India relating to those subjects, should first be submitted for his majesty's approval, and if no disapprobation was expressed within fourteen days to the proposed despatch, the same might be forwarded to India.

The other was a clause suggested by the heavy drafts which had, at a former period, been drawn from India, and nearly ruined the company, being, the minister remarked, "the private fortunes of Asiatic plunderers," who would again seize upon the opportunity of doing so with avidity. Lord North, in alluding to the acceptance of presents, observed that it would be proper to interdict their receipt entirely, for which purpose it would be well to form a court of judicature in this country for the trial of offences committed in India. This suggestion, though not acted upon at that time, was adopted at a later period.

The other act related to the supreme court, and was passed to appease the minds of many persons who dreaded the consequences of the powers assumed by the supreme court of India.

The appointment of Lord Macartney to the governorship of Madras was one of the signs of the times, as it regarded the progress of ministerial and parliamentary opinion respecting the company. The governing class in England became intensely desirous of obtaining such posts as the governorships of presidencies, and more especially the office of governor-general, for members of their class. Lord Macartney was the first governor appointed by the direct intervention of the go-

* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. i. chap. xi. p. 572.

† *Parliamentary History*, 1780, vol. xxi.

‡ 20 Geo. III. cap. 56.

§ 21 Geo. III. cap. 65.

|| 21 Geo. III. cap. 70.

vernment, and he unfortunately went to India in the spirit of one who felt that he did not owe his appointment to the company, and was superior in rank, as well as the origin of his appointment, to the company's servants. He made, therefore, little account of the opinion of Hastings, who was only a company's official, although governor-general of Bengal. Lord Macartney was a polite man, capable of governing his temper, and possessing much suavity of manner to inferiors in station; but he had a high opinion of his order, his office, and the source whence he derived it, and hence all harmony between the governments of Madras and Bengal were from the day of his arrival in India until Hastings left it impossible. At home, his lordship's measures and interests were backed up by the government.

Tidings of the appointment of Sir Elijah Impey, by Governor-general Hastings, to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, reached England in October, 1781. The directors doubted the legality of the proceeding, and parliament took up the matter with considerable heat. A committee of inquiry was nominated, and reported in strong terms upon the illegality of the conduct of Hastings and of Impey. An address of the whole house to his majesty demanded the recall of Sir Elijah to answer to the house for his acceptance of the office. The directors passed a resolution, on the 24th of April, removing him.

A report was made by the secret committee appointed to inquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic. Mr. Dundas, the chairman, submitted to the house an enormous series of resolutions, which amounted to no less than one hundred and eleven. The resolutions were divided into three classes, each class containing three distinct heads. The first regarded the general system of government; it censured the conduct of Mr. Hastings as governor-general, and that of Mr. Hornby, governor of Bombay, and declared it to be the duty of the directors to recall them. The second and third classes related to the affairs of the Carnatic. On these a bill of pains and penalties was brought in against Sir Thomas Rumbold, J. Whitehill, and P. Perring, Esqrs., for breaches of public trust, and high crimes and misdemeanours.

On the 28th of May, the house of commons came to the following resolution:—

“Resolved, That Warren Hastings, Esq., governor-general, and William Hornby, Esq., president of the council at Bombay, having in sundry instances acted in a manner repugnant to the honour and policy of this nation, and thereby brought great calamities on India,

and enormous expenses on the company, it is the duty of the directors to pursue all legal and effectual means for the removal of the said governor-general and president from their respective offices, and to recall them to Great Britain.”

These measures violently agitated the courts of directors and proprietors. Various meetings were held, and debates of the fiercest nature took place in them. On the 19th of June, a special grand court was convened by requisition in the usual manner, when the following resolutions were passed:—

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this court, that the removing of Warren Hastings, Esq., the governor-general of Bengal, or any servants of the company, merely in compliance with a vote of the house of commons,—without being satisfied that the grounds of delinquency against the said Warren Hastings, or such other servants, are sufficient of themselves to vindicate the directors in coming to such a resolution,—would weaken the confidence which the servants of the company ought to entertain of the justice of their employers, and will tend to destroy that independency which the proprietors of East India stock ought to enjoy in the management of their own affairs.”

“Resolved, That it be recommended to the court of directors not to carry into effect any resolution they may come to relative to the removal of Warren Hastings, Esq., till such resolution shall have been approved by a general court.”

From the 20th of June to the 9th of October, the directors, in various meetings, discussed the contradictory conclusions to which the house of commons and the court of proprietary had arrived, and passed resolutions at last in harmony with those of the commons. It being well understood that the directors passed these resolutions under pressure from the government, and seven of the directors having recorded a protest against the recall of Hastings, the court of proprietary again met on the 21st of October, and again passed a resolution by a majority of three hundred and fifty-three votes in a house of five hundred and three persons, forbidding the removal of Hastings, vindicating him from the imputations thrown on him by parliament and a majority of the directors, and attributing to the directors themselves the misfortunes, wars, and debts, which the resolution alleged Hastings by extraordinary fidelity and ability had done much to retrieve. On the 22nd of October the directors rescinded their resolution against Hastings.

There were frequent changes of ministry; but the tone of parliament and of government was adverse to the company. In April, 1783,

Mr. Dundas brought in a bill for the better government of India. It was rejected. The session terminated without any further attack upon the company. During the recess the celebrated India bill of Fox and Burke was framed. Mr. Burke was then in the government. Mr. Fox brought in his bill on the 18th of November. The company petitioned against it. Burke delivered one of his most eloquent and imposing orations in its behalf. His descriptions of the misdeeds of the company were exaggerated; and those of the civilization, and excellent qualities of the people and governments of India, were contrary to fact and philosophy. Against Hastings the speech was virulent. The bill passed the commons, and went up to the lords: the company again petitioned. The lords threw out the bill. The king was known to be opposed to it, and a large popular party in the country was equally so. The commons passed most serious resolutions condemnatory by implication of the course pursued by the crown and the peers. The ministry was dismissed, and William Pitt appointed first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. Mr. Pitt brought in a bill "for the better government and management of the affairs of the East India Company" on the 10th of January. The commons rejected it. On the 25th of March parliament was dissolved. The court of proprietors of India stock manfully supported Hastings, and resolved that he should not be recalled.

When Hastings reached England, as before related, he proceeded at once to London. In June, 1785, he received in person the thanks of the very same court of directors which censured and sought to remove him, when they supposed the favour of the cabinet would be secured by doing so.

In January, 1786, Major Scott announced in parliament that Mr. Hastings was anxious to defend himself against the aspersions thrown on him by Mr. Edmund Burke, and challenged the great philosopher and orator to bring forward his impeachment. This was imprudent, and rather prejudiced than served the case of Hastings in the house. At length that impeachment was made, so notable for the amazing eloquence displayed in it, especially by Sheridan and Burke. It is generally considered that Hastings did not display his usual ability in managing his defence, and this is attributed to the fact that he had not been accustomed to work with English agencies and in English modes. Nearly his whole life had been spent in India, and his mind had become adapted to Indian intrigues. Lord Macaulay says, "Of all his errors, the most serious was, perhaps, the choice of a cham-

panion. Clive, in similar circumstances, had made a singularly happy selection. He put himself into the hands of Wedderburn, afterwards Lord Loughborough, one of the few great advocates who have been also great in the house of commons. To the defence of Clive, therefore, nothing was wanting, neither learning nor knowledge of the world—neither forensic acuteness nor the eloquence which charms political assemblies. Hastings entrusted his interests to a very different person, a major in the Bengal army named Scott. This gentleman had been sent over from India some time before, as the agent of the governor-general. It was rumoured that his services were rewarded with oriental munificence; and we believe that he received much more than Hastings could conveniently spare. The major obtained a seat in parliament, and was there regarded as the organ of his employer. It was evidently impossible that a gentleman so situated could speak with the authority which belongs to an independent position. Nor had the agent of Hastings the talent necessary for obtaining the ear of an assembly, which, accustomed to listen to great orators, had naturally become fastidious. He was always on his legs; he was very tedious, and he had only one topic, the merits and wrongs of Hastings. Everybody who knows the house of commons will easily guess what followed. The major was considered as the greatest bore of his time. There was hardly a day on which the newspapers did not contain some puff upon Hastings, signed Asiaticus or Bengalensis, but known to be written by the indefatigable Scott; and hardly a month in which some bulky pamphlet on the same subject, and from the same pen, did not pass to the trunk-makers and the pastry-cooks."

Much of what his lordship has said of Major Scott, in the above passage, is correct; but, on various grounds, Scott was an agent well adapted to the purposes for which Hastings had chosen him. His knowledge of all the circumstances, personally and practically, on the ground of which the governor-general expected to be called to account, was perfect. He was well acquainted with all the personages who figured in these transactions. His industry was unwavering, and his personal friendship and admiration for Hastings the warmest. Hastings did not select him as his agent in view of a parliamentary impeachment, but in view of attack in the courts of directors and proprietors. Scott was a far more suitable agent for this purpose than Wedderburn would have been. He knew the ways of the directory, the tone and temper of the proprietors, his *whole time* was given to work among them for Hastings, and

he did so successfully. His entering parliament was an after-thought, and he was there very useful to his friend; he corrected innumerable misstatements, and was "always on his legs" for that purpose during the debates. Many a rhetorical flourish, very captivating to the house of commons was made sheerly ridiculous by a dry, prosy, but true statement from Scott. There was no putting him down, he was proof against all ridicule, reiterating his dry facts, financial, military, political, and personal, until they ceased to be disputed. He was a bore in the sense Lord Macaulay proclaims it, and he was so also to the enemies of Hastings, by his unsleeping vigilance, his physical endurance, and his ever-pestering, worrying statements and counter-statements, which were confounding to his antagonists, not one man among whom knew anything of the subjects of debate, except Burke. Burke, Dundas (the Lord Advocate of Scotland), and Sir Philip Francis, were the only men of great mark acquainted with Indian affairs. Burke had read on the subject, with a view to an Indian appointment from the ministry, which he knew he could never receive from the company; and he was embittered, therefore, against the latter and its agents. His mind was inflamed with envy against Hastings as much as was that of Francis. Burke was, from these circumstances, an indefatigable student of Indian affairs. Sheridan spoke with glowing eloquence on subjects of which he knew nothing. Dundas learned much of Indian affairs when he served as chairman of the committee which produced the hundred and eleven resolutions. Francis, of course, knew Calcutta well, and the doings of members of the supreme council; but of the languages, peoples, and mind of India he knew little, almost nothing. A plain, stern, dogged, persevering, matter of fact man, "well up" in Indian affairs, was very useful to Hastings in the house, and absolutely indispensable among the constituency of the company. With these Scott had constant intercourse: there was probably not a director, not a single member of the proprietary, with whom Scott had not talked over the whole question. All the holders of India stock might have had Scott's arguments by heart. Hastings foresaw this, and made his selection judiciously. It is quite true, as Lord Macaulay affirms, that Hastings was destitute of a parliamentary advocate possessing the splendour of eloquence which Burke, Sheridan, or Wedderburn possessed; but that was not, as Lord Macaulay represents, his fault; nor did the circumstance of Wedderburn being Clive's adviser and defender show any superiority of

judgment on the part of that great man to Hastings in the selection of his advocates, for Wedderburn had been the early friend and associate of Clive, and offered his services, which were, of course, thankfully accepted. Had Hastings found a similar friend, he would have gladly made his eloquence, tact, and legal knowledge available; but Hastings had spent many years in India, and had formed few new friendships in England. None of his old schoolfellows and early companions were in a condition to do by him as Wedderburn did by Clive. Yet many men of note, and among them those who believed that he had acted very wrong in several of the proceedings for which he was called in question, were indignant at the malignant persecutions with which Burke and others pursued him, and made themselves his friends. Lords Mansfield, Lansdowne, and Thurlow (the Chancellor) were foremost among them. Pitt was another of the eminent men who doubted the propriety of various parts of the conduct of Hastings, but was scandalized at the virulence of the proceedings against him. He had even privately confessed to Major Scott (for the untiring major had interviews with all the ministers) that Hastings deserved high rewards from his country, which he, as minister, was only prevented from recommending his majesty to confer, by the fact that a vote of censure remained on the journals of the commons. The leading opponents of government were the leading opponents of Hastings in the house; but the king, the holders of Indian stock, and the country, were intensely prejudiced against that party. The whigs in and out of the house opposed him, and a small but powerful section of the Tories, especially those who were disappointed of places by the government. One of the most fertile sources of attack against Hastings out of the house was the history of his marriage, and the name of Imhoff, and the guilt of his divorced wife, formed the material of the sarcastic squibs which were flung about in the clubs, coffee-houses, and journals. Lord North and Fox were accused of adding light labours of this kind to their relentless opposition in the house. Hastings did much to provoke all this, by an ostentatious defiance of his enemies. This did not arise, as Lord Macaulay supposes, from indiscretion and an undervaluing of his enemies; it arose from the fact that he was not conscious of guilt in the transactions where his lordship considers his guilt manifest. In some matters where his most ardent friends could not have defended him, he believed himself to have been in the right, and remained in that belief to the end of his days. His conscience was

neither tender nor enlightened: he was not, in any sense of the word, a religious man; but, as a politician, he was convinced that the course he had taken in India was that which his duty to the company and to his country demanded. The consciences of Burke, Francis, Sheridan, North, or Fox seem to have been neither more tender nor more enlightened than that of Hastings. There is no doubt that the defiant attitude which he took also arose from his determined character. He was not a man to quail before any foe. He who could coolly write despatches in reference to negotiations with the Mahrattas, when barred up in a house at Benares, with a few soldiers to defend him against half a million of fanatics, was not to be put down by the force of faction or the eloquence of political adventurers, however vast and dazzling the powers they might bring against him in the contest. It is remarkable that Hastings appeared to feel as little and fear as little the great weight of character and public station which some of his opponents brought against him, as he did the genius and personal hostility of others. The courage and persistence of Hastings were sustained by the openly avowed favour of the court. The king was his friend. Clive had derived much protection from the royal favour, Hastings even more. The ladies of the court scandalized many by their attentions to Mrs. Hastings, and it soon became evident that those who wished to find favour near the throne must not be remembered among the persecutors or prosecutors of Warren Hastings. The first note of war on the part of the opposition was an application for papers, by Edmund Burke. Only some of these were granted. In April, 1786, the impeachment was produced, and Hastings was informed that he might be heard by counsel at the bar of the house. Hastings defended himself in person. He was not an orator. He was a great writer, and relied much on the power of his pen for his defence. It was eloquent, but of vast length, and tired the patience of a house much fonder of exciting logomachies than of business statements.

In the beginning of June, Burke brought forward that part of the impeachment which related to the employment of English troops in Rohileund, in the service of the vizier, for a stipulated price. Burke affected to believe that he would have the support of Dundas, who formerly, as chairman of a committee of inquiry, condemned the Rohilla invasion. Burke must have known that the versatile Dundas would not be bound by such a circumstance; this was patent to the whole house, and the folly of selecting the least vul-

nerable point of the defence in the hope of catching the support of Dundas, or showing his inconsistency, was apparent to all the members not blinded by envy of Hastings, or pledged to the opposition. Dundas, as military men would say, turned the enemy's flank. He declared that although Hastings did wrong in supporting the aggressive designs of the Nabob of Oude, yet he had atoned for that fault, and won beside the lasting gratitude of his country by subsequent services. The tactics of Burke were indiscreet, and the spirit of his speech not less so. The feeling of the house was strong against him. Many of his expected supporters, finding that his first movement displayed bad generalship, forsook him. Only sixty-seven voted for the motion, in a house of one hundred and eighty-six members. A considerable number of the supposed supporters of the prosecution slunk away. Pitt spoke not, but voted for Hastings. The house of commons, *on report of a secret committee*, had censured the Rohilla war; a majority of the directors had censured it; but since then the *whole* of the facts had become known, they had been discussed with great ability in the court of proprietary by men the first and ablest in connection with Indian affairs, their speeches had been published, the error and the extenuation had been canvassed, and the commons in its final verdict refused to be carried away by the clap-trap of ready speakers, or affected by glowing antitheses of rhetoricians with less claim to principle than Hastings himself, were all the wrong-doing attributed to him chargeable at his door.

It was universally expected by the public that the impeachment would now drop, and even the government seems to have thought so, for Lord Thurlow openly spoke, notwithstanding the reserve of Pitt, of the desirableness of creating Hastings Baron Daylesford.

On the 13th of June, the country, if not the house, was startled by a renewal of the prosecution. Fox brought forward a resolution, condemnatory of what was called the deposition of the Rajah of Benares. Fox was eloquent on the occasion. Francis was learned, epigrammatical, and malignant as a demon. Pitt exposed the party purpose of Fox, the personal hatred of Francis, and eulogised in one of the most statesman-like of his speeches the policy, courage, and justice of Hastings in the transaction for which it was sought to condemn him. After an eloquent justification of Hastings, the house was astonished by the minister's declaration, that he should vote for Fox's motion, because the fine laid upon Cheyte Sing was too heavy, although Hastings did right to fine him! Pitt's vote was clearly

not an honest one. Like Fox himself, he had aims of his own in view, and he would uphold or sacrifice Hastings as best promoted those aims. He deemed it politic to conciliate the opposition, and appear impartial. From the first, he was unwilling to be thought the partizan of Hastings, while he denounced the prosecution in the private circle of his friends with unsparing severity. What made the conduct of Pitt in the house most extraordinary was, that the usual ministerial circular had gone out to his party the day before, requesting their presence in the house to vote against the motion of Fox. The change of opinion was attributed to Mr. Dundas, who, on this subject, influenced the mind of the premier. The persuasives by which Dundas succeeded were appeals to the love of power, and the ambition characteristic of Pitt. Hastings was more a favourite at court than himself, and Pitt was led by the insinuations of Dundas to believe that he would soon become his rival, as either a peerage or dishonour must result from the impeachment. The effect of Pitt's tergiversation upon the success of the motion was decisive. It was carried by one hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight, many in the majority declaring that they voted against their conscience to support the policy of the minister.

In 1787, the prosecution was renewed. The first charge opened was in connection with the conduct of Hastings to the begums of Oude, a portion of his public life more open to censure than any other. Sheridan introduced the charge in the most brilliant oration ever made by him, and which produced an effect in the house greater than probably any other speech ever delivered. After Sheridan's speech, the debate was adjourned. When the house resumed, it was evident that the eloquence of Sheridan had decided the motion. The house was now as much carried away by eloquence, irrespective of the merits of the question, as upon the first resolution they were coldly insensible to the finest passages of the orator, and looked only to the facts of the case. The influence of Pitt, however, had as much to do in forming the majorities on all the motions, as either eloquence or justice. Pitt supported Sheridan, as he had supported Fox. One hundred and seventy-five against sixty-eight carried the motion.

The party carrying on the impeachment were now sure of victory, and hurried numerous resolutions through the house. The friends of Hastings began to forsake him, as those of Clive had deserted him in the hour of misfortune. The sergeant-at-arms arrested him, and brought him to the bar

of the peers, where Burke was directed by the commons to produce an impeachment founded upon their resolutions. The period for prerogation was too close to allow of proceeding with the case, and Hastings was discharged on bail. At the opening of the following session, the commons proceeded to form a committee to manage the impeachment. The leading members of the opposition were called on to serve, and no name was objected to until that of Francis was read, when a large number of members objected to the injustice and indecency of the most malignant personal enemy Hastings had being placed in that position. It is much to the discredit of the leading men of the opposition, that they fiercely contended for the appointment of Francis. Dundas and Wilberforce, believing that Pitt would sustain the motion for the appointment of Francis, upheld it. Wilberforce was especially ingenious in his argumentative support. Pitt suddenly rose and opposed the appointment of Francis. "The heaven-born minister" had everything his own way; his servile followers voted that Francis was not a fit person to be nominated on the committee.

On the 13th of February, 1788, the sittings commenced, on the result of which the fate of Hastings depended. The scene has been portrayed by the brilliant pen of Macaulay. In one of the happiest, richest, and most fervid outflowings of his eloquence, he has impressed the solemnity, importance, and the whole aspect of the court upon the mind of this generation of readers. The trial, amongst other things, was remarkable for the great number and singular variety of notable persons who were spectators:—"The long galleries were crowded by an audience such as has rarely excited the fears or the emulation of an orator. There were gathered together, from all parts of a great, free, enlightened, and prosperous empire, grace and female loveliness, wit and learning, the representatives of every science and of every art. There were seated round the queen the fair-haired young daughters of the house of Brunswick. There the ambassadors of great kings and commonwealths gazed with admiration on a spectacle which no other country in the world could present. There Siddons, in the prime of her majestic beauty, looked with emotion on a scene surpassing all the imitations of the stage. There the historian of the Roman empire thought of the days when Cicero pleaded the cause of Sicily against Verres, and when, before a senate which still retained some show of freedom, Tacitus thundered against the oppressor of Africa. There were seen, side by side, the greatest painter and the greatest scholar of the age. The

spectacle had allured Reynolds from that easel which has preserved to us the thoughtful foreheads of so many writers and statesmen, and the sweet smiles of so many noble matrons. It had induced Parr to suspend his labours in that dark and profound mine from which he had extracted a vast treasure of erudition—a treasure too often buried in the earth, too often paraded with injudicious and inelegant ostentation, but still precious, massive, and splendid. There appeared the voluptuous charms of her to whom the heir of the throne had in secret plighted his faith. There, too, was she, the beautiful mother of a beautiful race, the Saint Cecilia, whose delicate features, lighted up by love and music, art has rescued from the common decay. There were the members of that brilliant society, which quoted, criticised, and exchanged repartees under the rich peacock hangings of Mrs. Montague. And there the ladies whose lips, more persuasive than those of Fox himself, had carried the Westminster election against palace and treasury, shone round Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire."

Such were the spectators of the scene, and the audience before which the eloquence of England's best orators was about to be displayed. The descriptions given by Lord Macaulay of the appearance of Hastings on this occasion and his approach to the bar, of his counsel and his accusers, are amongst the most graphic and life-like which his pen has depicted:—"The serjeants made proclamation. Hastings advanced to the bar, and bent his knee. The culprit was indeed not unworthy of that great presence. He had ruled an extensive and populous country, had made laws and treaties, had sent forth armies, had set up and pulled down princes. And in his high place he had so borne himself that all had feared him, that most had loved him, and that hatred itself could deny him no title to glory, except virtue. He looked like a great man, and not like a bad man. A person small and emaciated, yet deriving dignity from a carriage which, while it indicated deference to the court, indicated also habitual self-possession and self-respect; a high and intellectual forehead, a brow pensive, but not gloomy; a mouth of inflexible decision; a face pale and worn, but serene, on which was written as legibly as under the picture in the council-chamber at Calcutta, *Mens æqua in arduis*: such was the aspect with which the great proconsul presented himself to his judges. His counsel accompanied him, men all of whom were afterwards raised by their talents and learning to the highest posts in their profession: the bold and strong-minded Law, afterwards chief-justice of the King's

Bench; the more humane and eloquent Dallas, afterwards chief-justice of the Common Pleas; and Plomer, who, nearly twenty years later, successfully conducted in the same high court the defence of Lord Melville, and subsequently became vice-chancellor and master of the rolls. But neither the culprit nor his advocates attracted so much notice as the accusers. In the midst of the blaze of red drapery, a space had been fitted up with green benches and tables for the commons. The managers, with Burke at their head, appeared in full dress. The collectors of gossip did not fail to remark that even Fox, generally so regardless of his appearance, had paid to the illustrious tribunal the compliment of wearing a bag and sword. Pitt had refused to be one of the conductors of the impeachment; and his commanding, copious, and sonorous eloquence, was wanting to that great muster of various talents. Age and blindness had unfitted Lord North for the duties of a public prosecution, and his friends were left without the help of his excellent sense, his tact, and his urbanity. But in spite of the absence of these two distinguished members of the lower house, the box in which the managers stood contained an array of speakers such as, perhaps, had not appeared together since the great age of Athenian eloquence. There were Fox and Sheridan, the English Demosthenes, and the English Hyperides. There was Burke, ignorant indeed, or negligent of the art of adapting his reasonings and his style to the capacity and taste of his hearers, but in amplitude of comprehension and richness of imagination superior to every orator, ancient or modern. There, with eyes reverentially fixed on Burke, appeared the finest gentleman of the age; his form developed by every manly exercise; his face beaming with intelligence and spirit,—the ingenious, the chivalrous, the high-souled Windham. Nor, though surrounded by such men, did the youngest manager pass unnoticed. At an age when most of those who distinguish themselves in life are still contending for prizes and fellowships at college, he had won for himself a conspicuous place in parliament. No advantage of fortune or connection was wanting that could set off to the height his splendid talents and his unblemished honour. At twenty-three he had been thought worthy to be ranked with the veteran statesmen who appeared as the delegates of the British commons, at the bar of the British nobility." This was the future Earl Grey, the premier under whose government the reform bill was carried.

The reading of the charges and answers of Hastings occupied several days. Burke then opened the impeachment in a speech which

contemporaries describe as producing by the solemnity and manner of the orator, as much effect as by its powers of reasoning and marvellous eloquence. Even Thurlow, the determined abettor of Hastings, uttered exclamations of admiration, and, at the close of the peroration, Hastings himself appeared affected, notwithstanding the dauntless and proud front he bore. Fox, Grey (afterwards Earl Grey), Lord Loughborough (formerly the advocate of Clive), and Sheridan, all betrayed an animus the most hostile to the prisoner at the bar; but the lord-chancellor, a host in himself (considering his abilities, boldness, and the advantages of his situation), indicated from the first a resolution to save him. The trial was so protracted that public curiosity flagged, and the persecutors became less confident. Their great cards had been played, and the game was not won. The defence of Hastings was expected to be brilliant, and to come with telling power when the impressions produced by the orations of his accusers were worn away. Such was the state of matters at the end of June, and when both houses were weary of the session. Only thirty-five days were given to the trial; it was obliged to stand over for another year.

In 1789 other business drew away the attention of the house and the public from the trial; the illness of the king excited the popular sympathy greatly, and still further contributed to cast the interest taken in the trial into the shade. The friends of Hastings grew bolder. Advantage was taken of indecorous expressions used by Burke, to move a vote of censure upon him in the commons, and it was carried. This deeply humiliated the great man, and deprived him of much moral power in his further prosecution of the impeachment.

In 1790 parliament was dissolved, and the temper of the new house towards Hastings was tested by his friends, nearly as soon as it had assembled. It was maintained that the dissolution put an end to the prosecution. Pitt and the opposition united in affirming the contrary. Several of the articles of impeachment were, however, withdrawn, in order to facilitate the more rapid issue of the case.

In 1791 the prosecution on the part of the committee became less bitter, with the exception of Edmund Burke, who clung to it with all the tenacity of hatred which animated Francis, who, although not on the committee, was perpetually in communication with its members, and was, out of the house, the life of the prosecution, which still chased the already severely punished and much suffering Hastings.

In 1795 Hastings appeared before the bar of the lords to hear judgment. The curiosity of the public now returned with full force. His opponent Loughborough was chancellor; his friend Thurlow was in opposition; the committee for managing the impeachment was broken up into various parties, its members at enmity with one another; and out of the body of peers who took so deep an interest in the trial at its commencement, sixty had gone before the great tribunal, to render their own last account. Twenty-nine peers voted. Six voted against Hastings on the charges in connection with Cheyte Sing and the begums, a still smaller number voted against him on the other important articles of impeachment, and on none of the relatively minor charges was there a single voice against him. He was informed from the woosack that he was acquitted. He bowed with the same air of respectful dignity, firmness, and self-consciousness, as when he approached that bar nearly eight years before.

The decision met with almost universal approval. It was felt by the public that he had been put to an enormous cost—a fortune had been expended in his defence; that his anxieties for so many years were terribly penal; that he had been pursued with bitter personal animosity and jealous political envy; that his errors had been sought out with a vindictiveness such as had never before been directed against a public man, and that his great services had been unrequited by the country for whose greatness and glory he had done so much. All men had come to the conclusion that, but for Warren Hastings, the Asiatic empire of England had vanished from beneath her sceptre.

Hastings returned from the bar of the lords to his seat—the old family seat at Daylesford—a victor, but terribly impoverished by his contest. He had purchased the old manor house and estate, which had three quarters of a century before passed out of the family. The dream of his life's young morning was realized—he was “Hastings of Daylesford.” But, alas! he took up his abode there when fortune had done much against him, as well as for him; and the remainder of his years were destined to be spent in comparative obscurity. The malignity of his enemies pursued him still. Francis, Burke, and Dundas were as bitter as ever; they lost no opportunity, public or private, not merely to damage his reputation, but to hurt his interests. But for the generosity of the East India Company he must have sunk into poverty.

Like many great men who have a genius for public business and for government, he was a bad manager of his private affairs; and

he who, as governor-general of India, saved an empire from financial anarchy, was more than once on the verge of pecuniary ruin, as "Hastings of Daylesford."

Pitt continued to regard him with envy, because he enjoyed the king's favour; and because, on Eastern affairs, if not in other departments of statesmanship, he would have been a superior authority if permitted to emerge into public life. When Pitt retired from power, Hastings was nearly seventy years old.

In 1813 he was examined as a witness before the commons on the subject of India; on which occasion the whole house rose in respectful homage as he left its bar. Many marks of public respect were paid to him after that time by the Prince Regent, the leading men of the day, and the people generally. He was also made a privy councillor. His private life belongs rather to the biographer, but the closing scene was appropriate to the courage and equanimity of his career. On the 22nd of August, 1818, according to Macaulay—on the 3rd of that month, according to M. Auber and others—he closed his life, having attained his eightieth year. On that day he wrote to Colonel Toone in the following remarkable terms:—"I impose upon myself the last office of communication between you and me, to inform you that a few hours remain, which are to separate us from each other for ever. The infliction that must end me is a total privation of the function of deglutition, which is equivalent to the extremities of hunger, by the inability to take nourishment. I have called you by the only appellation that language can express me, 'Yar Woofadar,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it (unprofitably, I own), but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world, and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that in the efficient body of directors I have not one individual ill-affected towards me. I do not

express my full feelings; I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger and constituent body I can only express a hope, that if there are any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me, when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers, from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that also whose interest both had so long committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment in my departing hours, not alien from that which is due from every subject to its own."

Thus tranquilly this serene and heroic man passed away, after a career so eventful and turbulent, in which, amidst all its tremendous storms, he was ever calm, resolute, and great.

As it will not be necessary again to refer to this eminent personage in the progress of this history, except *en passant*, it may be here noticed that, after his death, the most marked tokens of respect for his memory were shown by the East India Company, which he had so long and so faithfully served, and which, during his long retirement from public life, had soothed his sorrows and generously provided for his wants. A court was called, when the chairman, Campbell Majoribanks, Esq., passed a warm eulogy upon his memory. The deputy-chairman, Mr. Robinson, afterwards Sir George Robinson, who had served in India as a civil officer of the company during a portion of the time when Hastings was governor, followed the chairman in terms of high commendation of the personal and official conduct of Hastings. The following resolution was passed:—

"Resolved, That as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Honourable Warren Hastings, in maintaining without diminution the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Mohammedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed in their several stations to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."

CHAPTER XCI.

HOME AFFAIRS (*Continued*).

DURING the progress of the events connected with Hastings, which necessarily occupied so large a space in the last chapter, the general affairs of the company occupied the attention of parliament and the country. In 1784, Pitt's bill was introduced. The new parliament met on the 19th of May, and the premier took an early opportunity of bringing forward his measure for the future government of India. In the sketch given of the history of the company's charters and constitutions, Pitt's bill was noticed sufficiently. The bill, after protracted discussions in parliament, and between the government and the company, was carried; but it was necessary in 1786 to introduce another bill to amend it.

During that year Lord Macartney returned from India, and immediately received a challenge from General Stuart, whose strange conduct in command of the Madras army during the war with Tippoo has been already noticed. His lordship was wounded. The circumstance led to the formation by the company of regulations against duelling of a most stringent character.

After the brief service of Mr. Macpherson in the chair of the supreme council of Bengal, and the refusal of Lord Macartney to occupy it, the directors took measures to find an appropriate successor to Hastings. This task was a difficult one, and their choice eventually fell upon Lord Cornwallis. He was appointed governor-general and commander-in-chief, and was the first upon whom the duty devolved of carrying out the act of 1784. General Sloper, who had previously assumed the command in chief of the army, was recalled upon a pension.

In 1787 the company made their first arrangements for an overland mail. In the same year, means were arranged for securing an annual budget of Indian finance to lay before parliament.

In 1788, when the first struggles for liberty were indicated in France, fears were entertained in England that a war between the two countries would arise, from the principles put forth in popular assemblies in that country. The government of France was suspected of being anxious to divert the minds of the people from home topics to foreign conquests; and, as oriental dominion had always been a tempting object to the lovers of glory in France, reasonable fears were entertained in England that projects of fresh Indian wars would be matured. Lord Cornwallis saw,

or fancied he saw, symptoms of revived hope amongst some of the native princes that a coalition with some European power might be formed. He communicated these fears to the directors, and exercised increased vigilance upon the movements of the native chiefs, especially upon those of Tippoo Sultan. At this juncture, differences sprung up between the government at home and the court of directors, which led to intemperate discussions in the house of commons and among the proprietors of Indian stock.

In 1781 it had been decided by parliament that for every thousand men sent out for the defence of India by the government, the company should pay two lacs of rupees. Four regiments had been ordered to be raised for service in India in the latter part of 1787, and discussions arose as to the rank of the officers relative to those in the company's service. Petitions from the latter, as to the way in which they had been superseded and otherwise treated by the royal officers, caused discussions of an unpleasant nature in the court of directors, and a long, angry, and unsatisfactory correspondence between the government and the court resulted. In order to get rid of this difficulty, the directors declined accepting the services of the four regiments. The crown insisted on sending them out. The company refused, in that case, to pay for them. Thus matters stood when, on the 25th of February, 1788, Mr. Pitt brought in a bill to enable the crown to send out troops without the consent of the company, and to hold the company liable for their payment. The bill was opposed, and it ultimately passed both houses, containing clauses which limited the number of king's troops which might be sent to India, and maintained out of the revenue of that country.

In August, 1789, the directors appointed General Meadows to the government of Madras, and Colonel Robert Abercromby commander-in-chief of Bombay.

At the close of that year, the directors made arrangements to reduce their military establishments, no danger such as had been apprehended having arisen from the political state of France. Lord Cornwallis was urged to consult economy in the reduction of the number of troops, native and European. At that very juncture, a new and terrible war in India was imminent. It is remarkable how frequently, when the company were preparing for retrenchment in military expenses, the

political horizon became suddenly darkened and the thunder-cloud of war let loose its fires. Tippoo Sultan was once more preparing to brave the power of England.

The revenue settlements of Bengal occupied the attention of the directors as well as of the governor-general during 1789-90. What has been called the permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis received the approbation of the directors. The merits of Mr. Shore (the friend of Hastings) as a financier were brought out more fully than previously by the arrangements in connection with the permanent settlement. Mr. Pitt was greatly struck with the ability displayed, and his impressions of Mr. Shore's great talents led to that gentleman's selection as governor-general of Bengal, on the retirement of Lord Cornwallis. The permanent settlement was carried into effect by orders from the court of directors, in March, 1793, fulfilling one of the clauses of the bill of 1784, "That, to prevent future oppression, government were to be requested to fix an unalterable tribute rent." As the correspondence between Lord Cornwallis and the directors was frequent and their views concurrent, the measures taken by his government in civil affairs, although not originating at home, may in this chapter be properly referred to.

In 1793 district courts were established, for the satisfaction of litigants and the ends of justice. The same year his lordship invested the collection of revenue and the administration of justice in separate officers. In 1797 the British parliament substantially incorporated the regulations of Lord Cornwallis, in these and other respects, in an act for the internal government of Bengal. These "regulations" for the administration of law and revenue were mostly suggested by Hastings, in previous provisions of a less perfect order, according as circumstances arose in his day allowing of such.

Matters in India now assumed the aspect of impending war, and Lord Cornwallis prepared himself for the issue. In other chapters, the events of that war will be related; in this place, it will be only necessary to say that English interests were exposed to fresh dangers, and English arms obtained fresh triumphs. The conduct of Lord Cornwallis was approved both by the company and the parliament. Thanks and honours were lavished upon him, and if he received much praise he deserved much. The war which his lordship had conducted to such a successful issue did not receive such cordial support in parliament. The pacific declarations of the act of 1784 were called for in both houses, and read. A motion was made

reaffirming the policy of that clause, in, if possible, stronger terms. Amongst the most ardent supporters of this motion was Lord Rawdon, who afterwards himself, placed in India in circumstances very similar to those of Lord Cornwallis, acted similarly to that nobleman, and had his conduct brought in question in a like way. It may indeed be affirmed that most of the eminent men in the British parliament who were forward to condemn the servants of the crown and company in India, would, in the same circumstances, from motives of patriotism and justice, have felt themselves constrained to have acted an identical part.

On the 21st of September, 1792, the court of directors supposing that Lord Cornwallis would return to England sooner than he did, nominated Mr. Shore as his successor. The revolutionary proceedings in France alarmed the conservative susceptibilities of the English, and war was declared. Instructions to this effect were sent out to Lord Cornwallis, and were acted upon by his lordship with his usual wisdom and valour.

On the 23rd of January, 1793, the East India Company resolved, *nemine contradicente*, that the statue of Lord Cornwallis should be placed in the court-room of the India-house, in order "that his great services might be ever had in remembrance." In June following, another resolution was passed, also without a dissentient voice, granting his lordship an annuity of £5,000 as a reward for his services.

The year 1793 was one of importance to the East India Company, as the period approached when a new agreement must be made with the public. It soon became obvious that the just interests of the company, and those of India, were to be made subservient to political and interested parties at home, if their measures could be carried through parliament. The manufacturers of Manchester were not free-traders in 1793, and they raised a fierce clamour against the importation of piece-goods from India, and the exportation of any machinery to India, by which cotton cloth might be more cheaply produced. These demands were effectually resisted. The China trade of the company, was, however, brought under modifications less in the interest of the company, and more in favour of the public. The company's charter was renewed for twenty years in spite of all opposition, personal, political, and commercial.

Edmund Burke opposed the appointment of Mr. Shore, now made Sir John Shore, on the ground of his friendship for Hastings. It was supposed that the new governor-

general would exercise an influence in India, with the company, and with the government, adverse to the party of which Burke was the head in the matter of the impeachment of Hastings. "The chair" replied to Burke in terms of becoming dignity, maintaining their prerogative, asserting the obligation which rested on them to select such high officials on the ground of personal fitness, and repudiating on their part all party motives. Sir John Shore was in England when this discussion arose. He entered upon the duties of government on the 28th of October, 1793. Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby assumed the office of commander-in-chief, under the court's appointment of September, 1792.

Lord Hobart, who was a nominee of Mr. Dundas, was appointed to the government of Madras on the 23rd of October, 1793. He was also nominated governor-general in case of the removal, from any cause, of Sir John Shore. Sir Charles Oakley, who was superseded by Lord Hobart, was, as a mark of respect, empowered to retain the reins of office for one month after his lordship's arrival at Fort St. George.

The company, having had its attention directed to Birmah, advised a mission from Bengal to the King of Ava. Captain Symes effected the purposes of the mission entrusted to him, which gave great satisfaction to the governor-general in India, and the directors at home.

Mr. Duncan was appointed to the government of Bombay in 1795.

In 1796 important military arrangements took place in London, under the supervision of the directors, by which batta and other extra allowances were fixed, a recruiting depot established, furlough regulations made, and retirement allowances for officers ordained, the entire expense of which amounted to the large annual charge of £308,000. A singular sentence was written at this time in the company's communications with the government in Bengal:—"That in reasoning upon political events in India, all conclusions, from obvious causes, must be liable to great uncertainty."

Lieutenant-general Sir Alured Clarke was appointed second in council, and commander-in-chief at Madras. He was sent out in view of a renewed war with Tippoo.

On the 24th of October, 1797, Sir John Shore was raised to the Irish peerage, in reward of his able services in India. The title bestowed upon Sir John was an odd one in connection with an Irish peerage, as it was connected with an English seaport, his style and title was Baron Teignmouth. His lordship's new honour was hardly needed to sustain his influence in India, where he only for a short time continued after his new rank

was conferred. In March, 1798, he returned to England. Previous to the return of his lordship, the Marquis Cornwallis was again nominated for the governor-generalship in India. Lord Hotham was not expected to remain in India, so that his provisional appointment would be of no avail. There were many questions open which it was supposed the Marquis Cornwallis was especially qualified happily to close. The military arrangements which at so much cost the company had formed were not well received at Bengal. Differences which arose when Hastings was in the chair of supreme government, and Lord Macartney in that of Madras, between the councils of Calcutta and Fort St. George, still continued; the difficulties connected with the debts of the Nabob of Arcot appeared to be interminable. Bengal required a supervision such as it had recently obtained from Sir John Shore, and formerly from Lord Cornwallis. Such were the leading reasons assigned by the directors for wishing to send to India again the statesman and general with whose former administration they had been so well satisfied.

The Marquis Cornwallis did not proceed to Bengal as intended. The public interests in the British Isles required that some statesman of great abilities and amiable disposition should be placed at the head of the Irish government. Thither he went. A terrible insurrection raged in that unhappy country in 1798, followed by another, confined to the capital, in 1803, which was led by the amiable, gifted, brave, and patriotic Thomas Addis Emmet. The followers of Emmet did not partake of his noble spirit and honourable principles. They attacked Lord Cornwallis, unattended and unarmed, dragged him from his carriage, and nearly murdered him. When Emmet learned the event, he no longer hoped for his country. He believed that he had commanded men ambitious of being soldiers, but whose ambition was satisfied with the rank of assassins. It is but just to them, however, to state, that when they learned who their victim was, they cursed their own weapons, and bitterly repented of the deed. The earl survived the attempt upon his life, and was destined at a future period again to govern India.

When the company found it impossible to obtain the services of Lord Cornwallis, their attention was fixed upon the Earl of Mornington. This nobleman had formed a taste for the study of Indian history and Indian affairs. When at Eton his education was conducted under the superintendence of Archbishop Cornwallis, who then resided at the palace of Lambeth, where, from 1771 to 1779, he was accustomed to pass the holidays. At the



RICHARD, MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K.G. &c.

From a Painting by Sir T. Lawrence. P. R. A.

palace he frequently met the Earl of Cornwallis, and the members of his family, as they passed much of their time with the prelate, their kinsman.

When, in 1786, Earl Cornwallis assumed the governorship of Bengal, young Wellesley was led to conceive the idea that much interest was connected with the study of Indian literature and story. He had no purpose or notion of ever taking part in the affairs of that country, at all events, within the peninsula itself. In 1786, Lord Wellesley (as he then was) received the appointment of lord of the treasury. He then obtained a high reputation for scholarship, eloquence, and wisdom. In 1795 he was made one of the commissioners for the affairs of India. Up to 1797 he held both offices, and a seat in the privy council. The court of directors nominated him governor-general of India, and he accepted the charge. The common impression was that his lordship was unfit for the post, as ignorant altogether of Indian affairs. His able management in India afterwards, led to the impression that he must have been a man of surpassing genius to form, so soon after his arrival, such just conceptions of the great task he had undertaken. These impressions were erroneous, except so far as that the genius of this remarkable man was such that had he gone to India ignorant of its affairs, he would have probably grasped the great subject, and mastered it under every disadvantage.

Every circumstance relating to the connection of such a man with India is interesting. M. Auber gives the following account of the outward voyage, its varied and important incidents, and the unexpected circumstances which furnished the earl with important information:—"Lord Wellesley had been requested to make a short stay in Madras, for the purpose of effecting a modification of the treaty with his highness the Nabob of Arcot, in 1792. But as great importance was attached to an exact observance of treaties with the native powers, a principle so honourably established under the administration of Lord Cornwallis, no exertion of any other power than that of persuasion was to be used for the purpose of inducing the nabob to adopt any alteration of the treaty. Lord Wellesley embarked at Portsmouth on *La Virginie* frigate, on the 9th November, and on the 29th arrived at Madeira, where he was received with every mark of attention by the Portuguese authorities. On the following day the *Niger* frigate, with the *Surat Castle*, having on board Sir John Anstruther, who was proceeding to Bengal as chief-justice, accompanied by the whole of the convoy,

arrived off the island. In the night the ships of the fleet were obliged to slip their cables and put to sea, to avoid the effects of a sudden and tremendous storm. Lord Wellesley arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in February, 1798, where he met with Major Kirkpatrick, the late resident at the court of Hyderabad, which post that officer had been constrained to quit, and to repair to the Cape for the benefit of his health. Lord Wellesley was, in some measure, aware that the increase of the French influence had occasioned considerable apprehension in the mind of Lord Teignmouth before he left India. His lordship, therefore, embraced the opportunity which the meeting with Major Kirkpatrick presented, to frame and submit a series of questions to that officer, whose replies enabled his lordship to form a more correct estimate of the importance to be attached to the subject. The result of his deliberations was communicated in a letter to Mr. Dundas, accompanied by his lordship's opinion on the value of the Cape, and more especially that of the island of Ceylon, to the interests of Great Britain. Ceylon had been placed under the Madras government since its capture in 1796. Accounts having reached Fort George, in January, 1798, that the chief of the insurgents was in communication with the court at Kandy, and that apprehensions were entertained that the rebellious chiefs and the king might unite with the French and Dutch against the British interests, Lord Hobart proceeded to Columbo, in company with Admiral Rainier, on the 7th of July, for the purpose of securing those interests. Having effected the objects of his visit, he returned to Madras, and on the 18th announced his intention to relinquish the government, and to proceed to Europe. General Harris, the commander-in-chief at Fort St. George, succeeded provisionally to the government. In reparation for the disappointment and loss occasioned to Lord Hobart, who it could not be supposed would remain after two successors had been nominated to the office of governor-general since his lordship's appointment as successor to Sir John Shore, in 1793, an unanimous resolution was passed by the directors, on the 8th of August, granting him a pension of £1,500 per annum, to commence from the time of his quitting Madras: which resolution was confirmed by the general court, on the 6th of December, when the thanks of the company were also unanimously voted to his lordship for his able and meritorious conduct in the government of Fort St. George. In the same month, the court of directors appointed Lord Clive (now Earl Powis) his successor. The question regarding the go-

vernment of Ceylon was yet undecided; but there were reasons to believe that it would be assumed by the crown. The Honourable Frederick North, in anticipation of this decision, having arrived at Bombay, addressed a private letter to Lord Wellesley, as he considered his lordship might be called to account 'for the arrival in India of a person unhoused, unappointed, unannealed,' who, with seven or eight more of his majesty's servants, in embryo, like himself, had no security for their employment but the word of ministers."* The island being declared a king's possession, Mr. North was confirmed in the government.

Lord Wellesley landed at Madras in April, 1798. On the 18th of May he reached Calcutta, and assumed his government. Scarcely had the governor-general arrived at his post, when the directors sent out the most rigorous instructions for his conduct. Tippoo was still the bugbear of "their honours," and they advised the noble governor not to wait for a declaration of war on the part of Tippoo, but if they found him engaged in any political coquetry with the French, war was to be declared forthwith. The directors were, no doubt, influenced in giving these directions by the advice of Lord Teignmouth. The company had arrived at the conviction, which was expressed at this period by General Craig—"A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India."

The year 1798 is rendered remarkable in Indian history by the fact, that in it the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, left England for Madras at the head of the 33rd regiment, and embarked at Fort St. George on the 15th of August. So active were the measures of Lord Wellesley, that the court of directors were kept in continuous correspondence and in anxious consideration of his despatches, although, at the same time, their confidence never for a moment wavered, however vast the magnitude of the conceptions, the plans, or the undertakings of his lordship. The grand source of alarm to the directors was the French. Often as they had been beaten, they still survived in India, and with wonderful elasticity rose to influence again. With an exceedingly small amount of territory, they yet continued to form connections the most potential with the native courts, and to land stores of war and military forces dangerous exceedingly to the power of England when used to strengthen some great native power at war with her. Mogul, vizier, Mahratta, nabob, sultan, or rajah, whoever possessed French alliance, was formidable to England; and although England always won in the long run, the race of competition was

* Auber's *Rise and Progress of the East India Company*, vol. ii. chap. v. p. 163.

often close. France nowhere displayed against England an energy so unflagging as in India. Hence, the first care of the directors ever was to provide security against French influence, and by diplomacy to dissuade, or by battle to deter, all native princes from confederacy with France. These principles operated upon the court of directors in 1798-99 with more powerful influence than ever before: hence, every movement of the Earl of Mornington was watched from London with eager anxiety. His lordship's own mind was the reflex of the general mind of the company and of the country; and therefore his policy was popular in Britain, and met with the earnest and confiding support of the directors. The noble earl's government and policy sustained the favour they at first received. Both houses of parliament, the directors, and the proprietary of the company testified repeatedly and enthusiastically their respect for his lordship, and gratitude for his services; and when at length his labours terminated, he was rewarded with a pension of £5,000 a-year as a tribute to his renown, and an acknowledgment of the great advantages he had conferred on the company.

During the year 1800 the services of Colonel Wellesley became highly appreciated by the court of directors and the government, by a variety of independent operations, which, although on a minor scale, were of great difficulty, and required a sound judgment and ready address.

Such were the leading events connected with the home proceedings of the company, and in relation to the company, during the part of the 18th century the home history of which has not been written in previous chapters. It has been thought judicious to place the account of the relation of the government and the company at home during this period before the reader in a connected form, although so many great changes took place in India. The reader, having before his mind the whole outline of the company's affairs at home, the history of the leading official appointments, and the views of the directors, will be prepared to understand more clearly the conduct and policy of public servants in India, and to connect them with the mighty issues of war and peace in the peninsula. When the 18th century closed, English progress in India had made for itself already a grand page in history; British interests there had become vast, complicated, and profound; and a future was opened for the ambition and usefulness of England into which it was possible to look, as through a vista, however obscure the detail of the prospect, and however veiled its remoter forms.

CHAPTER XCII.

MR. MACPHERSON SUCCEEDS HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—HIS FINANCIAL MEASURES—TIPPOO DEFEATS THE MAHRATTAS—LORD MACARTNEY SURRENDERS THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS AND REFUSES THAT OF BENGAL—AMBITION OF SCINDIAH—THE SIKHS BECOME IMPORTANT—EARL CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—HIS GENERAL MEASURES—TIPPOO INVADES TRAVANCORE.

THE last two chapters related the progress of home events connected with the East India Company, in such a manner as to bring before the reader the principal official personages in India from the period when Hastings retired from Bengal to the close of the century. The domestic policy of the Marquis of Cornwallis was also stated. The outline thus given of the proceedings and policy of the directors renders it unnecessary to dwell upon official changes and contests in India, so that the chapters relating the history of India during the fifteen years which intervened between the retirement of Hastings and the beginning of the nineteenth century, may be occupied with the great political events which influenced so much the progress of the English and the destinies of the native states.

When Mr. Hastings withdrew from the government, Mr. Macpherson, as has been already shown, assumed the presidency of the supreme council. Scarcely had that gentleman taken upon him the onerous charge of governing India, when he found himself surrounded by fresh intrigues and difficulties among the native states. The condition of these states was restless as the sea. Scarcely was one movement quelled than another more disturbed began. No general policy could secure peace. The directions from home, the instructions from government house at Calcutta, were for peace; but the elements of disturbance were susceptible and powerful, and there were always influences to act upon them. The Mahrattas were rapidly rising into supremacy. Madajee Scindiah was the most potent of all the chiefs of that remarkable people, and his office of vakeel-ul-muluck to the Mogul greatly increased his influence. On the 27th of March Agra surrendered to Madajee, which he held in the name of the Mogul emperor. After his conquest of that great capital he marched for Delhi with the Mogul, detained only by the fortress of Allyghur, which had been armed and provisioned for twelvemonths, and which Scindiah could not approach except to reconnoitre.

Mr. Anderson was at this time the company's agent to the Mogul, and was, therefore, at head-quarters in the Mahratta camp. He found Scindiah so exalted by his conquests,

his assumed vicegerency of the Mogul dominions, and the services he had rendered to the English as mediator between them and the Mahratta confederation in the late Mahratta war, that he began to treat the company's officers with disrespect, and bore himself in such way to Mr. Anderson that he prepared to leave the Mahratta camp. Scindiah, alarmed for the moment at the probable consequences of driving away an agent and envoy of England by insult, offered many assurances that he had intended no affront. Mr. Anderson was induced to remain, but charged the Mahratta chief with meditating war against the company. Scindiah, placing his open hand upon his sword, said, "By my sword I swear I have no intention to make war." This, coming from a chief of such warlike and haughty reputation, caused Mr. Anderson to hope that no feud would break out between the company and the Mahratta power. Still Scindiah showed various tokens of hostility to the English. Among them that which excited most suspicion was the resistance which he offered to the residence of an English agent at the court of the Peishwa. This agent, Mr. Mallett, was sent from Bombay to Poonah; Scindiah received him with respect, but objected to his permanent residence at that capital. The comparative proximity of Poonah to Bombay, and the great amount of commercial business between the two places rendered a resident agent essential. A distance of eight hundred miles would be traversed, if Scindiah were the only medium of communication between the company and the Mahrattas. The supreme government determined to insist upon the recognition of the agent sent by them to the court of the Peishwa. The views of Scindiah against Tippoo Sultan tended further to sow dissatisfaction between him and the supreme council. The conduct of Tippoo to the Mahrattas was provocative of war. Hyder Ali had been little more than a nominal Mohammedan; he had little regard to "God or the prophet," if the will of either, as represented to him, stood in the way of his policy. Tippoo's principles were, on the contrary, drawn from the Koran. He believed himself to have been raised up as an avenger of the faithful, and a scourge of the infidels,

and he made all the native states around him feel his wrath. The Mahrattas were heathen, and Tippoo believed that to convert such, under the threat of sword and fire, was a praiseworthy action. He was a Mohammedan fanatic, and infuriated in his fanaticism. He found means of compelling some sixty thousand Mahratta subjects, in one of the outlying provinces of that strange empire, to embrace Mohammedanism; and he put to death some thousands of Brahmins who refused to become followers of the prophet. His fury against native Christians rivalled that of the most terrible persecutors among the Roman emperors. Scindiah was as anxious to unite with the English in the chastisement of Tippoo, as he was to unite with any other power or powers for the humiliation of the English. The indications of the working of these desires in his mind rapidly increased.

In July, 1785, Scindiah made proposals for an alliance between the English, the Nizam of the Deccan, and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas against Tippoo. The supreme government at Calcutta would neither listen to these overtures, nor permit the government of Bombay to do so. Scindiah considered this a breach of treaty; the supreme government thought so too, but were compelled to bow to the new act of parliament. The fierce Mahratta knew nothing of the parliament, but considered the English in India as a power which could not be bound to engagements, as when they became inconvenient or expensive, there were orders from home, from company, king, or parliament, which were made a pretext for violating such agreements. Tippoo and the Mahrattas fought it out, and the former was the conqueror. Scindiah was recalled to Poonah by the Peishwa, but refused obedience, and maintained ambitious wars on his own account. Pleading an especial treaty with the English, they reluctantly entered into an ambiguous agreement, promising aid to him as a Mahratta chief, but refusing to be compromised by his engagements with the Nizam. Thus complicated, during the government of Mr. Macpherson, were the connections of the English with the Mahrattas; while the latter by their own especial complications with the Mogul, the Sikhs, the vizier of Oude, and Tippoo, were involving the English in the meshes of an inextricable entanglement with native states, except so far as the judgment of Mr. Macpherson averted such confusion. This it was not in his power to do wholly, for the force of circumstances was too strong for him; but he showed much good sense and tact, and had considerable success in his measures to preserve peace, and keep the company free from the embroilments from

which none of the native states were long exempt.

The intrigues and activities of Scindiah continued; his quarrels were as widespread as India itself, and his fortunes were chequered:—"The vicissitudes of the different parties disputing for the last fragments of the Mogul empire were so sudden and incessant, that they baffled the keenest political foresight. Scindiah, after holding the power of prime minister for two years, was expelled from his office by a new combination of the Mogul chiefs. His army was defeated, and he himself obliged to fly to his own dominions. He was succeeded by various nobles, amongst whom was the infamous Gholam Kadir, by whom Shah Alem was deposed and blinded. This outrage brought Scindiah again to Delhi; but the consolidated power of the British rendered him less formidable than he had been. The Prince Juwan Bukht, after several vain attempts to engage Nawab Vizir and the British government to aid him, and after one unsuccessful effort, in 1787, to re-establish himself at Delhi by force of arms, returned to Delhi, and died suddenly in 1788."*

Amidst the general confusion and intrigues of native powers, the Sikhs at this time became prominent. While Mr. Anderson was at the camp of Scindiah, a person in the garb of a merchant came to his "Moolavee," and after offering to sell him some cloths, stated that he had rare jewels to show him in private. On withdrawing to examine the precious stones, the pretended merchant disclosed himself as a confidential messenger of Dooljah Singh, the Sikh chief. He stated that his prince was anxious for friendship with the English, as a protection against the ever-spreading encroachments of the Mahrattas. He informed Mr. Anderson that thirty thousand Sikhs were dispersed in various disguises between Pamput and Delhi, and ready to make a powerful demonstration at any well-concerted juncture. Mr. Anderson informed his government, which was anxious to avoid giving offence to the Mahrattas, and yet solicitous to avoid aiding by any indirect measure their progress. Mr. Hastings had foreseen that the great struggle in southern India, and in all India from Delhi to Madras, must ultimately be with them. He objected to any opposition to them, which by being premature, would impair the resources of the company, and consolidate the rival power. His successor was guided by these views, although he had never rendered to Mr. Hastings, an effectual or generous support in that or any other department of his policy. Ultimately a pacific solution of the jealousies

* Franklin's *Shah Aulum*, p. 159.

and differences between the Mahrattas and the Sikhs led to the latter placing five thousand horse at the service of the former, in case of any attack upon them by Tippoo.

Lord Macartney proceeded to Calcutta in June, 1785, on business connected with the pecuniary obligations of the Nabob of the Carnatic. While at Calcutta he learned that he had been nominated by the court of directors as the successor of Mr. Hastings. His lordship declined accepting the honour, although it was one he had long desired; and Mr. Macpherson as senior member of council, *ex-officio*, remained at the head of the government. The resignation of Lord Macartney led to the appointment of Earl Cornwallis, as governor-general, and Mr. Macpherson resigned the post which, as a *locum tenens*, he had so well filled. His administration was marked by the settlement of Penang as an English colony. The British cabinet recommended him to his majesty for a baronetcy. His services have been well summed up by Dr. H. Wilson in the following passage:—"With regard to Scindiah, the only important transaction that took place with him, was his demand on behalf of Shah Aulum, of the tribute due to the Mogul, to the amount of four millions sterling. The demand was civilly, but peremptorily resisted by Sir John Macpherson's government, not, as might be supposed from the loose manner in which it is alluded to in the text, by that of Hastings. The leading feature of Sir John Macpherson's administration, however, was the eminent success which attended his efforts to reduce public expenditure, and re-establish public credit. In a minute in the secret department, dated 15th December, 1785, it is stated that a comparison of the receipts and disbursements of the year ending 30th April, 1786, exhibit a deficit of about £1,300,000. The arrears due to the armies of the three presidencies, were about two millions. The ascertained Bengal debt alone, was about four millions. The troops at Madras and Bombay were in a state of utter destitution, and some of them in open mutiny, from the great amount of their arrears. In this situation, the government of Bengal declared itself responsible for the debts of the three presidencies. All remittances of cash from the collectors' treasuries, were prohibited, until the arrears of troops within or near their districts, had been discharged. All civil servants, civil surgeons, and unceonanted servants, drawing more than 300 rupees per month, were to be paid their salaries and all their arrears, with certificates bearing interest at 8 per cent. per annum until cashed. All issues of paper, on account of the company,

except the company's bonds, were ordered to be registered, the registry was to be published, and the paper was to be paid off in the order of its issue. The cash accumulating in the treasuries was to form a fund, by which the certificates and other paper were dischargeable; and under these arrangements, the governor-general and council publicly expressed their expectations, that 'all the paper in currency at the end of 1785, would be paid off in the course of twelve months, through funds derivable from the amount of the reductions made in the established charges of the government, aided by the effects of these regulations, and the additional resources to be derived from the upper provinces.' These measures were made known to the public by advertisement in the *Official Calcutta Gazette*, 29th December, 1785, and 15th January, 1786. The orders were followed up by subsidiary arrangements, which completely altered the aspect of affairs. 'Every man in the settlement,' observed a competent authority on the spot, 'witnessed the magical effects of this measure. It operated like a charm in restoring public confidence, which once secured, this moving-fund acquired life and activity. At no remote period from the commencement of the plan, treasury certificates could raise cash in the market at a discount less than the legal interest of the money. I shall ever bear grateful testimony of the salutary relief from ruin, which the measure afforded to me, and to every trader in the settlement.*' In a letter to the governor of Madras, from the governor-general, dated 20th May, 1786, he writes, 'In our reductions of expense, which have been very great (25 lacs), £1,250,000, I shall have cold praise, and a thousand secret enemies.' He received, however, in November, 1786, the unanimous thanks of the court of directors, for his able administration of the affairs of India, and was raised by his majesty to the dignity of a baronet. It was during the government of Sir John Macpherson, that, by an amicable arrangement with the King of Queda, the valuable settlement of Penang, or Prince of Wales' Island, was added to the company's eastern possessions."

On the 12th of September, 1786, Earl Cornwallis landed at Calcutta, and immediately took charge of the government. His investigations of the condition of the revenue were prompt, and his report to the directors was, that the department was worked in a manner the most unsatisfactory. The company's paper was at a discount; the estimated

* Prinsep's *Proposal of a Substitute for Funding*, 1797.

and actual receipts of revenue were utterly discrepant, the former was stated as 92 lacs 59,000 rupees, but the actual receipt into "the khalsa" was calculated as 66 lacs 12,000 rupees. The debt was 6 crore 24 lacs, and bore interest at $8\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. per annum. A month after his assumption of government, his lordship declared that the expenses of the establishments of the presidencies absorbed the whole revenue, and that investments for trading purposes could only be made by issuing paper, which would increase the evil. The native chiefs had heard of the fame of the new governor, and many of them repaired to Calcutta to pay their respects. The vizier sent his minister, Hyder Beg Khan, Mohammed Reza Khan, the nabob Mobarek-ul-Dowlah, and the Shah-zada; each sought a personal interview.

Among the early communications of Lord Cornwallis to the directors, there were severe animadversions upon the condition of the company's army. Physically the natives were superior to the European recruits, according to his representations, and morally they were no worse, perhaps better. His lordship considered the loyalty of the sepoy doubtful.

In February, 1787, Sir Archibald Campbell, entered into a new and especial arrangement with the Nabob of the Carnatic for the defence of his territory. The nabob was to contribute "to the peace establishment," per year, nine lacs of rupees. In time of war, the company was to undertake the defence of the province, the nabob seeing to the payment of revenue. The great advantage of this arrangement was, that it prevented the divided councils and interests, which had previously, especially in time of war, so much embarrassed the relations of the company with the nabob. A treaty similar to the former was made by the same diplomatist with Ameer Singh, the Rajah of Tanjore.

These important treaties were followed by another, in July of the same year, with Asoff-ul-Dowlah, the vizier nabob of Oude. The noble earl at the head of the company's affairs, resolved that no interference with the internal affairs of the nabob's government should take place during his administration. His lordship forgave the vizier certain arrears due to the company, and urged upon him a more just administration of law in his dominions, and a system less oppressive to his people, pointing out, that from the contiguity of the territories, and the peculiar relations of the nabob and the company, oppression and injustice in Oude would endanger the security of that province, and thereby the territory of Bengal. In 1788 a treaty of commerce with

the vizier was effected on principles which both governments regarded as equitable and advantageous.

In 1788 Lord Cornwallis directed the attention of the company to the conduct and disposition of Tippoo, declaring that in case of a war in Europe between England and France, the latter power would be sure to ally itself with Tippoo, and as a consequence the Carnatic would once more be the theatre of a desperate and dangerous struggle. The Earl of Cornwallis felt convinced that a war between England and France was imminent, and his lordship knew that the intense desire of France to found an oriental empire was not diminished by former disappointment, disaster, and defeat. His lordship, on these grounds, intimated to the directors his purpose of watching Tippoo with unremitting vigilance. The governor-general was much engaged during the latter part of 1788, in negotiations with the nizam (or soubahdar) of the Deccan. Territory belonging to the English by treaty, was surrendered by his highness, and dubious passages in existing treaties settled and defined.

In July, 1789, an understanding was come to between the governor-general and the nizam, that a British contingent should be at the service of his highness, on condition that it should not be employed against any native state with which the company was at peace.

In 1788 Tippoo, aware that he was an object of jealousy and suspicion to the English, became peevish and affrontful to their agents. He also acted in an aggressive way towards the rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore. He advanced towards the Malabar coast in a manner most menacing to the Travancore rajah, and instigated the Rajah of Cochin to claim the ground upon which "the lines of Travancore" were built. The Rajah of Travancore addressed a requisition for troops to the commander-in-chief of the British forces of Madras, upon hearing which, Tippoo retired upon Seringapatam. It was clear that the period rapidly approached when Tippoo and the English must try their relative strength once more upon the field of battle. Before, however, the trumpet of war summoned him to the scenes of strife, Earl Cornwallis had opportunity to devote his time to the adjustment of the "permanent settlement," in conjunction with the celebrated Mr. Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth. The measures of these two eminent persons required a number of years to mature. The arrangements for civil judicature, magistracy, and police, which ultimately gave an historical interest to the administration of Lord Cornwallis were discussed by him, and

the foundation laid for their execution in the interval of peace, which took place between the first symptoms of a renewed struggle on the part of Tippoo, and the bursting forth of the impetuous torrent of his hostility.

The hour at length arrived when war with Tippoo must be proclaimed, however reluctant the governor-general to proceed to extremities, however desperate the state of Indian finance, and notwithstanding the peaceful resolutions of the English parliament in 1784, in reference to Indian affairs, and the consequent instructions to Earl Cornwallis to avoid by all means complications which would lead to war.

The precise circumstances out of which the war arose are sufficiently set forth in the formal demands of Tippoo upon the Rajah of Travancore, and the reply of the rajah. The demands, however, were only pretexes on the part of Tippoo to cover designs of aggrandizement. He set up pretensions for the sake of blinding the English government as to his real wishes. In this he succeeded, so far as the Madras government was concerned, which recognised the justness of Tippoo's demands, without any investigation of the merits of the case. The supreme council, however, certified themselves of all the particulars, pronounced the demands of Tippoo unjust, and his allegations false. All the native states in Southern India took the same view. The supreme government also pronounced heavy censure upon the want of intelligence and the pusillanimity, indolence, and neglect of duty on the part of the Madras government, several of the members of which it was necessary to displace:—"Towards the end of October, 1789, the army of Tippoo was known to be encamped in the neighbourhood of Palgaut; and the rajah was confirmed in his expectation of an attack. On the 14th of December, Tippoo arrived at a place about twenty-five miles distant from the boundary of Travancore, and the ravages of his cavalry were carried within a mile of the wall. On the following day a vakel, a sort of character in which the capacities of a messenger and negotiator were compounded, arrived from the camp of the sultan, bearing a letter to the rajah. It contained the annunciation of Tippoo's demands: that, as the rajah had given protection within his dominions to certain rajahs, and other refractory subjects of the Mysore government, he should deliver them up, and in future abstain from similar offences. 2. That as the Dutch had sold to him that which was not theirs to sell, he should withdraw his troops from Cranganore. 3. That he should demolish that part of his lines which crossed the territory of Cochin, because it be-

longed to the kingdom of Mysore. The rajah replied: 1. That the rajahs of whose protection the sultan complained had obtained an asylum in his country, because they were his relations, at the distance of many years; that no objection to their residence had ever been taken before; that to prove his amicable disposition, they should nevertheless be removed; and that no refractory subject of the Mysore government had ever, with his knowledge, been harboured in Travancore. 2. That the fort and territory which he had purchased from the Dutch belonged to the Dutch, and was in no respect the property of the dependent of Tippoo. 3. That the ground on which he had erected his lines was ceded to him in full sovereignty by the Rajah of Cochin before that rajah became tributary to the sovereign of Mysore; and that the lines, existing at the time when he was included in the late treaty between the English and the sultan, were sanctioned by the silence of that important deed.*"

The events which immediately followed are summed up with precision, and with admirable condensation by Mill:—"On the 24th of December Tippoo encamped at not more than four miles' distance from the lines; began to erect batteries on the 25th; early in the morning of the 29th turned by surprise the right flank of the lines, where no passage was supposed to exist; and introduced a portion of his army within the wall. Before he could reach the gate which he intended to open, and at which he expected to admit the rest of his army, his troops were thrown into confusion by some slight resistance, and fled in disorder, with a heavy slaughter, across the ditch. Tippoo himself was present at the attack, and, not without personal danger, made his escape.

"Intelligence of these events was received by the supreme government from Madras on the 26th of January; and on the morrow instructions were despatched to that presidency. The governor-general expressed his expectation that the Madras rulers had considered Tippoo as at war, from the first moment when they heard of the attack; that they had diligently executed the measures which he had formerly prescribed; and in particular, that all payments to the nabob's creditors, and all disbursements on the score of investment, had immediately ceased. He added, that his intention was to employ all the resources which were within his reach 'to exact a full reparation from Tippoo for this wanton and unprovoked violation of treaty.'"

The efforts of the governor-general to form especial alliances with the Mahrattas and with

* Mill; Thornton; Auber.

the Nizam of the Deccan became at once urgent. The Mahrattas were so powerful that it became absolutely necessary to engage them on the side of the English. A junction between the Mahratta states and Tippoo would have compelled the Nizam (as the Soubahdar of the Deccan had become universally styled), to join the confederacy. With any amount of French aid, there could be but little hope of the English company, in the low state of its finance, being able to hold its own. The first serious victories gained by such an alliance would cause all the native states in India to make common cause against the British. The Mahrattas had been humiliated so recently by Tippoo in the field—such fanatical outrages in the name of Mohammed had been perpetrated upon Mahratta tribes by the orders, or direct cruelty of Tippoo, and so great had become his power, that the Poonah government was willing to pledge the Peishwa to alliance with the English. The Nizam's wishes lay in the same direction; but he feared, such robbers were the Mahrattas, that they would invade his territory as soon as it was denuded of troops in the common cause. This delayed all action on the part of the government of Hyderabad. The Nizam was willing to march at once against Tippoo, if Lord Cornwallis would guarantee his territory against Mahratta invasion. His lordship dared not do that, from fear of offending the power against whom the guarantee was demanded. His lordship's diplomacy was surrounded by difficult and delicate conditions, and rare courage and address were required to bring out the company's "raj" safe through elements so conflicting.

The noble earl at the head of the government succeeded in accomplishing all that was necessary in the relations which he established with these rival powers. When the tidings of his measures reached England, the court of directors passed resolutions of satisfaction. The house of commons, having demanded explanations from the board of control, and manifested generally displeasure that war under any circumstances should break out with Tippoo, received with satisfaction the answers given by the president of the board of control, and expressed their approbation by a vote on the 2nd of March, 1791, in the following terms:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house that the treaties entered into with the Nizam on the 1st of June, and with the Mahrattas on the 7th of July, are wisely calculated to add vigour to the operations of war, and to promote the future tranquillity of India, and that the faith of the British nation is pledged to the due performance of engagements contained in the said treaties."

A considerable party in parliament which did not object to the treaties, as contingent upon a war necessary and unavoidable, were of opinion that the war with Tippoo could have been averted, and wished to press parliament to a declaration to that effect. These movements arose from party opposition to the board of control, as a branch of the general government, on the part of some, and from jealousy of the East India Company, which always to a considerable extent existed in the commons. The result of the discussions which ensued were the following declarations:—

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the attacks made by Tippoo Sultan on the lines of Travancore on the 29th December, 1789, 6th March, and 15th April, 1790, were unwarranted and unprovoked infractions of the treaty entered into at Mangalore on the 10th March, 1784."

"Resolved, That it appears to this house, that the conduct of the Governor-general of Bengal, in determining to prosecute with vigour the war against Tippoo Sultan, in consequence of the attack on the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, was highly meritorious."

The governments of Madras and Bombay, which were most immediately concerned, were utterly unprepared for war. The council of Madras was full of apprehension, ready to submit to any terms Tippoo might dictate. Had it not been for the firm intervention of the supreme government, the honour and interests of the company would have been irredeemably compromised.

Sir Thomas Munro* thus noticed the helplessness of the Madras government, the feebleness of its measures, and the impolicy of the unpreparedness for war in which the presidencies most concerned then were. Sir Thomas wrote from Amboor in January, 1790:—"A second attack is daily expected, and if the king is left alone, all his exertions against a force so superior can delay but for a very short time his ruin. The English battalions were behind the lines, but not at the place attacked: and it is said they have orders not to act, even on the defensive. If such be the case, the Rajah ought to dismiss them with scorn. The distinction made between recent acquisitions and ancient territory appears to be a subterfuge of government to cloak their dread of war under a pretended love of peace, for Cranganore was a fair purchase of the Dutch from the Rajah of Cochin, subject to an annual tribute of thirty-five rupees. Before we can assemble an army to face the enemy, Tippoo may be in possession

* Not to be confounded with Sir Hector Monro.

of Travancore. We have derived but little benefit from experience and misfortune. The year 1790 sees us as little prepared as that of 1780, and before the war. We shall commence the war under the disadvantage of a want of magazines. The distresses and difficulties which we then encountered from them, has not cured us of the narrow policy of preferring a small present saving to a certain, though future, great and essential advantage.*

Upon this letter, as illustrated by the events which followed, M. Auber thus remarks:—"Every word of this letter was almost prophetic. In the following spring Tippoo effected his objects. He subdued Travancore, laid waste the country, and took the fortresses of Cranganore and Jaycottah, possessing himself of all the northern portions of the province of Travancore. The conduct of the Madras government, during these proceedings, excited the strongest indignation in the mind of Lord Cornwallis. His lordship reprobated the supineness which they had manifested in making preparations to support the rajah, and adverting to the general state of the company's affairs on the coast, determined to take temporary charge of the government of Fort St. George, but relinquished his intentions on learning that General Meadows had been appointed to succeed Mr. Holland as governor."

General Meadows arrived on the 20th of February, 1790, and on March 31st, wrote the following despatch to the directors:—"I found things in that state of confusion that is generally attendant on a change of systems. Whether a civil or a military governor is best, I shall not take upon me to determine; but either is certainly better, I conceive, than neither or both. We have a long arrear both from and to us. His highness the nabob is so backward in his payments, so oppressive to his polygars, that at this time it is so necessary to have on our side, that I conceive it will be absolutely necessary, upon his first material delay of payment, to take the management of his country into your own hands: a measure, in spite of the opposition to it, so advantageous to you, the country, and even to his highness himself, when so wisely projected and ably executed by Lord Macartney. I came here at a most critical period, with many things of importance to decide upon in a less time than many prudent people would have thought necessary to decide upon one: but the approaching war with Tippoo was one of the most important. I heard and read all upon the subject a short time would allow of, and then adopted the plan laid down by Colonel Musgrave, which

* Private letters.

I thought the best, and which, from circumstances, it was very probable he would have to execute himself; for, in the present situation of the government, it is impossible I would leave it. I conceive the expense will be six lacs of pagodas a month, and can conceive anything but how or where we shall get the money, even stopping investments, &c. However unfortunate a war is, it should be made if possible short, brilliant, and decisive."

The suspension of the inefficient members of council, and the appointment of others in whom Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows had confidence, enabled the general before his despatch was sent away, to express his intention of leaving the government in the hands of the newly constituted council while he took the field against the enemy.

These letters of Sir Thomas Munro and General Meadows will make sufficiently clear to the reader the state of the English at Madras on the eve of the conflict in which they were once more destined to be conquerors.

The despatch of General Meadows gave great satisfaction to the directors, who entertained the highest confidence in the good sense and manly judgment of the general, as they also did in the statesmanlike qualities of Earl Cornwallis.

The war with Tippoo must occupy a separate chapter. It is in this only necessary to relate, that the preparations for bringing the Mysorean chief to subjection were on a large scale as compared with those attending other Indian wars. General Meadows placed himself at the head of fifteen thousand men, assembled in the Carnatic. His plan of operations was to march to Coimbatore, and afterwards to enter Mysore, while the Mahrattas and the army of the Deccan operated upon the north of the Mysorean territory. General Abercromby, at the head of eight thousand men, was concentrated upon the Bombay frontier to invade the possessions of Tippoo in the Ghauts. The council of Madras delegated to General Meadows, as governor of that presidency and commander-in-chief of its armies, the power of directing and conducting the war, and authority to make treaties or stipulations with the polygars of the Carnatic, who upon Tippoo's frontier were disposed to join him, and such as upon the Travancore borders were at least hostile to the rajah. It was supposed that the nairs, especially certain of that order subject to Tippoo, could be induced to render the British an effectual support, and the governor had full authority conceded to him to enter into agreements with them.

The general joined his army on the 7th of May. "The centre army," as the despatches

call a force under Colonel Kelly, was ordered to take the field in July, to preserve the Carnatic itself from marauding and desultory incursions of the irregular Mysorean cavalry. In October, the command of this force devolved upon Colonel Maxwell, on the death

of the commander just named. At that time the arrears of revenue to meet the expenses of the war, amounted to twenty-two lacs of pagodas. Such were the preliminaries of another great war with a great native power in India.

CHAPTER XCIII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—SUCCESSSES OF COLONEL STUART—INVASION OF MYSORE—REVERSES OF THE BRITISH—INVASION OF THE CARNATIC BY THE SULTAN—SUCCESSSES OF THE BOMBAY ARMY ON THE COAST OF MALABAR—ALARM AT MADRAS AND CALCUTTA—ARRIVAL OF EARL CORNWALLIS AT MADRAS.

THE importance, political and military, of not permitting Travancore to fall under the dominion of Tippoo, must be obvious to the reader who studies its situation on the map of India, and observes its relative position to the territories then held by the Sultan of Mysore, and by the East India Company:—"The territory of the Rajah of Travancore commences near the island of Vipeen, at the mouth of the Chinnamangalum river, about twenty miles to the north of Cochin. From this point it extends to the southern extremity of India, bounded on the west by the sea, and on the east by the celebrated chain of mountains which terminate near the southern cape. The situation of this prince made a connection between him and the English of importance to both: he was placed at so great a distance that he had little to apprehend from the encroachments of the company; his country, which was only separated from their province of Tinnivelly by the ridge of mountains, formed a barrier to the invasion of an enemy into that province, and through that province into the Carnatic itself; the support of the company was necessary to preserve the rajah against the designs of such powerful and rapacious neighbours as Hyder Ali and his son; the productiveness of his dominions enabled him to contribute considerably to the military resources of the English; and, in the last war with Hyder, his co-operation had been sufficiently extensive to entitle him to be inserted in the treaty with Tippoo under the character of an ally. The descent of Tippoo, with an army, into the western country, filled the rajah with apprehensions. He was the only prey on that side of the Ghauts, opposite the dominions of Tippoo, which remained undevoured; and the only obstruction to the extension of his dominions from the Mahratta frontier to Cape Comorin—an extension attended with the highly-coveted advantage of placing him in contact with Tinnivelly, the

most distant and most defenceless part of the English possessions in Coromandel."*

The importance of the territory thus described, and the dangerous policy of Tippoo, having determined the English to make war, it was at once energetically prosecuted. Lord Cornwallis relied much upon his native allies. The Mahrattas had already proved themselves formidable enemies even against English armies, and the Nizam of the Deccan possessed numerous troops, and, as the representative of the Mogul, possessed a certain influence over the religious prejudices of Mussulmen in the south of India. The directors had, however, with more judgment, than their servants in India displayed when courting connection with the government of "the soubah" (as they were accustomed to call the nizam or soubahdar), pronounced the army of his highness a worthless rabble, and expressed astonishment that any reliance should be placed upon his troops. Yet it was well that the Mohammedan influence of the nizam should be on the side of the English, as Tippoo appealed to the fanaticism of the Mohammedans of Southern India in language naturally calculated to inflame it.† He gave himself out to be a descendant of Mohammed, as divinely inspired to restore the religion of that prophet, by destroying or proselyting all heathens and infidels. He was fired with the emulation of the great Saracen conquerors, who by the sword and the koran desired to subjugate all men. His seal had inscribed in Arabic upon its centre. "I am the messenger of the true faith." Round the seal in Persian verse was inscribed:—

"From conquest, and the protection of the Royal Hyder, comes my title of Sultan; and the world, as under the Sun and Moon, is subject to my signet."

Tippoo was the first Mohammedan prince

* Mill.

† Malcolm's *Political History of India*. Penhoen's *Empire Anglais*, vol. iv. p. 54.

in India who formally and openly disclaimed the authority of the great Mogul; and who impressed coin with his own effigy and titles.* This was the more singular as he was a fanatic of Islam, and the Mogul was the Padishaw of all true believers within the bounds of India. Tippoo probably reconciled the inconsistency, by his claim of descent from the prophet, and inspiration from God. Hyder Ali had certainly set his son an example of non-allegiance to the sceptre of Delhi; but the independence of the father, although real was not ostensible, and although avowed was never declared formally. It was fortunate that the English army, both of the company and of the crown, at that period serving in India, was in an excellent condition, and in some degree prepared to cope with emergencies.

The following representation of the state of the British troops by an officer well acquainted with the history of the period is correct:—"There were in India, in 1788, a regiment of British dragoons, nine regiments of British, and two of Hanoverian infantry, in all about eight thousand European troops, in addition to the company's establishments. Several of the first officers in the British service were in command in that country; and a system was established, which, by joining the powers of governor to those of commander-in-chief, united every advantage which could give efficacy to the operations of war. The discipline, which had lately been ordered by the king for establishing uniformity in his army, was now equally practised by his majesty's and the company's forces in India. The field equipment was refitted and enlarged at the several presidencies; and every preparation made to act with the promptitude and effect which unforeseen exigencies might require. Public credit, increasing with the security afforded to the country, and also in consequence of like able arrangements in the conduct of the civil line of the government, the company's funds rose daily in their value; and their affairs, as stated to parliament, by the minister at the head of the India department, were not only retrieved from supposed ruin, but soon appeared to be in a state of decided and increasing prosperity."†

In an army thus constituted and uniform, the commanders might well have confidence even against the well-trained and numerous hosts of the Sultan of Mysore. At no previous period had the company such a military force. For the first time the royal troops and those

* Major Rennell's *Memoir of Tippoo Sahib*, p. 71.

† *Narrative of the Campaign in India, which terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan in 1792*. By Major Diron, deputy-adjutant-general of his majesty's forces in India. London, 1793.

of the company met in mutual good feeling and respect. Much of this resulted from the regulations which had been made a short time before, both in parliament and in the court of directors; much more, however, depended upon the impartiality and justice of Lord Cornwallis, who dealt equally by all, whether royal or company's soldiers, excluding all sinister influences, ignoring cliques at Calcutta, and simply doing what in his judgment was best for the army and the government. Lord Macaulay well observes, in reference to a very different man, "No man is fit to govern great societies who hesitates about disobliging the few who have access to him, for the sake of the many whom he will never see." Lord Cornwallis had this quality for governing great societies, as well as many other rare gifts. The neglect previously permitted to prevail in preserving the country in a proper state of defence was at last redeemed:—"The Carnatic, which had been the seat of the former, and would probably soon be the seat of a future war—at least the scene where our army must assemble, and the source whence it must be supplied—required extraordinary exertion of military arrangement, to prepare it for the operations of defensive or offensive war. To protect a weak and extensive frontier; to discipline a detached army; and to provide resources in a lately desolated country, fell to the lot of Sir Archibald Campbell. Skilled in every branch of military science; with knowledge matured by experience in various countries and climates; indefatigable in all public duties, and endued with a degree of worth and benevolence, which attached to him all ranks in the army, and excited voluntary exertion in every officer to second the zeal of his general, he had a task to perform, which, though great and complicated, was not beyond the reach of such distinguished talents. Granaries were established in the frontier and other stations in the Carnatic, containing supplies for near thirty thousand men for twelve months; and furnished in such a manner as to provide against the exigencies of famine or of war without incurring additional expense to the public; a complete train of battering and field artillery was prepared, surpassing what had ever been known upon the coast; a store of camp equipage for twenty thousand men was provided; the principal forts were repaired, and more amply supplied with guns and stores; the cavalry were with infinite difficulty completed to their full establishment; and a general uniformity of discipline and movement was established in the cavalry, infantry, and artillery."*

* *Narrative of the Campaign*.

Authorities differ as to whether Tippoo was prepared for the bold measures of the English. Finding, as he did, that the Madras government was timid and temporising—that at Bombay they considered the attack upon the lines of Travancore as not necessarily involving war with the British, he was surprised, it is alleged, when Earl Cornwallis treated that circumstance as tantamount to a declaration of hostilities against the East India Company. Other authorities give Tippoo credit for the nicest discrimination as to the characters of those with whom he had to do, and for having foreseen the course which things would take, for which he amply prepared himself.

The plan of operations by the army of Madras was determined by a report of Colonel Fullarton's, made after the previous war with Tippoo. The colonel averred that the most direct route from the Carnatic through the passes of the Ghauts, or the southern boundary of Mysore, was practicable. General Meadows resolved accordingly to ascend the Ghauts, and march upon Seringapatam. This route was more remote from Madras than that upon the northern boundary, through the Baramahl. The southern road, however, lay through a well-watered, grain-producing country, and where forage and cattle might be procured. General Meadows fixed his point of support at Coimbatore, and directed Colonel Stuart to begin hostile operations by attacking the forts in the low country before ascending the Ghauts. These strongholds could not have been left behind while entering the enemy's territory, and yet to reduce them must cause considerable delay, unless a small corps of the army could effect the purpose.

About thirty miles to the west of the basis of operations chosen by General Meadows, stood the strong post of Palgaut, which was considered as a bulwark opposed to an army advancing against Mysore in that direction. As Stuart marched to Palgaut, he encountered the first burst of the monsoon, which strikes that part of the peninsula with unexpended fury. It smote the British column: the country was laid under such a deluge as defied military operations; while the storm, as if wielded by the hand of a living foe, swept away the tents of the campaigners, dispersed their cattle, and all but utterly disorganized the force. Stuart arrived at Palgaut, and made formal summons for its surrender, which was all he could do at such a season. He returned to Coimbatore, and was thence dispatched to Dindigul in the south-east, a hundred miles distant from Palgaut. These long marches wearied the troops excessively, and many of the baggage animals died *en route*.

He soon found that his appliances for reducing Dindigul were insufficient. It was the custom of the British to neglect the proper means of reducing strong places, and to rely on the courage and physical strength of their men, reckless of the sacrifice of human life thus incurred. A very imperfect breach was made by the time that nearly all Stuart's ammunition was expended. He stormed this breach and was repulsed, notwithstanding the most desperate valour on the part of the troops. This display of daring intimidated the enemy notwithstanding their success, and being ignorant that the English were short of provisions, terms of capitulation were offered, which, of course, Stuart was glad to accept. When he arrived again at head-quarters, he was once more ordered to lay siege to Palgaut. The weather was now mild and radiant, and the earth was cooled by the monsoon; his army, therefore, made a rapid and healthful march against the object of their attack. Some delay was, however, created by the large train of heavy artillery which Meadows ordered to accompany the force, under the belief that a very considerable resistance would be offered. Such belief was unfounded. On the morning of the 21st of September, before all the batteries were opened, those of the fort were silenced after a feeble fire. The garrison surrendered, making only one condition, that they should be protected from the nairs in the British service, who were furious against Hyder for his recent persecutions of them.

While Colonel Stuart was thus occupied, General Meadows prosecuted with ardour and address his ascent of the Ghauts. The campaign conducted by that general has been severely criticised, and warmly defended. Probably the most impartial and clear account, in a brief compass, is that of an officer of engineers, and author of a history of British India—Hugh Murray, Esq. Having described the plan of operations by which the general reached the high table-land of Mysore, Mr. Murray says:—"A chain of posts along the rivers Cavery and Bahvany, namely, Caroor, Erood, Sattimungul, had been successively reduced; and the last of these, commanding the important pass of Gujellhutty, which opened the way into the heart of the country, was occupied by Colonel Floyd, with a force of two thousand men. By this arrangement the different corps were very ill-connected together; for General Meadows at Coimbatore was sixty miles distant from the division of Floyd, and thirty from that of Stuart. The second of these officers pointed out the danger of his situation, and the intelligence he had received that the enemy was collecting a great force to attack

him; but the commander paid no attention to this warning, and ordered the detachment to continue in its present position. The Mysore cavalry, under Seyed Saheb, had indeed, in their attack, been very easily repulsed, and even compelled to retire behind the Ghauts; still, this failure of the advanced guard under a pusillanimous chief afforded no ground to judge of what might be expected when the whole force under the sultan himself should be brought into action. Early in September his horsemen were seen in large bodies descending the Ghauts; and as, when crossing the Bahvany at different points, they endeavoured to surround the handful of English and sepoy, the latter soon felt themselves in a very critical situation. They nevertheless made a gallant defence, and the enemy, having entangled their columns in the thick enclosures which surrounded the British position, were charged very effectually with the bayonet, and several squadrons entirely cut off. The Mysoreans, however, still advanced with increasing numbers, and opened a battery, which did great execution among the native soldiers; yet these mercenaries stood their ground with great bravery, saying—'We have eaten the company's salt; our lives are at their disposal.' They accordingly maintained their position, and Tippoo thought proper to withdraw during the night to the distance of several miles: but the casualties had been so very severe, and the post proved so untenable, that Colonel Floyd considered it necessary in the morning to commence his retreat, leaving on the field three dismounted guns. The sultan, at the same time, having mustered his forces, began the pursuit with about fifteen thousand men, and after mid-day overtook the English as they retired in single column. The latter, repeatedly obliged to halt and form in order of battle, repulsed several charges; yet, as soon as they resumed their march; the Indians hovered round them on all sides. They were compelled to abandon three additional guns, and their situation was becoming more and more critical, when some cavalry being seen on the road from Coimbatore, the cry arose that General Meadows was coming to their aid. This report, being favoured by the commander, was echoed with such confidence through the ranks, that though Tippoo had good information as to the real fact, he was deceived, and withdrew his cavalry. Colonel Floyd was thus enabled to prosecute his retreat towards the main army, which had already marched to meet him, but by a wrong road; so that the two divisions found much difficulty, and suffered many hardships, before they could rejoin each other. The English, in the course of

these untoward events, had lost above four hundred in killed and wounded; their plans for the campaign had been deranged; the stores and magazines formed on the proposed line of march lay open to the enemy, and were therefore to be removed with all speed. General Meadows, notwithstanding, resumed offensive operations, and had nearly come in contact with the army of the sultan; but this ruler, by a series of manœuvres, evaded both him and Colonel Maxwell, then stationed at Barmahl, and by a rapid march descended into the Coromandel territory."

Tippoo menaced Trichinopoly, but being desirous to make a wide circuit of devastation in a short time, he wheeled to the north, and ravaged the Carnatic. His mode of procedure was similar to that of his father, when the latter marched to Madras, but either being poorer or more politic, instead of wasting all in his course by fire, as Hyder did in a large portion of his progress, levied "black mail," and so successfully, that he realized a considerable augmentation of his stores and treasury. The opposition which he met was nearly as slight as that which his predecessor experienced, when English power was less, and the Madras presidency not so capable of resisting an invasion. Tippoo approached Pondicherry, and negotiated with the French; but their orders from home at that time were peremptory, to come to no terms with him hostile to the English. This disheartened Tippoo, who had already encountered a desperate resistance at Thiagar, from a British officer of talent named Captain Flint, the same who in the previous war had met him with such gallant warfare at Wandiwash.

General Meadows, who in single actions fought with skill, and was industrious and brave, was not equal to the complicated movements of a campaign on so wide a theatre, and in so difficult a country. He was in fact out-generalled by Tippoo, and was at this juncture reduced to great straits. Neither his courage nor activity failed him, but he still talked of offensive operations when he was not able, with the force left at his command after disasters so numerous and so recent, to defend the Carnatic.

The campaign against Tippoo had proved unsuccessful. The British were compelled to resign their footing in the territory of the sultan, while he, descending from his highlands, negotiated with their rivals under the walls of Pondicherry, reduced the English garrisons of the Carnatic, and caused alarm at Madras itself. Meadows had still a fine body of men under his command, but they were not concentrated, were not strategically well situated, and were, numerically, so

inferior to the forces of Tippoo, that their very existence was in jeopardy.

During the progress of these events General Abercromby, at the head of the Bombay army, effected too little to influence the results of the campaign. When Tippoo was before Pondicherry, engaging a Frenchman to go on a mission to the court of Louis XVI. for troops, whom he was ready liberally to subsidize, Abercromby was busy on the coast of Malabar. His activity there was of importance to the second campaign, so soon about to commence, but was not effectual either in relieving Meadows, retrieving his reverses, or preventing the descent of Tippoo upon the coast of Coromandel.

On the 14th of December Abercromby took Cannanore. His previous delays enabled him to put his army in fine condition, so that the whole coast of Malabar was swept by his troops, every fort and place of arms belonging to the enemy surrendering at discretion, while Tippoo was equally triumphant on the eastern shores of the peninsula. The victories of Abercromby were not so influential upon the war as those of Tippoo. The Malabar coast was not so important a theatre of action as that of Coromandel.

When tidings of these things reached Calcutta, the supreme council and the governor-general were much alarmed. Earl Cornwallis still entertained the highest respect for the gallant Meadows, and for his capacity on a limited sphere of action, or as second in command; but he did not feel justified in any longer entrusting the military

conduct of the war to him. The tidings of occurrences on the Malabar coast did not reach Calcutta until a considerable time after the desperate state of the Carnatic was known there. Lord Cornwallis feared that under the influence of the reverses which had befallen the British, the nizam, or the Mahrattas, perhaps both, might make separate peace, and abandon the alliance. No confidence could be placed in their professions at the outset of the war; and as no prospect seemed to exist of the conquest and dismemberment of the country of Tippoo, it was not unlikely that they would not only give up their English ally, but join the sultan in his invasion of the English territory.


As early as the 29th of January, 1791, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Madras with six battalions of Bengal infantry, under Colonel Campbell, and a large supply of ammunition and military stores, with heavy guns. He immediately assumed the command of the Madras army, and lost no time in preparing everything for a new campaign. After consultation with the Madras council and his officers, he resolved upon a plan of campaign different from the former, except in the main purpose of somewhere ascending the Ghauts with the chief force at his disposal, and carrying the war into the Mysorean country. He ordered General Meadows to join him, and so energetic and prompt was his lordship's conduct of affairs, that within a week after he landed in Madras, he took the field. The second campaign will form the subject of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCIV.

SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN—LORD CORNWALLIS ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—HE ENTERS MYSORE—FORCES THE LINES OF SERINGAPATAM—LAYS SIEGE TO THE CITY AND FORTRESS—IS OBLIGED TO RAISE THE SIEGE—GENERAL ABERCROMBY COMPELLED TO RETIRE—SUFFERINGS OF LORD CORNWALLIS'S ARMY.

The policy of Tippoo towards the English was supposed by the governor-general to depend upon the aid which he received from the French. It was presumed by the British commander that, at all events, Tippoo's mode of conducting the war would depend upon the prospect of the co-operation of a French force in the Carnatic. The sultan was determined, with or without the French, to sustain a war, in which he had been so far successful; for he believed that the defensive power of Mysore was such as to baffle all the efforts and sacrifices which the East India Company could make to conquer it, while its

geographical position and character were such as would enable an energetic sultan, with military talent, at any time to invade and plunder the low-lying lands of the English on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. He believed that a very moderate amount of French aid in officers and men, especially in the engineer department, would enable him to conquer Madras, which he felt confident would be followed the next season by the conquest of Bombay. The sultan even boasted, that with ten thousand auxiliary French he would march across the country, and burn or retain Calcutta.



CHARLES MARQUIS CORNWALLIS, &c.

From a Painting by J. S. Copley, R. A.

The first purpose of the general was to elude Tippoo, leaving him in the Carnatic to do his worst there, and ascend the Ghauts before the sultan could either intercept him or perceive his plan. For this end his lordship marched to Vellore, and made as though pressing for Amboor, *en route* to the passes nearest and opposite to Madras. Tippoo, astonished and alarmed by tidings to this effect, which the English took care to have conveyed to him, disposed his resources to prevent the accomplishment of what he presumed must be the intention of the British chief. Had Lord Cornwallis purposed to adopt that plan, the rapidity of his movements, and the suddenness of his departure from Madras, would probably have enabled him to do, so in spite of Tippoo; but in that case the sultan would have hung upon his rear, and he would have been embarrassed in his march. Tippoo was very unwilling to leave the vicinity of Pondicherry, until he had secured the co-operation of the French, and was thus led to make delay which he was unable afterwards to redeem. He was also less prompt to move, because he had a large force of light cavalry, in which he knew the English were deficient, and he concluded that he could easily outmarch them, and intercept them at a moment sufficiently opportune to prevent their marching through the passes, towards which he supposed they would proceed from Amboor. The English commander, however, by a sudden detour to the right, and marching with great celerity for four days, came upon the northern pass of Moogler. There a body of the enemy was posted as a guard, but they were without any suspicion that an English force was near them, and were surprised, many were slain or captured, and the remnant were routed. By another rapid march of four days, the English general placed his army on the high plains of Mysore. The suddenness of his appearance there struck terror to the foe. Messengers arrived at the head-quarters of the sultan, informing him of these feats of generalship, which filled him with greater consternation than even the presence of an English army in the centre of his patrimonial territory.

Tippoo, leaving all his conquests in the Carnatic, hurried with so much rapidity as to throw his army into disorder, and ascended the Ghauts by the passes of Changana, and Policode. He seemed bewildered, acting on no plan, his rapidity was that of panic, not of generalship. Notwithstanding his celerity of march, he expended time on matters of inferior motive, and personally attended to the removal of his harem from Bangalore, when he ought, at the head of his army, to

have hung upon the flanks of his invading enemy. The English laid siege to the fortress of Bangalore on the 5th March. Thus, in one month, by marches and manœuvres worthy of a general, Tippoo was obliged to evacuate the Carnatic, his country, guarded so strongly by nature, was penetrated without resistance, and a powerful British force sat down before the second city in his dominions.

The English began their operations against the place with the utmost vigour, but various misadventures on the part of Lord Cornwallis's officers against the army of Tippoo, which harassed the English flanks, caused serious loss in men, and very great loss of horses, many of which were captured or stabbed by the irregular troops attending the sultan's army:—"Another enterprise, which proved somewhat hazardous, was the carrying of the fortified town of Bangalore, a place of very considerable extent and importance. It was surrounded with an indifferent wall, but the ditch was good, and the gate was covered by a very close thicket of Indian thorns. The attack was made, too, without any due knowledge of the ground; and the soldiers, both in advancing and in endeavouring to force an entrance, were exposed to a destructive fire from turrets lined with musketry. Colonel Moorhouse, one of the most accomplished soldiers in the service, received four wounds, which proved fatal. At length, when the gate was almost torn in pieces, Lieutenant Ayre, a man of diminutive stature, forced his way through it, and Meadows, who preserved an inspiring gaiety in the midst of battle, called out, 'Well done! now, whiskers, try if you can follow and support the little gentleman!' On this animating call, the troops dashed into the town; though its great extent rendered the occupation difficult. Tippoo likewise threw in a strong corps, which renewed the contest, opening a heavy fire with small arms; but when the English betook themselves to the bayonet, they drove the enemy with irresistible fury through the streets and lanes, and soon compelled them to evacuate the pettah. Our loss, however, amounted to one hundred and thirty-one."

The fortress was breached on the 21st. It was not in a condition to be stormed, but the energy of Tippoo seemed to have returned, and he was making such prodigious exertions for the relief of the place, that it was deemed necessary, even at a great sacrifice, to capture the stronghold as speedily as possible. The commander-in-chief, after consulting with his officers, ordered the assault to be made that night. This was good generalship. The enemy had no expectation that the night following the day on which an im-

perfect breach appeared, an assault would be attempted; not a man in the fortress entertained such an idea. The night was bright with all the beautiful clearness of tropical moonlight, so that the breach could be distinctly seen from the lines, and the dusky sentinels of the sultan pacing to and fro on the battlements. The signal for attack was a whisper along the ranks from the front of the assaulting column to the rear. They were ordered then to advance in silence, and with rapidity. At eleven o'clock the column advanced, treading lightly along the covered way, and then emerging with a rush, they planted the ladders, and the forlorn hope was within the place before the enemy were aroused to their danger. The drums of the sultan beat to arms, the killidar leading his troops rushed to the post of danger, but the English had already driven in troops posted near the breach, and spreading to the right and left around the wall, penetrated the place. A fierce hand to hand encounter ensued, but the English had learned from their chief the advantage in war of promptitude and celerity, and poured in, charging with the bayonet, and strewing their way with slaughtered enemies. The governor and the defenders fought bravely but vainly, the bayonets of the English like a torrent of steel swept all before them, and in a very short time the place was mastered.

Tippoo received the intelligence with despair, and even with stupor. He had expected the assault some days later, and was prepared with a stratagem to raise the siege at the period when his spies should announce to him that the storm was to take place. The suddenness of Lord Cornwallis's movements perpetually disconcerted his plans, and rendered useless his superior numbers and great resources.

The capture of Bangalore strengthened the governor-general every way, but he did not find there such supplies of provisions and forage as the exigencies of his army required, and the deficiency of his supplies of this nature from all sources now became serious. Instead of advancing upon Seringapatam, the sultan's capital, he was obliged to proceed northward on a gigantic foraging expedition, and also in the hope that the rear-guard of what the nizam called his army might arrive, which, as it was sure to plunder the country in its course, would be well supplied, and part freely with those supplies for money. Ten thousand horse made their appearance, as was expected. The astonishment and disappointment of the English general could not be suppressed when he beheld this force. Unacquainted with Indian warfare, and with the natives of

Southern India, his excellency had formed no conception of the sight which now met his eyes. Wilks, the historian of the Mahrattas, amusingly describes them thus:—"It is probable that no national or private collection of ancient armour in Europe contains any arms or articles of personal equipment which might not be traced in this motley crowd. The Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, matchlocks of every form, and metallic helmets of every pattern. The total absence of every symptom of order and obedience, excepting groups collected round their respective flags, every individual an independent warrior, self-impelled, affecting to be the champion whose single arm was to achieve victory." These wild heroes had neither provender nor provisions. The governor-general ordered them to relieve the harassed light horsemen of his army on the outposts, but they took no notice of the duties imposed on them, and engaged themselves altogether in plundering the enemy, when on outpost duty, and stealing from their allies when in camp.

The condition of the English now became truly alarming. Tippoo had laid waste the country. No supplies could be obtained. The governor-general determined to advance upon the capital, and by one bold stroke, if possible, frustrate his enemy and end the war. He had no carriage, and from this circumstance the march assumed a singular aspect. The troops, officers, and men, sutlers, followers, women, and even children, carried the ammunition. Swarms of camp followers, and nairs, each carrying a cannon-ball, exhibited an aspect of earnestness and oddity such as no army before probably ever displayed. "The British army marched over the barren heights above the valley of Millgotah, and there commanded a view of the mighty fortress of Seringapatam,—the nest of hewn stone, formidable even in the eyes of the British soldier, where Tippoo had brooded over his ambitious designs, and indulged his dreams of hatred in visionary triumphs over the strangers who had so lately imposed a yoke on Asia. Nature and art combined to render its defences strong. An immense extended camp without the walls, held the flower of the sultan's troops."*

Tippoo prepared to abandon his capital, or at all events, to remove his treasures and his harem to Chittledroog, a place built upon a towering rock supposed to be impregnable. The mother of the sultan, and some of his wives, upbraided him for his want of spirit,

* *History of British Conquests in India*, vol. i. p. 185. By Horace St. John.

reminded him that such a movement would alarm his people, and with stinging reproaches urged him for once to give battle to the English upon the open field, and by his resolution and numbers overwhelm them. He selected a position with good military judgment, and prepared to occupy it with obstinacy. Drawing up his fine army on a range of heights above the Cavery, upon an island in which Seringapatam stood, he thus placed himself between his capital and his hitherto conquering enemy, and dared the issue. Lord Cornwallis made a skilful movement against the left flank of his opponent. Tippoo threw up redoubts on precipitous hills, which covered that part of his position, and as his army was numerous, he could spare men to occupy all those outposts in strength. The guns of the sultan commanded in every direction the approaches of the English, while the nature of the ground over which they must march to storm the heights was so broken by natural and artificial inequalities, that the English could not silence the fire of the Mysoreans, nor adequately cover their own advance. Through all difficulties, in spite of the most terrible cannonade, midst showers of rockets, and confronted by deadly ranges of small arms, the English reached their enemies, steel to steel, and dislodged them from every eminence. Every rocky elevation was the scene of a separate conflict. With the same steady advance over crag and ravine, up the steep acclivity, and through the fiery flight of the enemy's missiles, the English pressed their unremitting way, occupying each post only when clashing bayonets and sabres had, with brief and decisive execution, closed the mortal strife. The enemy fled at last for shelter under the walls of the strong city. Five hundred British lay upon the slopes and summits of the contested ridges. The enemy perished in far greater numbers. This was accounted for by the mode in which the British fought. As the lines of flashing bayonets crested the well defended hills, they were lowered with quick precision, and searched with sure and sanguinary aim the over-crowded masses of the enemy. Then from the summits so well won, the English musketry poured a deadly fire upon the fugitives, who fell fast until pursuit could add no victims to vengeance, or glory to victory.

The deficiency of food for the men, and of any kind of fodder for the cattle, rendered it impossible for the British commander to remain long enough before Seringapatam to capture it. To retreat seemed almost as difficult. It was only possible by the sacrifice of all his baggage and stores, and of his splendid battering-train. His lordship

has been criticised severely by some for advancing at all against the capital, where he knew the resources of Tippoo were concentrated, in the state of destitution as to supplies of his army. It has been explained by some on the ground of the reasonable alarm entertained by his lordship of the immediate action of the French on the side of Tippoo. Intelligence of the French revolution had reached the governor-general, he apprehended that war between France and England would once more involve India in its vortex, and that the Carnatic would be, as before, the necessary theatre of battle. Under these exciting apprehensions, it has been said that his lordship acted with a precipitancy in beginning his march upon Seringapatam from Bangalore, out of keeping with his usual coolness of judgment. At all events, the hour for retracing his steps arrived. The fine material of his army was abandoned or destroyed, and a retreat commenced, in which his men, wearied and hungry, fell back reluctantly from before a foe they had vanquished, and just when the prize appeared within reach.

His lordship was not only obliged to retreat himself, but to countermand those forces which were hastening with all speed to his support. In the last chapter the successes of General Abercromby, on the Malabar coast, were noticed as contemporaneous with the campaign of General Meadows, and a part of the latter's plan of operations. When Lord Cornwallis began his march from Madras, Abercromby was directed to operate from the low lands of Malabar, and, if possible, ascend the Mysore country, so that it would be taken, as might be said of an army, on both flanks at once. Abercromby met with an ally who facilitated his enterprise. The people of Coorg were the enthusiastic enemies of Tippoo, on account of his civil oppressions and religious persecutions. Their youthful rajah, after a long captivity, had lately contrived to effect his return. The greater part of his subjects were groaning in exile; but in the depth of the woody recesses there was still a band of freemen, who rallied round him with enthusiastic ardour. By a series of exploits, that might have adorned a tale of romance, the young prince recalled his people from the distant quarters to which they had been driven, organized them into a regular military body, drove the oppressors from post after post, and finally became undisputed ruler of Coorg, expelling the Mohammedan settlers who had been forcibly introduced. A common interest soon united him in strict alliance with General Abercromby, who thus obtained a route by which he could transport his army, without opposition, into the elevated plain.

The conveyance of the heavy cannon, however, was a most laborious task, as it was often necessary to drag them by ropes and pulleys up the tremendous steeps, which form on this side the declivity of the Ghants. At length the general had overcome every difficulty, and was in full march to join Lord Cornwallis, when he received orders to retreat, which, in this case too, could be effected only by the sacrifice of all the heavy artillery.

At this juncture the Mahrattas were advancing in another direction. Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt, two of the chiefs of that strange people, were very earnest in the war. They took the field early in the campaign, but were impeded by obstacles which delayed their course in a manner honourable to themselves. The strong fortress of Durwar, garrisoned by some of the best soldiers of Tippoo, lay in the line of the Mahratta march. There were two battalions of the company's sepoys with this force, and with their aid the Mahrattas believed that they could take the fortress—an operation most unsuitable to the military tactics of those tribes. The siege was conducted in a manner so absurd and dilatory that protracted operations were necessary. The fortress held out from December 1790 to June, 1791, and then only surrendered because the Mahratta cavalry made the blockade so strict that the besieged could obtain no provisions. The terms of surrender were not observed by the Mahrattas, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the English officers who accompanied them.

While Lord Cornwallis's army was in full retreat, the men dropping down dead from sickness, fatigue, or hunger, a body of cavalry appeared, and beyond them, in the distance, vast clouds of dust arose, as if a numerous army were on its march. The English had just made their formation for encountering the supposed enemy, when a grotesque horseman advanced slowly, and with confidence. He was identified as a Mahratta. He was one of the advanced guard of the army of Purseram Bhow and Hurry Punt. Great was the joy of the wearied, and famished soldiery, and of their brave and skilful, but sorely afflicted chief. On came the Mahrattas, as clouds drifting upwards from the horizon before the rising storm. Squadron after squadron of wild cavalry—hardy, seasoned-looking warriors—swept on over the devastated and trampled plain; and at last the British sepoys, in their compact infantry order, thoroughly officered, and appearing in the finest state of efficiency, defiled before the governor-general. The British met one another with cheers, for which even the faint and the famishing in the army of Madras found a

voice. The singular looking hosts of troopers brandished their swords, shook their lances, and curvetted their well-fed steeds. Had the governor-general but known that such an army—well supplied, as a Mahratta army always was—was hastening to his aid along the steeps from the north, he would have held his position before Seringapatam, and the glory of Mysore had sunk suddenly as the eastern sun sinks at evening. Tippoo's irregular horse had intercepted all communication, and the governor was ignorant that the Mahrattas had pierced the passes of the Mysorean Ghants. Had he known so much, he would not have countermanded the advance of General Abercromby; had that general received intelligence which might have been communicated to him seaward of Madras, if at that presidency pains had been taken to organize a system of procuring and communicating intelligence, he would have continued his march. The English, notwithstanding the frequent failures of their plans from similar deficiencies, were still characterised by their want of alert and active vigilance. The arrival of the Mahrattas was a means of relief only to those who had money to buy what these allies possessed in abundance, but his lordship made such arrangements as procured supplies of necessaries for his whole camp. "As soon as these auxiliaries arrived, the scarcity in the cantonments of the English, which previously amounted almost to famine, ceased, so far as they were willing to pay the enormous prices that were extorted from their necessities. Every article abounded in that predatory host: it exhibited 'the spoils of the East, and the industry of the West,—from a web of English broad-cloth to a Birmingham penknife; from the shawls of Cashmere to the second-hand garment of the Hindoo; from diamonds of the first water to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden;' while 'the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity utterly inconceivable in any camp, excepting that of systematic plunderers by wholesale and retail.' These allies, moreover, introduced the commander to a most useful class of men, the brinjaries or grain-merchants, who, travelling in large armed bodies with their wives and children, made it their business to supply all the militant powers of Hindostan. They distributed their corn with the strictest impartiality to all who could pay for it; and the general, now amply supplied with funds, was no longer exposed to want, and easily obtained a preference over Tippoo, whose pecuniary resources were beginning to fail."

Notwithstanding the relief thus opportunely obtained, the governor-general did not deem it practicable to retrace his steps to the scenes of his recent conquests. His battering train having been lost, a fresh one had to be procured from Madras before he could hope to besiege Seringapatam. Other necessary supplies of military material were also necessary, in place of those which had been destroyed preliminary to the retreat.

Rest was now absolutely necessary for the army of Lord Cornwallis. Nearly all the cattle had died, either from overwork, or an epidemic disease which quickly destroyed them, and caused them to putrefy almost immediately after death. This caused sickness in the camp, which was much increased by the starved followers eating the putrid flesh. Small-pox, so common and so fatal in the East, made great havoc. The store of rice was to a considerable extent wasted, or embezzled by the native drivers and servants. The supplies which the Mahrattas sold at so high a price were rapidly vanishing. Safe communications were opened with Madras, and the wearied army, as it rested, awaited with zeal, as well as obedience, the day when, with recruited force, it might again march against the boasted capital of Mysore. While these events were passing, and indeed as soon as the junction with the Mahrattas was formed, Tippoo became anxious to negotiate. On the 27th of May he sent a flag of truce, accompanied by numerous servants and a bushel of fruit, and a letter in Persian soliciting peace. The flag and the fruit were returned the next morning, much to the gratification of the troops. An answer to Tippoo's letter was also sent, "acquainting him that the English nation would agree to no peace which did not include their allies; and if he meant to negotiate, he must in the first instance deliver up all the British subjects who were prisoners in his dominions, and consent that a truce should take place, until his proposals could be considered and the terms adjusted. The fruit was returned in the same manner as it had been sent; not as an insult, but merely to show that his lordship declined even the appearance of friendly intercourse with the sultan. In the army it was understood that Tippoo, finding he could not treat separately with the English, and seeing that he had another season to try his expedients for disuniting the confederacy, as well as to prepare for his defence, replied to his lordship, by asserting that he had no British subjects detained prisoners in his country since the former war, and that he would not agree to a truce."*

* *Review of Lord Cornwallis's Second Campaign against Tippoo.* By Major Dirom.

It was of great consequence to the success of another campaign that a good understanding should be established with the Mahrattas. This Lord Cornwallis succeeded in accomplishing before he dispatched General Meadows, Colonel Stuart, and others of his superior officers, on different expeditions. The Mahrattas were a people of great military pride and quick sensibilities; they were also vindictive, and, like most oriental people, fickle in their policy. Any ill-will springing up between them and the British troops would perhaps have been productive of irremediable mischief. A want of respect to their chiefs on the part of the governor-general would have sent the whole host away, or have caused them to make separate terms with Tippoo. Yet, if the governor-general had paid their chiefs any undue deference, or appeared to depend upon the alliance as a *sine qua non* for conducting the war with Tippoo, they would have at once assumed the air of conquerors or superiors, and become as troublesome as Tippoo himself. Lord Cornwallis had but little experience of oriental peoples, and that which he knew of the natives of India was confined to the neighbourhood of Calcutta previous to this campaign. He had, however, the mind of a statesman, with such superior natural taste and judgment as qualified him in an eminent degree for intercourse with orientals, especially in the transaction of political business. When the Mahrattas formed their junction with the British, they pitched their tents at some distance; and Lord Cornwallis had to consider with what ceremonial his interview with the leaders of this army should be associated. The following graphic picture was given by an eye-witness, the deputy adjutant-general of Lord Cornwallis's army, Major Dirom:—

"On the 28th May, the army fell back towards Milgottah, where the Mahratta armies were to encamp; and, to prevent discussion and delay on points of ceremony, Lord Cornwallis proposed to meet the Mahratta chiefs at tents pitched midway between the Mahratta and the British camps.

"Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by General Meadows, their staff, and some of the principal officers of the army, went to the tents at the hour appointed, which was one o'clock; but the chiefs, who consider precision as inconsistent with power and dignity, did not even leave their own camp till three, though repeated messages were sent that his lordship waited for them. They at length mounted their elephants, and, proceeding as slow and dignified in their pace as they had been dilatory in their preparation, approached the place of appointment at four o'clock, escorted by

several corps of their infantry, a retinue of horse, and all the pagentry of Eastern state. The chiefs, on descending from their elephants, were met at the door of the tent by Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows, who embraced them, and, after some general conversation, retired to a private conference in another tent.

"Hurry Punt, about sixty years of age, a Brahmin of the first order, and the personage of greatest consequence, is said to be the third in the senate of the Mahratta state. His figure is venerable, of middle stature, and not corpulent; he is remarkably fair, his eyes grey, and his countenance, of Roman form, full of thought and character.

"Purseram Bhow, aged about forty, stands high in military fame among the Mahrattas. He is an active man, of small stature, rather dark in his complexion, with black eyes, and an open animated countenance, in which, and his mien, he seemed desirous to show his character of an intrepid warrior. His antipathy to Tippoo is said to be extreme; for the sultan had put one of his brothers to death in a most cruel manner, and Hyder's conquests to the northward fell chiefly upon the possessions of his family, which he lately recovered by the reduction of Darwar. Hurry Punt was destined to be the chief negotiator on the part of his nation; each commanded a separate army, but the Bhow was to be employed more immediately in the active operations of the field.

"The chiefs themselves, and all the Mahrattas in their suite, and indeed all their people, were remarkably plain, but neat, in their appearance. Mild in their aspect, humane in their disposition, polite and unaffected in their address, they are distinguished by obedience to their chiefs, and attachment to their country. There were not to be seen among them those fantastic figures in armour so common among the Mohammedans, in the nizam's, or, as they style themselves, the Mogul army; adventurers collected from every quarter of the East, who, priding themselves on individual valour, think it beneath them to be useful but on the day of battle, and, when that comes, prove only the inefficiency of numbers, unconnected by any general principle of union or discipline.

"The Mahrattas of every rank seemed greatly rejoiced in having effected this junction, and considered it a happy omen, that this event should have taken place at Milgotah, a spot so renowned in their annals for the signal victory gained by Madharow in 1772, in which he completely routed and dispersed Hyder's army, and took all his cannon. Many of the chiefs and people who had

served with that general were now in these armies; but they had since felt the superiority of the forces of Mysore, and were impressed with such an idea of Tippoo's discipline, and his abilities in the field, that they were not a little pleased in having joined the British army, without having occasion to try their fortune singly with the sultan. They all showed great eagerness to hear the news, and to know the reason of our having burst our great guns. On being told of the victory of the 15th of May, and of the subsequent necessity of destroying the battering train, from want of provisions, and not knowing of their approach, they partook in the joy and grief we had experienced on those events; and seeing that we considered the late defeat of Tippoo as a matter of course, and that we looked forward with confidence to the capture of the capital, they expressed themselves to the following effect:—"We have brought plenty—do you get more guns—we will feed you, and you shall fight." The conference between the generals and the chiefs broke up between five and six o'clock, apparently much to the satisfaction of both parties."

The officer, who gave the description just quoted, presents also an animated picture of the military habits of our ally. It has been already related that two sepoy battalions were attached to the Mahratta forces. These regiments belonged to the Bombay army. The chiefs always placed the British infantry in front, so that they served as a picket to the Mahratta camp. Indeed, the only measure taken specifically to guard against surprise, was that those infantry regiments were thrown out in advance, encamping always in that advanced position. Cavalry was spread in detachments far on the rear and flanks of the army, to secure plunder or cover the arrival of supplies. These, without exercising any especial vigilance, would be soon able to detect an advancing enemy. Major Dirom expresses great surprise at the artillery appointments of our ally:—

"The gun carriages, in which they trust to the solidity of the timber, and use but little iron in their construction, are clumsy beyond belief; particularly the wheels, which are low, and formed of large solid pieces of wood united. The guns are of all sorts and dimensions; and, having the names of their gods given to them, are painted in the most fantastic manner; and many of them, held in esteem for the services they are said to have already performed for the state, cannot now be dispensed with, although in every respect unfit for use. Were the guns even serviceable, the small supply of ammunition with which they are provided has always effectually

prevented the Mahratta artillery from being formidable to their enemies.

"The Mahratta infantry, which formed part of the retinue that attended the chiefs at the conference, is composed of black Christians, and despicable poor wretches of the lowest caste, uniform in nothing but the bad state of their muskets, none of which are either clean or complete; and few are provided with either ammunition or accoutrements. They are commanded by half-caste people of Portuguese and French extraction, who draw off the attention of spectators from the bad clothing of their men, by the profusion of antiquated lace bestowed on their own; and if there happens to be a few Europeans among the officers and men, which is sometimes the case, they execrate the service, and deplore their fate.

"The Mahrattas do not appear to treat their infantry with more respect than they deserve, as they ride through them without any ceremony on the march, and on all occasions evidently consider them as foreigners, and a very inferior class of people and troops. Indeed the attention of the Mahrattas is directed entirely to their horses and bazars, those being the only objects which immediately affect their interest. On a marching day, the guns and the infantry move off soon after daylight, but rarely together; the bazars and baggage move nearly about the same time, as soon as they can be packed up and got ready. The guns and tumbrels, sufficiently unwieldy without farther burden, are so heaped with stores and baggage, that there does not seem to be any idea of its ever being necessary to unlimber, and prepare for action on the march. As there are no pioneers attached to the Mahratta artillery to repair the roads, this deficiency is compensated by an additional number of cattle, there being sometimes a hundred, or a hundred and fifty bullocks, in a string of pairs, to one gun: the drivers, who are very expert, sit on the yokes, and pass over every impediment, commonly at a trot. The chiefs remain upon the ground, without tents, smoking their hookahs, till the artillery and baggage have got on some miles; they then follow, each pursuing his own route, attended by his principal people; while the inferiors disperse, to forage and plunder over the country.

"A few days after the junction of the Mahratta armies, an irregular fire of cannon and musketry was heard in their camp between nine and ten at night. The troops immediately turned out in our camp, and stood to their arms, thinking that Tippoo had certainly attacked the Mahrattas; but it proved to be only the celebration of one of their ceremonies,

in which they salute the new moon, on its first appearance."

Another circumstance occurred soon after, also characteristic of their customs and discipline:—"The ground on which our army had encamped at the junction, being bare of grass, and extremely dirty, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of marching; and sent to the Mahratta chiefs, to request they would move next morning, as their camp lay directly in our route. They returned for answer, 'that they should be happy to obey his lordship's commands; but, as they had halted eight days, it was not lucky, nor could they, according to the custom of their religion, march on the ninth day.' His lordship gave way to their superstitious prejudice, and deferred his march."

The allies moved on the 6th of June to the north of the Mysore, towards Nagamangala. Purseram Bhow had established a post and depot there. From thence they marched eastward to Bangalore. The objects of these marches were to enable the Mahrattas to withdraw in safety the posts they had established on their line of march; to subsist the allies at the expense of the enemy; to cause Tippoo to consume the provisions which he had laid up for the defence of the capital.

The Mahrattas marched tumultuously, and seemed to depend upon the vigilance and discipline of the English against surprise, the very service which the English had expected from the numerous Mahratta irregular horse. Those horsemen were most active, but not so much as the eyes of the grand army, as independent corps, conducting all sorts of irregular and eccentric expeditions on their own account. They captured some of Tippoo's elephants, and minor convoys. They way-laid his cavalry scouts, and boldly fell upon them when a chance of success was opened. This was of importance to the English, whose horses were much reduced by travel and insufficient fodder.

Earl Cornwallis had much difficulty in keeping the Mahratta chiefs in good humour, each affecting the bearing of a sovereign prince. It was also most difficult for him to form plans of military co-operation with them. New battering trains were soon sent from Madras and Bombay, money came from Calcutta, provisions were found by the Mahrattas, but horses and oxen to draw the guns and stores could not be procured by any amount of payment. By ingenious arrangements with officers, especially those in command of battalions, Lord Cornwallis "relieved the bullock department," as the deputy-adjutant-general of the army expressed it. Camels were purchased by individual officers in their

zeal for the public service; and the whole army was animated by an enthusiastic desire to make up somehow every deficiency of equipment. The only supplies issued to the British sepoys were rice, salt, and arrack; the European soldiers had cattle and sheep for slaughter, in addition to rice and small rations of corn. The British commander, like the great Duke of Wellington many years afterwards in the Spanish peninsula, became a sort of grain merchant to supply his troops, and with equal success. Captain Read, an officer well versed in the languages of Southern India, and possessing a remarkable talent for organization, made arrangements with the grain merchants on a gigantic scale, and by trusting to them in fair and open market, treating them justly, and paying the value for their commodities, the English army received regular supplies. The Mahrattas by plunder barely provided for themselves, while the nizam's forces could neither supply their wants by purchase or plunder.

After the reduction of various forts, the army came in sight of Bangalore. Captain Read succeeded in meeting it with a convoy of brinjarries (or corn merchants), having ten thousand, or as some writers of the time affirmed, twelve thousand bullock-loads of rice and grain. Here Lord Cornwallis received intelligence of the favourable views which were entertained in England of his conduct in waging and conducting this war. He also received despatches informing him that half a million sterling was voted by the company to replenish his exchequer, and that large reinforcements of troops, especially artillery, were on their way out. From Cal-

cutta, he heard that bullock draught was preparing for his service, and a despatch from Vellore informed him of the arrival there, from Bengal, of one hundred elephants and twenty-five bullocks. Thousands of coolies arrived with provisions on their own speculation, so that supplies became abundant. The army was thus encouraged and their noble commander, confident of victory, communicated by sympathy his confidence to his troops.

A new disposition of forces occurred in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, with a view to protect the arrival of supplies to the allies, cut off supplies from Tippoo, and secure sufficient support for such vast bodies of men, troops, and camp-followers. Colonel Duff, whose name became afterwards so much identified with the peoples and countries of Southern India, took charge of the artillery, and prepared a battering train for service once more at Seringapatam. He had rendered invaluable aid to the army in the same way on its previous advance to the Mysorean capital.

The approaching period of the monsoons rendered an advance upon Seringapatam impossible. The grand army, under Lord Cornwallis, kept open its communications with the Carnatic, to secure the arrival of guns, ammunition, and stores. To ensure this important end, it was necessary to secure the pass of Palicodé, and that could only be accomplished by the capture of Oussoor, a fortified place which commanded it. This was the first operation of the army of any magnitude after the junction of the triune forces, and, as it may be considered as the beginning of the third campaign, is reserved for a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCIV.

WAR WITH TIPPOO: THIRD CAMPAIGN—EARL CORNWALLIS CONQUERS OUSSOOR—REDUCES THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF MYSORE, AND ADVANCES TO THE FORTIFIED LINES OF SERINGAPATAM.

ON the 15th of July the army moved from the cantonments of Bangalore towards Oussoor. This part of the country had not as yet been made the theatre of war, and the inhabitants were engaged in attention to their fields. The landscape was beautiful in its variety of aspect, fertility, and careful cultivation. Rich foliage crowned the knolls and hill-tops, as the ground undulated or rose in bolder eminences. The elevation of the region gave coolness, yet it basked in all the glorious light of the Indian sun.

The seventh brigade reached Oussoor under Major Gowdie. On the appearance of the British the enemy abandoned the place, attempting unsuccessfully to blow it up before commencing their flight. A large store of grain and powder rewarded the march of the British brigade. The fall of Oussoor was very dispiriting to Tippoo; he regarded it as strategically of great importance, and his orders were to strengthen and defend it to the uttermost. Previous to the arrival of Major Gowdie, the English prisoners were murdered

by express order of Tippoo, notwithstanding remonstrances by the governor, and solicitations for mercy from the inhabitants. Like his father, the sultan delighted to shed the blood of defenceless enemies. The various hill-forts in the neighbourhood surrendered, or were taken, and the English held the important pass, by which their stores and convoys were chiefly to arrive during the remainder of the campaign.

About the middle of August, Tippoo, having consented to treat with the allies jointly, instead of separately, as was his policy, sent a vakeel to Oussoor. This person, Apogy Row, was well known to the English, having in the previous war also acted the part of a negotiator. He would not open his credentials without certain ceremonies, which were evidently designed for delay, and he was, therefore, not permitted to enter the camp.

By the end of the month of September twenty-eight thousand bullocks were provided in the Carnatic for the use of the army. The laborious and expensive preparations in cattle, material, and carriage equipment, of which Tippoo had ample information by his spies, alarmed him more than the actual presence of numerous armies on the high table-land of Mysore. He was convinced that the English were in earnest, and had ample means to sustain a new and protracted campaign. Yet such was his hatred to the British, a feeling inherited from his father, and provoked by their shameless violation of treaty, that he preferred risking his all in conflict with them, to opportune concession.

During the remainder of the autumn the British were engaged in various directions, but chiefly to the north-east of Bangalore, in reducing forts, and cutting off communications with the country from the sultan's headquarters. His lordship in this way found means of employing the army honourably, and with great detriment to the enemy.

The country of Tippoo was studded with "droogs," fortified hills, or rocks. Some of these were exceedingly precipitous. Nature had provided Mysore with bulwarks of defence, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan knew how to make them available. Among these Nundroog was one of the chief, and was held by one of Tippoo's most trusted officers. There was only one of the faces of the rock which was accessible, and that only under circumstances of difficulty almost constituting the impossible. This portion of the crag was defended near the summit by a double wall. An English detachment commanded by Major Gowdie, under the direction of General Meadows, formed approaches on the steeps, built batteries, and dragged up cannon. In twenty-

one days two breaches were opened. General Meadows himself led the assault. A night of soft clear moonlight, such as guided the forlorn hope so swiftly through the newly-formed breach at Bangalore, favoured the English. The assailants suffered hardly any loss from the fire of the enemy; the steepness of the ascent brought them inside the range, but huge masses of granite were rolled down, which hurled away many of the English in their descent, so that ninety men were lost before the breaches were attained. Then sword to sword, high up on that moonlit summit, a fierce encounter took place in the gaping chasms made by the English guns. Thirty English fell in the breaches; these once carried, the enemy struggled no more, and Meadows, sword in hand, like a volunteer subaltern, entered at the head of the stormers. It was one of the most gallant feats ever performed by Englishmen, and by an English general.

Colonel Stuart attacked Savendroog, which had been of equal importance with Nundroog, but which, during the siege of the latter, was so strengthened, that Tippoo's officers considered it impregnable. It was battered, breached, and stormed in twelve days without a man being lost on the side of the conquerors. Outdroog was surrendered after a feeble resistance, so great was the panic created by what were considered, previous to their accomplishment by the English, impossible feats. Kistnagherry town was burned; the droog of that place was attempted by a *coup-de-main*, but the attack failed. Tippoo, perceiving the moral effect of these exploits, determined upon a bold attempt to countervail them. He led an expedition southward, and suddenly attacked Coimbatore. The garrison capitulated on terms which respected their liberty; Tippoo violated the capitulation, and sent the whole garrison prisoners to Seringapatam with every conceivable indignity, and many cruelties. Tippoo probably considered that even if ultimately defeated, he might execute vengeance upon such men as he could get into his power, the English in the former war having shown such indifference to the fate of the prisoners he had murdered, when they came to terms of peace. Tippoo was not able to effect much more than the reduction of Coimbatore.

Before the month of October had far advanced, the supplies of men and money arrived from England, including two companies of Royal Artillery, under Major Scott. Three hundred seasoned troops also arrived from St. Helena. These troops endured the climate of India better than those which came directly from England. While from the presidencies

of Bengal and Madras reinforcements and supplies were poured in on one side of Mysore, the reinforcements which arrived from England at Bombay were organized, and ready to ascend the Ghauts on the other side.

While these events occurred, Tippoo sent a strong force into the Baramaul, which endangered the British convoys. Lord Cornwallis ordered Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, at the head of a strong infantry brigade, to co-operate with some Mahratta irregular cavalry to clear that country. The chief work of this brigade was the reduction of forts, which the enemy feebly defended; but in every case where opportunity was afforded, they acted with treachery and cruelty. By the end of November, Colonel Maxwell performed his mission, but not without having sustained one serious repulse and heavy loss in officers and men.

While these events were transpiring, the Bombay army, under General Abercromby, was engaged in active operations. That officer, as seen in the last chapter, had been ordered by Lord Cornwallis to retreat. He returned to Tellicherry from Bombay early in November, bringing with him drafts on service, recruits, and a battering train. On the 23rd of the month this force marched from its cantonments, and assembled at Cannanore. Earl Cornwallis ordered General Abercromby to proceed upon the same plan as in the previous campaign. That officer accordingly marched on the 5th of December to the Pondicherrin Ghaut, and on the 7th crossed the river at Illiacore, this river being navigable to within two miles of the place which the general selected for the passage of his army, so that the heavy guns and stores were brought up to that point. From Illiacore the ascent of the ghaut was steep and rugged. Deep ruts had been formed by torrents during the previous monsoon. It was necessary to repair the road, that the guns and baggage might be brought up in safety, and thus considerable delay was occasioned. The English officers and soldiers were much impressed by the grandeur of the route, the bold mountain towering to the heavens, its steeps clothed thickly with forest, the views of the country beneath, and of the distant sea, presenting the richness and variety peculiar to oriental scenery. Having surmounted the difficulties of the ascent near Illiacore, the army had a long march of twenty-six miles through a wooded, partly undulated, and partly abrupt country to Pondicherrin, where the ascent of the great hill offers the grand impediment to an army. The number and strength of the trees peculiar to the Indian forest furnished means for affixing ropes to pull up the heavy guns and the store carriages.

Leaving the Pondicherrin Ghaut, the army pursued its toilsome way over thirty miles of wooded, rocky, picturesque, and most difficult country, to the foot of the Sedaseer Ghaut. At this point the services of the Rajah of Coorg became available, as in the previous advance, and much facilitated the march of the army, not only by supplies of food, but by the warlike and vigilant co-operation of a brave people. Having penetrated the range of successive ghauts, the Bombay army encamped on the plains of Mysore, where it awaited the period for co-operation with the grand army. General Abercromby's force consisted of four European regiments, eight battalions of sepoy, four companies of artillery in four brigades, amounting to nearly nine thousand good soldiers. Here it is necessary to leave the army of Abercromby until other events are related.

When, in July, the necessity of procuring subsistence compelled the allied armies to separate, the Mahrattas, with a Bombay contingent, under Captain Little, proceeded from the neighbourhood of Bangalore in the direction of Sera and Chittledroog. The country being fertile, the Mahratta commander, Purseram Bhow, selected it for his sphere of operations. Captain Little, at the head of the Bombay native contingent serving with his army, made for himself much distinction. One of the most sanguinary pitched battles of the war was won by him, and siege was laid to Scooly-Onore by the end of December. On the second of January the place capitulated.

Purseram Bhow was elated with his successes, which were chiefly due to Captain Little and his Bombay sepoy. The Mahratta, therefore, instead of joining General Abercromby's army, went in an opposite direction, disarranging the comprehensive plan of the campaign, and hazarding the success of the war. When "the bhow" ought to have been with Abercromby, so as to make the Bombay army unassailable, and secure the safety of his own, he was at Bidenore, unable to effect anything bearing upon the grand scope of the campaign.

Tippoo, alarmed by the rapidity of the Mahratta movements, and the enterprises which Captain Little had directed, detached Cummer-ud-deen Khan in the direction of Bidenore. The bhow became alarmed in turn, and, desisting from his designs on Bidenore and other cities in its vicinity, retired from before the corps of the khan, and, yielding to the stern letters of Lord Cornwallis and Hurry Punt, directed his course towards Seringapatam, to take his place in the military array formed against that city.

The khan, emboldened by the retirement of the bhow, from terror, as he supposed, of his superior prowess, performed various exploits with his cavalry, making long marches and effecting several surprises. A strong body of Mysorean horse penetrated into the Carnatic, committed extensive devastation, reached the neighbourhood of Madras, exciting much alarm, and were only repelled after all the Europeans had volunteered to go out against them. The council, always timid, although often rash, was of course panic-struck. The agriculturists all around Madras deserted their fields.

While these military movements were taking place, the English navy inflicted much injury upon the enemy's strong places on the coast of Malabar. Commodore Cornwallis, Captains Byron, Sutton, Troubridge, and Osborne attacked various coast fortifications belonging to Tippoo, assisted in the conquest of Cannanore, and captured Fortified Island, at the mouth of the Onore river. The French had sent out store-ships from their settlements for Tippoo's service, under protection of their own frigates, although the two nations were then at peace. The English commodore stopped one of these convoys. The French commodore fired two broadsides without any previous declaration or warning of hostile intent; the result was an action, in which the French were severely punished, and their frigate captured.

On the 14th of January, 1792, the various bodies of the grand army, with the exception of that belonging to the nizam, formed a junction in the neighbourhood of Outredroog. On the 25th of January, the advanced guard of the nizam's army was seen approaching, and Lord Cornwallis proceeded out to meet it. The allied armies marched next day, and on the 27th reached Hooleadroog. In the previous June that place had been conquered by the British. After the retreat of Lord Cornwallis, the Mysoreans again took possession of it, and strongly fortified it. The town was small, but the fort was considered inaccessible to assault; nevertheless, the killidar (governor) surrendered to Colonel Maxwell upon summons.

Lord Cornwallis posted a garrison at this place, and assembled all his forces in its vicinity. After such preparation as was necessary, his army moved forward towards the capital. Tippoo had no well-founded hope of defending his provinces; but in his obstinacy and determination he had resolved to defend the city to which his father had given so much fame as the seat of his government. Tippoo believed that it was strong enough to resist the allied arms of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Madras, and he counted upon

the exhaustion of their resources in the siege, which would necessitate a disastrous retreat, lead to dissension among the allies, another invasion of the Carnatic by himself, and the siege—perhaps capture—of Madras. With aid from the French and from the Sultan of Turkey, he believed he could expel the English from the shores both of Malabar and Coromandel; that the nizam and peishwa would be glad to make separate terms, and that his supremacy would be recognised in the peninsular portion of India. As the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, at a much later period, believed that Sebastopol would exhaust the resources of the great powers of Western Europe which besieged it, so Tippoo concluded that the allied powers of Southern India would pour out fruitlessly their blood and treasure before Seringapatam, so as to ensure him an ultimate and complete conquest.

Lord Cornwallis had succeeded in gaining the confidence of the governments of Hyderabad and Poonah, and in uniting in his plans the generalissimos of the armies of these states. He exercised, therefore, virtually, the supreme direction of the armies, and was enabled to carry out his plans of action without opposition. His resolution was to march at once upon Seringapatam. Hooleadroog was established as an advanced post, being ten miles nearer the grand object than Outredroog, and from which the allied armies, now finally assembled, were to commence their march, for the second attempt upon the enemy's capital.

Before proceeding upon the final struggle and grand issue of his enterprise, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of affording the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs, a view of his army in its full strength and array of war. Those personages appeared highly pleased with the compliment which his lordship proposed to confer, but did not seem to contemplate the utility of forming an intimate acquaintance with the discipline, equipment, arrangement, and component peculiarities of an ally's troops. They thought it a fine opportunity for displaying their own elephants, their personal pomp and glory, and for impressing upon the minds of the English troops, ideas of the greatness of the native sovereigns and commanders associated with them in the field.

On the 31st of January, the British troops were ordered under arms, for review by the nizam and the Mahratta chiefs. The noble earl, and General Meadows, proceeded to meet the princes and generals of the allies to the right of the English line.

The following graphic description of what followed, was given by the only officer present, who, acquainted with all the facts, thought proper to describe their occurrence:—

"The camp was pitched in a valley close to Hooleadroog, and, from the nature of the ground, could not be in one straight line, but was formed on three sides of a square, with a considerable interval, on account of broken ground, between the divisions, which were thus encamped each with a different front. The reserve, consisting of the cavalry, with a brigade of infantry in the centre, formed the division on the right of the line, and the two wings of the infantry formed the two other divisions of the encampment; the battering train being in the centre of the left wing fronting Hooleadroog. The extent of the line, including the breaks between the divisions, was above four miles. The prince, the minister, Hurry Punt, and the tributary Nabobs of Cuddapu and Canoul, who had accompanied Secunder Jan from Hyderabad, were on elephants richly caparisoned, attended by a numerous suite of their best horse, and preceded by their chuddars, who call out their titles; surrounded, in short, by an immense noisy multitude. The prince was in front, attended by Sir John Kennaway, on an howdered elephant, near enough to answer such questions as might be asked by his highness respecting the troops. On his reaching the right of the line, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired from the park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding, received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned the officers' salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular notice as they passed the corps of the reserve. Having seen a regiment of Europeans, besides the dragoons in the first division, the chiefs were not a little surprised to find a brigade of three regiments, on proceeding a little farther, in the centre of the second division. They had passed the sepoys at rather a quick pace, but went very slow opposite to the European corps, and seemed much struck with their appearance. The troops all in new clothing, their arms and accoutrements bright and glittering in the sun, and themselves as well dressed as they could have been for a review in time of peace: all order and silence, nothing heard or seen but the uniform sound and motion in presenting their arms, accompanied by the drums and music of the corps, chequered and separated by the parties of artillery extended at the drag-ropes of their guns. The sight was beautiful even to those accustomed to military parade; while the contrast was no less striking between the good sense of our generals on horseback, and the absurd state of the chiefs looking down from their elephants, than between the silence

and order of our troops, and the noise and irregularity of the mob that accompanied the Eastern potentates. After passing the right wing, the road leading through some wood and broken ground, the chiefs, on ascending a height, were not a little astonished to discover a still longer line than the two they had passed, and which, in this situation, they could see at once through its whole extent. But for the battering train, which occupied a mile in the centre of this division, at which they looked with wonder; but for the difference of the dress and music of the Highland regiments in the second European brigade, and the striking difference of size and dress between the Bengal sepoys in the right, and the coast sepoys which they now saw in the left wing; but for these distinctions which they remarked, such was the extent of ground which the army covered, and the apparent magnitude of its numbers, that the chiefs might have imagined a part of the same troops were only shown again upon other ground, an expedient not unusual among themselves, whenever they have it in view to impress strangers with a false idea of the strength of their forces. It was five o'clock before the chiefs reached the left of the line, when, having expressed themselves highly gratified with all they had seen, they accompanied Lord Cornwallis to his tents. After a short visit, and fixing the time and order of their march for the following day, they returned about sunset to their own camps."

The same author, from his official knowledge, gives the following account of the march:—

"On the 1st of February, the allied armies commenced their march from Hooleadroog in the following order:—The English army moved off as usual, at daybreak, in three columns. Firstly, the battering guns, tumbrils, and heavy carriages on the great road, formed the centre column. Secondly, the line of infantry and field-pieces, on a road made for them at a distance of a hundred yards or more, as the ground required, marched parallel to the battering train, and on its right, that being the flank next to the enemy. Thirdly, the smaller store carts and private baggage carts marched in like manner, on a road to the left of the battering train, beyond which was the great mass of baggage, carried on elephants, camels, bullocks, and coolies, all the servants of the army, and families of the sepoys. This immense multitude on the baggage flanks, was prevented from going ahead of the columns by the baggage-master and his guard, and was flanked, giving it a space of several miles which it required, by the part of the cavalry not on other duties,

and the infantry of the reserve. The advanced guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, the body guards, and the detail of infantry for the pickets of the new camp. The rear-guard was formed of a regiment of cavalry, and the pickets of the old camp, and did not move till they saw the baggage and all stores off the old ground of encampment.

"In this manner the line of march was shortened to one-third of what would be its extent if confined to one road; and, from the component parts of the army being thus classed and divided, the whole moved on with as much ease as if the battering train only had been upon the march. The heavy equipment of the army, great guns, store carts, provision and baggage, thus formed a mass of immense breadth and depth, guarded in such manner on all sides, that on no quarter could the enemy approach the stores or baggage without opposition from some part of the troops on the march. The armies of the allies, which were not mixed in our details, followed, as is their custom, at a later hour, and without any disposition for their defence."

The army, after successive marches, arrived before Seringapatam. The enemy's horse hovered upon the flanks, and offered considerable opposition to the advanced guard. Tippoo appeared disposed to dispute the passage of the river Madoor, but Lord Cornwallis having reinforced the advanced guard with a brigade of infantry, the enemy, after a show of resistance, dispersed, laying waste the country, and retiring upon the main army. Ascending high ground on the opposite banks of the Madoor, the British had a magnificent landscape, rich alike in fertility and variety, spread before them; far away on every side patrols of the enemy's horse were in observation, and the flame and smoke of burning villages and homesteads appeared along the whole horizon. The route now taken was different from that along which the army had advanced to the first attack of Seringapatam, and it was also different to that upon which Lord Cornwallis had retired; the troops were thus enabled to form a more extensive acquaintance with the country, which afforded the Europeans a lively pleasure; as compared with the low country beneath the Ghauts, it was alike beautiful and temperate.

The last march of the allies was made on the 5th of February, and lay over the barren hills to the north-east of the capital. From the line of route, the valley beneath was frequently spread out to view in all its extent; the proud city, with its cupolas, palaces, and fortifications, was distinctly seen; and beneath the walls in numerous lines were ranged the tents of the sultan's troops. Every step

the army advanced, the irregular cavalry of Tippoo harassed it; regular troops appeared on the flanks, and threw fiery showers of rockets. The advanced guard was obliged frequently to halt and draw up in line of battle. As the allies advanced, the impediments offered by the enemy increased, and when at last it reached the place of encampment, the quartermaster-general, his assistants and guards, were placed in imminent danger while marking out the ground. The line chosen for the encampment lay across the valley of Milgotah, and was parallel to that of the sultan, at a distance of six miles. The encampment of the allied armies was divided by a small stream, called the Lockany river, which, taking its rise from the lake below Milgotah, runs through the valley into the Cavery. The British army, forming the front line, its right wing reached from the river along the rear of the French rocks to a large tank which covered that flank of the line. The park and the left wing extended from the other side of the river to the verge of the hills which the army had crossed on their last march. The reserve, encamped about a mile in the rear, facing outwards, left a sufficient space between it and the line, for the stores and baggage. The Mahratta and the nizam's armies were also in the rear, somewhat farther removed, to prevent interference with our camp. The encampment of the confederate army was judiciously pitched at such distance from Seringapatam, and so covered by the French rocks in front of its right, as to prevent immediate alarm to the enemy, either from its proximity or apparent magnitude. The first night in which the allies lay before Seringapatam, they were disquieted by the activity of the enemy's cavalry, and the Deccan troops were much alarmed by flights of rockets which came perpetually among their tents. This alarm continued long after it was proved that more confusion than danger ensued from these missiles. The English took no notice of them, but their scouts stealing out and concealing themselves behind the crags which were scattered round, brought down with musket shots many of their foes.

On the 6th of February reconnoitering parties were out to examine the enemy's lines. From the left, Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell and his attendants had a clear although rather remote view of the sultan's camp. The following description of it was given by one of the staff of the British army:—"On both sides of the river, opposite to the island of Seringapatam, a large space is inclosed by a bound hedge, which marks the limits of the capital, and is intended as a place of refuge to the people of the neighbouring country from the

incursions of horse. On the south side of the river this inclosure was filled with inhabitants, but that on the north side was occupied only by Tippoo's army. The bound hedge on the north side of the river includes an oblong space of about three miles in length, and in breadth from half a mile to a mile, extending from nearly opposite to the west end of the island to where the Lockany river falls into the Cavery. Within this inclosure the most commanding ground is situated on the north side of the fort; and, besides the hedge, it is covered in front by a large canal, by rice fields, which it waters, and partly by the winding of the Lockany river. Six large redoubts, constructed on commanding ground, added to the strength of this position, one of which, on an eminence, at an ead-gah or mosque, within the north-west angle of the hedge, advanced beyond the line of the other redoubts, was a post of great strength, and covered the left of the encampment. The right of Tippoo's position was not only covered by the Lockany river, but beyond it by the great Carrighaut Hill, which he had lately fortified more strongly, and opposite to the lower part of the island, defends the ford. The eastern part of the island was fortified towards the river by various redoubts and batteries, connected by a strong intrenchment with a deep ditch, so that the fort and island formed a second line, which supported the defences of the first beyond the river; and when the posts there should be no longer tenable, promised a secure retreat, as from the outworks to the body of a place. Tippoo's front line or fortified camp, was defended by heavy cannon in the redoubts, and by his field train and armystationed to the best advantage. In this line there were one hundred pieces, and in the fort and island, which formed his second line, there were at least three times that number of cannon. The defence of the redoubts on the left of Tippoo's position was intrusted to Syed Hummeed and Syed Guffar, two of his best officers, supported by his corps of Europeans and Lally's brigade, commanded by Monsieur Vigie. Sheik Anser, a sipadar or brigadier of established reputation, was on the great Carrighaut Hill. The sultan himself commanded the centre and right of his line within the bound hedge, and had his tent pitched near the Sultan's Redoubt, so called from being under his own immediate orders. The officer is not known who commanded the troops in the island; but the garrison in the fort was under the orders of Syed Sahib. The

sultan's army certainly amounted to above five thousand cavalry, and between forty and fifty thousand infantry. Ever since the junction of the Mahratta armies, Tippoo, seeing he could not continue to keep the field, had employed his chief attention, and the exertions of the main body of his army, in fortifying this camp, and improving his defences in the fort and island."

The hostile armies were now in presence of one another on the grand theatre of action. The stake for which they contended was high. The defeat of the allies must result in a disastrous retreat, in which they would be obliged to separate, and would be attacked and beaten in detail; or, if the British succeeded by their skill and boldness in forcing their way against all attempts to cut them off, they would reach Madras with terribly diminished numbers. General Abercromby's army might be unable to make good its retreat, and would be exposed to the chance of attack unsupported by the army of Mysore. On the other hand, if the sultan suffered defeat, all was lost. He had but two chances left; one was in the great strength of his fortified camp, the other in that of the city and fortress of Seringapatam. He reasonably calculated that the only portions of the allies who would dare to storm his fortified camp would be the British, and that even if they succeeded, their army must be so reduced in numbers by the conflict as to render it impossible for them to prosecute a siege of the fortress, and he would then assail and defeat the native armies in the open field. Should the French render him assistance, he would then be enabled to conquer the Carnatic, and carry his arms also along the western coast. He expected that a great battle of artillery would take place before his fortified lines, which would lessen the numbers of the English, while his cavalry harassed and wearied out the Mahrattas and the troops of the nizam. His hopes were that the lines of his fortified camp would prove too strong for his enemies, and that the campaign would terminate in his favour without siege being laid to the capital itself. Thus both parties looked forward to the struggle as one of vast magnitude and consequence, and awaited with eager and anxious suspense the moment when the terrible tournament of the nations and powers of Southern India should meet in the concussion of deadly conflict which must one way or the other terminate the war. Another chapter must reveal the incidents and issue of the struggle.

CHAPTER XCVI.

THIRD CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—STORMING OF THE FORTIFIED CAMP BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—PASSAGE OF THE CAVERY, AND OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND.

THE rival armies now confronted one another with concentrated strength. Tippoo waited for the attack dogged and resolute. The Earl of Cornwallis determined upon bold and prompt measures. Having carefully reconnoitred the enemy's position, he issued the orders for attack in the evening of the 8th of February. As this was one of the most memorable and interesting actions ever fought by the British in India, it will interest the reader to peruse his lordship's own description of the plan of battle, as made known in his order of the day:—

The army marches in three divisions at seven this evening to attack the enemy's camp and lines; pickets to join, field-pieces, quarter and rearguards, and camp-guards, to stand fast.

Right Division. Major-general Meadows.

Centre. Lord Cornwallis; Lieut.-colonel Sturt.

Left Division. Lieut.-colonel Maxwell.

If the right attack is made to the westward of the Somarpett, the troops of that attack should, after entering the enemy's lines, turn to the left. But if the attack is made to the eastward of Somarpett, the troops should turn to the right to dislodge the enemy from all the posts on the left of their position.

The troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy's lines, should turn to the left; the front divisions, however, of both the right and centre attacks should, after entering, advance nearly to the extent of the depth of the enemy's camp before they turn to either side, in order to make room for those that follow; and such parts of both divisions, as well as of the left division, as the commanding officers shall not think it necessary to keep in a compact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and pass over into the island with them.

The reserve, leaving quarter and rearguards, will form in front of the line at nine this night, and Colonel Duff will receive the commander-in-chief's orders concerning the heavy park, the encampment, and the reserve.

Young soldiers to be put on the quarter and rearguards at gun firing, and the pickets to join when the troops march off.

A careful officer from each corps to be left in charge of the camp and regimental baggage.

Colonel Duff to send immediately three divisions of gun lascars of fifty men each to the chief engineer, to carry the scaling ladders, and the chief engineer is to send them to the divisions, respectively, along with the officers of his corps.

The officers of engineers and pioneers to be responsible that the ladders, after having been made use of by the soldiers, are not left carelessly in the enemy's works.

Surgeons and doolies to attend the troops, and arrack and biscuit to be held in readiness for the Europeans.

The divisions to form, as follow, after dark:—

The right in front of the left of the right wing.

The centre in front of the right of the left wing.

The left in front of the left of the left wing.

"In addition to the troops detailed in the orders, Major Montague of the Bengal, and

Captain Ross of the royal artillery, with a detachment of two subalterns and fifty European artillerymen with spikes and hammers from the park, accompanied the centre, and smaller parties the two other columns.

"The troops had just been dismissed from the evening parade at six o'clock, when the above orders were communicated; upon which they were directed to fall in again with their arms and ammunition.

"By eight o'clock the divisions were formed, and marched out in front of the camp; each in a column by half companies with intervals, in the order directed for their march.

"The number of fighting men was at the utmost 2800 Europeans and 5900 natives.

"The officers commanding divisions, on finding that their guides and scaling ladders had arrived, and that every corps was in its proper place, proceeded as appointed at half an hour past eight o'clock.

"The evening was calm and serene; the troops moved on in determined silence, and the full moon, which had just risen, promised to light them to success.

"The right column was conducted by Captain Beatson, of the guides, the centre column by Captain Allen, of the guides, and Lieutenant Macleod of the intelligence department; and harcarrahs (native guides or spies), who had been within the enemy's lines, were sent both to these and the left column.

"Tippoo's pickets having made no attempt to interrupt the reconnoitering parties in the forenoon, he probably did not expect so early a visit. The distance of our camp seemed a circumstance favourable to his security, and he did not, perhaps, imagine, that Lord Cornwallis would attack his lines till strengthened by the armies commanded by General Abercromby and Purseram Bhow."

Tippoo was wholly unprepared for an attack by infantry alone on a fortified camp, protected by guns of every calibre, in every direction. When the columns of attack moved on, the tents of the camp were struck, and preparations made for its defence in case of sudden attack. The cavalry were drawn up in the rear in support of it. Great was the anxiety of the camp guards as they stood to their arms, prepared for every casualty, and awaiting the issue of the terrible crisis in which the army was placed. Lord Cornwallis very

judiciously withheld from his allies any knowledge of the contemplated assault, until the army was actually in motion. Had they been made acquainted with the plan, they would have raised all sorts of objections, and, finally, refused co-operation. When they heard of the enterprise consternation seized them. The idea of a body of infantry, so small in number, without artillery or cavalry, advancing upon so strong a place, garrisoned so numerously, bristling with cannon, and held by a determined ruler, totally appalled them. When they learned that Lord Cornwallis himself commanded the column by which it was intended to penetrate the enemy's defences, their astonishment and alarm rose even higher. They could not conceive of a great English lord fighting as a common soldier, and voluntarily placing himself in a position so imminent of peril. The chiefs immediately prepared for the only issue of the conflict which they could comprehend as possible—the total defeat of the British, and the consequent dangers of destruction to the allied armies.

Onward marched the assailing columns. Between ten and eleven o'clock, the centre came upon a body of cavalry, with a strong detachment of the enemy's rocket brigade. The cavalry, astonished at being confronted by the head of a battalion of British infantry, galloped away, but left the rocketmen to make feint of attack. These did little harm to the English, who, amidst showers of innoxious fire flashing over their ranks like meteors, prosecuted the advance with rapid but steady step.

At this juncture the left column of the assailants were ascending the Carrighaut Hill, and the scene presented to head-quarters was grand and imposing, for instantly the hill was topped with a circle of flame, from continuous flashes of musketry. The centre column was quickened by the discovery of their approach made by Tippoo's cavalry, and, animated by the fusilade from the Carrighaut, they pressed on with extraordinary vigour, so that the retreating cavalry had scarcely reached the camp fifteen minutes before them. The English broke through the bound hedge which surrounded the camp, and penetrated at once the enemy's lines. The right column, from the nature of the ground, had been compelled to make a considerable detour, and unfortunately did not reach the hedge until half-past eleven o'clock. Lord Cornwallis had foreseen the probability of such a mishap, and had halted his troops half-an-hour in the early period of the march. Nevertheless the right column had wound its intricate way so much farther to the right than his lordship's plan contemplated, that after

all, the proposed approach to the boundary line was far from simultaneous. When this column did penetrate the hedge, it was at a spot too near that where the division under the commander-in-chief in person had already entered, but diverging to the right within the hedge, made directly against the chief redoubt upon which the defence relied on its left. The moon shone out brilliantly upon the cupola of the large white mosque which, crowning a hill, was as a beacon to the English. The mosque became the object towards which their march was directed. When diverging to the right this column proceeded in part without the hedge, and diverted the attention of the enemy, while the remainder of the division pushed on to the redoubt. It was not the intention of Lord Cornwallis that this redoubt should be attacked, because its situation was so far in advance of the enemy's proper lines of defence. The battle having already raged from the left to the centre, and thence to the right, the troops at the White Mosque Redoubt were thoroughly prepared, and a heavy fire of cannon loaded with grape and of musket-balls, smote the head of the assailing column. This terrible volley also revealed in vivid distinctness the full outline of the defence.

The English of the 36th and 76th regiments gallantly charged the "covert way," opening a steady and deadly fire on the defenders, who were swiftly driven within the inner works of the redoubt. The English, in essaying to pass the ditch, found themselves in the condition in which English troops have generally found themselves when similar duties were imposed on them—most of the ladders were missing, and those possessed were too short. The arrangements by which human life might be spared had been neglected, and the men had consequently to make fruitless efforts of valour to accomplish that which was physically impracticable. In this critical juncture a pathway across the ditch was discovered; over this the officers dashed, sword in hand, followed impetuously by the men. The pathway terminated against a small gate, which was the sortie; this the assailants forced in a moment, and entered a large traverse between the gateway and the redoubt. The enemy retired reluctantly and slowly before the bayonets of the assailing force. Reaching the inner circle of defence, whence retreat was impossible, the defenders turned a gun upon the traverse, which, if properly directed, must have swept it of the crowds whose eager valour urged them so madly on. From the circular rampart the soldiers of the sultan fired desultorily, but with close range, upon the thronging invaders,

who now filled the gorge and traverse. An irregular and less effective fire responded from the English. Several officers mounted a banquette to the right of the gorge, while a group of soldiers found their way up another to the left, and from both a dropping fire of musketry was directed into the redoubt. The fire of the enemy was still superior, and the officers resolved upon a charge with the bayonet. The men, as in the Redan at Sebastopol, during the storming of that place, were unwilling to give up the musketeer, but were at last brought into order by their officers, and, headed by Major Dirom and Captain Wight, charged in at the gorge of the redoubt. A close fire of grape and musketry caused a sanguinary repulse. Captain Gage opened such a fire of musketry from the banquette to the right as to deter the enemy from taking such advantage of their success as was open to them. The British were rallied, and again led by the same officers, whose escape in the previous attempt was almost miraculous. The enemy had not reloaded the gun by which the gorge had been raked, and their musketry fire was insufficient to check the advance. Captains Gage and Burne, with Major Close, scrambled in at the same time, and, supported by a few followers, dashed sword in hand upon the flanks of the defenders, who broke away, and perished beneath the bayonets of their pursuers, or were shot as they leaped into the ditch below. Some fugitives, breaking through all dangers, were upon the point of escape, but fell into the hands of the troops composing the supporting column. The redoubt was won before the supporting column had arrived. While yet the battle raged in the redoubt, Tippoo sent a large body to the rescue. They advanced with drums beating and colours flying. Fortunately Lieutenant-colonel Nesbit, after routing another body of the enemy, had his attention called by the noisy advance of this reinforcement from the sultan. The officer who led was challenged by Nesbit,* who felt uncertain who they were; he replied, "We belong to the *Advance*," the title of Lally's brigade. The Mysorean officer supposed the English to be part of his own brigade, but his reception soon altering his opinion, he set his men the example of ignominious flight, which was effectually followed. Had this corps arrived in time, and been commanded with spirit, it might have been impossible for the English

to hold the redoubt. To the left of the conquered defence was another work, which was stormed quickly, but with great slaughter; the commandant and four hundred men were slain, with the heavy loss of eleven officers and eighty men on the part of the British. A deserter from our army, who belonged to Lally's corps, gave himself up at this post. From his account, it appeared that Monsieur Vigie, with his Europeans, about three hundred and sixty, were stationed in the angle of the hedge in front of the redoubt. Captain Oram's battalion, upon which they fired, had attracted their attention, till finding themselves surrounded, they broke, and endeavoured to make their escape, some along the hedge to the left, but chiefly by passing through the intervals of our column as it continued advancing to the redoubt. The colour of their uniform contributed essentially to the effecting of their escape, and to the same circumstance Monsieur Vigie himself owed his safety; he was seen to go through the column mounted on a small white horse, but, being mistaken for one of our own officers, was suffered to pass unmolested. The deserter was of great use, he guided the English through various intricate ways, by which danger was avoided, and important objects accomplished at little loss. The general having established posts, wheeled his men to the left in the direction of the centre column. In attempting this he passed across the track of that body, and found himself to the left of the attack at Carrighaut Hill. No firing was heard, and no reliable intelligence of the operations of the centre or left columns was attainable. After a considerable pause a heavy firing began between Carrighaut and the fort, when General Meadows advanced to support the forces which he supposed to be engaged in the direction whence the sound of firing came. At this juncture the day broke, and General Meadows perceived what had taken place upon the centre and right attacks.

While the right column of the assailants were thus occupied, that of the centre, under Lord Cornwallis, was engaged in important operations. His lordship had divided his corps into three divisions. The first, or advance, had been ordered to force its way through the enemy's line, and, if successful, to follow the retreat of the defenders into the island. The second, or centre division, was to move to the right of the first, to sweep the camp in that direction, and ultimately attempt the capture of the island, which it was hoped might be facilitated by the first division entering with the fugitives whom they might drive from the lines. The third

* Some accounts represent this as having been done by Lieutenant John Campbell, of the grenadier company, 36th regiment, who, although wounded in the redoubt, rushed forth and seized the standards of this detachment of the foe.

division was the reserve, with which Lord Cornwallis posted himself, so as, if possible, to afford and receive co-operation as it regarded the column of right attack under Meadows, and of left attack under Maxwell. The first division of the centre column, under the command of the Hon. Lieutenant-colonel Knox, was composed of six European flank companies, the 52nd regiment of the line, and the 14th battalion of Bengal sepoy.

The captains of the advanced companies were ordered to push on, attacking only whatever they met in front, until they reached the great ford near the north-east angle of the fort, and then, if possible, to cross it and enter the island. Rapidity was the chief element of success in this movement, and this was urged by Earl Cornwallis himself upon the captains in terms exceedingly imperative. The 52nd regiment and the 14th Bengal sepoy were to follow, with more solid order, the rapid movement and more open formation of the flank companies, and all were to avoid firing unless in case of indispensable necessity.

At eleven o'clock the advanced companies reached "the bound hedge," and found the enemy ready to receive them with cannon and musketry. Without a shot the British dashed through the line, the astonished defenders fleeing panic-struck before a movement so unexpected and unaccountable. The sultan's tent occupied a particular spot in the line of the advance, but he had fled from it, leaving obvious signs of the precipitation of his departure. The ground between that point and the river was almost a swamp, being under the cultivation of rice; this circumstance, with the darkness and the tumult of the fugitives, caused the advanced companies to miss their way and separate. They reached the ford in two separate bodies. The first dashed across close behind the fugitives, with whom they were nearly entering the place, but the enemy secured every point of ingress opportunely. Captain Lindsay, at the head of a company of the 71st regiment, rushed into the sortie, which led through the glacis into the fort, thence he proceeded along the glacis, through the principal bazaar, which stretched away to the south branch of the river, over the north branch of which the British had passed. The enemy having no conception of the possibility of the English finding their way there, fled in terror; many were bayoneted in the attempt to escape. There was an encampment of cavalry on the island, who immediately dispersed, not knowing what force of English had penetrated the place. Lindsay and his gallant men of the 71st took post on a bridge over a nullah which lay across the island, and placed a

party at a redoubt which commanded the southern ford.

The second body of the advanced companies reached the northern ford at this juncture, and found it nearly choked with bullocks, bullock waggons, guns, and Mysorean soldiers. So great was the terror of the fugitives, that they made no resistance, and were bayoneted in great numbers as they struggled to pass the ford. Some of the guns of the fort opened upon the supposed situation of the English on the main-land, but none were directed against the ford, as the fugitives as well as the pursuers must in that case have been at least equal sufferers. The deputy-adjutant-general of the British army afterwards remarked upon this episode of the defence—"It is no incurious circumstance here to observe, what was afterwards learned from some French deserters, that, at the time of the firing of these guns, the sultan was at the Mysore or southern gate of the fort, which he refused to enter: he was much enraged that the guns had opened without his orders, and sent immediately directions to cease firing, lest it might be imagined in his camp that the fort itself was attacked, and the panic among his troops in consequence become universal. To this order, wise as perhaps it was in its principle, may be attributed the little damage sustained by the troops, who crossed into the island, within reach of grape from the bastions of the fort."

Knox and the companies under his command gained the glacis, where Captain Russell and some of the grenadiers of the 52nd awaited his arrival, the captain being of opinion that Lord Cornwallis intended the operations to be conducted against the northern face of the fort,—along that bank of the Cavery, rather than in the direction taken by Captain Lindsay. Knox turned to the left, in the direction opposite to that taken by Lindsay, until he arrived at "the Dowlat Baug," where he seized a moorman of distinction. Two Frenchmen were also captured, and all acted as guides to conduct the party to the "pettah"* of Shaher Ganjam. Arrived at that place, the British found the gate shut, but no garrison, the troops having moved to the lines to resist the attack there, and were unable to regain their post. The gate was forced. The French prisoners conducted the English to the gate, which led to the batteries. There also the guard had left. The gate being open, Knox, having only one hundred men with him, took post in the street, and ordered the drums to beat the grenadiers' march, as a signal to the other troops of the first division to come to his

* *Pettah*: a suburb generally adjoining a fort, and surrounded with "a bound hedge," wall, and ditch.

assistance. At this moment firing commenced from the lines and batteries along the river, on the right of the enemy's camp, opposite the advance of the left column of attack. Knox had a large number of officers with him, and he directed them, with detachments of his small force, to take in reverse the enemy's batteries, from which the firing had been heard. The enemy were terrified by a series of movements, which appeared to them so complicated and ingenious. Wherever they turned they met some English, and in the places least likely to meet them: and instead of opening a fire of musketry, the English parties silently and with celerity charged with the bayonet, giving no time for formation, or any suitable plan of resistance. Many of the Mysoreans, driven from the batteries, fled to the gate of the pettah. There Knox, with thirty soldiers, seized the fugitives, or slew them as they came up. Large parties threw away their arms, and turned in other directions, on meeting this small party of English, which they magnified to twenty times the number. One of the soldiers captured by Knox, in order to save his life, informed that officer that a number of Europeans were enduring a miserable incarceration in a neighbouring house. Knox released these; one of them was a midshipman, whom the French admiral, Suffrein, had captured ten years before, and with other prisoners inhumanly handed over to the sultan, with the full knowledge that they would be thus treated. Most of the liberated men were common soldiers, and some deserters, who were treated as barbarously as the rest. The main body of the troops of the first division followed in close order to the river. Missing the ford, about one thousand men of the 52nd, and the Bengal sepoy, crossed the Cavery opposite the Dowlat Baug or rajah's garden, which they entered by forcing open the river gate. Captain Hunter, who was in command of this force, was here joined by several officers and men of the flank companies who had been separated from their own parties, and who were ignorant of the route taken by their comrades. The captain took post in the garden, and awaited the development of events. In Indian warfare nothing is so dangerous as a pause; while victory shines upon the banner of the soldier, he must bear it onward; on the slightest hesitation, that sun becomes clouded, and the career of triumph is rapidly turned. While Hunter hesitated, the enemy rallied, and bringing guns to bear upon the garden, opened a severe fire. In this situation the captain remained until the first streak of morning appeared, when he descried a fresh party of the enemy with cannon on the opposite bank of the river. He

plunged into the Cavery, led his men across, dispersed the party, spiked the guns, and joined head-quarters, having suffered some loss from grape and musketry in crossing the river. The remaining portion of the first division failed to enter the island, and after a severe conflict, fell back upon Capt. Russell's brigade. The 71st regiment having charged and cleared the way for the Bengalees, they rallied and resumed their advance. The 2nd or centre division of the centre column, under Lieutenant-colonel Stuart, swept to the right of the 1st division, joined by the detachment of the 14th Bengal sepoy, which were separated from the first. Their march was directed against "the Sultan's Redoubt." This was a post of some strength, planned by the sultan himself, who gave a close personal superintendence to the work of the French engineers whom he employed. Major Dirom, describing the dispersed articles found at dawn around the sultan's abandoned tent in the camp, thus observed:—"Many pikes, ornamented with plates of silver, belonging to the sultan's sewary or state equipage, were seen scattered round the tent, in which, among other articles, was found a case of mathematical instruments of London make; which gives probability to the accounts we had received that the sultan had turned his attention to the science of fortification, and that he had been his own engineer."

Major Dalrymple, who commanded the advance, was obliged to disobey the orders against firing, for a large body of cavalry opposed his progress. He formed the 71st regiment in line, believing that a full volley would prevent the cavalry from charging. His opinion was correct, every shot emptied a saddle; by the time the line reloaded and shouldered, the smoke had dispersed, and the horsemen were seen scattered in all directions. The redoubt was immediately abandoned, the 71st regiment entering unopposed. Having garrisoned the place, Colonel Stuart directed the course of his division against the left of Tippoo's right wing, so as to meet the column under Maxwell, by which the right of the defence was assailed, and the left flank of which Maxwell had already turned. The rear or reserve division of the centre column, commanded by Earl Cornwallis himself, drew up by the Sultan's Redoubt after its capture by Major Dalrymple, and there his lordship anxiously awaited the co-operation of General Meadows from the right, while that officer, as has been shown, was anxiously in quest of him. His lordship remained in that position until near dawn, when the seven companies of the 52nd, and the three companies of the Bengal sepoy, which had occupied the garden and charged through the Cavery to

escape the peril of their position, arrived at the spot where his lordship awaited in suspense intelligence of the progress of affairs. The ammunition of these troops had been damaged in passing the river; this was fortunately discovered and the cartridges replaced, when Tippoo, who had learned the position of Lord Cornwallis, directed his left and centre to rally, concentrate, and fall upon the English commander-in-chief. These orders were obeyed with celerity and address, so that the English general found himself attacked by a powerful force. The unexpected arrival of the body which had retreated from the garden so swelled the numbers of Lord Cornwallis, that he felt himself in a position to receive the enemy with animation and decision. Here a fierce battle ensued. The English repulsed the Mysoreans by deadly volleys of musketry repeatedly, and on every occasion followed up the repulse by charges of the bayonet; but still the enemy rallied, relying on superiority of numbers. At daylight a well directed charge by the British finally repelled the attack. The position which his lordship occupied exposed him to the danger of being surrounded by the enemy, or of retiring under fire of his batteries. He skilfully withdrew round the Carrighaut, where, as described, he met General Meadows. Had that general occupied the time in boldly advancing, and had his lordship himself advanced to the support of his first and second divisions, the island would have been carried by a *coup de main*. The plan of Earl Cornwallis was bold, but he and most of his chief officers carried it out with disproportionate caution.

While the right and centre of the British were thus engaged, the left was also engrossed in the efforts and anxieties of complicated battle. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell was ordered to storm the Carrighaut, and descending its slopes, force his way across the river into the centre. The column, like that of the centre, was divided into several divisions. The front division of this column, under Lieutenant-colonel Baird, consisted of the flank companies of the 72nd regiment, commanded by Captain Drummond, and Lieutenant James Stuart, and the 1st battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Archibald Brown. The main body of this column, consisting of the battalion companies of the 72nd regiment, and the 6th battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Captain Macpherson, was, as detailed in the orders, led by Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell. He was accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Agnew and Lieutenant Wallace; and also by Lieutenant Capper, of the Madras establishment, who, with great zeal, had served as a volunteer with the army

during the two last campaigns, and attended Colonel Maxwell in this attack.

The Carrighaut was defended by infantry without artillery, but a strong rocket brigade* assisted the infantry. The enemy was surprised, and with little resistance deprived of an important post. The ascent was defended by a "double headed work," which was taken before the enemy could do anything but cast a few rockets, and offer a desultory fire of musketry. The hill commanded one of the principal fords, and the right wing of the sultan's lines. The flank companies of the 72nd scaled the defences and occupied them, the sepadar (brigadier) in command of the defence was mortally wounded in the escalade of the British. Descending from the high post of Carrighaut to a shoulder of the same hill, but having the separate name of Pagoda Hill, Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell possessed himself of that post also. Around the bottom of the hill ran a watercourse, in which a strong party of the enemy lay concealed; and as Maxwell moved down towards Tippoo's lines, they opened fire upon him with close range from their sheltered position. At the same time the fire from Tippoo's line within the bound hedge was directed upon them, but not with much effect, as there was not light enough to direct the guns with steady aim. Near the foot of the hill the Lockany river formed an obstacle, it was defended by infantry, and several officers were killed and wounded in approaching its banks. Nevertheless, Maxwell broke through every barrier, drove the Mysoreans from their concealed positions, forded the Lockany, cut through the bound hedge, stormed several posts, and found himself on the banks of the Cavery, meeting, as before named, the centre division of the British central column on the way. The passage of the Cavery was difficult, the river was deep, rocky, and commanded by the enemy's batteries on the island. Lieutenant-colonel Baird was the first to reach the opposite bank, followed by about twenty soldiers. Other detachments rapidly followed, but the ammunition of all was saturated with water. At this juncture the

* *Rocket*: a missile weapon, consisting of an iron tube of about a foot long, and an inch in diameter, fixed to a bamboo rod of ten or twelve feet long. The tube being filled with combustible composition, is set fire to, and, directed by the hand, flies like an arrow, to the distance of upwards of a thousand yards. Some of the rockets have a chamber, and hurt like a shell; others, called the ground rockets, have a serpentine motion, and on striking the ground, rise again, and bound along till their force be spent. The rockets make a great noise, and exceedingly annoy the native cavalry in India, who move in great bodies; but are easily avoided, or seldom take effect against our troops, who are formed in lines of great extent, and no great depth.

events took place (already described), where Colonel Knox was so successful. Lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, a cool and skilful officer, perceiving the effects of Lieutenant-colonel Baird's passage, sought and found a safer ford, which he passed with the remainder of his men. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart also crossing, both officers and the detachments under their command joined Colonel Knox at the pettah, where, the reader will remember, he posted himself with a few men, while his officers attacked the batteries which fired upon Maxwell's column. Colonel Stuart, in order to ascertain the position of the pettah in reference to the island generally, moved round the outside of the walls, and coming upon open ground, encountered a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, who appeared to be without orders, and to have remained idle during the night. The colonel attacked them in line, presuming upon their cowardice, and dispersed them, slaying many. He had scarcely performed this feat, when the English who had first landed, and marched round to the south side of the island, came in view. Finding themselves unsupported, they were retiring, in hopes of forming such a junction as actually took place. At this moment officers were dispatched to inform Earl Cornwallis of the position of affairs.

When daylight fully revealed the true aspect of events, it presented these results of the night's conflict,—nearly all Tippoo's redoubts in front of his lines had been captured; the lines themselves stormed; the Cavery forded by a portion of Lord Cornwallis's and the whole of Colonel Maxwell's columns; and posts taken and occupied on the island. Strategically, the situation of Tippoo was critical, and he had lost many men. The loss of Lord Cornwallis was also heavy, but bore a small proportion to that of the enemy, and the advantages obtained.

Earl Cornwallis and General Meadows looked with exultation from the Carrighaut Hill upon the whole theatre of the night's performances, and his lordship immediately took measures to reinforce the troops on the island. The enemy had already begun an attack there. Batteries and redoubts, advantageously situated, opened upon the English, and the scattered crowds of Mysoreans rapidly re-collected, and assumed form and order.

The command of the troops on the island devolved on Colonel Stuart. He retired from the pettah, and drew up his men across the island in front of the Laul Baug, covering the ford leading towards the Pagoda Hill with his right, and he occupied lines and batteries which had been constructed by the enemy for the defence of that part of the

island. The colonel's troops had expended all their ammunition that was not damaged. This exposed them to some danger, but the arrival of the reinforcements with a plentiful supply of ammunition, reassured Stuart, and disheartened the enemy. Leaving for a time Colonel Stuart unmolested, Tippoo passed the Cavery, and stealing forward large bodies of men under cover of the unequal ground, he prepared an attack upon "the Sultan's Redoubt," which General Meadows had taken the night before by a *coup de main*. Earl Cornwallis perceived this from the Pagoda Hill. The Sultan's Redoubt was within range of the guns of the fort which now opened against it. The gorge was covered by no traverse or outwork, and was left open to the fort, and exposed to the fire thence, so that the redoubt, if taken by the English, might be untenable. It was garrisoned by eighty men of the 71st, fifty Bengal sepoys, and twenty men, European engineers, and artillery. Some twenty wounded Europeans, men and officers, and perhaps an equal number of stragglers, had also entered the place. There was no water, and but a small quantity of ammunition. Against this poor defence the attacks of the enemy were unremitting all the morning. Repeated assaults were driven back with heavy slaughter. No assistance could be rendered from head-quarters, because all approach to the point of contest must be under the fire of the enemy's guns. Before noon, the commanding officers and nearly all the senior officers were killed or wounded. There was fortunately in the redoubt an officer sent thither by Earl Cornwallis the night before with a message; he found it difficult, if not impossible to return, and he took the command. This officer was Major Skelly. When he assumed the direction of the defence, the ammunition was within a few rounds of being expended. At that moment an officer saw two loaded bullocks in the ditch, such as were generally attached to regiments for carrying ammunition. Their burdens were secured, and found to be as was supposed. The discovery was of the utmost importance, and diffused joy and confidence throughout the little garrison. As soon as the men had filled their cartridge boxes, a body of cavalry numbering more than two thousand men were seen advancing towards the redoubt. It was supposed that they would charge through the open gorge. Before coming within musket-shot they halted, and about four hundred men dismounted, and, sword in hand, attempted to gain an entrance. They were received with a fire so close and precise, that a large number were slain in the opening of the gorge, and

the rest fled broken and panic-struck, covered by the discharge of cannon and rockets. It was one o'clock in the afternoon when this repulse took place. For a time the enemy seemed in doubt what course to pursue, except to direct a fire of field-pieces and musketry against the gorge. Matters so continued until two o'clock. Another assault was then made, led by the remnant of the brigade of Lally, commanded by Monsieur Vigie. The original soldiers of the brigade had either died, fallen in battle, or were invalidated, and it was now almost wholly composed of natives, Mahrattas, and other non-Mussulman peoples. They advanced steadily, until the defenders discharged a well-directed volley into their column, when the native soldiers refusing to advance, broke from their ranks and turned. This was the last effort of the enemy, who at four o'clock began to retire from behind the rocks where they had taken post. One fourth of the little garrison was now killed and wounded, and the latter were dying of thirst. A party volunteered to procure water from a neighbouring ditch and pond, and not only found a supply, but discovered that the enemy had retired, leaving only a few scouts in the vicinity of the rocks.

Earl Cornwallis made arrangements to relieve the garrison in the evening, as well as the troops at some other posts where harassing duty was performed, and directed supplies to be sent to the detachments which had so gallantly established themselves in the island. The desperate defence of the Sultan's Redoubt had drawn off the attention of the enemy from the troops in the island. At five o'clock in the evening after Tippoo withdrew his forces from the rocks, the cavalry dismounting, assisted by "rocket-boys," attacked the pettah. The English were seldom vigilant, and their native adherents were engaged in plunder when the attack began. Many of them consequently fell under the scimitars of the Moslem troopers, and the rest were driven out. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart ordered the 71st and a native battalion to retake the place. This was done after an obstinate combat, the British pursuing the enemy from street to street, whither they retired fighting. A prisoner taken in this conflict gave valuable information. He stated that Tippoo had convened his principal sirdars, and had exhorted them to make a bold effort to drive the English from the island, and to recover the tomb of Hyder; that the chiefs had thrown their turbans on the ground, and had sworn to succeed or perish in the attempt. The attack, the prisoner said, was to be made in the night, and the march of the assailants was to be

directed along the bank of the northern branch of the river, to turn the right flank of our line, and to cut off the communication with the camp. This account, so circumstantial, seemed to deserve credit, and Colonel Stuart made his arrangements to repulse the expected attack.

Major Dalrymple, with the 71st regiment, and Captain Brown's battalion, was directed to keep possession of the pettah, and two field-pieces were sent in order to strengthen their position. Lieutenant-colonel Knox had charge of the right wing, in which was posted the 72nd regiment; Lieutenant-colonel Baird was stationed on the left, with the six companies of the 36th regiment; and a proportionable number of sepoys were posted according to the space to be defended by each wing. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart himself, with Major Petrie, took post in the centre in the rear of Shaher Ganjam, with a small body as a reserve. The regimental field-pieces were posted in the most convenient stations, and the guns of the batteries were turned towards the fort. Small parties were also detached, as pickets, to the front, and Major Dalrymple was directed to seize the most favourable opportunity of sallying upon the flank or rear of the enemy, as they passed Shaher Ganjam to the attack of the lines. Lieutenant-colonel Stuart having reported this intelligence to the commander-in-chief, he immediately ordered four field-pieces into the island, which arrived in the course of the night; and Major Gowdie with his brigade, after furnishing the detail for the relief of the sultan's ead-gah redoubts, was directed to take post at the foot of the Pagoda Hill, to be in readiness to pass the ford into the island on the first alarm. Every possible precaution having been taken to insure success, the troops lay upon their arms anxiously expecting the approach of the enemy; but the night passed in silence, and day broke without an alarm. That an attack was intended could not be doubted; but the repulse in the Pettah had either slackened the ardour of the chiefs, or the soldiery dispirited by the fatal events of the last twenty-four hours, could not be brought to second the zeal and enthusiasm of their commanders.

On the evening of the 7th of February Earl Cornwallis was pleased to issue the following orders:—"The conduct and valour of the officers and soldiers of this army have often merited Lord Cornwallis's encomiums; but the zeal and gallantry which were so successfully displayed last night in the attack of the enemy's whole army, in a position that had cost him so much time and labour to fortify, can never be sufficiently praised; and his

satisfaction on an occasion which promises to be attended with the most substantial advantages, has been greatly heightened by learning from the commanding officers of divisions, that this meritorious behaviour was universal through all ranks, to a degree that has rarely been equalled. Lord Cornwallis, therefore, requests that the army in general will accept of his most cordial thanks for the noble and gallant manner in which they have executed the plan of the attack. It covers themselves with honour, and will ever command his warmest sentiments of admiration."

During the night Tippoo abandoned his few remaining posts on the north of the Cavery, and the island remained the next morning the only theatre of contest. The English found the pettah a defensible place, and their other positions were also good: they had likewise obtained great stores of forage by driving the enemy from the mainland. The pettah was also rich in grain stores, and a pulse wholesome for cattle. The Laul Bang, as the magnificent garden of Tippoo was called, supplied material for the siege, and the palace connected with it, as well as the buildings of the Fakeers, erected by Tippoo round the tomb of his father, furnished suitable habitations for the officers, the wounded, and the sick.

The city of Seringapatam was invested on its two principal sides; from the camp, and more especially from the pickets of the British, its fine outline, with its bold defences, were distinctly visible. The conflicts during the night of the 6th of February, and the day and night of the 7th, constituted a great and continuous battle, one of the grandest and severest which the English had fought in India. The arms, standards, and munitions of war already captured were immense. Eighty pieces of cannon, thirty-six of them brass, were taken. Tippoo had also suffered from desertion, many of his soldiers having fled on both nights, especially that of the 7th, and on the morning of the 8th, before day.* Many deserted to the English, and, according to the reports of the most intelligent among those who had remained longest with him, his loss up to the 11th of February amounted to probably twenty-five thousand men.†

* The nairs, and others whom he had oppressed, or persecuted on religious grounds, and who served with the English, cut off many of the fugitives.

† Tippoo's army was recruited from every part of Southern India. Mohammedans, from religious zeal, volunteering to serve him from every district across the peninsula, from Malabar to Coromandel. Numbers also volunteered from Central India from the same cause.

Major Dymock thus refers to these desertions:—"His sepoys threw down their arms in great numbers, and, taking advantage of the night, went off in every direction to the countries where they had been impressed, or enlisted: many came into our camp; and that continued to be the case during the siege. From their reports it appeared that, on a muster taken of the sultan's army, some days after the battle, his killed, wounded, and missing, were found to amount to twenty thousand. Fifty-seven of the foreigners in Tippoo's service took advantage of the battle of the 6th and 7th of February, to quit his service and come over to our army. Among them were Monsieur Blevette, an old man, who was his chief artificer, or rather chief engineer, and Monsieur Lafolie, his French interpreter, both of whom had been long in his and his father's service. Monsieur Heron, who was taken at Bangalore, and released on his parole, to enable him to bring away his family, also took this opportunity to fulfil his promises: several other people of some note were likewise of the number; some of them of the artificers sent to Tippoo from France, when his ambassadors returned in 1789. Thirty of these foreigners, headed by Joseph Pedro, a Portuguese, who held the rank of captain in Tippoo's service, engaged immediately with the Mahrattas. Some requested to go to the French settlements in India, others to return to Europe; a few might, perhaps, be taken into our service, and the remainder have probably engaged in the Mahratta or nizam's armies. The remains of the sultan's army, which had withdrawn in the course of the day and night of the 7th, were collected on the morning of the 8th; his infantry on the glacis, and within the outworks of the fort; his baggage and cavalry on the south side of the river towards Mysore. The crowd in and about the fort was very great; but his army never again encamped in order, or made any formidable appearance." Active preparations were now made for the siege. The magnificent garden was soon desolate, the rich fruit-trees and far-shading eypresses affording gabions for the engineers. Fascines and pickets were procured from the material of the garden palace, where the lascars and English pioneers spared nothing which their requirements demanded. An account of the remaining events must be reserved for another chapter.

Even Mahrattas, who, as a nation hated him, served in his ranks.

CHAPTER XXVII.

WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN (*Continued*)—SIEGE OF SERINGAPATAM—NIGHT ATTACK ON THE TENT OF EARL CORNWALLIS—GENERAL ABERCROMBY REACHES THE ALLIED CAMPS—SURRENDER OF TIPPOO'S SONS AS HOSTAGES—SECESSION OF HALF HIS TERRITORY AS A CONDITION OF PEACE.

ON the 9th of February the siege of Seringapatam commenced in due form. The island which now appeared likely to be the sphere of a fierce and sanguinary struggle was but four English miles in length, and one mile and a half in breadth. The centre being the highest ground, thence sloping in every direction to the river Cavery, the waters of which surrounded it. The following account of it, and the condition of Seringapatam at the period of the siege, was given by an official person on the staff of his excellency the governor-general and commander-in-chief:—"The west end of the island, on which the fort is built, slopes more, especially towards the north; the ground rising on the opposite side of the river commands a distinct view of every part of the fort. The fort and outworks occupy about a mile of the west end of the island, and the Laul Baug, or great garden, about the same portion of the east end. The whole space between the fort and the Laul Baug, except a small enclosure, called the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, on the north bank near the fort, was filled, before the war, with houses, and formed an extensive suburb, of which the pettah of Shaher Ganjam is the only remaining part, the rest having been destroyed by Tippoo to make room for batteries to defend the island, and to form an esplanade to the fort.

"This pettah, or town, of modern structure, built on the middle and highest part of the island, is about half a mile square, divided into regular cross streets, all wide, and shaded on each side by trees, and full of good houses. It is surrounded by a strong mud wall, and seemed to have been preserved for the accommodation of the bazaar people and merchants, and for the convenience of the troops stationed on that part of the island for its defence. A little way to the eastward of the pettah, is the entrance into the great garden, or Laul Baug. It was laid out in regular shady walks of large cypress trees, and full of fruit-trees, flowers, and vegetables of every description.

"The island of Seringapatam is watered not only by a river, but also by a canal cut from it, at a considerable distance, where its bed is higher than the island, and brought from thence in an aqueduct across the south

branch opposite to that face of the fort. This stream, conducted in various canals to all the lower parts of the island on the south side, afforded great convenience to the inhabitants in that quarter, and was the means of keeping the gardens in constant beauty and abundance.

"The fort, thus situated on the west end of the island, is distinguished by its white walls, regular outworks, magnificent buildings, and ancient Hindoo pagodas, contrasted with the more lofty and splendid monuments lately raised in honour of the Mohammedan faith. The Laul Baug, which occupies the east end of the island, possessing all the beauty and convenience of a country retirement, is dignified by the mausoleum of Hyder, and a superb new palace built by Tippoo. To these add the idea of an extensive suburb or town, which filled the middle space between the fort and the garden, full of wealthy, industrious inhabitants, and it will readily be allowed that this insulated metropolis must have been the richest, most convenient, and beautiful spot possessed in the present age by any native prince in India.

"The sultan's proud mind could not be tranquil, in seeing his beautiful garden, and all his improvements, in the possession of his enemies, who were also preparing to deprive him of his last citadel, and all that remained of his power. His anger was expressed in a continual discharge of cannon from the fort, directed to the island, to the redoubts, and to every post or party of ours within his reach. Some of his shot even ranged to the camp, and seemed aimed at head-quarters; but the distance on every side was considerable, and his ineffectual cannonade served rather to proclaim the wrath of the sovereign, than to disturb or materially annoy his enemies."

Tippoo saw that he had no hope of repelling the English, and as a means of conciliation, as well as of obtaining terms of peace, he determined to release Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, whom, in violation of the terms of capitulation, he carried captives from Coimbatore.

"On the evening of the 8th of February, Tippoo sent for these officers. They found him sitting under the fly of a small tent (the roof without the walls), pitched on the south

glacis of the fort, apparently much dejected, very plainly dressed, and with only a few attendants. After giving them the welcome tidings of their intended release, he asked Lieutenant Chalmers, who had commanded in Coimbatore, whether he was not related to Lord Cornwallis, and an officer of considerable rank in our army. On being answered in the negative, he then asked whether he should see his lordship on going to camp; and being told he probably should have that honour, requested him to take charge of two letters on the subject of peace, which he said he had been very anxious to obtain ever since the commencement of the war, as it was not his intention to break with the English; and requested his assistance in effecting that important object. He further expressed his wish that Mr. Chalmers would return with the answer; told him their baggage should be sent after them; gave him a present of two shawls and five hundred rupees, and ordered horses and attendants to go with them to the camp."

Such was the hypocrisy and treachery of Tippoo, that while suing for peace, and although really anxious to procure it, he was meditating fresh schemes for retrieving by arms the disasters which had befallen him. On the forenoon of the day on which he liberated the British officers, his cavalry passed from their encampment and moved down the south side of the river Cavery. Notice was given of their movement from the island to head-quarters, but no one supposed that they had any intention of crossing to the north side of the river. This, however, they accomplished at a ford six miles distant from Seringapatam; and on the morning of the 10th, at dawn, moved to the rear of the left wing of the British camp, undiscovered, and passed between the camps of the nizam and that of Earl Cornwallis. The nizam's army seldom threw out pickets, or appointed posts of observation, yet the English sepoy sentinels mistook the enemy for horsemen of the Deccan. An officer who was in the English camp on the night of the transaction thus describes what followed, and accounts for the failure of the enterprise:—"The head-quarters were in the rear of the right wing, and so near to the right flank of the line, that the party of the enemy on passing the park of artillery, which was posted between the wings, asked some of the camp followers for the Burra Sahib, or commander. Not suspecting them to be enemies, and supposing these horsemen wanted Colonel Duff, the commanding officer of artillery, they pointed to his tent. The horsemen then drew their swords, and galloped towards the tent, cutting some lascars and people as they

advanced, till being fired upon by a party of Bombay sepoy drafts and recruits, encamped in the rear of the park, who had turned out with great alacrity; they were dispersed before they could do any further mischief. Some shot were afterwards fired at them from the park as they went off, but they got away across the hills again with very little loss.

"This scheme was one of those daring projects that have been so frequently practised by the native powers against each other in effecting revolutions in the East; and had those assassins been conducted by a guide, or their judgment been equal to their spirit in the attempt, it is possible they might have effected their murderous purpose. But the Mohammedan horsemen in the service of the native powers in India are generally intoxicated with bang, a plant mixed with their tobacco in smoking, or with opium, of which they take a large dose before they enter upon any dangerous enterprise: this inebriation renders their exertions so wild and disunited, that it is almost impossible for them ever to prove successful against a vigilant enemy. This incursion, though soon over, created a general alarm in the army; the safety of Lord Cornwallis was not less the object of the public than the private concern."

Increased vigilance was adopted by the English; and the commander-in-chief, who was careless of having his tent guarded, was induced to order a captain's guard to do duty there in future.

Immediately after this event, and while the work of making pickets, fascines, and gabions, proceeded vigorously on the island and in the British camp, another series of operations went forward which were of deep interest to all the armies concerned. These were connected with the march of the Bombay army under General Abercromby to join that under Lord Cornwallis. When last the march of the Bombay army was noticed, it had ascended the Ghauts, and appeared on the enemy's frontier. Various circumstances hindered its progress, and Tippoo dextrously impeded it by complicated and skilful movements of troops in that direction. On the 8th of February, while the army of Lord Cornwallis was operating so successfully before Seringapatam, Abercromby began a rapid movement to form a junction with his chief. On the 11th he crossed the Cavery at Eratore, not more than thirty miles from Lord Cornwallis's camp. On the 13th he had to ford a small river, which emptied itself into the Cavery, between his army and the object of their advance. At that place, suddenly, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry, which had been watching for the opportunity, swept between

the army and the baggage, destroying and capturing a considerable portion. They also repeatedly charged the rearguard, and cut off a few stragglers and camp followers. On the 14th, a powerful corps of Mysorean horse harassed both flanks, and repeatedly appeared ready to charge; it was at last necessary for the British to halt, and stand in order of battle. Just as the formation of the line was completed, a British officer contrived to reach Abercromby with intelligence that Colonel Floyd, with the cavalry of Lord Cornwallis, four thousand allied horsemen, and a battalion of sepoy, were on their way to cover his advance.

Tippoo was observant of all these movements, and set the whole cavalry of Mysore in motion to cut off some of those bodies of troops. On the morning of the 14th, when Colonel Floyd marched with the British horse, the allies lingered on the ground, and refused to follow when the importunities of Major Scott urged the necessity of the whole force keeping together. When at last they did move, Tippoo's troopers passed between them and the British, attacked and routed them, and had not Floyd and his British dragoons hastened back, the Deccan and Mahratta horsemen would have been altogether dispersed. The enemy took to flight on the appearance of the British. On the 16th, the Bombay force arrived in the camp of the commander-in-chief. It consisted, after its losses, and the deduction of garrisons and posts formed *en route*, of three brigades; and when the sick and wounded were sent to hospital tents, the force numbered six thousand bayonets. One-third of the men were Europeans: with the exception of a few topasses the rest were sepoys.

The time had now arrived for commencing the siege, and orders were issued to open the trenches. Major Dirom thus described the bulwark against which the energy and skill of the assailing armies were to be directed, and the mode of attack contemplated:—

“The fort of Seringapatam, of a triangular figure, constructed on the west end of the island, is embraced by the branches of the river on its two longest sides; the third side, or base of the triangle towards the island, being the face most liable to attack, is covered by strong outworks, and is defended by two very broad and massy ramparts, the second at a considerable distance within the first, both having good flank defences, a deep ditch, with drawbridges, and every advantage of modern fortification.

“The two other sides of the fort being protected by the river, it was intended that the main attack should have been carried on from

the island, by making a lodgment in the Dowlat Baug, or rajah's garden, and from thence to run regular approaches against the north-east angle of the fort, which would also be subject to a powerful enfilade attack from batteries on the north bank of the river. Much time and many lives must probably have been lost in this attack; the undertaking was arduous; but there being no impediment, besides those of art to encounter, the superior power of our troops and artillery could not fail of success.

“Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, had in the meantime been able to reconnoitre the north face of the fort very closely, and from what he saw, and the information he received from Monsieur Blevette, the head artificer, and others of Tippoo's Europeans, who had come over to us, it was judged more advisable to make the principal attack across the river against the north face of the fort. The curtain there was evidently very weak, and extending close along the bank of the river, left no room for outworks, and the flank defences were few and of little consequence. The ditch, excavated from the rock, was dry, and said to be inconsiderable; and it appeared to be so from what could be observed in looking into it from the Pagoda Hill. The stone glacis which, built into the river, covers that face, was broken, or had been left incomplete, in two places, including several hundred yards of the curtain; the walls might therefore be breached to the bottom, and would probably fill up great part of the ditch. The fort built on the declivity of the island on the north was there exposed in its whole extent, and every shot fired from that quarter must take effect, while the slope the island has also to the west end, exposed that part of the fort to a very powerful enfilade attack from the ground by which it is commanded on the south side of the river, opposite to the south-western face of the fort.

“The north branch of the river, which would intervene between the main attack, and the fort, was the only objection. It seemed possible, by repairing an old dam or embankment, to throw the water entirely into the other branch; at all events the channel, though rugged, was not deep or impassable, and the embarrassment of such an obstacle was in some measure compensated by the security it gave against sallies, and the cover it would afford in breaking ground at once within breaching distance of the fort. The fire, too, from that side, could not be very considerable, and there was a certainty of carrying on the approaches rapidly, and breaching the place with little loss. It might not be necessary to storm,

and if it should, an extraordinary exertion must be made at the general assault.

“Such were understood to be the principal reasons which determined Lord Cornwallis to relinquish the attack from the island against the east face, and adopt, in preference, that across the river against the north face of the fort.”

On the 19th of February orders were given to open the trenches. At the same time, Lord Cornwallis commanded that the British troops on the island should cross to the south side, and disturb the cavalry encampment there, so as to divert the attention of the enemy from the proceedings directed against the north face of the fort. The 71st regiment and the 13th battalion of Bengal sepoy were ordered for this service. Night, soon after sunset, was chosen for this expedition. The troops crossed the river, made a detour among paddy fields, and about midnight arrived at the enemy's camp. Captain Robertson, at the head of a few companies, was sent forward, while the rest of the detachment remained in support. The captain ordered that the men should advance in close order, yet stealthily, and not fire. He entered the camp undetected, and fell upon the troopers with the bayonet, killing above one hundred. The men fled in confusion, leaving their horses, about two hundred of which the English bayoneted. The enemy now began to assemble as the alarm was given. Robertson then fired several volleys at random into the camp, so as to keep up the confusion already created while he retired. The effect of this manœuvre on the fort was instantaneous; rockets were thrown up, blue lights ignited, the bastions illuminated, so that the whole fort seemed to be a blaze of fire—the enemy expected a general assault. A single shot was fired in the direction of the musketeer, but it was impossible to open a cannonade without destructive effects upon the cavalry. Captain Robertson bravely and skilfully accomplished the task assigned to him, without losing a man. There was no breach of discipline, no plunder, although many horses might have been taken away; had the men left their ranks to make prizes of the horses, the whole party might have been endangered.

Major Dalrymple, to whom the expedition had been entrusted, brought off his troops safely:—

“He returned with his detachment to the island, at four o'clock in the morning, and proceeded from thence to the head-quarters of the army, with the 71st regiment, which was one of the corps ordered up from the island, in consequence of the plan of attack being changed from thence to the north side of the fort.

“Lieutenant-colonel Ross, the chief engineer, and the Honourable Lieutenant-colonel Knox, who was to command the guard for the trenches, had, in the afternoon, visited the outposts, and looked at the general situation of the ground opposite to the north face of the fort, as directed in the general orders. The large redoubt, called Mahomed's, which was constructed for the defence of the centre of the sultan's camp, is nearly opposite to the middle of the fort on the north side, and at the distance of about fifteen hundred yards from that face. The approaches were to connect with that redoubt; but in order to take full advantage of an attack so unexpected on that side, it was determined to break ground within breaching distance of the fort, and, having formed a sufficient parallel, to work back from thence to the redoubt. A deep ravine, in which there is a stream of water on the right of the redoubt, turns along its front, and is branched into several nullahs, or canals, for the cultivation of the rice fields between the redoubt and the river. One of these nullahs, running nearly parallel to the north face of the fort, and being also at the distance wished, about eight hundred yards, was to be formed into a first parallel for the attack, to which the ravine or water-course itself formed an imperfect approach. About one thousand yards to the right of the ground fixed upon for the parallel, there was a square redoubt of the enemy's near the river, and a mosque with very strong walls, at nearly the same distance on the left, both convenient posts to be occupied by the guard for the trenches.

“The troops for working, and for guarding the trenches, having assembled at the engineer's park as directed, marched down as soon as it was dark, to commence the interesting operations of the night. The disposition of the guard for the trenches, or covering party, consisting of the 36th regiment, and two battalions of sepoy, being the first arrangement, was made by Lieutenant-colonel Knox, according to the plan fixed with the chief engineer, and was as follows:—

“Captain Wight, with the grenadiers, and a battalion company of the 36th regiment, accompanied by Lieutenant Mackenzie, aide-camp to the chief engineer, with a party of pioneers with gabions for closing the gorge of the work towards the fort, was sent to dislodge the enemy, and take possession of the redoubt on the right of the parallel: the light infantry company of the 36th regiment, under Captain Hart, and two companies of sepoy, were to occupy the mosque to the left. Sergeants' parties were distributed along the front and flanks of the parallel, to prevent the possibility of surprise. A battalion of sepoy was

sent into the nullah intended for the parallel, and the remainder of the covering party lay upon their arms, on each side of the water-course in the rear of the parallel, under shelter of some banks near the burying-ground of Tippoo's Europeans, whose quarters had been at Somarpett.

"The chief engineer having detailed the working parties under the different officers of his corps, proceeded to execute the parallel which he had marked out the preceding night. They worked undiscovered, and so ineffectual were the blue lights of the fort, that, when illuminated on all sides, in consequence of the diversion which was made from the island, they did not enable the garrison to see the people who were at work within eight hundred yards of the walls; nor can those lights be of any service to discover an enemy, unless in a very close attack, where they are generally of still more use to the assailants.

"General Meadows, accompanied by the officers of his suite, came down in the evening to the advanced redoubt, where he remained during the night, in readiness to give his orders in case anything particular had occurred. In the morning he inspected the work that had been executed, and afterwards continued his daily visits to the trenches during the siege. By daylight, the nullah was formed into a wide and extensive parallel, and a redoubt was constructed to cover its left flank, the right being protected by the ravine.

"The party that had been sent to possess the redoubt near the river, having found it evacuated, and too open to be rendered tenable, in the course of the night rejoined Colonel Knox. In the morning the parties were withdrawn that had been posted in front, and on the flanks of the parallel during the night; but the party was continued in the mosque on the left, as it was thought strong enough to resist the cannon of the fort.

"Daylight showed the sultan that the exertions of his enemy had been directed to a more material object than beating up his horse camp during the night; and that his attention had been successfully drawn off to a different quarter, during the most interesting operation of the siege. He opened every gun he could bring to bear upon the parallel, and upon the mosque, and sent parties of infantry across the river to harass our troops in flank, and to interrupt the work.

"Tippoo, finding all his exertions from the fort would be ineffectual in repelling the attack on that side, thought of employing another expedient in his defence, by turning off the water from the large canal, which, being cut from Caniambaddy for the cultivation of the grounds on the north side of the river,

supplied the greatest part of our camp. This measure, he knew, would distress our troops, and, by depriving the camp of a large stream of running water, soon render it unhealthy; and moreover, by increasing the quantity of water in the bed of the river, would add to the difficulty of our approach. It is probable that the Bombay army, previously to their junction, prevented the sultan from an earlier attempt to deprive us of this source of health and comfort, to which he was now urged by the opening of our trenches, and the commencement of the attack on that side of the fort. The sudden deficiency of the water soon indicated that the enemy had diverted the stream from the canal. The 14th battalion of coast sepoy, commanded by Captain Wahab, was immediately detached with a party of pioneers to dispossess the enemy, and endeavour to repair the damage. Tippoo's troops did not attempt to defend the position they had taken on the banks of the canal, which they had broken down in order to turn the stream into the bed of the river; and the embankment being very massy, the little they had been able to destroy was soon repaired, and the stream again confined to its former channel."*

A battalion of sepoy was stationed there to prevent a second attempt by the enemy. After the commencement of the main attack as above described, the Bombay army was directed to cross the river, and invest the south-west side, and make ready for an enfilade attack upon the face of the fort. When Abercromby made good his passage, he perceived the enemy drawn out in battle array. Tippoo did not believe that the river could be forded with guns at that particular point, and had made no provision to prevent such a result. His cavalry had been thrown into such confusion by the surprise effected through the activity and boldness of Captain Roberts, that they were marshalled with difficulty. He now appeared in person at the head of his infantry, resolved to prevent Abercromby securing such points as would strengthen his position. These were a redoubt, and a "tope" or grove between the fort and the heights upon which Abercromby took post, and the sultan manifested an intense anxiety to prevent their occupation. The English forbore any attempt during the day, but at night Colonel Hartley, with a battalion of grenadier sepoy, effected a surprise. The next morning Tippoo saw from his fortress three Europeans and six sepoy battalions under Abercromby on the heights, strongly posted, and beyond the range of the guns of the batteries.

On the nights of the 19th and 20th, and

* *Narrative of the Campaign in India, 1792.*

21st of February, the English carried on their works with industry, courage, and skill; thirty men only were killed and wounded by the cannonade of the sultan during those operations. He watched the English with vigilance, and opposed them with activity. Every morning he paced anxiously and fearlessly the ramparts, to observe the progress made the previous night. Every feature of the defence was drawn by himself, and his fortitude amazed the allies. Deserters were now numerous, especially from his cavalry, to the English, the Mahrattas, and the nizam—the majority of these renegades preferred the services of the sovereign of the Deccan.

During the progress of all these demonstrations Tippoo negotiated with hesitating and reluctant diplomacy. His vakeels were received by the British commander-in-chief. Tents were pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, and thither the representatives of the sultan and the allies repaired on the 15th, 16th, 19th, and 21st. Deserters reported that the chief men in the city, anxious to save their treasures, and preserve their families from alarm, and possibly insult, had remonstrated with the sultan against continuing a war which brought desolation and disaster to their doors. Tippoo refused to make the extensive concessions demanded from him, still believing that the allies would not long be able to obtain subsistence in a country already nearly exhausted. The strong fort of Mysore was still his. Cummer-ud-Deen Khan held the Bide-nore country, as already shown, and he was supposed to be hastening thence with reinforcements and convoys.

On the 22nd of February Tippoo found that General Abercromby had pushed up his posts in closer proximity to the weakest part of the defence. He determined to dislodge them. For this purpose a strong detachment occupied the tope, a few moments before the arrival of an English party for the same purpose; a combat ensued, the English were reinforced from the redoubt, their surprise of which has been related, and the combat became extended and severe: the Mysoreans were driven out, and the English drew up in front of the grove opposite the batteries of the fort. All day Tippoo threw rockets against the tope, and sent out skirmishers, who succeeded in wounding the English sentinels. When night fell he directed the guns of the fort against it, while cavalry and infantry operated upon its flanks. The English were largely reinforced, and a fierce battle was fought. The arrangements for supplying the English with ammunition were, as usual, bad, and the brave men had to retire before continuous peals of musketry, to which they

had no means of replying. The enemy, emboldened, charged the tope, the troopers dismounting and leading the way sword in hand. The English instantly turned, charged with the bayonet, and drove the aggressors under the walls of the fort. Again the enemy advanced, but did not charge, maintaining a murderous fusilade, which the English could not answer by a single shot, and were obliged to retreat under a heavy and galling fire. While the enemy were pressing more closely, and their fire thickening, the 12th battalion of Bombay sepoy, with a supply of ammunition, arrived, and turned the fortunes of the day. The sepoy covered the retreating English, who, with replenished cartouch-boxes, rallied, and again drove the enemy out of the tope, once more taking post in its front, along which a battle of musketry was waged with furious energy. The English again reinforced, pursued the enemy under the guns of the fort, as the sun set closing the day and the battle. This battle caused great uneasiness to the British on the island, and in the camp of head-quarters, as the waving to and fro of large bodies of men, and the continued roar of musketry, led the British to believe that the whole of General Abercromby's force was in action, and hotly pressed. When night came, a burning anxiety to know the result pervaded the allied camps, and means were taken to obtain prompt intelligence, which allayed all doubts, and afforded fresh encouragement. Abercromby himself had been apprehensive that the attack was a feint by Tippoo to engage the attention of the English while Cummer-ud-Deen should fall upon his rear, so that he feared to detach support to the troops in the tope, so as to put an earlier termination to the conflict. The English lost about one hundred and twenty men, and many valuable officers, in killed and wounded.

On the night of the 23rd of February the second parallel was finished, and the ground selected for the breaching batteries within five hundred yards of the fort. On the same night a redoubt was constructed on an island in the river, from which it was believed a cannonade might be directed with effect in certain conjunctures. Abercromby advanced to a ravine between the fort and the lately contested tope, and made there a lodgment. A battery was commenced near that point, from which to throw red-hot shot and shells into the fort.

On the night of the 24th the English were prepared to open a fire from nearly sixty cannon and howitzers. The weight of metal was sufficient for breaching, and the means of setting the city on fire were ample and certain. The place was not yet fully invested. Pur-

seram Bhow was, as has already been shown, on an expedition which he chose to take without the concurrence of his allies. He was now expected, and with his force of twenty thousand cavalry, a brigade of English sepoy infantry which he had with him, and thirty pieces of cannon, the investment of the city would speedily be completed, and Tippoo would obtain no supplies, unless his lieutenant, the khan, could force his way through the blockade.

Major Cuppage was advancing from Coimbatore with a very strong brigade, and orders to take the fort of Mysore on the way. Supplies were abundant, and the arrangements for convoys effective. The sultan could no longer maintain himself, unless by sorties he could clear the vicinity of his capital and raise the siege. The 24th of February dawned on the besieged and besiegers, full of interest. The former, drooping and dependant, expected that as soon as the shadows of evening closed around the ramparts, the thunder of the breaching batteries would roll over the city. The besiegers were full of high hope, eager to avenge their murdered countrymen, and enrich themselves with the booty of a stormed capital. Suddenly orders came to the English to cease working in the trenches, and to abstain from all hostile acts. At the same moment, Tippoo, ever treacherous even when treachery brought little advantage and much peril to himself, opened an active fire from all points of the defence, wounding and slaying several officers, as well as many men. This was in contravention of articles of armistice signed the night before. Lord Cornwallis sent repeated flags of truce and remonstrances, but the sultan continued his fire until noon, although the English did not reply. His aim probably was to make his people believe that he had dictated terms of peace. The same day a proclamation of Lord Cornwallis announced the cessation of hostilities, but that the same vigilance, as if in actual warfare, was to be observed at all the posts of the allied armies. On the night of the 23rd Tippoo had signed preliminaries of peace, having accepted the terms dictated by Lord Cornwallis. These terms were severe, but not more than the conduct and character of Tippoo necessitated, and it was in the power of the allies to have then closed his career, and have saved much blood and treasure that afterwards it became needful to expend. As the struggle between the English and Tippoo did not end with this war, and the treaty made by Lord Cornwallis laid the foundation for subsequent quarrels, it is desirable to present its terms to the reader:—

Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace concluded between the allied armies and Tippoo Sultan.

ART. I.—One half of the dominions of which Tippoo Sultan was in possession before the war, to be ceded to the allies from the countries adjacent, according to their situation.

ART. II.—Three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, to be paid by Tippoo Sultan, either in gold mohurs, pagodas, or bullion.

1st. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid immediately.

2nd. One crore and sixty-five lacs, to be paid in three payments not exceeding four months each.

ART. III.—All prisoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ali, to be unequivocally restored.

ART. IV.—Two of Tippoo Sultan's three eldest sons to be given as hostages for a due performance of the treaty.

ART. V.—When they shall arrive in camp, with the articles of this treaty, under the seal of the sultan, a counterpart shall be sent from the three powers. Hostilities shall cease, and terms of a treaty of alliance and perpetual friendship shall be agreed upon.

Major Dymock relates that "the allies, Hurry Punt on the part of the Mahrattas, and the nizam's son, Secunder Jaw, and his minister Azeem-ul-Omrah, on the part of the nizam, conducted themselves with the greatest moderation and propriety in the negotiation, and on every occasion on which they had been consulted during the war."

The surrender of his sons as hostages caused much commiseration in the city, and a sort of insurrection among the ladies of the harem, who besought the sultan to request an additional day's delay from Lord Cornwallis, in order that the young princes might be sent into his camp with suitable preparation. His lordship, hearing of this, sent word that he was willing to defer the surrender of the hostages, and that he would wait upon their highnesses as soon as they arrived at the tents prepared for their reception. Tippoo requested that they might be at once conducted to his lordship's tent, and delivered into his own hands.

On the 26th the hostages left the fort, and seldom has the page of history recorded a scene more touching. The ramparts were crowded with soldiers and citizens, whose sympathy was deeply stirred. Tippoo himself was on the rampart above the gateway, and is represented as having shown profound emotion.

As the princes left the gate the fort saluted them with the usual discharge of cannon, and as they approached the British camp twenty-one guns thundered forth a similar token of respect. They were met by the English negotiator, Sir John Kennaway, the Mahratta and nizam's vakeels, and a guard of honour. The princes were conveyed on elephants caparisoned after the manner of Southern India; each was seated in a silver howdah. The vakeels of the different courts were also borne

upon elephants. Harearrahs* led the procession, and seven standard bearers, carrying small green flags suspended from rocket poles. After these followed one hundred pikemen, whose weapons were inlaid with silver. The rearguard consisted of two hundred sepoy and a squadron of horse.

Lord Cornwallis, attended by many of his principal officers, as well as his staff, met the princes at the entrance to his tent, as they descended from their howders. He embraced them, and taking one in each hand, led them into his tent. The elder, Abdul Kaliek, was only ten years of age, the younger, Moozaad-Deen was two years younger. Lord Cornwallis placed them on each side of him as he sat. Gullam Ali, the principal vakeel of Tippoo, then surrendered them formally as hostages, saying, "These children were this morning the sons of the sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father." Lord Cornwallis addressed the vakeel, assuring them that his protection should be extended to his interesting hostages; and he spoke so feelingly, yet cheerfully, to the children that he at once gained their confidence.

The princes wore flowing robes of white muslin and red turbans, in which each wore a sprig of rich pearls. They had necklaces composed of several rows of large pearls. From the necklace, each wore an ornament of the same pattern, the centre of which consisted of a large rich ruby, and one exquisitely chaste emerald. The centre piece was surrounded by brilliants. Their manners were characterised by propriety and dignity becoming their high rank. The elder boy had a Moorish aspect, his colour was rather dark, lips thick, nose flat, and the countenance long and preternaturally thoughtful. Neither his person nor manner was so much admired as the appearance and demeanour of the younger child, who was fair, with regular contour, large, bright, expressive eyes, and a countenance kind and cheerful:—"Placed too, on the right hand of Lord Cornwallis, he was said to be the favourite son, and the sultan's intended heir. His mother (a sister of Burham-nd-Deen's, who was killed at Sattimangulm), a beautiful, delicate woman, had died of fright and apprehension, a few days after the attack of the lines. This melancholy event made the situation of the youngest boy doubly interesting, and, with the other circumstances, occasioned his at-

* *Harearrahs*: messengers employed to carry letters, and on business of trust. They are commonly Brahmins, are well acquainted with the neighbouring countries, are sent to gain intelligence, and are used as guides in the field.

tracting by much the more notice. After some conversation, his lordship presented a handsome gold watch to each of the princes, with which they seemed much pleased. Beetel-nut and otto of roses, according to the Eastern custom, being then distributed, he led them back to their elephants, embraced them again, and they returned, escorted by their suite and the battalion, to their tents. Next day, the 27th, Lord Cornwallis, attended as yesterday, went to pay the princes a visit at their tents, pitched near the Mosque Redoubt, within the green canaut or wall, used by the sultan in the field, of which we had so often traced the marks during the war. The canaut of canvas, scolloped at top, was painted of a beautiful sea-green colour, with rich ornamented borders, and formed an elegant inclosure for the tents. It was thrown open to the front, and within it the pikemen, sepoy, &c., of the princes' guard formed a street to a tent, whence they came out and met Lord Cornwallis. After embracing them, he led them, one in each hand, into the tent, where chairs were placed for his lordship, themselves, and his suite. Sir John Kenna-way, the Mabratta and the nizam's vakeels, also attended the conference. The eldest boy, now seated on his lordship's right hand, appeared less serious than yesterday; and when he spoke, was not only graceful in his manner, but had a most affable, animated appearance. The youngest, however, appeared to be the favourite with the vakeels; and at the desire of Gullam Ali, repeated, or rather recited some verses in Arabic, which he had learned by heart from the Koran, and afterwards some verses in Persian, which he did with great ease and confidence, and showed he had made great progress in his education. Each of the princes presented his lordship with a fine Persian sword, and in return he gave the eldest a fuzee, and the youngest a pair of pistols, of very fine and curious workmanship. Some jewels, shawls, and rich presents were then offered to his lordship as matter of form; after which, beetel-nut and otto of roses being distributed, the princes conducted his lordship without the tent, when he embraced them and took his leave. The tent in which the princes received Lord Cornwallis, was lined with fine chintz, and the floor covered with white cloth. The attendants sprinkled rose-water during the audience; and there was a degree of state, order, and magnificence in everything, much superior to what had been seen amongst our allies. The guard of sepoy drawn up without was clothed in uniform, and not only regularly and well-armed, but, compared to the rabble of infantry in the

service of the other native powers, appeared well disciplined and in high order. From what passed this day, and the lead taken by the eldest son, it seemed uncertain which of them might be intended for Tippoo's heir. Perhaps, and most probably, neither; for Hyder Sahib, about twenty years of age, has always been said to be Tippoo's eldest son; had been educated accordingly, and had accompanied his father constantly during the war, till lately, when he was sent on a separate command.* The vakeels declared that he was not a favourite, nor destined to be the heir. This was, however, supposed to be said by them to prevent that prince also from being demanded as a hostage.

On the morning of the 28th, a salute was fired from the fort, to announce the satisfaction of the sultan, at the treatment which his sons received. Every preparation was now made to complete the definitive treaty, and hasten the departure of the allies. There arose many grounds of suspicion that Tippoo had actually murdered some of the English prisoners after the signature of preliminaries of peace, and that others were retained in a miserable confinement in Seringapatam. Ten sepoy of General Abercromby's corps were taken on the 29th of February, brought into the fort, each mutilated of his right hand, and sent back to the English camp. These men were shown to Tippoo's vakeels, who said they had been caught plundering. The sepoy declared that they were wandering about beyond the fort, were seized, brought before the sultan's chubdar, or officer of justice, and thus mutilated. The vakeels denied that this was by orders of the sultan, or with his knowledge. When Tippoo was remonstrated with by Lord Cornwallis, the reply was insolent and satirical:—"His lordship must have been misinformed; but for his satisfaction, if he desired it, he would throw down one of the bastions that he might see into the fort." In a variety of ways, the sultan appeared as if he doubted the sincerity of the allies, or was himself insincere. He was preparing the means of further defence, although his sons were hostages, and he had signed terms of a preliminary treaty. His vakeels also raised every obstruction which falsehood and artifice could create to the ratification of the treaty. He refused to pay the full fine stipulated, although a crore of rupees had been already sent. Cumber-ud-deen Khan had arrived with an immense convoy, and a powerful reinforcement, and was permitted to enter the fort. The cession of territory was after many disputes fixed, and yielded nearly half a million sterling to each of the three allied

Narrative of the Campaign.

powers. The sultan had determined, as soon as the allies withdrew, to take ample vengeance upon the Coorg Rajah for the aid which he gave to the Bombay army. Lord Cornwallis insisted therefore upon that prince being secured as an independent sovereign by the treaty. Tippoo refused, and so keen was his love of revenge, that no concession demanded of him excited such grief and indignation. He was nearly driven to madness.

Lord Cornwallis sent back the guns to the island, and ordered the troops to prepare to renew the siege, should matters come to that extremity. There was, however, such disarrangement and destruction of material as rendered a new siege far more difficult than the former. Fresh food was scarce in the camps, a pestilential effluvia stole over the posts which were occupied in the island, and many of the men sickened and some died. Upon all this the sultan had calculated, and therefore instructed his vakeels to procrastinate, while he added strength to his fortifications, especially to the north face of the fort. The civil officers of Tippoo represented to him the great forces now occupying his country, and urged him to remove all doubt of his sincerity, by a full and frank compliance with the terms of the treaty. They were justified in these representations, for, on the 16th of March, 1792, the following number of troops were in Mysore, and chiefly around Seringapatam:—11,193 Europeans, 72,620 natives, with 254 cannon.

The negotiations with the sultan made such unsuccessful progress, that on the 16th of March, the body-guard which attended the princes was disarmed, and the royal children were sent towards the Carnatic. Intimation was given to the sultan, that if the definitive treaty were not immediately signed, hostilities would be resumed.

Purseram Bhow, with his Mahrattas, and the Bombay sepoy battalions, under Captain Little, attached to the army of that chief, crossed the river to the south side of the fort, to join the forces of General Abercromby, and make the blockade there more complete. "It may appear extraordinary that the other Mahratta army, or the nizam's army, had not been employed to act with General Abercromby, in the absence of Purseram Bhow. Lord Cornwallis mentions in one of his despatches, that it suited neither the health nor inclination of Henry Punt to go upon any detached service; and that the nizam's minister, although he, with great zeal, offered to supply the place of the bhow, was so completely ignorant of military affairs, and such was the want of arrangement prevailing in every department of his army, that he was

equally unable to put his troops in motion, or to provide for their subsistence, even for a few days, if removed from our army."

The bhow took eagerly to his task, and with his cavalry scoured the country to Mysore, capturing elephants, camels, and bullocks belonging to the sultan. At last finding resistance vain, his troops unwilling to defend the city, and his family and vakeels anxious for peace on any terms, Tippoo signed the necessary documents. He requested that the ratification of the treaty should be presented by his sons to Lord Cornwallis in person. This was to induce his lordship to recall the *cortège*, which had been halted at a day's march. With this request Lord Cornwallis complied. Tippoo requested a personal interview with Lord Cornwallis, which his lordship refused, probably from an apprehension of giving cause of jealousy to our allies, from having no great respect for the sultan's character, and from seeing it would answer no essential public purpose.

"On the 19th of March the young princes, attended and escorted in the same manner as when they first arrived in camp, came to perform the ceremony of delivering the definitive treaty to Lord Cornwallis and the allies. They arrived at head-quarters at ten o'clock, which was the hour appointed, and were received by his lordship, as formerly, with the greatest kindness and attention. The boys had now gained more confidence; the eldest in particular, conducted himself with great ease and propriety; and, after some general conversation, having a parcel handed to him, which contained the definitive treaty in triplicate, he got up and delivered the whole to Lord Cornwallis. The nizam's son, or Mogul Prince as they call him, and the Mahratta plenipotentiary, Hurry Punt, did not think it consistent with their dignity to attend on this interesting occasion, any more than on the first day that the princes arrived in camp. Even their vakeels were late in making their appearance. At length, on their coming, the eldest prince receiving two of the copies of the treaty, returned to him by Lord Cornwallis, delivered a copy to each of the vakeels of the other powers, which he did with great manliness; but evidently with more constraint and dissatisfaction than he had performed the first part of the ceremony. One of the vakeels (the Mahratta) afterwards muttering something on the subject, the boy asked at what he grumbled; and, without giving him time to answer, said, 'they might well be silent, as certainly their masters had no reason to be displeased.' These may not be the precise words, but something passed to that effect, which did great honour to the boy's manli-

ness and spirit. The princes having completed the ceremony, and delivered this final testimony of their father's submission, took their leave and returned to their tents; and thus ended the last scene of this important war.*"

The losses of Tippoo were very heavy. The British main army captured 432 pieces of cannon, and in the various conflicts with it, including the siege, Tippoo acknowledged that the number of men, killed, wounded, missing, and taken prisoners, was 31,720. The Bombay army took 224 guns, and the acknowledged loss of the sultan to that army in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters was 9020 men. The Mahratta army, and Bombay brigade associated with it, slew, wounded, captured, or caused to desert, 6850 men, and made prizes of sixty-six pieces of artillery. The nizam's army, with the Madras brigade attached, won thirty-six guns, and slew or dispersed 1550 men. The naval squadron of the English at Fortified Island, seized or spiked forty-three cannon, and killed and wounded 200 men, besides taking the fort. The nizam's army took four forts, the Mahrattas six, the Bombay army sixteen, and Lord Cornwallis's own army forty. "The guns taken by Tippoo Sultan during the war were the thirty-seven at the Travancore lines, belonging to the rajah (found afterwards in the Paniany river); six field-pieces, which the detachment at Sattemangulum were, from the cattle being killed, under the necessity of quitting in their retreat; two or three guns at Permcoil, in the Carnatic; and the few guns which the detachment commanded by Cummer-ud-Deen Cawn retook in Coimbatore. The only forts of consequence that remained in Tippoo's possession at the conclusion of the war were, Seringapatam, Chittledroog, Bidenore, Mangalore, or a new fort near it called Jemaulghur, Kistnaghery, and Sankeridurgum. The two last forts being in the ceded countries, there were only four places which have not either been in the possession of his enemies during the war, or made over to them in consequence of the peace."

The prize money of the army was considerable. Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows gave up theirs for the benefit of the army in general. The company granted a year's batta, which, with the value of captured commodities, made nearly £600,000. The British armies and their allies soon began their homeward march when the treaty was signed, and the sultan was left to brood over his disasters in his diminished dominions.

* Major Dirom's account.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

DEPARTURE OF LORD CORNWALLIS FROM INDIA—SIR JOHN SHORE BECOMES GOVERNOR GENERAL—HE RESIGNS—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON IS APPOINTED GOVERNOR GENERAL—GENERAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE ENGLISH—EFFORTS OF THE FRENCH—TIPPOO SULTAN FORMS A FRENCH ALLIANCE TO EXPEL THE ENGLISH FROM INDIA.

LORD CORNWALLIS having brought the war with Tippoo to a successful issue, sought the earliest day compatible with public interests to retire from the government of India, and Sir John Shore assumed the reins of government; Major-general Sir Robert Abercromby receiving the appointment of commander-in-chief. The general was appointed to his high office by the court of directors in September, 1792; Sir John was installed in his high office, October 28, 1793. Lord Hobart, a nominee of Mr. Dundas (the enemy of Hastings), succeeded Sir Charles Oakley in the government of Madras, five days before Sir John Shore filled the chair of the general government.

Notwithstanding the successes of Earl Cornwallis, and the moral impression which he left behind with all the native states, their treachery and selfishness were such that the English could rely on no treaty, nor on the personal disposition of any chief; reliance could be alone placed on their own power for peace, and the integrity of their territories. The influence of the French was again beginning to be felt. They formed a fresh treaty with the nizam of the Deccan, and acquired such power over him by means purely diplomatic, that he took two French brigades into his service.

The disturbances in Europe, which ensued upon the French revolution, threatened to affect the interests of England in India. The coasting trade was impeded by French cruisers, and no effectual means were taken against them until much loss of property, and some loss of life ensued. Commodore Cornwallis, in the spring of 1794, checked these attacks upon the coasting vessels.

Tippoo Sultan having performed all that he had stipulated, and scrupulously maintained peace, his sons were therefore surrendered to him on the 28th of March. It was the belief of the governments of all the presidencies that the sultan was, by a rigid economy, and a skilful attention to the resources of his dominions, preparing for a new struggle, in order to regain the territories wrested from him, and his prestige in Southern India, and that he only awaited the restoration of his children to take a more decided course. Strong suspicions were entertained that he was, with such objects, already in

correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey, and with the revolutionary government of France. As soon as Tippoo received his sons, indications were given that he was preparing for war, and the foe against whom the bolt was likely to be thrown was the nizam. A jealousy existed between this prince and the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, and Tippoo was anxious to ally himself with the latter.

The treaties of 1790 clearly constrained neutrality on the part of the English, and such a policy suited the temper of the governor-general. The French took advantage of that neutrality, and instigated both the Mahrattas and the nizam to make war. French officers and troops actually joined both armies. The nizam was defeated without any help from Tippoo, and the Mahrattas were ascendant in all Southern India, except where the English, French, and Tippoo held a stern independence. The French continued to intrigue, and a French and English contingent were at the same time in the nizam's country.

While matters were thus uncertain in the Deccan, events rapidly occurred in the north, which increased the power of the English. The Vizier of Oude and the Rohillas had a fresh war, which ended in the supremacy of the ally of the English, and new arrangements, political and financial, in their favour.

The death of Sir William Jones, the learned and upright judge at Calcutta, was regarded as a loss to India and to England.

In the year 1796 the directors decided upon a revision of the military system of British India, which was carried out at an increased cost of £308,000 per annum. The appearance of a new French squadron off the coast of Coromandel caused uneasiness at the presidencies of Madras and Bengal, and the rumour that a powerful Dutch fleet was at sea, destined to co-operate with the French, deepened the alarm, and led to active defensive preparations. Sir George Keith Elphinstone encountered the Dutch fleet at the Cape of Good Hope, and compelled it to surrender, relieving the government of India of all fear from that quarter.

Before the year 1796 closed, the army of Tippoo had been increased so much, and his general military preparations were of such a character, that representations were made to him of the suspicious nature of his proceedings,

and explanations were demanded. At the same time the Madras army made ready for the field, in case the answer of the sahib should prove unsatisfactory. The government of Bombay also placed the coast of Malabar in a state of defence. The troops of that presidency were ordered to attack any French force landing in Western India, even if it were necessary to violate the territory of Tippoo.

The sultan's letter was ingeniously evasive, affording no explanation and offering no offence. Tippoo prepared more actively to assert certain claims upon Kurnaul, a dependency of the nizam, and the English government prepared to enforce respect for the treaty of Lord Cornwallis.

During 1796-7 the financial pressure upon the company was exceedingly severe. In whatever form the company prospered, financial distresses incessantly recurred. Sir John Shore was an able financier, but he had not the bold conceptions of Hastings, and he dared not incur the danger of impeachment in England by any measures of finance resembling those by which Hastings so often filled the coffers of the company. Sir John's conduct gave such satisfaction in England, that he was created Baron Teignmouth, October 24th, 1797.

The affairs of Oude were greatly disturbed during Sir John Shore's administration. The vizier died, a pretender ascended the musid, the country was disturbed, the court a scene of debauchery and cruelty the most horrible and flagrant. Oude was what it had always proved before, and what it constantly became afterwards—a torment and difficulty to the English. Vizier Ali, who had been acknowledged by the government at Calcutta, was deposed, and Saadut Ali set up, who stipulated to pay seventy-six lacs of rupees instead of fifty-six paid by his predecessor, and also promised to pay up all arrears incurred by previous nabobs of that province. Territory was also surrendered, and money obtained for the company to a large amount under various forms and on different pretences.

In March, 1798, Lord Teignmouth returned to England. Lord Cornwallis was again appointed governor-general, but, as was mentioned in a previous chapter, the state of Ireland required his services. The Earl of Mornington accepted the vacated post. On the 18th of May, 1798, Lord Mornington assumed the authority of governor-general. The first measure of great general interest upon which he entered, was a revision of the system of finance. The credit of the company was at a very low ebb, for

there existed a general impression in India that Tippoo, the French, the Mahrattas, and other powers, would all combine in a grand attempt to overthrow the English.

In June, 1798, the directors sent out a despatch for war to be proclaimed against Tippoo, if it were found that he had entered into any negotiations with the French. This resulted from a proclamation made at the beginning of the year in the Isle of France, declaring the wish of Tippoo to form an alliance offensive and defensive with France. At this juncture the force of French auxiliaries in the pay of the nizam amounted to fourteen thousand. Seindiah, the most ambitious prince in India, not excepting Hyder, had also a French force in his pay. Tippoo, early in 1799, sent an embassy to France. At Mangalore he accepted a French detachment to serve in his army, and he now seemed anxious for the moment when a renewed struggle with the English should begin.

After the peace with him in 1792, the state of the army was, as usual, permitted to decline in Madras, so that in 1799, General Harris, who then commanded the troops there, declared that it was inadequate even for the defence of the Madras territory. North-western India was in danger from the Affghans, whose incursions were incessant and fierce. The state of the British army there was most unsatisfactory. It was principally recruited from Oude fanatics, who were disloyal; and the relaxation of discipline was such as to excite the utmost alarm of General Sir James Craig, who went so far as to affirm that from the want of discipline, and the general character of the sepoys, "the fate of our empire in India probably hung by a thread of the slightest texture." Again, the commander-in-chief reported, "A defensive war must ever be ruinous to us in India, and we have no means for conducting an offensive one."

The Sikhs and the Mahrattas carried on consultations which were supposed to be inimical to the English. Under French influence and instigation all India seemed ripe for a combined attack upon the English, when in 1798 Lord Mornington found himself at the head of the government.

Immediately upon the arrival of Lord Mornington as governor-general of India, he found himself opposed by the council of Madras in a manner similar to that from which Hastings suffered so much inconvenience. His lordship possessed a spirit resolute like that of Hastings, but his aristocratic connexions in England gave him a power and authority which were wanting to Hastings. He resolved to exercise both, in asserting his

prerogative as governor-general, and he at last succeeded in quelling the insubordinate disposition of the jobbing council of Madras.

At this juncture in Indian history, a man appeared upon the stage destined to acquire a fame wide as the world, and lasting as time—Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington. In February, 1797, he landed at Calcutta with the 33rd regiment of the line, of which he was lieutenant-colonel.*

* The history of the Duke of Wellington is too well known to English readers to render it necessary to give any detailed account of the previous history of that wonderful man. Yet as the circulation of our History of the British Empire in the East is considerably beyond the limits of the British Isles, the following brief notice may be desirable:—"It is a circumstance of rather unusual occurrence that the day and place of a famous birth should be unknown even to contemporary inquirers; yet such is the case on the present occasion. It is certain that the Duke of Wellington was born in Ireland, and of an Irish family, and that the year in which he saw the light was that which ushered also Napoleon Buonaparte into the world. The 1st of May, 1769, is specified, with few variations, as the birthday of Arthur Wellesley by those of his biographers who venture on such circumstantiality, and Dangan Castle, county Meath, has been selected with similar unanimity as the scene of the event. The former of these statements has received a kind of confirmation by the adoption of the duke's name and sponsorship for a royal infant born on the day in question; yet, in the registry of St. Peter's Church, Dublin, it is duly recorded that 'Arthur, son of the Right Honourable Earl and Countess of Mornington,' was there christened by 'Isaac Mauu, archdeacon, on the 30th April, 1769.' This entry, while it conclusively negatives one of the two foregoing presumptions, materially invalidates the other also; for, though not impossible, it is certainly not likely that the infant, if born at Dangan, would have been baptized in Dublin. Our own information leads us to believe that the illustrious subject of this biography first saw the light in the town residence of his parents, Mornington House, a mansion of some pretensions in the centre of the eastern side of Upper Merrion Street, Dublin, and which, as it abutted eighty years ago as a corner house upon a large area, since enclosed with buildings, was occasionally described as situate in Merrion Square. We are not inclined, however, to pursue a question of which the most notable point is the indifference with which it was treated by the person most immediately concerned. The Duke kept his birthday on the 18th of June."

Arthur Wellesley, by the death of his father in 1781, became dependent, at an early age, upon the care and prudence of his mother. Under this direction of his studies he was sent to Eton, from which college he was transferred first to private tuition at Brighton, and subsequently to the military seminary of Angiers, in France. On the 7th of March, 1787, being then in the eighteenth year of his age, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley received his first commission as an ensign in the 73rd regiment of foot. His promotion was rapid, but not more so in its first steps than in examples visible at the present day, and much less so than in the case of some of his contemporaries. He remained a subaltern four years and three months, at the expiration of which period of service he received his captaincy. The honour of having trained the Duke of Wellington would be highly regarded in the traditions of any particular corps, but so numerous and rapid were his exchanges at this period, that the distinction can hardly be claimed by any of the regiments on the rolls of which he was temporarily borne. He entered the army,

It will be seen from the brief abstract of the memoir given in the note below, that when the Hon. Arthur Wellesley landed in India, he was in his twenty-eighth year, had seen considerable service, and had occupied the post of a brigadier in critical circumstances; indeed, both the lieutenant-colonel and his regiment had received high commendations for their conduct at various operations in the Low Countries.

as we have said, in the 73rd, but in the same year he moved, as lieutenant, to the 76th, and within the next eighteenth months was transferred, still in a subaltern's capacity, to the 41st foot and the 12th Light Dragoons, successively. On the 30th of June, 1791, he was promoted to a captaincy in the 58th, from which corps he exchanged into the 18th Light Dragoons in the October of the year following. At length, on the 30th of April, 1793, he obtained his majority in the 33rd, a regiment which may boast of considerable identification with his renown, for he proceeded in it to his lieutenant-colonelcy and colonelcy, and commanded it personally throughout the early stages of his active career. These rapid exchanges bespeak the operation of somewhat unusual interest in pushing the young officer forward; for in those days a soldier ordinarily continued in the corps to which he was first gazetted, and to which his hopes, prospects, and connections were mainly confined. So close, indeed, and permanent were the ties thus formed, that when Colonel Wellesley's own comrade and commander, General Harris, was asked to name the title by which he would desire to enter the peerage, he could only refer to the 5th Fusiliers as having been for nearly six-and-twenty years his constant home. The brother of Lord Mornington was raised above these necessities of routine, but what is chiefly noticeable in the incidents described is, that the period of his probationary service was divided between cavalry and infantry alike—a circumstance of some advantage to so observant a mind.

Before the active career of the young officer commenced, he was attached as aide-de-camp to the staff of the Earl of Westmoreland, then Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and in 1790, having just come of age, he was returned to the Irish parliament for the family borough of Trim. The most eager researches into this period of his career have not elicited anything to prove that he was distinguished from those around him. In one particular, indeed, he shared the failings common to his class and times, after a fashion singularly contrasted with the subsequent developments of his character. Captain Wellesley got seriously into debt. So pressing were his obligations, that he accepted temporary relief from a bootmaker in whose house he lodged, and before quitting England on foreign service, contrived the arrangement of his affairs to another Dublin tradesman, whom he empowered for this purpose to receive the disposable portion of his income.

At length, in the month of May, 1794, Arthur Wellesley, being then in his 26th year, and in command of the 33rd regiment—a position which he owed to his brother's liberality—embarked at Cork for service on the continent of Europe, so that his first active duties involved great independent responsibility. Throughout the war in the Netherlands, the Hon. Arthur Wellesley distinguished himself by courage and ability. The command of a brigade had devolved upon him by seniority, and he had commanded the rearguard in a disastrous retreat. After the termination of the Netherlands campaign, his regiment returned to England, where it remained until ordered to India.—*Abridged from Memoir of the Duke of Wellington, in "The Times," September 16, 1852.*



L. G. & Co. sculp.

FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

At the period that Colonel Arthur Wellesley and his brother, the Earl of Mornington, governor-general of India, met at Calcutta, war with Tippoo Sultan was imminent. On this account the 33rd regiment was ordered to Madras, where, in September, 1798, Colonel Wellesley arrived. It was a circumstance both singular and important, that the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, who was destined to play so important a part in the coming war with Tippoo, had had previous opportunity of making himself acquainted in a military point of view with Madras, the Carnatic, and the contiguous territory of Mysore. Soon after Colonel Wellesley had landed at Calcutta, he was ordered on an expedition to Manila, but the dangerous condition of affairs at Madras led to the recall of that expedition. On his return from the Straits of Malacca, he proceeded to Madras, without touching at Calcutta. He there made acquaintance with Lord Hotham, the governor, remained in the presidency for several weeks, examined the ground which must be passed over in a conflict with Tippoo, and made himself well acquainted with the military capabilities, defensive and offensive, of the Carnatic, so that when he was ordered to Madras officially, he was a competent judge of the military questions which were then under discussion.

On Lord Hotham's removal from the government, Lord Clive, eldest son of the great conqueror of Bengal, arrived to fill that situation. How different his position and prospects from that of his illustrious father! The first Clive landed upon the sea-stricken shores of Madras, poor and desolate, a mere clerk, in the lowest situation; the son and successor of that unfriended youth landed as governor of that very place, with the rank and title of a peer, and all the advantage which great wealth confers.

The Earl of Mornington entertained a very high respect for Lord Clive, although they had never met, and he at once opened communications with him of a confidential nature as to the government and prospects of the presidency, the causes of former failures and present dangers, and the grounds of hope for future success. There is a frank, manly, generous tone in the communications of the governor-general to Lord Clive, which cannot fail to impress men much in his favour. The governor-general also requested Lord Clive to accept the exposition of his views, which would be made by his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. Thus the latter was brought into intimate and confidential relations at once with the governor of the presidency, to the defence of which he was to

bear so important a relation. The connexion also of Colonel Wellesley with General Harris, then commanding the troops of the presidency, was intimate and full of confidence—another circumstance which bore upon the future favour of the colonel, and upon the good of the service.

Before passing to the narrative of events in which General, afterwards Lord Harris, took so important a part, some notice of that noble soldier is desirable. General Harris described himself thus, "A humble clergyman's son, thrown very early in life into the army, entirely a soldier of fortune, with scarce any assistance save my own exertions." It is remarkable that the great Duke of Wellington, notwithstanding his aristocratic connexions, attributed his advancement also to his own exertions:—"I raised myself to my present position," was one of his terse expressions in the house of lords, spoken in the closing period of his career.

The father of General (Lord) Harris was the youngest child of seven; he was educated for the church, but never advanced beyond the rank of a curate. Lord George Sackville was an intimate friend of the struggling curate, and promised to provide a profession for one of his children. George was the eldest son of the Rev. Mr. Harris, and was born in the year 1744. When about fourteen years of age, Lord George Sackville gave him a cadetship in the royal artillery, his lordship being then master-general of the Ordnance. On the displacement of Lord George, his successor, the Marquis of Granby, confirmed the appointment, and thus commenced the military career of Lord George Harris. He was afterwards gazetted to an ensigncy in the 5th regiment of foot. In 1765 he obtained a lieutenancy by purchase, the means of which were obtained by the greatest difficulty. He soon after obtained leave of absence in order to travel and study in France, and he there not only learned the French language, but studied the military art as professed by that nation. On his return he joined his regiment in Ireland, where many adventures befel him trying to his courage and prudence, but confirming those virtues in him. In 1771 he obtained a company by the severest self-denial on the part of his mother, as it had to be purchased by an outlay of £1100; he had then attained his twenty-sixth year. He soon after was ordered with his regiment to America. He soon saw active service there, and was desperately wounded at the battle of Bunker's Hill. After rapidly recovering from his wound, he was again engaged with the Americans, and was again wounded. He was afterwards entrusted by Earl Cornwallis with

a letter to Washington, and obtained the majority of the 5th regiment. Colonel Walcott having been shot through the body at German Town, Major Harris took the command of the regiment. While covering the embarkation of the troops from Philadelphia, he made the friendship of the celebrated Admiral Lord Howe, an event which influenced the major's future career. In October, 1778, he went with General Meadows on a secret expedition against St. Lucie. General Meadows, with one thousand seven hundred British, was attacked by five thousand French, who were signally repulsed. On this occasion Major Harris, at the head of the 5th, greatly distinguished himself.

After these events the major embarked in a Dutch vessel for England, and was captured by a French privateer. He was almost immediately set at liberty, and after visiting home, and marrying, re-embarked to join his regiment at Barbadoes. In 1780 he again returned to England, and was persuaded by General Meadows to go with him to Bombay, as military secretary and aide-de-camp. From Bombay he proceeded with General (Sir William) Meadows to Madras, and served in the campaigns against Tippoo Sultan, in 1790, so that the character of the country of Mysore, and of its resources, army, and sovereign, were well known to General Harris, when, under the government of the Earl of Mornington, his services were required in a post of high command.

After the campaigns of Earl Cornwallis, General Harris returned to England, but again went out to India, landing at Calcutta in October, 1794, when he received the appointment of commander-in-chief at Madras. His nominal rank in the army was afterwards raised to that of lieutenant-general, and a seat in the Madras council was given to him, in which he supported the authority of the Earl of Mornington, when as governor-general that factious body attempted to oppose him. These high honours were conferred upon him in 1797. In this position the events now under relation found the commander-in-chief of the Madras army.

The Earl of Mornington was determined to bring the dangers and difficulties of India to an immediate solution. He laid down a plan of action, and sent it as a secret despatch to Lieutenant-general Harris, and recommended his brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, to devote his skill and energy to the object of bringing the troops in cantonments to a higher state of discipline. The noble earl resolved upon bringing Tippoo to account for his conspiracy with the French against the English.

Meanwhile events went on elsewhere which quickened Lord Mornington's decision. "At the very moment when Colonel Wellesley was ordered to Madras, Buonaparte had actually disembarked a French army on the shores of Egypt, and had put himself in communication with Tippoo—facts quite menacing enough to warrant unusual misgivings. The strength, too, of the Mysore army gave at least seventy thousand troops, admirably equipped, and in no contemptible state of discipline, while the Madras muster rolls showed a total of no more than fourteen thousand of all arms, including less than four thousand Europeans. In fact, Lord Mornington had been compelled to exchange the scheme of attack originally contemplated for a more cautious and regular exertion of his strength. With these reluctant conclusions he ordered General Harris to stand on the defensive along the Mysore frontier, and to augment the efficiency of his army by all available means, while he turned his own attention to the native courts, whose alliance or neutrality it was desirable to secure. That nothing on his part might be wanting to the success of the enterprise, he had transferred himself and his staff from Calcutta to Madras, and the effects of his policy and his presence were quickly discernible in the impulse communicated to every department of the service, and the restoration of energy and confidence throughout the presidency. These efforts were admirably seconded by the practical exertions of his brother at Wallajahbad. So effectually had Colonel Wellesley employed the three months of his local command, that the division under his charge from being weak and ill provided had become conspicuous for its organization and equipment; and when the whole army afterwards took the field in wonderful efficiency, the especial services of Colonel Wellesley in bringing about this result were acknowledged in a general order of the commander-in-chief."

Among the measures which demanded Lord Mornington's care and vigour, was a plan for disarming the French in the nizam's employ. The scheme adopted was the governor-general's own, and the *modus operandi* was drawn up by him in detail, and executed with the utmost secrecy, and the most energetic promptitude. A treaty was concluded with the nizam, September 1st, 1798; by it a contingent of six thousand company's soldiers with artillery was to serve with the army of the Deccan. In pursuance of this arrangement, Colonel Roberts, with his detachment, reached Hyderabad on the 10th of October. Everything was silently made ready, and on the 22nd the English contingent, with a force of cavalry belonging to the nizam, surrounded

the French camp, disarmed all the sepoy, and seized the persons of the French officers, without shedding one drop of blood.

The governor-general showed an earnest desire to avert war; he granted a ready compliance with certain demands concerning disputed territory made by Tippoo's vakeels. He endeavoured to open up negotiations for conferring peace, by breaking up the alliance between Tippoo and the French. Colonel Doveton was commissioned to facilitate a settlement; but after three separate efforts to accomplish his purpose, which were defeated by the evasions of Tippoo, there remained no appeal but to the sword.

The governor-general having settled a new treaty with the nizam, directed negotiations through Colonel Palmer to the Mahrattas. The colonel produced at the court of Poonah the proclamation of the French governor of the Mauritius, announcing Tippoo as an ally to drive the English out of India. His excellency wished to have a contingent placed in connexion with the Peishwa, as had just been arranged at the court of the nizam. The Mahratta minister refused compliance, but expressed his purpose to abide by the treaty under which the last war with Tippoo had been brought to so happy an issue. By negotiations with Persia, a stop was put to the threatening proceedings of Zemaun Shah in the north-west. His excellency's next step was to form a commission for the purpose of correspondence with all tributaries, allies, or subject chiefs connected with Mysore, so as to detach them from connexion with the sultan. This commission was comprised of remarkable men, namely, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Lieutenant-colonel Close, Lieutenant-colonel Agnew, Captain Malcolm, political assistant at Hyderabad, and Captain Macaulay. At last, a declaration of war was made; Tippoo was summoned to submit, and referred to General Harris as the medium through whom he must make any communication to the governor-general.

The council of Madras was reluctant to enter upon the war; everything there was, as it always had been when left to a Madras council, in confusion and distress. There were no funds, no commissariat, the troops insufficient in number and equipment, and no readiness even for operations of defence.

Mr. J. Webbe, the chief secretary, considered the plans of Lord Mornington dangerous and impracticable, and the opinions of this functionary had great weight with the community of Madras, native and European. The future Duke of Wellington had so high an opinion of him that he had his portrait hung up at Strathfieldsaye, and used

to point it out as the likeness of one of the ablest and honestest men he ever knew. General Harris was, however, determined to carry out the views of the governor-general, which he believed sound, whatever course might be taken by the "timid members of council." Mr. Webbe, so much esteemed by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, pronounced against war with Tippoo, notwithstanding his conspiracy with the French, on the ground that the French could not then aid him, that Tippoo could not of himself disturb the balance of power, and that it was impolitic for the English to extirpate the sultan, as they would by that act increase unduly the influence of the nizam and the Mahrattas. The reasoning of Mr. Webbe was sound, although Tippoo deserved any penalty the English could inflict. The predictions of Mr. Webbe were verified, the destruction of Tippoo was one of the elements of the great Mahratta war, in which the English expended so much blood and treasure. Earl Mornington acted with justice towards Tippoo. He did not proclaim war until efforts of moderation failed. It was his conviction that the French would succeed in throwing forces into India to aid the sultan, unless he were speedily removed out of the way. The governor-general's mode of proceeding disclosed eminent capacity, but after all Mr. Webbe was correct in his policy. Had Tippoo been left to himself at that juncture, it might have been as well for English interests in India for a long time. The die however was cast, and the differences between the Mysore tyrant and the East India Company were soon to be settled by the sullen arbiter—war.

In the conduct of Lord Clive, General Harris and the governor-general obtained co-operation and support. His lordship relieved the general from the cares of the Madras government, which had virtually devolved upon him, and he worked with an earnestness worthy of his gifted father.

Mr. Webbe, the ablest civilian then in India, fell under the displeasure of the directors and the government at home, because of his conscientious and honourable opposition to Lord Mornington. His lordship, Lord Clive, and General Harris, protested against the removal and political degradation of so upright and competent a person, and induced the directors to revoke their measures, but the inferior members of the Madras council, anxious to gain favour with the home authorities, contrived to divest him of the chief secretaryship, and send him to Nagpore. The noble sufferer took this so much to heart that, *en route*, upon the banks of the Nerbuddah, he died of a broken heart. The

conduct of the Earl of Mornington, Lord Clive, and General Harris towards this invaluable man, was honourable, generous, manly, and just, as might be expected from such men, who sympathised with honour and genius, and who in differing from the gifted secretary, respected his judgment and his motives, and confided in his talents and integrity. Probably at no period of the eventful life of General Harris, excepting while engaged, soon after, in the siege of Seringapatam, did he feel such a sense of anxiety and responsibility, as during the discussions with Mr. Webbe, and his preparations for this war. To such an extent was his mind oppressed with these feelings, that he wrote to the governor-general, begging that Sir A. Clark, then at Calcutta, should be appointed to the supreme command. His excellency considered the general competent, and ex-

pressed his reluctance to remove him from so honourable and important a post, even at his own request. The governor-general being then at Madras, a personal interview removed the general's doubts, and restored his confidence. The general, remembering the experiences of Lord Cornwallis, under whom he had served in the previous war against Tippoo, expressed his determination to advance at once upon the capital, to evade even a general engagement with Tippoo, and not to tarry for any advantage whatever, but to decide the war at the capital, unless Tippoo forced on an engagement by throwing his army across the march of the British. The governor-general concurred in this line of strategy, as did also the superior officers of the army. The progress and events of the war itself must form the subject of a separate chapter.

CHAPTER XCIX.

FINAL WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAN—STORMING OF SERINGAPATAM—DEATH OF TIPPOO.

WHEN at last the hour arrived for commencing the conflict with Tippoo which he had by his folly provoked, the arrangements of the British were in a condition to inspire the highest hope, except in the department of the commissariat, in which the English had always proved themselves deficient. The opening of the campaign has been much praised. "The whole force put in motion consisted of three columns: the corps of the Carnatic, thirty thousand strong; that of Bombay, two-thirds less numerous; and the contingent of our ally, the nizam. The latter consisted of the British detachment in the nizam's service, of a few battalions of his own infantry, including some of M. Raymond's force lately disbanded, and of a large body of cavalry. To complete the efficiency of this powerful division it was resolved to add a king's regiment to its rolls, and at the express wish of the nizam's minister, coupled with the prompt approval of General Harris, Colonel Wellesley's corps was selected for this duty, and on him the general command of the whole contingent was suffered to devolve. By these arrangements, which were to the unqualified satisfaction of all parties concerned, Colonel Wellesley assumed a prominent place in the conduct of the war, and enjoyed opportunities of displaying both his special intelligence and his intuitive military powers. Few opportunities indeed could be better calculated for the

full development of his genius. He held a command sufficiently independent to elicit all his talents; he formed one of the political commission attached to the commander-in-chief; and he acted under the eyes of a governor whose acuteness in discerning merit and promptitude in rewarding it were quickened on this occasion by the natural impulses of affection. Nor were there wanting in the same ranks either models of excellence or stout competitors for fame. Besides Harris himself, there were Baird and Cotton, Dallas and Brown, Floyd and Malcolm—soldiers all of them of high distinction and extraordinary renown, who either sought or staked a professional reputation in this memorable war against Tippoo Sultan."

The anonymous writer just quoted thus sketched the progress of the campaign:—"By the end of February, 1799, the invading forces had penetrated into the dominions of Mysore, though so difficult was the country, and so insufficient, notwithstanding the previous preparations, were the means of transport, that half-a-dozen miles constituted an ordinary day's march, and three weeks were consumed in conveying intelligence from the western division of the army to the eastern. The first movements of Tippoo from his central position had been judiciously directed against the weaker corps which was advancing from Cannanore on the opposite coast of

the peninsula, but in his attempt on this little force he was signally repulsed, on which, wheeling to the right about, and retracing his steps, he brought himself face to face with the main army under General Harris near Malavelly, a place within thirty miles of his capital city, Seringapatam. His desires to engage were promptly met by the British commander, who received his attack with the right wing of the army, leaving the left, which was composed of the nizam's contingent under Colonel Wellesley, to charge and turn the flank of the enemy opposed to it. Colonel Wellesley's dispositions for this assault were speedily made, and, having been approved by General Harris, were executed with complete success. The conduct of the 33rd decided the action. Knowing that if he could break the European regiment the native battalions might be expected to despair, the sultan directed a column of his choicest troops against Colonel Wellesley's corps; which, reserving its fire till the enemy had closed, delivered a searching volley, charged, and threw the whole column into a disorder which the sabres of the dragoons were not long in converting to a rout. After this essay it was clear that the campaign would turn upon the siege of the capital, and on the 4th of April the army, by the judicious strategy of Harris, arrived in effective condition before the ramparts of Seringapatam. Between the camp of the besiegers and the walls of this famous fortress stretched a considerable extent of irregular and broken ground, affording excellent cover to the enemy for annoying the British lines with musketry and rocket practice. At one extremity was a "tope" or grove called the Sultan Pettah tope, composed mainly of betel-trees, and intersected by numerous watercourses for the purposes of irrigation. The first operations of the besiegers were directed to the occupation of a position so peculiarly serviceable to the party maintaining it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th, General Baird was ordered to scour this tope—a counterposition which he discharged without encountering any opposition. Next morning Tipoo's troops were again seen to occupy it in great force, on which General Harris resolved to repeat the attack on the succeeding night, and to retain the position when carried. The duty was entrusted on this occasion to Colonel Wellesley, who, with the 33rd and a native battalion, was to be supported by another detachment of similar strength under Colonel Shawe. This was the famous affair of which so much has been said, and which, with such various colourings, has been described as the first service of Arthur, Duke of Wellington. On receiving the order, Colonel Wellesley

addressed to his commander the following note, remarkable as being the first of that series of despatches which now constitute an extraordinary monument of his fame :—

Camp, 5th April, 1799.

MY DEAR SIR,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

Upon looking at the tope as I came to just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

I am, my dear Sir, your most faithful servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"This letter has been often appealed to as evidence of that brevity, perspicacity, and decision, afterwards recognised as such notable characteristics of the great duke's style. The attack made by Colonel Wellesley was a failure. Bewildered in the darkness of the night, and entangled in the difficulties of the tope, the assaulting parties were thrown into confusion, and, although Shawe was enabled to report himself in possession of the post assigned to him, Colonel Wellesley was compelled, as the general records in his private diary, to come, 'in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope.' When daylight broke the attack was renewed with instantaneous success, showing at once what had been the nature of the obstacles on the previous night; but the affair has been frequently quoted as Wellington's 'only failure,' and the particulars of the occurrence were turned to some account in the jealousies and scandals from which no camp is wholly free. The reader will at once perceive that the circumstances suggest no discussion whatever. A night attack, by the most natural of results, failed of its object, and was successfully executed the next morning as soon as the troops discovered the nature of their duties."

During these and subsequent operations General Harris showed conscientiousness, capacity, and untiring diligence, so that the Duke of Wellington observed: "It is not sufficiently known that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded." Independent of his personal exertions in the details of the army, the general produced a voluminous body of despatches, letters, and reports, full of information and interest, and proving that he was competent in wielding the pen as well as the sword. In approaching Seringapatam his temper and diligence were severely tried by the casualties to baggage, baggage animals, carriages, stores, and guns, especially the battering trains, occasioned by the nature of

the country. All the predictions of Mr. Webbe were fulfilled, and much that the general feared from his previous experience under Lord Cornwallis came to pass. Fortunately the progress of General Harris was unopposed, in consequence of the expedition of Tippoo to cut off the Bombay army, as already referred to in the quotation just cited. That event was of considerable importance to the campaign, and the defence of the troops of the Bombay army reflected great honour upon them, and much influenced the fate of the war. Tippoo would have succeeded in surprising the army of General Stuart, and in cutting off a brigade before the main army could come to its assistance, but for the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg, who, the reader will remember, materially aided the advance of General Abercromby's army in the previous war. Lieutenant-colonel Montresor had command of three native battalions at Sedaseer, near Periapatam. In this direction Tippoo's army cut through the jungles with astonishing celerity, and fell upon the brigade, which made an obstinate defence under the gallant example and skilful arrangements of the brigadier. This occurred on the 6th of March, but Tippoo's vicinity was discovered through the vigilance of the Rajah of Coorg, on the day before, who, hastening to General Stuart, apprised him of the danger of Colonel Montresor's detachment. The rajah hurried with his own troops to the colonel's assistance, and General Stuart in person made a rapid march with a regiment of British infantry, and the flank companies of another. The rajah, in his despatch to the governor-general, gave by far the most interesting account of the event which appeared. Its unique character will interest the reader:—"On Tuesday, the 5th of March, myself, Captain Mahony, and some other English sirdars, went to the hill of Sedaseer, which is within my territories. This mountain, which is exceedingly lofty, the English sirdars and myself ascended, and we remained there. Having from thence reconnoitred, we observed nothing for the first four or five hours (Malabar hours); after this we observed one large tent in the direction of Periapatam, which is within the territories of Tippoo Sultan, and continued to see some other white tents rising; a large green tent then appeared, and then another tent which was red, and after that five or six hundred tents. Upon this, the English sirdars and myself were satisfied that it was the army of Tippoo Sultan; we then returned to the English army at Sedapore, and acquainted the general that Tippoo's army was at Periapatam. The army was accordingly prepared, as were also the battalions at Sedaseer, under

the command of Colonel Montresor. Next morning, Tippoo's army advanced close to the battalions under the command of Colonel Montresor, and there was a severe action. After the battle commenced, the battalions put a great many of Tippoo's people to death. Tippoo, unable to sustain their fire, and having no road by which to advance, divided his army into two divisions, with the intention of getting into the rear of Colonel Montresor's battalions by a secret path. The colonel having received intelligence of this division, made a disposition of his force so as to sustain both attacks; and maintained the fight from the morning, uninterrupted, till two o'clock. The enemy were beaten, and unable to show their faces. When the information of Tippoo's attack reached the main body, General Stuart, in order to assist the force at Sedaseer, marched with two regiments of Europeans, keeping the remainder of the army in the plain of Karrydygood. Upon this occasion I accompanied General Stuart.

"Tippoo, in order to prevent the two regiments from advancing to the relief of the troops at Sedaseer, was posted in the road between. General Stuart, upon approaching, ordered the two regiments to attack the enemy. A severe action then ensued, in which I was present with my people. Many of the enemy were slain, and many wounded, the remainder having thrown away their muskets, and swords, and their turbans, and thinking it sufficient to save their lives, fled in the greatest confusion.

"Tippoo having collected the remains of his troops, returned to Periapatam. Having considered for five days, but not having taken up resolution to attack the Bombay army again, he marched on the sixth day (Saturday) back to Seringapatam. My continual prayer to the Almighty is, that the English empire may continue as my parent, that I may remain as their child; that all their enemies may be defeated, and that their territories, measures, and prosperity, may increase without end, and that I may enjoy peace under their protection. In this manner I approach the Sovereign Ruler with my constant prayer, night and day, and all times in humble supplication."

Arrived before Seringapatam, General Harris dispatched a strong corps under General Floyd, to meet and assist General Stuart. Floyd's force consisted of four cavalry and six infantry regiments, twenty field-pieces, and a body of the nizam's horse.

On the 7th of April, 1799, the allied army took up its position for the last siege of Seringapatam. Tippoo was so much engrossed with the proceedings in his front,

that twenty-four hours elapsed before he was aware of the dispatch of General Floyd, to bring General Stuart from Periapatam. When at length he heard of the movement, he sent his confidential lieutenant, Cummer-ud-Deen, with nearly his whole cavalry, in pursuit.

On Sunday, the 11th, General Harris moved out to meet Generals Floyd and Stuart, who had in the meantime formed a junction.

The most active, if not the most successful officer with General Harris, up to the time when the siege actually commenced, was the Hon. Colonel Wellesley; yet he was exceedingly delicate, giving no promise of the "iron frame," for which he became afterwards celebrated. There is an incidental proof of the physical delicacy, and arduous energetic temperament of the embryo great man, in one of the Earl of Mornington's dispatches written at the time. His excellency, writing to General Harris, said, "Do not allow Arthur to fatigue himself too much," showing the governor-general's opinion of his brother's inability to endure much toil, and of the eager earnestness of his nature.

On the 17th of April, General Harris recorded in his journal his apprehensions as to the supplies for the armies. The commissariat was still the defective part of the service of the British army; officers competent in the field, chivalrous everywhere, seem to have given no proper attention to that indispensable part of an effective army. Men of rank thought it beneath them. General Harris himself, although infinitely painstaking, and well aware of how much depended upon regular and ample supplies, was less proficient in the ability to provision an army than in any other part of his profession. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley surpassed the general-in-chief, and all his officers, in this invaluable requisite of generalship. The state of the supplies was such on the 17th, that General Harris believed it necessary, against military rule, to hasten the attack, and run great risks in doing so, rather than hazard the loss of his army by hunger and sickness; various outpost combats ensued in consequence of this determination, which occupied two days. On the 19th, General Stuart reported to head-quarters, that the Bombay column had only two days' provision. The journal of General Harris at this time (as subsequently published by his son-in-law) betrays an anxiety intense and feverish from the inadequacy of supplies, but, nevertheless, the expression of his apprehensions is uniformly pervaded by a trust in Providence and deference to the will of God, which must be edifying to all who peruse it, and invest the memory of the man with a sacred dignity.

Thus, on the 25th of April, he wrote—"A violent storm of wind and rain last night; I trust we shall not have more rain, or it will be next to impossible to get our guns into the batteries. Providence directs all things for the best; then let us bow down in humble resignation." The guns were got into the batteries by the exertions of the general and his soldiers, although there was more rain, and the difficulties were great, for, on the 26th, he recorded—"Our new battery, and the altered one, opened, and had very soon every success expected. Determined to attack the enemy's post in our front and right in the evening. Disposition made and communicated to Colonel Wellesley, who commanded in the trenches, with the 73rd Scotch brigade, 2nd battalion Bengal volunteers, 2nd battalion 3rd regiment coast sepoy." These dispositions proved effectual, but only after the English sustained heavy loss, the sultan making desperate resistance. It was the last effort of gallantry made by Tippoo previous to the assault. The proceedings were of great importance to the English, as furnishing the ground for the breaching batteries which were yet to be erected. The order for attack was given by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, who personally superintended its execution, with the caution and boldness which were his characteristics. The following description was given by one who had the best means of knowing the events he relates:—"At the hour proposed, the guns from our batteries commenced a heavy fire of grape, which was the signal for the attack. The Europeans then moved out, followed by the native troops. The enemy, seeing this movement, began an active fire from behind their breastwork; guns from almost every part of the fort opened upon our troops with great effect, and, by the time they had quitted the trenches, the fire of cannon and small arms was general. The companies from the 73rd regiment and Scotch brigade then pushed on with great rapidity to the enemy's works, who, seeing the determined spirit of the English troops, fled from their posts in great confusion and dismay; but many fell by the bayonet while endeavouring to escape. The relief from the trenches, which was this evening commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, had by this time arrived; a part of the 74th regiment, and the regiment De Meuron, composed the Europeans of that relief, and were ordered immediately to advance to support the rest. These pushed on to the right of the attack. A heavy fire was continued from the ramparts, and by those of the enemy who had fled from

* The Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, for some time private secretary of Lord Harris.

the part of their intrenchments first attacked, and taken post behind the traverses more to the right; several made a desperate stand, and fell by the bayonet; the Europeans dashed in, forcing the traverses in succession, until they had extended as far as the turn of the nullah towards the stone bridge. At this turn there is a redoubt, open to the south-east angle of the fort, but which flanked a watercourse running parallel and close to the intrenchment that was carried. This redoubt was stormed by the 74th regiment, and left in their possession, while Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, with a small party of that corps, and a few men from the regiment De Menron, pushed forward along the intrenchments and the road, till he came to the bridge leading over the great river. Lieutenant-colonel Wallace at the same time advancing considerably more to the right, till, fearful of risking too many lives while acting in the dark, he prudently fell back, and took possession of the enemy's post at the stone bridge, on the road to Shawe's post; but this post being too much detached from the main body of the troops, he withdrew the party left to defend it during the night. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell crossed the bridge, and went some distance on the island; but it was necessary to make an immediate retreat from that dangerous situation, and nothing but the night and the consternation of the enemy could have given the smallest chance for the party to escape. They returned under a heavy fire from all sides, and made their way back to the redoubt, where Lieutenant-colonel Wallace had taken post with the few of the 74th regiment who had remained with him, and the rest of the troops with whom he had placed to the left along the watercourse, which runs close to the intrenchment, and in this situation they remained all night, exposed to grape from the fort, and galled by the musketry from the ground on the right flank, and from the post at the stone bridge, which took them in the rear. The enemy continued firing grape and musketry at intervals the whole night; at length the daylight appeared, and discovered both to us and to them the critical state of our men. Lieutenant-colonel Campbell having been crippled the preceding night by being barefooted during his excursion across the bridge, was obliged to return to camp, and Lieutenant-colonel Wallace being next in command, he sent to inform Colonel Sherbrooke of their situation, and to request further support, as the enemy were collecting in great force on the right flank, and at the post they occupied near the stone bridge, from which they galled our people in the rear to a great degree.

Colonel Sherbrooke, on receiving this report, instantly ordered all the Europeans who had remained in the trenches to advance to Colonel Wallace's post, and each man to take with him a pickaxe, or monitie.* Colonel Wallace, in the meantime, seeing the necessity of dislodging the enemy from the bridge, ordered Major Skelly, with a few men of the Scotch brigade, to move down and attack that post. He was followed by a company from that regiment, and soon got possession.

"The Europeans had by this time arrived from the trenches, and by their exertion and the assistance of the pioneers, an intrenchment was thrown up and completed by ten o'clock; but from the dawn of day to that hour continued efforts were made by the garrison to regain what had been lost, but in vain. The determined bravery of our troops baffled all their endeavours. The post gained at the bridge secured the rear of the other, and presented a new front to the enemy; it was strengthened by another company from the 74th regiment and two companies of sepoys, and in a short time the whole of them were under cover. The loss on this occasion was great. Two officers and sixty men killed, ten officers and two hundred and sixteen men wounded; nineteen men also missing; altogether, killed, wounded, and missing, three hundred and seven officers and men."

On the night of the 28th, a breaching battery was erected, which on the morning of the 30th, was opened against the walls. By the 1st of May the outer wall of the west angle of the fort was partly demolished, and the masonry of the bastion within was greatly shaken.

On the 2nd of May, Tippoo made clever and daring efforts to close the breach, which he was enabled, in a considerable degree to effect, because the English working parties who were preparing for the assault, were in such a position as to prevent discharges of grape against Tippoo's workers. Colonel Wellesley, perceiving this disadvantage, used the most strenuous and persevering exertions to complete the task committed to the English workmen, so as to leave the range free against the workmen of the sultan, or the breach still practicable, if the general-in-chief should order an assault. The letter in which the future hero of so many other great sieges reported his proceedings, is very characteristic—terse, pointed, and complete. It will be seen that the Hon. Colonel Wel-

* A sort of spade, used throughout India in the removal of earth, and very efficient in the hands of those who are accustomed to it. It is chiefly employed in the formation of those magnificent reservoirs for water, to which the peninsula owes its fertility.

lesley had, in a subordinate command, to encounter at Seringapatam the very difficulty which so much impeded him in the war of the Iberian peninsula some years later—want of tools. Many a time during his brilliant career in Portugal and Spain had he to make a report in similar terms—"It could not be done for want of tools." Even so late as the siege of Sebastopol the English soldiers were unable from this cause to perform the task assigned to them. Or when supplied with tools, the result in India, Spain, and the Crimea has been the same—they were of such bad material as to be soon rendered useless. It is strangely characteristic of the English, that with resources beyond all other nations for military appliances, they should be neglectful beyond all other nations in providing them, notwithstanding innumerable proofs of the danger incurred by the neglect, and the sacrifice of human life which it occasioned.

To Lieutenant-general Harris.

MY DEAR SIR,—We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools. I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do anything to it until the night before it is to be used.

Lieutenant Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis. On the left of the breach, he found the wall which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieutenant Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our trench was exposed, from which alone we could fire as we repaired the other. Lieutenant Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

I am, &c., ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The period for the assault at last arrived, and the commander-in-chief resolved to devolve that duty upon Major-general Baird. That officer was ordered to capture the rampart as his preliminary measure in the actual attack. In order to accomplish this, his force should be divided into two columns, one to proceed along the northern rampart, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop; the other to proceed along the southern rampart, and to be commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke. These columns were to proceed in their respective routes until they joined on the eastern face, thus making a complete circuit of the rampart. They were then to descend into the town, attacking such cavaliers as were not captured in the onset, and routing any bodies of troops making a stand for the defence of the place.

An excellent arrangement was suggested

to General Baird by the commander-in-chief, to prevent confusion or accident among the troops giving the assault, and also to conceal from the enemy to the latest moment the intention to make it that night. The different corps were to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night, and in such succession, as should place them there in the precise order that they were to go out to the assault. Thus each party would know its precise place the moment the signal should be given to incur the hazard of the undertaking. It was agreed between the commander-in-chief and Major-general Baird that such should be the plan of operations.

As the assault upon Seringapatam, which terminated the career of Tippoo, is one of the episodes in Indian history most interesting to English readers,—the war against Tippoo having been the only Indian war very popular in England,—the events which issued in the catastrophe of the throne of Mysore will be given in detail. Colonel Close, the adjutant-general (afterwards Sir Barry Close), communicated to General Baird, on May 3rd, his final orders for the morrow. Some knowledge of these is necessary for the clear comprehension of the whole action, for an account of a battle, especially if it be the storming of a fortification, however exciting certain features of the conflict may be, cannot afford an intelligent interest to the reader unless the plan of operations is first possessed, if not in all its minutiae, yet sufficiently in detail to show the dependence of one part upon another in conducting to one grand result.

Disposition of the Troops ordered for the Assault of the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May, 1799.

Left attack, under Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

To move in column, left in front.

To take possession of the cavalier, close to the breach, and move along the north rampart of the fort; to proceed till they join the right attack, leaving a battalion company of the 33rd regiment in charge of the cavalier already mentioned, close to the breach, and occupying such other parts on the ramparts, by detachments from the 12th and 33rd regiments, as shall be thought necessary by Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop.

Right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke.

To move in column, right in front.

To move along the south rampart of the fort, leaving such parties as may be thought necessary by Colonel Sherbrooke, from the 73rd or 74th regiments, in charge of such parts of the ramparts as he may deem it essentially necessary to occupy.

Half of the European and half of the native pioneers to accompany each attack with hatchets: the European pioneers to carry the scaling ladders, assisted by forty men from the battalion companies of each of the leading regiments; the native pioneers to carry a proportion of fascines.

If the road across the river and the breach shall be deemed sufficiently broad, the two attacks to move out to the assault at the same moment. On coming to the top of

the breach, they are to wheel to the right and left, so as to get on the face they are ordered to move on; but if the road and breach are too narrow, the left attack is to move out first. The leading companies of each attack to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases of absolute necessity.

Each attack to be preceded by a sergeant and twelve volunteers, supported by a subaltern officer and twenty-five men.

The leading flank companies of each attack to be provided with hand-hatchets.

Major-general Baird carried his orders into speedy and precise execution. While he was doing so, the English batteries kept up through the night an incessant fire, and so well was it directed towards the breach, that the enemy was unable to work at it. There were no indications that the enemy expected the assault, although this continued night fire might have been regarded by him as a portent of the coming storm. The British army, confident in the genius of such men as Harris, Baird, Wellesley, Close, Stuart, Shawe, Malcolm, &c., were full of joyous excitement. These, upon whom the chief responsibility devolved, were exceedingly anxious. At a little before one o'clock, the hour appointed for the assault, the commander-in-chief sat in his tent alone, in profound thought and painful suspense. Captain Malcolm, already famous, although destined to be better known to the world as Sir John Malcolm, came on business connected with the approaching crisis. Seeing the general's expression of countenance so full of mingled doubt and stern resolution, the captain cheerfully rallied his chief, saying, "Why, my lord, so thoughtful?" referring playfully to the probability of the conqueror of Seringapatam gaining a peerage. The general replied, "Malcolm, this is no time for compliments; we have serious work on hand; don't you see that the European sentry over my tent is so weak from want of food and exhaustion, that a sepoy could push him down. We must take the fort or perish in the attempt. I have ordered General Baird to persevere in his attack to the last extremity: if he is heat off, Wellesley is to proceed with the troops from the trenches; if he also should not succeed, I shall put myself at the head of the remainder of the army, for success is necessary to our existence."*

At the given hour—one o'clock in the afternoon, which was selected because the enemy was likely to seek repose in the heat of the day—the storming parties moved from the trenches. They boldly forded the Cavery, under a heavy fire, and many fell. Each of the divisions reached the ramparts

* *The Life and Services of General Lord Harris, G.C.B., during his Campaigns.* By the Right Honourable S. R. Lushington, Private Secretary to Lord Harris, and late Governor of Madras.

according to the plan prescribed, and fought their way round to the place assigned for their meeting. The resistance offered to these divisions was unequal, Tippoo in person, surrounded by his principal chiefs, having delayed the course of one of the sections of the attacking force, while the other encountered no leaders of eminence, although the troops opposed to them were numerous. Having descended into the city, all points where the enemy assumed a defensive position were speedily conquered, and at last the sultan's palace was the only considerable place remaining unvanquished.

While these events proceeded, Colonel Wellesley remained at the head of the forces in the trenches, in a state of mind similar to that of General Harris at head-quarters. Colonel Wellesley had received reports of the state of the breach, had revised them in terms exactly like those afterwards used at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz; had superintended the final preparations, and was expecting the result from his appointed post. "It was," says one near him, "a moment of agony, and we continued with aching eyes to watch the result, until, after a short and appalling interval, we saw the acclivity of the breach covered with a cloud of crimson." The assault in fact succeeded, and Colonel Wellesley advanced from his position, not to renew a desperate attempt, but to restore some order in the captured city, and to certify the death of our dreaded enemy, by discovering his body yet warm and palpitating under a heap of his fallen adherents.

The events in the city, when the troops were drawn up before the palace eager for the assault, formed portions of the most touching and exciting episodes of the siege, and constitute one of the most romantic stories of Indian warfare. The soldiers were eager to storm the palace gates, believing that Tippoo was there, and hoping to release some British prisoners. A report, however, had spread among the troops, upon authority that seemed worthy of reliance, that Tippoo had murdered all the English prisoners taken during the siege. This turned out to be true; but before full evidence of the fact had been acquired, the belief of its truth incited in the English soldiery a thirst for vengeance. Within the palace, the confusion and disorder equalled the consternation of its residents, and those upon whom its defence devolved. The killidar (governor) was paralyzed by a report that Tippoo had been shot, and was lying dead under one of the gateways.

The royal family refused to open the palace gates, dreading retribution for the murder of so many English. Major-general Baird, who



Walker.

LAST EFFORT AND FALL OF TIPPOO SULTAN.

Singleton, R. A.

headed the assault, had himself been cruelly incarcerated for three years in Seringapatam. General Baird was unwilling to expose the occupants of the palace to the horrors of a storm in the temper of his infuriated soldiery. He commissioned Major (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allan to hold up a flag of truce, and, if possible, induce the inmates of the palace to place themselves under the protection of the English general. The major was familiar with the language of Mysore, and was a man of happy address and engaging manner. He undertook the task with his usual ability, and eager to prevent the further effusion of blood, and the vengeance which the exasperated soldiers of the 33rd were panting to inflict, he persevered with honourable and laudable pertinacity, until his persuasiveness and tact were crowned with success. It is impossible for any narrative to do justice to his conduct, or to depict the scenes in which he took part. He has himself left a modest record of what took place, which is too interesting not to afford to the reader:—

“Having fastened a white cloth on a serjeant’s pike, I proceeded to the palace, where I found Major Shee and part of the 33rd regiment drawn up opposite the gate; several of Tippoo’s people were in a balcony, apparently in great consternation. I informed them that I was deputed by the general who commanded the troops in the fort, to offer them their lives, provided they did not make resistance, of which I desired them to give immediate intimation to their sultan. In a short time the killidar, another officer of consequence, and a confidential servant, came over the terrace of the front building, and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They were greatly embarrassed, and appeared inclined to create delays, probably with a view of effecting their escape as soon as the darkness of the night should afford them an opportunity. I pointed out the danger of their situation, and the necessity of coming to an immediate determination, pledging myself for their protection, and proposing that they should allow me to go into the palace, that I might in person give these assurances to Tippoo. They were very averse to this proposal, but I positively insisted on returning with them. I desired Captain Scohey, who speaks the native languages with great fluency, to accompany me and Captain Hastings Fraser. We ascended by the broken wall, and lowered ourselves down on a terrace, where a large body of armed men were assembled. I explained to them that the flag which I held in my hand was a pledge of security, provided no resistance was made; and the stronger to impress them with this belief, I took off my

sword, which I insisted on their receiving. The killidar and many others affirmed that the princes and the family of Tippoo were in the palace, but not the sultan. They appeared greatly alarmed, and averse to coming to any decision. I told them that delay might be attended with fatal consequences, and that I could not answer for the conduct of our troops by whom they were surrounded, and whose fury was with difficulty restrained. They then left me, and shortly after I observed people moving hastily backwards and forwards in the interior of the palace: I began to think our situation rather critical. I was advised to take back my sword, but such an act on my part might, by exciting their distrust, have kindled a flame which, in the present temper of the troops, might have been attended with the most dreadful consequences, probably the massacre of every soul within the palace walls. The people on the terrace begged me to hold the flag in a conspicuous position, in order to give confidence to those in the palace, and prevent our troops from forcing the gates. Growing impatient at these delays, I sent another message to the princes, warning them of their critical situation, and that my time was limited. They answered, they would receive me as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose, and soon after the killidar came to conduct me.

“I found two of the princes on the carpet, surrounded by a great many attendants. They desired me to sit down, which I did in front of them. The recollection of Moozaad-Deen, who, on a former occasion, I had seen delivered up, with his brother, hostages to Marquis Cornwallis, the sad reverse of their fortunes, their fear, which, notwithstanding their struggles to conceal, was but too evident, excited the strongest emotions of compassion in my mind. I took Moozaad-Deen (to whom the killidar, &c., principally directed their attention) by the hand, and endeavoured, by every mode in my power, to remove his fears, and to persuade him that no violence should be offered to him or his brother, nor to any person in the palace. I then entreated him, as the only means to preserve his father’s life, whose escape was impracticable, to inform me of the spot where he was concealed. Moozaad-Deen, after some conversation apart with his attendants, assured me that the padishah was not in the palace. I requested him to allow the gates to be opened. All were alarmed at this proposal, and the princes were reluctant to take such a step, but by the authority of their father, to whom they desired to send. At length, however, having promised that I would post a guard of their own sepoy with-

in, and a party of Europeans on the outside, and having given them the strongest assurances that no person should enter the palace but by my authority, and that I would return and remain with them until General Baird arrived, I convinced them of the necessity of compliance, and I was happy to observe that the princes, as well as their attendants, appeared to rely with confidence on the assurances I had given them.

“On opening the gate, I found General Baird and several officers, with a large body of troops assembled. I returned with Lieutenant-colonel Close into the palace for the purpose of bringing the princes to the general. We had some difficulty in conquering the alarm and objections which they raised to quitting the palace; but they at length permitted us to conduct them to the gate. The indignation of General Baird was justly excited by a report which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege; this was heightened, probably, by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during more than three years' imprisonment in that very place: he was, nevertheless, sensibly affected by the sight of the princes, and his gallantry on the assault was not mere conspicuous, than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion. He received the princes with every mark of regard, repeatedly assured them that no violence or insult should be offered to them, and he gave them in charge to Lieutenant-colonel Agnew and Captain Marriott, by whom they were conducted to head-quarters in camp, escorted by the light company of the 33rd regiment; as they passed, the troops were ordered to pay them the compliment of presenting arms.

“General Baird now determined to search the most retired parts of the palace, in the hope of finding Tippoo. He ordered the light company of the 74th regiment, followed by others, to enter the palace-yard. Tippoo's troops were immediately disarmed, and we proceeded to make the search through many of the apartments. Having entreated the killidar, if he had any regard for his own life, or that of his sultan, to inform us where he was concealed, he put his hands upon the hilt of my sword, and in the most solemn manner protested that the sultan was not in the palace, but that he had been wounded during the storm, and lay in a gateway on the north face of the fort, whither he offered to conduct us, and if it was found that he had deceived us, said the general might inflict on him what punishment he pleased. General Baird, on

hearing the report of the killidar, proceeded to the gateway, which was covered with many hundreds of the slain. The number of the dead and the darkness of the place made it difficult to distinguish one person from another, and the scene was altogether shocking; but aware of the great political importance of ascertaining, beyond the possibility of doubt, the death of Tippoo, the bodies were ordered to be dragged out, and the killidar, and the other two persons, were desired to examine them one after another. This, however, appeared endless, and as it was now becoming dark, a light was procured, and I accompanied the killidar into the gateway. During the search we discovered a wounded person lying under the sultan's palanquin; this man was afterwards ascertained to be Rajah Cawn, one of Tippoo's confidential servants; he had attended his master during the whole of the day, and on being made acquainted with the object of our search, he pointed out the spot where the sultan had fallen. By a faint glimmering light it was difficult for the killidar to recognise the features, but the body being brought out, and satisfactorily proved to be that of the sultan, was conveyed in a palanquin to the palace, where it was again recognised by the eunuchs and other servants of the family.

“When Tippoo was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive. On feeling his pulse and heart that doubt was removed. He had four wounds, three in the body, and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear, and lodged in the cheek. His dress consisted of a jacket of fine white linen, loose drawers of flowered chintz, with a crimson cloth of silk and cotton round his waist; a handsome pouch, with a red and green silk belt hung across his shoulder, his head was uncovered, his turban being lost in the confusion of his fall; he had an amulet on his arm, but no ornament whatever.

“Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders, and a short thick neck, but his feet and hands were remarkably small; his complexion was rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline: he had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps of sternness, in his countenance which distinguished him above the common order of people.”

The portrait of this remarkable man thus given by Major Allan is correct. Tippoo himself believed, or was desirous of persuading himself, that he was descended from Mohammed, and had received, as he believed

Mohammed had, a divine commission. His flatterers were accustomed to compliment him, by averring that he very much resembled in person the great Arab conqueror. This opinion has been generally entertained in Europe, but had no foundation in fact. Muir's description of "the false prophet" is generally received as correct, and the reader can judge how far it agrees with Major Allan's delineation of Tippoo:—"Slightly above the middle size, his figure, though spare, was handsome and commanding; the chest broad and open, the bones and framework large, the joints well knit together. His neck was long and finely moulded. The head, unusually large, gave space for a broad and noble brow. The hair, thick, jet black, and slightly curling, fell down over his ears; the eye-brows were arched and joined. The countenance thin but ruddy. His large eyes, intensely black and piercing, received additional lustre from their long dark eyelashes. The nose was high and slightly aquiline, but fine, and at the end attenuated. The teeth were far apart. A long black bushy beard, reaching to the breast, added manliness and presence. His expression was pensive and contemplative. The face beamed with intelligence, though something of the sensuous also might be there discerned. The skin of his body was clear and soft; the only hair that met the eye was a fine thin line which ran down from the neck toward the navel. His broad back leaned slightly forward as he walked; and his step was hasty, yet sharp and decided, like that of one rapidly descending a declivity. There was something unsettled in his blood-shot eye, which refused to rest upon its object. When he turned towards you, it was never partially, but with the whole body."*

The body of the sultan was the next day buried with military honours in the mausoleum built for his father. During the funeral ceremony a thunder-storm burst above the city. The lightnings played around the place of sepulture, as if Heaven designed to mark its anger against a man whose every step through life was stained with blood, and whose character, like that of his father, was essentially cruel. Several Europeans and natives were killed, and others injured by the lightning. The scene, its causes, and attendant consequences, deeply impressed the minds of the whole population of Seringapatam and of the British army. Search was made by order of General Harris for the state papers of Tippoo, when abundant material was obtained to justify the Earl of Mornington in declaring war against him, although the line of policy

* *Muir's Mohammed.*

sketched out by the able and indefatigable Mr. Webbe (the chief secretary at Madras), was that which was most consonant with the data upon which his excellency proceeded. It appeared that Tippoo had carried on correspondence hostile to the English, and for the purpose of expelling them from India, with the French Directory, with the Affghan Prince Zemaun Shah, the Mahrattas, and other Indian powers. The plan of co-operation with Buonaparte, then in Egypt, for an invasion of India, was also discovered.

The despatches of General Harris are master-pieces of good sense and professional knowledge. The Earl of Mornington's sagacity in selecting such a man for the arduous post of commander-in-chief of such an army was proved. He wrote home letters of high compliment to General Harris and the army; and, eloquent as these despatches were, they were not too encomiastic. His lordship, acting upon the principle which always characterized the conduct of his illustrious brother, the future Duke of Wellington, selected suitable men for his purpose, and left such a measure of responsibility and discretion with them, as kept them unfettered, and stimulated their exertions. - General Harris was in every way worthy of his lordship's confidence, which was rendered with respect and cordiality.

The adjustment of affairs at Mysore, and the arrangements necessary for carrying on the government of the newly-acquired province, occupied the attention of the governor-general. He had, however, men at hand competent to the task. The intellectual resources of the English in India were at that time very abundant, and the Earl of Mornington well knew how to use them. Among his officers, civil and military, there were few who at all approached in administrative ability his own brothers, Mr. Henry Wellesley, and the Hon. Colonel Wellesley. He dispatched the former, with Lieutenant-colonel Kirkpatrick, to Seringapatam, to make preliminary arrangements, and furnish him with full information for a perfect judgment of what might be necessary for the government of Mysore. Before his excellency formed any definitive judgment of the affairs of that kingdom, he directed General Harris to adopt measures insuring the complete and permanent military mastery of the country. He ordered that possession should be taken of the district of Canara, and of the heads of all the ghauts communicating between Canara and the upper country, as well as the Coimbatore country. The general-in-chief was also ordered to demand the unequivocal surrender of all forts throughout the Sultanate of Mysore, and peremptorily to demand, in the name

of the East India Company, from all officers of the late sultan, civil and military, that all description of public property should be placed at his disposal.

The governor-general entered into minute detail as to the portion of troops to be employed by the general on each particular service, but always deferring to General Harris as to the soundness of any judgment pronounced in military affairs. So clear, comprehensive, and complete were the military views of the Earl of Mornington, that one is forced to adopt one of two opinions—that his gifted brother, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, imparted them, or that he himself possessed an intuitive military genius. There were no men of such remarkable talents about him as to leave a third view probable—that some one of the military men of Calcutta or Madras inspired his views. The prompt replies to General Harris's despatches leave the impression that the Earl of Mornington, like his great brother, Colonel Wellesley, was gifted by nature with military talent.

The governor-general supposed a French invasion by way of the Red Sea possible. He is represented by most historians of the time as unduly apprehensive of it. Such an impression is erroneous. He desired it. It was his conviction that such was then the power of the English in India, that they could give a very good account of any army of Frenchmen landing on the peninsula. His excellency was very desirous that the nizam's troops should move to the south-east, and gradually pass out of the Mysore territory, leaving the English contingent to garrison certain places near that frontier.

The chief difficulty connected with Mysore, in the mind of the earl, was the relation of the Peishwa to that territory. The Mahrattas had acted haughtily, yet evasively; they had not carried out the principles of the treaty

formed in prospect of the former war with Tippoo, and made permanent; they indicated a desire themselves to possess the sovereignty of Southern India. They were sure to claim a large portion of the conquered dominions of Tippoo, and his excellency believing that they had no claim similar in validity to that of the nizam, who had entered heartily into the war, resolved that they should acquire no more than was necessary to a fair show of alliance. The numerous French prisoners he ordered to Madras. Finally, matters were put in train for the permanent occupation of Mysore and the distribution of territory among the allies. The government of the English province, including the capital, was given to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley with the universal approbation of the English in India, both civil and military.

The old royal family, that had been so cruelly and treacherously deposed by Hyder, was restored to the throne—a nominal one—under the protection, and, in fact, dictation of the English; and the old capital, the city of Mysore, was once more made the depository of metropolitan dignity.

The conquest of Mysore was complete, and the glory of Seringapatam gone for ever. For a time the English were destined to look down from its high turrets and conquered bastions, as from a watch-tower, upon Southern India, as if observing the enemies of their growing empire, still numerous and powerful there. Eventually the mosques and palaces, the walls and battlements, of the once mighty queen of the table-land of Southern India were to sink into decay. When its ruins were trodden by the descendants of the conquerors, they could regard them with no regret as to the prosperity of Southern India or of Mysore, and view them only as appropriate monuments of the achievements of British valour over a treacherous and sanguinary despotism.

CHAPTER C.

THE HON. COLONEL WELLESLEY, AS GOVERNOR OF MYSORE, MAKES WAR ON DHOONDIA WAUGH—RESULTS UPON THE INTERESTS OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA—GENERAL DIFFICULTIES OF LORD WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT—AFFAIRS OF OUDE—DISAGREEMENTS WITH BIRMAH—MISSIONARY EFFORTS IN THE 18TH CENTURY.

THE conquest of Mysore made much impression in Europe. England hailed the intelligence with delight. The pride of the country was gratified. The English felt that the French were not the only conquerors. In the subjection of a great oriental kingdom as large as Scotland, the national vanity found a set-off against the triumphs of the French.

Throughout the continent the event was regarded as a great triumph to the arms of England, and an acquisition of power raising that country in its position, in respect to other European states. "It is not easy, perhaps, at this period of time, to appreciate the extraordinary interest with which it was viewed by contemporary observers, but it deserves

to be remarked that these impressions were by no means confined to the shores of Britain. In the negotiations for the peace of Amiens, the French plenipotentiaries repeatedly specified the conquest of Mysore as counterbalancing the continental triumphs of Napoleon himself, and the argument was acknowledged by Mr. Fox and his party to be founded on substantial reason."

In July, 1799, General Harris left Seringapatam for Pondicherry, and according to the orders received by him from the governor-general, he surrendered to Colonel Wellesley the government of Mysore, civil and military. It has been said that so great an honour would never have been conceded to the colonel, had he not been the brother of the governor-general. This remark, might with justice be made, if both these illustrious persons were not gifted and conscientious men. The Earl of Mornington was certainly desirous to promote the welfare of his brothers, but he was not the man to do so at the cost of the public weal. Indeed, so slow was he to recognise the superior gifts of the colonel, that he more than once disappointed the just expectations of the latter, when his excellency supposed that his duty pointed out the preferment of a competitor. In this way, Major-general Baird—no doubt a gifted man, but far inferior to Colonel Wellesley—received preference when the whole army looked for and desired the promotion of Arthur Wellesley. There are few instances which show more competent and conscientious performance of duty than is to be found in the government of Mysore by the Hon. Arthur Wellesley. He displayed a capacity for detail, for intricate accounts, for laborious public business, for judging of men in military and civil situations, for discerning the native character, for penetrating and unravelling native intrigue, such as seldom in the world's history been seen in so young a man. His laborious toil for the public good, while his health was really delicate, showed a devotion to duty which became characteristic of the man, and enabled him to set an example to the people of the British Isles which has not been lost.

From various providential causes, the purpose of the governor-general to send Colonel Wellesley on different expeditions was frustrated. The designs of the governor-general upon the Isle of France, which was a nest of pirates and French privateers, were rendered nugatory from a circumstance common in Anglo-Indian history—the refusal of the admiral to co-operate, standing out upon the superior dignity of his profession, and attempting nothing until the period for doing anything had passed away. The design of Lord

Wellesley to give his brother the command of an expedition against Batavia, was overruled by the wise remonstrances of Lord Clive, who affirmed that the condition of Mysore required the administrative ability and military talent of a man such as he pronounced Colonel Wellesley to be. Lord Clive also declared that no other officer appeared to possess in so high a degree the qualifications necessary to quell a chief of the adventurous spirit of Dhoondia, and so well adapted to sustain a desultory and predatory warfare. So long as Dhoondia was in arms, Mysore must have continued in a dangerous condition, as the daring exploits of that chief inspired hopes in the disaffected from the coast of Malabar to the jungle country, along the Mahratta confines. That strange people encouraged Dhoondia; while professing alliance with the company, they allowed men and supplies to be drawn by the insurgent chief from their country, although when he was ultimately driven within their borders, they robbed his camp of elephants, cattle, and treasure. The opinions of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley concerning the policy necessary to be pursued towards Mysore and the surrounding country below the Ghauts, was full of wisdom. His letters and despatches at that period are most remarkable productions. Concerning the people along the Malabar coast who sympathised with the Mysoreans, ready to rise upon the prospect of success should Dhoondia gain any important advantage, Colonel Wellesley observed:—"As soon as the person of this rebel shall be taken, it is probable that the inhabitants will be more ready than they have been hitherto to give up their arms; and the day on which the inhabitants give up their arms and acquiesce in the orders and regulations of government, which require that no man shall appear armed, will be the date of the establishment of civil government in the province. Till then everything must be chance or force." These opinions were verified by the events in which the Colonel took so important a part. The chief strength of the rebel leader consisted in the difficulties of the country he occupied for the operation of regular troops. He knew all its recesses, and made its unequal ground and far-spreading jungles—so unhealthy to Europeans—his fastnesses, from which he sallied forth at the most favourable moments with expert skill, resolute daring, and opportune vigilance, against the cultivated country, laying waste whatever parts were known to be disposed to settle down peaceably under English rule. The mode of operating in such a country, recommended by Colonel Wellesley, and practised by him so far as his authority and opportunities allowed, was new to the English

in India, but opened up to them a plan of aggression against the natives as efficient as it was original. When afterwards acting in Cotiote, the opinions entertained by Colonel Wellesley on this matter were expressed more formally and received more notice; but it was in his first pursuit of Dhoondia that the plan was adopted, on a limited scale, for the means at his command did not allow of its extensive adoption:—"The result of my observations and considerations upon the mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this,—that as long as the jungle is thick as the enemy can conceal himself in it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers, and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our side. You propose, as a remedy, to move in small compact bodies in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind,—I say only some purposes, because their success would not be complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as the Nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But, as we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road. This, you say, is a work of time; it is true it is so, but it must be recollected that the labour of every man turns to account,—that the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following season as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security to the followers is adopted.*"

The separate command of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley in Mysore not only introduced a new mode of warfare against the desultory

proceedings of irregular native troops, but it opened up a new era in the military discipline of British India. Peculation and jobbery pervaded all ranks and grades of both the company's and the royal army, but more especially the latter. To conceal the robbery which was practised, perjury was resorted to when investigations took place, which was seldom the case. The tribunals nominated to hear complaints and try offences were of little utility, for they were seldom conducted honestly, being generally ready to screen powerful delinquents, and often composed of men who ought themselves to be placed on their trial for the plunder of public property, or the oppression of inferior officers, the common soldiery, or the natives. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley made strong representations to his superiors as to the importance, duty, and necessity of establishing a good administrative system. In one of his despatches on this subject, he gave a definition of the administration of justice which has been called "Aristotelian":—"I understand the administration of justice to be the decision of a competent tribunal upon any question, after a complete knowledge of its merits, by an examination of witnesses upon oath in order to come at the truth."

In his attempts to carry out, and cause to be carried out, the administration of justice after such fashion, the governor of Mysore met with difficulties which would have deterred probably any man then living but himself. Hearings or Olive might have undertaken the task, but after those two most eminent persons, Colonel Wellesley alone was competent to grapple with this great evil. His mode of procedure may be illustrated by a single case, and related in his own words:—

"While I was absent in the month of January last (I believe) the *Lascars, &c.*, of the store department of Seringapatam wrote a petition to the military board and a letter to General Brathwaite, both without signature, in which they represented the existence of all kinds of enormities and bad practices in the store department,—such as false musters, stealing of stores, cheating, &c. Captain — was at Madras at the time these papers were received, and they were communicated to him; whereupon he went off in a great hurry to stop some bandies loaded with gun-metal, which General Brathwaite was informed were coming from Seringapatam. He did stop these bandies at Vellore, and it was found that the gun-metal belonged to General Smith,—at least, it was said so.

"However, the military board and government determined to defer the inquiry till I should return, and then to order that the

* *Supplementary Despatches and Memoranda of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. India, 1797—1805. Vol. ii. Murray, 1858.*

whole matter of the petition and letter above-mentioned should be inquired into. Accordingly I received orders to institute an inquiry shortly after my return, and of course I determined that it should be an inquiry in earnest. I first gave orders to the commissary to turn off his dubash, and then I assembled a large committee, consisting of myself, all the staff of the army and garrison, and all the most respectable officers not employed upon any other duty; and, indeed, they were mostly the friends of the commissary.

"On the first day we went into the arsenal to inquire into the grounds of the complaints; the petition was explained to all the Lascars and artificers, and they were asked particularly whether they had any grounds of complaint on the subject of each allegation. They all declared not, and appeared anxious to come forward to vindicate the commissary and his dubash from any imputation that might have been laid upon them by the petition and letter. However, I was not satisfied with this proceeding, and on that evening I issued a proclamation, in which I called upon the inhabitants to state who had purchased stores, and threatened punishment to those who had purchased them and concealed it. Then came out a scene of villany and peculation which has never been surpassed, and seldom equalled in this country. It was proved before the committee that Colonel —— had sold large quantities of saltpetre, which he had stolen from the stores while he was a member of the committee for the valuation of captured property, and that the arsenal was a public sale shop for all kinds of military stores and ordnance, the principal agent in which transactions was the commissary's dubash. The artificers and Lascars who had at first declared that they had no reason to complain, and knew nothing of the petition and letter to the military board, then came forward to testify the truth of everything, and proved particularly that false msters had been taken and sent to Madras, and that, in fact, half the people for whom pay was drawn were not employed.

"When the dubash was called upon to make his defence, to the surprise of everybody, he said that he was determined to tell the truth and to conceal nothing; and he declared that he had orders for everything that he had ever done, either from Colonel —— or Captain ——, and that he had papers in the arsenal which would prove the truth of what he then asserted. On account of what appeared against Captain —— on that day I determined to turn him out, and I did dismiss him that evening, but he went to the arsenal before he was dismissed and broke open the desk, and, as the dubash says, destroyed some

of the papers which he had heard him promise to produce to the committee. However, he did not destroy all, and particularly not those relating to himself, which I forced him to produce; and the dubash, by means of them, has been able to prove clearly that Captain —— had a large share of the profits resulting from the sale of ordnance and stores. In regard to Colonel ——, the proof against him was not equally clear, for want of the papers which were destroyed; but it is clearly proved against him that he sold copper bands taken from the pillars of the Mysore palace, contrary to the orders of the military board; that he never gave General Smith credit for above an eighth part of the money produced by the sale of guns, which he avows, and which he says belonged to General Smith, until, by the proceedings of the committee, it appeared he had sold guns to that amount, and there are papers still forthcoming which will prove that he had his share of the profits arising from the false msters. Besides this, Captain —— sent gunlocks, &c., to Madras, for sale, and he knew of Colonel ——'s robbery of the saltpetre, and was concerned with him in cheating the captors and the public out of a large part of it.

"All this can be proved by writings and accounts, besides by the evidence of a host of dubashes and conicopolies.

"I have thus given you the outline of what has passed, but the intervals have been filled by details of scenes of villany which would disgrace the *Newgate Calendar*.

"Government are now deliberating upon all this, and I expect shortly to have orders which will let me know whether these gentry are to be brought to a court-martial, or to be dismissed the service, or to be hanged."

Thus, Colonel Wellesley had at the same time to reform the administrations of justice in his own army, to administer a large and disorganized kingdom, to maintain anxious correspondence with the governments of Calcutta and Madras on most important subjects, sometimes in connection with enterprises in which he was expected to take part, and to drive a powerful chieftain from a difficult country, whose followers were numerous, and who had the sympathy of the natives and of neighbouring states. Some of the instructions received by Colonel Wellesley from his superiors, were of a nature to cause apprehensions of the results should he obey them. He was directed, in case of the expulsion of Dhoondia, to pursue him into the Mahratta territory, which the colonel foresaw would cause a Mahratta war. Notwithstanding the professed friendship of the Peishwa, that high personage sent troops against Dhoondia, who

routed them with such ease and with such little loss of life on either side, as to lead to the suspicion that the war waged by the Peishwa was a pretence. For two months, Colonel Wellesley was left unsupported by the Madras government, while in vain endeavouring by long marches and night surprises to bring his enemy to battle. The British commander had to extemporise a commissariat, to provide support for his troops, and even to organize a corps of engineers from the service of the line. He was neglected by his superiors, as he was afterwards in the Spanish peninsula.

After a harassing campaign, on the 10th of September, 1800, Colonel Wellesley came upon the rebel camp. The force at his command was four regiments of cavalry, the horses of which were nearly worn out with excessive toil. The colonel did not hesitate to charge the enemy. It was a brilliant performance; the rebel force was routed with slaughter, and Dhoondia himself was slain. An interesting boy of four years of age, son of the rebel chief, was taken among the baggage. The colonel took him to his tent, and protected him. During his residence in India he tenderly guarded the child, and when about to return to Europe, he left a sum of money for the education and maintenance of his favourite. The results of this campaign were important to Colonel Wellesley himself, as well as to the public. The reputation of the governor of Mysore rose high among the native courts, and in the presidential capitals of the company. The governor-general was greatly gratified, and the government at home not less so. The Earl of Mornington had been blamed for placing his brother in a post which it was alleged ought to have been given to General Baird or some other superior officer; but the selection had justified itself, and the success of the colonel increased the fame of the elder brother, by extending the confidence already so largely entertained in his judgment. Concerning his position at that time, some curious remarks were made by him a short time before his death, when Duke of Wellington and Warden of the Cinque Ports:—"I thought myself nobody at the time, but now, on perusing my own despatches, I perceive that I was a very considerable man."

The death of Dhoondia put an end to all fears about the disturbance of Mysore and the coasts of Malabar. This, however, did not exempt his excellency, the governor, from anxiety, as it was from Mysore that the English chiefly watched the Mahrattas, who were known to be intensely inflamed by jealousy against the English, and anxious to form any

combination to dispossess them of power. The Peishwa and the lesser magnates of the tribes were, however, at variance; and Colonel Wellesley displayed an acute policy in playing off one chief against another, so as to prevent any immediate organization of the confederacy against the English.

The government of Colonel Wellesley in Mysore was interrupted by his appointment to the command of the army intended to attack the Isle of France, and afterwards Batavia, but the final destination of which was Egypt, the Earl of Mornington having conceived the plan of sending thither an expedition against Buonaparte. Colonel Wellesley having been unjustly superseded in that command by his brother, who gave the appointment to General Baird, he returned to his government in Mysore. The expedition to Egypt sailed under Baird, but was too late, the army of Abercromby having defeated the purposes of the French expedition.

It was in April, 1801, that Colonel Wellesley resumed his government of Mysore. He continued in the government, conducting it with discretion and sagacity, and rendering large services to the state without any honour having been conferred upon him until April, 1802, when he received promotion in his military rank: he was gazetted major-general. For some time longer Colonel Wellesley gave his chief energy to the government of Mysore, still exercising vigilance in reference to the proceedings of the ambitious and discordant Mahratta confederacy, until at last the breaking out of the Mahratta war furnished a new field for the exercise of his military genius.

Meanwhile, the governor-general was occupied in incessant cares to preserve the peace of India and the security of the British possessions. On every side there were difficulties. The government of Hyderabad was losing stability and power. In order to preserve it as a counterpoise to the Mahrattas, it was necessary to meddle with its affairs more intimately than suited the tastes of the directors, the policy of the imperial government, or accorded with the instructions sent out to the governor-general. Certain territory was assigned to the company as an indemnity for the outlay in support of the contingent forces maintained for the defence of the nizam's dominions.

The Affghans became exceedingly troublesome. Repeated invasions of the Sikh territories by their chief alarmed the government of British India. Negotiations with Persia to counteract these incursions of the Affghans eastward had some effect in retarding their progress, but their aggressions were a constant source of uneasiness at Calcutta, and all

over British India. These invasions inspired the Rohillas with hope of independence, and while the Oudeans were ever ready to oppress them, they were equally willing to unite with them against the English. The affairs of Oude, always more troublesome and harassing to the English than those of any other part of India, caused more disquietude to the Earl of Mornington, or, as he became, Marquis of Wellesley, than even the enmity and plots of the Mahrattas.

The financial embarrassments of the Oude government were much the same as they had always been; and, as usual, it was in arrears of the stipulated tribute to the government of Calcutta. The whole condition of Oude during the administration of the Marquis of Wellesley, and the philosophy of that condition, were afterwards expressed in a memorandum of the Hon. Major-general Wellesley on the subject, with a brevity and perspicuity exceedingly remarkable as coming from one who had spent so few years in India. No documents concerning Oude since presented by officers of the British government have surpassed in accuracy and clearness that of General Wellesley. The reader may learn the state of that country, not only at the beginning of the present century, but even since the period of annexation, from the masterly memorandums of him, who, afterwards as the Duke of Wellington, became so important an authority on all political subjects when regarded from a military point of view. This memorandum has been very appropriately termed a *resume* of the subsequent history of the province:—

“Oude is a fertile country, was at that time well cultivated, and is peopled by a hardy race, who have for a great length of time supplied soldiers to all the states of India.

“In this situation, it is obvious that the government of Oude must always have been an object of jealousy to that power which possessed the provinces of Behar and Bengal, which are situated lower down upon the Ganges. In fact, these provinces had no natural barrier against an invasion from Oude, and depended for their security upon their own artificial means of defence.

“This was the case not only in respect to the state of Oude itself, but in respect to the Rohillas; to the king, who was at that period of time in some degree of strength; and to the Mahrattas; each of which powers might have found an easy and convenient passage through Oude to an invasion of the company's provinces of Behar and Bengal.

“On the other hand, by the possession of the provinces under the government of Oude, or an intimate union with the government, a

barrier was immediately provided for the provinces under the Bengal government. Nothing remained on the left or east of the Ganges besides the Nabob of Oude and the company, excepting the Rohillas, and this river afforded a strong natural barrier against all invaders. Besides this object, the seat of war, in consequence of the alliance with or possession of Oude, was removed from the company's provinces, the source of all the means of carrying on war, to those of the enemy if it should have been practicable to carry on offensive war; or, at all events, to those of the nabob if such supposed war should have been reduced to the defensive.

“By the first treaty with the nabobs of Oude, the company were bound to assist the nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates that evil. It is usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy is generally the whole or nearly the whole disposable resource of the state, it is not easy to produce it at the stipulated moment. The tributary government is then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from *aumildars*, to sell the office of *aumildar*, and to adopt all the measures which it may be supposed distress on the one hand and avarice and extortion on the other can invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

“As soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty, and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realise the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by *aumildars*, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government, and the result is an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

“But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government,

and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration in order to save the resources of the state and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy."

The occupation of Lahore by the enterprising Affghan chief, Shah Zemaun, compelled the Marquis Wellesley to enter in a decided manner into the circumstances of Oude. His decision to do so was, however, made imperative by events which he could neither foresee nor controlled. Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth) had in his last arrangements connected with that province of the Mogul empire, permitted Vizier Ali, after his deposition, to remain in Benares. The Marquis Wellesley deemed it imprudent to allow him to reside so near to the scene of his former intrigues, and ordered his removal to Calcutta. The deposed vizier refused to leave Benares for any place of residence south or east.

On the 14th of January, 1799, he called on the English resident, Mr. Cherry, and complained in violent and vindictive terms of the purpose for his removal entertained by the governor-general. The resident remonstrated, when suddenly Ali struck him with his sword, and the attendants of the vizier instantly cut Mr. Cherry down. Four other Englishmen who were present were also assassinated, but a fifth defended himself until assistance arrived, when Ali and his fellow-conspirators fled. He collected about him other men as desperate as himself, but they were pursued by the British authorities, and, after having behaved most cowardly, dispersed. Ali sought refuge in Rajpootana, where a chieftain, whose protection he relied upon, delivered him up to the English. These circumstances created a great sensation in Oude, where the populace sympathised with the desperate Vizier Ali.

Colonel Scott was then sent to the nabob with a demand for the dismissal of his native troops, and his acceptance of a British contingent. The nabob endeavoured, with the usual hesitation of Indian princes, to evade those demands, and when that was no longer possible, he offered to resign the sovereign authority, which the governor-general did not feel at liberty to permit without instructions from home, unless, indeed, the nabob resigned his sovereignty to the company. The artful nabob calculated upon this, and therefore made proposals which he presumed would create delay. Finally, he refused to support a British contingent, on the ground of the expense. The Marquis Wellesley then demanded that territory equivalent

to the tribute agreed to be paid to Sir John Shore should be assigned absolutely to the company, and that new arrangements should be made between his highness and the English, which would in effect place the administration of Oude in the hands of the latter. Troops were ordered to advance from Bengal against Oude; this led the nabob to surrender. The marquis immediately appointed a commission for administering the affairs of Oude, and nominated one of his gifted brothers, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, as chief commissioner. He acted with vigour towards the petty states contiguous to Oude, concluding a treaty with the nabob or rajah of Ferokabad, similar to that which had been concluded with Oude. Rajah Rajwunt Sing refused to acknowledge the treaty; siege was therefore laid to his fortress, and his power was subjugated. A number of zemindars who maintained a state of revolt for a short time were vanquished. Mr. Henry Wellesley having quelled all revolt, and established tranquillity in Oude, resigned his office.

The Marquis Wellesley carried his authority with a high hand, asserting the supremacy of the English wherever the least opening for interference was made by circumstances. The Nabob of Surat and the Rajah of Tanjore were among the lesser magnates who were compelled to recognise English authority by new forms and under new stipulations. The Nabob of Arcot, whose affairs had so often involved the company in war, were almost as troublesome to the presidency of Madras as those of the Nabob of Oude were to the presidency of Bengal. Lord Clive conducted the negotiations with wisdom and skill worthy of his father. He succeeded step by step in asserting the supremacy of the English in Tanjore and the Carnatic, so as completely to absorb the authority of the rajah and the nabob.

While during the last decade of the eighteenth century the English were engaged in so many fierce struggles in Western, Southern, and South-eastern India across the peninsula, much uneasiness was created in the presidency of Bengal by events in the extreme East. The first quarrels with the Birman empire began during that period.

In 1782, Minderagee-praw, Emperor of Birmah, invaded the country of Arracan, on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal.* His invasion issued in conquest:—"Many of the Mughs, or natives of Arracan, preferring flight to servitude, took refuge in the Dumbuck Hills, on the borders of the Chittagong district, and amid the forlorn wastes and

* See the geographical portion of this work.

jungles skirting the frontiers; where, having formed themselves into independent tribes of robbers, they carried on unceasing hostilities against the Birmans. Some settled in the district of Dacca and Chittagong, under the protection of the British flag; while others, rather than abandon their country, submitted to the conquerors.*

The Mughls settled in the eastern provinces of Bengal were industrious, and prospered exceedingly. The fame of their success soon spread to their countrymen, who were suffering in Arracan under Birmese oppression. They accordingly flocked in great numbers to Dacca especially, and so extensive was the emigration, that it threatened to depopulate the newly-acquired province of the Birman empire. The prosperous settlers in the British provinces aided their brethren who had fled to the mountains and there led a predatory life, as well as inhabited the shores of the numerous creeks, and carried on a constant piracy against their Birmese conquerors. In 1794 many of these sea warriors plundered the Birmese traders, and carried their booty into the British territory. His Birman majesty pursued them with an army. The British government sent Major-general Erskine with a force to oppose them. A truce was obtained, the Birmese recrossed the boundary river into their own territory, and the British, seizing the ring-leaders of the Mughls, delivered them into Birmese custody.

In 1797-98 the oppressions of the Birmese upon the Arracanese were so unendurable, that forty thousand of the latter escaped into the British territory:—"When they entered the province of Chittagong, the situation of the unfortunate wretches was deplorable in the extreme: numbers perished from want, sickness, and fatigue, while the survivors were constrained to live upon reptiles and leaves, until such time as the British government humanely relieved their wants by providing them with food and materials for the constructing of huts, to shelter them from the then approaching rains. The Birmese having collected an army of about four thousand men, followed the emigrants into the province of Chittagong. The commander of the troops addressed a letter to the magistrate of the district, demanding the expulsion of the refugees. The magistrate of Chittagong replied that the Birmese troops should instantly retire from the province, or otherwise their commander must stand the consequence; and the magistrate further informed him that no negotiation would be entered into until such time as they had. The Birmese troops, in the mean-

* *Modern Traveller*, part xxv.

time, fortified themselves with stockades in the mountains, and for many weeks carried on a petty warfare with the company's troops. They successfully repulsed an attack that was made upon their stockades on the 18th of July, 1799; but soon afterwards retired to their own boundary of Arracan. A British officer was then deputed by the government of Calcutta to the governor of Arracan, to endeavour to effect an amicable adjustment of differences.**

The state of the emigrants in eastern Bengal engaged the serious attention of the supreme council at Calcutta, and Captain Cox was dispatched to the Birmese frontier to register the refugees, and allot them ground for their subsistence. Their number was nearly fifty thousand. This proceeding gave offence to his Birman majesty, who sent an ambassador to the governor-general to protest against any patronage being extended to those who had fled from his authority, and to require the English government to coërcé their return. Lord Wellesley assured the ambassador that the fugitives were at perfect liberty to go or stay, but that they should not be interfered with so long as they conducted themselves peaceably.

The ambassador was not satisfied, and the governor-general was so anxious to conciliate him, that the effect produced was to leave the impression that the English feared a recourse to arms on the part of his Birman majesty. There was a strong disposition on the part of his excellency's advisers to reverse the liberal and hospitable policy which had previously been pursued, but which was vindicated at the time, and afterwards by the able Anglo-Indian statesmen, Sir John Malcolm, who pronounced that "policy became enlisted on the side of humanity; that they should at least obtain a temporary asylum." †

In the latter part of the year 1800, the governor of Arracan addressed the English magistrate of Chittagong, conveying a threat of invasion, if the emigrants were not forthwith expelled from British territory. The Marquis Wellesley doubting that the demand of the government of Arracan had been made with the authority of the King of Ava (as his Birmese majesty was frequently called), resolved to dispatch an embassy to that court to ascertain the fact, and to improve the general relations of the two governments. The question of the emigrants received no decision, but lay festering as a cause of quarrel between the two governments until, in 1811, it received a practical solution.

* *A Political History of the extraordinary events which led to the Birmese War*. London, 1827.

† *Political History of India*.

It was towards the close of the 18th century that the great modern missionary enterprise began in India, under the auspices of the Baptist missionaries, Carey, Marshman, and Ward. This is one of the most interesting pages in Anglo-Indian history, yet one of the most discreditable to the East India Company and the British government. Considering his instructions, the Marquis Wellesley displayed more moderation than, with his own views and feelings, might have been expected. He was hostile to missionary operations, and to evangelical religion in any of its aspects, and he was surrounded by those who were even more hostile. The Baptist missionaries were not suffered to settle in British India, but were indebted to the liberality and Christian feeling of the Danes for a home and a sphere of operations. Eventually, they were allowed to conduct their pious enterprises within English territory, but it was only when a determined expression of religious feeling in England created apprehension on the part of the company and the board of control, that public opinion would influence the parliamentary elections, and initiate proceedings hostile alike to the company and the government.* The whole conduct of the directors, the board of control, the cabinet, and of the supreme council of Calcutta was unjust, unchristian, and hostile to the spirit of British liberty. To show that the author does not allow any partial views to dictate so severe an opinion, the reader shall have opportunity of judging the event in the light in which it has been presented by a popular reviewer, by no means favourable to Christian missionaries as a class, nor to the principle of Protestant evangelical missions. While the tone of the reviewer is sometimes barely respectful to the missionaries, it extenuates the conduct of the British government, and of the Anglo-Indian government in Calcutta; yet there is sufficient truthfulness of narrative, and sufficient candour in the review, to place the history of the affair before the impartial reader in such form as to enable him to form a correct judgment of the conduct of all the parties concerned. Referring to Messrs. Carey, Marshman, and Ward, personally, the reviewer observes—"Under the auspices of the Baptist Missionary Society, the latter two, after some previous attempts by Mr. Carey, proceeded to Serampore, then under the Danish flag, in 1799. In the first instance, such was the apprehended danger

from their labours that they were required by the authorities at Calcutta to enter into engagements to return immediately to England. But the governor of Serampore protected them for a time, and eventually the English governor-general, Lord Wellesley, permitted them to remain. Indeed, the latter was content that they should establish their mission in a settlement beyond the reach of British interference, where he would be relieved from the necessity of disturbing them; and at Serampore, where Carey joined them, they set up a printing-press, printed tracts and testaments in Bengalee, and established boarding-schools, out of which they defrayed a portion of the expenses of their undertaking. In 1800, they entertained their first candidate for conversion, who, as the marginal abstract states, disappointed the missionaries themselves. His name, which was Fukeer, and his story are both symbolic. He was 'the first native, after seven years of severe and discouraging exertions, who had come up to the point of avowing himself a Christian. He was received as a Christian brother, with feelings of indescribable emotion.' The missionaries persevered against various impediments which were cast in their way by Englishmen as well as Hindoos. The English captured Serampore, and in 1802, the court of directors ordered the abolition of the college at Fort William, with which Carey had also connected himself, from a feeling of annoyance at its patron, Lord Wellesley. Lord Wellesley, who was annoyed in turn, requested the directors to revise their order, and in the meanwhile sustained the college for a time. The missionaries, on the other hand, in the commencement of 1803, actually baptized their first Brahmin, an amiable and intelligent youth named Krishna Prasad. Before his baptism he trampled on his *poita*, or sacred thread, to indicate his rejection of the creed with which it was associated, and then placed it in Mr. Ward's hands, who records in his journal,—'this is a more precious relic than any the Church of Rome can boast of.' So far, however, did the missionaries condescend to the prejudices of caste, that 'Mr. Carey and his colleagues did not at that time consider it necessary to insist on a Brahmin's divesting himself of his thread, which they considered as much a token of social distinction as of spiritual supremacy.' The converts were therefore baptized, and preached to their fellow-countrymen with their *poitas* across their shoulders. But eventually they were induced themselves to discard them, while to the honour of these particular missionaries, it ought to be added that from the first they excluded all distinctions

* *The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, embracing the History of the Serampore Mission.* By John Clark Marshman.—Longmans, 1859. *Christianity in India; an Historical Narrative.* By John William Kaye, &c. Smith and Elder, 1859.

of caste from the celebration of the holy communion. Where the Brahmin Christian had formerly received the elements before the Soodra Christian, in this very instance, when called upon to lay down a rule, they abolished every vestige of caste in this particular, and the Brahmin received the bread and wine after the carpenter, Krishnu. Their first baptism was soon followed by the first marriage of converted Hindoos, by which the Brahmin aforesaid was united to the daughter of the carpenter. So far another step was made towards the obliteration of caste distinctions, which the missionaries were undeniably anxious to effect. A week after this marriage, Gentooism had its demonstration in return, in the celebration of suttee, when 'three women were burnt with their husbands on one pile, near Mr. Ward's house.' Then followed the first burial of a Christian convert, at which there was some difficulty in overcoming the caste prejudices of his companions, and inducing them to carry his body to the grave. Among the Hindoos the Brahmin only carries the dead Brahmin, and each caste the deceased of its own caste only. But again the missionaries stood out and conquered this inveterate reluctance, Mr. Marshman himself assisting as one of the bearers. A later triumph over caste may be ascribed to the love of science, when, about twenty years ago, the Brahmin students of the Medical College at Calcutta consented, for the first time, to handle a dead body in the dissecting-room. So far, however, the missionaries laboured with fair success in individual instances, and in 1805, they contributed largely, by their endeavours, to a much greater work—the suppression of the immolation of widows. To do them justice, we should bear in mind their great exertions in this behalf. From their first settlement at Serampore they had been unremitting in their endeavours to draw the attention of government to this practice. Its frequency at the time was little known in England, and it awakened no feeling of national responsibility. Few even in India were aware of the extent to which it prevailed, and the missionaries considered the first step towards its abolition was to bring the number of victims prominently into view. They accordingly deputed natives in 1803 to travel from place to place within a circle of thirty miles round Calcutta to make inquiries on the subject, and the number was found to exceed four hundred in the year. To obtain a more accurate return, ten agents were the next year stationed within this circle, at different places along the banks of the river, and they continued at their stations for six months, noting down every instance of suttee

which came within their observation. The result, even for this interval, gave the number of three hundred; and Mr. Carey instructed one of the members of council on this point, and he made a stirring appeal to Lord Wellesley, then on the eve of his departure. No immediate result followed that history can recognise. In fact, the question was substantially postponed for another quarter of a century, and twenty thousand more victims ascended the funeral pile before it was decided. But no one who reads these pages can doubt that Brother Carey and his coadjutors assisted very materially in preparing opinion in India and England to achieve this special glory of our creed and dominion.

"In 1808, the proceedings of the missionaries were so distrusted by the government that they were required to submit the manuscript of every publication to the inspection of the Secretary, and could not print a single page without his *imprimatur*. They were allowed, however, to circulate the Scriptures, and, as Lord Minto had happily recovered from the panic of the Vellore mutiny, when, in 1808, Serampore fell again into the hands of the English, the missionaries were empowered to extend their operations. On the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813, there was a parliamentary fight for their further liberation from restrictions, in which Wilberforce sustained them, and in which their efforts for the Christianization of India were effectually sanctioned. If these efforts have not been very successful as yet, nevertheless their subsequent history has some elements of interest, and it is not without some few ingredients of encouragement. The charter of 1813 was the commencement of a new era, from which we date a higher theory of our mission in the East. The prescriptive principles of Leadenhall Street were then abjured; Europeans were allowed freely to resort to India; the missionaries have been allowed to travel to every division of the empire, and have enjoyed a perfect liberty of the press. They have come in contact with the strongest religious prejudices of the people, and have distributed thousands of tracts exhibiting the absurdities of Hindoo superstition, in language more fervid than that which was considered fifty years ago certain to lead to an explosion; and during the formidable rebellion of 1857, when the whole of the north-west provinces was in a blaze of revolt, and the most strenuous efforts were made to expel us from the country, 'the missionaries,' according to Mr. Marshman, 'were treated with uniform deference and respect by the most influential classes in the country.'"

This notice of the work of the missionaries, its commencement, progress, success, the hostility shown to it, is carried down to a period (1813) long subsequent to the government of the Marquis Wellesley. Its introduction here prevents the necessity of recurring to the events to which it refers, when relating the great political movements of the early portion of the nineteenth century.

At the beginning of 1801, both Lords Wellesley and Clive contemplated retiring from their respective governments, but the events which occurred in India compelled them, from patriotic feelings, to remain. Both those able men were surrounded by difficulties which were hardly appreciated in England, because of the brilliancy of their career. The financial talents of Lord Wellesley were not considered equal to his gifts in other respects, and his war against Mysore was waged at a prodigious expense. His lordship's opinion

of the powers necessary to a governor-general were regarded as too ambitious, and sometimes arbitrary, both by those who carried out his views in India, and by the directors and proprietary of the East India Company. He demanded the entire control of the whole financial resources of India, a demand which appeared to the directors unconstitutional, unreasonable, and unnecessary. These considerations influenced the noble marquis in a desire to retire from the onerous post which he had occupied with so much ability. Public considerations, however, decided the part he took, and the aspect of affairs in Europe and in India at the beginning of the nineteenth century, justified his lordship in devoting his great energies, talents, and experience to the government of British India, however some portions of his conduct, and some of his opinions, might be regarded unfavourably in India or at home.

CHAPTER CI.

RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH TO INDIA IN THE OPENING OF THE 19TH CENTURY—POLICY OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY IN REFERENCE TO FRENCH INFLUENCE IN INDIA, AND THE MAHRATTAS—WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL WELLESLEY—BATTLES OF ASSAYE AND ARGAUM.

In the beginning of 1801 some official changes took place in the supreme government by orders from home. Letters patent were issued by the crown, appointing the Marquis Wellesley captain-general in India. The differences of opinion and feeling between the king's and the company's officers rendered this step desirable. Officers holding the king's commission frequently murmured when called upon to serve under company's officers of superior rank, and sometimes obedience to such officers was refused, on the ground that they did not hold the king's commission. The letters patent invested the governor-general with full command over all military forces employed within the limits of the company's exclusive trade. They also required his lordship's obedience to all orders, directions, and instructions from the first commissioners for the affairs of India, or from any of her majesty's principal secretaries of state.

Lieutenant-general Gerard, afterwards Lord Lake, was appointed commander-in-chief by a vote of the court of directors, on the 1st of August, 1800, in succession to Sir Alured Clarke. In February, 1801, General Gerard assumed his new functions, and Sir Alured retired. Colonel Stevenson was appointed to command in Malabar and Canara, under

the civil jurisdiction of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley—shortly afterwards made major-general.

The proceedings of the French caused uneasiness in London and in India, as to their designs upon that country. In May, 1802, Mr. Bosanquet, then chairman of the court of directors, wrote to the Marquis Wellesley, informing him that the French government was exceedingly jealous of British sovereignty in India, declaring his conviction that the peace recently made with France could not be lasting, and advising his excellency to be prepared for whatever might ensue upon its violation. Lord Wellesley had himself entertained the opinion that the French would spare no pains to unsettle the power of England in Asia, and he had distributed agents in all the countries of western Asia and eastern Europe, whence intelligence might be procured or where alliances might be formed. At Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Bussora, Alexandria, &c., British agents served their employers with great efficiency. A mission had been sent from Calcutta to Baber Khan, Shah of Persia, to ascertain the intentions of that prince, to form a more correct estimate of his military power, and to gain through his court precise knowledge of the relations

maintained with it by Zemaun Shah of Affghanistan, who had so frequently threatened northern Hindostan. The officer entrusted with the mission to the court of Persia had been instructed to gain its assent to some arrangement which would check the incursions of Zemaun Shah, and to form a treaty against the French, should they attempt by way of Persia to penetrate into India. Captain Malcolm had been selected for the performance of this delicate and important task. He arrived in Bushire in February, 1800, and in twelve months transmitted to Calcutta two treaties with Persia, one political the other commercial. He returned in September, 1801, having succeeded in all the objects of his mission. He also formed a good understanding between his government and the Pasha of Bagdad, which was considered politic, and an excellent provision against certain schemes supposed to be indulged by the French. The operations of the French in Egypt induced the governor-general to form a treaty with the Portuguese viceroy of Goa, in result of which eleven hundred British royal infantry, under the command of Sir William Clarke, were added to the garrison. Thus the governor-general, independent of any instructions received from home, made provision in all directions against the much dreaded designs of France.

The French were aware of all these proceedings. Their agents abroad and their spies in London informed them, for the most part correctly, of what the governor-general of India did, and of the tone of feeling, suspicion, and manœuvres of the English cabinet and the directors of the East India Company. Preliminaries of peace between France and England had been much hastened by the success of the English in Egypt. They were signed October 1st, 1801. The definitive treaty was, however, not signed until March 27th, 1802. The delay in signing the definitive treaty confirmed the English in their suspicions that the peace was not intended by France to be solid and lasting. Their suspicions were but too well grounded. In October Buonaparte, then elected first consul for life, addressed the Helvetic republic in terms which alarmed the English. The first consul plainly desired to control the Swiss nation in the exercise of its independent rights, and indicated that the system of propagandism and aggression, which the French had professed to give up, was still their policy. Lord Hawkesbury wrote to the French ambassador, M. Otto, that the English government would not surrender such conquests as might have passed to France and Holland under the articles of the late treaty of peace,

of which the conduct of the first consul to the Helvetic republic was considered a violation. Lord Hawkesbury also sent instructions to the Marquis Wellesley in accordance with his communication to M. Otto. On receipt of this intelligence, the governor-general regulated all his proceedings upon the assumed certainty of war with France and Holland.

On the 17th of June, 1803, England declared war against Holland, which was soon followed by a similar declaration against France. None of the vanquished possessions of France and Holland in Asia, which the English were to have surrendered at the conclusion of the peace, had been given up.

The proceedings of the British government and the governor-general of India, in reference to France and Holland, met with the approbation of the court of directors, but very strong difference of opinion existed as to the means to be employed. The Marquis Wellesley was for proceeding with all his measures on a gigantic scale of expense, proportionate to the grandeur and energy of his conceptions. Lord Castlereagh, then at the head of the board of control, concurred with the governor-general, and was as little disposed to economy. The directors considered that the operations of the company in India should be purely defensive, and should consist only in the defence of their trade and territory. Lord Castlereagh and Wellesley desired to employ the resources of the company for the purposes of imperial aggrandizement. The correspondence of these two notable persons, in reference to the court of directors, sometimes resembled that of enemies to the company, whose duty it was to turn its property to other account than its own use, rather than that of high functionaries of the king's government, bound to protect the company, to co-operate with it, and to regard its trading resources with the same sacredness of trust as the resources of any other company, or of any individual British citizens ought to be, and in most cases would be regarded, however indifferent the British government generally showed itself to the rights of private citizens, or of corporations, when such stood in the way of ministerial or party convenience. Whenever the company laid out money for political purposes in the service of the government, the accounts were disputed, payment was delayed, perhaps refused, or their settlement clogged with some unjust conditions.

In 1803, information reached Marquis Wellesley of a secret engagement between France and the Batavian republic, in virtue of which the latter ceded Cochin and other oriental settlements to France. M. Lefebvre, a staff officer at Pondicherry, wrote a memoir

justifying the French in resuming these possessions, under the treaty of Amiens. According to this memoir, while the English were wholly occupied in Western India against French aggression from that point, a secret expedition should be prepared to proceed from Spain, *via* Mexico, to Manilla, and thence to India. At the same time the Dutch republic should send an expedition by the Cape of Good Hope to the Spanish islands, and thence to Trincomalee. The author of the memoir predicted that if France did not deprive the English of their Eastern dominion, Russia, rapidly advancing in power, would attempt it.

A copy of this memoir was procured by the Marquis Wellesley, and he judged that although such a scheme might never be attempted by the governments in question, it was evident that the national feeling of France was directed to the acquisition of territory in India, and to the expulsion of the English thence, as freshly as when first the conflicts between the two nations gathered in "little wars" around Myhie and Tellicherry. The great error of the British had been in restoring Pondicherry, when first conquered, but the exigencies of peace in the European relations of the two powers, constrained what, received as an oriental policy only, was an error and misfortune.

The conduct of Lord Wellesley to the various branches of the Mahratta empire was based upon his knowledge and conjectures of the designs of the French. He perceived that the French hoped through the Mahrattas, as formerly through the Nizam of the Deccan, to gain a footing in India. The Mahratta sovereignties, stretching away from the shores of Malabar to the confines of the Punjab, holding sway in the heart of India, furnished means for French intrigue. If by disciplining and commanding their armies the French gained a military prestige among them, French generals might undermine the authorities they served, as well as organise and lead powerful, well equipped, and efficiently drilled armies against the English territories in numbers which, so led and disciplined, no resources derivable from England could repel. The policy of Lord Wellesley was that which Lord Cornwallis adopted in the Deccan—that of compelling or inducing the dismissal of all French and foreign mercenaries, and the employment of strong British contingents, the expense of which to be borne by the governments which they ostensibly defended. This was a far more subtle plan than that of the French; it was indeed of French origin, for it was the scheme by which Dupleix and Bussy had so long before ruled the court of

Hyderabad, and used the power of the Deccan, in the disputes of peninsular India. The Marquis Wellesley had, by what was called the subsidiary treaty of 1798, secured the nizam as an ally. His highness was obliged to rely upon a British contingent; his French forces were gone, although he still reserved some officers and troops contrary to the treaty, and he was rather desirous to increase their number as a counterpoise to the overbearing influence of the English.

The Mahratta sovereignties at that time were the Peishwa, the Guicawar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. The Peishwa was supreme in *nominal* authority, as in real rank. He was the grand vakeel of the Delhi emperor, but had been partly cajoled and partly coerced by Scindiah to make him his deputy in that office, who so used it as virtually to wield whatever was left of authority, and to bear whatever prestige remained of the name and dignity of the Great Mogul. The grand seat of Mahratta authority was then, as it had always been, at Poonah. Dowlut Row Scindiah might be considered rather as the chief sovereign in India than as a Mahratta chief owing allegiance to the Peishwa. Scindiah's territory lay in and around Malwa, lying to the west of Central India. The Guicowar dominated Gujerat to the west of Scindiah's possessions. Holkar prevailed south of Malwa, and ruled in his capital of Indore. The Rajah of Berar, or as he was more frequently called, the Nagpore Rajah, reigned in the city of that name, over a wild people, and a country of rigid and uncultivated soil east of the other Mahratta chiefs, and contiguous to the British province of Bengal.

"Independently of the apprehensions created by their immense resources and their inveterate aggressiveness, the Mahrattas were evoking at this moment the dreaded vision of French influence and ascendancy. Though the peace of Amiens had checked the overt operations of our redoubtable rivals, their intrigues were still continued with characteristic tenacity. Napoleon had sent Decaen to India with strict injunctions to provide for war while observing the stipulations of peace. Nor was this all; for Peron, a French adventurer, who had arrived in Hindostan twenty years previously as a petty officer in Suffrein's squadron, was rising rapidly to the command of the whole Mahratta forces. He had disciplined and armed some fifteen or twenty thousand men for Scindiah's service, who were officered by his own countrymen, and who were not inferior to the trained battalions of the company. His influence with Scindiah was so

unbounded as actually to excite jealousy among the Mahratta chiefs; and if he had possessed the national spirit of Dupleix, or been opposed by any less a soldier than Arthur Wellesley, it is not too much to conceive that our Eastern empire might have hung upon a thread.*

Holkar was as active as Scindiah in disciplining his troops by French officers, although he did not set the example, nor employ so large a foreign force. Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar were all competing for ascendancy at the court of Poonah, the Peishwa, their nominal and rightful lord, being not only unable to control them, but controlled by them in turn. The Guicowar would no doubt have been as forward in this competition as the other three, but his territory lying seaward, and other circumstances, brought him more into contact with the English. His territorial position gave him less opportunity of exercising any control at the Peishwa's court, and whatever the differences of the other three confederates, they were willing to coalesce against him. His pretensions were, as if by common consent of the other chiefs, excluded.

The policy adopted by the English was more easy of application in his case than in that of the Peishwa, or the other nominally confederated but really hostile chiefs. The English accordingly, having failed to induce the Peishwa to accept and support a powerful British contingent, treated with the Guicowar, with whom, for various objects, they had been in close negotiation, and upon whose power they had been gradually encroaching for years. The East India government, never wasting opportunities nor wanting pretexts, now discovered that Surat was shamefully misgoverned. This, and the nonpayment of the tribute, formed a good justification for annexing it to the company's territories; which plea was further strengthened by the constant difficulties arising out of the right of secession. The Nabob of Surat, like many other vassals of the Delhi empire, when strong enough, became virtually independent, and rendered his succession hereditary. But disputes having arisen respecting the inheritance, the British interfered and exercised their authority. A subsequent dispute upon the same subject, in 1789, afforded a further opportunity for the company, and the nabob was treated similarly to the ruler of Oude, being compelled to surrender the civil and military government of his dominions to the English, receiving in lieu a pension, and with it protection. But the chout,

or tribute, he had agreed to pay to the Mahrattas, was not so easily settled. The Guicowar prince declared his readiness to relinquish his portion of the tribute to the company, but the Peishwa was not so yielding.

The Guicowar, further to secure the British alliance, yielded the Chourassy district. His death, in September, 1800, produced great disturbances; for his son was perfectly imbecile, and unfit to control the intrigues of the court of Baroda. These intrigues speedily brought on a war between the late prime-minister, Nowjee Apajee, and an illegitimate brother of the deceased Guicowar; but the English, siding with the minister, and furnishing troops, victory declared in his favour. Nowjee being unfettered, pursued his economical reforms by dismissing the Arab mercenaries; but this body refused to disband, demanding enormous arrears: afterwards mutinying, they seized Baroda and imprisoned the Guicowar. The English immediately invested Baroda, which surrendered in ten days. Contrary to capitulation, many of the mutineers joined the rebel Kanhojee; but were pursued, and ultimately, with the latter, driven from Gujerat.

The policy of the English towards the Guicowar was pertinacious, wily, and successful; it lay with the discretion of the Bombay government whether a contingent of its army should not occupy the capital of Gujerat. The British were also persistent in urging upon the government of Poonah the reception of an English force, to be paid for by the Poonah treasury; no French, nor other foreign officers or soldiers to be admitted to serve the Peishwa: but that dignitary, mainly under the influence of Scindiah, still resisted. Events, however, brought about what negotiation had otherwise failed to accomplish. The confederates became open enemies. Scindiah conducted hostilities with varying fortunes. The horrors of war rolled over the great Mahratta empire, advancing and receding like the flowing tide, but still coming nearer and nearer to the capital. The Peishwa fled to Bassein, and claimed the protection of the English. This was granted on the much-coveted condition of his admitting an English division to garrison his capital. He reluctantly consented, and signed an agreement afterwards known as the treaty of Bassein. Meanwhile, the flight of the Peishwa to Bassein was treated by Holkar, then in the ascendant, as an abdication, and he, with the other chiefs, appointed Ameerut Rao Peishwa in his room. Had it not been for this hasty proceeding of Holkar, the Peishwa would not, although indebted for his safety to the English, have signed the

* *Travellers' Library*, 31.

treaty of Bassein. No sooner had he committed his hand to the hated stipulations, than he intrigued for their violation. He opened up communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for that purpose. While he was intriguing against his protectors, they were fighting for him. He was, by prompt and expert military measures, reinstated in his government, and the usurping Peishwa was deposed. The latter, however, so conducted himself towards the English after his deposition, that they granted him a pension and assigned him a residence at Benares. The engagement concluded between the Peishwa and Colonel Close at Bassein, on the last day of the year 1802, was confirmed by the governor-general on the 11th of February, 1803. By the seventeenth article, "The union of the two states was so firmly connected that they were to be considered as one, and the Peishwa was not to commence, nor pursue in future, any negotiations with any power whatever." A subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual appointment of field-pieces and European artillerymen, was to constitute the contingent.

The circumstances attending the reinstatement of the Peishwa again brought General Wellesley into prominence. The government of Madras collected a force which Lord Clive, the governor, placed under the command of General Wellesley. General Lake was ordered either to remain in Onde at the head of the army there, or to proceed to Hurryhur and take the command of the force there.

The government of India was at this time singularly well served by diplomatists of talent. Mr. Webbe was then resident of Seringapatam, a man of extraordinary resources, who was regarded with implicit confidence and the highest respect, amounting to reverence, by General Wellesley. That gentleman was ordered to Nagpore, to watch the movements of the rajah, with whom the Peishwa, in whose interests these movements were taking place, was in traitorous correspondence. Major Malcolm, whose services in Persia had been of such signal importance, was appointed to Seringapatam, but he proceeded to the city of Mysore, where the new sultan resided, as a place affording him a better position from whence to watch the Mahratta intrigues. Upon these two experienced politicians devolved mainly the procuring of such intelligence as would influence the governor-general's orders.

The Madras army assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of the Hon. General Wellesley, who, on the 9th of March, 1802, commenced his march towards Poonah. On the

12th, he crossed the Toombudra river. Holkar watched him, but moved away towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore. General Wellesley was joined by the son of Purseram Bhow, and other chiefs and sahibs, who came to avow their allegiance to the Peishwa and render their support. General Wellesley learned from his native coadjutors that the usurping Peishwa intended to burn Poonah when the British approached it. The general, to prevent such a calamity, performed one of the most splendid feats in his whole military history. Between the morning and the night of the 19th of April he accomplished a forced march of sixty miles, although detained in the Bhoze Ghaut for nearly six hours. This march seems, in the present day, all but incredible. It saved the city; Ameernt Rao, the usurping Peishwa, had barely time to escape. On the 13th of May the Peishwa re-entered his capital, and resumed his seat upon the musnid. The Peishwa was hardly reinstated in his authority when he acted in all respects contrary to the advice tendered to him by the British government, and upon which he had undertaken to act. His extreme vindictiveness infuriated old enemies and made new ones. He neglected business, and so treated his troops that they began to disband, and the sirdars who had come to his standard in a generous devotion, separated to their jaghires.

General Wellesley sought to unite by negotiation Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar in the treaty of Bassein. These chiefs temporised, while preparing to renege their forces against the British. They believed that their united arms could sweep from India all other powers, and concerted means to bring this belief to the test.

The governor-general found it impossible at such a distance as Calcutta to act with that celerity or effect necessary, when the tidings he received from day to day were so diverse, and the great Mahratta chiefs apparently so vacillating, while really resolved on war. He therefore entrusted his brother, while in command of the Madras forces, to conduct all affairs, civil and military, connected with Poonah, the Deccan, and Hindostan, and with full powers to decide any question that might arise, and to conclude any negotiations he judged beneficial to the state, with either Scindiah, Holkar, or the Nagpore rajah.

Everything done by those three potentates portended war. They were active and acute, full of vigour and sagacity. The Peishwa threw the whole burden of his own defence upon his ally. He engaged to add fifteen thousand men to the army of General Wellesley; he actually sent but three thousand,

and those wretchedly equipped, without ammunition, and no paymaster or means of pay. He had no intention of observing any of his engagements. Indian princes prided themselves on the ingenuity with which they compelled others to keep treaty, while they evaded all stipulations which belonged to it. The disposition of the English was, as usual to postpone, and allow their enemies to gain time by bootless negotiations. Lord Wellesley, the Hon. General Wellesley, and Lord Clive were prompt and decisive, but the supreme council, as well as the councils of the presidencies, were continually creating delays by plausible obstructions of some kind. General Wellesley experienced much mortification from the defective organization of the commissariat of his army, and the Madras council was an incompetent as its predecessors in previous wars in furnishing adequate and opportune support. General Stuart, however, the commander-in-chief of the Madras presidency, co-operated efficiently with the governor in matters strictly military, and so far as he could without exciting the morbid jealousy of the council. At length, all being ready, and negotiations having proved fruitless, the series of stirring events commenced which have been designated—

THE MAHRATTA WAR.

The dispositions of the British forces, when the grand Mahratta conflict began, were masterly:—"The course taken by the governor-general, in concert with the governments of Madras and Bombay, was to order the assembly of a *corps d'armée* at all the points threatened by Holkar in the conduct of his operations against the Peishwa. A corps of observation was placed on the southern frontier of the Peishwa, to maintain the integrity of the British possessions, and the territories of the nizam, and the Mysore rajah. Another was established on the north-west frontier of Mysore, while the Bombay government pushed troops to the eastern and southern confines of the territory which it controlled. The nizam was not inactive. The subsidiary force at Hyderabad prepared for service."

The Hon. General Wellesley made Poonah his point of support and base of operations. General Lake was appointed to command what was called the army of Hindostan; his theatre of operations was the Mahratta confines of Upper Bengal.

On the 6th of August, 1802, General Wellesley ordered the Bombay troops in Gujerat to attack Baroch, which was successfully accomplished. The general's command extended to that remote part, and this vast

extent of authority and responsibility involved on his part inconceivable care and anxiety. The general ordered Colonel Stevenson, his second in command, to move forward from Aurungabad. The 8th was the first day the weather permitted the general himself to march, on the 9th arriving at the fort of Ahmednuggur, which was stormed with great rapidity and terrible loss to the enemy. Scindiah, writing of this exploit, observed:—"The English are truly a wonderful people, and their general is a wonderful general. They came, looked at the pettah, walked over it, slew the garrison, and returned to breakfast: who can withstand them?"

After the surrender of Ahmednuggur, General Wellesley received such intelligence as led him to place a portion of his troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson on the 21st of September, directing him to march by a separate road on the 22nd, and form a junction with the corps under his own command on the 23rd, so as to attack the enemy with their united forces on the 24th. On the 22nd of September the two corps marched by separate routes, for the purpose, as General Wellesley alleged in his despatches, of preventing the enemy's escape by one route while the British were pursuing the other, and also because the whole army could not proceed, in one day, through a certain pass which lay in General Wellesley's line of march. These reasons for the course adopted are so distinct and convincing, that it is surprising that military critics should have animadverted upon the general's division of his forces. General Wellesley hoped that either corps could keep the enemy at bay, if encountered by him, until communication were opened with the other. This was not, however, so easy as the general supposed, for, according to Sir Archibald Alison, although the two British columns were only a few miles apart, they were separated by a line of rugged hills preventing mutual access.

General Wellesley having arrived at Naulniah, intended to encamp there, and form his projected junction with Colonel Stevenson. Having, however, learned to his surprise that the enemy was encamped in full force near the village of Assaye, he determined to attack them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. The force of the enemy has been very variously estimated. Thorn computes it at sixteen regular battalions of infantry (Pohlman's brigade), amounting to six thousand men; the brigade of Dupont, amounting to twenty-five hundred; four battalions of the Begum Shimroo,* amounting to two thousand. The

* This lady had been a dancing girl, whom Shimroo, the Swiss adventurer, who made himself infamous by the massacre at Patna, had married.

irregular infantry of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's infantry probably amounted to as many more. The cavalry, Thorn alleges to have amounted to thirty thousand. There were one hundred pieces of cannon, numerous attended by artillerymen disciplined on the French system.

The force at General Wellesley's command is estimated by Thorn as twelve hundred cavalry, European and native, two thousand sepoy infantry, and thirteen hundred European infantry and artillery, constituting a force of four thousand five hundred. The Rajah of Mysore's and the Peishwa's cavalry were with this force, and amounted to three thousand men. The total force of the enemy could hardly have been less than fifty-five thousand men and one hundred cannon; that of the British, the Peishwa, and the Rajah, seven thousand five hundred. General Wellesley left a large detachment of native cavalry with his baggage and tents at Naulnah, and advanced against the enemy.

As the battle that ensued was one of the most sanguinary ever fought in India, and General Wellesley ran the risk of a terrible defeat, his generalship has been much criticised, many military critics alleging that the attack should never have been made. The reasons which influenced General Wellesley were, however, conclusive. It was of the utmost consequence that the enemy should not escape, and have an opportunity of initiating a mode of warfare which would have proved most harassing to the English. If General Wellesley had waited for Colonel Stevenson, he would have been attacked before that officer could have arrived to his support, and where the enemy's large cavalry force could have acted with advantage. In the position occupied by the Mahratta forces, their cavalry could not with much advantage be brought into action, and even the force of their artillery would be limited. The moral prestige of the English would be sustained by a bold attack, inaction would have lessened this power on the minds of the sepoys; they were more likely to act offensively with spirit, than defensively with coolness and fortitude. The general knew his men, and knew his enemy, although he afterwards admitted that he had undervalued their discipline. Lieutenant-general Welsh, in his military reminiscences,* affirms that the Mahrattas had intended to attack the two divisions in detail, and that when they saw only one of the corps advancing to assail their position they thought the English mad.

General Wellesley perceived the enemy

* *Military Reminiscences of Thirty Years*, by Major-general Welsh, vol. i. p. 174.

posted near the junction of two rivers, so that if he could place himself between them and that junction, part of their artillery and the whole of their cavalry would be ineffectual. "They were drawn up in a peninsula, formed by the rivers Kaitna and Jocee, in a line facing the Kaitna, and about half a mile distant from it; the cavalry on the right in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun, reaching to their line of infantry, which, with the guns, was posted near the fortified village of Assaye. Their cavalry were on the right, and the infantry and guns were on the left. The village of Assaye was in rear of the enemy's left, and the distance between the rivers was about a mile and a-quarter. The enemy, expecting their left flank to be turned, formed their right wing of infantry, with its right resting on the Kaitna, and the left on the village of Assaye; their left wing being formed to the rear, at a right angle with the left of the front line, *en potence*, and with their rear to the Jocee, the left flank resting on Assaye; there being nine battalions in the front, and seven in the second line. About a mile and a-half in front of the enemy's new line was the junction of the two rivers, so that when General Wellesley formed his army in front of the enemy's front line, the battle field was in the form of a triangle, the enemy forming the base of it. General Wellesley occupied the centre of the space, by which means his flanks and rear were covered, the junction of the rivers being in rear of his centre. The enemy had more than half their guns in the front line, the rest in the other line (*en potence*). The general drew up his infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in his rear."*

General Wellesley had left by far the greater part of his cavalry to guard his camp, and observe the masses of the enemy's horse. General Wellesley opened a cannonade, which, although well directed, was not successful; he had only seventeen cannons opposed to the whole front line of the enemy's artillery. His gunners fell fast, and the enemy's fire was not in the least slackened. He ordered his infantry to advance and carry the enemy's cannon with the bayonet. This was performed in a manner the most gallant. Under showers of shell and grape they advanced and bayoneted the gunners, many of whom remained at their posts to the last.

The British infantry re-forming, charged the second line of guns, which were supported by dense masses of infantry, with their numerous cavalry in the rear. The Mahratta line was well formed, their rear turned to-

* *British Military Exploits*. By Major William Hough, Deputy-Advocate General, Bengal army. Allen and Co., Leadenhall-street.

wards the river Jooc. As the British advanced, the Mahratta cavalry continued to cross the rivers on either flank, and get in their rear, sabreing the English gunners. Many of the artillerymen of the first or vanquished line of the enemy had pretended to be slain, a common artifice in oriental warfare, and finding their cavalry advancing against the rear of the British infantry, they started up, reloaded their guns and fired upon the advancing English. Some of the English cannon were also turned upon the English infantry. It will be naturally asked where at such a moment, was General Wellesley's cavalry. Colonel (afterwards General) Welsh says that "they had just then charged a large body of the enemy in front, who had, with the assistance of a very heavy and destructive fire from their guns, not only galled, but nearly annihilated the gallant 74th, and pickets on our extreme right. This last line, although it stood well, was at length broken, and the guns captured; while our cavalry pursuing the fugitives, fell in with an immense column, who, though retreating, opposed them, and killed Colonel Maxwell, the brigadier; nor were they completely routed without a severe struggle, and heavy loss on our side. The second line being put *hors de combat*, the general, who was everywhere, placed himself at the head of the 78th regiment, faced about and charged the enemy, who were in possession of the first line of guns, and routed them with great slaughter. Here ended the conflict; those who had captured our guns making off as soon as they saw their danger, although about half-past five a body of ten thousand cavalry came in sight, and made some demonstrations, but dared not charge; and at eight o'clock in the evening they entirely disappeared."

The death of Colonel Maxwell had nearly occasioned the loss of the battle. He gallantly led on the charge, but received a musket ball which inflicted a fatal wound; he suddenly threw up his arms, and his horse halted; his men, supposing it to be a signal for retreat, turned right shoulder forward, and galloped along the whole of the enemy's line, receiving his fire. When the mistake was discovered the men were re-formed, and were so anxious to redeem their honour that they made one of the most desperate cavalry charges ever performed by the British even to the present day, contributing most effectively to retrieve the fortunes of this well-contested battle.

General Wellesley, in a letter to Major Malcolm, describing the conduct of both armies thus wrote:—"Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own,

and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time, whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably: the sepoy's astonished me. These circumstances and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer in equality of numbers. The enemy's cannonade was terrible,* but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the pickets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did."

The loss of both armies was heavy, but the British suffered proportionately more than the vanquished, owing to the great disproportion of numbers. General Wellesley in his despatches computed the Mahratta loss as 1200 men killed on the field of battle, and four times that number wounded. He computed his own loss, in officers and men, to be 626 killed, 1580 wounded. The fruits of the victory were many. The enemy's guns were captured—more than one hundred in the field, and twenty pieces more in the pursuit. Much baggage and stores were seized by the auxiliary cavalry. The best disciplined of Scindiah's infantry, who offered the bravest resistance, were left *hors de combat* upon the field. The moral influence of the British general and his troops was much enhanced. Colonel Stevenson was enabled to conquer Berhampore and Asseergur on the 16th and 21st of October, while General Wellesley, with his small force now somewhat augmented by the troops of the Peishwa and British sepoy's, was free to act with effect in other directions. Scindiah sought a truce, and sent vakeels into the camp of the general. But he was not sincere in his negotiations, merely seeking to gain time. The general finding this to be the case, and indignant that the truce was violated, proceeded to attack the Mahratta army under the Rajah of Berar and Ragore Boorslah, on the plains of Argaum. Having formed a junction with Colonel Stevenson's corps, the general came in sight of the enemy on the 28th of November,

* Despatches.

strongly posted near the village of Argaum. Their line extended five miles. The village of Arganm, with numerous gardens and enclosures, lay in the rear; in their front a plain intersected by watercourses. The task before the English was not so formidable as at Assaye, the enemy not possessing half the number of guns, nor were their artillerymen so well disciplined. The English force was more numerous, and native and European were veterans. This, however, did not much improve the quality of the native forces, who behaved shamefully, and so endangered the result of the battle to the English, that but for the courage and presence of mind of General Wellesley, the British would undoubtedly have suffered a defeat. No account of the battle of Argaum ever published possesses the united advantages of brevity, accuracy, and authority, in the same degree as those accounts given by the conqueror himself, in his despatches and letters. In his despatch he thus wrote:—"I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second and supporting the right, and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy's left." After alluding to the confusion caused by the unsteadiness of the native troops, the general stated that when his line was formed, "the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the first battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night."

In a letter to Major Shaw, military secretary to the governor-general,* General Wellesley wrote—"If we had had daylight an hour more not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time if my native infantry had not been panic-struck and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably

in the battle of Assaye, being broke, and running off when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assaye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night."

The allusion of General Wellesley to the conduct of the sepoys at Assaye being better than at Argaum requires some qualification. In the advance upon the second line of the enemy at the former battle, two sepoy regiments in succession gave way, and it was only when the Highlanders, who had previously suffered much in storming the first line, advanced against the second that it was carried. The loss sustained by the enemy in the battle of Argaum was very great, but could not be ascertained with any approach to accuracy by the English. That of the latter was severe, considering how soon the action was over: 346 officers and men were put *hors de combat*. The British cavalry suffered little, but forty-five horses were either disabled or slain in the pursuit. This was the third action which General Wellesley had fought, and his reputation had been raised by each to a very high degree, although he had been severely criticised by military connoisseurs for his generalship. His first action against Dhoondia was simply a charge of cavalry, which the critics avowed should not have been made on the occasion, according to the rules of war. The success of the general was regarded as a piece of good fortune. It is impossible, however, not to perceive, where no professional prejudice warps the opinion, that the means adopted were just such as were calculated to accomplish the end immediately in view. The battle of Assaye, it was admitted, was conducted in every respect properly, and was a great victory, but it was alleged that the attack should never have been made. Had it not been made, it is plain, that no similarly favourable opportunity could have been found to strike a severe blow upon so numerous an enemy, while to evade a battle, must have issued in a retreat before a cavalry four times more numerous than the general's whole army. The battle of Argaum was described as fought against military rule, and only won by the activity, self-reliance, and presence of mind of the general. No doubt he had a sufficient consciousness of his possession of those great

* Despatches, vol. i. p. 533. 2nd December, 1803.

qualities to take his own gifts into account as elements of success. If he turned aside from the maxims of military science, it was with a happy audacity like that which Napoleon had been for some years displaying in Europe and Egypt. The opinion of that great man concerning the conduct of General Wellesley in India, and especially in the battle of Assaye, given many years after, showed a high appreciation of the genius of the English general, although the critique of his great rival was tinged by those personal, national, and political prejudices to which Napoleon the First so often allowed his mind to be subjected. The terror which the name of General Wellesley inspired in the southern Mahratta country was great, and wherever he turned, the enemy fled or made a comparatively feeble resistance. The fort of Gawilghur was taken from the Rajah of Berar,* on 14th of December, which was followed by the peace with him in three days, under the treaty of Deogaum.†

On the 30th peace was signed with Scindiah, by the treaty of Surjee Augengaum. Scindiah was probably influenced in signing a treaty, as was also the Berar Rajah, by the fear and defection of minor chiefs. Ambajee forsook the standard of Scindiah early in December, and formed a separate treaty with the English on the 16th. Ambajee was, however, treacherous to the English as to Scindiah, for he refused to deliver up the fort of Gwalior, so famous in India, and which, according to the treaty, had been ceded to the British. It was not surrendered until the 5th of February, 1804, after a breaching battery had opened upon it. In the treaty of the 30th of December, 1803, Scindiah made his possession of this fortress a *sine quâ non*. In a letter to Major Malcolm, written May, 1804, General Wellesley declared—"I am convinced that I should not have made the peace if I had insisted upon Gwalior." The Marquis Wellesley differed from his brother on this question, but events proved that General Wellesley had a more intimate knowledge of the subject, and of the policy to be pursued, as might be expected from his opportunities as commander of the army by which the disputed treaties had been conquered. It was not until the 25th of December, 1805, when the Marquis Wellesley had returned home, after the death of the Marquis of Cornwallis, his successor, and when Sir George Barlow was governor-general, *pro tempore*, that an end was put to the quibbles and questions connected with the fort of Gwalior.

While General Wellesley was conducting

* Despatches, vol. ii. p. 583.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 588.

the war in one direction, General Lake was operating with a separate army in another, and after both armies had conducted successful campaigns, their respective commanders were kept in continued vigilance and action, from the wayward and uncertain conduct of Holkar and other chiefs, who regarded conventions and agreements simply as means of deceit or delay.

In February, 1804, Holkar, undismayed by the successes of the British, demanded from General Wellesley cessions in the Deccan. He immediately sent an agent to Scindiah, in order to induce that chief to violate his treaties and join him in an attack upon the British possessions. General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray, then commanding in Gujerat, to enter Malwa, and penetrating to Indore, attack Holkar in the capital of his dominions, while another of Colonel Murray's detachments was to proceed to the Deccan, and act against Holkar there. Lake took measures on the opposite side of the Mahratta dominions, to render more easy of accomplishment the plan of operations from Gujerat laid down by General Wellesley. Throughout these proceedings, the General displayed a sagacious foresight, and an intuitive perception of the conditions of Indian warfare, which must strike all persons acquainted with the character of the nations of peninsula India as indicating the great military genius, and general intellectual capacity of the British general. His instructions to Colonel Stevenson, which were implicitly followed out by that officer, and ensured the success of his undertakings, prove the ability of General Wellesley to make successful war in India, while they show how little he regarded the received rules of war, where it was politic to depart from them:—"Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access, for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory.

Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground."

It was not reserved for General Wellesley to accomplish any very signal feats of arms in the Mahratta war, although the superintendence of military arrangements over a wide field continued to devolve upon him while he remained in India. Whether in the camp, the field of battle, the barrack-room, the stores of the commissary, his perfect power of military organization, his capacity alike for generalization and detail were observed by all. Nor was his genius less conspicuous in civil things. At the desk writing letters and despatches, in *viva voce* discussion with vakeels and ministers, in the durbar of native princes, in the chair of government administering the affairs of provinces, he displayed as masterly parts as when exercising the functions of what was regarded as his peculiar profession.

When tidings of the battles of Assaye and Argaum reached England, the directors paid no particular attention to them, and conferred no honours on the chief by whom they were won. The government conferred upon him the Order of the Bath. In India his deeds were highly appreciated, a sword valued at £1000 was voted by the British inhabitants of Calcutta. The general was not contented with the value set upon his achievements by either the crown or the company, although the Order of the Bath was in those days highly estimated. It will interest readers of the present day to peruse the general's own language expressing his sense of neglect. In a letter to Major Shaw, he wrote:—"I have served the country in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the court of directors,

although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claims upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered on the scale on which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff of India, and if it had not been for the lamented death of General Frazer, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary."

In March, 1805, Sir Arthur Wellesley (as his Order of the Bath entitled him) left India for England. His health had suffered considerably, and his dissatisfaction with the ministers and the company contributed still more to induce in him a desire to quit India for ever. His service there had made impressions of a lasting kind. He had set an example of kindness in his treatment of the natives, and checked the arrogance of his countrymen wherever it came within his observation. He established the importance of promptitude, both in the field and in negotiations with native states. His letters and conduct had impressed upon the general staff of the army, and all officers on service, the necessity of acquaintance on their part with the people and topography of all countries made the theatre of war, or which were likely at any future period to become so.

CHAPTER CII.

MAHRATTA WAR (*Continued*)—OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAKE—BATTLES AND SIEGES—FINAL SUBJUGATION OF THE MAHRATTAS, AND TREATIES OF PEACE.

In the last chapter, the operations of General Wellesley against the Mahrattas were traced through the campaigns in which he vanquished Scindiah at Assaye, the Rajah of Berar at Argaum, and directed Colonel Murray's invasion of Malwa and Indore from Gujerat, in order to suppress the power of Holkar. It was intimated also in that chapter

that General, afterwards Lord Lake, operated against the Mahratta forces from Bengal. His first movements were directed against Scindiah, his subsequent campaigns against Holkar. The campaigns of Lake were more continuous, and involved a fiercer struggle over a greater area, but were not so interesting in their character as those of the com-

mander in the south. While Wellesley was gaining Assaye and Argaum, he was winning the victories of Delhi and Laswaree. There were three armies acting at the same time against the various Mahratta tribes. Two of these were under the supreme direction of General Wellesley, one of which was under his immediate command, of which for some time Colonel Stevenson commanded a separate corps; the other army which Wellesley directed was that which operated from Gujerat, but which was too far off for him to guide its details.

It will assist the memory of the reader to see the dates of the chief actions fought by these different armies presented in one view:—General Wellesley, on the 12th August, 1803, took Ahmednuggur. On the 29th August General Lake defeated Perron's troops at Coel; on the same day, Baroch in Gujerat was taken by storm. Lake took the fort of Allyghur on the 4th September, on the 11th gained the battle of Delhi. On the 23rd September, Wellesley gained the battle of Assaye. On the 18th October, Lake took possession of the fortress of Agra. On the 1st November he gained the battle of Laswaree. On the 28th November, Wellesley gained the battle of Argaum. In October, Colonel Stevenson had taken Berhampore and Asseergur; and Colonel Woodington had reduced Champaneer and Powanghur. Colonel Harcourt had been successful in Cuttack; and Colonel Powell had attained advantages in Bundelcund. Both Scindiah and the Berar Rajah had pledged themselves to "retain no Frenchmen" in their service, or "the subjects of powers in a state of hostility to Great Britain; nor of any of our own, without permission." The Marquis Wellesley had by his proclamation of August, 1803, brought over most of the foreign officers, as well as all our own. In the four great battles we had taken above three hundred guns, and in the fortresses a great many guns, and great quantities of military stores.

To understand clearly the operations of General Lake both against Scindiah and Holkar, it is necessary to state that while both those chiefs were at war with the English, they were also carrying on hostilities with one another. On the 25th of October, 1802, a great battle had taken place between them at Poonah, in which Holkar had gained a great victory. His army at that time consisted of fourteen battalions of infantry, numbering each about one thousand men, commanded wholly by French officers, and as many more commanded by native officers. His cavalry numbered twenty-five thousand. He had one hundred pieces of cannon. Both

in the cavalry and artillery, especially the latter, French officers held important commands. At that date Holkar's object was not to attack the English, but to destroy the power of his competitors. Had he then directed his numerous and well-equipped army wholly against the British, it was the opinion of the best English officers that the confederated Mahrattas would have been too strong for us.*

On the 27th of December, 1803, Lake moved after Holkar, with instructions if possible to engage him and destroy his army. In February, 1804, Holkar sought assistance from the Rohillas and Sikhs, with the view of extending a confederation through North-western India against the English. In March, 1804, so confident was Holkar of his power to cope with all enemies, that he demanded the cession of territory in the Doab and in Bundelcund, and asserted the right to collect the chout (one-fourth of the landed revenue). At the same time, he made overtures to Scindiah for united action against the English. While Scindiah's forces lay at Assaye, he sent an army under Ameer Khan to assist the rival Mahratta chief. The promptitude of General Wellesley in the meantime defeated Scindiah, and rendered the junction impossible. When at last Holkar resolved to confront the English, he found General Lake, flushed with victory over Scindiah, ready to encounter him. The Mahratta chief had outwitted himself; while the English were destroying the flower of Scindiah's troops, they were removing all impediments that lay in the way of attacking the still more formidable Holkar.

When the war on the Bengal side commenced in June, 1803, about a month after the Peishwa was restored at Poonah by General Wellesley, the following were the arrangements and amount of troops:—One thousand three hundred men under Colonel Fenwick at Midnapore, not far from Calcutta; two thousand men under Major-general Deare, stationed at Mirzapore, on the Ganges, as a protection to the province and city of Benares. Four thousand nine hundred and sixteen was assembled under Colonel Harcourt, of Madras and Bengal troops for the conquest of Cuttack, belonging to the Rajah of Berar. A force was assembled on the south bank of Soane under Lieutenant-colonel Broughton. Three thousand five hundred men, under Lieutenant-colonel Powell, were collected near Allahabad, for the purpose of invading the province of Bundelcund: while the grand army under

* *British Military Exploits in India, Affghanistan, and China*, by Major W. Hough, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, Bengal army.

General Lake, commander-in-chief in India, amounted to ten thousand five hundred men; these acted under his excellency's orders. The total British force was about fifty thousand men. The Mahrattas were estimated* at two hundred and fifty thousand: and forty thousand men organized and drilled by French officers under M. Perron; and one thousand guns.

The marquis was desirous of striking a blow before the cold season should allow the Mahrattas to cross the Nerbuddah into Hindostan. On the 29th August, 1803, General Lake defeated Perron's troops under the walls of Allyghur†—stormed and carried it on the 4th September, fought the battle of Delhi on the 11th September,‡ when he released the Emperor, Shah Alum, who had been imprisoned for many years by the Mahrattas. His eyes had been put out by Ghoolam Khadir. General Lake took Agra on the 18th October, 1803. M. Perron allowed his second in command (M. Pedron) to make his military arrangements, while he himself returned with his body-guard to Agra. The capture of Allyghur was effected by blowing open the gate.§

General Wellesley expressed much admiration of this exploit of General Lake, which, he declared, he had often attempted, without being able to accomplish. Allyghur would have proved a most formidable place for an escalade.

On the 7th of September, Lake marched from Allyghur, and encamped near Delhi on the 11th. The enemy consisted of six thousand cavalry, and thirteen thousand infantry, under the command of a French officer, M. Louis Bourquieu. Lake's force was only four thousand five hundred men. Bourquieu despised the English brigade which had advanced against an army. He had intrenched himself before Delhi, supposing that he would have been attacked by a very superior force. He resolved at once to attack the English, and for this purpose threw out his whole cavalry force, which, when they approached nearly to musket range, halted, and the infantry passed them. These were met by the English with close and successive volleys, by which their ranks were broke, and they fled behind their guns. Against these the English intrepidly advanced, under a terrible fire from caanon and musketry. The British infantry gave one volley and charged, opening their ranks to let the cavalry pass, whose charge was splendid. The battle was short,

* Thorn, p. 315.

† Ibid., p. 91.

‡ Ibid., p. 111.

§ *A History of British Military Exploits and Political Events in India.* By Major Hough.

sharp, and decided. The result,—Shah Alum was restored to his throne. He had been in the hands of the Mahrattas since 1771—since he left the alliance and protection of the English at Allahabad at that time. At the juncture of the battle of Delhi, he was treated by Scindiah just as the Peishwa, the rightful sovereign of the Mahrattas, was treated at Poonah. He was obliged to issue the orders of Scindiah as the decrees of the empire.

General Lake was authorised by the governor-general to establish at Delhi a settled form of government in the name of the Mogul. He then departed for Agra. On the 24th of September, Lieut.-colonel Ochterloney, deputy-adjutant-general of the Bengal army, was nominated resident at Delhi, where only a battalion of sepoy, and four companies of recruits, gathered in the surrounding country, was left in garrison. There had been many British as well as French officers in the service of Scindiah; the former left his ranks as soon as proclamation of war was made by the governor-general. These officers having joined the corps under General Lake, were employed as guides, were used to strengthen regiments weakly officered, and were appointed to the command of Mewathies, as the recruits about Delhi were termed. It was one of those officers, named Lucan, that blew up the gates of Allyghur, and led the English safely through the intricate mazes of the place.

On the 2nd of October General Lake reached Muttra, where Colonel Vandeleur joined him with a detachment. That gallant officer afterwards earned distinction for himself as a good cavalry officer. An important event occurred at this place; several British officers and some French, in command of a detachment of troops sent by Scindiah to join General Perron, surrendered themselves prisoners of war to Colonel Vandeleur shortly before the arrival of General Lake. This detachment consisted of several regular battalions of Scindiah's army, and its surrender much weakened his force.

On the 8th of October, the army arrived at Agra, and on the 9th the Rajah of Bhurt-pore offered a treaty offensive and defensive. This was an immediate advantage to the British, for the rajah sent five thousand horse, such as they were, to operate with Lake's army before Agra. The garrison acted with vigour, arresting all the European officers at once, a measure of safety and of danger, for some of these officers were in the English interest, others were, however, true to the Mahrattas, and the loss of their services was irreparable to the city.

Seven battalions of the enemy occupied the

glacis and the town, with a well-appointed and powerful artillery, directed, in many cases, by intelligent French officers who had not been placed under arrest. The first operation of General Lake, after going through the essential preliminaries in laying siege to a fortress, was an attack against the posts occupied by these battalions, which was successful. The enemy made an obstinate defence within the town, but Lake seized a large mosque, from which a heavy fire was kept up against the enemy. In two days after this success, the enemy's infantry outside the fort surrendered, numbering two thousand five hundred men. This terrible reverse did not diminish the exertions of the troops within the fortress. It was not until the 17th that the breaching batteries opened. On the 18th, under the influence of an English officer within the fortress, the garrison surrendered. The Mahratta troops, five thousand five hundred in number, marched out prisoners of war. Twenty tumbrils of treasure, containing 22 lacs of rupees, equivalent to £220,000, were obtained in the treasury. The ammunition and stores were very valuable, as Agra was more a depot of arms and a treasury than a strong fortification. M. Perron, the French commander, had the falsehood and effrontery to claim the money as his personal property—a claim which was of course rejected, Colonel Hessian, the governor, having honestly avowed that the treasury contained only the property of the state.

General Lake's proceedings had been so well calculated, and so complete, that Scindiah's plans were soon entirely frustrated.

Two battalions of Scindiah's army had escaped from Delhi; these formed a junction with fifteen battalions, the remainder of the corps, the advance of which had surrendered to Colonel Vandeleur. Guns and a force of cavalry accompanied these battalions, making a very fine army, which hung upon the rear of the English, but did not attempt the relief of Agra. The main object was to watch Lake's movements, deceive him, and recapture Delhi, so as to regain possession of the person of the Mogul. The army of Scindiah seized convoys, harassed reinforcements, and bombarded Cotumbo. Lake having left Agra, was to the north-west of Futtehpore Sikree, when the booming of the cannon at Cotumbo broke upon his ear. The next day (the 30th), by a forced march, leaving his heavy guns and baggage at Futtehpore, the army advanced to Cotumbo, near which it encamped next day.

General Lake determined on an attempt with his cavalry to seize the guns and bag-

gage of the enemy, while his infantry was on the march. At eleven o'clock on the night of the 31st, Lake, with the cavalry, began a forced march, and after a progress of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy at sunrise on the 1st of November. Their force consisted of seventeen battalions of infantry, of much less than the usual strength, not exceeding together nine thousand men; a cavalry division of about five thousand men, and a powerful artillery of seventy-two guns.

The Mahrattas had heard of the approach of Lake, had magnified his army, and retreated rapidly from Cotumbo. They were making a forced and confused march when his advanced guard beheld the struggling crowds in their wild Mahratta costume, their guns showing darkly in the grey morning. The guns were ingeniously chained together, a circumstance which baffled Lake's cavalry, who found that they were unable to retain their conquests, for, as they retired to reform, the artillerymen jumped up from beneath the guns and bore them away. Lake checked the progress of the enemy until his infantry arrived at twelve o'clock. He formed them in two columns of attack. The enemy awaited the attack with two lines of infantry, the guns drawn up in double lines in front of the first rank of the infantry, the rear guns being placed in the intervals of the first line. The village of Mokaulpore was between the two lines of the infantry near the right flank. It was fortified, and partly rested on a rivulet which covered the enemy's right. The Mahratta cavalry were well posted in the rear of their second infantry formation. The position was a fine one, and the appearance of the troops stalwart and confident.

Lake arranged a portion of his cavalry so as to watch that of the enemy, the remainder to support his attacking columns. What used in those days to be called "galloper guns" were arranged so as to support the advancing infantry. Lake himself, with one of the columns of attack advanced against the enemy's right formation of battle. The column was badly formed, confusion arose in the ranks, the men came up slowly, and the sepoys showed a disposition to leave the fighting as much as possible to the Europeans. The officership of the British was bad, and only by hard fighting, and after terrible courage, did they succeed. The cannonade of the enemy was cool, prompt, and rapid:—"The effect of this fire, which was terrible in the extreme, was felt with peculiar severity by the 76th regiment, which fine body, by heading the attack, as usual, became the direct object of destruction. So great indeed was the loss of this corps, and such was the

furious fire of the enemy, that the commander-in-chief deemed it more advisable to hasten the attack with that regiment, and those of the native infantry, consisting of the second regiment, twelfth and sixth companies of the second battalion sixteenth, which had closed to the front, than to wait till the remainder of the column should be formed, whose advance had been delayed by unavoidable impediment."

The guns were captured. The enemy gave way on the left, as the success of the British on the right became assured. The dauntless indifference to danger shown by the Scottish soldiery struck the enemy with awe, and while the men opposed to them died at their posts, those on the left became so intimidated as to offer an inferior resistance. The day was won by the right attack. The loss of General Lake was extremely heavy. Major Hough thus details it:—"The loss in killed and wounded amounted to 824. Of these the cavalry lost 258; his majesty's 76th regiment, 213; the 2nd battalion, 12th, and the company's 16th native infantry,* lost 188; leaving the remainder, sixty-five, to be divided among all the other corps—and 553 horses killed, wounded and missing. The guns captured were seventy-one in number." Lake's secret letter explains the nature of the battle. The following extracts are full of interest:—"These battalions (Scindiah's) are uncommonly well appointed, have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet; all the sepoy's of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and if they had been commanded by French officers,† the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life, or anything like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again. Their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever; they have three times the number of men to a gun as we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort; all their men's knapsacks and baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance. We have taken all their bazaar, baggage, and everything belonging to them; an amazing number were killed—indeed the victory has been decisive. The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do anything without British troops, and of them there ought to be a very great proportion." "Had

* The 16th were removed to the brigade in which his majesty's 76th were, owing to gallant conduct in the attack on the town of Agra in October, 1803.

† The proclamation brought them over.

we been beaten by these brigades, the consequences attending such a defeat must have been most fatal. These fellows fought like devils, or rather like heroes, and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe from the position they had taken we must have failed."

The general was of opinion that the organization of the British army was dangerously defective; that the sepoy's would seldom fight well, unless mixed with a proportion of Europeans, which he thought should never be less than one to four, but, if possible, in a much greater proportion; and that under any circumstances their devotion was not to be relied on. He considered that the loyalty of the Bengal sepoy's was not worthy of confidence, and that if they were trusted as the main strength of the army, British power in India was "suspended from a thread." These views of the general produced no effect upon the policy or opinions of the company.

In 1804 the operations of Lake and his lieutenants against Holkar were unfortunate. Lake dispatched Colonel Monson against him with the forces of the Rajah of Jeypore; while Murray, by the orders of General Wellesley, as before shown, acted against him from Gujerat. Holkar soon lost his possessions in Hindostan, north of the Chambul, and was hemmed in between Murray and Monson. From these difficulties he extricated himself through the faults of his adversaries. Murray was tardy, Monson was utterly incompetent, and believed the sepoy's to be disloyal. His rearguard, commanded by Baboojee Scindiah, was betrayed by that chief.

When the rainy season commenced, General Lake went into cantonments at Cawnpore, too remote to render assistance to Monson. General Wellesley was of opinion, that had Lake fixed his head-quarters at Agra, Monson might have been saved from discomfiture and disaster. Lake was not as competent to manage the operations from Bengal, as Wellesley was from the south. Indeed, General Wellesley threw much of the blame of Monson's ruin upon General Lake.

Lake marched from Cawnpore, and arrived at the general rendezvous at Agra on the 22nd of September. The strategy of Lake was unskilful; Holkar proved more than his match. After the bad arrangements of Lake had caused a considerable sacrifice of munitions of war and provisions, Holkar succeeded in engaging the general's attention with his cavalry, while he conveyed his infantry and artillery to Delhi, and laid siege to it. The Mohammedan population were insurgent.

An intense fanaticism against Christians animated the whole people, and Colonel Ochterlony had much difficulty in repressing insurrection. He called in the troops dispersed in the neighbourhood, strengthened the defences of the city, and gave the command of the forces to Lieutenant-colonel Burn, the senior officer.

From the 8th of October to the 15th, the siege was maintained by Holkar, and Ochterlony, with his few irregular soldiers, conducted a defence not often surpassed in skill and valour. Like Colonel, afterwards General Williams, at Kars, half a century later, he was everywhere, superintending the detail of the army, but was not so successful in attaching to him the people of the city he defended. It is doubtful whether the enemy would not have succeeded, had not Ochterlony contrived to apprise Lake of his circumstances, the approach of whose advance guard was the signal for the retirement of Holkar's army, which consisted of twenty thousand infantry and one hundred guns. As he retired, he plundered the country in every direction. Lake pursued the enemy with his cavalry, and overtook him while encamped at night. The general, instead of attacking the camp with his troopers, fired grape into it from his horse artillery guns, which allowed Holkar to escape. Lake still maintained a hot cavalry pursuit. Holkar, who was with his cavalry, would hardly have been so ready to fly, had he not heard of a signal defeat inflicted upon his infantry and artillery at Deeg. To that place, Major-general Fraser had pursued them. A battle was fought, during which General Fraser lost his leg, and the command devolved upon Colonel Monson, who nobly redeemed his former ill fortune by good conduct and bravery; nearly two thousand of the enemy perished in this battle. The English lost three hundred and fifty, killed and wounded. Eighty-seven guns were captured, and the enemy were obliged to abandon the open country and take shelter in the fort of Deeg. This place belonged to the Rajah of Bhurtpore, with whom, in 1803, Lord Lake had made a treaty offensive and defensive. He, like most of the native princes, proved to be a traitor. Lord Lake resolved to punish him as well as inflict further defeat upon the enemy he sheltered. The fort and citadel were taken by storm after an obstinate defence.

On the 25th of December, the English were in possession of all the guns of the remaining artillery of Holkar's army, of the stores of the fort, and of that army. Two lacs of rupees were found in the treasury. In conquering the intrenched camp, fort, and citadel, Lake's

army lost only forty-three men killed, and 184 men wounded.

The general left a garrison in Deeg, and marched with his army on the 28th. On the last day of the year he was joined by Major-general Dowdeswell, with his majesty's 75th regiment and a supply of stores. The army halted until New Year's Day, and marching in the evening, reached Bhurtpore on the 2nd of January, 1805. This fortress was situated thirty miles W. N. W. of Agra. Having battered a breach, Lake attempted to storm on the 9th, and was beaten off with a loss of 456 men killed and wounded. He erected fresh batteries, as the enemy succeeded in stockading the breach. Major-general Smith, arriving with three battalions of sepoys and one hundred convalescent Europeans, and Ishmael Bey, a partisan of Holkar, having come over with a regiment of cavalry, a second storm was resolved upon, which took place on the 21st, when a breach was pronounced practicable, from intelligence gained by the following stratagem:—"To learn the breadth and depth of the ditch a havildar and two troopers of the 3rd native cavalry volunteered their services. Dressed like the natives of the country, and pursued by men as if deserters, they got to the ditch by the stratagem of pretending to be enemies of the English and wishing to enter the fort, by which plan they passed along the ditch to a gateway and saw the breach, then galloped back to the army. They were rewarded and promoted.*"

This storm also failed, with terrible loss. Eighteen officers were killed and wounded, and more than five hundred men. The remainder of the month the army lay before the fortress, watched by the cavalry of Holkar strongly reinforced, various affairs of outpost occurred, and Holkar's troopers made attempts more skilful than gallant to intercept or interrupt convoys from Agra, compelling Lake to keep a considerable portion of his army marching backwards and forwards, to ensure the safety of his stores and escorts.

The chiefs with Holkar quarrelled; some withdrew to Rohilcund, some to Rajpootana. General Smith was sent in chase of some of these parties, without much plan either on his own part or that of Lord Lake, and with little result beyond the loss of some officers and men in cavalry skirmishes, and the return of the troops wearied with incessant marching. On the 10th of February Major-general Jones arrived with a division of the Bombay army, consisting of two battalions of king's troops, four of sepoys, and about six hundred native cavalry.

* Thorn.

Lord Lake had now a large army and a great many generals, and if Bhurtpore was not impregnable he must take it. He a third time, however, failed, with a loss of 894 men killed and wounded. The conduct of the soldiers was excellent. The sepoy fought with a quiet submission to the word of command, the Europeans with devoted courage. Neither Lake nor his generals showed much skill, and the task itself was most difficult. Cannon continued to play upon the place until the 22nd of February, when a fourth storm took place. The Hon. Brigadier Monson, who had shown such incapacity when co-operating with Colonel Murray in a previous campaign, commanded the stormers, who were in number more than three thousand. The brigadier fought with desperation, and kept his men fighting when no result could happen but their destruction; they were beaten, with a loss of nine hundred and eighty-seven men killed and wounded. Few assaults in Indian sieges, and few defences, were more terrible than this, as the following description shows:—"The bastion to be attacked was extremely steep, and there was no possibility of getting up to the summit. Several soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavoured by these steps to reach the top, but were knocked down by logs of wood, and various missiles, from above. The enemy from the next bastion kept up a destructive fire. Several efforts were made against the curtain. The enemy's grape told with fatal effect. The people on the walls threw down upon the heads of the troops ponderous pieces of timber, and flaming packs of cotton, previously dipped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, the explosion of which had a terrible effect. The struggle was carried on with the most determined resolution on both sides. Brigadier Monson strained himself to the utmost in maintaining the unequal struggle; but after two hours' arduous exertion, he was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attempt, and return to the trenches."*

Lake might well be dispirited after so many failures. He had consumed an immense amount of stores and ammunition; his guns were worn out; the cost of his army had been very great. He still persevered, ordering supplies from Agra and Allyghur. At this juncture the rajah's treasury became exhausted. Lake had been recently exalted to the peerage, and the rajah made that circumstance the occasion of friendly overtures. He sent a vakeel to Lord Lake, congratulating him on his being ennobled, and expressing a

* Major Hough.

desire for peace. On the 10th of April, 1805, the treaty was signed. The chief clauses of it were, that the rajah would pay twenty lacs of rupees (£200,000), never employ any Europeans in his service, and the fortress of Deeg was to be retained until there was no longer a possibility of renewed treachery on his part, or the English were satisfied of his amity.

Lord Lake was much chagrined at the failure before Bhurtpore, and attributed it mainly to his deficient material, the fewness of his officers of engineers and artillery, and men who understood sapping and mining. The British officers displayed dauntless bravery, and but little military ability. The first act of Lord Lake after the signature of the treaty was to make a cavalry attack upon the camp of Holkar, who hovered about seeking for a favourable moment by some bold manœuvre to raise the siege. Lake routed him, killing many of his men, and capturing many of his horses. The indomitable Holkar, however, soon found new recruits and new resources, and went about, like a Tartar chief, plundering all around. Lake then disposed of that portion of his army, which he desired to keep the field, along the western bank of the Jumna, well placed for co-operation as new events might demand.

Holkar retired into Jondpore and Rajpootana. Lake, with five regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and a strong body of horse artillery, followed and sought battle. The Mahratta requested the assistance of the Punjaubee chiefs. The Sikhs, in a grand national council, agreed to withhold all aid from the fugitive. This decided the fate of Holkar, who, as well as Seindiah, agreed to a treaty of peace. The treaty with the latter included various minor chiefs, such as the Rajahs of Joudpore and Kotah, the Ranees of Odeypore, &c. The treaty was ratified on Christmas-day, 1805. Peace, however, was not altogether restored. Meer Khan, the best general of Holkar, and claiming to be an independent chief, felt aggrieved that he was not named in the treaty. His remonstrance having been treated carelessly, he sarcastically observed, "a fly may torment an elephant," and retired to his house. Soon afterwards he appeared in arms in Rajpootana, and caused immeasurable trouble. He managed his desultory warfare so well, that he acquired an independent position, and was afterwards recognised as a nabob by the English. Holkar became mad a few years after, and Meer Khan became the vicegerent of Holkar's dominions, in the name of that chief's wife. It was not until the 9th of January, 1806, that the British army retraced their steps.



Sit. Lawrence. P. R. A.

G. Stodart

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

LONDON, JAMES & VIRTUE

Thus ended the great Mahratta war. Some of the bitterest enemies of the English made good terms for themselves; it was the interest of the British to conciliate them. Some of the most faithful friends of the company, who were weak, were thrown aside and exposed to the vengeance of the Mahrattas. The Rajah of Jeypore was one of these, and it is to the discredit of Lord Cornwallis, in his second government, and of Governor-general

Barlow, that this injustice was perpetrated with their sanction, in spite of the indignant protests of Lord Lake, who, under the authority of a previous governor-general, Lord Wellesley, had formed a treaty offensive and defensive with the rajah. The bitter taunt of Hyder Ali was thus again justified—that no confidence could be placed in the English, as a treaty made by one governor-general was revoked by another, or by the company.

CHAPTER CIII.

RESIGNATION OF THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY—MARQUIS CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS HIM—POLICY AND DEATH OF HIS LORDSHIP—APPOINTMENT AND REVOKATION OF SIR G. BARLOW—NOMINATION OF LORD MINTO—AFFAIRS OF MADRAS—MUTINY AND MASSACRE AT VELLORE—ARRIVAL OF LORD MINTO—HIS POLICY.

DURING the campaigns with the Mahrattas, and for some time subsequently, there were various changes in the presidential and chief governments, which affected the general policy of the English in India. Lord William Bentinck's arrival in Madras was beneficial to that presidency. The Marquis of Wellesley was apprised by Lord Castlereagh, in 1803, of the war with France, and was urged to make the expenses of India be paid by the revenues of India, which the noble governor's warlike policy rendered impossible. When the general government in Calcutta heard that France had taken possession of Holland, it increased the military ardour of his excellency. His brother's successes in the Deccan tended to the same result; and he became more and more committed to a policy, much too warlike for the views of the board of control, and the court of directors. In 1805, when intelligence reached Lord Wellesley that England declared war against Spain, and that his government relied on his prudence and vigour to protect the Eastern dependencies of England from any casualties in the result, his lordship's military ardour found renewed scope.

On the 30th July, 1805, Lord Cornwallis arrived at Calcutta, to assume a second time the united office of governor-general and commander-in-chief. Lord Lake, much to his mortification, was nominated to the command of the forces in the Bengal presidency. Lord Wellesley shortly after returned to England. The Marquis Cornwallis had received instructions from the court of directors and the board of control, to carry out the policy which when before in India he had initiated, of holding no connection, and carrying on no hostilities, with the Mahrattas.

He scarcely waited for the Marquis Wellesley to quit Calcutta before he began to reverse all that that nobleman had done, or authorised his generals to perform, in connection with the late war. Treaties and arrangements were revoked, and alliances dissolved, so that his lordship, by his disregard of the actual state of things, sowed broadcast the seeds of future troubles all over India. Some of these were nipped in the bud, others grew and ripened. Blood and treasure had to flow again freely before this error and precipitancy of his lordship could be retrieved. The Marquis Wellesley might possibly have avoided both the Mysore and Mahratta wars, so, at all events, Mr. Secretary Webbe thought, whose opinion was as good as any in India; but these wars having been brought to an issue, and treaties framed resulting from such issue, it was perilous policy to act as if nothing had occurred, and to treat matters as if the *status quo ante bellum* had been suddenly restored by the hand of Providence.

While the stern and indignant remonstrances of Lord Lake and other officers were before him, the marquis sickened and died. He died at Ghazepore, on the 5th of October, 1805.* Sir G. H. Barlow succeeded as governor-general. He adopted "the policy of his predecessor," abandoning all connection with the petty states, and generally, with the territories to the westward of the Jumna."

On the death of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Lake, as the senior officer in India, assumed the command in chief, when he was about to retire from the country, indignant at his previous supercession.

Barlow was not long permitted to wear his new honours. The court and cabinet were jea-

* Mill, vol. vi. p. 658.

lous of the company's influence, and revoked. Sir George's appointment, giving the high post to Lord Minto. The latter candidate had power and influence in parliament; Sir George had only his talent and long services. These qualifications availed little in comparison with parliamentary and court influence.

While these changes were passing in Calcutta, Lord William Bentinck was winning fame for himself by the administration of the affairs of Madras. He completely altered the fiscal management of Tanjore, where speculation prevailed among the natives to an extraordinary degree. The conditions of Malabar and Canara, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with Travancore, suppression of insurrectionary movements among the polygars, introduction of new judicial and revenue systems engaged the attention of his lordship, and repeatedly drew from the directors the expression of their approbation.

On the 17th of October, 1804, Sir John Cradock succeeded General Stuart as commander-in-chief of the forces in Madras. General Wellesley retired from Madras when his brother resigned the government of India.

In consequence of the war in Europe, Lord W. Bentinck retained Pondicherry. His attempts to introduce there good revenue and judicial systems, to govern the settlement fairly, were countervailed as much as possible by the French residents, who were nearly all spies of the French government. Among the many events in which Lord W. Bentinck had a deep interest, there was none that so much affected his own interests and reputation as the mutiny at Vellore, which broke out in the month of July, 1806.

Sir John Cradock, when commander-in-chief, found no code of military regulations for the army of Madras; and in March, 1805, he proposed to Lord W. Bentinck the formation of one. His lordship recommended the council to adopt such as had already appeared "in orders;" other regulations approved by the general, he commended to the consideration of council.

The tenth paragraph of the code thus formed ran as follows:—"The sepoys are required to appear on parade with their chins clean shaved, and the hair on the upper lip cut after the same pattern, and never to wear the distinguishing mark of caste, or their earrings when in uniform. A turban of a new pattern is also ordered for the sepoys." This last clause was added in the new regulations. This "tenth paragraph" of the new military code, having been inserted among the old orders, did not come under the consideration of the governor and council. The sepoys did not appear to take any particular notice of

this order. The first symptoms of dissatisfaction arose in the 2nd battalion of the 4th regiment of native infantry, which composed part of the native garrison of Vellore. On the 6th and 7th of May they objected to wear the turban, and did so with an insolent manner, and with indications of a mutinous spirit. They were reduced to order by the stern application of authority. The Madras government was surprised to hear of this; they had not noticed the paragraph until the reports of these demonstrations against the turban had reached them. Inquiry was instituted, and the native officers and men generally professed to have no objection to the turban. The governor issued an order to the troops, declaring that "no intention existed to introduce any charge incompatible with the laws or usages of their religion." The commander-in-chief, a self-willed man, did not think it necessary, and it was not published. Probably if it had been promulgated no good would have resulted, for although the objections of the sepoys were conscientious and sincere, they were formed upon false representations made by political emissaries. This may readily be conceived, as Vellore was the place appointed for the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan; they were allowed a large sum for the maintenance of their dignity, and their retainers were numerous. Every vagabond Mysorean who wished to attract their notice settled in the neighbourhood, and treated them as sovereigns. The Mohammedans of all ranks regarded them as the rightful rulers of Southern India, and therefore as aggrieved by infidels and foreigners. They were held sacred by the devotees, as sons of the great apostle of Mohammedanism in Southern India. These princes encouraged this disaffection, and not only favoured, but expended, it was afterwards alleged, large sums of money to promote disaffection. A conspiracy amongst the Mohammedans of Southern India, to overturn the British government by general insurrection of its own soldiers, had been set on foot. The means of accomplishing this, was by persuading them that their religion was endangered; that the English desired to make them Christians by force. Some pretext in the violation of caste privileges was sought, and, as the English officers were very ignorant of the native languages and prejudices, it was believed an opportunity would soon be afforded. The tenth paragraph of the military code furnished such an occasion. Fakeers went among the troops, with the connivance of the native officers, and persuaded them that the turban violated their caste, that the screw on the front of their uniform was a

cross, and that the order concerning their beards was an infringement of the Koran; that they must strike a great blow for their religion, or submit to be made Christians by force. These reports were spread not only among the troops at Vellore, but all the stations of Southern India, more especially among those which formed the contingent at Hyderabad, in the Deccan.

Information was given to the commander at Vellore, by a soldier named Mustapha Bey, that a conspiracy for revolt and murder existed among the native troops. His statement was absurdly referred to the native officers. They declared the statement false, and accused the witness of continued drunkenness, which at times affected his reason, and that he was then labouring under such hallucination. The want of vigilance, intelligence, and a proper knowledge of their troops by the European officers was such that the statement of the informer was discredited, and the accused were believed, whose interest it was to conceal the fact. The information probably hastened the revolt, and made it premature for the purposes of the general conspiracy.

On the 10th of July, at two o'clock in the morning, when the English soldiers of his majesty's 69th regiment were asleep, the sepoys rose and fell upon them. Colonel Fancourt, thirteen of his officers, ninety-nine non-commissioned officers and privates, were massacred, and fifteen others died of their wounds. Nearly all were injured to some extent. The rage and fury of the fanatics was boundless, and their thirst for blood such as has characterised Mohammedan zealots everywhere, in every age of their history. No quarter was given, no pity was shown. Comrades in arms, who had fought by their sides, and perhaps rescued them from peril, were murdered in their sleep, or cut down or shot as they rushed forth undressed to seek the cause of alarm. There was a searching eagerness for blood on the part of these men such as only Mussulmans can show. The massacre was not confined to the two companies of the 69th regiment; every European that the mutineers could reach they barbarously slew and mutilated. All the Europeans, military and civil, must have perished had not some awoke in time to arm, and made a most gallant and desperate defence. The common soldiers fought with discipline and courage when all their officers were killed or wounded. Even after their ammunition was expended they charged the revolvers in line with the bayonet, and performed prodigies of valour. Mr. Thornton* gives the following

condensed and faithful account of what ensued:—"About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of dragoons and some native cavalry, of the strength of four hundred and fifty men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieutenant-colonel Kennedy. On his arrival, Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns—a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to its legitimate authorities. About three hundred and fifty of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about five hundred were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled."

At Wallajabad, Hyderabad, and various other places, the officers in command were more cautious; and when they heard of the terrible catastrophe at Vellore, they disarmed the Mohammedan sepoys, and their alarm amounted to panic.

Lord W. Bentinck instituted a commission of inquiry. His council and the commander-in-chief of Madras were for vigorous measures of punishment. The government at Calcutta was for a course between extreme severity, and that of extreme leniency insisted upon by Lord W. Bentinck. Finally, a temporary incarceration, and the banishment of some, were the punishments inflicted by Lord W. Bentinck. The Mohammedan soldiery believed that the English dare not punish their brethren, or so dreadful a massacre, inflicted with unrelenting bloodthirstiness, would never have

* *Chapters on the Modern History of British India.*
By Edward Thornton, Esq. London, Allen, 1840.

been treated so lightly. Neither Lord W. Bentinck nor General Cradock was equal to the emergency, and the directors recalled both. The sons of Tippoo and their dependents were removed to the neighbourhood of Calcutta.

Dr. Hayman Wilson, in tracing a parallel between the mutiny of 1857 and that of 1806, attributes both to the same causes—religious fanaticism, and caste prejudices, acted upon by agents of a political conspiracy. This is the true philosophy of both revolts. The learned doctor, however, is of opinion that in each case the British officers displayed most culpable ignorance of the habits of thought and prejudices of the troops they commanded, and that, in consequence of this ignorance, outrages were offered to the religious feelings of the soldiery sufficient to provoke revolt.

In 1806 the provocation was chiefly given to the Mohammedan soldiery; and the family of Tippoo, their abettors, and the chief Mohammedan families of the Deccan made use of the dissatisfaction thus excited to create a military revolution, in the hope of driving the English from India, and once more asserting Mohammedan ascendancy. In 1857, the same state of things as to the feelings of the soldiery and the folly of the English officers, in reference to both Mohammedan and Brahminical devotees, furnished the Mohammedan princes of the north-west with grounds for organizing a conspiracy which would include the Hindoo princes, and originate one more grand struggle for the expulsion of the English.

Mr. Petrie succeeded Lord William Bentinck in the government of Madras. The new governor had immediately to encounter a most extraordinary opposition from Sir Henry Gwillim, one of the puisne judges of Madras, whose language against him and his government from the bench shocked the notions entertained by the English of judicial propriety. The Indian judges had frequently proved themselves neither just nor temperate. The intemperate and political judge was ordered home by the king's government. Sir G. Barlow, having vacated the government of Bengal, was nominated to that of Madras. Mr. Petrie, who had held that post provisionally, resumed his former position as member of council.

Lieutenant-general Hay Macdowal succeeded General Cradock as commander-in-chief of the Madras army. That presidency remained for years, as it nearly always had been, torn to pieces by the disputes of all classes of persons connected with the administration of its affairs.


Lord Minto having arrived at Calcutta at the end of July, 1807, he at once announced a policy opposed to annexation, and

to all interference with the native states. He ostensibly adopted the opinions of Governor Barlow and the Marquis Cornwallis, where these differed from the policy of Marquis Wellesley.

The general feeling of the small native states who had been betrayed by the policy Lord Minto came to India to perpetuate was irrepressible. His lordship perceived this, and was extremely anxious to do what lay in his power to soften it, but the directions from home were peremptory. The board of control and the directors were alike bent upon a timid time-serving policy towards peoples who were acute enough to perceive its weakness, and dishonest enough to take advantage of it, in spite of promises, conventions, treaties, and even their experience of the danger of arousing British power.

During the year 1808, the new governor-general was much occupied in the affairs of the Deccan; the nizam became so bewildered by the intrigues of his ministers, and the chief rajahs of his dominions, and the conflicts of these persons with one another and the English resident, that he abandoned all hope of directing the government, and sunk into supineness.

Various impracticable measures were urged upon Lord Minto by the board of control, which was little influenced by the conclusive reasons urged by Indian statesmen against them. An impression was at this time entertained at home, that a balance of power might be established in India for the security of the several states, and for the interest of the whole; but such a system had never existed in that country: it seemed to be opposed to the character and constitution of those states. Rapine and conquest were their legitimate pursuits, being sanctioned by the principles of the religion professed by the Mohammedan power, which was dead to all semblance of public faith, justice, or humanity. In justice to the directors of the East India Company it must be remarked, that their arguments, remonstrances, and protests with the board of control against a policy so injurious to India were as ceaseless as they were unavailing. Meanwhile, the strange policy of alienating the friends that had been faithful, and of conciliating every robber and assassin who had by the acts of villany common in the East, or by his audacity, made himself powerful, prevailed at Calcutta. Among the chiefs which received favour from the English, was one Ameer Khan, referred to on a former page as Holkar's chief general, to which office he had risen from the condition of a private horseman. This person had, in spite of previous treaties, a considerable portion of Holkar's territory made over to him



THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF MINTO.

by Lord Minto; and a formal treaty sealed the bond of amity between this desperate robber and murderer and the East India Company. Although Lord Minto engaged the alliance of this person, it was not until the government of the Marquis of Hastings that the plunder was perpetrated upon Holkar in his favour, and a treaty formed to secure it to him through no less a personage than Mr. Metcalf. One passage of Ameer Khan's history will illustrate the character of the man, and the morality of English policy in those days; for there was no pressing necessity to force the English into an alliance with him to the disadvantage of other chiefs really worthy their protection and amity. This Ameer Khan had been literally hired to murder one Sevae Sing by a potentate who was the rival of the latter. The Ameer found in this commission an employment to his taste, and thus accomplished it:—"Sevae Sing had been persuaded to promise a visit to Ameer Khan, but when the hour came, the Rajpoot chief, who probably had received some intelligence of the designs against his life, hesitated. Ameer Khan, when he learned his irresolution, mounted, and proceeded with a few followers to the shrine of a Mohammedan saint, close to the walls of Nagore. He was here joined by Sevae Sing, whom he reproached for his fears, and asked him if he thought it possible that a man who cherished evil designs could show such confidence as he had that day done, by placing himself in the power of the person he meant to betray. Sevae Sing confessed his error. Presents, dresses, and even turbans (a pledge of brotherhood) were exchanged, and Ameer Khan swore at the tomb of the saint to be faithful to his new ally, who was persuaded to go next day to his camp, where splendid preparations were made for his reception, and a number of chiefs appointed to meet him. The troops were under arms, some on pretext of doing honour to the visitor, others apparently at exercise. The guns were loaded with grape, and pointed at the quarters prepared for the rajah, who, with his principal adherents, to the number of two hundred, were seated in a large tent, when it was let fall upon them at a concerted signal: and while the officers of Ameer Khan saved themselves, all the Rajpoots were inhumanly massacred by showers of grape and musketry from every direction. Of seven hundred horse that accompanied Sevae Sing, and continued mounted near the tent, only two hundred escaped; the rest were slain, and a number of Ameer Khan's people, among whom was one of his own relations, fell under the promiscuous fire of the cannon. Sevae Sing had been killed by grape, but his head

was cut off, and sent to Maun Sing, who rewarded Ameer Khan with a jaghire and a large sum of money."*

To the close of 1813, the affairs of Baroda, Gujerat, the Guicowar, and the Peishwa, engaged the English in perpetual negotiations and mediations. It was also necessary to have recourse to arms on a small scale, and reduce several forts belonging to the Kattywar rajahs.

The affairs of Oude in 1810-11 gave great concern to the general government. The causes of anxiety were precisely similar to those which had always existed since Oude became a source of strength and weakness to the British. The vizier was anxious to gain from his zemindars high rents, utterly indifferent to the capacity of the land to yield them. The zemindars were turbulent and fraudulent; the poorer cultivators sleek, sly, treacherous, and dishonest. Oude and Ireland exhibited many features of resemblance in the relations of landlord and cultivator.

The external political relations of British continental India demanded the diplomatic skill, and drew largely upon the time and energies, of the governor-general, from his arrival to his departure. The French were, as usual, the bugbear of Calcutta politicians. At the close of 1807, it was rumoured that the French intended to invade North-western India by way of Persia and Afghanistan, and with the aid of these powers and of Turkey. It was feared that all Mohammedan India would rise in revolt at the appearance of an allied French and Mussulman force anywhere. Lord Minto appointed Colonel Malcolm (afterwards Sir John) his agent in Persia, with powers plenipotentiary in Persia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkish Arabia, suspending the authority of the agents at Bagdad, Bussora, and Bushire. From Bushire he transmitted, in 1808, an historical review of the progress of French intrigues in Persia, and of the military proceedings of the Russians on the north-west frontier of that country. Colonel Malcolm was unable to reach the Persian capital, the intrigues of the French having succeeded in gaining a prohibition from the shah. The efforts of Colonel Malcolm were followed by those of Sir Harford Jones from England in 1807-8. He succeeded in making a treaty by which the French ambassador was ordered to leave Persia. In 1808-9, Colonel Malcolm travelled along the Persian and Arabian coasts, gaining intelligence, and watching vigilantly every indication of hostile influences. In 1810, he succeeded in gaining a gracious reception at Teheran, where he remained until Sir Gore

Sir John Malcolm.

Ouseley arrived there from England as ambassador from his majesty.

Soon after his arrival, Lord Minto also dispatched an envoy to the court of Cabul, to counteract French and Russian influence in that quarter. The person selected for this office was the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who conducted himself with such temper, wisdom, and address, in exceedingly difficult and provoking circumstances, that he concluded a treaty in June, 1809, securing the alliance of the court of Cabul against the French contingent, upon any invasion of India. The revolutions in Cabul, and the constant dangers to which it was exposed from Persian invasion, rendered English diplomacy extremely delicate and cautious. All the qualities required in the arduous position were united in the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. Mr. Hankey Smith was dispatched upon a mission to the Ameers of Scinde, to promote the common object; the result was, "an agreement of friendship, which excluded the tribe of the French from settling in Scinde." The object of the Ameers was, however, the conquest of Cutch, and when they found the English indisposed to aid them in an aggressive war, they became very indifferent about the "agreement of friendship," and "the tribe of the French."

A mission to the Sikhs was confided to Mr. Metcalfe. The celebrated Runjeet Sing was then monarch of Lahore. That chief led troops to the north-west confines of the company's Bengal territory. The governor-general wisely supported the efforts of Mr. Metcalfe by troops, under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, taking care not to violate the territory of Runjeet. It was a species of diplomacy which the Sikh rajah very well understood, and he entered at once and heartily into the negotiations. The stipulations of a treaty were signed in 1809, which constrained Runjeet not to retain imposing military forces on the north side of the Sutlej, and the English not to interfere with the interests of that territory. The present of a beautiful carriage and pair of carriage horses wonderfully pleased Runjeet, who punished several inferior chiefs who had inflicted injury upon British officers.

From 1806 to 1814 disputes occurred with the Nepaulese on every supposable subject between two oriental border powers. The English underrated the power of Nepal, and afterwards paid dearly for having done so.

In the Eastern Archipelago, Lord Minto displayed great activity, but an account of events there must be reserved for a separate chapter.

The disputes with the King of Ava, which

had continued for many years, more or less active, in consequence of the immigration of the Mughs to British India, broke out with more than usual violence in 1811. The origin of it was thus briefly stated in a letter from the Bengal government to the court of directors, 23rd January, 1812:—"In the early part of the past year, 1811, a native of Arracan, named Kingberring, whose ancestor, as well as himself, possessed lands to a considerable extent in that province, near the frontier of Chittagong, and who, in consequence of his having incurred the displeasure, and been exposed to the resentment of the King of Ava, took refuge, with a number of his followers, in the district of Chittagong, about fourteen years ago, meditated the design of embodying those followers, as well as other Mughs, who many years since emigrated from Arracan. This project he actually carried into execution in the month of May, 1811, having either by persuasion or intimidation, induced a large body of Mughs to join his standard. Partly owing to the secrecy and caution with which he carried it into effect, and partly to the negligence of the darogas (native magistrates) of the Thannas on the frontier, his proceedings were unknown to the magistrate of Chittagong until he had crossed the Nauf river, which forms the common boundary of the two countries."

This account, although official, is inaccurate. It is painfully difficult to rely upon any documents published by the board of control. They generally consist of extracts, partially culled out of official despatches, and often garbled or curtailed. It would appear from other documents in possession of the Bengal government, that Kingberring's plan of organizing an attack upon Arracan was known to the local magistrate, who declared, in a report made to his government, that, in consequence of being apprised of it, he sought to arrest that person, but could not succeed. The local authorities displayed such culpable negligence, that they appeared to connive at the raids of the Mughs, and gave to the government of Ava much just cause of complaint, and war was imminent. Lord Minto dispatched Captain Canning as envoy to Rangoon, to appease the government of Ava. Captain Canning promised that Kingberring and his associates should find no shelter in the British territory. This promise was violated. Captain White, in his narrative of the disputes with Birmah, goes so far as to allege that the promise was made to deceive; that neither the envoy nor the government of Calcutta were sincere in their stipulations.*

* *A Political History of the Extraordinary Events which led to the Burmese War.* By Captain W. White.

The result of Kingberring's invasion of Arracan was thus announced to the court of directors by the government of Calcutta:—"Your honourable court will observe from the tenor of these last advices, (from the magistrate of Chittagong, dated the 11th and 14th of January,) that, contrary to expectation and appearances, the government of Ava has found the means of collecting a force of sufficient strength to defeat the troops of Kingberring, who, deserted by most of his followers, has become a fugitive. That numbers of his people whom he drew from Chittagong, and the inhabitants of Arracan, have fled for refuge to our territories, and more are expected. That the magistrate, with a view to prevent the probable incursions of the Birmese troops in pursuit of the fugitives, has instructed the commanding officer of the station to proceed with the whole of the disposable force and take post on the frontier, furnishing him with directions for the guidance of his conduct, until our orders should be received regarding the course of proceeding to be observed with respect to the fugitives; for the surrender of whom it may be expected that demands will be made on the part of the government of Ava, even if the forces of the latter should not penetrate into the province of Chittagong, for the purpose of seizing or destroying them."

Early in January, 1812, the troops at Chittagong assembled at Ramoo, the head-quarters of Colonel Morgan. The passes, and other strategical positions, were immediately occupied. The Birmese forces, commanded by the rajah of Arracan, advanced to the boundary of the province upon the river Nauf. His excellency demanded the surrender of the two principal leaders of the invasion. The magistrate referred the matter to his government. An answer not arriving soon enough to please the rajah, he sent another demand, couched in language very imperative, demanding the surrender of all the fugitives, and of Dr. M'Rae, whom he alleged had assisted the invaders. The magistrate replied, that the ringleaders should be secured, and their followers prevented from doing mischief. The disposal of those taken into custody he alleged must be settled at Rangoon between the English viceroy and the Birmese government. The magistrate warned the rajah against violating British territory. More troops advanced to the frontier to support the English magistrate. A ship of war, and a cruiser of twenty guns, to convey the envoy in safety in case of a rupture between the two states.

Early in 1812, the Birmese crossed the frontier, attempted to stockade themselves within the English territory, and sent parties in different directions to arrest the fugitives. The Arracan rajah sent at the same time vakeels to the English camp to negotiate. The British commander demanded as a preliminary to any negotiations the retirement of the Birmese troops within their own confines. The Birmese proved faithless in their negotiations at Ramoo, as the English had done at Rangoon. A viceroy of the King of Ava administered affairs at Rangoon, and the negotiations of Captain Canning were therefore tedious and circuitous, leaving opportunity for difficulties on the frontiers to ripen and increase. At Rangoon the situation of Captain Canning became dangerous; designs to kidnap him and to destroy the British ships were put into execution, and only defeated by the vigilance of the British. Finally, the envoy was withdrawn, the Birmese soldiers re-crossed the Arracan frontier, and the English troops retired to their usual cantonments. The English government published a manifesto, that if the King of Ava had any complaints to make, or redress to demand, he must do so through a vakeel, at Calcutta.

While matters were taking a peaceable turn, Kingberring again collected a force for the invasion of Arracan, and on the 4th of June, 1812, actually invaded the province. He was again defeated, and found shelter in the British territory. The Birmese troops did not pursue across the boundary, but the viceroy at Rangoon treated with scorn the pacific allegations of Captain Canning, whose recall was revoked by the governor-general. The indefatigable Kingberring collected fresh forces in October, and possessed himself of the frontier hills and jungles. This time British troops were ordered to disperse the gatherings of the insurgents within the company's territory, which was not effected without bloodshed. The desperate leader escaped, and at the end of the year, for the third time, invaded Arracan with results similar to those which attended his previous raids. He was a man of dauntless intrepidity, and the most wonderful perseverance. Courage and persistence were also shown by his followers. The troubles on the Arracan border continued during the remaining period of Lord Minto's government, and the relations between it and the government of Ava were most unsatisfactory. Disputes also arose on the frontier of Nepal. On the 4th of October, 1813, the Earl of Minto resigned the government of India to the Earl of Moira.

CHAPTER CIV.

GOVERNMENT OF THE EARL OF MOIRA—BORDER FEUDS ON THE CONFINES OF ARRACAN—WAR WITH NEPAUL—DIFFICULTIES IN OUDE—THE PINDARREE AND SECOND MAHRATTA WAR—HOLKAR, SCENDIAH, AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR SUBJUGATED.

THE first matter which called for the attention of the Earl of Moira, was the desperate efforts of Kingberring to reconquer Arracan for the Mughls. In consequence of his proceedings, Birmese troops entered the British province of Chittagong, and plundered numerous villages, during the month of January, 1814. In February, the English government invited the Birmese commander to enter the territory and clear it of the Mughls, who were preparing an invasion, as the English found it impossible to prevent their gatherings. This the Rajah of Arracan refused to do, believing that so extraordinary a communication would never have been made by the English, if they had not meditated some treachery. The object and policy of the Mughls in this persevering border warfare was thus pointed out in the despatch of the Bengal government on the 5th of February, 1814:—"Mr. Pechell (the magistrate) observed that it had been suggested to him at different times, and from a consideration of all the events of the last two years, he was himself strongly inclined to believe it, that the Mughls despaired of regaining Arracan by their own means, but that their object was, by working upon the unreasonable jealousies and arrogance of the Ava government, by a continuance of their periodical incursions into Arracan, ultimately to embroil the British government in a war with the state of Ava, the consequence of which might possibly be the expulsion of the Birmese by the British power, and the re-establishment of themselves in Arracan under a government of their own."

Early in April, 1814, Kingberring made his fourth descent on Arracan. He was as usual beaten, and was pursued into Chittagong, where the pursuers committed some murders, but retired on the approach of British troops. After this failure Kingberring and his more active followers remained fugitives in the province of Chittagong until April, 1815, when he died. This circumstance ensured peace only for a few months, for in the following October, Rynjungzing, an enterprising friend of the deceased chief, gathered the Mughls into a fresh aggressive confederacy, which plundered the frontier villages of Arracan, and bore their booty in safety to the hills. This course he continued to follow until May, 1816, when, fearing arrest and capital punishment at the hands of

the English authorities, he delivered himself up. In 1817, another daring leader, one Cheripo, having committed frontier ravages, he was seized by the English magistrate, but set at large on promise of keeping the peace. Matters continued for years along the line of the Chittagong and Arracan frontiers in nearly the same state. In 1819 a quarrel arose between the Birmese and other native states at a great distance from Arracan, but which occasioned renewed disturbances in that quarter, and complicated the English relations with Birmah.

The province of Assam had been in a state of anarchy during the whole period of the government of Lord Moira (Hastings) up to 1819. This endangered the peace and prosperity of the British district of Rungpore, and was regarded with uneasiness by the government of Calcutta. The Birmese placed one Chunder Kaunt upon the musnid of Assam, in opposition to the reigning Rajah Poorundur Singh. The rajah fled for refuge to Rungpore. He at once appealed to the British government for assistance to regain his throne, offering to pay the expenses of the troops employed in his restoration, and to become tributary to the English. The government of Calcutta declined interfering with the affairs of foreign states, but assured the rajah that he and his followers should be protected so long as they resided peacefully at Rungpore. The rajah did remain peacefully so far as English interests were concerned, but he formed various plans for raising a sufficient force of his own countrymen to reconquer his throne. The Birmese resented this, and the sanctuary of British soil was violated. The mode in which the Birmese proceeded in the affairs of Assam, led the governor-general to believe that that power was forming a conspiracy and acting on a plan to drive the English from Eastern India. This idea received colour from the fact that the Birmese interference in Assam began soon after a formal demand had been made upon the governor-general for cession to his Birmese majesty of Ramoo, Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, on the ground that they had been dependencies of the Birmese government. The despatch of the governor-general, in 1818, when this demand was made, conveyed his views to the court of directors in these terms:—"There is no way of accounting for this extravagant

step on the part of the court of Ava, but by supposing it to have originated in a secret agreement with the Mahrattas. The governor of Merhege, a Birman chief of great eminence, had been permitted to visit the upper provinces for professed purposes connected with religion. There is reason to surmise that his real object was to ascertain the real strength and determination of the Mahrattas, in consequence of previous overtures from them; and it is probable that he had adopted delusive notions of both. The King of Ava immediately after the transmission of the message, which was really a declaration of war, would learn that the views of his expected allies had been anticipated, and that the Mahrattas were crushed. Thence his hostile intentions subsided without further explanation." Sir John Malcolm instituted an inquiry into this transaction, and reported to the government that the court of Ava was engaged in hostile intrigues with the rajahs of central India, and the devotees of Benares.

In 1820, the usurper of Assam and his patron, the Avanesse monarch, demanded that the English should give up the fugitive rajah, which they indignantly refused to do. The Assam usurper quarrelled with his patron, and cut off the head of a Birman, who held the high post of prime-minister. On account of these transactions the Birmanese invaded Assam again, and their former *protégé* was driven from the musnid, and, like his predecessor, fled to the company's territories for shelter. The Birmanese, with their usual insolence and arrogance, pursued him across the frontier, bringing fire and sword upon many peaceful villages inhabited by British subjects. Satisfaction was, however, offered for this injury before the English government had time to demand it.

The English had now two ex-rajahs of Assam in their hands at Rungpore. The second fugitive had, while rajah, captured the commander-in-chief employed by the first, a half-caste native gentleman named Bruce. Through his former captive he applied to the British government for arms and ammunition to regain the throne which he had usurped, and from which those who placed him there had for his treachery expelled him. Lord Hastings—not following the principle of non-interference pursued by Lords Minto and Cornwallis, and which in common with them he avowed—allowed arms to this adventurer from the public arsenals, affording the Birmanese a *casus belli*. The application on behalf of the exiled *quasi* rajah was made by the British resident, Mr. Scott. Lord Hastings, in his homeward despatch, thus alludes to

the transaction:—"We informed Mr. Scott, in reply, that we had directed the sanction of government to be conveyed to Mr. Bruce, for the transport of three hundred muskets, and ninety mannds of gunpowder, intended as a supply to Rajah Chunder Kaunt. The necessary orders, we informed Mr. Scott, would be issued through the territorial department, to give effect to any pass he might himself hereafter grant; and in case of application being made at the Presidency, the sanction of government would be given, as in the present instance."

Sir John Malcolm admits that the Birmanese received great provocations, but denies that the government of Lord Hastings had done anything to incense them, whereas it was his administration which was responsible for the chief exasperations which sprang up. Captain White, who served long upon the Birmanese frontier at Chittagong, thus notices the mode in which Sir John disposes of the merits and demerits of our relations with Birman up to the end of 1821:—"The whole of these events have not only been omitted to be noticed by Sir John Malcolm, in his *Political History of India*, but he goes further, and pronounces, 'those reasonable grounds which the Birmanese had for discontent had certainly not increased during the administration of Lord Hastings.' How far Lord Hastings may feel obliged to Sir John, for not only passing over the facts recorded, but for such an unqualified assurance, it is difficult to say; but one thing is certain, the statement appears totally at variance with candour and truth." Towards the close of the year 1821, a most arrogant demand was made by the King of Ava,* for the surrender of the ex-rajahs and all their adherents. In reply to this request the Birmanese chief was informed, 'that it was not the custom of the British government to deliver up persons who might take refuge in its territories on account of political disturbances.'

The ex-rajahs of Assam continued each on his separate account to make war on the Assam frontiers, but were defeated, and in July, 1822, the commander-in-chief of the Birmanese army in Assam announced to the English authorities in Rungpore, that if the fugitives again found hospitality there, he would cross the frontier at the head of 18,000 men. The government of Calcutta ordered that all fugitives should be disarmed and sent to a distance from the frontier. Notwithstanding the order, they collected troops and prepared for fresh inroads. Lord Hastings, among the last acts of his government, dis-

* His majesty was called by this title and by that of Emperor of Birman indiscriminately.

armed them, and many were sent into the interior. The whole of his lordship's policy towards the Birmese empire was inconsistent and capricious, and laid the foundation for the great Birmese war, which so soon followed. Lord Hastings' chief officers, military and official, had declared that it must soon come; but no preparation was made by him or them for the emergency.

Birmah was not the only neighbouring country with which the government of Lord Hastings quarrelled. In his summary of his administration he says, "There were made over to me, when the reins were placed in my hands, no less than six hostile discussions with native powers, each capable of resorting to arms." The sixth named in his list was the first which encountered his arms; this was the Goorkha state of Nepal.

THE NEPAULESE WAR.

Very early in the administration of Earl Hastings he was called upon to declare war with Nepal. For a series of years that state had made border aggressions, and as these were perpetually protested against by the English, and menaces held out in case of their repetition, and yet no armed resentment shown, the Nepaulese calculated upon impunity, after the manner of orientals generally. When the British at last appeared to be in earnest, the Nepal monarch supposed them so occupied in Hindostan, and Eastern and Western India, as to be unable to molest him. He opened communications with the Pindarree chiefs and their Mahratta sovereigns, with the Sikhs, and with the Birmese. The King of Ava, either relying on his own unaided power, or suspicious of Nepal, refused any complicity with the projects of the latter power, although the border feuds on the confines of Arracan and Chittagong were then raging.

Lord Hastings regarded with great anxiety the symptoms of an approaching war with Nepal. In his summary of his administration, published long afterwards, having enumerated other warlike discussions which he found when he assumed the government, as occupying the supreme council, he refers to this one in the following terms:—"The sixth contention, with Nepal, remained for decision by arms. A struggle with the latter was unpromising. We were strangely ignorant of the country or its resources; so that overlooking the augmented abilities latterly furnished by science to a regular army for surmounting local obstacles, it was a received persuasion, that the nature of the mountains, which we should have to penetrate, would be as baffling to any exertions of ours, as it had

been to all the efforts of many successive Mohammedan sovereigns: no option, however, remained with us." On the 29th of May, 1814, the Nepaulese attacked the company's frontier police. War was declared, and an army ordered to the field.

The relative situation of the Nepal or Goorkha country to that of the company has been sufficiently explained in the geographical portion of this work, to which the reader is also referred for its geographical and topographical peculiarities. A perusal of the descriptions there given will enable the reader to apprehend the plan of hostilities adopted by Lord Hastings. He ordered a division to the western extremity of the line of frontier, numbering 6,000 men, under Major-general Ochterlony. The Dehra Doon was to be occupied by Major-general Gillespie, who was to besiege Jeytak. The force under his command was a strong brigade of 3,500 men. Major-general Wood was directed to march from the Gurruckpore frontier with a small division of 4,500 men. He was to take his course through Bhotwul and Shooraj to Pulpa. A small *corps d'armée*, under Major-general Marley, numbering 8,000, was to force its way through the valley of Muckwanpore to Katmander.

On the south-east frontier Captain Latter was placed with the local battalion of Rungpore and a regular battalion of native infantry. He was to guard that line of territory, but to act defensively or aggressively as circumstances allowed or demanded. The entire force ordered against Nepal was about 30,000 men and sixty guns.

The force of the enemy was not estimated at more than 12,000, but their artillery appointments were believed to be good, and their country was more easily defended than any on the Indian frontiers. Major-general Gillespie's column was the first to come into action. In the third week of October his troops were before Kalunga, upon which the Goorkhas fell back. On the 31st the fort was stormed, although no proper breach had been made. There were four columns of attack, who were to give the assault simultaneously, on the firing of a signal gun. Three of the columns had to make a considerable detour, and never heard the signal. The enemy made a sortie which was repelled, and the general, thinking that the troops might, by pursuing them hotly, enter with them into the fort, ordered those at his disposal to make the attempt. The men did not succeed in entering with the retiring Goorkhas, and could not force the gate. The scaling ladders, as mostly the case in English assaults, were too few and too short. The general madly urged on his

men to accomplish impossibilities. In his wild attempts to force the soldiers against stone walls, which they could not conquer by escalade, he was shot through the heart. The arrival of one of the stray columns covered the retreat of the unfortunate and ill-directed assailants.

On the 25th of November the British again appeared before the place; breaching batteries were erected. On the 27th at noon a breach was considered practicable. The troops appointed for the assault advanced with unloaded muskets. The breach was found to be impracticable, and was defended by spearmen and matchlock men—a species of arms well adapted for such a defence. The English, unable to return the enemy's fire, could not keep the position which they had gained in and near the breach long enough for fresh troops to arrive. The result was defeat, with a loss of 680 men. The total incapacity of those in command was so obvious to the soldiery, that they were unwilling to advance under such leaders.

It was found that the garrison obtained its supply of water from beyond the fort; it did not occur to the British commanders to cut off the supply. A bombardment was resorted to. The fortress was only defended by 600 men, and the outer walls were its only defence. The place soon became untenable. The garrison stole away in the night with perfect impunity, the English commanders not having sufficient vigilance and skill to suppose the like practicable, or take measures to prevent it. The Goorkha commandant joined a fresh body of troops, and defied pursuit. A gallant and enterprising English officer of inferior rank, went after them with a small detachment, suddenly fell upon them, cutting up many, and totally dispersing the remainder. Kalunga was destroyed. The Goorkhas were much encouraged by the slaughter of the English around its walls, and despised their antagonists. Lord Hastings, annoyed and disappointed, felt it necessary to augment the army of operation, as well as recruit extensively the whole army of Bengal. Colonel Mawby, who commanded this division after the death of General Gillespie, was ordered to form a junction with General Ochterlony. Before forming the junction Major-general Martindale reached the division, and it was resolved to attack the fort of Jytate, situated on the summit of a mountain 5,000 feet above the level of the sea. The British advanced against it in two columns. The Goorkhas had stockaded several positions commanding the approaches. The English violated every rule of warfare; the Bengal sepoy fought with reluctance and without

spirit. The British were beaten at every point; nearly 500 men and officers were put *hors de combat*. The whole conduct of this division of the army had been disgraceful. The contempt which the Goorkhas entertained for the British after the affair at Kalunga much increased.

To the west the operations of Ochterlony were guided by a skilful mind. He was confronted by the best general of the Goorkhas. The country was difficult, but that circumstance only tested the ability of the English general. His opponent's points of support were strong forts on mountains thousands of feet above the level of the sea; every important point in the approaches was stockaded. Ochterlony "turned" some of these, shelled others, and by strategy conquered them all without sacrificing his men. The strong places fell before him, and he was only checked in his career by tidings that the co-operating column had failed in the task allotted to it, with terrible loss of men and prestige. Ochterlony resolved to wait for reinforcements. As these came up in detachments his patience and temper were tried by the want of firmness and courage on the part of the Bengal sepoy, and the deficient management of the officers. He made roads, organized irregular levies, brought up wild and hardy Sikhs, turned them all into soldiers by his example and activity, and again resumed the offensive.

On the 27th of December Colonel Thompson was dispatched to prosecute directions given to him for intercepting convoys of the enemy, cutting off their lines of communication, and spreading along their rear, conducting a desultory warfare. By the amazing skill of his dispositions, celerity of his marches, number of his detachments, all operating at once, and yielding one another effective support, he dislodged the enemy from many of his strong places without striking a blow or losing a man. The foe bewildered, as detachments of British confronted them in every direction where they supposed it was impossible the English could penetrate, gave up one fort after another, not knowing where to make a stand, or from what direction danger was to be apprehended.

The snows fell heavily among the mountains of Nepal during the winter of 1814-15. The elements alone protected the enemy from being circumvented and deprived of all their defences in the direction in which General Ochterlony acted. Nevertheless, by the 1st of April, 1815, he was before the great fortress of Maloun, which he invested. The armies acting on the opposite extremity of the line were unsuccessful. The third division, under General Wood, was at Gorakpore at the be-

ginning of November, but the army was in no respect fit for action, and continued unable to move at all until the middle of December. The march from Bhotwul to Pulpa lay through a difficult mountain pass. The first obstacle encountered by General Wood was a strong stockade. He and his staff came upon it unexpectedly, and many of his escort fell by the fire directed from it. When his troops came up they were attacked by a sortie from the stockade, and thrown into disorder. Wherever the general was there was confusion. Captain Croker, who led an attack on the flank of the stockade, achieved great success, but was left unsupported. The general did not know what to do. Loss of life, defeat, and shame resulted. He made no attempt to redeem his country's honour or his own. He lingered about with the army until malaria swept numbers of his men to an untimely death.

Wilson affirms that Earl Moira's chief reliance for the success of the operations was upon the division which was directed to march against the capital. It assembled at Dinapore, on the right bank of the Ganges, and on the 23rd of May began its march. Major Roughsedge, with a local battalion, operated to clear the country of Goorkha outposts, for the advance of the division. The major acted like a true British soldier. He swept the patrols and detachments of the enemy back in every direction, penetrated the jungle, surprised Purseram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was encamped with four hundred men. They were so suddenly attacked they could make no resistance, fifty were slain, many drowned in the Bhagmati. Captain Hay and Lieutenant Smith carried out the major's orders in this good work so well, that the whole district known as the Tirai was occupied, and proclaimed annexed to the company's territory. The division advanced, and had a marvellous list of apparently good reasons for not being able to do anything. They had to wait for so many things, that the Goorkhas regained heart, finding that the major who had cleared the way for the division was much more formidable than the division itself. The English officers in command of detachments in the country, which Major Roughsedge had so speedily cleared for them, took no precautions, were left in isolated positions, no plan of mutual support laid down for them, they were attacked and beaten in every direction. The officers, and in some cases, most of the men with them, perished. The principles of war did not appear to be understood by these men, nor even the commonest attainments of their profession, beyond mere drill and the personal use of arms.

General Marley gave up the Tirai without a single operation worthy of a general. Reinforcements swelled his corps to thirteen thousand men, having a large proportion of Europeans. He was afraid to move. Having wasted all January, 1815, he suddenly abandoned his army. Colonel Dick assumed the command, and awaited the arrival of Major-general Wood, to whose command the corps was originally entrusted. While awaiting the arrival of the general, Colonel Dick and his officers cleared the Tirai of the enemy with hardly the loss of a man. General Wood was indisposed for active warfare; he thought the season too advanced, and another month was thus wasted. He broke up his army and cantoned it from the Gunduck to the Kusi.

The various corps advanced in 1816, encountering the enemy in stockades and forts. There was great sameness in these campaigns, the operations being similar in every direction. The chief interest, however, was connected with the army of Ochterlony, who after the news of surrender of Malouin reached England, was created a baronet. It would be endless to describe the errors, mistakes, and dauntless acts of bravery of British officers in detached posts. This mountain warfare was so new to them, that they only began to adapt themselves to it when the war was coming to a close. On the 12th of February, Ochterlony marched through "the great forest," an extent of nine miles. By the efforts of his engineers he discovered a pass which the enemy had not stockaded nor defended. Leaving his camp standing, he penetrated it with a brigade, and "turned" the pass, which the enemy had prepared to defend. Seeing his tents, and the sentries performing their usual duties, the Nepanese supposed that the whole force remained in the encampment. A single action, and that not a general battle, decided the campaign. On the 6th of March, a ratified treaty was brought to camp. Among its stipulations was one to the effect "that the cession of territory exacted from Nepal should comprehend the country conquered in the actual campaign and the valley of the Rapti." It appeared, during the negotiations for the treaty, that the Nepal Rajah had sent an embassy to China for help, alleging that the English made war upon them for not offering a free passage to their troops for the invasion of China. The Chinese ministers laughed at them, telling them that "if the English meant to invade China, they would take a shorter way than through the mountains of Nepal." The war with Nepal being thus terminated, the Nepanese Rajah professed to be an ally of the company, and on some occasions subsequently gave proof of alliance.

It is almost unnecessary to say that Oude was among the number of his lordship's difficulties, and that its financial management and general government caused continual uneasiness at Calcutta. No state possessing its power, wealth, area, and a population so gigantic, ever displayed so much poltroonery. Boastful, arrogant, tumultuous, and seditious, the soldiery and people were ever ready to revolt, and commit the most cruel murders, and as ready to fly before the face of a military force. The vizier, voluptuous and greedy, like his predecessors, robbed his people, and squandered his revenue, so that he was unable to meet the exigencies of his government, and pay the stipulated tribute, on condition of which he held his throne. Lord Moira, after much trouble and difficulty, brought some arrangement into the distracted affairs of his court and his dominions.

A war having broken out with Nepal, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Nagpore, considered it a good opportunity to resume their old ways, and make a little war for themselves. They meditated the reduction of the small state of Bhopal. Lord Moira, apprised of their designs, frustrated them by opportune measures, and at the close of the year 1816, those old Mahratta chiefs were again subdued.

During the year 1816, a British force was engaged in the territory of Cutch, reducing forts, deposing petty rajahs, reconciling conflicting allies, and reducing rebellious subordinates of the Guicowar and the Peishwa. Fierce disputes arose between these two branches of the great Mahratta family of chiefs, which involved the governments of Madras and Bombay in anxiety.

THE SECOND MAHRATTA, OR PINDARREE WAR.

This war, which received both these designations, properly, began in hostilities with the Pindarrees alone, but ended in a war with the great confederated chiefs of the Mahrattas.

The Pindarrees, or "free companies," were literally bands of military freebooters, who followed chiefs, Hindoo or Mohammedan, which were bold enough or rich enough to organize a free corps. These Pindarrees were dispersed throughout the Mahratta states, but the places from which they mainly sallied forth on their expeditions of murder and plunder were Malwa and Central India. They were mostly subjects of Holkar and Scindiah. These chiefs pretended a great horror of the dishonest doings of those fierce robbers, but in reality profited by them. The English agents, officers, and commercial people suffered much from them. They constantly plundered the territories of allies whom the English were bound to de-

fend, and the superior Mahratta chiefs sometimes joined in those expeditions. The attack upon the Rajah of Bhopal, a faithful friend of the English, by Scindiah and the Nagpore Rajah was simply a Pindarree incursion in the first instance, incited by those chiefs, and then turned to account for their own aggressive ends. The troops of both Holkar and Scindiah became in fact Pindarrees, supporting themselves by pillage, and only recognising the standard of their sovereigns when a grand national war took place. Ameer Khan, whom the English petted so much, was simply a Pindarree leader—a recognised military robber.

The princes of Rajpootana were held in subjection by their own nominal troops, who were nearly all Pindarrees. Professor Wilson thus describes the condition of some of them:—"The Rajah of Odeypore, indolent and improvident, was bearded in his capital by military adventurers,* and robbed of his domains by his own feudatory chiefs and clansmen. The Rajah of Joudpur, affecting idiocy, abandoned the reins of government to the hands of a dissolute prince, whose career was soon after cut short by the hand of an assassin. The Rajah of Jeypore, a slave to an infatuated attachment to a Mohammedan dancing girl, preserved only a portion of his hereditary possessions, by the sufferance of Meer Khan. Every vestige of regular and orderly government had disappeared, and complete dissolution of the bonds of society must have ensued, had not the government of British India obtained, by persevering representation and remonstrance from the authorities in England, a reluctant and qualified permission to effect the extirpation of that part of the predatory system which consisted in the peculiar organization of the plunderers, termed Pindarrees, as preliminary to the overthrow of the whole scheme of military depredations."

As early as 1812, the Pindarrees had made attempts upon the British provinces. When first known to the British authorities,† the Scindiah Shahi Pindarrees, who were by far the most numerous of the two, were under the leading of a number of sirdars, of whom Cheetoo, Karim Khan, and Dost Mohammed, were the principal. None of the Holkar Shahi chiefs were leaders of much note. Blacker‡ gives the following estimate of their numbers:—"The Scindiah Shahi, 18,000

* His palace on the bank of the lake was besieged, and as Colonel Tod said, the servants bringing up water were plundered. Our government allowed him in 1818, the sum of 4000 rupees (£400) a month, till his country yielded some revenue.

† Wilson, p. 105. See *Papers Pindari War*, pp. 24, 25.

‡ *Memoir of the War* (1821), p. 18.

horse, 13,000 foot, and fifteen guns; the Holkar Shahi, 3,000 horse, 200 foot, and three guns. To add to these sources of disorder, the mountaineers on the south and west of Malwa, and the Bhils and Mhers, and the petty Hindoo chiefs on the south and east of the same country, were committing unchecked ravages in retaliation for invaded rights* or disregarded claims.† “The Pindarrees threatened Mirzapore, plundered Ganjam, Masulipatam, Guntore, and the Northern Circars. It was expected that any attack on these hordes, as being under the protection of Scindiah and Holkar, might cause a war with those chiefs. It was, moreover, known that these chiefs and the Berar rajah advocated the supremacy of the Peishwa, who again, in 1816, was collecting armed followers at no great distance from Poonah.‡ The governor-general, therefore, resolved to be prepared for all events.”§

The great difficulty of suppressing the Pindarrees was the countenance given to them by the Mahratta sovereigns. They in fact were themselves Mahrattas, and subjects of those princes, and to a great extent controlled their nominal rulers. Besides, the whole of the Mahratta chiefs were bitterly hostile to the English, and the abrogation, or modifications amounting to abrogation, of the treaties with Lord Wellesley by Lord Cornwallis, followed up by a policy in the same direction by Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto, so elated them that they calculated upon the instability of English treaties, whether for or against them, and presumed upon ultimate impunity.

The treaty of Bassein had been repeatedly broken by the Peishwa's ministers, and it required the firmness, temper, and intelligence possessed by the English resident at the court of Poonah, Mr. Elphinstone, to avert recourse to arms for the redress of British wrongs. Murder, assassination, and treachery in every form were the instruments with which the ministers of the Peishwa worked, and it was necessary for the English to interpose resolutely in order to prevent the confines of their territory from becoming scenes of anarchy. This success lasted only a few years. The Peishwa and his ministers, as well as all the Mahratta chiefs, were encouraged to resume their intrigues against the English by the latter being occupied with two wars which were supposed sufficient to strain their resources, the Pindarree and the Nepaulese; by the disturbed state of Oude, and by the perpetual contentions with Ava, which, it

was rumoured all over India, would lead to a war most perilous to English power. Accordingly, early in the year 1817, Trim-buckjee Daughiah, an assassin and murderer, who possessed the Peishwa's confidence, and had held the chief authority in his dominions, collected forces, with the connivance of the Peishwa, for the purpose of surprising and murdering the English contingent at Poonah, after the manner in which the mutinous sepoy's at Vellore massacred their comrades. Means were at the same time taken to seduce the British native soldiers from their allegiance.

The English assembled troops in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and denounced the contemplated movement of the Peishwa. Mr. Elphinstone demanded a new treaty instead of the violated treaty of Bassein as the alternative of a declaration of war. At the same time, Mr. Elphinstone demanded the surrender of the leader and originator of the plot.

The following sets forth, in as brief a form as it is possible to give it, the revolution in the Mahratta empire, which the Elphinstone treaty created, for the Peishwa, terrified by the military preparation of the English, signed it. The preliminary convention provided that the Peishwa should surrender several of his strongest forts, as a guarantee that the treaty would be fulfilled. The treaty was concluded on the 13th of June, and ratified on the 25th of July, 1817:—“The most important feature in this treaty, was the disavowal of the Peishwa's paramount right, as the head of the Mahratta confederacy, and the cessation of the mutual reception of vakeels by the Peishwa and all other states; and the restriction imposed upon the communications of his highness with the foreign powers, except through the medium of agents of the British government, as such vakeels had been known to carry on clandestine intercourse. The Peishwa renounced all future claims on the Guicowar, which claims had, in fact, arisen from his position as head of the Mahratta confederacy. He was also to be excluded from all concern in the affairs of Gujerat, and he agreed to restore to the Guicowar, in perpetuity, the Ahmedabad farm, at the former rent of four and a-half laes. The tribute from Kattywar was transferred to the company. Provision was made to enable the Guicowar to reduce the claims of the Peishwa, by the payment of four laes per annum, or standing on arbitration. In lieu of the contingent force to be supplied in virtue of the treaty of Bassein, the Peishwa was to place at the disposal of the British government funds for 5000 cavalry and 3000 infantry. The company acquired the Northern

* By the Pindarrees.

† Wilson's Notes.

‡ Wilson, p. 215.

§ Major William Hough.

Circars, with the Peishwa's possessions in Gujerat, and the Kattywar tribute, with an extent of country in the Carnatic, including the strong forts of Darwar and Koosegul. The fort of Ahmednuggur, held by the company through sufferance, was transferred to them in perpetual sovereignty; likewise all the Peishwa's rights in Bundelcund and Hindostan. He was thus excluded from all connection or concern with the countries north of the Nerbuddah. Provisions were also made relative to the services of the southern jaghiredars.*

It is difficult to suppose that any one acquainted with the Mahrattas could believe that the Peishwa would observe a treaty subversive of all his honour and power, and so utterly humiliating. He did not observe it. He had scarcely signed it when he began secret military preparations, and efforts to seduce the Hindoo portion of the British troops. He gradually assembled a large army near the British camp. English officers were waylaid and murdered in every district of his previous dominions, more especially in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and it became at last absolutely necessary to enforce the treaty at the point of the sword. Mr. Elphinstone had but a small brigade of English near the capital, which was speedily reinforced by several sepoy detachments and a European regiment. The Peishwa commenced operations by burning and plundering the British residence at Poonah. But for the sound judgment, presence of mind, and calm intelligence of Mr. Elphinstone, the ruin of the British detachment must have been effected. His measures secured it from surprise, averted the seduction of the sepoy battalions, and placed the brigade in a position to act with promptitude and effect. He ordered Lieutenant-colonel Burr to advance and attack the forces of the Peishwa, which were mad with triumph from the destruction of the presidency.

On the 5th of November 1817, a battle was fought between these forces. The golden pennon (zurree pulkah), the grand standard of the Mahrattas, held in veneration by all the tribes, was borne by Mozo Dickshut a trusted chief of tried valour, but he fell defending it, and this circumstance being deemed ominous by the superstitious soldiery, deprived them of confidence, and they did not any longer maintain the contest with spirit. Colonel Burr gained a victory, but only by desperate fighting, nearly all the survivors of his force being severely wounded. His gallant little army numbered 2500 men, the host of the Peishwa was 25,000. On the 17th of No-

vember, General Smith advanced at the head of a formidable force, swept all before him, entered Poonah, and planted the standard of England on the palace of the Peishwa, who fled at his approach.

While these events were transpiring in Western India, the Marquis of Hastings was carrying out his project for the destruction of the Pindarrees, a work which required various especial alliances, military conventions, and temporary engagements of different descriptions with other chiefs of the Mahrattas, the Patans, and numerous tribes in Central India, and bordering on the Bengal frontiers. The Patan chief, Meer Khan, referred to in the account given in a previous chapter of the operations against Holkar, under Lord Lake, was presumed to be a suitable instrument of the designs of the government, and he was accordingly made the object of these favours, an account of which was anticipated in the chapter relating the war against Holkar.

The intrigues between the English and Meer Khan against the integrity of Holkar's dominion were not honourable to our nation. In connection with them, all persons about the court, all parties in that state, intrigued for and against the English, and for and against one another. Perjury, perfidy, abduction, assassination, murder, plunder, revolt, and civil war, rent and stained the realms which had owned the sovereignty of the once far renowned Holkar. That chief died in 1811, and his successor was a child, the regent, his mistress, mother of the child, who was young, beautiful, talented, despotic, and profligate, and who was betrayed and murdered. As the only release from anarchy, the government of young Holkar appealed to the English for protection, and Mr. Metcalfe was nominated to conclude negotiations. Before he could accomplish anything, Scindiah, who had been plotting against the English and watching for an opportunity to attack them ever since the defeat of his forces by Wellesley and Lake, succeeded in inducing a change among the ministers of the young chief, and confederated with them for purposes hostile to the company.

In November a British force, under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, crossed the Nerbuddah. The advanced divisions, under General Malcolm and Colonel Adams, were to act against the Pindarrees; Sir Thomas was ordered by the governor-general to advance into Malwa, although the resident warned his excellency that the rajah would in consequence declare war.

Early in December, the whole of Holkar's army assembled within twenty miles of Mahidpore, and, after a council of war, marched

* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii. p. 524-5.

against that place. On the morning of the 20th of December, young Holkar was playing in his tent, when he was enticed away, and at the same instant a guard was placed over Toolsah Bacc, the mistress of the deceased sovereign: at night she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the Seepra. The Patan chiefs loudly demanded to be led against the enemy, and began to plunder the baggage of the English. General Hislop ordered an instantaneous attack upon Holkar's army, which was well posted on the banks of the Seepra, nearly opposite to Mahidpore, their left flank protected by the river, their right by a deep ravine, while their line, which could only be approached by one ford, was protected by ruined villages. The bed of the river afforded some cover for the British troops in forming, and as their flanks were all but impregnable, it was determined to attack in front. The plan of battle was simple, and the execution of it prompt, orderly, and gallant. In crossing the river many men were lost, but the foot artillery, well arranged on the right bank, covered the passage. The horse artillery crossed to the enemy's side, and silenced many of their guns. The whole army effected the passage, and stormed the defences of the enemy, carrying them all with sword and bayonet. When the Mahrattas began to retire, a charge of cavalry turned their retreat into a rout. Sir John Malcolm commanded the right wing; Major J. L. Lushington, afterwards General Sir James Law Lushington, and Lieutenant-colonel Russell, commanded the two lines of cavalry in the final charge.

Signal as this defeat was, it did not secure peace. Various zemindars and rajahs in the Doab held fortified places, which were stormed. The Patan population in Rohilcund rose in arms, and various troublesome dispositions of troops and weary marches were necessary before the insurrection was suppressed. Scindiah, who had led the government of Holkar into the disasters thus experienced, did not strike a blow, but hastened to make such accommodations as would screen himself from penal consequences. He made a new treaty on the 5th and 6th of November, 1817, by which he bound himself to an alliance offensive and defensive, and to furnish a large cavalry contingent for the Pindarree war.

Incredible as it may seem, none of these events, disastrous as they were to the Mahrattas, and triumphant to the British, had any effect in deterring the Rajah of Nagpore from correspondence with Bajee Rao, the fugitive Peishwa, and organizing an army to attack the English. It was plainly intimated to him that his treason was discovered, and he was

warned that military operations would be directed against him if he took a single hostile step. He attacked the residency, which Mr. Jenkins, the resident, afterwards M.P., and a director of the East India Company, defended with great spirit and success. Happily there was a small body of troops at hand, but the best and bravest of them were surpassed by the devoted courage and activity of the civilians, some of whom fell. Reinforcements arriving, the rajah's capital was attacked in force. He sought terms; they were granted. He endeavoured to turn them to account by an act of treachery for the destruction of the British. He was suspected, his scheme defeated, and his capital stormed. He was made prisoner. Mr. Jenkins, for political reasons, reinstated him, on condition of the surrender of his chief forts and much of his territory. His officers refused to surrender the forts, and his servants retained possession of the territory, and he connived at their defection. The territory was conquered, the forts stormed, and the rajah himself being detected in a correspondence with the ex-Peishwa, for a united attack upon the English, Mr. Jenkins seized his person, and declared the musnid vacant. The rajah and two of his chief ministers were sent in custody to Allahabad. On the way he escaped.

In 1818 pursuit of the Peishwa occupied the attention of the governor-general and the military chiefs. When his highness fled from Poonah, he found many abettors and followers. All the petty rajahs of his dominions were ready to take up arms on his behalf against Europeans. He collected an army stronger than that which had been beaten at Poonah. They took quarters at Corygaum. A British officer named Staunton was on his way to Poonah, with a weak battalion of infantry, a few squadrons of horse, and a considerable detachment of artillery; arriving at the heights of Corygaum, he beheld the Peishwa's army in the plain beneath. Staunton immediately made for the village with the design of occupying it. He had only just succeeded in doing so when he was attacked by the whole army of the enemy, probably numbering 40,000 men. The attack continued all day until 9 p.m. The mosques and pagodas were again and again taken by each party. All the British officers were put *hors de combat*, except Captain Staunton and two others. All the artillery men were killed or wounded. The cavalry were cut up or exhausted. There was no water. Some wells were discovered in the night, and the fainting soldiers were relieved from the pangs of thirst. In the morning the Peishwa did not renew the attack, but withdrew his army. The captain brought

off his guns and colours, his sick and wounded, to Seroor, which place they entered on the third day, during which they had no refreshment but water. The gallant conduct of Captain Staunton and his troops was much applauded in India and in England. The East India Company voted him a purse of 500 guineas, and a splendid sword of honour, with an inscription panegyricizing his courage, skill, and fidelity to duty. The rewards bestowed upon his chivalrous soldiers bore no proportion to their deserts.

Soon after this event Generals Smith and Britzler marched against the formidable fortress of Sattara, which was soon reduced. Mr. Elphinstone raised the standard of the Rajah of Sattara, announced the protection of the company, a just system of revenue, and the establishment of religious liberty. In the whole of this transaction Mr. Elphinstone acted with sagacity and justice. His activity and precision everywhere that his presence and influence could reach, entitled him to the gratitude of his country.

General Smith maintained a hot pursuit of the Peishwa, whose army he overtook at Ashtee, where he gained a signal victory, taking the Rajah of Sattara and all his family prisoners, who were sent to Mr. Elphinstone, who conducted them to their palace at Sattara. Gocklah, the best general in the Peishwa's army, fell in the battle of Ashtee, which circumstance depressed the troops. The Peishwa fled from the field of his defeat, and was joined by Holkar and his infantry in his retreat; they both took refuge in Candeish, where Gumput Rao, with what was left of the Rajah of Nagpore's army, joined them. The jaghiredars* of Candeish, timid of the consequence to themselves of favouring such refugees, corresponded with Mr. Elphinstone. This led to desertion by many of the followers of the confederated Mahratta chiefs. The Peishwa led the life of a fugitive for six months, pursued by Generals Smith, Hislop, and other British commanders. During that time, Brigadier-general Monro conquered many forts, and, in command of a small body of troops, performed many glorious enterprises, which were, however, connected with a warfare so desultory, and involving operations so similar, as to preclude a detailed account. The Peishwa sought to reach Malwa, but Sir John Malcolm's dispositions effectually thwarted that purpose. On the 27th of May, being pressed by the forces of Sir Thomas Hislop, the Peishwa intimated, by his vakeel, to Sir John Malcolm an intention to surrender. At Keree, on the 2nd of June, Sir John visited the Peishwa. The

* Holders of jaghires or estates.

events which followed this visit are thus described by M. Anber:—"He appeared low and dejected, and retired for a private interview, when he said, that he had been involved in a war he never intended; that he was treated as an enemy by the state which had supported his family for two generations, and was at that moment in a position that demanded commiseration, and believed that he had a real friend in Sir John Malcolm. The latter replied, that every moment of delay was one of danger, and that he should either throw himself at once on the British government, or determine on further resistance. 'How can I resist now?' he exclaimed, 'I am surrounded.' Sir John Malcolm remarked that he was so, but he could not complain; that he still had the power of escape as much as ever, if he wished to become a freebooter and wanderer, and not accept the liberal provision designed for him. He replied, with the flattery of which he was master, 'I have found you, who are my only friend, and will never leave you; would a shipwrecked mariner, after having reached the port he desired, form a wish to leave it?' Still, upon the plea of a religious ceremony, and that it was an unlucky day, he wished on the third to postpone till the next day surrendering himself up and accepting the propositions, by which he engaged to proceed to Hindostan, a pension of not less than eight lacs of rupees per annum being secured to him. To this delay Sir John Malcolm most positively objected. The firing of some guns in the quarters of Asseer had a considerable effect upon him, and at eleven he determined to come to Sir John Malcolm's camp."

The fortunes of the other Mahratta chiefs are thus briefly summed up:—"Trimbuckjee, on learning the dispersion of Bajee Rao's force, retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he was taken prisoner by Major Swanton, sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar. The exertions of Mr. Elphinstone were very successful in effecting the introduction and establishment of the new government.

"The settlement of the Bheels in Candelsh was prosecuted by Captain Briggs, under Mr. Elphinstone's direction, and the state of Sattara was likewise making favourable progress.

"The condition of the newly acquired provinces, and the measures adopted by the British government, (subjects of deep interest,) properly form matter for a separate work. The remaining fugitive, Appa Sahib, the ex-rajah of Nagpore, would have been captured near the fort of Asseerghur, but for Jeswunt Rao Sar, who sallied forth and saved him from his pursuers. He proceeded from

thence to Lahore, where he was allowed to live in absolute privacy, on a very scanty allowance from Runjeet Singh; a permission extended by that chief in a manner which showed his sincere desire not to dissatisfy the British government." It became clear in the course of the proceedings connected with the temporary surrender of the fort of Asseerghur, required from Scindiah under the treaty of November, 1817, that secret communications and engagements were carried on by him in the Peishwa's interest while he was making ostentatious parade of alliance with the English. He humbled himself, besought pardon, and was forgiven, provided his future conduct proved true.

This troublesome, expensive, and sanguinary war arose from the ignorance of the board of control, which sent out the Marquis of Cornwallis the second time with express instructions to revoke the policy of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Cornwallis entered heartily into these instructions, for he had always been adverse to any connections with the Mahrattas. Still he had himself been obliged to form treaties and military connections with them, and he did not continue long enough in power during his second government to perceive the alteration of circumstances which rendered the severe policy of Lord Wellesley necessary after the first Mahratta war. Had Lord Cornwallis been spared, there can be no doubt, from his clearness of perception and wisdom, that he would have allowed Lord Wellesley's arrangements to remain, and not have exposed the company and his country to the dangers and costs of a second Mahratta war, to assert that ascendancy he so unfortunately revoked. Had the treaties of Lord Wellesley been permitted to stand, there is abundant reason to believe, from all the evidences which were evoked during the second Mahratta war, that so great a calamity would have been averted.

During the year 1819 Mr. Elphinstone was actively employed in arranging the government of the Mahratta states. It is a curious circumstance that in 1859, forty years after, a copy of his proclamation to the landholders should be called for in the British legislature, and was actually printed in the returns, according to which it appears that the proclamation was to be circulated freely, with a view to convince the amildars and pattels of the hopelessness of the Bajee Rao's cause, and

to assure the natives of the good treatment and protection which they would experience from the British government. Villages that had distinguished themselves by expelling or resisting the rebel troops were to be rewarded by large remissions, and by permanent marks of favour. Conspirators and all banditti were to be treated as rebels and punished "promptly and severely." The necessity of adhering to the customs of the country was strongly urged during the provisional government, even to the exemption of Brahmins from capital punishment, except when guilty of treason. No new imposts were to be levied, and those that seemed oppressive or unpopular were to be repealed. All lands held free of revenue were to remain so, and to be left with the present proprietors, who were, however, to prove their titles by showing their "sunnuds." The conciliation of the Bheels and Ramoosces was to be effected "by every means."

Upon the conclusion of the war the Marquis of Hastings carried out the whole scheme of policy originated by the Marquis Wellesley, a scheme which Lord Hastings had himself denounced when imperfectly acquainted with Indian affairs. Blacker states that the number of British officers killed and wounded were 134, and the number of all other ranks 3,042. The campaign, or series of campaigns, lasted from November 5, 1817, to May 13, 1819.*

In 1819 treaties were made with the Rajahs of Odeypore, Jeypore, Joudpore, Jesselmer, and Bicanur, also with the petty chiefs of Banskawara, Dungepore, Pertabgerh, Sirohi, Krishnagerh, Kerauli, Bundi, and Kotah. "With each of these formal engagements were contracted, upon the general basis of subordinate co-operation and acknowledged supremacy." During the more quiet periods of his government, Lord Hastings made considerable alterations in the financial and judicial systems. He also organized a superior police force. After an unusually protracted period of government, Lord Hastings retired in January, 1823. It was on his passage home that he drew up the summary of his administrations, which has since been so much quoted. His arrival in London led to many debates in the India-house, and notable rewards were conferred upon his lordship and his successor in the title.

* Blacker's account of the Pindarree War.

CHAPTER CV.

PROGRESS OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA AND THE ARCHIPELAGO, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MARQUIS HASTINGS—CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS AND BOURBON; OF THE MOLUCCAS; OF JAVA, AND THE ISLES IN ITS VICINITY.

IN China the century opened with the eventful circumstance of the American flag having been first hoisted at Canton. This occurred on the 2nd of January, 1801.

On the 5th of November, 1803, the court of directors informed the select committee of Chinese merchants that hostilities had recommenced between the English government and the French and Batavian republics.

On the 22nd of May, the same year, the court of directors of the East India Company were informed by the board of control, that his majesty intended to address a letter to the Emperor of China, and send him presents; and it was recommended that the chairman should send a letter to the viceroy and the hoppo. Lord Castlereagh sent a letter to the prime-minister of the Chinese emperor. One of the king's gardeners was sent to Canton to collect specimens of the vegetable productions of that part of China, and he was accompanied by a botanical painter to take drawings.

On the 14th of February, 1804, a squadron of French men-of-war, commanded by Admiral Linois, encountered the English homeward-bound China fleet in the Straits of Malacca. The French admiral counted upon an easy victory, as his force was very formidable. His own ship, the *Marengo*, carried eighty guns. Two of his vessels were large fast-sailing frigates, a corvette of thirty guns, and a Dutch brig of eighteen guns. Captain Dance was the commodore of the English vessels. He sailed in the *Earl Camden*, a good ship. Captain I. T. Timins, of the *Royal George*, bravely and skilfully seconded the commodore. All the captains and their crews entered into the action with alacrity and spirit. There was much to defend, for the value of the fleet and cargo was estimated at nearly eight millions sterling.* The *Royal George* received sixty-six shots in her hull and rigging, and bore the brunt of the

enemy's fire. The enemy's squadron was beaten off, and the company's fleet proceeded in safety.

In 1805 the letter of his royal majesty to his imperial majesty was delivered to the viceroy, after innumerable delays and obstacles created by the Chinese officials. A "chair," fancifully and richly decorated, was sent for the conveyance of the box containing his majesty's letter. The supercargoes went in procession to the palace. On the 22nd of January the royal presents were formally presented; the chair containing the letter was laid down before the front entrance to the palace. The supercargoes were conducted, under a salute of three guns, into the hall of audience by a side entry, while the letter was borne through the grand entrance. The viceroy and hoppo were seated under a gorgeous canopy at the upper end of the hall, attended by numerous mandarins in their official costume. The letter was then presented to the viceroy, who, with the hoppo, rose to receive it, and remained standing some time in token of respect. The letter was then carried to an inner apartment, and the grand officers resumed their seats. The viceroy declined receiving the letters sent by Lord Castlereagh and the chairman of the court of directors, on the ground that it was contrary to the laws of China to receive presents or communications from any foreign minister or mandarin. The president of the supercargoes requested that the letters might remain, pending permission being granted by his imperial majesty to receive them. To this arrangement the viceroy consented. The supercargoes retired under another salute of three guns.

On the 8th of May, 1806, a letter from the emperor to the King of England, with presents, arrived at Canton. They were delivered to the president on the 19th, with precisely the same ceremonials as those observed in receiving the letter from his Britannic majesty. The letter of his imperial majesty was very unlike the communications made to the English by former emperors, and was couched in terms of singular propriety, although clothed with an air of strange originality of manner, and pervaded by a tone of eccentric and unique thought. The

* M. Anber, in his *History of British Power in India*, gives this estimate. His work was published in 1837. It is to be presumed that he intended to correct a former estimate of the value of this fleet made in another of his works, "*China*," published in 1834, in which he names sixteen millions as the value. Both works are regarded as standard authorities, yet they present this striking discrepancy. The discrepancies among other authorities also, take a wide range as to the value of the homeward-bound China fleet of that year.

following extracts will no doubt much interest the reader.

"Your majesty's kingdom is at a remote distance beyond the seas, but is observant of its duties and obedient to its laws, beholding from afar the glory of our empire and respectfully admiring the perfection of our government. Your majesty has dispatched messengers with letters for our perusal and consideration; we find that they are dictated by appropriate sentiments of esteem and veneration; and being therefore inclined to fulfil the wishes and expectations of your majesty, we have determined to accept of the whole of the accompanying offering.

"With regard to those of your majesty's subjects who for a long course of years have been in the habit of trading to our empire, we must observe to you, that our celestial government regards all persons and nations with eyes of charity and benevolence, and always treats and considers your subjects with the utmost indulgence and affection; on their account, therefore, there can be no place or occasion for the exertions of your majesty's government."

In 1806 the directors of the East India Company permitted a Mr. Maning to go to China at their expense, who professed to have for his object the pursuit of science and the exploration of the country. Some curious circumstances arose out of that gentleman's mission. In 1807, he arrived at Canton. He presented a petition to the hoppo, "to be received into the service of the Emperor of China." He offered himself for employment by his imperial majesty as "Astronomer and Physician." His services were refused. In February, 1808, he proceeded to Cochin China, hoping to be allowed to stay there some time, and thence to effect an entrance to China. This scheme also failed, through the jealousy of the Cochin Chinese. He then proceeded to India, intending, if possible, to gain an entrance by way of Thibet, Bhotan, or Tartary. On all these frontiers he found an accurate description of his person and purposes in possession of the Chinese authorities, and he was baffled. Finally, this persevering gentleman accompanied the embassy of Lord Amherst to Pekin, in the year 1816.

In the year 1807 the company's trade was stopped in China in consequence of the death of a Chinese in an affray with some sailors belonging to an English ship. The dissipated and disorderly conduct of the English sailors had done much to prevent the friendly intercourse of the British and Chinese. The Chinese demanded the death of an Englishman for that of their countryman who had fallen. The conduct of the merchants on this

occasion, as on other occasions in the history of the English in China, was cruel and unjust. They were quite willing to sacrifice the life of some one of the sailors, although none of the men could be fixed upon as having committed the manslaughter. The courage and firmness of the English naval officer on the station alone saved his country and his countrymen from this degradation, and rescued the man whose life was fixed upon by the English merchants as an atonement to save their trade. It is to the honour of the directors of the East India Company that they not only approved of the gallant conduct of Captain Rolles in saving the life of his countryman, but presented him with £1000.

Sir George Staunton, whose services to the company at Canton had been very considerable, was appointed interpreter to the factory.

In 1808 the English at Canton were alarmed by rumours of a French invasion of Macao, and they represented to the governor-general of India the necessity of strengthening the defences of that place in a manner which it was beyond the power of the Portuguese to effect. In September of that year, a considerable French force was off Java, and in consequence Admiral Drury led an English squadron to Macao. Troops were landed and the defences made stronger. The hoppo protested against any foreign troops being landed there without permission of his imperial majesty, according to the treaty existing between him and the Chinese. The English and Portuguese were unwilling to retrace their steps, and the Chinese prepared for a barbarous system of warfare.

Conflicts on the river between her majesty's ships and the Chinese forts occurred, although war was not declared. "Admiral Drury seems not to have possessed that cool and deliberate judgment which was essential to the business he had been engaged in."*

The committee were so alarmed for their trade by the occupation of Macao by the French, and were so animated in their resentments against that nation, that they were willing to risk a war with China to accomplish their purpose. The British naval officers acted with prudence and forbearance, as well as courage, and decided that the imperial treaty with Portugal forbid the occupation of the island by any but Portuguese. The committee at last gave way. The directors were so displeas'd with the conduct of "the select committee" for managing their affairs in China, that they displaced them, and appointed servants in inferior positions above them.

In 1809 the insolent and haughty conduct

* Parliamentary papers.

of an English naval officer at Canton had nearly embroiled his country with the United States of America. Captain Pellew, R.N., impressed American seamen, or seamen on board American ships, into the service of the king. The American government demanded redress, which had to be conceded to avert war, the pride and petulance of this British officer thus causing humiliation to his country.

From the years 1806 to 1810 the Chinese Ladrões, native pirates, called after their brethren the Portuguese of Macao, infested the coasts of China.* These men were similar to the pirates which infested the Chinese seas in the seventeenth century, from whom the Dutch settlers in Formosa suffered so severely. Mr. Davis, afterwards Sir J. F. Davis, governor of Hongkong, has given the following curious and interesting description of the character and history of these Chinese pirates:—"Not the least remarkable feature about this formidable fleet of pirates was its being, subsequent to the death of its original chief, very ably governed by his wife, who appointed her lieutenants for active service. A severe code of laws for the government of the squadron, or of its several divisions, was enforced, and a regular appropriation made of all captured property. Marriages were strictly observed, and all promiscuous intercourse, and violence to women, rigorously punished. Passes were granted to the Chinese junks or boats which submitted to the pirates: but all such as were captured in government vessels, and indeed all who opposed them, were treated with the most dreadful cruelty. At the height of their power they levied contributions on most of the towns along the coast, and spread terror up the river to the neighbourhood of Canton. It was at this time that the British factory could not venture to move in their boats between that place and Macao without protection; and to the Ladrões, therefore, may be partly attributed the origin of the valuable survey of the Chinese seas by Captain Ross; as the two cruisers which were sent from Bombay, at the select committee's requisition, to act against the pirates, were subsequently employed by them in that work of public utility, the benefits of which have been felt by the whole commercial world.

"Finding that its power was utterly unavailing against the growing strength of the Ladrões, the Chinese government published a general amnesty to such as would submit, and return to their allegiance, a stroke of

policy which may be attributed to its acquaintance with the fact, that a serious dissension had broken out between the two principal commanders of the pirate forces. This proceeded even to the length of the black and red squadrons (which they respectively headed) engaging in a bloody combat, wherein the former was discomfited. The weaker of the two now submitted to accept the offers of the government, which promised free pardon, and kept its engagements; the leader was even raised to some rank in the emperor's service! Being thus weakened by the desertion of nearly half her forces, the female chieftain and her other lieutenant did not much longer hold out. The Ladrões who had submitted were employed by the crafty government against their former associates, who were harassed by the stoppage of their supplies, and other difficulties, and a few more months saw the whole remaining force accept the proffered amnesty. Thus easily was dissolved an association which at one time threatened the empire; but as the sources and circumstances, whence piracy has more than once sprung up, are still in existence, the success and impunity of their predecessors may encourage other bands of maritime robbers to unite in a similar confederacy at no distant period."*

Difficulties between the English merchants and the Chinese authorities were perpetuated by the frequent fatal conflicts of the English sailors and the natives, and the sternness of the Chinese penal code, which exacted blood for blood, life for life.

The Chinese officials were constantly finding pretexts for stopping the trade. An inexorable jealousy of foreigners characterised the policy of the imperial government. In consequence of this, objections were taken to the presence of European ships of war in the Canton river, and to the service of the natives at the foreign factories.

His majesty's ship *Doris* exercised a blockade against the American merchantmen during 1814. The ship captured an American vessel, which offended the Chinese, who ordered the committee of the English factory to send the *Doris* away. This, they explained, was beyond their power, the ship of war belonging to his Britannic majesty, not to the East India Company. The Chinese could not understand this explanation, or affected to be unable to do so. Captures and re-captures of American ships in the river followed the making of the first prize, and inflamed the resentment of the Chinese. They interrupted communications between the East Indians and the English men-of-war; their magistrates

* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 63, 64.

* *The Chinese: a General Description of China and its Inhabitants.* By John Francis Davis, Esq., F.R.S., &c., Governor of Hongkong. London: C. Cox, King William-street, Strand, 1851.

seized and subjected to cruel punishment all who took service with the English; the mandarins violated the sanctuary of the factory; and, in fine, all the long-conceded privileges of the English were infringed. What followed has been well described by Mr. Davis.

"The committee, seeing the hostile disposition of the government, determined on the bold measure of stopping the trade, as the only means of arriving at a remedy. The Chinese, somewhat startled at their old weapon being turned against themselves, began to display a more conciliatory temper, and, after some debate, a mandarin was appointed to meet Sir George Staunton, who was deputed to conduct the negotiation on the part of the committee. Accordingly, on the 20th of October, Sir George proceeded to Canton, accompanied by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe and Mr. Davis. The first subject of complaint was the arrest of the linguist Ayew, for performing a service which was merely complimentary on the part of the English, and expressive of their respect for a dignified officer of government, who had conducted the first embassy through China, and been on friendly terms with its members. It was immediately replied, that his seizure was on account of a totally different affair, and that there was no intention of condemning the proceeding. Several meetings took place with the principal mandarins and one or two assessors, but little progress was made towards an adjustment; when the viceroy suddenly determined on breaking off the negotiation. The committee upon this resolved on issuing a notice to all British subjects to quit Canton: Sir George Staunton and the gentlemen with him embarked in the *Wexford*, and the whole fleet proceeded down the river.

"This step had the effect of completely curing the obstinacy of the viceroy. A deputation of Hong merchants was sent down to the ships, with authority to state that mandarins would be sent to discuss the remaining points in dispute if Sir George would return. On his reaching Canton, an attempt was made to retract the pledge, but this could not be persisted in; and, after several long and tedious audiences with the mandarins, the principal points in dispute were gained, and incorporated in an official paper from the viceroy, as the only security against a breach of faith on the part of the Chinese. The privilege of corresponding with the government under seal, and in the native character, was now for the first time established; an assurance was given that no Chinese officer should ever enter the British factory without leave previously obtained; and licence was given to native

servants to enter into the service of the English without molestation from the petty mandarins; together with some other points."*

Mr. Davis has summed up the concessions of the Chinese on this occasion in language improperly vague for a work professing to give complete information on the subject of British relations to the Chinese government. M. Auber has been more complete on this head, although prolix in his narrative of the events that led to such an issue. According to that writer, the relations between the Chinese and English were placed in 1814 upon the following basis, which includes the matters mentioned by Mr. Davis, and "some other points," which he leaves his readers to guess:—

"On the 29th November, a communication was made by Howqua of the decisions passed by the viceroy, to the following effect:—

"1st. Permission given to address the government in Chinese through the Hong merchants without the contents being inquired into.

"2nd. The use of offensive language not very satisfactorily answered.

"3rd. The local magistrate not to visit the factory without giving due previous notice.

"4th. The communication by boats between Canton and Whampoa to be open and free as usual.

"5th. Natives may be employed as coolies, porters, tea-boilers, cooks, and in other similar capacities, but persons not to be hired under the denominations of *keupan* and *thawan*.

"6th. Ships of war to remain at their usual anchorages while the ships are at Whampoa, but when they depart, the ships of war to depart.

"7th. Boats to receive passes at certain stations.

"8th. The country ships have been fired at as due notice to the Bogue Fort.

"9th. Merchantmen only admitted to Whampoa.

Additional Articles.

"1st. Address to be laid before the emperor to be written in the foreign character as before.

"2nd. Important affairs to be addressed to the viceroy, commercial affairs to the hoppo, local district affairs to the local magistrates.

"3rd. Further arrangements respecting the boats passing the Bogue; the people will then be directed to behave courteously.

"4th. The opening or not of the trade will not be inquired into.

* Davis's *China*, chap. iii. pp. 72, 73.





Sir T. Lawrence

W. J. Edwards

THE RIGHT HON^{BLE} LORD AMHERST.

From the Picture in the British Factory, Canton

"5th. Notice will be given when natives are tried implicating foreigners.

"An edict confirming the same was issued on the 2nd December."

The year 1814 was signalised in the history of the British in India by the commencement of the compilation of an Anglo-Chinese dictionary, by the Rev. Dr. Morrison, a missionary of the London Missionary Society, and an English congregational minister. The perseverance and devotedness of this remarkable man made him in this, as in so many other respects, a benefactor to the Chinese people, to the English in China, and useful to the relations of the two nations. The directors of the East India Company favoured this great undertaking, as did their select committee at Canton. Sir G. Staunton, at the request of the committee, superintended the issue of the work. The whole work was not completed until 1824, Dr. Morrison having been interrupted in his labours by attendance at the embassy in 1818.

In 1816 it was determined by his majesty's government and the court of directors, that an embassy should be sent to the Chinese emperor from the Prince Regent of England. Lord Amherst was fixed upon as a suitable person for this important mission. The ostensible objects of this embassy were briefly stated to be—"a removal of the grievances which had been experienced, and an exemption from them and others of the like nature for the time to come, with the establishment of the company's trade upon a secure, solid, equitable footing, free from the capricious, arbitrary aggressions of the local authorities, and under the protection of the emperor, and the sanction of the regulations to be appointed by himself."

The embassy embarked at Spithead, on board his majesty's ship *Alceste*, on the 8th of February, 1816, and arrived at the mouth of the White River, Gulf of Pe-tche-lee, on the 28th of July. The disembarkation did not take place until the 9th of August, when the imperial legate visited Lord Amherst. It was arranged that negotiations should not be entered into until the arrival of the ambassador at Tien-Sing. On the 12th his excellency arrived there, and was met by a second imperial legate, when a discussion at once arose as to the performance of "ko-tow"—the homage demanded by the emperor from all representatives of foreign princes. Lord Amherst refused. His excellency and suite, accompanied by the legates, proceeded up river. On the 16th of August, his lordship was roused from his bed at a very early hour by the Chinese officials, for the purpose of informing him that the homage or "ko-tow"

must be performed, or his further advance stopped. Lord Amherst objected to the ceremony as an indignity to the king his master, and to the British nation. He argued that if the ceremony were merely a form, as the Chinese officials pretended, then he had no objection to practise it, provided a written declaration were made to him that a Chinese ambassador would perform the same ceremony at the court of his Britannic majesty in case such were sent there. The legates refused to give any such pledge, and made the "ko-tow" the alternative to the dismissal of the embassy. The legates proposed that a rehearsal should be performed, in order that the ambassador might try how far his scruples were unrelenting, but it was intended that this rehearsal should be public and ceremonious, and was evidently intended as a trap for his excellency, who declined any rehearsal whatever, adhering to his previous stipulation, which he repeated. The voyage was prosecuted to Tong-choo-foo, where the navigation of the river ends, and whence the journey to Peking, only twelve miles, is performed by land. At this place the legates proposed that the ambassador should write home for instructions. His lordship declined doing so, and was treated rudely by the mandarins. He insisted upon sending a letter to the emperor; upon producing the superscription, the evidence of his lordship's high rank seemed to awe the officials, and their rudeness gave place to obsequiousness.

In the afternoon of the 28th, the embassy arrived at Peking, which it was not permitted to enter, but was conducted round the walls, and at sunrise was in the neighbourhood of Yuen-min-yuen. The ambassador was not allowed to see the emperor, or personally to deliver his credentials to the prime-minister, as he still persisted in refusing a homage which amounted to idolatrous worship, and which recognised the Emperor of China as the sovereign of the universe, and the King of England as his tributary.

His excellency and suite were compelled to return; *en route* to Canton he was treated with respect. He arrived at the factory on the 1st of January, 1817. The frustration of the mission was mainly due to the viceroy, and other officials at Canton, who knew that its chief object was to complain of their insolence, violence, oppression, and extortion.

During the passage of Lord Amherst up the river, and overland to Peking, and even while returning, the Canton authorities behaved with ill will to the British naval officers in the Canton river. The captain of the *Alceste* (Lord Amherst's vessel) was refused anchorage at Whampoa. Of this circum-

stance, Mr. Davis observes:—"It was intended to degrade the British ambassador below the tribute-bearer from Slam, whose junk has free leave to enter the river! The *Alceste*, however, proceeded very leisurely on her way; and Captain Maxwell, on being fired at by the junks, and the fort at the river's mouth, silenced the junks at a single shot; while one broadside sufficed to send the garrison of the fort scampering up the side of the hill, down which that defence is somewhat preposterously built. The effect of this decisive conduct was evinced in the short space of one day, by the arrival of all sorts of provisions to the *Alceste* at Whampoa, by a free consent to load the *Hewett*, and by the publication of a statement that the firing at the entrance of the river was an affair of saluting! Those who composed the embassy were gratified to find on their arrival at Canton, on the 1st of January, that Captain Maxwell had not been deterred by any unnecessary apprehensions for their safety from duly maintaining the dignity of the British flag."

The duties and annoyances of Lord Amherst were not over on his arrival at Canton. The emperor had written a letter for the Regent, and committed the delivery of it to his viceroy at Canton, who was personally to place it in the hands of the British ambassador. This ceremony was performed in an eminently uncivil manner, which the ambassador took care to rebuke in a way which comported with the dignity of his bearing throughout. This ceremonial terminated Lord Amherst's business in China. Barrow relates,* that Lord Macartney's embassy cost the Chinese government £170,000. Mr. Davis was of opinion that the embassy of Lord Amherst cost it an equal sum. The letter of the emperor to the Prince Regent was intolerably insolent and arrogant. The following passages from it will suffice to disclose its character:—"Hereafter there is no occasion for you to send an ambassador so far, and be at the trouble of passing over mountains and crossing seas;" and in a vermillion edict† the following passage:—"I therefore sent down my pleasure to *expel* these ambassadors, and send them back to their own country, *without punishing the high crime they had committed.*"

Immediately after the departure of the ambassador, various acts of cruelty were perpetrated by the Canton authorities, which were intended chiefly as insults and threats to the English. The failure of the embassy was much discussed in England, very many

were of opinion that Lord Amherst should have complied with the Chinese customs, whatever they were. Dr. Barry O'Meara, in his *Voice from St. Helena*, represents the imprisoned Emperor Napoleon I., as deriding the English and Lord Amherst for their pride and impracticability in not stooping to any humiliation the Chinese thought proper to impose, which the ex-emperor considered indifferent, whereas the commercial advantage to be obtained was substantial. The opinion of so renowned a person was much quoted in Europe, and especially in England after O'Meara's book was published, whenever Chinese affairs brought up the subject. The Emperor Napoleon was however a bad judge on points of ethics or honour, however sagacious in matters of war or policy. He could assume the language and conduct of a Mohammedan in Egypt, a Romanist in Italy, and an atheist in France, when political and personal objects were to be promoted by so doing. Lord Amherst's honour and principle were of a higher cast, and regulated by a sense of duty drawn from purer sources than any acknowledged as authoritative by Napoleon Buonaparte. Lord Amherst did not, like his French imperial majesty, place the Bible on his *political* book-shelves; he had another and more becoming compartment for it. Duty to the person of his king, the honour and dignity of his country, and to the religion he professed, forbid Lord Amherst to render the idolatrous homage and recognition of supremacy demanded by the Tartar emperor. He acted conscientiously, and the present generation of Englishmen at all events approves. Had Lord Amherst participated in the degrading and dishonourable ceremonial proposed, he would not in all probability have obtained any advantages for his nation, and the English would have been reminded at Canton by the viceroy, that their king was the emperor's slave. At it was, the firmness of the ambassador much impressed the Chinese authorities, and notwithstanding their first outbursts of resentment, made them more wary of affronting a people who might assert their independence in a very troublesome manner. At all events, Mr. Davis, who had opportunities of personally observing the effects, thus expresses a similar opinion:—"It has often been a subject of just remark, that this *unsuccessful* mission was followed by a longer interval of tranquillity, and of freedom from Chinese annoyance than had ever been experienced before. From the year 1816 to 1829, not a single stoppage of the British trade took place, except in the affair of the *Topaze* frigate in 1822; and then the Canton government was glad to

* *Travels in China.*

† From its being written on paper of that colour by the emperor's own hand.

make the first advances to a resumption of the suspended intercourse, as we shall see. In 1820 an accidental occurrence took place, which gave rise to transactions of a very remarkable nature, proving in the strongest manner the anxiety of the government to avoid a discussion with the English. Some boats from one of the company's ships were watering in the river, when they were barbarously attacked by a party of Chinese with stones. The officer in charge of the boats fired over the heads of the assailants to make them desist, but the shot unfortunately took effect among some boys on a high bank opposite, and killed one of them. The Chinese, as usual, demanded that somebody should be given up; but the committee insisted on the urgent emergency which led to the discharge of the gun, as well as on the accidental nature of the case. In the meanwhile, the butcher on board one of the ships committed suicide; and the Chinese, on hearing this, immediately took it up, thinking proper to assume that *he* must be the individual who had shot the boy! The utmost eagerness and haste were shown by them in appointing an inquest of mandarins, who proceeded to examine the body; and, as it was decided by them at once that the deceased butcher must be the homicide, the trade proceeded as usual. It must be observed, that the committee only granted permission for the ship to be boarded by the mandarins when they demanded it, and that the whole proceeding showed the extreme anxiety of the local authorities to accommodate the affair."

The English abstained, however, from all compromise in the transaction, as is known by the distinct testimony of the Rev. Dr. Morrison, the congregational missionary, and Chinese interpreter to the company. This narrative shows at once the difficulty the English had in carrying on trade peaceably with the Chinese, and the good effect of firmness tempered by justice and discretion in dealing with the Cantonese authorities. No other events of interest occurred in connection with English relations to China, during the period to which this chapter refers.

CONQUEST OF MAURITIUS.

During the Marquis of Wellesley's government, various measures were contemplated by him to frustrate the purposes and humiliate the power of the French and Dutch in the Eastern Archipelago. The expedition of Buonaparte to Egypt disconcerted these measures. General Baird and General Wellesley, who were nominated first to command the military portion of an expedition to the Mauritius, and then against Batavia, received

other commissions. The admiral who was to command the naval part of these enterprises did not make his appearance at the rendezvous, Trincomalee; and General Baird was dispatched with the troops to Egypt, General Wellesley to Mysore. No opportunity for prosecuting either of the meditated attacks occurred until 1810, during the government of Lord Minto. The capture of Mauritius does not properly come within the range of this history; it is therefore here only necessary to observe that the expedition against the Mauritius was successful, and that the conquest much reduced French influence in the East.

At the same time the Isle of Bourbon was captured, but was restored to France at the peace of 1814.

CONQUEST OF THE MOLUCCAS.

Lord Minto's career as an Indian statesman was closed with more *éclat* than it otherwise would have been, by his acquisition of the Moluccas and the Island of Java. "An empire, which for two centuries had contributed to the power, prosperity, and grandeur of one of the principal and most respected states of Europe, was wrested from the short usurpation of the French government,* added to the dominions of the British crown, and converted from a seat of hostile machinations and commercial competition, into an augmentation of British power and prosperity."†

In the year 1808 Mr. Raffles, afterwards Sir Stamford Raffles, was secretary to the government of Prince of Wales' Island. Ill health compelled change of scene, and he proceeded to the Moluccas. There he acquired considerable information as to the trade and general condition of the islands near and beyond the Straits. He also obtained very precise information of the power of the Dutch, and the value of their possessions in the great Archipelago. Mr. Raffles drew up reports of the condition of Penang and Malacca, which influenced the government in modifying their intentions in respect to these settlements, and their views of the importance which should be attached to them. Mr. Raffles drew up a paper on "the Malayan Archipelago," which so pleased Lord Minto, that he desired to make the gifted author governor of the Moluccas. With this intention other claims interfered. In the document drawn up by Mr. Raffles, he insisted upon the necessity to the ultimate interests of

* The Moluccas and Java, with its minor islands, were subjected to France, when Holland, the parent country, was conquered by the French.

† Auber's *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, vol. ii. chap. xii. p. 470.

England in the East, that French influence should be completely extirpated throughout the Archipelago. The governor-general resolved to carry out the opinions of Mr. Raffles, and to proceed himself with an expedition against Java.

Previous to the accomplishment of his purpose, some other achievements were performed in consonance with the general object, such as the reduction of the Moluccas, or Spice Islands.

In the middle of February, 1810, Captain Tucker, with his majesty's ships *Dover*, *Cornwall*, and *Samarang*, and part of the Madras European regiment, under Captain Court, arrived off the island of Amboyna. The ships opened a heavy cannonade. Under their fire four hundred of the Madras regiment were landed, in two detachments, one under Captain Court, the other commanded by Captain Philips. Philips attacked a battery in front, and carried it by storm. Court made a circuit and took some of the redoubts in reverse. The next morning the guns of the captured batteries were directed against the town and fort. The Dutch governor was summoned to surrender, and obeyed. Thirteen hundred Dutch and Malay soldiers laid down their arms. The former were sent to Java,—a very questionable policy, as that place was about to be attacked. The Malays were enlisted in the English service. Thus the English at last, and finally, avenged the insults and outrages inflicted upon them so long before, by the Dutch at that place. The whole of the Moluccas were soon afterwards captured, the Dutch in every case making a feeble resistance, unworthy of their former glory. The garrisons of the Batavian republic were swiftly swept from the Archipelago, except from Java and its neighbouring isles. The last of the Moluccas that yielded to British power was Ternate, the scene of so much competition and contention between them and the Dutch in the early enterprises of the traders of those nations among the Spice Islands. There exists but little information concerning the attack on this place, once so famous as a battle-field for the maritime rivals in the Archipelago. Mill has compressed some fragmentary accounts in the *Asiatic Register*, vol. xii.—the official despatches and old newspaper correspondence. His narrative is brief and clear, and supplies all that is worth relating. "Ternate was taken by Captain Tucker with a detachment of Europeans, the seamen and marines of the *Dover*, and some of the newly enlisted Amboyna corps. Captain Tucker arrived off the island on the 25th August; but light and baffling winds kept him off the shore, and a landing was not practicable till the 28th. A hundred and seventy

men were landed in the night, with intent to surprise the forts and batteries which guarded the bay. The difficulties of the approach frustrated the scheme, and the men were re-embarked. Early in the morning they were again put on shore; and, whilst the frigate engrossed the attention of the enemy, they proceeded unobserved to an eminence supposed to command the Fort of Kayomaira, the principal Dutch post. They arrived on the hill at noon; but to their great vexation they found that the fort was screened from their view by an intervening forest. They then endeavoured to proceed by an inland route, but, after incessant exertion throughout the day, it was found impossible to disencumber the path of the immense trees which had been cut down and piled across it. Turning to the right, they followed the course of a rivulet which led to the beach, and brought them about ten o'clock within eight hundred yards of the fort before they were discovered. Disregarding a smart fire of grape and musketry, they rushed forward, escaladed the walls, and carried the fort. On the following morning the combined operations of the detachment and frigate overpowered the other defences of the bay, and by the evening the town and island were surrendered. Few casualties impaired the exultation of the victors. Their conquest completed the reduction of the Moluccas, and Java with its dependencies alone remained in the possession of the Dutch."

CONQUEST OF JAVA AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

Having wrested the Moluccas from the united grasp of France and Holland, the English were eager for the meditated attack upon Java. The governor-general determined upon personally superintending the operations; some delay was therefore necessary. The delays perpetually interposed by the naval commanders were, however, the chief difficulties in the way of all enterprises which the Indian government had hitherto attempted by sea. This want of alertness was shown at Mauritius and the Isle of France, Amboyna, and Ternate; and but for the intelligence of Mr. Raffles, and the determination of the governor-general not to be impeded by the admirals, and to carry out his purpose promptly and resolutely, the undertaking would have been deferred that year,—probably for ever; for it is certain that the French and Dutch would have made desperate efforts to send reinforcements and supplies, and the garrisons would have made the defences infinitely more formidable. In pursuance of his object Lord Minto proceeded to Madras, on the 9th March, 1811. Troops

were ordered to proceed from Bengal on the 15th and 16th; on the 18th of April he reached Penang. The extent of information with which Mr. Raffles was enabled to furnish the governor-general on all points relating to countries of which scarcely anything was known, and the comprehensive views with which he accompanied his reports, proved of infinite value. An incident that occurred at this stage of the proceedings marked the judgment and decision of Mr. Raffles. The late period when the expedition reached Malacca, caused some anxiety on account of the favourable monsoon, which was nearly terminating. A question arose as to which of two passages should be followed, in the course towards Java. The point called for an immediate determination; the choice was to be made between the northern route, round Borneo, which, from the little known of the navigation of those seas, was thought to be the only practicable one, especially for a fleet; but how the dangers of the Bartabac passage, where only one ship could pass at a time, were to be avoided, no one could suggest. Mr. Raffles had strongly recommended the south-west passage, between Caramata and Borneo, and "staked his reputation on the success which would attend it." The naval authorities were opposed to it; but Lord Minto reposed full confidence in the judgment and local information of Mr. Raffles, by embarking with him in his majesty's ship the *Modeste*, commanded by Captain the Hon. George Elliot, on the 18th of June, 1811, and leading the way on Mr. Raffles' sole responsibility. The result was entirely successful. The fleet, consisting of sixty sail,* was in six weeks in sight of Batavia, without a single accident. The *Modeste* alone would have done it a fortnight sooner.† In the progress of the expedition from the roads of Madras, much danger was incurred by storms. His majesty's ship *Dover*, and many other vessels which remained longest, were driven on shore at Madras, and wrecked. Happily, the transports, with the troops on board, left in time, and escaped. The first division of the army left Madras April 18th,‡ 1811, under the command of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie. When Lord Minto arrived at Malacca, he learned that General Daendels had been recalled by the French government, and that General Jansens had replaced him, and had brought out strong reinforcements.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the British commander, was led by the information which reached him from various quarters, to decide on attacking Batavia, as the place where the contests for the Franco-Dutch colonies of Java and dependencies was likely to be decided.

On the evening of the 3rd of August, the vanguard of the fleet made Cape Carawang, and early next morning ran in for the mouth of the Mirandi river. During the lulls which occurred between the land and sea breezes, the ships safely anchored. Early in the evening the first division of the troops landed. The fleet, when all had assembled, consisted, according to Major Hough, of four sail of the line, fourteen frigates, seven sloops, eight of the honourable company's cruisers, fifty-seven transports, and seventeen gun-boats, under the command of Rear-Admiral Stopford, who joined the expedition at Batavia. When at Malacca, the military force was officially reported* to be as follows:—

General Abstract of the Army, Malacca, 4th June, 1811.

	OFFICERS.	NATIVE OFFICERS.	N. C. O. & PRIVATES.	TOTAL.
European forces	200	—	5144	5344
Native forces	124	123	5530	5777
	324	123	10,674	11,121
Pioneers, Lascars, &c.				839
			Grand total	11,960

Of this force 1,200 were left behind sick, at Malacca; 1,500 of the remainder became ill on landing at Java. The cause of this sickness was not the climate of Java, but the bad, and, in some cases, disgusting quarters afforded to the men while on board the transports, together with the rough weather encountered on the passage.

Colonel Gillespie and the advance brigade first landed at Chillingching, a village ten miles or so to the eastward of Batavia. He immediately took up a position over the road to Cornelis, to gain possession of that road, and protect the landing of the rest of the troops, which was safely effected.

On the 7th of August, the advance guard of the British crossed the Angale river by a bridge of boats, and halted themselves.† The next day, Batavia was summoned. The inhabitants, such as the French had not driven away, were eager to surrender; and our troops had therefore no difficulty in taking possession of the town.

It was expected that the French and Dutch would make a stand at Weltevreden. Against that place the army began its march on the 10th. The cantonments were abandoned on

* Mill computes them at 100 sail. He probably reckons a description of vessels which Auber does not include in "the fleet."

† M. Anber's *Rise of British Power*, &c.

‡ Thorn's *Memoir of the Conquest of Java*. London, 1815.

* Major Thorn, deputy quartermaster-general at Java.
† Wilson, vol. vii. p. 356.

the approach of our army, but General Jumel, the French officer second in command, had intrenched a camp for a division of the Dutch army in a strong position, overlooking the road to Cornelis, about a mile from Weltevreden. Two villages covered the position of the Dutch infantry. The enemy met our advance with grape and musketry; the English general skirmished in front, using his horse artillery and rifles freely, and turned with his main force the left flank of the defence. Having set fire to the villages, the British troops charged through the smoke and burning houses, dispossessing the Dutch infantry and artillery of every strategical point, and driving them in headlong retreat until they found protection under the cannon of Cornelis. In the arsenal of Weltevreden a large amount of military stores and 300 guns became the prize of the victors. General Jansens was confident that Cornelis would defy the whole force of the governor-general until the rainy season would render it impossible to occupy trenches or a camp in its vicinity, and cause great loss in sickness to the English if they attempted a blockade. Jansens held an intrenched camp, his flanks protected between two rivers, the Sloken and the Batavia river. It was a position resembling that which Scindiah occupied when General Wellesley fought the desperate battle of Assaye. The Batavian river near Cornelis was unfordable, and the banks broken in abrupt acclivities. The Sloken was, with difficulty, fordable, but it was defended by powerful batteries and redoubts. There was a strong redoubt on the British side of the river to protect the only bridge left standing. Between the two rivers the trenches were protected by formidable redoubts, and the inequality of the ground concealed the strength of the defences, and gave the defenders opportunity to manœuvre against any assailants, whatever quarter the attack came from. The camp, both in front and rear, was protected similarly, both by art and nature. The circumference of the lines was nearly five miles, and was mounted by 280 pieces of cannon. Seldom had the English in all their daring assaults on strong places, a position presented to their attack more undesirable.

On the night of the 20th of August, the English began regular approaches, and as the works progressed, a heavy battering train was mounted. The main attack was upon the *tête du pont*. Having battered the redoubt, and considerably weakened the enemy's fire, the moment for the assault arrived. Colonel Gillespie took the command. He was the same officer who (related in our account of the Goorkha campaign), as Major-general Sir

R. R. Gillespie, was killed on the 31st of October, 1814, at Kalunga, in Nepal. He had some dismounted dragoons, the body-guard, and a body of marines; besides the grenadier and light and rifle companies of the 14th, 59th, 69th, and 78th regiments, and grenadiers of 5th and 6th volunteers, Madras pioneers. Lieutenant-colonel Macleod and Major Tule were ordered to advance, the first named against a redoubt in the angle of the enemy's front and left, the other upon the bridge leading to the rear.

On the night of the 26th of August, the English began their formidable task. Gillespie led his men on in silence; at dawn the enemy's videttes perceived him: the British, as commanded, abstained from firing a shot, but rushed upon the pickets with the bayonet, nearly all of whom perished, and the advance redoubt was carried nearly as soon as the alarm was given. The promptitude, celerity, and discipline of the English gave effect to valour, and this first step of their progress was accomplished without loss. The 78th regiment, without entering the redoubt, carried the bridge over the Sloken. Gillespie crossed with them, and without firing a shot dashed at once against the redoubt within the lines, which also commanded the passage of the bridge. Each of these redoubts had twenty eighteen-pounder guns, besides several of twenty-four and of thirty-two pounds. Colonel Gibbs, who was guided to the scene of action by the enemy's fire, crossed the bridge after Gillespie, and while that officer stormed the redoubt to the left, Gibbs turned to the right, where another redoubt was also in a position to command the bridge; he at once stormed it, relying solely on the bayonet. When the bulwark was conquered, a Dutch officer set fire to the magazine, which blew up, causing terrible havoc and destruction. The devoted man who thus sacrificed his own life to what he considered the honour and interests of his country, inflicted by his suicidal act severe loss upon his enemies. The grenadier companies (there were two on the occasion) of his majesty's 14th regiment were blown up. Many other English soldiers perished. Contrary to the intentions of the Dutch officer, his act also slew many of his own countrymen. The magazine was fired before the Dutch and French could make good their retreat. By these events a way into the intrenched camp was conquered, and the English poured over the bridge impetuously, spreading in every direction most likely to make their conquest sure. Cornelis was entered, and the enemy driven out. The whole of this work was performed in the dim grey

light of early dawn, but by the time it was accomplished the sun was above the horizon, and both armies were presented to one another in full view. The enemy was dispersed, broken, or bayoneted in the redoubts and trenches. The English were mustering in order, undisputed victors of the position. The enemy had strong reserves which had made no effort to save the place; these were drawn up on a plain in front of the barracks and lesser fort, protected by its guns. There were several battalions of infantry, a considerable body of cavalry, heavy guns in position, and twenty pieces of horse artillery in line. There appeared a prospect of a new and fierce engagement. His majesty's 59th regiment at once advanced, and the enemy shamefully gave way. The 59th entered and captured the fort, while Colonel Gillespie, coming up with the dragoons and horse artillery, the retreat of the enemy broke into a disgraceful flight. For ten miles Gillespie maintained the pursuit, pouring grape into the flying masses, and passing between the different bodies with his cavalry, cut them up, unless as their cries for mercy stayed the hands which wielded the British sabres. Six thousand were thus spared; a regiment of French voltigeurs, fresh from France, laid down their arms. The number slain was not computed; at all events, no correct reports remain to attest it. The English lost eighty-five officers killed and wounded, and eight hundred men. There were besides, seventy-three seamen and marines numbered among the British who fell. General Jansen escaped with a small body of his light cavalry to the eastern coast. A squadron of frigates, with extra detachments of marines, were sent to Cheribon, the place surrendered to Colonel Wood.

While Sir S. Auchmuty went in pursuit of Jansens, a naval expedition was directed against the Island of Madura, off the north-east coast of Java; it was captured. Jansens collected a force of native cavalry at Jater, six miles from Samarang. Auchmuty landed at Samarang, from which the inhabitants fled. He went at once in quest of the enemy's camp, which was drawn up on a range of hills, difficult of access, their steeps presenting a surface of sharp and broken crags. The occupants of the camp were chiefly natives, and numbered about eight thousand men, with twenty guns in position. Auchmuty's force was one thousand strong, a very excellently formed body, all Europeans, engineers, sappers and miners, artillery, &c., being in proportion to the companies of the line. He had a strong detachment of pioneers, and six light field-pieces. The summit of the

range was level and grassy, fit for cavalry, of which the native army was composed. There were also slopes by which the troopers could ascend or descend along the opposite sides with ease. As soon as Auchmuty's pioneers began their work, the troopers took to flight, leaving the guns behind them, which, with the exception of occupying the field, was the only honour or advantage won by General Auchmuty. General Jansens shortly after surrendered the island to Great Britain, and the troops yet in arms as prisoners of war.

The conquest of Java and the Moluccas led to the promotion of Lord Minto in the peerage; he was made an earl. Mr. Raffles was knighted, and made "lieutenant-governor of Java and its dependencies." Colonel Gillespie obtained the command of the troops. This officer manifested a strangely hostile feeling to Sir Stamford Raffles. He could regard no subject in the same light as the governor. The latter was a statesman, a scholar, and a philosopher, and Colonel Gillespie was unable to apprehend the extent or depth of the governor's views. The colonel desired to occupy Java with numerous forces; the governor believed it unnecessary, and insisted upon economy in the new government. Gillespie resented this, and brought so many and such serious charges against his excellency, that it became necessary for the governor-general of India to institute an official inquiry, which issued in the honourable acquittal of Raffles from all the impeachments so petulantly brought against him. The commander-in-chief was displaced.

While yet Colonel Gillespie continued in command, his services were actively demanded in various ways to preserve in order the territory which he had so gallantly done his part to conquer. The French and Dutch stirred up the natives against the English by all sorts of misrepresentations. The Sultan of Yadtryakaita proclaimed war against the invaders. Gillespie attacked his capital, and carried it by storm. The sultan himself was taken prisoner and exiled to Penang. His son was placed by the English on the vacant throne. The capture of Yadtryakaita appalled the young sultan, and made him submissive to the English. It had been defended by one hundred thousand men, who showed much courage, but their weapons and discipline were so inferior, that they were unable to defend the place even against a few thousand Europeans.

On the north-east coast of Sumatra, the Sultan of Palembang defied the power of the English. Gillespie sailed from Java, in March, 1812, and the sultan fled without striking a blow for his independence. The English

commander dethroned him, and placed his brother on the throne. The expedition was taken, because the sultan had entered into an engagement with the Dutch, refused subsequently to revoke it, and bound himself not to admit them or the French to his dominions. The position in which the English then were positively demanded the adoption of a policy, towards the neighbouring sultans, of treating all as enemies who were not allies: otherwise the French and Dutch would form points of support on the different islands, and endanger the British possessions. Batavia had too long proved a source of peril to English commerce in the Eastern seas, for the English quietly to allow French or Dutch, when vanquished in one place, to create a position of power in another.

On the 18th of May, Colonel Gillespie left Sumatra for Bauea, of which place he took possession. Java remained in the quiet possession of the British until 1815, when a circumstance occurred which created considerable alarm. The native officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of a Bengal light infantry battalion conspired, in October, with some other sepoys and their officers, to murder all Europeans upon whom they could lay their hands, and desert, or, subverting the constituted authorities, join the natives of Java in effecting a revolution. The cause of this atrocious conspiracy lay as usual in a breach of faith committed by the government. The conspirators were volunteers, who, contrary to the prejudices of their caste and nation, freely offered to join the expedition to Java, on condition of being restored to their country at the expiration of the third year of service. The government was very glad to make the bargain, but the English officials had no concern about keeping it. It was scandalously and tyrannously violated. The sepoys, despairing of all hope of again seeing their country, and smarting under a sense of wrong, gave way to the vindictive passions which characterise the Bengalees, and the hatred of Europeans and Christians, which is as strongly characteristic of them, and formed the sanguinary purpose, which, had it not been timely discovered, would have been ruthlessly executed. It is remarkable how the sepoy has ever proved himself the same sanguinary monster, whether at Vellore, or Java, or Cawnpore. It is equally remarkable that after such decided proofs of their readiness, men and officers, to assassinate their comrades and defenceless Europeans, upon any provocation from the government, that both the government and British officers continued to trust them, until the mutiny of 1857, and the horrid butcheries

of Cawnpore. Some of the criminals of Java were executed, the rest were drafted into battalions returning home. A sanguinary outrage was in truth the shortest way to obtain justice, when the soldier in India was robbed or wronged by his superiors.

In 1816, Java was given up to Holland. The overthrow of Napoleon Buonaparte in the campaign of 1813, led to general rearrangements among the European governments, all of whom showed jealousy of England, upon whom the brunt of the war fell in the coalition against France. The ministers of England were deficient in intelligence, patriotism, and diplomatic talent. They were far more solicitous to prop up the despotisms of continental Europe, to flatter, and to caress them, than they were to secure the commercial advantage and national honour of the United Kingdom. The authorities in India made strong representations against the surrender of Java. The East India Company was anxious for its retention. Sir Stamford Raffles pointed out, in an able despatch, the vast resources of that island, as one of the richest and most fertile places on the globe. He showed that the time must come when a mighty trade would be carried on through the Straits with China, and that whatever European power or powers would possess the islands of the Eastern Archipelago could command that trade. The despatch of the eminent statesmen, the lieutenant-governor of Java, was not even read by the minister of the day: and other important despatches were at the same time treated with similar insolent contempt, or culpable neglect. The grand object with the ministry was the upholding and extension of despotic government everywhere. The opposition were influenced in their arguments, and perhaps in their motives, by party. When Java was conquered, Sheridan, who knew nothing of the subject, and who, except for party purposes, seldom paid attention to any matter of public interest, derided the conquest as not worth the expense incurred. The object of the eloquent declaimer was to damage the ministry; he took no trouble to ascertain the truth. The object of the English ministry was to satisfy the Holy Alliance; English commerce, and the interests of the English people, were secondary objects. No surrender of territory was ever made by the English more impolitic. The abandonment of Borneo at a later period, although a most injurious step to English interests, and in spite of the expressed will of the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers of England, as well as the merchants of Singapore and India, was not so purblind as the surrender of Java. In 1814 when England agreed to surrender

Java to the Dutch, the revenue of the island was more than half a million sterling. The government of Holland was so occupied by the return of Napoleon from Elba, and the campaign in Belgium and France in 1815,

that it was unable to take advantage of the cession made by "its generous ally." It was not therefore until the end of 1816, that the Dutch flag again floated over the queen of the eastern isles.

CHAPTER CVI.

HOME EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE 19TH CENTURY TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CHARTER IN 1833-4.

THE century opened as to the home affairs of the company with a grave discussion concerning "the shipping interest." The company's ships were the finest merchantmen in the world; capable of coping in battle with the martial navies of other countries, even with those of Holland, France, and Spain. The peculiar manner in which these ships were held as property, by persons holding votes in the proprietary, gave a distinct preponderance of this particular interest over other separate interests in connection with the company. The result was a monopoly which proved injurious to the company and the country, which was offensive in England as in India, and objected to by the parliament and the board of control. The measures of the Marquis Wellesley in India, in taking up Indian-built ships to carry freights to England, shook the monopoly, and led to a fierce opposition on the part of the proprietary to the encroachments of the crown. After a contest, the details of which would afford no interest to the reader in these days, the crown triumphed. The circumstance is important, as it was the beginning of successive encroachments upon the exclusive privileges of the company, which rapidly succeeded in the course of the present century, until the East India Company ceased to be a trading society. The disputes with the shipping interest were not concluded, when new differences arose between the company and the board of control, about "the private trade." M. Anber, commenting upon this quarrel, wisely observed, "A combination of circumstances frequently gave rise to feelings that never would have existed had the causes which produced them been disposed of as they arose." At the close of 1802, M. Bosanquet, being chairman of the court of directors, and Lord Castlereagh president of the board of control, there was more harmony than usual between the two branches of Indian government. Still there arose discussions upon finance that were vexatious. The company possessing the exclusive trade of India and China, the English public

and parliament were unwilling to render any aid to the company towards bearing the expenses of the great wars carried on in India. Besides it was alleged that the conquered territory should pay the expense of the conquest. Yet, whatever might be the ultimate relation of the revenues of the new territory to the expense incurred in obtaining them, they seldom repaid it for many years. Most of the wars in the East with European powers have been, through the whole period of British connection, initiated by the board of control, or by the governors-general, who were its nominees and in secret correspondence with its chief. These wars were frequently opposed to the policy and directions of the company. The board was exacting upon the directors. The directors complained that their profits were swallowed up by the expenses of a policy adverse to their interests and their wishes, and entirely the work of the government. Frequently, when it appeared to the world as if the company and the board were of one mind, the former was obliged to submit to the latter, under threats of bringing their differences before parliament, and overthrowing their monopoly by an appeal to the principles of one class and the prejudices of other classes of the British people. In fact the company was in continual danger of having their ships, stores, and funds employed for the advantage of the general public, under the orders of the secret committee of the board of control, or under the direct and arbitrary orders of the crown. Whenever the company requested the reimbursement of the immense property thus squandered by the state at their expense, their accounts were disputed, or they were told that the public exchequer would not allow of the repayment. Hints and threats were generally added, that if they made any noise about the matter, the parliament and public would be appealed to against the monopoly. From the time the company was rich enough to become an object of plunder, the crown and parliament were ever ready iniquitously to deprive it of its property, under

threats, if it did not submit, of destroying its privileges. Among the most blunt and uncourteous of the company's tyrants at the board of control was Lord Castlereagh. The mild but severely just remonstrances of the company's chairman, Mr. Bosanquet, in 1803, rebuked the officious and unprincipled statesman, with a dignity and power which any other minister but his lordship would have felt.

The directors in 1803, as indeed at all times, wrote to the governor-general, urging economy and the liquidation of the debt. The governor-general urged that money should be sent from England for the investments. Lord Wellesley, and all other governor-generals appointed by the board of control, treated Indian finance as if the East India Company was an association conveniently existing for the purpose of providing England with funds to make war in the East against other European nations, offensive or defensive, as the case might be, and for adding to the glory of England by Asiatic conquests. Clive, Hastings, Barlow—in a word, the company's own servants, when invested with supreme power, acted as if the object of their government was to consider and to promote the interests of a great commercial association, called the East India Company, which they were bound to serve as their employers. In their conquests, while they were patriotic and jealous for the renown of England, they regarded battle and victory as a part of their business as agents of the company. Under the board of control, the governor-general was a leading member of the aristocracy, appointed for party purposes, as a reward for home services, rather than his fitness for India; and he acted as if his main business was to fulfil his period of office in such a manner as would redound to his own glory; prove the cabinet which nominated him wise in their nomination, and assist in keeping up, or creating, a parliamentary majority for his party. The company, which created the English interest in India by its own resources and at its own risk, has been generally treated as a troublesome appendage to the board of control, interfering with the patronage of the president, the cabinet, and the governor-general. The double government never worked well, not because it was a double government, as was supposed by many, but because the objects of the two governing bodies were opposed. Either the board of control should have been so constituted as to be a check, in the interest of the nation, upon the improper exercise of the privileges entrusted to the company, or the company should have been abolished when the board was formed. The president of that


board aimed at objects altogether alien to the privileges and existence of the company, and in the interest, not of the nation, but of a dominant party of the crown, and of the ministry of the time being.

In the beginning of 1804, the directors were alarmed at the drain of specie caused by the wars of the Marquis Wellesley. Lord Castlereagh encouraged the marquis in disregarding the opinions of the directors, who, whenever they complained of the expenses caused by wars, were set at nought by the joint action of the person at the head of the board at home, and the person at the head of the council abroad. While war was raging, and the directors dreaded bankruptcy, the board of control was engaged in costly plans connected with the Calcutta college and other projects.

In 1805 the policy of Lord Wellesley was impugned with great severity in the house of commons by Paull. This gentleman had been a servant of the company, and resident in Oude. In that situation he received much kindness from Lord Wellesley, which he repaid with ingratitude. The dissolution of parliament in 1807 stopped Mr. Paull's proceedings. This gentleman did not again obtain a seat in parliament. He committed suicide in 1808.

Lord Folkestone took up the impeachment of Lord Wellesley. He was aided by a considerable number of members, but their incriminatory resolutions were rejected by large majorities. Still his lordship's transactions in Oude were regarded as precisely similar to those of Hastings, and it was demanded that his aristocratic connexions should not screen him. The whole of these discussions were set at rest by a resolution, asserting his personal honour, public zeal, and usefulness, being proposed by Sir John Anstruther, which was carried by an overwhelming majority. This did not satisfy the directors of the East India Company, who persisted in regarding the policy of Lord Wellesley as one of aggrandizement and war, injurious to the trade and ruinous to the finance of the company. They believed that neither the war with Tippoo nor the Mahrattas was necessary, that both should have been allowed to pursue their course of intrigue in their own way, the governor-general simply providing for the security of the company's territories in case of invasion.

Throughout these proceedings in the commons, the noble marquis received the support of the crown and the cabinet. He was even offered the seals of the foreign office during the progress of the parliamentary proceedings. His lordship, with a high sense of honour, such as all who knew him would have expected, declined office while charges were hanging over him.



M.A. Sneyd. Sculp.

H. Bourne

THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUIS OF TASPINE

In 1809 he was deputed ambassador to the junta in Spain; in 1810, he was invested with the Order of the Garter, and throughout his long career held many offices of distinction, and always with honour.

When Lord Cornwallis assumed the government of India, his first care was that most usually the trouble of all governor-generals—*finance*. He was very popular with the directors; they were therefore filled with astonishment and alarm when they learned that he had taken treasure intended for the Chinese investment out of the ships at Madras, to the amount of a quarter of a million sterling. When, in February, 1806, intelligence of his lordship's death reached England, the directors received it with the deepest concern. Apart from the personal esteem which they entertained for him, he had initiated a policy of retrenchment to make up for the quarter of a million sterling, and to compensate for the war policy of his predecessor. So attached were the directors to his lordship, and so highly did they approve of his plans, that they bestowed upon his son and successor the sum of £40,000.

On the 20th of January, 1806, Mr. Pitt died, a man whose policy had exercised a decisive influence upon the affairs of the company. But for him it is probable the board of control had never been formed.

A fierce contest ensued between the board of control and the court of directors in naming a successor to Lord Cornwallis. It was agreed on all hands that Sir George Barlow should occupy that post temporarily, but the board wished to force upon the directors Lord Lauderdale; the directors contended that Sir G. Barlow, their own servant, was competent. They knew nothing of Lord Lauderdale, had no confidence in him, and would not be parties to his appointment. The court refused to revoke the appointment of Sir George. Lord Minto had succeeded Lord Castlereagh as president of the board of control, and he intimated to the directors, on the 29th of May, that the king had revoked the appointment of Sir G. Barlow. The court of directors presented an indignant remonstrance. As a compromise, Lord Minto himself was appointed. The whole proceeding was discreditable to the crown and the cabinet. Whatever the merits of Lord Minto ultimately proved to be, Sir G. Barlow was competent, and there was no ground for his removal, but the desire on the part of the ruling party in the state to wrest the patronage from the company, and make the office of governor-general of India an appointment dependent upon the services rendered in English party politics by the person obtaining it.

This mode of disposing of the high office of governor-general of India was as strikingly illustrated by the way in which Lord Minto himself was replaced by the Earl of Moira (Marquis of Hastings). Professor Wilson states, that on the change of ministry in November, 1811, the ministry were obliged by circumstances to confer the office on Lord Moira. His lordship had been engaged to form a ministry, and this was to be his reward.

"A resolution was accordingly moved by the chairman (of the court of directors), under the dictation, no doubt, of the board of control, that Lord Minto should be recalled. No reason for the measure was assigned; but it was adopted in opposition to the tenor of a letter received from Lord Minto's friends, expressing his wish to be relieved in January, 1814. This letter was assigned as the reason for the immediate appointment of Earl Moira; but, as objected by one of the opponents of the arrangement, Mr. Charles Grant, the plea was delusive, as no one could pretend to assign it as a sufficient reason for proceeding to the choice of a governor-general in November, 1811, whose presence at Fort William could only be necessary in January, 1814."

In the years 1813-14, the amount of the debt of India was £27,000,000; the interest, £1,636,000, a permanent diminution of £592,000 annual interest. But taking the sicca rupee at two shillings, the debt would be only £23,183,000, and the interest only £1,402,287.

The year 1813 was one of great importance to the East India Company. It was then the first great inroad was made in its exclusive privileges. From the beginning of 1811 a very warm discussion was maintained by the mercantile public, and by political economists, with "the East India interest." A very considerable power was brought to bear upon the members of both houses of parliament against the renewal of the company's charter.

On the 22nd of February a petition was presented to parliament by the company praying for a renewal of the charter, and setting forth the grounds upon which such prayer was urged.

On the 13th of March the house of commons, on the motion of Lord Castlereagh, resolved itself into a committee, when his lordship submitted resolutions altering the constitution of the company. The company demanded permission to give evidence, and to be heard at the bar of the house. On the 30th of March their first witness was produced, no less a person than the great Warren Hastings. Afterwards the subject was con-

sidered by select committees, and the results published in two large quarto volumes.* The minister was not moved by any evidence submitted by the company: neither was the commons. They passed the resolutions of Lord Castlereagh, and a bill founded on them. The Lords hastily passed it.†

In the chapter on the government of India, notice was taken of the various changes made in the power and authority of the company by successive acts of parliament. It is therefore unnecessary in this place to enlarge upon the subject of the changes in 1813. The following abstract of the modifications then made is, however, necessary to enable the reader to take a comprehensive view of the new condition of the company, and the way in which the affairs of India were influenced by them:—

“The trade of India was thrown open in ships of a given tonnage, under license from the court of directors, on whose refusal an appeal lay to the board, to whom the directors were to transmit the papers with their resolution thereon. The resort of parties to India for commercial and other purposes was placed under similar provisions.

“In order to satisfy the doubts which had arisen regarding the outturn of the company's commercial affairs, the accounts were, in future, to be separated, under the two heads of ‘territory’ and ‘commerce,’ according to a plan approved by parliament. It exhibited what portion of the extensive establishments, both in India and at home, came under each head of charge, and showed the result of the company's financial resources, whether arising from commerce or territory.

“A general authority was given to the board over the appropriation of the territorial revenues, and the surplus commercial profits, which might accrue after a strict observance of the appropriation clauses.

“The board were to have control over the college and seminary in England. The offices of governor-general, governors, and commanders-in-chief, were now made subject to the approval of the crown. Restoration of suspended or dismissed servants was not valid without the consent of the board; neither could the court of directors grant any sum beyond £600 without their concurrence.

“An episcopal establishment was also authorised.”

The revenue measures of the Marquis Hastings occupied the attention of the court of directors during several years, beginning in 1816. His reports on criminal justice and

* *Reports of the East India Committees, 1813-14.*

† 53 George III., cap. 155.

civil judicature made in 1818, also engaged much of the attention of the directors.

In 1819 the directors were so pleased with the labours and successes, civil and military, of the Marquis of Hastings, that they recommended the court of proprietors to vote a sum of £60,000 out of the territorial revenues of India, to purchase estates in any part of the United Kingdom for his lordship's emolument.

From the year 1819 until the termination of the government of Lord Hastings, disputes were maintained between the British and Dutch governments concerning Eastern affairs. The occupation of Singapore, where Sir Stamford Raffles had asserted British authority, provoked the jealous susceptibilities of the Dutch, who, after the surrender to them of the Island of Java, laid claim to a monopoly of the trade of the Archipelago. Mr. Canning was then president of the board of control, and he spared no pains to qualify himself to meet the Dutch commissioners, who were appointed to press upon the English government an adjustment of the dispute. For five years these debates continued, frequent reference to India necessarily deferring a settlement. At last, in 1824, a treaty terminated the contest. By this agreement the Dutch were to surrender to the English all their settlements in continental India; Malacca, and Singapore, were to be recognised as English settlements. The Dutch were to obtain Sumatra. Great public dissatisfaction was felt by the British mercantile public with this treaty. To the influence of Sir Stamford Raffles it was due, that the English minister who in 1814 had surrendered Java, did not surrender all the Straits' settlements. Lord Castlereagh cared little for commerce, or the commercial classes; his aim was to satisfy the despotic governments of the continent, and maintain an intimate alliance with them. His successors for many years were as little disposed to study the interests of the mercantile classes.

Sir Evan Nepean having resigned the government of Bombay in 1818, Mr. Canning intimated to the directors his desire to appoint as governor of that presidency some eminent servant of the company, or distinguished otherwise in public employment. This was an invasion by Mr. Canning of the custom of the board of control in grasping at the patronage of India for party and ministerial purposes. The directors made choice of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.* He was nominated governor of Bombay in October, 1818.

In 1823 the Marquis of Hastings was re-

* Subsequently this gentleman acquired great celebrity by his work on India, especially the Mohammedan period of Indian history.

ceived, upon his return to England, with distinguished manifestation of approval by the government and the company. It was resolved by the latter to confer upon him some further substantial mark of their approbation. This consisted in a vote of £20,000 to his son, which, however, was not conferred until 1827.

When, in 1822, the Marquis Hastings resigned the office of governor-general, the Right Hon. George Canning was nominated to that office. This was the spontaneous act of the directors, in consequence of Mr. Canning's intelligent and conciliatory direction of the board of control. This arrangement was, however, doomed to disappointment, for the death of the Marquis of Londonderry (Lord Castlereagh) led to a reconstruction of parties, and of the ministry, and on the 18th of September, Mr. Canning accepted the seals of the foreign office.

In 1819 Sir Thomas Munro was appointed governor of Madras, and it was generally expected that, upon the resignation of Mr. Canning, he would be promoted to the vacated office. Two other candidates of greater influence, however, stood forward, Earl Amherst, and Lord W. Bentinck. The interest of the former nobleman prevailed. He assumed the office on the 1st of August, 1823. Mr. Adam, the senior member of council, had filled the chair from the departure of the Marquis of Hastings.

For several years after the departure of Earl Amherst to his government, the company and parliament had little to occupy them concerning India of a nature to interest the general public, except returning thanks for victories gained by British troops in fresh wars, and the distribution of prize-money won by their exploits.

In 1827 the company was deprived of a valuable servant, by the death of Sir Thomas Munro. He had rendered great advantages to the presidency of Madras by his improvements in the judicial and revenue systems, and possessed the highest confidence of the court of directors and proprietary. His opinions on Indian affairs are quoted as decisive authority, yet few men of eminence in India, and of equal ability and experience, have more frequently erred in their views of the probable prospects of the people and the country. The directors found it a difficult task to select a suitable successor to Sir Thomas Munro. Their choice fell upon the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington, Jan. 1827. On the same day, Major-general Sir John Malcolm was appointed governor of Bombay, in the room of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.* Nei-

ther Mr. Lushington nor General Malcolm left England for India until the July following the date of their nomination to office. The year which witnessed the appointment of Mr. Lushington and Sir John Malcolm to the government of the minor presidencies, saw the departure of Lord Amherst from India, and the appointment of Lord W. Bentinck as governor-general. He did not, however, leave England for his post of honour until February, 1828. He and Lord Amherst met at the Cape of Good Hope.

The uneasiness of the court of directors during 1828-9, concerning the increase of the public debt in India, was very great. From 1824 to 1828 it had increased more than thirteen millions sterling, in consequence of war, and the acquisitions of territory causing the extension of the civil service. The revenues of the company did not keep pace with this accumulation of debt. The instructions of the board of directors to the governor-general to effect retrenchment assumed a tone of great urgency.

In 1830 the proposition for constituting a legislative council occupied the government in Calcutta, and in London. In the month of October in that year the draft of a proposed bill was sent to the court of directors by the governor-general, for the purpose of being submitted to parliament. This draft underwent modifications, after much discussion at the board of control and the court of directors, and finally formed a part of the new act upon the renewal of the company's charter, in 1833.

In the month of May, 1833, Lord William Bentinck was appointed commander-in-chief in India, in the room of Sir Edward Barnes. This was the third instance of a governor-general being at the same time commander-in-chief. During the whole time of Lord William Bentinck's government, the correspondence between the company and the governor-general on the subject of revenue was constant. The revenue papers of this period are most voluminous, and disclose the labour and ability of his lordship, and the diligence and talent which were then in the court of directors.

The employment of natives in various departments of the state was strenuously advocated by Lord William Bentinck, and perhaps too readily acquiesced in to the extent of his recommendations by the directors. Native agents must be employed in India, but they constitute the grand difficulty of administration. Evils, for which the government of the presidencies, the supreme council, the board of control, and the court of directors, have been held severally or together responsible,

* This enlightened historian, diplomatist, statesman, and administrator survives in 1859.

have originated in the native agencies, which are almost always corrupt, mercenary, cruel, and perfidious.

During the government of Lord William Bentinck, the home authorities were much occupied with the consideration of the dilatory modes of communication between India and England. Except in certain instructions regulating the personal conduct of the governor-general, little was done to remedy an inconvenience intensely felt. The subject of steam navigation, as applied to India, had been brought under the notice of the court in 1823 by a despatch from the government of Bombay, but in the meantime nothing had been effected. In the year 1825, the voyage to India by steam had been accomplished in the ship *Enterprise*, commanded by Captain Johnson. She was, however, under sail without steam a fourth of her voyage. This ship, with other steamers, had been employed in the Birmese war, yet no organized method of utilizing steam, for the benefit of our Indian empire, and English communication with it, had been adopted. The enterprising labours of Mr. Waghorn, in order to establish steam navigation *via* Egypt, engaged the attention of the English in India and in England during a considerable portion of Lord William Bentinck's administration. It was not until 1834 that the subject was thoroughly taken up by the house of commons. It was deemed expedient to extend the line of the Malta packets to such ports in Egypt and Syria as would complete the communication between England and India, and that a grant of £20,000 should be made by parliament for trying the experiment with the least possible delay. The enterprises of Colonel (General) Chesney in proving that the Euphrates was navigable, and that its navigation might be made to facilitate the intercommunication of the East and West, also engaged parliamentary discussion.

The dreadful bankruptcies of commercial houses in Calcutta, and other parts of India, in 1833-4, produced great alarm in London, and in several respects embarrassed the court of directors. In the commercial chapters of this work an account was given of this state of things in India, and the causes which produced it.

In a former chapter a history of the different charters was presented to the reader, rendering it unnecessary in this place to enter into minute detail. The affairs of the company, however, assumed in 1833-4 an aspect so entirely new as to require a relation of their progress. On Thursday, the 13th of June, 1833, Mr. Grant, in a committee of the whole house, brought before the commons the consideration of the charter. He made a general

statement on behalf of the government, and proposed a series of resolutions. The statement partly conveyed the purposes of the government, and partly the opinions upon which their project was based. The following, stripped of the arguments and eloquence of the speaker, is an abstract of his statement:—"The whole of the transaction was to be entirely free from the finances of this country. The ability of the Indian territories was not to be doubted. The intentions with regard to the internal government of India were then pointed out. It was proposed to establish a fourth government in the western provinces; to extend the powers of the governor-general; to appoint a supreme council, to whom power was to be given to make laws for India, and to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court. The presidencies of Madras and Bombay were to be made more subordinate to the governor-general, and their councils reduced. The following resolutions were then moved:—

"1st. That it is expedient that all his majesty's subjects shall be at liberty to repair to the ports of the empire of China, and to trade in tea and in all other productions of the said empire, subject to such regulations as parliament shall enact for the protection of the commercial and political interests of this country.

"2nd. That it is expedient that, in case the East India Company shall transfer to the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, all assets and claims of every description belonging to the said company, the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, shall take on itself all the obligations of the said company, of whatever description; and that the said company shall receive from the revenues of the said territory such a sum, and paid in such a manner, and under such regulations, as parliament shall enact.

"3rd. That it is expedient that the government of the British possessions in India be entrusted to the said company, under such conditions and regulations as parliament shall enact, for the purpose of extending the commerce of this country, and of securing the good government, and promoting the moral and religious improvement of the people of India."

These resolutions, and the bill founded upon them, a copy of which was sent to the directors on the 29th of June, led to much discussion between the company and the ministers of the crown. On the 3rd of July the bill was laid before the court of proprietors, having been presented to parliament and read a first time on the 25th of June. The second reading of the bill took place in the

commissions on the 11th of July, and a third time on the 26th. The bill went up to the lords with such powerful support that it rapidly passed that house, being read a third time on the 16th of August. On the 28th, the royal assent was given to it by commission. The rapidity with which the bill was carried, was thought as extraordinary as the change which it effected in the character of the company.

M. Auber makes the following comment upon the parliamentary success with which the government measure was crowned, and the policy of the East India Company in reference to a bill which deprived it of so much of its authority and privilege:—"The change which it has made in the character of the company is as great as the rapidity with which it was effected was extraordinary. Scarcely six weeks intervened between the announcement of the scheme to the general court and its adoption in principle by a ballot of eight to one in its favour. It was a strong testimony to the judgment and foresight manifested by the court of directors in the management of the company's commercial affairs, that, on so sudden and unexpected a termination of those operations, the financial

out-turn should have secured a continuation of the same rate of dividend as had been enjoyed by the stockholders for the preceding forty years, when the company were in possession of their exclusive privileges, and also provide for the foundation of an accumulating guarantee fund for their principal of twelve millions."

The commercial character of the company was now at an end. From 1813 to 1834 it existed in a restricted form; in April, 1834, it ceased for ever. Its title of "East India Company," and its territorial lordship, remained. All the commercial property of the company was sold. Their *real* capital was estimated at twenty-one millions sterling. Their dividends were guaranteed by the act of 1833, on a nominal capital of six millions, at 10½ per cent. These dividends were made chargeable on the revenue of India. Although subsequent events did not confirm such expectations, the charter of 1833-4 ostensibly threw open India to British adventurers, and natives and settlers were eligible to office. How the new charter worked, and its effects upon affairs, home or Indian, must be reserved for other chapters.

CHAPTER CVII.

GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST—BIRMESE WAR—CAPTURE OF RANGOON—ADVANCE UP THE IRRIWADDY—OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONTIER OF BENGAL—TREATY WITH BIRMAH.

LORD HASTINGS left Calcutta in January, 1823, and Mr. Adams, as senior member of council, assumed the government *pro tempore*. That gentleman only retained the high office seven months, during which he obtained much odium and much praise. Some of his measures were well calculated to confer benefit on India; others, although well meant, were not fortunate, and some were very unfavourably received. None of them were of sufficient importance to bring before our readers. That which involved Mr. Adams's administration in most discussion at home, was his attempt to impose restrictions upon the press, which the Marquis of Hastings had removed. Mr. Adams believed that the natives who possessed some education, would use the press seditiously, and that European settlers would employ it to the detriment of the company. It was explained in the last chapter how Mr. Canning was elected to the post vacated by Lord Hastings, and resigned the

office before sailing for India. It was also shown how Lord Amherst secured the interest requisite for an appointment, which began to be regarded as desirable by the highest of the aristocracy. When, on the 1st of August, 1823, Earl Amherst arrived, he found serious cares remaining for the government. There was nothing in the first few months during which he administered affairs to call for remarks from the historian, but he was then obliged to maintain a war with the Birmeese, which, as shown in former chapters, had for many years menaced the frontiers of Assam and Arracan. This formidable quarrel was the more an impediment to the civil administration of his lordship, as his government was much opposed by the partizans of Lord Hastings, and he was himself averse from several of the noble marquis's proceedings, especially in the affairs of Calcutta and Bengal. Captain White observes:—"It is almost impossible to imagine the arduous, difficult, and

perplexing situation in which Lord Amherst stood. For besides the important duties he had to perform as governor-general, he had a most formidable opposition to contend against in the council chamber. This was produced by the *change of men*, in the change of governor-generals. Lord Hastings had generally left much to his council, or his favourites, who were men certainly not of the most brilliant talent. Lord Amherst, not wishing to imitate the example of the noble marquis, determined to judge for himself, and not by proxy. There were other causes, too, which tended to create difficulty, and render his lordship unpopular. These were unfortunate circumstances to have happened at any time, but more particularly so at that critical period; because they all tended not only to embarrass the mind of his lordship, which required the utmost tranquillity, but to impede the progress and welfare of the operations of government."

The captain was himself a partizan of Earl Amherst, and some allowance must be made when he draws a comparison invidious to Lord Hastings. It was, however, plain enough that the noble earl inherited from the noble marquis some very troublesome questions, which the friends of the former would have preferred to find in a satisfactory course of settlement.

BIRMESE WAR.

The *immediate* cause of hostilities with Birmah was rival claims concerning the Island of Shuparee, situated at the entrance of the Nauf river. This river was the boundary between the two territories, and, flowing between the island and the Birmese side, the English naturally claimed it as their own. The Birmese contended that it had been theirs centuries before; but if this claim had been good, they might also be the owners of Chittagong and Moorshedabad. The Birmese had made no pretension to this island until 1821, nor did they then urge any alleged right. Their demand, therefore, in 1823 had all the appearance of seeking an occasion for war.

Early in January, 1823, a "Mugh boat," laden with grain, was passing near the island. It was stopped by the Birmese, and the steersman was shot. The object of this was to deter the ryots of the company from cultivating the island, which being a mere sand-bank, was certainly not an enviable possession for either British or Birmese. When the magistrate of Chittagong heard of the cruel outrage, he posted a sergeant's guard of sepoy upon the island. Immediately the Birmese assembled a much stronger force on

their bank of the Nauf. The English magistrate increased the strength of the post to fifty men. Early in May, the Birmese authorities of Arracan made a formal demand to the magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the troops, or there would be war. Late in May the demand was renewed more sternly, and in language of stronger menace. The magistrate replied that the island had belonged to the British for a lengthened period, but if the King of Ava had a claim, it would be negotiated at Calcutta, in conformity with justice and the friendship of the two nations, but that force would be repelled by force.

On the 3rd of August, a vakeel from the governor of Arracan waited upon the magistrate of Chittagong, and made a written demand for withdrawal from the island, which, it alleged, belonged not to the British, but to the "Golden Government." The governor-general himself replied to this communication, asserting the right of the Bengal government to the island, but offering to send an officer of rank to negotiate, and bring all disputes, if possible, to an amicable termination. The Birmese had no faith in the English government from the repeated violations of pledges in former disputes, they therefore resolved to bring the matter to the arbitrament of force. On the night of the 24th of September, a party of 1000 Birmese landed on the island, attacked and routed the guard of sepoy, killing and wounding several. What Sir John Malcolm had predicted had come to pass, and in consequence of the neglect, on the part of the government of Bengal, of those means which he had recommended. The Birmese did not remain on the island, and as soon as they evacuated it, another party of sepoy was sent there.

The governor-general, anxious to promote peace, treated the attack on the island as one by the governor of Arracan, unauthorised by his imperial majesty of Ava. A letter was sent to Rangoon, by ship from Calcutta, addressed to the viceroy, mildly expostulating against the outrage committed, and expressing the expectation that the act of the governor of Arracan would be disavowed. The governor-general also addressed a letter to the governor of Arracan, expressing his astonishment and indignation. The rajah replied:—"The island was never under the authority of the Moors or the English; the stockade thereon has consequently been destroyed in pursuance of the commands of the great Lord of the Seas and Earth. If you want tranquillity, be quiet; but if you rebuild a stockade at Shein-ma-bu, I will cause to be taken by force of arms the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad, which originally belonged

to the great Arracan Rajah, whose chokies and pagodas were there. The rajah also verbally informed the messenger dispatched with the letter, that if the British government attempted to retake the island, they would invade Bengal by Assam and Goolpara, and would enter Chittagong by the mountains from Goorjeeneea, up to Tipperah: adding that the King of Ava had armies ready for the invasion of the British dominions at every point; and that they had driven them from the Island of Shuparee by his majesty's command.*

It was evident from this reply, written and *visa voce*, that the Birmese emperor had been long preparing for war, and had laid his plan of operations.

On the 11th of November, the agent to the company on the north-east frontier, announced to the government that a large force had been dispatched from the Birmese province of Assam for the conquest of Cachar; bordering on the company's province of Silhet. The English government had made a tributary convention with Cachar, and in virtue of this demanded that the Birmese troops should make no offensive demonstrations against that state. The Birmese, however, claimed an older prescription for a connection of the same kind. The English, therefore, threatened as they were along the whole line of the north-east frontier,—the Birmese openly avowing their intention to wrest from them Moorsheadabad, Dacca, Tipperah, and Chittagong,—could allow no incursion in that direction by the troops of Birman. On the south-east frontier of Chittagong, large armies were collecting for the purposes of invasion in that quarter. "It was no longer a question for the surrender of fugitives and rebels, but a far more important one—who should be the supreme sovereigns of India."

In January, 1824, the sepoys were withdrawn from the island at the mouth of the Nauf, in consequence of its unhealthy situation. The Arracan rajah then offered to regard it as neutral territory, but accompanied the proposal with insulting menaces of invasion in case of non-compliance. The governor-general refused to accept a proposal so made.

On the 15th of January four ministers of rank from Ava, arrived on the frontier, crossed to the island, and hoisted the standard of the Birmese empire. The ministers sent invitations to the officers of the company's troops on the frontier to visit them, and to the officers of vessels in the river, in the hope

* *Political History of the Events which led to the Birmese War.*

of accommodating matters by friendly conversation. The officers of the pilot schooner, *Sophia*, attended by two lascars, landed in acceptance of the invitation. They were all seized and sent into the interior of Arracan. The military officers were sufficiently wary not to place themselves in the power of a people who made war so treacherously. This perfidious and violent act of the Birmese emperor's ministers alarmed the people on the Chittagong frontier, who fled with their families, fearing that they might be seized and made slaves. The English government demanded the restoration of the kidnapped officers and lascars, and reparation for the offence. No notice was taken of the demand. The British employed themselves writing and negotiating when they ought to have been acting, and in this way increased the public danger, and caused eventually a heavier loss of human life.

At the end of January, 1824, the Rajah of Arracan formally refused, in the name of the emperor, to deliver up the officers and men of the *Sophia*. Early in the same month Cachar was invaded by two Birmese armies. The English met this demonstration by several well-written letters on the part of their agent, which probably amused more than edified the Birmese commanders; and certainly, after all that had occurred between the two states, was not likely to deter the Birmese officers from executing the commands of their superiors. The general wrote a letter in reply, the substance of which might be comprised in one of its sentences—"We have eyes and ears, and have the interest of our sovereigns at heart."*

The regions of Cachar and Assam were torn by factions, which facts were made available by the Birmese to promote their own designs of aggrandizement. The English resolved to make these local feuds instrumental in checking the Birmese. Accordingly, on the 18th of January, the officer on the frontier, learning that a united Birmese and Assamese force had passed into Cachar, at the foot of the Birtea lien pass, and were stockading themselves at Bickram-pore, and that two other forces had penetrated in other directions, resolved also to enter the Cachar country. The first blood drawn was on the 17th, the English fell in with a Birmese stockade, from which a fire was opened upon them. Major Newton, who commanded the British, stormed the blockade in the most gallant manner with trifling loss, and put 175 Birmese to the bayonet. The Birmese army, six thousand in number, advanced within five miles of the company's

* There were two kings or emperors at Ava, the temporal and the ecclesiastical.

territory. Major Newton withdrew his troops to the frontier post of Bhadrapore. The English wrote letters, and sent messengers requesting the Birmese to do what they had so many times declared they would not do. Instead of attending to these epistolary expostulations, they published flaming manifestoes, strongly stockaded themselves on the English frontier, and demanded that Major Newton and his soldiers should be given up to the Birmese authorities to be executed! The English, of course, again replied, and it is difficult to say how long they would have continued to substitute arguments for arms, if events had not compelled a more decisive course. The release of the kidnapped mariners, who had been treated kindly in their captivity, possibly deferred a little the final blow; but it at last fell—the governor-general proclaimed war against the Birmese empire. The justice of his doing so has been arraigned by a party in England who are ever ready to denounce the proceedings of their own government, and more especially in India. The following opinion and statement of facts, from the pen of the immortal Sir Henry Havelock, the saviour of India, is a just defence of the war:—"Previous to this invasion of our little island territory, the question of the direct invasion of Bengal had been discussed in the hall of the Lotoo, or grand council of state, and the king, though a man of mild disposition, and not caring much to encounter a war with the governors of India, had yielded to the arguments of his councillors, and, amidst the applauses of the assembly, had sanctioned the invasion of Bengal. At that grand council the Bundoola, with vows and vehement gestures, announced that from that moment Bengal was taken from under the British dominions; his words being: 'Henceforth it has become in fact, what it has ever been in right, a province of the Golden King. The Bundoola has said and sworn it.'"^{*} It was a war, said Havelock, "for the vindication of the national honour, insulted and compromised by the aggressions and encroachments of a barbarous neighbour. A war for the security of the peaceable inhabitants of the districts of Chittagong, Moorshedabad, Rungpore, Silhet, Tipperah, menaced with the repetition of the atrocities perpetrated the year before in Assam. That would indeed have been a parental government that should have consented to have abandoned its subjects to the tender mercies of Bundoola and the Maha Silwa!"[†]

^{*} *The Good Soldier: A Memoir of Major-general Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B.* By Rev. W. Owen. London.

[†] It is not generally known that "the good soldier,"

The measures taken by the commander-in-chief of the British army were as follows. He recommended three brigades of three thousand men each to be stationed on the eastern frontier, at Chittagong, Jumalporc, and a flotilla on the Burrampooter towards Assam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The troops on the frontier were ordered to defend those provinces, and if necessary or politic, to cross into the frontiers of the enemy, but not to seek conquests in those directions. The grand attack was to be made on the maritime provinces of the Birmese empire.

Thus, while the emperor meditated an invasion of the contumacious territory of the British, the latter, barely defending that line, carried war along the coasts of the emperor. The troops to conduct the defensive operations belonged, as a matter of course, to the Bengal army. The forces destined for offensive operations were partly from Bengal, and partly from Madras, royal and company's regiments: from Bengal her majesty's 13th and 38th foot, two companies of artillery, and the 40th native infantry (marine corps), 2175 men; from Madras her majesty's 41st and 89th foot and Madras European regiment, and, including seven native regiments, 9th, 12th, 28th, and 30th Madras native infantry, artillery, and pioneers, 9300 men, or grand total, 11,475 men. The object was to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irriwaddy river. The Bengal troops sailed in April, 1824. Besides transports, there was

Sir Henry Havelock, was an author. On this subject our readers will peruse with interest the following remarks of the Rev. W. Owen, from his most interesting memoir of the general:—"Havelock had not been long in India before the outbreak of the first Birmese war called into action his qualities as a soldier, and subsequently gave him an opportunity of employing his pen as a 'soldierly writer.' Owing to the publication of his 'Memoir' in Serampore instead of London, and six months after the excitement had died away, the work never acquired the popular favour which its merits should have commanded. The volume has nearly fallen into the class of rare books, and it is said that one copy only can be found in London. This book affords an opportunity of presenting Havelock before the public as the narrator of the various scenes in which his military prowess was first called into exercise. The memoir of the three campaigns of Sir Archibald Campbell's army in Ava, was written when Henry Havelock was a lieutenant in the 13th light infantry, and deputy-adjutant-general to the forces of the Rangoon expedition. The writer, who speaks of this production as his 'first essay in military history,' tells us that he 'was employed on the general staff of the Rangoon expedition; and that he has devoted a very few hours of his leisure of peace to tracing this memorial of the operations of an army, a part of the sufferings of which he shared, and the last successes of which he had the happiness to witness.' Havelock describes this war as one directed 'against barbarians, a struggle against local difficulties, and as excluding the promise of those splendid achievements which illustrate the page of history.'"

a flotilla of twenty-gun brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying an eighteen pounder each. There were his majesty's sloops *Larne* and *Sophie*, and several company's cruisers, and the *Diana* steambot. Major-general Sir A. Campbell, commander-in-chief of the forces; Brigadier-general Macbean commanded the Madras troops. The Bengal troops reached the rendezvous about the end of April (Port Cornwallis in the great Andamans). They were joined by his majesty's frigate *Liffey*, Commodore Grant, and *Slaney*, sloop-of-war. The last Madras division left on the 23rd of May, and joined at Rangoon in June and July. More troops were sent from Madras in August and September; and, by the end of 1824, his majesty's 47th regiment, and the governor-general's body-guard, making the whole force engaged in the first campaign 13,000 men. Captain Canning went as political agent, and joint commissioner with Sir Archibald Campbell.

On the 9th May, 1824, the expedition arrived off the Rangoon river, and the same evening (in nautical phrase), "stood in." Before arriving at Rangoon, detachments were sent to seize the islands of Cheduba and Negrais.* There were various other operations in the neighbourhood of Rangoon, all of them successful, scarcely any opposition having been offered. The approach of the fleet to Rangoon caused the greatest consternation. The account given by Major-general Sir Henry Havelock (as he ultimately became) is graphic and striking:†—"The arrival of the British fleet off the mouth of the Rangoon river filled the court of Ava with consternation, and was immediately followed by some of those demonstrations of rage and cruelty which display the barbarous character of the people against whom the expedition was directed. The subordinate officer left in command of Rangoon immediately directed the seizure of all the English residents in the town, an order which included all 'who wore the English hat.' In consequence of this order the American and English missionaries, the British merchants, the American merchants, and other wearers of the English hat, were seized, loaded with fetters, and thrown into prison. The sufferings to which these persons were exposed, and their subsequent release, depicted by Havelock in vivid colours, correspond in a striking manner with recent exhibitions of Indian cruelty, while their release might be regarded as a sort of promise of future acts of deliverance in which Havelock was to bear a

leading part. The historian tells us that 'they had been dragged from their homes under every circumstance of brutal indignity; their clothes had been torn off, their arms tied behind them with ropes, tightened until they became instruments of torture rather than means of security. They had been followed by the execrations of the populace, whose national barbarity was heightened into frenzy by the terrors of the crisis. They had been loaded with chains. They spent a night of hunger, pain, and agonizing uncertainty. But no sooner had the fleet appeared in sight, than an order from the Rewoon was delivered through the grating of their prison. The prisoners, all of whom were acquainted with the language of the country, listened intently to catch its import. Suspense was converted into despair. The Rewoon had commanded that, if a cannonade should be opened against the town of Rangoon, every prisoner should be put to death. The first gun was to be the signal for their decapitation. Instantly the gaolers commenced their preparations. Some spread over the floor of the Taik-dau a quantity of sand to imbibe the blood of the victims. Others began to sharpen their knives with surprising diligence. Others brandished their weapons with gestures and expressions of sanguinary joy over the heads of the captives. Some seizing them, and baring their necks, applied their fingers to the spine with an air of scientific examination. The Birmans, coerced for ages by dint of tortures and frightful punishments, have acquired a kind of national taste for executions. The imagination cannot picture a situation more dreadful than that of these foreigners placed at the mercy of such fiends. These prisoners, who were subsequently brought still nearer to death, were at length set free by the entry of the British troops." The authorities and the inhabitants of Rangoon fled, after opening a feeble cannonade, so that the English entered the place almost unopposed. Both Commodore Grant, who commanded the naval squadron, and Sir Archibald Campbell, the military commander, were of opinion that by the river the forces might proceed to the capital; an opinion combated by the naval and military staff. Neither of the commanders were acquainted with Indian warfare. Sir Archibald had served well in Spain, which did not particularly qualify him for war on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. The army was in fact incapable of going anywhere, by sea or land, in consequence of the defective state of the commissariat—the old deficiency of English armies everywhere. To remain, inadequately supplied with provisions and the place deserted, was almost as difficult as to proceed to

* Official documents.

† The author of this history quotes from the Rev. W. Owen, who has, with indefatigable pains, selected all the salient points of the gallant general's history of this war.

any other place. The army was also numerically too small, had it been supplied with provisions and land transport, for such operations as might bring the war to a speedy close. To secure the discomfiture of the British by famine, the retreating Birmese laid waste the country. Whatever the effect upon the convenience or comfort of the English, starvation was the result to a large portion of the population. The English contrived to obtain provisions by sea, but the pestilential atmosphere of Rangoon affected their health. In proportion as the troops were kept in activity, the malaria affected them less, even although in their operations they were obliged to travel rice swamps, and the marshy lands on the river's banks. Sir Thomas Munro, writing from Madras to Lord Amherst, strenuously urged the advance of General Campbell upon the capital of Ava by the Irriwaddy. But the councils of the English at Calcutta and Madras, as well as at Rangoon, were hampered by the questions of systematic supplies and well organized transport, questions which seem to have embarrassed the administrators, civil and military alike. When at last, by enormous trouble and expense, and after the failure of innumerable contrivances, Sir A. Campbell obtained such supplies and such amount of conveyance as enabled him to move, he left a garrison at Rangoon, composed of native troops with invalid Europeans, and forming the remainder of his force in three divisions, he advanced against the enemy. Previous to this movement, the British had various skirmishes with the enemy, who formed a cordon around Rangoon to hem in the British, and also to prevent the natives seeking any communication with them. In these skirmishes the Birmese fought with far more obstinacy than the sepoy, but their stockades and huts were generally forced and carried by the bayonet, the English soldiery mainly achieving these exploits, the sepoy swelling the numbers, thereby deterring the enemy, and sometimes directing an efficient musketry fire in answer to the ginjals and matchlocks of the Birmese.

When General Campbell commenced his advance, he headed the first division in person, which consisted of only twenty-four hundred men, and was called by way of distinction the land column. The troops composing it were his majesty's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three native battalions, the body-guard, a troop of Bengal horse artillery, and part of the rocket troop. The second division was under Brigadier-general Cotton, consisting of his majesty's 89th, 1st Madras European regiment, two hundred and fifty of the 18th Madras native infantry, foot artillery, and

part of the rocket troop, amounting to only twelve hundred men. The third division, his majesty's 13th and 12th Madras native infantry, with details of artillery, not numbering more than six hundred men. This detachment was under the command of Major Sale.

The plan of proceeding was for the first division to proceed by land to Prome, situated on the Irriwaddy. The division under General Cotton was to proceed by river, forming a junction with General Campbell at Prome, after carrying the enemy's intrenchments at Panlang and Donabew. The river division was to be accompanied by a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, under Captain Alexander, R.N. Major Sale's small detachment was to operate by sea, in pursuance of which order it proceeded to Cape Negrais.* Major Sale was directed to proceed against Bassein,† and after clearing the neighbourhood of Birmese troops, to cross the country and join the main body at Henzada, on the Irriwaddy. This little detachment was very successful, landing and destroying the enemy's works, and ascending the Bassein river to the town of that name, from which the enemy retreated, setting it on fire as they retired.

General Cotton's division advanced to Yougan-Chena, where the Rangoon branch separates from the Irriwaddy. The column reached Panlang on the Rangoon river on the 19th of February, and found both banks stockaded. The enemy were without much difficulty shelled out, and as they fled were galled by flights of rockets. A detachment of the Madras native infantry was left as a garrison, and the flotilla proceeded. On the 6th of March they took up a position before Donabew. The works were on the right bank of the river, of great strength, and commanding the whole breadth of the current. "The chief work, a parallelogram of one thousand by seven hundred yards, stood on a bank withdrawn from the bed of the river in the dry season, and rising above it. Two others, one a square of two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre, and the other, an irregular work, four hundred yards from it, stood lower down on the river, forming outworks to the principal stockade, commanded and supported by its batteries. All three were constructed of squared beams of timber, provided with platforms, and pierced for cannon; and each had an exterior ditch, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed bamboos, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. One hundred and forty guns of

* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 119.

† Not to be confounded with a place of the same name near Bombay.

various calibre, and a greater number of ginals, were mounted on the parapets, and the garrison consisted of twelve thousand men, commanded by the most celebrated general in the service of Ava. General Cotton had left his native regiment at Panlang, and part of the Europeans to guard the boats and stores. His whole available force did not, therefore, exceed six hundred bayonets, a force manifestly inadequate to the storming of Donabew.*

General Cotton having unconditional orders to attack, determined to obey them. On the 7th of March he formed two columns, composed together of five hundred men. They advanced against the smaller stockade, under cover of the fire of two field-pieces and a rocket battery. It was an easy conquest. The next attempt was directed against the second intrenchment; two hundred men were ordered against it, but they were overwhelmed with numbers and driven back. The disparity of force rendered the attempt absurd if not criminal. General Cotton was obliged to fall back, and, re-embarking, to drop down the river to Yung-Yung, and await orders from the commander-in-chief.

It was painfully evident that the whole force sent upon the expedition to Rangoon was too small. The government at Calcutta had formed no correct notions of the task to be accomplished, and it does not appear that Sir Thomas Munro, at Madras, had seen matters much more plainly than Lord Amherst. His high reputation gave favour to views which were inexperienced and impracticable.

While Cotton waited for orders, he heard that Sir Archibald Campbell also found himself too weak to advance against Prome, and was obliged to fall back. The commander-in-chief had laid his plan of campaign in ignorance of the resources of his enemies. The plan itself had in the main been recommended by Sir Thomas Munro, and in a tone more confident, if not imperative, than his knowledge of the subject warranted. Sir A. Campbell, by his retrograde movement, came before Donabew on the 25th of March. His army encamped near the river, *above* the works—the flotilla was below them. The flotilla advanced on the 27th, and landed heavy guns and mortars. Before batteries were erected, shells and rockets were thrown into the stockades and intrenchments, causing alarm and loss of life to the enemy, and slaying their commander-in-chief. On the 3rd of April the cannonade of the English opened; the Birmese retired without firing a shot. The post was garrisoned, and Sir

A. Campbell resumed his progress towards Prome. The total loss of the British at Donabew was thirty killed, and one hundred and thirty-four wounded. The wounded and slain of the enemy probably did not exceed that amount.

On the 8th of April, the commander-in-chief was joined at Tharawa by Brigadier M'Creagh, with his majesty's 1st Royal Scots, and the 28th Madras native infantry, and a good supply of draught cattle and elephants. The Birman army, rallied by the Prince of Tharawaddi, fell back for the defence of Prome. The commander-in-chief appeared before Prome on the 25th of April. There, as at Donabew, the enemy retired, burning the stockades. At this place General Campbell lingered long without effecting anything, although his force was five thousand men, and fifteen hundred more at Rangoon had received orders to join him. An armistice was agreed upon, to extend from the 17th of September to the 17th of October, in order to enable the English agents and Birmese vakeels to come to terms of peace. In September, Sir James Brisbane, commander-in-chief of the British navy in the Indian seas, joined the army.

The Kyi Wungyi met the British general in October, to form definitive terms of a treaty on the plain of Narenzik. It soon became obvious that the demands of the English appeared to the Birmese negotiators as arrogant and unreasonable. They remonstrated, and endeavoured to dissuade the British from making such requisitions; but finding the English general inexorable, they demanded an extension of the armistice until the demands of the English were referred to the emperor. The conditions on which the English general insisted, were as follows:—“The court of Ava was expected to desist from all interference with Assam and Cachar, and to recognise their dependence of Manipore. Arracan, with its dependencies, was to be given up to the British, and an indemnity of two crores of rupees (£2,000,000) was to be paid for the expenses of the war; until the discharge of which sum, Rangoon, Martaban, and the Tenasserim provinces, were to be held in pledge. A resident was to be received at Ava, and a commercial treaty to be concluded, by which the trade with Rangoon should be relieved from the exactions by which it had hitherto been repressed.”*

The demands of the English were indignantly spurned by the Birmese court. A new army advanced upon Prome, and being very numerous, nearly invested the British lines, with the intention of intercepting their

* Deputy judge-advocate-general of the Bengal army.

* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 130.

communications. A powerful detachment of the grand army of Birmah was thrown forward twenty miles from Prome. General Campbell saw that it was essential to the preservation of his communications to dislodge them. On the evening of the 15th of November, Brigadier-general M'Dowall, with five regiments of Madras native infantry, advanced in three columns. The ground was flooded and marshy, and did not admit of the use of field-pieces. The division brought no battering guns. Confusion and ignorance prevailed in the British columns. They were repulsed with heavy loss, the commander of the division was killed, an officer mortally wounded, and nine officers disabled. The total loss killed, wounded, and missing, was two hundred and sixteen. It was an experiment with a little army of sepoy infantry. The Birmese showed no apprehension of them, and after their victory, spoke of the sepoys with contempt.

The Birmese were now encouraged to attempt the English lines at Prome. They advanced and intrenched themselves within a few miles of that place. The English, under Campbell and Cotton, attacked them on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, defeating them on every occasion, slaying many, with only a loss of three officers killed, two wounded, one mortally; twenty-five soldiers killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded. The Birmese army was completely routed.

The British reached Meaday on the 19th of December, accompanied by the flotilla. A flag of truce was borne by the enemy to the naval commander, offering to negotiate. Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., had conducted the previous negotiations, and those officers were again employed to meet the Birmese negotiators. Nevertheless the British, resolved not to be obstructed by delays under the guise of negotiations, advanced, until army and flotilla arrived at Patanagoh, opposite to Melloon, on the 29th of December. On the 30th, the negotiators undertook to meet in a boat in the middle of the river. General Campbell, Admiral Brisbane, Mr. T. C. Robertson, the civil commissioner, and their suites, went on board, where four great officers of the imperial government waited to receive them. The demands of the English were repeated, and renewed expostulations and arguments against them were made by the Birmese. At last they gave way, consenting to surrender the territory, but declared their government unable to pay the indemnity. The British, therefore, reduced the demand to a crore of rupees (a million sterling). A definitive treaty was executed on the 3rd of January, 1826. An armistice was settled to extend to the 18th of that month,

to give time for the ratification of the treaty, the Birmese ministers not being plenipotentiaries. On the 17th, a deputation of Birmese requested an extension of the armistice. The British, perceiving that the object was to gain time, refused, and demanded the evacuation of the camp of Melloon by sunrise on the 20th, under menace of attack. The Birmese refused to abandon the camp; neither did the ratification of the treaty arrive by the 20th. Melloon was attacked, stormed, and captured.

By far the most interesting account of this action extant is that which is contained in General Sir Henry Havelock's account of this war. He was then a humble lieutenant, but had the genius of a general, and the pen of an accomplished and proficient military writer. The reader of this history will be deeply interested in the perusal of Havelock's most graphic and eloquent description of this battle, of which, in part, he was an eyewitness, and in part a participator. As the work written by the lamented historian and general (as he afterwards became) is not accessible to the public, the following extract will be read with the more interest:—

“When the day broke on the 19th (Jan. 1826), the left bank of the river was seen already lined with batteries. The engineers had accomplished so much of their task in the night, that the bustle in the British camp did not appear lively enough to indicate any extraordinary exertion. A battery of eighteen-pounders and heavy mortars confronted the centre of the grand stockade. Another of lighter pieces had been prepared to batter the pagoda work to the southward. The guns and howitzers of the horse brigade were in battery opposite to the left of the central work. By eleven o'clock, twenty-eight months of fire were ready to open on the Melloon. The whole strength of the rocket brigade was ranged near the right of the battery of the centre. At eleven, Sir Archibald Campbell, in person, gave the word. The roar of the first salvo shook the ground, rent the air, reverberated amongst the rocks and woods behind Melloon, and died away in sullen echoes from the more distant hills. In an instant it was repeated. The deafening peals succeeded with a rapidity which suggested the image of unchecked vengeance falling in thunder upon the heads of the deceitful barbarians. The British officers on the left bank, stooping and coming forward, bent the eye anxiously to discern the effect upon the hostile camp. It was evident that the artillery had hit the range at once. Balls were seen to strike the work, raising a cloud of dust and splinters, demolishing the defences, and ploughing up the area of the square. Shells

hit sometimes a few paces from the parapet, behind which the garrison was crouching, bursting among their ranks, sometimes upon the huts of the troops and marked points of the pagodas. The rockets flew in the truest path. Many fell upon the barbarians; many shaped their course direct into the pavilions of the chiefs. Partial fires were soon seen to break out at Melloon. Twice the line of the barbarians which manned the eastern face gave way under the dreadful fire; twice they were rallied by their chiefs. The storm of fire, of shells, and bullets, continued without intermission for an hour and a quarter. Fifteen minutes before one, the boats of the flotilla began to move from a point two hundred yards above the light battery. The first brigade had been embarked on board the leading vessels. The flank companies of the 87th, the 41st, and 89th British, and strong native detachments, found themselves afloat almost at the same moment on board the remainder of the flotilla. General Cotton directed the movements of the troops last mentioned. Lieutenant-colonels Godwin, Parlyby, and Hunter Blair, served under him as brigadiers. This force was to gain the right bank a little above the great work, and operate against its northern face, now cruelly enfiladed by the horse brigade. As one of its columns was intended to intercept the retreat of the Birmans, the whole body ought to have been put in motion antecedently to the first brigade, the movement of which should have been consecutive; but the attempt which was made to render the advance of both simultaneous, ended in inverting the order of their operations. The first brigade came too soon, and the turning columns too late in contact with the enemy.

"All eyes were now fixed upon the progress of the first brigade. Its boats began to fall rapidly down the stream. Colonel Sale was seen in the leading man-of-war's boat, far a-head of the heavier vessels. The brigade was to attack the south-eastern angle of the great work, the abattis of which was said to be defective. Thus it had to receive the fire of the whole eastern front of the fortification. The Birmans opened every musket and ginjal upon it as soon as the first boat was on a line parallel to the stockade. The stream carried the British within half-musket shot of their numerous enemies, who, relieved from the severity of the cannonade, which the intervention of the boats necessarily caused to be suspended, had now full leisure to direct their fire. It caused a sensation of nervous tremor amongst the unoccupied spectators on the right bank, to see these two old tried corps thus silently enduring the storm of barbarian

vengeance. A dense cloud of smoke from the Birman musketry began to envelop the boats. Now and then, by the flash of a nine-pounder from one of the gun-vessels, she was seen to present her bows for an instant to the line, and direct a pairing shot against the works. But the moment of retribution was at hand. The headmost boat was seen to touch the sand. A body of troops sprang ashore. They formed themselves with the alacrity of practised *tirailleurs* under the slope of the bank. They were a part of the 38th. They began to answer and check the fire of the Birman bastion near them. The vessels followed as rapidly as possible; but all seemed too slow for the wishes of those who looked upon the animating scene. They felt the inexpressible desire to urge on, by the power, as it were, of imagination, to press forward, to impel to the point the headmost boats, which, though dropping quickly, yet seemed to the eyes of impatience to lag. More soldiers leaped upon dry land with a cheer; others followed. The spectators looked for the leader of the brigade. They did not yet know that a ball had struck him between the shoulder and the breast, and that he lay swooning, from the loss of blood, in the boat. The numbers of the column speedily increased; it quickly assumed shape, and was in motion. The advance ceased to fire; the mass of the 13th (this was Lieutenant Havelock's regiment) and the 38th, pressing on, was in a moment at the foot of the works. The soldiers began to spread and seek for a gap, or entrance, with the ready tact produced by experience in such affairs. There was a pause of three seconds, then a move again. The British were seen at once overlooking the works. The Birman fire ceased along the line; all was decided. The barbarians began to rush in headlong flight across the great area; the British column to direct its course full upon the pagodas, which marked the head-quarters of the chiefs. The second column had landed, and was manœuvring upon the north-western angle. The Birmans, warned by the priority of the attack in front, were already issuing from it in large bodies. This was the conflict at Melloon."

The generalship of the English in this battle was severely criticised by Havelock. It was his opinion that, by a different plan of action, a brilliant advantage might have been gained, which was not obtained. As this is not a military work, it would be inappropriate to quote the extended critique of Havelock. It is modestly and gracefully written, and is pervaded by clearness of view, precision of thought, and proves the writer to have been, even at that early period of his military his-

tory, profoundly read, and a deep thinker in military science.

On the 8th of February the army approached within five miles of Pagahm-mew. This place had once been the capital of the Birman empire, and was regarded as a holy city. It was solidly built, and capable of offering much resistance to an enemy, if governed and garrisoned with skill and valour. The Birmese appeared determined to make a stand there, and Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to lose no time in attacking, and, if necessary, storming the place. In the description of what occurred, we shall again gratify our readers by a passage from the narrative of the good and great Sir Henry Havelock:—"The British advanced along a narrow road, thickly hedged in on either side with the tree called by the inhabitants *ber*, by the English *jujube*, and by philosophers *zizyphus jujuba*. It bears a fruit resembling the plum, and varying equally in size. It is in some countries a dwarfish, but in this district of Birmah rises to the height of ten or twelve feet, and is commonly defended with thorns. The small force of the British raised clouds of dust in passing over the sandy soil. The Birmans fired the first shot. The advance of their right opened a random *fusillade*, out of distance, at the head of the column of the 13th, and then retired. The vanguard of the British (in which Havelock was engaged) in a moment after became engaged with the advance of the barbarian centre, posted at the base of Loganunda. It drove it in. But as the column under the major-general reached the foot of the monument, the enemy showed considerable force in its front, and on its right. As the British moved on, the barbarians rushed forward to meet them. They presented themselves with wild, frantic gestures, and hideous shouts. The whole of the 13th were extended, *en tirailleur*, to resist this sudden onset. The horse artillery got into action. The body-guard supported at the centre. These three corps now formed the true vanguard of the British. The 13th dashed among the barbarians in extended files. They overthrew them. The thickets were soon strewed with their bodies. The barbarians were hotly pursued, thundered upon by the guns of the horse artillery, and cut down by the sowars wherever they could be overtaken. The rest of the force, in seconding this manœuvre, found it difficult to debouch. It was impossible to escape very rapidly from the narrow mouth of the single defile into which the troops were closely wedged together with the carriages of the foot artillery, their rockets and tumbrils. The heat was excessive, and two of the battalions

were harassed by the night march. All this was not sufficiently borne in mind in following up the first advantage. The companies of the 13th, spread along a considerable line, became engaged with formidable masses of the enemy before they could receive any support from the corps of the main body. The barbarian general took advantage of this with a laudable adroitness. He promptly moved up large bodies of horse and foot to the aid of his worsted advance; he caused a mass to debouch from his extreme left, menacing the right flank of the British, and another to press down from his centre to cut off their vanguard from the road. The ground was a succession of hillocks planted with the *jujube*. Many of the little summits were covered with the ruins of pagodas; others with monuments less worn by time. Thus, the adverse lines were hardly aware how closely they approached each other. A noisy fire was supported along either front. The 13th were very widely extended. The major-general, accompanied by the principal officers of his staff, was in the very centre of the attack of the vanguard. His person must have been distinctly seen by the barbarians. Large bodies advanced within a few yards of him. Their shouts seemed already to announce a victory. The situation of the major-general was for many minutes critical. He had with him only fourteen men of the 13th, sixteen sowars of the body-guard, and two field-pieces of the horse artillery; but their guns threw grape and round shot rapidly and truly amongst the enemy; their quick discharges disconcerted them, and the firm countenances of the troopers and infantry soldiers filled them with uncertainty. They could not in a moment make up their minds to one of those decisive movements by which battles are won. The opportunity which might have saved their capital escaped them. Their masses began to take up the ground from which they had first moved, but remained there steadily and in great force. A heavy firing was at this instant heard on the left. The major-general retired before the enemy's advance, which pressed after him. The Hindostanee troopers displayed a memorable coolness. They waved their sabres proudly to the shouting barbarians, turned their backs only for a moment, then rapidly fronted and resumed their attitude of defiance, riding down the boldest of the Birmans who ventured close to them. Constantly calling to the infantry, which they covered, to quicken their pace, but never quickening their own, thus retiring and fronting in succession, they finally gained a little pagoda mount, on which the major-general had taken his stand. Sir

Archibald Campbell then caused the 13th to be recalled and concentrated by sound of bugle. The guns and howitzers armed the plateau of the mount. Its ruinous brick-work supplied an irregular rampart. The enemy stood formed in immense force directly in front of the hill, their foot backed by squadrons of the Cassay horse. They still showed a disposition to turn the British by both flanks. The major-general surveyed them for a few minutes through his telescope. He then said calmly, as the troops re-formed, 'I have here the 13th, and the body-guard; the whole Birman army shall not drive me from this hill.' Nevertheless, some anxious moments had to be passed in this little position. There was yet no intelligence of the movements of the left. The enemy's detached parties of either arm yet inundated the valleys and thickets to the right and left. Some even penetrated to the rear; but, at length, the 89th arrived, and was seen to take up its position in support. All was secure in this quarter, which had been so seriously menaced. The British again prepared to attack the troops of 'The King of Hell';* but they perceived that he had already sensibly diminished his force in their front. A staff-officer, who had succeeded in communicating with General Cotton, brought news which accounted for this retrograde movement.

"The right flank of the Birmans, and their communications with Pagahm, were already in jeopardy. When General Cotton debouched beyond the Loganunda pagoda, he was opposed, as the major-general had been, by advanced bodies of the barbarians. The 38th routed them, and followed closely the line of their retreat. The Birmans at length threw themselves into a field-work near the bank of the river. Nearly the same thing happened which had before taken place at the outworks of Donabew. The 38th wheeled round the work, under the fire of its defenders, entered it by the rear-ward opening, and began to make a carnage of all within. The barbarians, thus screwed into their own places of defence, leaped in terror over the western parapet. Hundreds rushed headlong down the lofty and most vertical bank of the waters of the Irriwaddy. 'The King of Hell' was compelled to abandon his first position and retire on Pagahm. As soon as the success of the left was announced to General Campbell, he put his column in motion. The statements of prisoners indicated an obstinate

defence in Pagahm. It was thought that only half the day's work was achieved. In half an hour more the lines of manœuvre taken by all the columns of battalions, except the 43rd, converged upon a single point in the eastern wall of the city. The 13th was the most advanced. The main road descended into a ravine. Beyond this, a village and pagoda intervened, and screened the walls of Pagahm. The enemy were posted here in force. When the firing commenced, the horse artillery were dispatched at full speed to the right, to enfilade the village, and take every successive position of the enemy rapidly in flank; but the leading companies of the 13th had already descended into the valley. The enemy's balls began to strike the huts and trees around them. It was in vain to dally here, exposed to a fire from behind walls. The regiment formed in line quickly, but with the steadiness of a field-day. It advanced at the charge with a loud huzza, and in redoubled time. The levies of 'The King of Hell' had not a chance of remaining. They were driven before the onset of this regiment from position to position, from pagoda to pagoda, from eminence to eminence, back upon, over, within, and again beyond their walls; then from walled inclosure to inclosure, finally into their boats on the Irriwaddy, or along the route to the capital, as panic urged them. All their standards were captured. The major-general and his staff entered by the eastern gate of Pagahm.

"The sound of the last cannon shot had scarcely ceased to echo among the pagodas when the major-general thus conveyed his sentiments to his troops in general orders:— 'Providence has once more blessed with success the British arms in this country; and in the decisive defeat of the imposing force posted under and within the walls of Pagahm-mew, the major-general recognises a fresh display of the military virtues which have characterized his troops from the commencement of the war.'"

Having narrated the successful exploits of the British in their campaign from Rangoon, it is necessary, before stating the final results of the war, to relate the main incidents of the operations from eastern Bengal. Three brigades were stationed at Chittagong, Jumal-pore, and Goalpara; and a flotilla was placed on the Burrampooter river, towards Assam, and in the neighbourhood of Dacca. The English resolved to defend Cachar and Manipore, and carry the war in that direction into the territories of the enemy, if occasion offered. Colonel Innes quartered his brigade at Silhet, Colonel Shapland at Chittagong, Brigadier-general M'Morrice at Goalpara. One of the plans of the British was to penetrate from Cachar through Manipore into the valley of

* An army of the Birman Emperor, entitled "Retriever of the King's Glory," were commanded by a savage warrior styled *Nee Woon Breen*, which has been variously translated as "Prince of Darkness," "King of Hell," and "Prince of the Setting Sun."

the Ningti river, which falls into the Irrawaddy. Colonel Shuldham, at the head of 7000 men, attempted this route and failed. Another plan was to pass from Chittagong into Arracan, and across the mountains into Ava, and effect a junction with the army sent from Rangoon. General Morrison, at the head of 11,000 men, attempted this enterprise. His force consisted of his majesty's 44th and 54th regiments of the line; the 26th, 42nd, 49th, 62nd Bengal native infantry, and the 2nd light infantry battalion; the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry; a Mugh levy; a body of local horse; a strong party of native pioneers, and a fine detachment of the Bengal artillery. A flotilla of sloops and gun-brigs was to co-operate with this division of the army. Commodore Hay commanded the flotilla, and his especial work was to carry troops and supplies along shore. This little army began its progress in the beginning of January, 1825. A portion of the force remained at various stations on British territory, to be sent after the army if necessary. His majesty's 54th, 10th Madras native infantry, and left wing 16th native infantry, went by sea. The field-battery, his majesty's 44th, 1st light infantry battalion, four companies 42nd Bengal native infantry, five companies 62nd native infantry, right wing Madras 16th native infantry, and two troops of Gardner's local horse went by land. The 26th and 49th Bengal went by boats along the coast. There were 1,500 Europeans, and 8,000 native troops; total, 9,500 men. The approach to the town of Arracan lay across a narrow valley, skirted by hills of an average height of four hundred feet. Stockades were placed on these hills, in advantageous positions, garrisoned by 9,000 Birmans. On the 29th of March an unsuccessful attack was made on these stockades. On the evening of the 31st of March, Brigadier Richards (afterwards better known as Lieutenant-general Sir W. Richards), commanding a brigade, which consisted of six companies 44th foot, three of the 26th, three of the 49th, thirty seamen, and thirty Gardner's dismounted horse, ascended the hills, by a circuitous route, and established his troops on the summit before he was perceived by the enemy.* Next morning, the brigade took the Birmese in flank, while the commander-in-chief took them in front. The enemy were beaten out of all the stockades, and fled precipitately through the passes, leaving Arracan to the victors. The illness of General Morrison caused the command to devolve upon General Richards. The British troops continued to hold Arracan through the summer, but made

* Wilson, vol. ix. p. 106.

no effort to prosecute their way toward the heart of the Birmese empire. On the 31st of October, Brigadier Richards, while commanding "the south-eastern division of Arracan, reported the impracticability of passing through the mountains. This was an error, no survey of the roads and passes having been made by Richards, in consequence of the insufficiency as to numbers of his engineer staff, and the sickness which prevailed among that portion of his officers. The troops in Arracan suffered severely from miasma rising from the pestilential marshes which then covered so large a portion of the low country. He might, however, have wintered in Ava, as was proved by Captain Ross, who, with the 18th Madras native infantry, and a number of elephants, marched to Pakangyet, on the Irrawaddy, eight marches from Yandaboo, and thence, after crossing the river to Sembew Ghwen, quitted the low country in three days, and in eight more crossed the mountains, by a practicable route to Aeng, in Ava." The war was decided by the Rangoon army before anything was effected by the army of Arracan, except the conquest of that province. After the war was over, a portion of the sepoys were conducted through the mountain passes from Ava into Arracan, proving the practicability of that route on any future occasion of war.

The treaty concluded with the Birman emperor was one of great importance to the British. His Birman majesty agreed to renounce all claim to Assam, and the principalities of Jyntia and Cachar, and recognised the independence of Manipore. He consented to cede in perpetuity the four divisions of Arracan, namely, Arracan Proper, Ranri, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and also the three districts of Tenasserin, Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui, or the whole of the coast belonging to Ava south of the Sanlueu river; to receive a resident at his capital, and sanction the conclusion of a commercial treaty; and, finally, he agreed to pay a crore of rupees (or about £1,000,000), in four instalments, the first immediately, the second within one hundred days from the date of the treaty, and the other two in the course of the two following years. The British engaged to retire at once to Rangoon, and to quit the Birmah territory upon the payment of the second instalment. The discharge of the promised indemnity was tardily and reluctantly complied with. On the receipt of the ratification of the treaty the army broke up from Yandaboo. Rangoon was held by the British until after payment of the second instalment of the indemnity.

The English suffered from a dreadful mortality, one-fourth of all who had not been

killed or wounded died of the diseases engendered by the unhealthy situations in which they were quartered; and before the English abandoned Rangoon, half of the troops left alive were in hospital. The mortality has been compared to that of the unfortunate expedition to Walcheren in 1809; but the latter was not so fatal as the expeditions in the Birmese war.

While the English were in occupation of the country, it was deemed important to gain as much intelligence as possible of its people, and to conciliate as far as might be the emperor and his court. In pursuance of this policy, Lieutenant Havelock was selected, with Captain Lumsden and Assistant-surgeon Knox, of the Madras army, to bear presents to the emperor from his conquerors. These officers went upon their interesting and peculiar mission, encountering many obstructions from the jealousy of the Birmese. The American missionaries, who had acquired considerable influence over many persons about the imperial court, rendered the English gentlemen many services. On their arrival at Ava, they learned that six prisoners were detained. They drew up a protest, declaring that this was an infraction of the treaty, and declining to wait upon his majesty without an order were issued for the release of these men. After a most vindictive resistance, this was at last conceded. The day after the reception, the prisoners were set free. The prudent and gentlemanly conduct of Lieutenant Havelock did much to smooth the difficulties of dealing with the Birmese court, and at the same time to maintain in full lustre the dignity of England, through that of her representatives. Indeed throughout the Birmese war the usefulness and devotion to duty of Mr. Havelock were an honour to his country, and attracted the notice of the whole army, particularly that of the commander-in-chief. The following is a striking specimen of the piety and earnest religious zeal of Mr. Havelock:—"In the temple of Rangoon, when the city was taken, he was seen in the temple—the idol temple—filled with the images and cross-legged infernals of that country. *He placed the lamps in the hands of the idols, and by the light sat down to teach, to lead the devotions of the soldiers, and to open to them the Scriptures.*"* Another interesting incident in the life of Havelock occurred during this war. The gallant commander of the 13th, Major Sale, then holding the local rank of Lieutenant-colonel, required a detachment for some particular service, and directed the company of Captain —— to undertake it. The adjutant replied that the men were intoxicated. Sale immediately observed, "Turn out Havelock's men;

* The Rev. Paxton Hood.

he is always ready, and his men are never drunk." Havelock was then a lieutenant, but was at the time in command of his company. He brought out his men, who were like himself "ready," and "never drunk," and the duty was accomplished. At this juncture, also, an event occurred in the life of that remarkable man, which bore upon his prospects, and at the same time illustrated his character. The incident is given as written in the interesting and able memoir of Havelock, by the Rev. William Owen, of London:—"On the adjutancy in his corps becoming vacant, an application was made to the governor-general to give it to Havelock. His lordship demurred, on account of what had been said to Havelock's disparagement as being an enthusiast and a fanatic. Bitter was the hostility which beset him on that occasion, and only in this manner it was overcome: a return was ordered of the offences committed by the men of the several companies throughout the regiment; and having examined the return, the governor-general said he found that the men in Havelock's company, who had joined in his religious exercises, were the most sober and best behaved men in the regiment. The complaint against the men, he said, was that they were Baptists, and he added that he wished that the whole regiment were Baptists, too. The result of the inquiry was, the bestowal of the adjutancy upon Havelock, and the entry in his memorandum-book simply mentions the fact, with the addition of the following words:—"Continue religious instruction to the soldiers, and do everything to promote temperate habits among them!"*—This anecdote is as favourable to the character of Lord Amherst as to that of Havelock. His lordship never allowed his religious, political, or personal feelings or prejudices to interfere with the just administration of his high office, and what was due to his king and country.

The Birmese war had proved one of the most costly which we had waged in India. Various writers estimate it at fourteen millions sterling; and the loss from all causes, in the field and in garrison, along the Bengal frontier of Assam, in Arracan, and along the Irrawaddy, at twenty thousand men. The European soldiers, and especially the officers, perished in greater proportion than the sepoys, or Mugh auxiliaries; indeed the loss of life among the last was not great.

After the treaty was signed between the Governor-general of India and the Emperor of Birmah, Mr. Crawford was appointed envoy to the court of Ava, to arrange a commercial treaty. The mission returned to Rangoon in

* *The Good Soldier.*

January, 1827, having accomplished its object. He was not gratified with his reception, and he dissuaded his government from enforcing the article of the treaty providing that a British agent should reside at the court of Ava. No further intercourse was held until 1829, when Lieutenant-colonel Burney was sent to Ava on a British mission. In 1824, the colonel, then Captain Burney, had been

dispatched to the court of Siam, to congratulate the monarch of that country on his accession to the throne. His mission to that court it was supposed qualified him to proceed to that of Ava. His term of residence there was a long one. He remained until 1837, when he was obliged to quit, in connexion with events to be related when our narrative shall arrive at that period.

CHAPTER CVIII.

GOVERNMENT OF LORD AMHERST (*continued*)—SIEGE, STORM, AND CAPTURE OF BHURTPORE—DEATH OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO—TRANSFER OF THE CROWN OF DELHI AND EMPIRE OF HINDOSTAN TO THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—ARRIVAL OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK IN INDIA—HIS GOVERNMENT AND REFORMS—HIS DEPARTURE FROM INDIA AND RETURN TO ENGLAND.

DURING the progress of the Birmese war, the state of India was unsatisfactory. The deposed princes, especially the Peishwa at Benares, were as usual intriguing to foment disturbance and shake British power if possible. When at the beginning of the war the Birmese in Arracan made a successful entrance into Chittagong, the natives of eastern Bengal, and of all Lower Bengal, felt extreme alarm. Agents of the Peishwa circulated false intelligence, and represented the Birmese as invincible, and at last the native merchants of Calcutta were panic-struck, and could with difficulty be dissuaded from removing their property and withdrawing from Bengal.

At the end of 1824 disturbances broke out in an extremity of India precisely opposite to that endangered by the Birmese. In Cutch there was a revolt which appeared to assume political importance. It was discovered that the Ameers of Scinde had incited it.

The whole of India was swarming with military adventurers, the relics of defeated armies, or the mercenaries who had served the English in their various wars as irregular cavalry. There were numbers of men ready to join the English against any enemy, or to join any power, foreign or native, against the English. On the whole, they were more willing to serve against than for the prevailing power. Notwithstanding that Bengal and Central India had been subjected to them, the British were in the predicted condition of the Arabs,—their hand was against every man, and every man's hand was against them. While yet the Birmese war exhausted the exchequer and drained the garrisons of India of European troops, war was waged elsewhere.

The Bhurtpore territories which were independent passed through a series of violent

commotions and revolutions up to 1824, and in that year. The Jauts, who inhabited that principality, were disposed to regard the English as protectors against foreign enemies, but were not desirous to see them interfere with their home concerns. Sir David Ochterlony did interfere, and the governor-general, contrary to the advice of his council, revoked the proceedings of the resident, who resigned. Sir David died soon after, at Meerut, much regretted in India, where his talents, civil and military, had been a great advantage to his country. Sir David had assembled an army to besiege Bhurtpore, and by force of arms adjust the disputes there which menaced the peace of Hindostan. On the 19th of December, 1826, when a vote of thanks was passed to the army at Bhurtpore, Sir J. Malcolm observed, "If the siege had failed, it would, in all human probability, have added to the embarrassments of the Birmese war, that of hostilities with almost every state."

After much hesitation, and great reluctance to have another war on his hands, while that with the Birmans was raging, policy determined Lord Amherst to engage in a conflict with Bhurtpore, the strongest fortress in all India. Lord Combermere had arrived at Calcutta, the 2nd of October, 1825, as commander-in-chief of the forces in India. He went up the country, and fixed his headquarters at Muttra. According to Captain Creighton, of his majesty's 11th Light Dragoons, the forces at Lord Combermere's disposal consisted of upwards of twenty-five thousand men, and more than a hundred pieces of artillery, with abundance of material. The force of the enemy's garrison was estimated at twenty thousand men, chiefly Rajpoots and Jauts, with some Affghans. The

greatest security of the fortress however, according to Major Hough, was in the thickness and toughness of its walls, constructed of clay hardened in the sun.

SIEGE OF BHURTPORE.

The English now, for the second time in its history, besieged Bhurtpore, and this time with better fortune than had attended the siege conducted by Lord Lake. On the 10th of December, 1825, the army of Lord Combermere stood before the great fortress. During the siege conducted by Lord Lake, twenty years before, the great ditches which surrounded the place had been filled from the Mote Jhil, an extensive piece of water. To hinder the enemy from accomplishing a similar object, Lord Combermere placed detachments of troops, so as to render the opening of sluices or cutting of embankments exceedingly difficult operations. This proved of great importance in the progress of the siege, for the ditch continued dry. The extent of the fortress was so great that it could not be completely invested, but posts were appointed all around.

On the 24th of December, the breaching batteries were opened, but while they broke the material of the walls, they did not breach them, from the peculiar material of which these bulwarks were composed. Sometimes the round-shot entered the embankments, as the walls might be called, and remained there, rather adding to their strength. Shells crumbled some portion of the surface, which fell away, but no breach was effected. Thus it was not at Sebastopol that gigantic earthworks resisted, for the first time, a numerous and scientific army. The fortress of Bhurtpore was a series of vast earthworks, more solid and enduring than those thrown up before Sebastopol. Before the English army had collected before the place, discussions had been maintained as to the probable results of a cannonade and bombardment, the experience of Lord Lake, in 1805, having suggested these discussions: besides, British officers had become acquainted with all the peculiarities of the fortress. Mining was at last resorted to, under the auspices of Lieutenant-colonel Forbes, or, as some maintain, of Sir A. Galloway. Major Hough thus notices this controversy:—"Wilson (page 197, note 1) alludes to the claim of the late Major-general Sir A. Galloway, who was at the siege in 1805, and in 1825—but his memoir was given to Lord Combermere when before the fort,—Lieutenant (Colonel) Forbes, when in Calcutta, gave his plan to Lord C., and the credit is due to him. The latter was wounded and disabled

near Jhil. He had been instructed in mining under Sir C. Palsey, before he went to India. Sir A. Galloway published a pamphlet on the attack on mud forts; and was wounded in the pioneers at the first siege."*

On the 17th January, 1826, the largest mine, containing two thousand pounds of gunpowder, was exploded. The explosion formed breaches. The next day the assault was made. The columns which attacked the breaches were commanded by Major-general Reynell and Major-general Nicolls (afterwards Lieutenant-general Sir Jasper Nicolls, commander-in-chief of the forces in India). The Jangina gate was stormed by a column under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Delanaine. The whole of the assailing force amounted to eleven thousand. All the columns of attack were successful, although they met with an obstinate resistance, from the belief entertained by the garrison that the place was invulnerable. The artillerymen fell under the bayonets of our soldiers, defending their guns to the last extremity. No less than seven thousand of the garrison perished, including every chief of note. A very great number were wounded. The loss of the British was 103 men and officers killed, and 466 wounded.

The day after the capture, the young rajah, Bulwunt Singh, on whose behalf the war was undertaken, was reinstated on his throne, under the protection of the British.

The prize money amounted to forty-eight lacs of rupees (£480,000). Lord Combermere was created viscount when the intelligence of his victory reached England. No doubt the signal failure of Lord Lake, in the memorable siege of 1805, influenced the government and the country to exaggerate the exploit of the capture of Bhurtpore; still it was a great undertaking, and some idea of its magnitude may be formed by the prodigious expenditure of material—upwards of sixty-one thousand missiles of all kinds having been used.

The fall of Bhurtpore was the termination of this short war, and at its conclusion the condition of India, regarded from a British point of view was most striking, and calculated to afford a comparison with the past which greatly enhanced the glory and renown of England and of her East India Company. The following is a truthful and graphic description of the relation of the British to the states of India when affairs had settled down after the Birmese and Bhurtpore wars, before Lord Amherst resigned his government:—"The progress of the British had now

* Hough's *History of British Military Exploits in India.*

reached a point where campaigns could no longer be required within the limits of India. Powerful enemies they had none. In 1827, all the chiefs of Malwa, with the Mahratta princes, sent missions to the government which they had once dreamed of destroying. Holkar was dead, and Scindiah died in the following March, leaving no wreck of the dominion which had formerly spread over the largest provinces of Hindostan, and bearing no malice against the stately power which had deprived him of it. In the same year, also, the crown of Delhi was in name, as it had long been in reality, transferred to the company; while the title of the king, acknowledged until now, was extinguished. The English put an end to the vain folly of acknowledging themselves vassals to a man who had lost every attribute of power, except its rapacity and pride.*

The rapid termination of the siege of Bhurtpore restored the waning influence of Lord Amherst. A feeling adverse to his lordship had arisen in England, in consequence of the slow progress of the Birman war, and the disastrous loss of life in connection with it. His lordship, however, was really not to blame. The officials of the East India Company at Calcutta have been stigmatised, even by the most zealous advocates of that body, for their culpable ignorance of everything connected with the Birmese empire. Still it must be pleaded on their behalf, the vast empire of which they were in charge, and the rapid revolutions and terrible wars which they had to assist in directing and bringing to a fortunate close. Lord Amherst was a diligent governor, a just and a brave man. He dealt with good faith to native chiefs, with dignity and leniency to open enemies, with sagacity and caution to false friends. He watched over the prosperity of the army and rewarded merit. He served his king, his country, and the East India Company with fidelity, and ruled numerous nations with an honest, intelligent, and benevolent concern for their good. The government of this nobleman has never received its due meed of praise. Had his lordship followed the advice of those around him he would, on the first reverses in the Birmese war, have abandoned offensive tactics, defended Chittagong, and the north-east frontier, and have taken up a defensive position at Rangoon. His courage and wisdom resolved otherwise, and his perseverance and industry were crowned with success. He was very effectually aided by Sir T. Munro, the governor of Madras, whose exertions were extraordinary to provide troops, munitions of war, and supplies. It is certain that but for

* Auber's *British Power in India*, vol. ii.

the aid of the Madras presidency, Bengal could not have carried on the war on the eastern shores of the Bay and up the Irrawaddy with success, whatever power they might have wielded against Assam and the north-east frontier of Bengal to Birmah. There were many minor difficulties arising out of the hostile feeling prevailing throughout Hindostan against the British, which tested and proved the firmness and address of Lord Amherst, his adjustment of which was not noticed as he deserved. There were also some little wars, troublesome and irritating, the more so as the most trifling incident of open revolt or hostility on the part of any petty state, might have set all India in a blaze of conflict. These he settled with rapidity and decision, the only wise mode of dealing with refractory chiefs and rajahs. The Rajah of Colapore gave the Bombay presidency much trouble, and an appeal to arms was necessary to quell his fierce efforts to inflame that part of western India. Colapore was a small Mahratta state, and was pervaded by the predatory spirit of that uncertain, vindictive, and warlike race. Colonel Walsh, with the troops quartered at the station of Belgaun, very soon reduced his highness of Colapore to a quieter frame of mind, and left his soldiery and people no heart for further aggressions upon their neighbours. There was no state in India too small, no rajah too insignificant at that date to create the necessity for armed intervention. It is strange that a minute Mahratta territory, too small to be taken into account in the alliances and wars with the Mahrattas, should become aggressive and provoke a campaign, when Scindiah, and Holkar, and the Peishwa stooped to the conquering sword of England, and dared not to flaunt a hostile banner in the presence of a sepoy soldier of the company. Yet such was the eccentric and thoroughly oriental fickleness and presumption of the Mahratta race, and of all the races of India, that no statesman could foresee which chief would rise in hopeless insurrection, or in his independence proclaim hopeless war. No Indian statesman could say where in India a firebrand might not fall, spreading the flames of insurrection, of military revolt, or of declared war.

In 1827 Sir Thomas Munro ceased to live and labour for India, and for his country. A life of this remarkable man has been published by the Rev. Mr. Gleig, the author of a memoir of Clive, and another of Hastings. Like the latter works, it is full of panegyric of its hero; and his errors and weaknesses are passed over in a manner which would be unfaithful, were it not that the writer is so earnest and sincere in the excess of admira-

tion with which he regards his hero. This feeling may well be excused when exercised towards one who rendered India fiscally, judicially, and martially, such important services, and in whom the East India Company and the British government held the most entire confidence.

In 1827 Lord Amherst proceeded to the upper provinces. He had the honour of adjusting the relations in which the British government remained to the King of Delhi until the great revolt and rebellion, in 1857, swept away the dignity of that title for ever. Previous to 1827, the people of India regarded the East India Company as the vassals of the King of Delhi, whatever the power the English displayed. In that year, and by the hands of Lord Amherst, the crown of Delhi and of the empire of Hindostan was transferred to the East India Company. M. Auber beautifully and truly says:—"The event is said to have been viewed with deep melancholy by the royal family and their dependents. They felt, whatever privations they might have suffered from the Mahrattas, their title to the sovereignty of India had been invariably acknowledged. They were now, for the first time, divested of it. The feeling of the public, however, corroborated the opinion expressed by General Wellesley, that the natives were the most indifferent people, as to their governors, of any he had met with. They seemed on the present occasion to be unconcerned in the matter, and contemplated, without surprise, our assumption of a character, 'which had been purchased with the talents, treasure, and blood of our nation.' Lord Amherst having returned to the presidency, embarked in H.M.S. *Herald*, at the close of March, for England, resigning the provisional government into the hands of W. B. Bayley, Esq."

Although the administration of Lord Amherst was one of mingled military effort and social reform, the advent of the latter had arrived, and become stronger in the English mind than any desire for humiliating enemies, or enlarging territories. Miss Martineau represents the period of "comprehensive domestic amelioration" as beginning in 1823, and as predominating until 1855. This representation is partly correct, although the last years of the company's raj, terminating before this work was wholly published, eclipsed the glory of all former eras in the melioration of the condition of the people of India, and the initiation of public works. Miss Martineau gives the honour of the great change to the Marquis of Hastings, and does justice to the claims of Lord Amherst in having followed in the same direction:—"After long waiting,

and many discouragements, the time at length arrived when war ceased within the peninsula of India, and the energies of its rulers could be devoted to the improvement of the condition of the inhabitants, and the retrieval of the affairs of the company. There was war in Birmah, as has been seen; but long before Lord Moira's (henceforth to be called Lord Hastings) term of office was over, there was such a state of peace from the Himalaya to Ceylon as enabled him to give the crowning grace to his administration, by instituting social reforms as important as his military successes were brilliant, and his political scheme definitive and successful. The system which was conceived by Clive, professed by Warren Hastings, thoroughly wrought out and largely applied by Lord Wellesley, so as to be fairly called his own, and reversed for a time by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, under orders from Leadenhall Street, was accomplished and firmly established by the Marquis of Hastings. British authority was supreme in India; and not only had it no antagonist for a long course of years, but it availed to prevent warfare among the states of the great peninsula. Reforms, political, social, and moral, at once ensued; and they were vigorously continued through three vice-regal terms. They may be most clearly apprehended by being surveyed as the harvest of twenty years of peaceful administration, beginning with the close of Lord Hastings' wars, and ending with the resignation of Lord William Bentinck, in 1835.

"Lord Hastings left the company's revenue increased by £6,000,000 a year; and a considerable part of the increase was from the land, indicating the improved condition of the people who held it. He was succeeded by Lord Amherst, who had the Birmese war to manage in the first instance; and the Mahratta and Pindarree wars had left behind them the difficulty dreaded by every pacific governor-general—an unsettled and unorganized population of soldiers, whom it was scarcely possible to deal with so as to satisfy at once themselves and their neighbours. The reforms already conceived, and even begun, had not yet checked abuses, or remedied grievances; and there were real causes of disaffection, in the new provinces especially, which gave a most mischievous power to a marauding soldiery at the moment of finding its occupation gone. A vigorous rule was therefore necessary, and almost as much military demonstration as in warlike times. The improved revenue did not meet these calls, and much less the cost of the Birmese war; and a new loan and an increased taxation marked the close of Lord Amherst's term. He left the

territory in a peaceable state, with not a single fort standing out, as Bhurtpore long did, against British authority, while the company's territories were largely increased by the Birmeese forfeitures. He won not a little European popularity by ascertaining the fate of the expedition of La Perouse, which had been as much a mystery as that of our Franklin expedition ever was; and he came home in 1828 full of confidence that the reforms inaugurated by his predecessor, and promoted by himself, would retrieve all financial difficulties, if they were but duly taken in hand by his successor. For such an object the very best choice was made. If our raj were really over, as the deluded sepoys now suppose, and the last Briton were to leave India for ever, tradition would preserve the memory of Lord William Bentinck, in the gratitude of the native population for centuries to come, though he overruled whatever was intolerably mischievous in their notions." Before, however, the great reform of Lord William Bentinck had begun, or his lordship assumed the office of governor-general, much had been done to adjust the judicial and revenue departments to the interests of the company and the desires of the Hindoos.

In 1827, before Lord Amherst quitted the country, nearly all civil suits instituted throughout the Bengal provinces were decided by native judges. In consequence of this, Lord William Bentinck extended the experiment which he has generally received the credit of having originated.

By law all British subjects were competent to serve on juries in India. Custom, however, had pronounced that half-castes were not British subjects, and law sanctioned this strange decision. It was for Lord Amherst to redress this grievance. In 1826 it was decreed that all "good and sufficient residents" were competent to serve on juries, with this restriction, that only Christian jurors should sit on the trial of Christians.

Thus when Lord W. Bentinck landed at Calcutta on July 4th, 1825, although he entered upon his arduous office under circumstances calculated to try his nerve and his judgment, he found the principle of reform established in the Indian government, and various improvements of the most important kind already initiated, which only required his helping hand to be confirmed in the customs of Indian administration.

Gradually the expenses of all the establishments in India had increased, whereas the revenue did not proportionately increase. The occupiers of land resorted to forgery and every species of fraud to cheat the officers of revenue; and the *native* officers, by ex-

ortion and plunder, rendered the occupiers still less able and less willing to pay. The zemindars were to a great extent bankrupt. The efforts of Lord Cornwallis to introduce the feudal system of Europe to India, and create a native aristocracy in Bengal, somewhat after the model of Britain, was a ridiculous failure and a cruel wrong. The finance of India from all these and other causes became embarrassed. In three years, previous to the arrival of Lord W. Bentinck, the public debt of India had increased £13,007,823.* The East India Company and the board of control had charged his lordship to effect, if possible and by all means allowable, a great financial, economical reform. On his arrival he at once invited the opinions of all classes, and left the press unfettered to discuss his measures. No man perhaps was ever less shackled by the prejudices of "his order" than Lord W. Bentinck. Class, caste, and creed were nothing in his eyes where justice and truth were concerned. He resolved, if it could be done by industry and the fearless discharge of duty, to place Indian finance on a solid and equitable basis.

His first practical procedure of a definite kind was the establishment of finance committees. He vigilantly superintended their inquiries, examining everything with herculean industry. He found it practicable and right to enforce reductions of expense in every direction, and incurred vast odium from "the departments" for so doing. In reply to many complaints and much abuse he observed, "I have done my duty; and this conviction, as I learn from dreadfully dear-bought experience, is the only consolation that defies all contingencies."

The committees of finance which excited so much displeasure in India were not devised as an original scheme by Lord William. The Marquises Cornwallis and Wellesley had appointed the like, but they did not personally look so closely into their investigations, and in those days there was not so much to look into. Lord William intended the investigations to bear fruits, and he resolved to carry out to their consequences all results flowing from these inquiries.

From the commander-in-chief of the army to the humblest ensign, and even to the most inane sepoy, there arose a murmur of dissatisfaction, followed by a cry of anger against the economic governor-general. Batta, half-batta, quarter-batta, were the words most frequently in the lips of the heroes of all the presidential armies. The privileges which these epithets expressed were revised, threatened, or reversed, as the facts brought to light by the

* Finance Report, 1832.

committees seemed, in the governor-general's opinion, to warrant. The company at the same time urged economy as essential to the future government of India. Arduous indeed was the office of governor-general in the hands of Lord W. Bentinck.

In 1829 his lordship actively employed himself in visiting the provinces of Eastern Bengal, and the whole of the provinces along the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. This resulted in abrogating the separate government of Prince of Wales's Island and its dependencies, and of annexing these territories to the government of Bengal. He also in this year invited native gentlemen of all degrees to meet him and make known their views on the condition of India, and the invitation was also extended to all European settlers. "A communication was likewise invited of all suggestions tending to promote any branch of the national industry; to improve the commercial intercourse by land and water; to amend any defects in the existing establishments; to encourage the diffusion of education and useful knowledge; and to advance the general prosperity of the British empire in India. The invitation was addressed to all native gentlemen, landholders, merchants, and others, and to all Europeans, both in and out of the service, including 'that useful and respectable body of men,' the indigo planters, who, from their uninterrupted residence in the Mofussil, had peculiar opportunities of forming an opinion upon the various subjects."

While these matters proceeded, extensive labours were imposed upon the governor-general in reference to "residencies, agents, collectors," &c., in every province of India, but especially in the provinces of Central India, newly acquired by the Pindarree and Mahratta wars.

This year was made memorable by the abolition of suttee. To the firmness and humanity of Lord W. Bentinck, in spite of the cowardice and political and religious indifference of many around him, this great reform is to be attributed. It must, however, be admitted that one of the sources of the revolt and insurrection of 1857 existed in the resentments which the abolition of suttee awakened in the minds of the heathen portion of the people of India. This interposition of the state on the side of humanity was never forgiven. The Brahminical women of India, in whose interest it was made, never forgave it. The women of *heathen* India believe that their condition is less honourable since the abolition of suttee, and they have incited bitter hostilities in consequence to their sons. The abolition of female infanticide, a later

reform, caused a still more intense animosity to the English on the part of the women of heathen India. The removal by murder of a portion of the female offspring of a family, left it possible to give a larger marriage portion to the survivors than can now be afforded. The women of India therefore, forgetting that they might have perished but for the abolition of the atrocious custom, regard the English as having by their philanthropic views deprived them of fortune, and by their religious interference decayed and impaired the social condition of the Hindoo people.

His lordship made a comprehensive tour to the upper provinces, inciting the higher classes of natives to exertion for the improvement of the country. The education of the natives was one of his lordship's favourite ideas, and he endeavoured, by such means as were at his disposal, to carry it out. The establishment of a legislative council, which entered into the charter of 1833 (see last chapter on home affairs), was originated by Lord Bentinck in 1830. A good understanding between the celebrated Runjeet Singh, the Sikh chief, and the governor-general, was established during the tour of the latter through the upper provinces. His lordship's patronage of Lieutenant Bruce, the justly celebrated Asiatic, and subsequently African traveller, was useful to the company, and a means of extending in Europe a better knowledge of the vast range of nations lying between the Indus and the Caspian Sea. Outrages perpetrated in Delhi, upon the court of the king and the people of that city by the English resident, and the English in his service, excited a spirit of revolt, and rendered the interposition of the governor-general necessary.

Colonel Pottinger was sent at the close of 1831 to negotiate a friendly treaty with the Ameer of Scinde. While Colonel Pottinger was rendering the Ameers of Scinde more amicable, Mohammedan fanatics were disturbing the whole face of the country near Calcutta, attacking the Hindoos and the government, plundering, murdering, and assassinating. Troops were at last dispatched against them; many of the offenders were slain, and the rest were imprisoned or dispersed. The glory of the Mohammedan religion was the object of their coarse outrages and sanguinary atrocities.

In 1831-32 the affairs of Cachar and Assam occupied the attention of the supreme council. Disputes with Birmah were originated, which led to new complications with that government. The judicial systems, the registered debt of India, steam navigation, and the state of commercial credit at Calcutta, occupied

incessantly his lordship's attention from 1831 to 1835. The government of the nizam required the interposition of Lord W. Bentinck. The state of Mysore was such that it became necessary to assume its government as an English province. It was not for his lordship to escape trouble with Onde, which had been more or less a thorn in the side of every governor-general from the days of Clive. M. Anber strikingly observes on this subject:—"The imbecility of the king had defeated the reforms that were effecting in his country, and its affairs were fast relapsing into their ancient condition of anarchy and confusion. The misgovernment of that kingdom has been a subject of frequent and earnest remonstrance on the part of the British government, during the whole of the thirty-two years which have elapsed since the conclusion of the subsidiary treaty. Lord W. Bentinck was fully empowered to take final and decided measures for assuming the government for a certain period. In consequence of the appearance of a real disposition on the part of the king, though at this late hour and probably under an impression of alarm, to reform his administration, the governor-general determined to suspend the

execution of this extreme measure, to which all the authorities both in India and in Europe, had always entertained so strong a repugnance: and thus to afford the king another opportunity of retrieving his character and that of his administration."

During the war with Mysore great services had been rendered (see chapters on that war) to the British government by the Rajah of Coorg. In 1833 the possessor of that dignity acted contumaciously and injuriously to the government of India, and after protracted efforts of negotiation an armed force was sent against him. This tyrant had murdered every legitimate descendant of the throne of the rajahlik, and perpetrated atrocities that rivalled those of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sahib. He was subdued by a force acting under Brigadier Lindsay, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart, Colonels Waugh, Miles, and Foulis. Coorg was "annexed."

When in March, 1835, his lordship prepared to depart from Calcutta, addresses were poured in upon him from every part of India and every class of the community; and upon his arrival in England, the court of directors and the board of control were lavish in their encomiums upon his government.

CHAPTER CIX.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SIR CHARLES METCALFE—GOVERNMENT OF LORD AUCKLAND —RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN—PERSIAN INVASION OF HERAT—BRITISH EXPEDITION TO THE PERSIAN GULF—TREATY OF LAHORE.

On the retirement of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe assumed, provisionally, the government of British India. His administration was too short to admit of many incidents. There was one measure which Lord William Bentinck had initiated, but which Sir Charles Metcalfe fully carried out, which was of a nature to influence India extensively for good or evil,—freedom of the press. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the mode in which Sir Charles carried out his favourite idea. It met with much opposition and much advocacy. A public address was presented to his excellency at Calcutta on the part of a numerous and influential portion of the inhabitants, highly eulogistic of his excellency's views, and the practical application of them. Unfortunately, the natives, who have since used the press, have had no sympathy with liberty, civil or religious; and almost the only use made of the freedom conceded has been to give expression to a furious fanaticism, and a bitter

hostility to the government. Military revolt and civil insurrection have been more promoted by the native press than by any other means, not excepting even the preaching of fakeers. The government has certainly obtained the advantage of knowing, by the columns of the native press, the state of feeling which the more educated classes of the natives have cherished. It is to be feared, however, that very little use has been made of the knowledge thus derived, and the advantage has been counterbalanced by the incitement to sedition which the native newspapers have supplied.

The fact that Sir Charles held the government merely as the *locum tenens* of some nobleman, to be selected by the English cabinet, deprived his acts of the authority they would otherwise have possessed. Had this enlightened man been allowed to remain, as the directors and the proprietary of the East India Company earnestly desired and urged, it had been well for England and India. It,



THE EARL OF AUCKLAND.

however, became an understood thing that the post of governor-general of India should be held by a nobleman, and by the direct nomination of the cabinet. Mr. Canning, during his presidency of the board of control, laid it down as a principle that no servant of the company should be permitted to occupy the high post of governor-general. He alleged that the office ought to be so held as to constitute a link between the imperial crown and the people of India as well as the company. This was more specious and popular than convincing, or sincerely urged. The real object of Canning and of all ministerial parties was, to grasp the patronage of India from the company. In carrying out such an object, India has been more than once endangered, the company exposed to loss, and England to obloquy.

On the 5th of March, 1836, Lord Auckland arrived as governor-general. The appointment of this nobleman was against the wishes of the court of directors, and led to much animadversion in England. It was regarded as a discreditable party nomination; and the whigs at that time having been unfortunate in several of their *élèves* of office, there was a disposition on the part of the English public to find fault with any one upon whom they conferred any post of an important nature, unless his claims were very manifest:—"His lordship was the son of one of the most steady adherents of the administration of Mr. Pitt, under which his services were rewarded by a peerage. He acquired distinction as a diplomatist, and also as a statistical and economical writer. His son forsook the politics of his family, and attached himself to the whig party."*

The general tone of the public, and of writers on Indian affairs, concerning this appointment is indicated by the following passages from an author who has written well on subjects connected with India, although his work is not extensively known:—"The advent of Lord Auckland as governor-general of India was destined to prove a momentous epoch in the Anglo-Indian annals. On this appointment being made known, the public were somewhat at a loss to guess what peculiar quality of his lordship had formed the justification of the act. None knew what his administrative ability might amount to; and all who took the trouble to form any opinion on the subject, were unanimous that the name of Auckland could by no human possibility become distinguished in connection with the government of the vast territories over which it was decided that he should hold an almost

uncontrolled sway. But these cavillers were mistaken; they knew not their man. Before these sceptics in the achievements of an Auckland were three years older, they had the strongest possible reasons for according to his lordship a distinction and a notoriety as world-wide and as indelible as any achieved by a Clive or a Wellington. It was Lord Auckland's destiny to place the British arms in a position they had never previously occupied on the continent of India; to carve out for the British forces a career as disastrous as its origin was unjustifiable and unworthy; to peril our position in the East; to sacrifice an army of brave men; and, finally, to clothe half the nation in mourning, and to overwhelm the other half with shame and indignation."*

The commencement of Lord Auckland's administration has been thus described by Edward Thornton:—"The first year of his administration of the government of India was completed without the occurrence of any event sufficiently remarkable to require notice, and the first half of the ensuing year passed with equal tranquillity. The calm was then interrupted by some violent proceedings in that perpetual seat of trouble and disquiet, Oude."

The disturbance thus alluded to was no less than a struggle for succession to the throne, of a nature, which, although attended by some bloodshed, and which might have caused still more serious loss of life, was, nevertheless, ridiculous. The King of Oude, as the prince previously called Nabob was then generally styled, died. The English recognised as successor the claimant who, according to Mohammedan law, was the rightful heir. This was very well known by the various branches of the royal family, who, professing the Mohammedan religion, and ready to sacrifice, if they dared, the life of any person who would oppose it, yet were willing to violate its institutions and precepts when their own corrupt or ambitious desires could be gratified in so doing. Scarcely had the British prepared to place the heir upon the musnid, than the begum, or queen-dowager, at the head of a numerous train of followers, appeared at the gate of the city to place upon the throne a very young candidate, whose cause she espoused. The English had but a small force. Reinforcements could soon be obtained, but the arrangements made for bringing them to the capital were bad. The gates of the city were, however, closed. The begum demanded, in the name of "the rightful sovereign," that they should be opened. The resident refused. The queen-dowager

* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton, vol. vi., chap. xxix., p. 73.

* *The Three Presidencies of India.* By John Capper, F.R.A.S.

ordered one of the gates to be forced by elephants, which command was successfully obeyed. Captain Paton was knocked down and made prisoner. The rabble of retainers proceeded with the begum, took possession of the palace, and placed the youthful aspirant to sovereignty upon the musnid. British troops arrived, forced an entrance to the city, slew thirty of the begum's retinue, wounded many others, and dispersed the rest. The legal candidate for the throne was then invested with the dignity of his office, and the begum and her *protégé* made prisoners. This, however, did not terminate the troubles of succession; for when did any difficulty arise in Oude without peculiar complications, such as could hardly occur elsewhere? Various royal personages made public declaration of their right to the sovereignty of Oude, but none dared to prosecute his claim by arms. After relating these facts, Mr. Thornton notices another competitor whose mode of prosecuting his claims was peculiar. The terms in which that historian denounces the advisers of this last on the list of claimants deserves quotation. The name of this prince was Akbul-ood-Dowlah:—"This personage, under European advice, proceeded to England, and there addressed the court of directors of the East India Company. The folly of undertaking a long voyage to assert a claim known to be absolutely and undoubtedly bad, and with a certainty of its being rejected, need not be dwelt upon. What profit the advisers of the claimant derived from the expedition cannot be known; but they were fully aware that none would accrue to the person on whose behalf they affected to act. Such occurrences are not now, indeed, uncommon in the history of British India, and they will probably never cease altogether until native powers shall acquire sufficient acquaintance with the principles of British policy to prevent their becoming the dupes of unprincipled adventurers."

Soon after the conclusion of the Oude disturbances, questions arose in connection with the Rajah of Sattara, destined to occupy a more prominent place in English interests. When the Mahratta empire was destroyed, the chief of that confederation, the Peishwa, became dependant upon the mercy and generosity of England. The Marquis of Hastings conceded to the prince the dignity and independence of a sovereignty, and he became known in India and to England as "the Rajah of Sattara." The previous position of the prince resembled that which for a long time was filled by the Mogul. It was one of titled humiliation. The Mogul had been no better than a prisoner to the various Indian princes

who ruled ostensibly in his name. The Peishwa was held in durance by his chief minister. The Mahratta chiefs, Scindiah and Holkar, ruled Peishwa and Mogul, and the people in their name. From this vassalage Lord Hastings took the Peishwa, and made him independent in fact as well as name, as Rajah of Sattara. This favour was conferred on him when he had violated treaties, and by the fortune of war lost everything. He was not grateful, but conspired against his benefactors, setting up claims to the sovereignty of Hindostan, and the Mahratta empire. To accomplish his absurd aims, he attempted to corrupt the sepoy soldiery, more especially the native officers, a plan which had at last become the hope of every plotter among the native chiefs. The English had ample proofs of his guilt, but treated his power with so much contempt that they took no pains for a considerable time to punish him. Sir James Cawar arriving in Bombay as governor of that presidency, it was deemed expedient by the higher authorities of the company to commit to his management this affair. Sir James was popular; the native princes esteemed him; there existed among men of all parties confidence in his judgment, the purity of his motives, and his moderation. Contemning the rajah's power, yet wishing to avert possible complications and disturbances, Sir James adopted the course of exposing to the rajah the evidences of his guilt, of which the English were in possession, and urging upon him to abandon his conspiracies and projects of ambition. After long and fruitless efforts to induce him to adopt the course which was alone compatible with the treaties he had signed with Lord Hastings, all hope of bringing him to reason was abandoned; he was deposed, and his brother placed upon the throne. The deposed rajah followed the same plan as that adopted by the unsuccessful applicant for the throne of Oude. He hired advocates in England, and sent over diplomatic agents, whose business was to accuse before the directors the conduct of their servants in India; failing in that, to arraign the directors themselves before the court of proprietary, and that proving fruitless, to impeach the East India Company before the parliament and the country. These agents denied all that had been alleged against the rajah, of which the company and the board of control had the most conclusive proofs. In public assemblies, where such statements might be safely made, the rajah's rights to an extensive sovereignty in Southern and Central India, were made the subject of declamation. Many benevolent persons who favoured the "Society for the Protection of

Aborigines," and many members of the "Society of Friends," who always sympathise with the aggrieved or oppressed, gave a willing ear to the advocates of the rajah, some of whom were men of surpassing eloquence. The result was, a long continued agitation in favour of the deposed prince, which issued in no advantage to himself, while his long hoarded treasures were dissipated in largesses and stipends to those whom he employed in his advocacy in England.

When Lord Auckland arrived in India, he found rumours of a projected Russian invasion prevailing at Calcutta, and, indeed, all over the peninsula. Political and philanthropic parties in England have ridiculed these rumours as foolish, or denounced them as created by the military to promote a war, and ensure distinction and promotion. Members of the "Peace Society," who seem to believe, by constantly endeavouring to make others believe, that England can never have a just war, were the foremost in pronouncing that these apprehensions of Russian intrigue were groundless. The British government was, however, in possession of conclusive evidence that Russia sought to create an influence in Central and Western Asia inimical to British interests in India, and calculated to spread the prestige of her own greatness, and prepare the way for the advancement of her own empire.* The chief instrument of Russia in her projects was Persia. Through the influence of the shah, it was believed that a way might be opened to British India. The czar determined to buy, or conquer, or cajole alliances to the very gates of Hindostan. Moreover, Persia was incited to encroach upon Afghanistan, so as to bring her boundary nearer to India; because, while the czar encroached from the Caspian upon Persian territory, Persia would complain less if indemnified on her Afghan frontier.

A most interesting correspondence was published, under the authority of government, entitled, "Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Persia and Afghanistan." It consisted of 117 official letters, diplomatic notes, and reports; besides the documents corroborating the important facts connected with the subject. Embracing a period of about four years and three-quarters, it begins with a despatch, dated St. Petersburg, 15th January, 1834, addressed to Lord Palmerston, announcing the probable settlement of the succession to the throne of Persia, and closes with a circular from the Foreign-office,

* The author, in his *History of the War against Russia* (Virtue, Ivy Lane and City Road, London), has entered into this question, and afforded proof of the intrigues of Russia in the direction now noticed.

dated March 20th, 1839, assigning the motive which induced our government to withhold, for a time, all diplomatic intercourse with that country. In reference to these papers, Sir John McNeill observed — "The evidence with which these documents abound of a deep-rooted hatred of our prosperity cherished by that power, and of a settled and well-digested plan of progressive hostility, not the less dangerous from disguise, or the less effectual from the cautious and wary steps with which it is generally prosecuted, is so circumstantial and so palpable that any endeavours to set that evidence in a stronger or clearer light would weaken instead of confirm the effect."

Persia, incited by Russia, made war upon that portion of Afghanistan which she wished to seize. Colonel Borowski, the Russian ambassador at the court of Teheran, urged the invasion of Candahar and Herat.* Russian agents spread themselves all over Persia, urging the people to war. The czar's ambassador openly encouraged the Persian court to seize upon the coveted territories before the British could interfere for their defence.† Mr. McNeill (afterwards Sir John) succeeded Mr. Ellis as the envoy of England to the Persian court. Through him the English government offered its mediation‡ between Persia and Cabul. This was done in a manner exceedingly calculated to dissuade the young shah from his ambitious designs. Nevertheless, the Persians advanced against Herat, accompanied by Russian officers. The following abstract of the state papers published on this subject, is attributed to Sir John McNeill himself:—"Upon receiving the above intelligence, Lord Palmerston directed the Earl of Durham (Paper No. 34, January the 16th, 1837) to ask Count Nesselrode whether the extraordinary conduct held by Count Simonich in Persia was in accordance with the instructions he had received from his court. Lord Durham, in his answer,§ asserts most positively, in the name of Count Nesselrode, that Simonich had no instructions of the kind inferred by Mr. McNeill, and that the charges brought against the Russian minister arose no doubt in misapprehension. This assurance was still further confirmed by the next despatch of Lord Durham,|| wherein his

* Parliamentary paper, No. 11. Despatch of Mr. Ellis from Teheran, Nov. 13, 1835.

† Despatches of Mr. Ellis, from Teheran, from No. 12 to 28; beginning 24th Dec., 1835, ending Aug. 22nd, 1836.

‡ Despatch of Lord Palmerston, June 2nd, 1836. Paper No. 29.

§ No. 35, Feb. 16, 1837.

|| No. 36, Feb. 24, 1837.

lordship states the substance of a conversation he had had with Mr. Rodofnikin, Russian under secretary of state, who protested most solemnly against any supposition injurious to the sincerity of his court, offering to exhibit to Lord Durham the original book, containing the instructions transmitted to Count Simonich. In the meantime the shah's army, harassed by numerous detachments of Turcoman horsemen hanging on his flanks and in his rear, abandoned the siege of Herat, and returned to his capital, where we find Count Simonich again urging, on the 30th December, 1836, the expediency of resuming the expedition against Herat in the spring, and offering, by way of further encouragement, the assistance of his own military services. Agents from Cabul and from Candahar, secretly instigated by Russian emissaries, made at this period their first appearance at Teheran, and endeavoured to conciliate the favour of Count Simonich and of the shah. They offered to co-operate with Persia against Herat, and sought protection against the Sikhs. Kumber Ali Khan was sent by the shah on an embassy to Dost Mohammed Khan, of Cabul, who was represented as having applied for the assistance of Russia and of Persia.

"Taj Mohammed Khan (despatch No. 40), agent from Candahar, at Teheran, accompanied by the Persian minister for foreign affairs, visits the Russian ambassador, and receives from him a letter and presents for his master. He is forbid to visit Mr. McNeill, whose influence is now in a rapid state of decline; while Russian intrigue is everywhere active and triumphant among the numerous nations or tribes of central Asia, according to the several inclosures contained in this despatch.

"On the 2nd of May, 1837 (No. 42), Mr. McNeill communicates to Lord Palmerston that he had renewed his offer of mediation between Persia and Afghanistan, and on the 1st of June, of the same year (No. 43), he justified himself against Count Nesselrode, renewed his charges against Count Simonich, and supplied various further most conclusive details in proof of the accuracy of his former statement, nor was it long before the progress of events removed whatever doubts might still attach to his unequivocal assertions; as on the 15th of July, 1837, Mr. Rodofnikin placed in the hands of Mr. Millbank a copy of a despatch, dated May 28, 1837, and addressed by Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, conveying the intelligence of a renewal of the expedition against Herat. This was soon confirmed by Mr. McNeill himself (despatch No. 45, 3rd January, 1837), who at the same time informed Lord Palmerston that the preparations for war had been kept a profound secret

entirely on his account. It appears further that Mr. McNeill called upon Count Simonich (No. 47, June 30, 1837), and the conversation which passed between them in the presence of Captain Sheil is a striking example of that solemn kind of mystification which the presumption of superior power ventures sometimes to put on the credulity of the weak, not in the hope that it will be believed, but merely to avoid the harshness of stating an unwelcome truth. Count Simonich acknowledged, in reference to the denial of Count Nesselrode, that in his official capacity he was bound, if not to dissuade, at least to abstain from encouraging the warlike mood of the shah; but he at the same time states that his own individual opinion was quite at variance with his public duty. Having to choose between two opposite lines of conduct, and to make his election whether in this matter he should advocate the wishes and intentions of his master the emperor, or his own, he preferred the latter." Mr. McNeill threatened to withdraw from the Persian court, and remove Colonel Sheil,* the English commissioner, from the Persian camp. This alarmed the shah, who endeavoured to dissuade so extreme a course on the part of the English minister, and Mr. McNeill consented to remain. The Russian minister, intensely desirous to effect the removal of both McNeill and Sheil, succeeded in influencing the Persian court to measures intolerably insulting to the English officials, so that after many efforts of a conciliatory nature, Mr. McNeill withdrew from the court,† sending however a letter of useless remonstrance. There was a want of firmness both in the despatches of Lord Palmerston and the tone of Mr. McNeill, which weakened the influence of the latter, both with the Russian envoy and the Persian court. The menaces of the English agent "wanted precision of means and limitation of time," which rendered them inoperative.

Mr. McNeill left the camp of the shah of Persia on the 7th of June, 1838, and at once proceeded towards the borders of Turkey. The departure of the English ambassador created alarm amongst the shah's advisers, and messengers were sent beseeching him not to cross the frontier, and means would be speedily adopted to bring about a reconciliation. This conciliatory conduct on the part of the shah was quickened by intelligence which reached his camp, that an English force had arrived in the Persian Gulf, and had taken possession of the Island of Karak. Lord Auckland also had issued a manifesto, and

* Brother of the Right Hon. Richard Lalor Sheil, celebrated in the agitations of Roman Catholic emancipation.

† Paper No. 85, June 25, 1838.

made a demonstration upon the Indus, which constrained his Persian majesty to adopt more moderation in his policy. The consternation which filled the people, also acted upon the court; the wildest ideas spread, not only in Teheran but the provinces, as to the powerful army with which the English were about to invade Persia. It was in vain that the czar's envoy ridiculed the idea of the English being able to send a large army anywhere, the credulous Persians believed the rumours of English power and purpose as readily as they before received the news circulated of Russian greatness and resolve. They were actuated, like all orientals, by display of force, or the conviction that it could and would be put forth,—diplomacy, resting upon international law and the faith of treaties, had no meaning for them. Even Count Simonich, the Russian envoy, and Captain Vicovich, the Russian military commissioner, became really alarmed, supposing that a sufficient substratum of truth lay beneath the reports which had been circulated to give just grounds for apprehending that the English were at last roused, and were about to put forth their might. The Persian monarch taunted the Russian diplomatist with having deceived him as to the relative power of the two great European countries, and demanded some practical proof that Russian assertions of capacity and resources, were something more than empty boastings. The only answer his excellency could make to such an appeal was his withdrawal from the Persian court and camp. He retired from Herat September 9, 1838.*

Uncertain as oriental courts proverbially are, there has been always a peculiar levity about that of Teheran. After the departure of the Muscovite envoy, the shah, as if from sheer folly or passion, refused to abandon his designs upon Herat. Simonich had left secret agents, Russian, Affghan, and Persian, well supplied with Russian gold, to effect what his presence would render more difficult of accomplishment as things stood. These men played their game well, and succeeded in inducing his majesty to order the resumption of hostilities, when the spring of 1839 rendered a campaign practicable.† Mr. McNeill also obtained precise information of a treaty between the chief of Candahar and the Shah of Persia, *under the guarantee of Russia*, hostile to the independence of Affghanistan and the safety of British interests in India. The promises made to induce Mr. McNeill to return to the court were evaded, and he reluctantly crossed the boundary into Turkey and returned to England.

* Government papers, Nos. 90, 92, 94, 95, 98.

† Government papers, No. 106. Nov. 28th, 1838.

While these transactions were passing in Asia, matters in connection with them assumed a serious aspect in Europe. Lord Palmerston, then holding the seals of the English Foreign-office, demanded from Russia a categorical explanation of the conduct in Persia of the accredited agents of the government of St. Petersburg. The Marquis of Clanricarde was then the British ambassador at St. Petersburg; he waited upon the Russian minister for foreign affairs, and presented the draft of a note from Lord Palmerston, worthy of the great diplomatic talents of that extraordinary man. The note concluded with the following passage, the firmness, force, and dignity of which produced a great effect upon the Russian minister and his master:—"The British government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with regard to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too conscious of her strength, and too conscious of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British government considers itself entitled to ask of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia, and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and Mr. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Mr. Vicovich."*

The Russian government disavowed its agents. The Russian foreign minister addressed a note to the ambassador from his court to the court of London, November 1st, 1838,† declaring that Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich were unauthorised in adopting the course which they pursued towards Persia, Affghanistan, and England. This despatch alleged that Captain Vicovich was not really a military commissioner with the shah's army before Herat, but a *commercial agent*, sent to secure for his country commercial advantages which the English sought to monopolise in Asia. Notwithstanding the disavowal of the offending agents, which the despatch contained, its tone was resentful and arrogant. The despatch assured the British minister that Count Simonich was recalled, and General Duhamel sent to Persia in his stead. Captain Vicovich was also recalled.

Lord Palmerston's replies to this and subsequent despatches of Count Nesselrode are

* Government Papers, No. 106. October 23, 1838.

† Government Papers, No. 110.

characterised by remarkable sagacity, adroitness, and firmness, tempered with courtesy. His lordship declared that the resumption of diplomatic intercourse with Persia would depend upon entire satisfaction being rendered to the English government for past insults and injuries, and the abandonment by the shah of all ambitious designs upon territory contiguous to British India. The active and ostensible interference of Russia was thus brought to a termination; the mischief it had effected remained, and furnished occasion for the Affghan war.

While this series of events was passing in Persia and on the Affghan frontier, another series not less important was going on elsewhere. Lord Auckland, on his arrival in India, directed his attention to the navigation of the Indus,* and formed commercial treaties with the Indian states bordering on that river. These proceedings excited jealousy on the part of the Affghan chiefs, the Persian shah, and the czar, and no doubt incited the hostile proceedings which they adopted. It is necessary here to glance at the state of Affghanistan at this period, and of the Sikh territory.

Runjeet Singh, whose reputation for courage and sagacity pervaded all north-western India, ruled over the country of the five rivers. He had a fine army, disciplined by French officers. His power and resources were great, and his ambition at least equalled them. He was desirous of enlarging the bounds of his dominions, whether from the British, the Ameers of Scinde, or the Affghans, he cared not, so as his acquisitions were valuable, and his means of conquering them safe. The English deemed it wise to stand well with Runjeet; he was a barrier to Affghan and Persian. The Sikh ruler appears to have been keenly alive to the process of absorption of native states by the English, although he felt it to be his policy to remain on friendly terms with so powerful a neighbour. It is related of him that in a conversation with a company's officer, he pointed to a large map of India before him, on which the British territories were defined by a narrow red band, and exclaimed, "When Runjeet dies, company's red line swallow up all Panjaub country."†

The various states or chieftainships of Affghanistan (as the reader will see by turning to the geographical portion of this work), lay beyond the Panjaub. The chiefs of Candahar and Cabul were the most important of these, and the latter was regarded as the supreme chief of Affghanistan. Shah Sujah, the imbecile ruler of Affghanistan, had been expelled

that country, in the ordinary Eastern style, to make room for one far better able to rule such a turbulent people as were his subjects; and the deposed chief appeared well satisfied to find himself with his head on his shoulders, eating the company's "salt" within the walls of the British fortress of Loodianah, one of the north-western frontier stations.*

The brother of Shah Sujah, named Mahmoud, was the successful competitor for the throne of Cabul. He was indebted for his fortunes to a chief named Futteh Khan. This chief was murdered by the man he raised to a throne; for what ingratitude is too base, or what sanguinary deed too cruel for an oriental Mohammedan prince? The relatives of the khan determined to avenge his injuries. They promoted a successful revolution, and Mahmoud fled to Herat, where he reigned over a limited territory. The brothers of the murdered khan divided the dominions of Mahmoud. Amongst these brothers the most energetic and sagacious was Dost Mohammed Khan, and he reigned in the seat of Affghan empire, Cabul. The other brothers resided at Candahar. Shah Sujah, the ejected monarch, twice attempted to recover the throne from which Mahmoud had expelled him, but his efforts were unsuccessful.

Amidst these turbulent proceedings, the vigilant and enterprising monarch of the Panjaub found opportunity to annex the rich Affghan province of Peshawur, "the gate of Hindostan." The Shah of Persia supposed it possible that he also might gain something by the turmoil, and the weakness which it created, and he began that course of intrigue and aggression, in which he was encouraged by Russia and resisted by England, chiefly because his success would give Russia a position of relative strength dangerous to English dominion in India. A memorandum drawn up in January, 1836, by Mr. Ellis, the predecessor of Mr. McNeill, as British envoy to the Persian court, sets the danger apprehended by England in its true light, with great perspicuity of statement and perspicacity of language.

"The Shah of Persia lays claim to the sovereignty of Affghanistan as far as Ghizni, and is fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat in the spring. Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamram Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with his royal highness the late Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his vizier, Yah-Mohammed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the shah a full justification for commencing hostilities. The success of the shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their

* Government Papers, No. 3. September 5, 1836.

† *The Three Presidencies.*

* *The Three Presidencies.*



Stodart

RUNJEET SINGH.

THE FOUNDER OF THE PUNJAUB EMPIRE

From a Drawing by an Indian Artist

minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken. Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the commercial treaty, the residence of a Russian consular agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advance of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British government that the obligations of public faith will permit; but while the British government is free to assist Persia in the assertion of her sovereign pretensions in Afghanistan, Great Britain is precluded by the ninth article of the existing treaty from interfering between the Persians and the Affghans, unless called upon to do so by both parties; and, therefore, as long as the treaty remains in force, the British government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian empire.*

To thwart the projects of Russia, and make eastern Afghanistan the barrier for the defence of British India, became the objects of the British government. Lord Minto had previously conceived this idea, and Lord Auckland believed that the time had arrived for carrying it out. In order to ascertain whether it could be accomplished, a mission, ostensibly commercial, was sent from India in September, 1837. Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes, was selected for this purpose. He had travelled in Afghanistan, and knew the character of its chiefs. On his arrival at Cabul, he perceived that the agents of Russia and Persia were active there, as Captain (Colonel) Sheil found them at Herat, and Mr. Ellis and Mr. McNeill knew them to be at Teheran. The Candahar chiefs had solicited Russian aid to expel Runjeet Singh from Peshawur. They had previously desired to make a convention with the English for that purpose, whose connections with Runjeet did not allow of any interference with his ambition when not directed against themselves.

Captain Burnes, apprised of the proceedings, used every influence he could bring to bear with the Ameer of Cabul and his brothers at Candahar, to detach them from Russian and Persian alliance. Dost Mohammed pretended to concur in Captain Burnes's arguments and policy. It is probable that the ameer preferred British alliance, but he had no reliance

upon British faith. He averred that what Captain Burnes promised, Lord Auckland would probably disallow; that Lord Auckland's promises would be probably repudiated by his successor, or the company, or the Queen of England. He was so situated as to be obliged to come to terms with one side or the other, and the projects and promises of Russia and Persia were clear, distinct, and definite; those of Captain Burnes were vague and general, on the plea that his authority was limited. The Russian ambassador wrote from Herat to Cabul, and to Candahar, offering sufficient money to secure the conquest of Peshawur. The Russian government would send the specie to Bokhara, and the khans should procure the means of conveying it safely thence.

The determination of the Affghan chiefs to recover Peshawur from Runjeet Singh, and the inability of the English to offer any hopes of securing that object or assisting it in any way, weakened the power of English diplomacy. Finally, Captain Burnes withdrew from Afghanistan, the chiefs assuring him that they preferred English alliance, but that Russia was the greater power, and they found it necessary to place their country under its protection.

Lord Auckland was prepared for such an issue. He had determined upon preventing the conquest of Herat, or if conquered, to compel its restitution. Contemporaneous with the presence of an English squadron in the Persian Gulf, a treaty between Runjeet Singh, the ex-king of Cabul, and the governor-general, led to the formation of a plan for a military campaign against Afghanistan. India was tranquil, and secure on every frontier, so that his excellency was enabled to organize an army of twenty-five thousand men, and send them across the Indus.

Meanwhile Russia was moving troops in central Asia in a manner which caused great agitation from the Oxus to the Indus. The following extract of a despatch from Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, strikingly exhibits the fact and the effect:—

Teheran, December 30, 1837.

I learn through native channels of information, which are not unworthy of credit, that a large body of horse, consisting of many thousands, had marched from Khiva two months ago to the aid of Kamran, and that, after long doubt and hesitation, the government of Bokhara had at length decided on sending a considerable body of horse to Kamran's assistance. This force, the number of which was not stated, had, it was said, been paid and mustered at Bokhara, preparatory to its setting out for Herat, when the letters containing this information were written. The same informant states, that all the principalities bordering on Persia to the eastward, having become alarmed for their own safety, had determined to send succours to Herat, believing that if that city fell they should have to defend themselves in their own territories. A general,

* Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, presented to both houses of parliament by command of her Majesty.

indeed an universal, opinion prevails in all those countries, that Persia is pushed on and supported by Russia in her schemes of conquest; and I must confess that the demonstrations of joy which Count Simonich manifested on the fall of Ghorian, were well calculated to confirm that impression, for they far exceeded the expressions of gratification which might have been expected, even from the Persian government itself.

The Persian army before Herat amounted in the spring of 1838 to forty thousand men, and although the chief of Herat destroyed all means by which the enemy could procure supplies within a considerable distance of that city, ample provisions were obtained. This circumstance was much dwelt upon by Mr. McNeill in his communications to Lord Palmerston, as showing that Persia was well supplied with money, and that food and provender for a large army could with ease be ordinarily found, if operations against India were undertaken in that direction.

The importance of preserving Herat, the basis of Lord Auckland's policy in the emergency that arose, may be seen by the English reader from the perusal of two documents, one an extract of a despatch from Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston; the other a despatch from his lordship to the British envoy.

Camp before Herat, April 11, 1838.

In the meantime, Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabul, and I learn from Captain Burnes's communications, that the success of his negotiations there will in a great measure depend on the failure of the shah's enterprises against Herat. At Candahar our position is even more precarious; and I have the honour to inclose a translation of a draft of a treaty between the shah and the chief of Candahar, which it is proposed to conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat and Candahar under a chief, who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia. I am unable to inform your lordship what progress has been made towards the conclusion of this treaty, or what view the shah may have taken of the position in respect to these countries, in which, by this arrangement, he would be placed; but the treaty is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am not without very serious apprehensions, that even before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced to co-operate with the shah; while in the event of Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the chief of Candahar will consider it to be for his advantage to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than with England. I therefore continue to be of opinion that the fall of Herat would destroy our position in Afghanistan, and place all, or nearly all, that country under the influence or authority of Russia and Persia. I need not repeat to your lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia for purposes injurious to British interest is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original

object to give additional security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only power that threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain; and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract; I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of the treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1838.

SIR,—I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the treaty between Persia and Great Britain is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears on the contrary, that the shah is occupied in subverting those intervening states between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected himself with an European power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests and the security of her dominions may suggest.

Urged by the Russian agents the shah continued the siege of Herat, the defence of which was directed by a young subaltern of the East India Company's army, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, brother to Sir Henry Pottinger, so distinguished as an officer and diplomatist in India.

In July, 1838, a breach was effected by the Persian cannon, and the troops of the shah gallantly attempted to storm it. The Afghans charged them sword in hand, drove them out, and pursued them across the ditch, making extraordinary havoc. The number of the killed and wounded amounted to between seventeen hundred and eighteen hundred men. The loss in officers was most serious, a number of Russian officers assisting in the direction of the shah's forces having perished; amongst them was Major-general Barowski. Two of the principal khans in the Persian army were killed, and four others wounded. Nearly all who fell received wounds from the Afghan scimitar. This event was most humiliating to the Russians, more especially as Count Simonich planned the attack. This dreadful repulse did not cause the shah to abandon the siege. He probably would have done so, but Russian obstinacy and perseverance prevented such a result. The shah's army, aided by the Khan of Candahar's, be-

came more active in the neighbourhood, and subjected the subsidiary forts and towns.

Colonel Stoddart, who was afterwards murdered by the King of Bokhara, was employed by Mr. McNeill to bear despatches to the shah, in the autumn of 1838. The colonel presented his majesty with the final demands of England, which were :—

“1st. That the Persian government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries.

“2nd. That the Persian government, according to the stipulations of the general treaty, shall conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain on the same footing, with respect to privileges, &c., as the consuls of other powers.

“3rd. That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahomed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished; and that a firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations.

“4th. That the Persian government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British minister.

“5th. That the governor of Bushire, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished; and that measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings.”

When this document was presented, a scene took place of a singular character, which, as being so recent a transaction, and depicting so strikingly the manners of the Persian court, cannot fail to interest the reader. Colonel Stoddart describes it in a despatch to Mr. McNeill.

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 12, 1838.

I have the honour to inform you, that I arrived yesterday, at 11 A.M., and proceeded direct to the Hajee's tent. Omar Khan, the son of the Candahar chief, Kohundil Khan, with eight Afghans, were there. The minister himself was with the shah, and on his return received me in a friendly manner, ordered a tent for me in my old quarters, near my stable, made me his guest, and fixed to-day for my reception by the shah. He inquired what news there was, and I told him I should have been here two days before, had not Thamasp Meerza thought proper to send seven horsemen, with Mahommed Khan Jaleelawund, after me from Ghorian, who detained me by force, which indignity he excused by saying he considered it the interest of Persia to detain me, without having any orders to do so. This I should represent to you I said, as I was not at liberty to enter on any other subject than those with which I was specially charged.

To-day, at half-past 10 A.M., I received an official note from the deputy-minister for foreign affairs, Meerza Ali, requesting me to accompany him, agreeably to the shah's

directions, to the royal presence. I accordingly went, and was haudsomey received. After delivering your letter, I delivered the message in Persian. On my coming to a pause, in the part requesting him to turn from ill-disposed advisers and refer to his own wisdom for the interests of Persia, his majesty said, “The fact is, if I don't leave Herat there will be war, is not that it?” I said, “It is war; all depends on your majesty's answer. God preserve your majesty,” handing the original English written message. He said, “This was all I wished; I asked the minister plenipotentiary for it, and he would not give it, alleging that he was not authorised.” I said, “He was not then, but now he is ordered to give it. No one could give such a message without especial authority from his sovereign.” He declared again that such a paper was all he had wanted, and turned for assent to his chamberlains. He complained the paper was in English, which he could not read, and three times requested me to give him what I had read from in Persian, or to translate it for him, which I declined, referring him to the original. I said that was according to our custom, and requested his majesty would soon favour me with an answer, that I might forward it without delay. He said, “Immediately and without delay, they shall translate it for me. Meerza Baba and Meerza Sauleh shall translate it, and the answer shall be given immediately, it will not take long, to-day or to-morrow.” His majesty then read your letter, and I took my leave. The shah's manner throughout was marked by more than his usual kindness, both towards myself and in inquiries after you. He was in a raised room, up six or seven steps, the room was small and full, and the deputy-minister did not take me into the room, but the shah made me come up close to him, and as his majesty spoke very kindly in welcoming me, I did not think it a fit occasion to stiekle for ceremony; otherwise I would not have delivered the message without entering the room.

This interview with the shah was speedily followed by another, which Colonel Stoddart thus relates:—

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 14, 1838.

I have the honour to inform you that the shah summoned me to an audience this morning, at which his majesty formally gave an answer to the message I had the honour of delivering in writing on the 12th instant. His majesty stated, “We consent to the whole of the demands of the British government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all.” I replied, that I thanked God his majesty thus regarded the true interests of Persia. His majesty then said, “The British will, I trust, arrange for us this matter of Herat.” I replied, I was commanded, in case of his majesty's desiring British mediation between Persia and Herat, to acquaint him, that I was empowered to conclude, on your part, the original arrangements that had been made; and drawing the paper of terms out of my pocket, I said, “Here are those terms, by which the envoy extraordinary is still ready to stand.” His majesty read them, and said, those were his own terms, and added all we want is one thing, that they should not make incursions into Khorassan. There is a great Mollah come to camp from Herat, with whom we will arrange the matter.” I replied, “It is most easy;” and assured him, that the British government was most anxious to put an end to this slave-taking. He wished to retain the paper of terms, but I told him I had not another copy, and would give him a copy of it, which in the afternoon I furnished to the deputy-minister for foreign affairs for his majesty. On coming from the shah's presence, I acquainted deputy-minister, that as far as it went, the answer of the shah was most satisfactory; but that we

now looked to the fulfilment of his majesty's words; and I hoped no delay would take place, as every hour was valuable, and I could not undertake to say the operations of our troops would be suspended by anything less than the shah's actually carrying into effect what he was called upon to do by the British government. The deputy-minister saw this in the light I desired, and on my returning his call in the evening, said the shah had given orders about returning hence; and that his majesty would probably place the arrangement with Herat in my hands, and that respecting the reparation for the treatment of the Gholam, his majesty was considering it, and would order it as soon as he had decided what to do with Haje Khan. The deputy-minister assured me the whole would be carried into effect immediately.

Notwithstanding the assurances so positively, publicly, and formally given to the British agent, the very next day a heavy musketry fire was opened by the Persian infantry against the defences of the city. Colonel Stoddart at once adopted a tone so indignant and firm that the assurances were renewed, and the Persian foreign minister sent a formal declaration to Mr. McNeill of the acquiescence of his majesty in all the demands of Great Britain.

On the 6th of October, 1838, Mr. McNeill, in a despatch to Viscount Palmerston, informed him that the shah had raised the siege, and that Colonel Stoddart had dispatched a person who had accompanied the army fifty miles from Herat. In this despatch the British envoy bore the following honourable testimony to the wisdom and courage of Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger:—

“In concluding this despatch, I hope I may be permitted to solicit the favourable consideration of her majesty's government for Lieutenant-colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who have both, during this protracted siege, been exposed to all the hardships and privations, the one, of the besiegers' camp, the other, of the besieged city. Colonel Stoddart has brought to a

successful conclusion his duties in camp, and Lieutenant Pottinger has thwarted all the military efforts of the Russian officers of superior rank, who for some months conducted the siege, and all the intrigues by which the Russian mission sought to sow dissension and excite alarm amongst the defenders of Herat.”

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the Persian army from before Herat, the shah was unwilling to give up several minor forts and districts which he occupied, and showed such reluctance to fulfil his agreements on various points, that Mr. McNeill was obliged to defer his return to the Persian court, and to carry on a voluminous correspondence with Colonels Stoddart and Sheil, and with his government. The shah addressed a diplomatic note to various European governments, reflecting upon the whole proceedings of the British government, and this opened new ground of contention between the envoy and the Persian court. Finally, the influence of Russia was brought to bear upon the Persian court to induce submission, in consequence of the firm and able conduct of Lord Palmerston, in London, and the Marquis of Clanricarde, in St. Petersburg.

The British government was determined, in order to its own security, to place Shah Sujah, the expelled ameer of Cabul, upon the throne, and to depose Dost Mohammed. As before noticed, Runjeet Singh joined in a convention for that object. This agreement was called “the treaty of Lahore.” It has been also noticed, on a former page, that Lord Auckland advanced 25,000 men across the Indus. The alarm in Afghanistan and Persia created by this step, had much influence in deciding Persian policy. Another chapter will relate the conduct and results of the Afghan war.

CHAPTER CX.

THE AFFGHAN WAR—BOMBARDMENT OF KURRACHEE—SUFFERINGS OF THE TROOPS—STORMING AND CAPTURE OF GHIZNI—ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH ON CABUL—SHAH SUJAH PLACED UPON THE MUSNID—GENERAL WILLSHIRE STORMS AND CAPTURES KHELAT.

THE following was the arrangement as to the quality and amount of force in this expedition:—“Bengal and Bombay were each to furnish a portion of the British force, and the command of the whole was to be entrusted to Sir Henry Fane, commander-in-chief in India. From Bengal were provided two troops of horse and three companies of foot artillery, the whole under the command of Brigadier Graham. The Bengal cavalry brigade, under

Brigadier Arnold, was formed of the 16th lancers and the 2nd and 3rd light cavalry. One division of infantry, comprehending three brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd), were commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; another, consisting of two brigades (4th and 5th), by Major-general Duncan. The first brigade was composed of her majesty's 13th light infantry, and also of the 16th and 48th native infantry; it was under Brigadier Sale. The second

brigade, commanded by Major-general Nott, contained the 2nd, 31st, 42nd, and 43rd regiments of native infantry. The third, under Brigadier Dennis, comprehended the Buffs, and the 2nd and 27th native infantry. The fourth brigade, composed of the Bengal European regiment and the 35th and 37th native infantry, was placed under Brigadier Roberts; and the fifth, comprising the 5th, 28th, and 53rd regiments of native infantry under Brigadier Worsley. An engineer department under Captain George Thomson, was provided, together with two companies of sappers and miners, native soldiers, with European non-commissioned officers. The equipment of this force was completed by a siege-train of four eighteen-pounders, two eight-inch and two five-and-a-half-inch mortars, with two spare howitzers, one a twenty-four, the other a twelve-pounder.

"The Bombay force under Sir John Keane, the commander-in-chief at that presidency, consisted of two troops of horse, and two companies of foot artillery, under Brigadier Stephenson; a brigade of cavalry, composed of two squadrons of her majesty's 4th light dragoons and 1st Bombay light cavalry, under Brigadier Scott; and a body of infantry, consisting of her majesty's 2nd and 17th, and of the 1st, 5th, 19th, and 23rd native regiments, under the command of Major-general Willshire. The Poonah auxiliary horse were to accompany this force, which also brought into the field an engineer department, a detachment of sappers and miners, and a siege-train, consisting of two eighteen-pounders, and four nine-pounders.

"Law has its fictions, and so has statesmanship. The force, of which a detailed account has been given, though, in fact, intended for the conquest and occupation of Afghanistan, was regarded only as an auxiliary force aiding the operations of the Shah Sujah-ool-Moolk, at the head of his own troops. Under the sanction of the British government, an army had, indeed, been raised ostensibly for the service of the shah; and this as a point of decorum, was to be regarded as the chief instrument by which he was to regain possession of his dominions. The shah's army consisted of a troop of native horse artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and five of infantry. Major-general Simpson, of the Bengal army, was appointed to the command of this force, for which a staff and commissariat were duly organized, a military chest established, and satisfactorily provided. The whole of the above force was to advance by Candahar on Cabul. Another force, assembled in Peshawur, was to advance on Cabul by way of the Khyber Pass. This

was called the Shazada's army, Timur, the son of Sujah, having the nominal command. It consisted of about four thousand eight hundred men, artillery, infantry, and cavalry, obtained from various sources—British sepoy and adventurers, raised for the occasion, partly regular and partly irregular, and armed with almost every conceivable variety of offensive and defensive weapon, sword, shield, match-lock, musket, and rifle. With this force acted the Sikh contingent of six thousand men, under General Ventura.* The whole of this combined force was under the command of Colonel Wade. Another Sikh force, under one of Runjeet's native officers, was posted on the frontier of Peshawur, as an army of observation."

On the 1st of October, 1838, the governor-general, by proclamation, dated Simlah, gave an *exposé* of his motives for this expedition, which have been already incidentally adverted to in the relation of the intricate, complicated, and varied transactions which the intrigues of Russia had brought about. The governor-general insisted in this document upon the necessity of the East India Company possessing a friendly and allied state or states upon the north-west boundaries of their dominions. At the same time his excellency appointed Mr. W. Hay Mac Naghten minister on the part of the government of India to the court of Sujah-ool-Moolk. The staff of agency nominated to assist Mr. Mac Naghten, were Captain Burnes, Lieutenant D. E. Todd, Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Lieutenant B. Leech, and Mr. P. B. Lord, a surgeon in the company's service, who afterwards much distinguished himself. Lord Auckland designated the force by which the reinstatement of Sujah upon the throne of Cabul was to be effected, "the army of the Indus."

At the end of November, the Bengal army was encamped at Ferozepore. At this place a series of remarkable interviews occurred between the governor-general and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, which were conducted with ostentations magnificence.

While the Bengal army was quartered at Ferozepore, it was determined that a smaller force should be employed, as being equally efficient, and more easily subsisted. Sir Henry Fane, feeling the difficulty of selecting the troops to advance—all the Europeans among them being eager to proceed—determined it by lots. The following portions of the army had the fortune to win:—the 1st, 2nd, and 4th brigades of infantry; 2nd troop 2nd brigade horse artillery; and the camel battery of nine-pounders. Sir Henry Fane remained behind from ill health.

* One of Runjeet Singh's French officers.

Major Pew took the command of the artillery instead of Brigadier-general Graham. The command of the Bengal force, which advanced, devolved upon Sir Willoughby Cotton; and it was ordered that when a junction was formed with the Bombay army, the united divisions should be commanded by Sir John Keane.

Early in December, 1838, Shah Sujah's army marched. It was followed in a few days by the Bengal troops. Early in January the allies arrived on the banks of the Indus. The shah's troops then began to desert, but the desertion was not carried to any great extent. The Bengal sepoys were also exceedingly unwilling to enter Affghanistan. Those among them who were Mohammedans were reluctant to fight against their co-religionists. Those who were Brahminical feared to fight at all; they apprehended that in a strange country, beyond the boundaries of India Proper, they would of necessity be deprived of the means of preserving caste. This apprehension was well founded. When the Bombay sepoys joined, they were found far more willing for the performance of duty. This irritated their brethren of the Bengal army against them, so that frequently in performing work supposed to be somewhat beneath the dignity of caste, the Bengal sepoys jeered and taunted those of Bombay for doing what the Bengalees either neglected or refused to attempt. There was a disloyal spirit among the Bengal sepoys which does not appear to have extended to the native officers, nor even non-commissioned officers, and was concealed in the presence of Europeans. Indeed, something of enthusiasm appears to have been simulated; for Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Havelock, describes the whole Bengal army as animated by military ardour.

Captain Burnes had concluded a convention with the ameers of Scinde, by which the British were to take possession of the fortress of Bukkur, "situated on an island in the Indus, between the towns of Roree on the eastern bank, and Sukkur on the western; the eastern channel being that which separates it from Roree, and by which the British force approached, is about four hundred yards in width."

The services of Captain, afterwards Sir Henry Pottinger, were of great importance in Scinde at this juncture, as the tardiness of the government at Calcutta, and the want of direct dealing on the part of the Scinde ameers, rendered hostilities in Scinde not improbable. The Bombay army was accordingly delayed on its march, and the Bengal army was in consequence directed to march

against Hyderabad, the capital of Scinde. Fresh intelligence having arrived of the success of Captain Pottinger's negotiations, the Bengal army halted, and after a short delay, to make sure of the good faith of the ameers, it returned to Bukkur. Captain Havelock gives a graphic description of those changes, and the emotions which they excited in the army:—"At this period the spirits of every soldier in the Bengal contingent were buoyant and high. Before us lay Hyderabad; it was known to contain the accumulated wealth of the most affluent as well as powerful of the branches of the Talpore family, amounting in specie, jewels, and other valuables, and ingots of gold, to eight crores of Scindian rupees well told, or not less than eight millions sterling. Such a prize is not often in a century, even in India, presented to the grasp of a British army."* A few pages afterwards he says, "In a moment all our visions of glory and booty were dispelled; it was announced to us that the ameers were at length brought to a sense of their impending danger, and that, compelled to comprehend that a few days would, according to every calculation of human prudence, deprive them at once of their independence, their capital, and the accumulated treasures of years, they had accepted unreservedly all the conditions of the treaty laid before them by Colonel Pottinger."† "Vainly repining, therefore, at the change in events which had given this small sum (ten lacs) to the state, instead of endowing the army with eight crores, its officers and men, with light purses and heavy hearts, turned their backs on Hyderabad, from which they had hoped never to recede until they had made its treasure their own, and put to a stern proof that Beloochee valour which had so loudly vaunted its power to arrest their further progress, and fix on the banks of the Indus the war which they had set out resolved to carry into the centre of Affghanistan."‡

The tone of these extracts is hardly in keeping with the softness of character attributed to the late Sir Henry Havelock. He was, however, a stern soldier, although a kind and pious man. He was ambitious of military distinction, as far as honour and principle allowed, and he had an intense desire to become a good military historian, and to make Xenophon his model in that respect.

On the 20th of February it was deemed expedient that the Bengal column should take the lead, and, accordingly, the irregular force of Shah Sujah fell behind. It was thought

* *Narrative of the Campaign in Affghanistan.* By Captain Havelock, vol. i. p. 151.

† P. 155.

‡ P. 157.

possible that in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore the ameers might offer some opposition, notwithstanding their recent treaties, and it was better to ensure a speedy chastisement, such as the Bengal force would inflict, whereas the Shah Sujah's army might be defeated, and occasion a general violation of the convention by the ameers.

The progress of the Bombay army was unsatisfactory, the Scinde ameers having violated those terms of the convention by which camels and supplies were to be provided. It was not until the end of December, 1838, that it arrived at Tatta, where it was met by Sir John Keane, and was detained for a considerable time. On the 4th of March, 1839, this army was "officially declared to have become part of the army of the Indus."

Previous to the arrival of the Bombay division at Tatta, other events occurred still further provocative of the ill-feeling existing among the ameers to the British. Brigadier Valiant was placed in command of a reserve, consisting of her majesty's 40th regiment of the line, two thousand two hundred Bombay native infantry, consisting of the 2nd grenadiers, the 22nd and 26th regiments, and detachments of pioneers and artillery. By the request of Captain Pottinger, Sir Frederick Maitland, commander of the naval forces on the Indian station, proceeded with the ship *Wellesley*, the 40th regiment, and the artillery, to Kurrachee. The *Berenice* and *Euphrates* steamers, with the native troops on board, arrived on the 1st of February before Kurrachee. Sir Frederick summoned the commandant of the fort to surrender it to the British forces. He refused. Five companies of the 40th were landed; they took up a position in the rear of the fortress. The *Wellesley* brought her broadside to bear within eight hundred yards. In an hour the face of the fortress exposed to its fire was a heap of ruins. The soldiers of the 44th charged through the open space, no enemy offering resistance. To the astonishment of the conquerors, the garrison only consisted of twenty men, who having hid under the cliffs, escaped injury. They were made prisoners by the 40th. On the 2nd of February, the British flag floated over the ruined walls of the fort of Kurrachee.

On the 16th of April the Bengal column was at Quettah, having marched through the Bolan Pass without encountering any resistance. On that day Sir John Keane arrived with the advances of the Bombay army; the main body was several marches in the rear. Both columns were harassed by bands of robbers, who seemed to contemn death where there was a prospect of plunder. It was

generally believed in the army, that in the Kojuk Pass advantage of its precipitous and varied formation would be taken by the enemy. There were difficulties in getting through this pass, irrespective of the dangers. Dacoits, and other predatory wanderers, appeared at intervals, but no attack was made by an Affghan force. On the 20th of April the Bengal army reached Candahar; the Bombay force did not arrive until seventeen days later. The sirdars fled. Shah Sujah advanced through a line of his own troops, occupied a temporary musnid, and was proclaimed sovereign of Affghanistan. The commissariat of the army was execrable, no proper forethought had in this particular been exercised. The march to Candahar was in consequence attended by great suffering and great loss. "It must be confessed," says Captain Havelock, "that hitherto our task has been escorting, not campaigning, but this pacific duty has been performed under arduous circumstances; and the exposure to the vicissitudes of climate, the fatigue, and the deficiency of food and water, which tried the strength and resolution of our troops between Quetta and Candahar, as well as the active hostility of the predatory tribes, ought never to be despised as military difficulties. How gladly would our army have exchanged them for the most determined opposition of the Affghans in the field! How often did our officers long for a battle to raise the sinking spirits of the soldier, and make him feel that he was not labouring and suffering in vain." * Captain Havelock also thus wrote concerning the sufferings of this army:—"The plain on which our camp is now pitched is not, like the level of Siriab, watered by deep and well-supplied kahreezes,† carrying coolness and the promise of fertility down their slopes. A small cut through which we found water flowing from a spring-head in the mountains, has alone supplied us with the useful element since first we advanced to this point. This little channel the Candahar sirdars have caused to be dammed up near its source in the hills, and behold two bold brigades and the levy of the shah reduced to the greatest straits. Horses, already half-starved for want of grain and good grass, were throughout the day panting in all the agonies of thirst; and in the evening a few drops of water could not be obtained even to mix the medicines of the sick in our hospitals, or to supply them with the refreshment and comfort of a few spoonfuls of tea. All ranks have been taught to understand to-day how little prized when plentiful, how outrageously demanded when scarce, is that

* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 332, 333.

† Subterranean aqueducts.

bounteous provision for the wants of God's creatures, water! Weary of the delays which had kept us so long at Dundi Goolace, we moved forward on the 21st* into the plains which we had surveyed from the summit of the Kojuk Pass, recognising all the distinctive peaks of the scattered hills which we had observed from that commanding height. We saw them now magnified as we approached them, and casting a dark shade over the plains which they overhung. Anxious looks were from time to time cast towards these green eminences, and their bases were carefully searched for any small streams which might supply the urgent wants of a thirsting force. It was not very pleasant to discover that this day, too, we must depend for a supply of the indispensable element on the stream of a small and imperfect kahreez. Its water was brackish, and flowed scantily and sluggishly. Thousands of brass *lotas* and leathern buckets were soon dipped into the little channel; and though proper regulations were promptly established, one-half of the force had not been watered before the scarcity commenced. Soon diluted mud alone could be obtained, and whole regiments, under a burning sun, with parched lips, sighed for night to cool them, and then for morning, that they might move on to a happier spot. The troops were buoyed up towards evening with fallacious hopes of the waters of a spring, actually discovered in the hills, being brought down to their relief into the plains; but up to the hour of early march no stream had begun to flow into the dry bed of a nullah,† on which many were gazing in hope. The sufferings of the soldiers, both European and native, were for some hours so great as nearly to tempt some for a moment to forget the restraints of discipline; and never do its principles achieve a greater triumph than when troops are seen obedient and respectful, and trying to be cheerful under this form of privation. At Killa Puttoollah, officers of the highest rank were brought to acknowledge the value of this simple element. This was no time for the luxurious ablutions which, under the sun of Central Asia, preserve health and restore strength; no time to waste a single drop of the precious fluid on any bodily comfort, or for any purpose but preparing food, or slaking a raging thirst; and thousands felt this day that all the gifts of that God whose public praise and ordinances were forgotten on this Sabbath of unwilling penance, would have been worthless to man, if in his anger he had withheld the often-despised blessing of water. The kindness and consi-

deration with which some officers of no low rank shared the little portion of the much-coveted fluid which they could obtain with the privates around them, was creditable to their humanity, and ought to have won the confidence and affections of those whom they commanded.*

On the following day, the army, unable to find water, was compelled to advance:—"Forward the brigade moved, to finish a second march of ten miles, their horses dropping from drought and exhaustion as they toiled on, and leaving in the mountain passes melancholy traces of this day's sufferings and perseverance. When the cavalry had thus got over five miles, in the course of which British dragoons and native troopers were seen eagerly sharing with their chargers muddy and fetid water drawn from puddles at the side of the road, the very sight of which would, in Hindostan, have equally sickened all to whom it was offered, they struck into a by-road on their left, and winding their way by a narrow path through an opening in the undulating eminences, found themselves towards evening on the banks of a plentiful stream. The rush of unbridled indulgence of the troops and their horses into its waters, after all the privations of the morning, may fairly be described as uncontrollable. What moderation was to be expected from man or beast breaking forth from the restraints of a two days' unwilling abstinence?"†

Well acquainted with this distress, the Afghan banditti hovered about the camp at Candahar, presuming that the men on outpost duty would be too weak to be on the alert, or to avenge such robberies as might be perpetrated upon the convoys and material. The British chiefs in command seemed incapable of making provision for the commissariat of an army, and even in Candahar no adequate arrangements existed to supply the troops.

Shah Sujah spent money freely in attempting to enlist under his standard the Afghan chiefs. They accepted his gold and cheated him. He had neither power nor popularity, and indications were already numerous that the British would have to establish him on the throne of Cabul, in spite of the tribes. The army was obliged to remain in Candahar until the 27th June, unable to procure provisions. During the time the shah and his British auxiliaries were marching to Candahar and occupying that place, "the Lion of the Punjab," as old Runjeet Singh was termed, was operating by way of Peshawur. His martial career in connection with the

* April, 1839.

† Artificial watereourse.

* *Narrative*, vol. i. pp. 319—322.

† *Captain Havelock's Narrative*, vol. i., pp. 323, 324.

tri-partite alliance was not destined long to continue, for before the forces of the other two parties to the alliance left Candahar, he died. Shah Sujah, and the British commanders acting with him, were happily ignorant of the event, or it would have probably deterred them from marching to Cabul, as it was apprehended in India that the death of the Maharajah would be followed by great changes, and perhaps violent revolutions, the consequences of which to the alliance might be of the most serious kind.

At last the march for Cabul began, the soldiers being put upon half rations, although a most difficult task lay before them. There was plenty of provisions left behind in Candahar, the army having no means of conveyance. While the troops were encamped they were half starved, because provisions could not be procured by the ill-managed commissariat. When about to march, abundance of food was at their command, but the mis-managed transport service could not bring it with the army. There was force in the mingled sneer and compliment which a native prince had made long before, that "the English ought to be carried in palanquins to the field of battle, and then set down to fight." His highness considered them more adapted to fighting than campaigning.

The army reached Ghizni on the 22nd of July. The English generals were without intelligence as to the strength of the fortress. Worse still, they were under impressions on the subject positively false. The battering train had been left in Candahar, *under the impression that it would not be required.* The English officers were even informed that no defence would be made at Ghizni, cowardice and treason combining to place the fortress, without a struggle, in the hands of Shah Sujah. Captain Thomson, chief engineer of the army of the Indus, thus describes the first impressions of the scientific department of the army on approaching the place:—"We were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty feet high, flanked by numerous towers and surrounded by a *fausse braye* and a wet ditch. The irregular figure of the *enceinte* gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged; screen walls had been built before the gates; the ditch cleared out and filled with water (stated to be unfordable), and an outwork built on the right bank of the river, so as to command the bed of it." Such was the impression made by the first near

view of the fortress of Ghizni. "The works," Captain Thomson adds, "were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering train, and to attack Ghizni in form a much larger train would be required than the army ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading."*

The allies met with an unexpected advantage, by which their task was facilitated. A nephew of Dost Mohammed deserted to the English, and afforded valuable information. Upon a careful reconnoissance the intelligence thus derived was found to be correct, as far as such means of confirmation could be of service. The fortifications showed no weak part. The gates had all been built up with strong masonry, except the Cabul gate. The engineers reported that there was no feasible mode of attack but by blowing open that gate with powder, and charging through the smoke and fire, over the *débris*, into the place.†

This plan having been resolved upon, it was necessary for the army to change ground, an extremely difficult operation under the circumstances of the case. The troops were without proper rations; they had endured excessive fatigue, and the weather, as is usual at that time of year in the elevated districts of Afghanistan, was cold, and would be especially felt by hungry and harassed men. The army had not been encamped three hours when it was ordered to march in two columns. The men murmured, but not disloyally, at this movement, the necessity of which they did not perceive. It was necessary, however, for as Captain Outram (afterwards General Outram, and one of the heroes of Lucknow) relates—"It was confidently stated that Dost Mohammed Khan himself marched on the 16th (of July).‡ The distance is eighty-eight miles (we made seven marches), and by regular marches he would have reached Ghizni on the 22nd (next day), and as this day (21st) he would have been within one march, and would have heard the firing, he would, it was to be supposed, push on; so that there

* Memoranda of the engineers' operations before Ghizni in July, 1839.

† In his *Narrative of the Afghan Campaign*, Major Hough asserted that none of the gates were built up, and that therefore all the gates were accessible to the same means of assault as the Cabul gate. In a later work describing the same campaign the major omits the statement. He was with the army.

‡ From Cabul.

was a great object in not delaying in changing ground. As in 1834 Dost Mohammed had moved from Cabul to defend Candahar against the shah, the presumptions were in favour of his march to Ghizni. We knew from Dost Mohammed's own nephew that two of the three gates were blocked up; and it was argued by some that the sudden movement to the Cabul gate, which was said not to be built up, would put the enemy on their guard, and cause that gate also to be secured; whereas, by a march in the morning, it would not appear so suspicious. The movement was a delicate one, being a march in two columns by two different routes; for it involved a night march for the rear and much of the baggage, if not for the troops, as we were not to march till four in the afternoon, and the route for both columns could not be well known. The march in two columns would, it was concluded, expedite the movements, but then there were two columns of baggage to protect, and we could not protect that of the column on the right. The march of the baggage at all that night was inconvenient, and we gained no time by it."

The necessity of making the change so promptly, and of executing it so rapidly, caused much suffering on the part of the troops. Captain Havelock describes their sensations on the night when their march was executed, as they took up their miserable quarters:—"A son of the Ameer of Cabul had marched down from the capital with the view of deblocking Ghizni, and was now close to us. The forces of the Ghiljies, Abdoolruhman and Gool Moomhumud, were in the field at no great distance. A party, also, of fanatics from the Sooluman Kheils, who had taken arms when a religious war had, as a last resource, been proclaimed by the tottering Barukzyes, now occupied the heights to the eastward of the valley in which the fortress stands. Reflections on these circumstances and on our want of a battering train, the glimmering of the lights on the hostile battlements and in the plains, and the chill of the night air, effectually chased away slumber until day broke on the 22nd.*"

When day dawned, many of the sick were still pursuing the tedious march, and it was necessary to send out parties to bring them in. Many of the camp followers had lost the track of the columns, and parties of cavalry had to scour the country for their protection. These miserable camp followers had suffered horribly. The author of *The Three Presidencies* affirms that 100,000 persons of this description left the banks of the Indus with the grand army, and that of these not 20,000 returned, the rest perishing by sword, famine,

* *Havelock*, vol. ii. p. 65.

or cold. With considerable difficulty the sick and the stragglers were rescued before the appearance of any of the forces intended to raise the siege. Scarcely was the safety of these helpless persons secured, when crowds of ferocious irregulars descended from the hills to attack the head-quarters of Shah Sujah. The shah's cavalry charged and defeated them. Captain Outram led a portion of his Afghan majesty's irregular infantry into the fastnesses of the neighbouring hills, to beat up the nests of the fanatics. This raid was attended with success, having been accomplished with the gallantry and judgment which are so characteristic of that resolute and talented officer. He made many prisoners, and captured the banner of green and white, a standard of fanaticism under which they had been gathered to wage a holy war against the English infidels. When the prisoners were brought in, a terrible event followed. They cursed the shah in his presence, and some of them drew weapons and stabbed the shah's officers. He ordered them to be put to death, an order which was executed upon sixty most formidable and fanatical ruffians.

In the evening the officers received their orders for the assault, which were soon communicated to the soldiers, when a display of that heroic emulation characteristic of the English soldier took place. The whole of the European troops were ready to volunteer for the assault. Dr. Kennedy, in his narrative of the campaign, relates:—"On visiting the hospital tents of her majesty's 2nd and 17th regiments, I was surprised to find them clear of sick; the gallant fellows had all but risen in mutiny on their surgeons, and insisted upon joining their comrades." The sick were employed as sentinels, and some of the more convalescent on outpost duty. The night was spent in preparations for the attack. Storms prevailed throughout, so as to render the movements of the English inaudible in the city. Ghizni seemed to sleep in perfect stillness; not a signal-light gleamed through the gloom which overhung it, nor a sound from its garrison reached the parties preparing to assail it. It was necessary to make a feint in order to conceal the real plan of attack. Three companies of the 35th regiment of native infantry, under Captain Hay, marched round to the north side of the fortress and opened an unremitting fire of musketry, which could scarcely be heard amidst the bellowing of the storm. The balls, however, telling upon men stationed on the parapets, and at the loop-holes, the fire was returned. The field artillery and camel battery of nine-pounders

* *Narrative*, vol. ii., p. 46.

opened, the former from heights which commanded the citadel, the latter from the low grounds directed a fire against the walls. Even the fire of the nine-pounders could hardly be heard, except in the lulls which occurred in the storm. The enemy employed all the guns they could direct against this cannonade. Previous to the dispatch of Captain Hay's detachment against the north face of the defence, four companies of the 16th native infantry, and two of the 48th, succeeded in occupying a position on the outskirts of the town. Within an hour of dawn, the officers of engineers had stealthily advanced near to the gate against which the assault was to be made. The party consisted of Captain Peat, of the Bombay engineers; Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, of the Bengal engineers; three sergeants, and eighteen men, of the sappers.* Captain Havelock represents Captain Thompson, the chief officer of engineers, as having himself undertaken this task, which is an error; the service was committed to the officers named. The enemy, suspecting that some hostile plan was in progress without divining what, burned blue lights. These were, however, burned upon the top of the walls, instead of being cast below. Captain Peat believed that had the latter course been adopted, the plan of attack would have been discovered and frustrated. Captain Havelock has fallen into another error in representing the engineer party as conveying nine hundred pounds of powder for the purpose of blowing open the gate. The charge was three hundred only, and this was far above the amount usually deemed necessary for blowing open gates, which was from sixty to one hundred pounds. The bore was placed, and the train laid without the plan being detected, or any serious casualties occurring.

Behind the engineer party a fine column of infantry was placed on the Cabul road, ready to rush forward when the train should be fired. This column was constituted as follows:—"The advance was composed of the light companies of the Queen's, the 17th, and the Bengal European regiment, and of Captain Vigor's company of the 13th light infantry. It was led by Colonel Dennie. The main column, under the immediate command of Brigadier Sale, was made up of the remainder of the Queen's and Bengal Europeans, whilst, as an auxiliary to its efforts, the whole of the 13th, excepting its storming company, extended as skirmishers along the whole of the assailed point of the fortress. The support was, her majesty's 17th regiment, led by

Colonel Croker. The reserve, commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton, was composed of the remaining companies of the 16th, 35th, and 48th."

Before dawn approached the signalled moment arrived; the train was about to be fired. At that instant a brilliant blue light burnt up above the gateway, and a crowd of the enemy's staff was seen pouring down, if possible, to discover the cause of the movements of men, which were again indistinctly heard by the sentinels. The match was touched by the British engineers, a rumbling noise rolled along the earth where the assaulting column stood, and beneath the city a dense compact column of smoke shot up where the glare of blue light had been illuminating all around; a crash followed, the gate was shivered to atoms, the huge masonry above it fell in ruins, burying the chiefs and soldiers who had an instant previously looked forth so wistfully from its battlements. High above the din of the cannonade, the rattle of musketry, and even the rushing of the tempest, the British bugle rang out shrill and clear, and, as if in a single bound, the column of the assailants leaped forward and pierced the opening of the chasm which now yawned to receive them. The Affghans recovered from their surprise with creditable promptitude, and, sword in hand, pressed towards the fatal breach. The English had no sooner set foot within the entrance, than the concussion of large bodies of men, hand to hand in deadly strife, swelled above the tumult of the night. The clashing of arms, the shout of the combatants, the scattered and desultory fire of such as used their musketry, went forth over the hosts within and without, creating intense excitement and suspense. The principal fighting devolved upon the advance, which at last made good its entrance, took up a position which covered the entrance of the main column, and by their triumphant cheers encouraged their followers forward. Yet, at this moment, all was nearly lost, and those who had gained an entrance were exposed to danger of destruction. This event has been better told in Havelock's narrative than elsewhere:—

"Brigadier Sale, whilst his skirmishers were closing by sound of bugle, had steadily and promptly pressed forward to support the forlorn hope. As he moved on, he met an engineer officer suffering from the effects of the recent explosion, and anxiously inquired of him how the matter went. This gallant person had been thrown to the ground by the bursting of the powder; and though he had not received any distinct wound, fracture, or contusion, was shaken in every limb by the concussion. His reply was, that the gate was

* *History of the British Empire in India.* By Edward Thornton.

blown in, but that the passage was choked up, and the forlorn hope could not force an entrance. Brigadier Sale was too cool and self-possessed not to be able at once to draw the inference, that to move on under such circumstances was to expose his troops to certain destruction. He ordered the retreat to be sounded. The tempestuous character of the weather, and the noise of the fire of all arms, did not prevent this signal from being heard, even by the reserve; but it conveyed the order which British soldiers are always slowest in obeying. The column, however, made a full halt in the path of victory; but the check was not of long duration. The brigadier, perfectly calm at this moment of supposed difficulty, addressed himself to another engineer officer, with whom he happily fell in at this interesting moment. He assured him that though the passage of the gateway was much impeded, the advanced stormers, under Colonel Dennie, had already won their way through it. The brigadier promptly gave the signal to move on.

“But the delay, short as it had been, was productive of mischief. It had left a considerable interval between the forlorn hope and Brigadier Sale's column, and just as the latter, in which the Queen's regiment was leading, had pressed into the gateway, a large body of Affghans, driven headlong from the ramparts by the assault and fire of Colonel Dennie's force, rushed down towards the opening, in the hope of that way effecting their escape. Their attack was made upon the rear company of the Queen's, and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment. The encounter with these desperate men was terrific. They fiercely assaulted, and for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. One of their number, rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp shumsheer.* The Affghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling, but the pummel, not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Affghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of the brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of his trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt of his shumsheer; but he had an active and powerful opponent, and was himself faint from loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the 13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened, in the *mêlée*, to

* Asiatic sabre.

approach the scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognised, and called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his drawn sword through the body of the Affghan,* but still the desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the brigadier, for a moment, got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre, which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mohammedan once more shouted, ‘Uo Ullah!’ † and never spake again.” Sale regained his feet, and persisted in directing the efforts of his soldiers, who were still fighting, and had yet to make sure their way. At last the walls were everywhere conquered, and there was street-firing and close conflicts where scattered groups of British and Affghans met. The commander-in-chief, perceiving the entrance was open, ordered the cannonade to be directed against the citadel, against which also Sale, who seemed to regain strength under the excitement, directed the soldiers of the 13th.

Colonel Croker and the support came on slowly, being obstructed by the *débris* of the gateway and masonry, and by the wounded, whom the surgeons were bringing beyond the walls. The reserve came up with the retarded supports, and entered in one body. The Affghans, however, gaining courage by the slow progress of the supports, mounted the walls and skirmished; some, finding concealments, picked off the English soldiers. When the last of the reserves had entered, the anxiety of the British was not over. The citadel was strong, and might offer considerable and even dangerous resistance. Events relieved their anxiety in an unexpected manner. The commander of the place, Mohammed Hyder, was paralysed by the suddenness of the onset, and the astonishing manner, as it appeared to him, by which the British effected an entrance. He abandoned the defence in despair. The 13th and 17th English regiments forced the gates and entered the citadel, scarcely any resistance being offered. They at once planted their colours, and as these flaunted in the breeze, and displayed their unmistakable symbols in the morning light, the whole army, within and beyond the walls, raised a prolonged cheer of victory.

Sir J. Keane was conqueror of Ghizni. Desultory efforts were still, however, made by the enemy. A fire was poured from the ramparts upon the reserve, heavier than that which galled the support. On entering the place, the reserve ascended that rampart. The Affghans,

* Kershaw went on into the battle.

† “Oh God.”

finding that every shelter was penetrated by their persistent enemy, made a gallant charge, sword in hand, to cut a passage to the gateway, in the hope of escape. The track over which they rushed was studded with groups of wearied soldiers, doolies containing wounded men, and the horses of the Affghans running wildly about. As the fugitives pressed forward, they cut, indiscriminately, at everything, even the horses, but their chief desire was to destroy the wounded and helpless. This enraged the British soldiery; the scattered groups gathered along the route, and not one Affghan passed the gateway,—they were shot down or bayoneted to a man. In the streets groups of Affghans still remained, who kept up a dropping fire, and then, retiring to the houses, reserved their shots for the officers, who especially suffered from this cause. These desperate men refused quarter, so that the houses had to be stormed and the defenders put to the bayonet. Sir John Keane entered the city escorting Shah Sujah to his fortress, won for him by the dauntless valour of his allies.

During the storming of Ghizni, a son of the ruler of Cabul remained with 5000 horse in observation. He saw the result of the struggle—the British flag floating near the citadel. He fled to Cabul to report the disaster. The cavalry of Sir John Keane instituted a hot pursuit, inflicting some loss upon the enemy.

The army advanced upon Cabul, where it met with no resistance, and Shah Sujah was elevated to the musnid, without any manifestation of joy or regret. Thus the conquest of the throne of Dost Mohammed was achieved with little loss by arms, though with enormous sacrifice of life, arising from the defective organization of the British army in the transport and commissary departments. The loss of the English in killed and wounded in Ghizni was not more than two hundred men, amongst whom not one officer was slain,

although a large proportion fell wounded by the fire from the houses.

Colonel Wade, who was at Peshawur, as soon as he heard that the commander-in-chief had marched from Candahar for Cabul, also set out for the same direction, penetrating the celebrated Khyber Pass. The chief obstacle to the progress of Wade's brigade was the fort of Ali Musjed. It was stormed with a loss within ten men of that sustained by the British at Ghizni, and a greater proportion of killed. Wade entered Jellalabad unopposed, and marched thence, without meeting an antagonist, to Cabul.

While the British remained in full force at Cabul, various minor expeditions were undertaken against villages, fortified rocks, and country forts; the Affghans generally refusing quarter, and dying with the utmost enthusiasm, indicating the most vindictive animosity, believing that they perished for the faith of Islam, and gained Paradise. The most important of these lesser enterprises was the reduction of Khelat. That fort and territory was governed by a Beloochee robber-chief. He had inflicted many mischiefs upon the British, and manifested to them an intense resentment. The conquest of this stronghold was committed to General Willshire, an officer who proved his competency for the trust reposed in him. The robber klian defended his fortress with more valour than skill. The English with surpassing courage took by storm the surrounding heights, battered in the principal gate of the fortress by cannon, and took the place by assault. The slaughter was great, the Beloochees and Affghans fighting with furious valour, and desperate self-sacrifice. The chief himself died, sword in hand, at the head of his devoted adherents. Captain Outram represents the prisoners as 2200, including the wounded; the slain he computes at nearly one-fourth that number. Thus ended the first stage of the great Affghan war.

CHAPTER CXI.

AFFGHAN WAR (*Continued*)—MARCH OF SIR ROBERT SALE FROM CABUL TO JELLALABAD—DEFEAT OF AKBAR KHAN—MAINTENANCE OF THE POSITION UNTIL RELIEVED BY GENERAL POLLOCK.

WHEN the British had, as they thought, established the throne of Shah Sujah, the whole Affghan races were plotting the destruction of the invaders and their *protégé*. The robber tribes in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass succeeded in plundering and rout-

ing the Sikhs, by whom they were guarded. Mr. Mackinson, Colonel Wheeler, and other officers, civil and military, made agreements with the Khyber chiefs, and even subsidized them, but the Mussulman chieftains kept faith with none.

Under circumstances of such general hostility, it is strange that Lord Auckland should deem it expedient to remove a great part of the force which should have remained to protect the newly elevated monarch until he had succeeded in strengthening his party, and securing the prospect of a tolerably undisturbed reign. Such, however, was the decision of the government of Calcutta; Sir John Keane was ordered to return with a large portion of the troops.

The author of *The Three Presidencies*, a good writer, but a warm partizan, and who assails all the measures of Lord Auckland, because he owed his appointment to a whig government, thus remarks upon the return of Sir John Keane:—"The commander-in-chief hastened from the scene of his hollow exploits; and scarcely resting at the seat of government, took his way home, to show himself to the British public as the conqueror of Afghanistan, receiving, as the fruit of his splendid achievement, a title and a pension; the greatest exploit of the entire campaign having been the blowing open of a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder." This was the tone of that portion of the press in India and in England, which discussed public affairs, and the conduct of public men, in the spirit of party. "Blowing open a wooden door with a few bags of gunpowder," was not a faithful description of a work of great military skill, which Captain Thompson devised, and other engineer officers executed. The conquest of Ghizni by Keane, and that of Khelat by General Willshire, were achievements of skill and valour, and entitled the officers and men who effected them to honourable distinction. These distinctions were ultimately conferred. "In addition to the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company, the governor-general, Lord Auckland, received an advanced step in the peerage, being created Earl of Auckland. Sir John Keane was created a peer, and parliament added a grant of a pension of two thousand pounds a year to the general and his two next heirs male. Mr. Mac Naghten and Colonel Henry Pottinger were created baronets; Colonel Wade obtained the honour of knighthood; Sir Willoughby Cotton received the Grand Cross of the Bath; General Willshire, Colonel Thackwell, and Colonel Sale were made knight-commanders; and Colonels J. Scott, Persse, Croker, and R. Macdonald, companions of that order. There was also an extensive grant of brevet rank." One officer, who had served not many years short of half a century, Colonel Dennie, was passed over unrewarded, while his inferiors in service and seniority, received high honours. It is to be deeply regretted that just com-

plaints are so often heard in connection with the unrequited services of distinguished military men, and that promotion is so frequently distributed with a partial hand. Few cases have been more flagrant than that of the heroic Colonel Dennie, even although such abuses are numerous, disheartening to the service, and dishonouring to the country.

On the 2nd of January, 1840, "a general order" announced the dissolution of the army of the Indus. Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir W. Mac Naghten were left in Cabul as political agents. Major-general Elphinstone was placed in command of the troops in garrison, and as commander-in-chief of the army of occupation. The state of the commissariat was desperate; it was only by paying an extraordinary price that any provisions could be obtained. Seldom has a garrison been left in such a condition as that at Cabul under General Elphinstone. The worst part of the army was the general himself. He was utterly incompetent to command it, and that incompetency brought ruin upon the army and to the cause for which the occupation was intended. The following description of General Elphinstone, and of the circumstances of his nomination to command, is as just as it is moderate in its tone:—"The officers who served under General Elphinstone throughout this unhappy crisis have invariably spoken of him with tenderness and respect. He was an honourable gentleman, a kind-hearted man, and he had once been a good soldier. His personal courage has never been questioned. Regardless of danger, and patient under trial, he exposed himself without reserve, and bore his sufferings without complaining. But disease had broken down his physical strength, and enfeebled his understanding. He had almost lost the use of his limbs. He could not walk; he could hardly ride. The gout had crippled him in a manner that it was painful to contemplate. You could not see him engaged in the most ordinary concerns of peaceful life without an emotion of lively compassion. He was fit only for the invalid establishment on the day of his arrival in India. It was a mockery to talk of his commanding a division of the army in the quietest district of Hindostan. But he was selected by Lord Auckland, against the advice of the commander-in-chief, and the remonstrances of the Agra governor, to assume the command of that division of the army which of all others was most likely to be actively employed, and which demanded, therefore, the greatest amount of energy and activity in its commander. Among the general officers of the Indian army were many able and energetic men, with active limbs and clear understanding. There was one—a cripple,

whose mental vigour much suffering had enfeebled; and he was selected by the governor-general to command the army in Afghanistan.* The secret of this disgraceful conduct on the part of Lord Auckland, is the spirit of policy which pervades all our public offices, and from which few of our public functionaries keep clear. Lord Auckland was made governor-general of India because it was "a good thing," and the party he supported desired to find a good thing for him. He in turn gave the command of the army in Afghanistan to a friend and supporter, because such ought to be provided for, and the command itself was one of honour and emolument. If the public welfare was left out of sight by the government which appointed Lord Auckland, it cannot be matter of surprise if he in his turn thought nothing of the commonwealth when nominating others to office.

Scarcely was General Elphinstone left in command when indications were given that Shah Sujah would have a hard struggle to maintain his crown. Still, the first winter was got over without revolt; but the spring and hostilities opened together. Dost Mohammed was riding about among the tribes, swearing them on the Koran to do battle with the Feringhiea. Akbar Khan, the Dost's most warlike son, raised large forces, and displayed great activity, as well as some military enterprise and capacity. The English authorities, both civil and military, at Cabul, were utterly incapable of discharging the duties which devolved upon them. Sir Alexander Burnes, and Sir W. Mac Naghten, however high their reputation for diplomatic talent and knowledge of Indian affairs, were unequal to the position they then occupied. Their incredulity and credulity were alike astonishing. They refused to believe the most credible testimony as to the state of Afghanistan generally, and believed the professions of the chiefs in and around Cabul, in spite of ocular demonstration of their rebellion.

During the summer of 1841 there were contests everywhere, the wild chieftains cutting off the supplies of the British, and harassing the garrisons with fatiguing vigilance. The turning point in the fortunes of Shah Sujah was the attempt to cut down the expenses of his government. An author † of distinguished merit has thus depicted the event:—"In October, 1841, Kohistan became the seat of an extensive conspiracy against British authority, and the Eastern Ghiljies, one of the largest of the clans into which the Afghans are divided, were trying to break a yoke they never wished to wear. At the same time it

was found that the million and a quarter, the cost of maintaining the authority of Shah Sujah, was more than the dignity was worth to us, certainly more than it was proper to appropriate from the revenues of India, especially as a loan had to be raised, and money came in very slowly. It was then found necessary to cut down the expenses occasioned by this sacrifice in favour of legitimacy, and the retrenchment began with the stipends and the subsidies furnished to the wild Ghiljie chieftains."

The effect of this has been thus described by Mr. Kaye:—"The blow fell upon all the chiefs about the capital—upon the Ghiljies, upon the Kohistanees, upon the Canhulees, upon the Momunds, even upon the Kuzzilbashes. Peaceful remonstrance was in vain. So they held secret meetings, and entered into a confederacy to overawe the existing government, and to recover what they had lost. Foremost in this movement were the eastern Ghiljies. Affected by the general retrenchments, they had also particular grievances of their own. They were the first, therefore, to throw off the mask. So they quitted Cabul—occupied the passes on the road to Jellalabad—plundered a valuable *cafila* (caravan)—and entirely cut off our communications with the provinces of Hindostan."

In the month of October, 1841, Sir Robert Sale's brigade was ordered from Cabul. The infatuation of the British agents still continued; the incapacity of the Hon. Major-general Elphinstone, left the commander-in-chief of the forces in India ignorant of the true state of the case. Beside that exalted person had remonstrated against General Elphinstone's appointment, and the general had no desire to communicate with him more frequently than he deemed absolutely necessary. Of what really was absolutely necessary he was quite incapable of judging. Sir Robert Sale marched with his brigade, and had not gone far beyond Cabul when he was attacked by hordes of Afghans, who hung upon his flanks. They had to do with a brave man and skilful soldier, and paid dearly for their temerity. In penetrating the Khyber Pass, the attacks of the enemy were more frequent and dangerous. They made every crag a breast-work, and being good marksmen, picked off many of the brigade. The way in which Sir Robert met these assaults, is thus described by Mr. Gleig, in his memoir of *Sale's Brigade*; it is a thrillingly interesting story:—"The bugles sounded for the leading companies to extend, and away among the precipices ran the skirmishers; scaling corries with a steady foot, and returning the fire of the Afghans with great alacrity. Meanwhile the column slackened not its pace for a moment. Onward

* Kaye's *Afghanistan*.

† Rev. W. Owen.

it pressed, detaching two or three companies as flankers, which mounted the hills on the right and left, and soon became warmly engaged, till by-and-by the stockade or breast-work of huge stones, wherewith the enemy had endeavoured to block up the pass, became conspicuous. A gallant rush was made at this work, which, however, the Affghans did not venture to defend, and then Lieutenant Davis, hastening his horses, went on with his guns at a gallop, and at a gallop passed through. From that time the fire of the enemy began to slacken. Their skirmishers, indeed, had already yielded to the impetuous attack of the leading companies, and the whole now fleeing to the crests of the mountains, whither our men could not follow, gradually melted away, and at last disappeared. The loss sustained in the course of this affair was less severe than might have been expected. Sir Robert Sale himself received a musket ball in the ankle just as he entered the pass; and almost at the same moment his aid-de-camp, who rode by his side, had his horse shot under him. Captain Younghusband, of the 35th native infantry, likewise, and Lieutenant Miers, of the 13th, were wounded seriously; and among the rank and file in all the corps engaged casualties occurred. But the total amount of men put *hors-de-combat* was wonderfully small, considering the great advantage of position which the enemy possessed; and of horses four were struck. Of those attached to the guns, happily not one received damage. The result of this successful encounter was to carry the 35th native infantry, with all their baggage and followers, over one important stage on their homeward journey. The narrowest and most intricate portion of the pass was threaded; and in a sort of punch-bowl, or circular valley, offering a position comparatively secure from night attacks, they made preparations for encamping. Not so the 13th. To have left the Bootlak gorge in the hands of the enemy would have been not only to isolate the 35th, but to give up the communication between Cabul and the frontiers altogether; and hence the gallant 13th had received instructions, so soon as the barricade should be forced, to return to the camp whence they had set out in the morning. They now proceeded to obey these instructions; and, carrying the wounded with them, marched back into the defile. Again they were assailed, both from the right hand and the left, with a desultory, but warm skirmishing fire; and again they ran the gauntlet through it, fighting for every inch of ground, and winning it too, though not without some loss and considerable inconvenience. They then returned to the tents

and to the force, mounted and dismounted, which they had left to protect them; and slept that night as soundly as soldiers are accustomed to do who have gone through a sharp day's work, with honour to themselves."*

Our space allows not to give the detail of this terrible march. General Sale had to contest every step of the road, and every step was contested with heroic fortitude and surpassing judgment. Colonel Dennie was the right hand of Sale, displaying a like intrepidity and judgment. The enemy succeeded, however, in bearing away tents and ammunition in great abundance.

Sale led on his brave men, inspired by his genius and fortitude. There was much suffering, and some loss of life, but the punishment inflicted upon the Affghans was severe. At last the gallant brigade reached Jellalabad, on the 13th of November, 1841. Sale immediately occupied this place, from which the people fled. He gave some little strength to its miserable defences. Colonels Dennie and Monteith, and Major Broadfoot, who commanded the sappers, were as towers of strength to the general. He had also the good fortune to have Captain Havelock upon his staff. That officer had been on the staff of General Elphinstone, but was appointed to serve in a similar capacity with General Sale, on his departure from Cabul. It was a letter of Havelock's, sent in a quill, which was the means of making known to the English agent in Peshawur the condition of the garrison.

It became necessary for Sale to fight a battle in order to impose respect upon the hordes by which he was surrounded. Accordingly, on the 16th of November, Colonel Monteith, at the head of eleven hundred men, sallied out against five thousand of the enemy, who suffered a signal defeat, which secured the garrison from further molestation for some time. Meanwhile, the indefatigable Broadfoot toiled with unflagging ardour in building up the defences, and devising expedients for rendering the attack of such enemies abortive. Food became scarce; the men were put on half rations, and thus a new cause of anxiety arose among the heroic band of officers who commanded. Abbot and M'Gregor, two very gallant and skilful officers, made successful efforts to keep up some supplies. It became, however, necessary to make another attack on the enemy. This was also successful, the Affghan hosts, however superior in numbers and sturdy in resistance, fading away before the superior skill and discipline of the British.

The brave garrison continued to skirmish

* Gleig's *Sale's Brigade*, pp. 80, 81.

with the enemy until the 13th of January, 1842, when a sentry on duty perceived a traveller advancing on a miserable pony, faint and apparently wounded. The traveller approached, and proved to be Dr. Brydon of General Elphinstone's corps. The doctor then supposed himself to be the only survivor of that army. Sale had previously heard of the discomfiture of Elphinstone, and therefore resolved to hold Jellalabad in case the general made good his retreat so far. The story which Dr. Brydon related, disclosed the fact of the destruction of the troops with which he had left Cabul. This showed the garrison of Jellalabad that nothing under providence could save them but their own gallantry and wisdom. The narrative of Dr. Brydon, and the events which occurred at Cabul after Sale's departure from that garrison, must be deferred until the story of the "illustrious garrison of Jellalabad" is told. The position was maintained with fluctuating hopes until the 7th of April, 1842, when it became necessary to fight a battle beyond the defences to clear the neighbourhood of the enemy.

Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, and the hope of the Affghan chiefs, occupied an intrenched camp, with the intention of blockading the little garrison and of making a dash upon it, when, as Akbar hoped, want and disease should have exhausted it before help was at hand. Between the intrenched camp and the town there were several forts, all of which Akbar had garrisoned. It was resolved by Sir Robert Sale to attack both the camp and the forts. His plan was to move out in three columns, one commanded by Colonel Monteith, another by Colonel Dennie, and the third by Captain Havelock. The forts were to be passed by and the camp attacked, Sir Robert concluding that if the main body of the enemy was defeated the forts would be surrendered. If not, they could be more advantageously attacked after the conquest of the intrenched camp. In the execution of the plan Sir Robert Sale's column was exposed to a flanking fire from one of the forts, when he ordered the 13th light infantry to bring left shoulder forward and storm a small breach, which the quick eye of the general saw to be practicable. Colonel Dennie led the assault, and received a mortal wound before the breach was entered. The soldiers on penetrating it found a second line of defence which could not be scaled, nor breached without cannon. Here they were exposed to a murderous fire from matchlocks and wall pieces. As this "keep" could not be escalated or forced, the 13th were ordered to leave the place and pursue the original plan. At double quick pace they rushed forward,

driving in the skirmishers, and dashed through the intrenchment. The victory of this column was complete. The progress of the other portions of the attack has been thus described by the Rev. Mr. Gleig:—"Meanwhile, both Colonel Monteith's and Captain Havelock's columns had trodden down all opposition. The former maintained, without a check, the pace at which their advance began. The latter, sweeping round by the river, in order to turn the flank of the position, became exposed to the attack of the enemy's cavalry, and were more than once obliged to form a square, which they did with the precision of an ordinary field day. But they, too, gained their point, and now the three divisions uniting, poured such a fire upon the enemy's masses, as dissolved them quite. Their guns, which had been served with much boldness, were in consequence deserted. One they endeavoured to carry away with them, but a well directed round-shot from Abbott's battery killed both the horses which had just been harnessed to the limber, after which the rout became universal. Had the force of British cavalry been such as could have been launched, without support, in pursuit, few would have escaped to tell of that day's overthrow. As it was, the fugitives being chased towards the river, rushed madly in, and perished, almost as many amid the deep water as by the bayonets and shot of the pursuers. Never was victory more complete. Camp, baggage, artillery, ammunition, standards, horses, arms of every kind fell into the hands of the conquerors. The camp they committed to the flames; of the baggage, as well as of animals to transport it, they conveyed back to Jellalabad as much as they cared to preserve; and they were specially gratified by discovering in one of the forts that flanked the line an important magazine of powder, shells, and shot."

The effect of this battle was disheartening to the confederated chiefs. Provisions were brought into the town, and many persons of note made submission. Akbar Khan continued his flight to Cabul, justifying his fugitive movements by the wildest stories of the numbers, bravery, and physical force of the English, and the powers of magic and enchantment possessed by their general. The moral effect of that day's triumph for the English spread over all Affghanistan, and showed how little English interests had to apprehend when confided to officers of capacity and spirit, such as Sale, Dennie, Monteith, Broadfoot, and Havelock. The Rev. W. Owen, in his interesting memoirs of Havelock, makes the following remarkable statement:—"In the midst of all these harassing scenes there were faithful

servants of Christ who were not forgetful of his claims, and were endeavouring to promote his cause. During the whole siege of Jellalabad a Jew from Bokhara was engaged in writing a transcript in Hebrew of Martin's Persian Testament, under the superintendence of a pious officer, a work that proved instrumental to his own conversion to Christianity."

The despatch of Sir Robert Sale, recounting the history of the defence of Jellalabad, and the battle of the 7th of April, is a most interesting and remarkable document. The Rev. W. Owen states, upon authority that is beyond question, that this despatch was not written by Sir Robert, but by Captain Havelock, who was then upon his personal staff.* It is one of those remarkable productions for which this scholarly soldier was distinguished, and was spoken of by the late Sir George Murray in advantageous comparison with Cæsar's *Commentaries*. It will, perhaps, satisfy the wish of the intelligent reader, and do some justice to the memory of Havelock, to give this remarkable document *in extenso* :—

From Major-general Sir Robert Sale to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Jellalabad, 16th April, 1842.

SIR,—The relief of this place having been at length effected by the victorious advance through the passes of the Khyber of the army under Major-general Pollock, C.B., I conceive that I owe it to the troops who have so long formed the garrison here, to address to you a report which may convey some notion of their conflicts, and the severity of their duties, labours, and privations. It has before been made known to government that I reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October, 1841, under instructions from the authorities at Cabul, and there received intelligence of the breaking out of a terrible insurrection at the Affghan capital, on the 2nd of November. My retracing my steps on that city was, in a military sense, impracticable, since the first inevitable sacrifice would have been of the lives of three hundred sick and wounded, whom I could not have left in dépôt with the treasonable irregulars at Gundamuck, whilst my cattle was unequal to the transport of my camp equipage, and my ammunition insufficient for protracted operations. In the position which I occupied I could not absolutely command a day's provisions, or even water, and should have been hemmed in on every side by hostile tribes, amounting to thirty or forty thousand men, part of whom might have seized Jellalabad and reduced it to ashes, or, holding it, have left me no alternative but a disastrous retreat towards Peshawur. I therefore came to the resolution of anticipating any movement of this kind, and, by possessing myself of this city, establishing a point upon which the force at Cabul might retire if hardly pressed. Two marches brought me, after a successful contest at Futehabad, to Jellalabad. My breaking up from Gundamuck was followed by the immediate defection of the irregulars there, the destruction of the cantonment, and a general rising of the tribes. I found the walls of Jellalabad in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them; the *enceinte* was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of two thousand three hundred yards. Its tracing was

* Owen's *Havelock*.

vicious in the extreme: it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, which there was not more than two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of four hundred yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole *enceinte* was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened upon the defenders, at twenty or thirty yards.

The garrison took full possession of the town, in such a state, on the morning of the 12th of November, and, in the course of the day, the place and detached hills, by which on one side it is commanded, were surrounded and surmounted by a force of not fewer than five thousand insurgents. A general attack, on the 14th of November, ridged us of these enemies, and a similar array, brought against us a fortnight afterwards, was dissipated by a second sally, on the 1st of December. But we had seized the town, having in our possession not quite two days' provisions and corn for our men and horses, and beheld the arduous task before us of striving to render the works defensible, and collecting supplies for our magazine from the midst of a fanatical and infuriated people, with very narrow means, in the way of treasure, to purchase them. I appointed Captain Broadfoot, of Shah Sujah's Sappers, Garrison Engineer, and Captain Abbot, of the Artillery, Commissary of Ordnance. Captain M'Gregor, Political Agent, gave me the aid of his local experience, and, through his influence and measures, our Dak communication with India was restored, and a great quantity of grain collected; whilst the unremitting and almost incredible labours of the troops, aided by the zeal and science of Captain Broadfoot, put the town in an efficient state of defence. Captain Abbot made the artillery dispositions in the ablest manner, and used every exertion to add to, and economise, our resources in the way of gun and musket ammunition, in both of which we were deficient for the purposes of a siege. Lead and powder were procured in and about Jellalabad, and a quantity of cartridges discovered in an old magazine, and thus the troops completed to two hundred rounds per man. It is to be remarked that I might, in the second week of November, have marched upon Pesh Bolak, relieved from investment the corps of Juzailchees under Captain Ferris, and with it operated a doubtful retreat upon Peshawur. But I felt it to be my duty to give support to the last moment to our troops, struggling against their numerous enemies at Cabul, and maintain for them a point on which to retreat and rally, if they met with reverse.

On the 9th of January I was summoned by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion to give up the place, in fulfilment of a convention entered into by the political and military authorities at Cabul; but as I was fully assured of the bad faith of our enemies, I refused to do this; and on the 13th received the melancholy intelligence of the disastrous retreat of our troops from the capital and their annihilation in the Ghiljic defiles by the rigours of the climate, and the basest treachery on the part of those in whose promises they had confided. Almost at the same time it became known to us that the brigade of four regiments, marched to my succour from Hindostan, had been beaten in detail, and forced to fall back upon Peshawur: my position was most critical, and I might, whilst our enemies were engaged in plundering the force from Cabul, have attempted, and perhaps effected, though with heavy loss, a retreat across Khyber, but I resolved, at all hazards, on not relinquishing my grasp on the chief town of the valley of Ningrahar, and the key of Eastern Afghanistan, so long as I had reason to consider that our government desired to retain it. The discouragements of my garrison at this moment were very great, their duties most severe,

their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours made by the enemy to seduce the native portion of them from their allegiance. But their fidelity was unshaken, and their serenity amidst labours and privations unclouded. With reference, however, to the state of fanatical excitement and national antipathy which prevailed around us, I had been compelled, as a measure of prudence, to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of Juzailchees, and a few of the Afghan Sappers, and a body of Hindostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mohammed Khan. Works had in the meantime been completed, of which the annexed reports and plans of Captain Broadfoot contain ample details. Generally, I may state, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines, and destroying gardens and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to six or seven feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, round the whole of the walls: the place was thus secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy not provided with siege artillery.

But it pleased Providence on the 19th February, to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, east to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawur face, and reduced the Cabul gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature.

The troops turned with indefatigable industry to the repair of their walls, but at the moment of the great convulsion, Sirdar Mohammed Akbar Khan, Barukzye, the assassin of the late envoy, and treacherous destroyer of the Cabul force, having collected a body of troops, flushed with a success consummated by the vilest means, had advanced to Murkhail, within seven miles of our gates. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22nd of February, and soon after—establishing his head-quarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant—invested the town, and established a rigorous blockade. From that time up to the 7th of April, the reduced garrison was engaged in a succession of skirmishes with the enemy, who, greatly superior in horse, perpetually insulted our walls by attacks and alerts, and compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Sujah's 2nd cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Sing, 5th cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Deenie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mine, on the 11th of March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot, who was severely wounded, and Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne, on the 30th and 31st of January; and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mohammed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattison, her majesty's 13th light infantry, and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar on the 7th instant.

I have to notice as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our

camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other weapons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged myself to them to recommend to Government, that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Sujah's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars, to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period, having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown among them; but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee, and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read of them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers, and men, British and Hindostanee, of every arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarm posts every night, from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabul and Jellalabad, were heavy; and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-general Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty, to bring the series of labours, privations, and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the supreme government of India, and through his lordship to that of the court of directors and of our sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of garrison engineer, will meet with attentive perusal: I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution, during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Afghan Huzaree and Eusifzye portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two infantry regiments under the lamented Colonel Deenie and Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron 5th light cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissalla 2nd Shah Sujah's cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne; Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6 light field battery has ever been excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse and Lieutenant Dawes have proved themselves excellent officers of ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain M'Gregor, political agent, has cheerfully rendered very valuable assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing

danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not, perhaps, to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know they have been unremitting; and their result, in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabul, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Sujah's force, and Assistant-surgeons Robertson and Barnes, her majesty's 13th light infantry, Hare, 35th regiment, and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, commissariat officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th regiment, native infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter-master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of the 13th light infantry, of which corps I am proud of being a member: I fully concur in the sentiments which he expresses, and hope the distinctions which he recommends for the officers of his own corps will be accorded. The cheerful and persevering manner in which the native soldiers laboured with the shovel, mattock, and handbarrow, was as surprising as their steadiness and courage in the field were conspicuous.

I have to acknowledge the zealous manner in which Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, Brevet-captain Gerard, of the corps of Juzailchees, Captain Burn, and Lieutenant Hillersdon, of the Khyber Rangers, and Lieutenant Dowson, of the Jambazes, when their services could no longer be available with their corps, volunteered to do duty with my regiment in which they could be useful.

I must finally express my gratitude to Providence for having placed so gallant and devoted a force under my command; in every way it has exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to solicit the interposition of Major-general Pollock, C.B., who has nobly laboured and fought to relieve it from its critical position in the midst of a hostile empire, in now committing it to the protection and favour of the Right

Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and through him of the Court of Directors, and of our Sovereign.

"I ask permission especially to recommend the following officers for honorary distinction, or brevet rank, or both, viz., Lieutenant-colonel Monteith, C.B., commanding 35th regiment native infantry, now second in command; Brevet-major Fraser, light cavalry, who acted as my aid-de-camp on the 7th instant; Captain Abbott, Commandant of Artillery, and Commissary of Ordnance; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Mountain Train, and senior officer of the shah's troops with my force; Captain Broadfoot, commanding Sappers, and Garrison Engineer; Captain Oldfield, 5th light cavalry, senior officer of that arm; Captain Seaton, 35th regiment native infantry; particularly recommended for his conduct on the 7th instant, by Lieutenant-colonel Monteith; Captain Younghusband of the same regiment, who was distinguished with the advanced guard in the Khoord Cabul Pass, and there severely wounded; Captain Burn, late commandant of the Khyber Rangers, and doing duty with the 35th regiment, N. I.; Captain Wilkinson, on whom the command of the 13th light infantry devolved in the field on the fall of Colonel Dennie, C.B.; Captain Fenwick, her majesty's 13th light infantry, whose highly deserving conduct in the Pass of Jngdulluck was noticed then in my despatch; Captain Havelock, her majesty's 13th light infantry, Persian interpreter to Major-generals Elphinstone and Pollock, and attached to me as staff, and who commanded the right column in the final attack on Mohammed Akbar's camp; and Captain Hamlet Wade, her majesty's 13th light infantry, my Brigade-major, whose exertions in the action of the 7th I have elsewhere highly commended. Both these latter officers rendered most valuable services throughout the investment and siege. The officers of all ranks, and soldiers of all arms, European and native, I have likewise to represent as generally and individually deserving of reward and encouragement, and I hope that Government will sanction my calling upon commandants of corps and detachments to send in rolls of such ostive officers as they may deem worthy of the insignia of the order of "Merit" and of "British India."

I have the honour to be, &c.,

R. SALE,

Major-General Commanding, Jellalabad.

CHAPTER CXII.

TRANSACTIONS AND BATTLES OF THE BRITISH ARMY AT CABUL, FROM THE DEPARTURE OF SIR ROBERT SALE TO THE RETREAT OF THE HON. GENERAL ELPHINSTONE.

LEAVING Sir Robert Sale and his gallant brigade at Jellalabad, it is necessary to recall the reader's attention to Cabul. The withdrawal of Sale's force left the garrison of Cabul so much weakened, that the disaffected chiefs became sanguine that they should be able to effect its destruction. After the brigade of Sale left, the forces remaining consisted of the 44th British regiment of the line, the 5th and 54th Bengal native infantry, the 5th Bengal light cavalry, with the exception of a squadron, which left with Sir Robert. A company of foot artillery, and a troop of horse artillery. The shah's own force was

two regiments of infantry, a mountain train of artillery, and several squadrons of Hindostanee and Affghan cavalry. The 37th Bengal native infantry accompanied Sale part of his way.

The arrangement of the forces at Cabul were such as it might be supposed no officer of tolerable information would adopt. Part of it was quartered at the Balla-Hissar, the royal residence which overlooked the town, and the remainder was established in cantonments three miles distant. The force was divided when the most ordinary prudence would have united it, after the disasters which

had been experienced, and while the Affghan chiefs were already in arms. The indiscretion of the general-in-chief did not stop there; for part of the commissariat was within the walls of Cabul itself, and a number of the officers were permitted to reside there.

On the 2nd of November, 1841, the populace of Cabul rose in insurrection. The houses of the British officers were first attacked, and among them, with especial malignity, those of Sir Alexander Burnes, and of the paymaster of the shah's forces, a British officer, Captain Johnson. Had Sir Alexander Burnes, even then, showed firmness and a quick insight of events, the insurgents might have been intimidated. Sir Alexander, however, forbid his guard to fire on the people, and tried the British plan of quieting a mob by making a speech. Neither Clive, Hastings, nor Wellesley, would have wasted time at a period of such urgency in a way so unsuitable to orientals. The result was, that when the sepoy guard was permitted to defend the minister, the moment had passed for effectual action. The sepoys were overpowered; Sir Alexander, his brother, Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, an officer of distinguished talents and bravery, perished. Broadfoot slew six of his assailants before he fell. The residency was plundered; every one in it, even women and children, were, with the bloody ferocity of Mohanmedans, murdered. The house was plundered, and then burned. The shah's treasury was also plundered, and after the massacre of those in charge of it, and their families, committed to the flames. Several British officers were wounded, and the escape of any was miraculous, for the whole population, well armed, was excited to the highest pitch of fanaticism,* and crying out madly for the blood of the infidels. An attempt was made to assassinate Captain Sturt, of the engineers (son-in-law of General Sale), in the precincts of the palace. He was stabbed three times by an Affghan of rank, who escaped into an adjacent building. Captain Lawrence, a distinguished political servant of the company, afterwards still more known and honoured, had a narrow escape from sword and matchlock while bearing a despatch.

The shah was more vigilant, active, and skilful than the English generals. He sent Campbell's Hindostanee regiment in his own service, and three guns, to suppress the insurrection. The populace were prepared for such an event, and gallantly resisted. The Hindostanee soldiers did not display much courage or loyalty, and gave way without making any impression upon the enemy. A

son of the shah, and a number of Affghans—a sort of body-guard—supported the Hindostanee infantry, but the horsemen showed even less loyalty and spirit than the Hindostanees. Brigadier Shelton and a portion of the troops was just then encamped at some distance from both the Balla-Hissar and the cantonments. He was ordered, or, as it would appear, requested to send a portion of his troops to the former place, with which he complied, and the rest he marched to the cantonments. Neither he nor General Elphinstone took any measure to put down the insurrection in the city, which might have been done that day by officers of intelligence and promptitude.

Orders were given that the 37th Bengal native infantry, which had gone part of the way with General Sale, and remained posted at the Khoord-Cabul, should return. Major Griffiths conducted his regiment safely, but had to fight his way against very superior numbers during the whole march. Lady Sale, who witnessed their arrival, and who had a more masculine intellect and military mind than the chief officers of the British force, described the progress of the gallant Griffiths and his men as if it had been a mere parade movement. The arrival of this battalion on the 3rd, did not lead to any increased activity, or more decided policy on the part of the English general. Some of the officers made desultory efforts on their own account, to dislodge the rebels from various posts which it was dangerous to allow them to occupy, but the general seemed as incapable of laying down any plan for the action of others, as he was of going about or doing anything himself; the rebels, therefore, continued the offensive, and strengthened themselves in every way, and in all directions. Several important positions were lost by English officers for want of ammunition, for which their applications to their superiors were made in vain.* Various chiefs, faithful to the cause of Shah Sujah, offered assistance to the British officers, but were so discouraged by the haughty contumely with which they were treated, that they shrunk back into neutrality, or were compelled for their own safety to join the enemy. A small fort used by Brigadier Auquetil, a French officer in the shah's service, and where also some of his majesty's commissariat stores were placed, was defended by some Affghans in the shah's service, who were commanded by Captain M'Kenzie, an officer of courage and great presence of mind. That gallant man defended the post until he had not a single cartridge left. His solicitations for ammu-

* *Military Operations at Cabul.* Lieutenant Eyre.

* *Lady Sale's Journal.*

nition to British cantonments and to the Balla-Hissar were in vain; he therefore evacuated the place in the night, and endeavoured to join head-quarters. His adventures were romantic, and his escape from the dangers by which he was surrounded wonderful. His own account of that terrible march is graphic and exceedingly interesting:—"Before we had proceeded half a mile, the rear missed the advance, upon whom a post of the enemy had begun to fire. All my regulars had crept ahead with the Juzailchees, and I found myself alone with a chuprasse and two sowars, in the midst of a helpless and wailing crowd of women and children. Riding on by myself, along a narrow lane, to try and pick out the road, I found myself suddenly surrounded by a party of Affghans, whom at first I took to be our Juzailchees, and spoke to them as such. They quickly undeceived me, however, by crying out, 'Feringhee hust,' 'here is a European;' and attacking us with swords and knives. Spurring my horse violently, I wheeled round, cutting from right to left, for I fortunately had my own sword drawn previous to the surprise. My blows, by God's mercy, parried the greater part of theirs, and I was lucky enough to cut off the hand of my most outrageous assailant. In short, after a desperate struggle, during which I received two slight sabre cuts, and a blow on the back of my head, from a fellow whose sword turned in his hand, which knocked me half off my horse, I escaped out of the crush, passing unhurt through two volleys of musketry from the whole picket, which by that time had become alarmed, and had turned out. They pursued me, but I soon distanced them, crossing several fields at speed, and gaining a road which I perceived led round the western end of the shah's garden. Proceeding cautiously along, to my horror I perceived my path again blocked up by a dense body of Affghans. Retreat was impossible; so, putting my trust in God, I charged into the midst of them, hoping that the weight of my horse would clear my way for me, and reserving my sword cuts for my last struggle. It was well that I did so; for, by the time that I had knocked over some twenty fellows, I found that they were my own Juzailchees. If you ever experienced sudden relief from a hideous nightmare, you may imagine my feelings for the moment. With these worthies, after wandering about for some time, and passing unchallenged by a sleepy post of the enemy, I reached the cantonments."

The next day apathy and neglect pervaded the English head-quarters, as on the preceding days. The British commissary held his stores in a small fort, which, if taken, the

stores from which the troops were fed would fall into the hands of the enemy, and the English must either surrender, or starve. This important position, upon the occupation of which so much depended, was guarded by one officer, an ensign, and a few sepoys of the 5th Bengal native infantry. During the 4th of November, Mr. Warren, upon whom the maintenance of the post devolved, sent word that he was pressed by a very superior Affghan force, and unless he obtained speedy assistance he must abandon the defence. Instead of sending a body of troops to assist him in retaining a place of such vital importance, a very small detachment was sent to aid him in evacuating it. The detachment sent for this purpose was too small to fight its way to Ensign Warren, and had to retreat with the loss of a considerable portion of the men; yet, notwithstanding this failure, another small force was dispatched on the same errand, and, of course, with the same result.

Captain Boyd, the English commissary-general, and Captain Johnson, commissary-general to the shah, made representations to General Elphinstone of the folly and ruin of surrendering such an important place to the rebels, containing as it did stores of rice, rum, medicine, under-clothing, &c., amounting in value to four lacs of rupees; whereas, the cantonments did not contain food for three days, and none could be procured elsewhere. Ensign Warren was then ordered to hold the post. The officer replied in sensible and earnest language to the effect that the insurgents were mining the walls, and that his men had become disheartened, and some had deserted. He was again ordered to hold the post, and informed that at two o'clock in the morning he would be reinforced. The commander-in-chief occupied his time in prolix councils of war, and no relief was sent to Ensign Warren. While General Elphinstone and his chief officers were debating, Ensign Warren and the remains of his detachment entered the cantonments. The enemy had set fire to the gate of the fort, as well as shattered a portion of the wall with gunpowder. Warren, no longer able to defend the place, and his soldiers no longer willing to do so, escaped with difficulty. Lieutenant Eyre in his work on *Military Operations in Cabul*, describes the effect which the capture of the commissariat fort produced upon the troops: "It no sooner became generally known that the commissariat fort, upon which we were dependent for supplies, had been abandoned, than one universal feeling of indignation pervaded the garrison; nor can I describe the impatience of the troops, but especially the native portion, to be led out for its recapture

—a feeling that was by no means diminished by their seeing the Affghans crossing and recrossing the road between the commissariat fort and the gate of the Shah Bagh, laden with the provisions on which had depended our ability to make a protracted defence.”

General Elphinstone was so goaded by the loudly expressed indignation of the officers of inferior rank and the common soldiers, that he was obliged to venture upon some act of apparent decision. He ordered an attempt to be made to capture the fort of Mohammed Shureef, by which the commissariat fort was commanded. Two guns under Lieutenant Eyre were ordered to open a fire upon the forts, to cover an assault by Major Swayne, who was to blow open the gate with powder. The guns maintained their cannonade until their ammunition was nearly gone, but Swayne made no attempt to lead his infantry to the attack. Whether he would have ventured to do his duty ultimately it is difficult to say, for General Elphinstone recalled the party. This was attended by another burst of indignation on the part of the troops; even the sepoy could not restrain the expression of their scorn, and demanded to be allowed to storm the fort. The 37th Bengal regiment—which had behaved so well as a battalion under Major Griffiths, and when brigaded under General Sale—called out loudly for permission to take the place. The cause of this shameful failure it is difficult to determine, as testimonies disagree. Lieutenant Eyre attributes it to Major Swayne; Lady Sale throws all the blame on General Elphinstone. The following passages convey the language expressed by both authorities. Major Eyre thus wrote:—“Major Swayne, instead of rushing forward with his men, as had been agreed, had in the meantime remained stationary, under cover of the wall by the road side. The general, who was watching our proceedings from the gateway, observing that the gun-ammunition was running short, and that the troops had failed to take advantage of the best opportunity for advancing, recalled us into cantonments.” Lady Sale says:—“The troops retired by order of General Elphinstone, to my no small surprise, for the enemy had begun to run out from a broken bastion; but when they found our people retreating, they took courage, and no more left the fort.”

General Elphinstone, who seemed to have no mind of his own, was again moved by the murmurs of the troops, and ordered a renewed attempt to take the fort, to be made on the next day. Edward Thornton thus describes it:—“At an early hour three iron 9-pounders were brought to bear upon the north-east

bastion, and two howitzers upon the contiguous curtain. The firing was maintained for about two hours, during which the artillerymen were exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters stationed on a couple of high towers which completely commanded the battery. A practicable breach being effected, a storming party, consisting of three companies, one of her majesty's 44th, one of the 5th native infantry, and one of the 37th native infantry, marched forward and speedily carried the place. The death-throe of this redoubtable fort was far less violent than might have been expected from the degree of tenacity attributed to it. About one hundred and fifty men succeeded in planting the British flag upon it; but it is to be lamented that the gallant officer, Ensign Raban, of the queen's 44th, who first waved it on the summit of the breach, was shot through the heart while in the act of thus displaying the signal of his country's triumph.” The British cavalry pursued the fugitives, and would probably have cut off the whole had not the enemy's horse have made a demonstration in such numbers as compelled the British to draw off.

The *commissary fort* was still in the hands of the enemy, and so considerable a portion of the stores remained in it that its recapture might have saved the army. But the general would neither order this to be done nor allow others to do it. Lady Sale thus narrates one instance of the general's delinquency in this respect:—“Paton [assistant quartermaster-general] and Bellew [deputy assistant quartermaster-general] meet in council with Sturt [her son-in-law, and chief officer of engineers], at nine, most evenings, at our house. To-day [6th November] arrangements were made for carrying the shah's garden and the commissariat fort by daybreak, everything being so clearly explained, that even I understood it as well as hemming the handkerchief I was making. . . . Plans were sketched, and all the minutæ written out, so that the general might have no questions to ask. It is now midnight, and no reply has been sent from him, though an answer was to have come to say whether the work should be done or not.” From subsequent passages in the *Journal*, it seems that the general hesitated—then approved the plan—then abandoned it.

It is probable that but for the interference of the chief civil officer, Sir W. Mac Naghten, General Elphinstone's army would have been destroyed without the general permitting any proper disposition of defence to be made. At Sir William's suggestion, Brigadier Shelton, a very brave but dull officer, who had lost an arm at Waterloo, where he had distinguished himself by courage, was ordered

to remove from Balla-Hissar to the cantonments to assist the general-in-chief, whose incapacity, physical and mental, had now arrived at such a pitch as to require some more vigorous soldier in immediate consultation with him to save the army from speedy ruin. Shelton was vigorous and gallant enough for this task, but had not the mind of a general any more than his chief. Even when Shelton took a prominent share of responsibility, Sir W. Mac Naghten, only by undertaking to be held responsible, could induce an attack upon a fort so near to the Balla-Hissar as to enable its garrison to fire musketry among the British troops. This fort, which was called the Rika Bashee, was in consequence ordered to be stormed. The assailants consisted of the 44th royal regiment, the 37th native regiment of Bengal, and about an equal number of Affghans in the shah's service. A troop of horse artillery, and a gun of "the mountain train," were attached to this force. Captain Bellew, who behaved with great gallantry, laid powder to the gate. The explosion missed the main gate, and blew open a wicket, through which only two or three soldiers could pass at a time, by stooping, or almost creeping. A few men instantly rushed in, chiefly officers, very few of the soldiery showing any disposition to enter. Colonel Mackerall, and Lieutenant Cadett of the 44th, Lieutenant Hawtrey of the 37th Bengal regiment, and Lieutenant Burd of the shah's force, with dauntless intrepidity entered together, sword in hand, clearing the enemy from the way. The garrison, supposing that the large gate was blown in, and that the whole British force were entering, fled in dismay through a gate at the opposite side. At that instant, however, the enemy's cavalry, always more gallant than the infantry, charged round the angle of the fort, and began to sabre the shah's infantry, who fled without resistance. The British infantry behaved with nearly as little spirit, English and sepoy fleeing together. Indeed, the sepoy of the 37th showed a disposition to form and resist, but the panic of the 44th was unmitigated. Major Scott made efforts to rally them, but in vain. He then called upon volunteers to follow him; one man only had the courage or confidence, whichever was the virtue required. His name was Steward. He would have been unnoticed and unrewarded by his stoical superiors had not Sir W. Mac Naghten interested himself in him, and procured his promotion to the rank of sergeant.

The heroic courage of Brigadier Shelton alone retrieved the disgrace, and saved the brave men who had entered the fort. The brigadier rallied some of the troops, who, after

renewed displays of cowardice, or want of confidence in their officers (it is difficult to which influence to attribute their hesitation), at last entered the fort, and secured its conquest. In the meantime, the officers and their few followers who had entered the wicket gate when it was blown open, had been exposed to a fearful conflict. They shut the gate out of which the garrison had fled, drew a chain across it, and fastened it with a bayonet. Two of their number, Lieutenants Cadett and Hawtrey, returned to bring up assistance. Before the runaway soldiers were rallied by Shelton, the Affghans returned (having heard of the flight of the English), and forced away the chain and the bayonet. Mackerall fell, bravely fighting to the last. Lieutenant Burd and two sepoy found shelter in a stable, barred the gate, and fired from the apertures which admitted air. Against this frail post the Affghans directed their whole fury: young Burd and his two followers flinched not, and kept the enemy at bay until assistance arrived. When that at last came, one of the faithful sepoy was slain, and thirty dead Affghans lay around and in the entrance of the shattered door of the stable. Edward Thornton says, "when the fort was gained, the gallant pair were found by their companions unharmed. The rescue, indeed, was at the last moment, for the ammunition of the besieged combatants was reduced to a stock of five cartridges."

The English had two hundred killed and wounded during these conflicts. Captain M'Crae was cut down in the first charge upon the gateway. Captain Westmeath was shot in one of the skirmishes without. The effect of the success was that the enemy abandoned the minor adjacent forts. Grain, to a considerable extent, was found in one, which circumstance cheered the army not a little. During the day much of it was removed to a safer place. A guard was applied for by the commissary to protect the remainder through the night, but with the infatuation by which all the imbecile control of this army was characterised, this important request was refused. Before morning it was removed by the enemy, and another serious deprivation was inflicted upon the army.

On the 13th of November, the enemy appeared in great force upon the heights, and fired into the cantonments. Sir W. Mac Naghten by taking upon himself* the responsibility, succeeded in inducing the general to send out a force to disperse them. The British soldiery, both European and native, showed a want of courage so unusual with British troops, as to excite the astonishment

* Thornton, vol. vi. p. 26.

of their officers. The fact was, the men did not doubt the courage of their officers, which far surpassed their own, but they had lost all reliance upon the military capacity of the commander-in-chief, and of his principal officers; they were therefore unwilling to incur peril when life might be thrown away in a useless enterprise. The British, however, gained their object, and captured one of the enemy's guns. Another was protected by a heavy fire from the Afghan matchlocks, and the men of the 44th regiment could not be stimulated by the words or example of their officers to charge and capture it. This was the second time that regiment, which had so highly distinguished itself at Waterloo, had shown a want of British spirit at Cabul, independent of some minor instances in which it was deficient in alacrity and military ardour. As the soldiers of the 44th could not be prevailed upon to incur the danger of the enemy's fire to carry the gun away, Lieutenant Eyre and a horse artillery gunner descended into the ravine where the gun lay abandoned, and spiked it. The bad example set by the 44th infected the whole of the native infantry. The attack made at the instigation of Sir W. Mac Naghten, had a salutary effect upon the Afghans, who for nearly a week offered the British little molestation. The English general being quite content to be let alone, left his enemies to adopt their own course.

On the 22nd November a contest occurred in the village of Behmaroo. That place had afforded the English some supplies, who, utterly thriftless and incapable, left it unprotected. The Afghans, to cut off the resources derived thence, occupied the village without hindrance. When the mischief was effected, the English general began to think of the inconvenience attending it, and ordered Major Swayne, of the 5th native infantry, with a small force of cavalry and infantry, and a *single gun*, to dispossess them. *Another gun was sent afterwards.* The orders were to storm the village. Major Swayne, however, behaved on this occasion precisely as he had done when ordered to storm the commissariat fort. He stood for hours firing at too great a distance to do any harm, the infantry being under cover with the major, the cavalry and artillery being exposed to the long-range matchlocks of the enemy. The artillery, of course, replied as efficiently as their position allowed; the cavalry were useless. In the evening, Brigadier Shelton joined the assailants, if such they might be called, and looked on while, as Lady Sale described, they did nothing. As the party retired at the close of this ignominious day, Brigadier Shelton had the folly to inquire of Lady Sale if she

did not approve of the way in which the troops conducted themselves. This brave woman, accustomed to witness the heroic deeds of her illustrious husband, and the military genius which distinguished him, answered with indignant censure, pointing out the absurdities, in a military point of view, of the way in which the undertaking had been conducted and had failed. But not even the rebukes, remonstrances, or scorn of a sensible and resolute lady could inspire the English generals with wisdom, or goad them into a spirited conduct of the war. Shelton had as gallant a heart as ever beat in British bosom, but he had not mind. He was a good, kind, just, honest man, true to his country and his duty, but he had no capacity for the responsibility devolved upon him; and the system of the British army did not provide that men should be at hand, as they always might be with any considerable body of British troops, equal to emergencies such as are common to armies.

The next day Brigadier Shelton went out with about one thousand infantry of the 44th regiment, and the two native regiments, a company of sappers, a squadron of regular light cavalry, another of irregular, and one hundred men of Anderson's horse. With this force also there was a single gun. This error Lady Sale commented upon severely and justly at the time. A second gun might easily have been sent, so that a regular and unintermittent fire could have been preserved. The gun was brought to a knoll, which was supposed to command the enemy's principal bivouac. The enemy became confused, seeking places of shelter, and giving a desultory fire from their "juzails." Shelton was urged by the more intelligent of his officers to storm the place while the enemy was in confusion, as the night was dark. This he neglected to do; for, although personally fearless of danger, he was too kind willingly to expose his soldiers, of whom he was fond, to any perils that did not promise to bear important fruit; and, unfortunately, his judgment was seldom clear in that respect. When morning dawned and gave the enemy light to penetrate the objects and plans of the assailants, and fight or fly as their interests might point out, Shelton resolved upon a storm; selecting an officer who had already repeatedly proved himself incompetent, the general filled up the measure of his infatuation. Major Swayne was ordered to storm the principal gate. He could not find it—*it was wide open.* He instead came upon a small wicket, which was barricaded; he did not try to force it, but placed his men under cover, where they quietly remained out of harm's way, and doing no

harm to their enemies, until they were called off. Lieutenant Eyre believes that Major Swayne was obliged to put his men under cover, being unable to force the gate. It was forced, however, but not by him. Lady Sale says a way was made through the space it closed, "by a few men pulling it down with their hands, and kicking at it." The place was taken, not because British skill or valour accomplished it, but because the garrison, overrating the energy and ability of their foes, chose to evacuate it and take ground on an opposite hill to that occupied by the British, and separated from it only by a gorge. Perceiving the vacillation of the English, the Affghans returned to the village and re-occupied it with much judgment, and in considerable force. The brigadier proceeded to dislodge the enemy, who remained in position on the opposite height. Whatever may be conceived as improbable for a general to do under such circumstances, Brigadier Shelton performed. He brought forward skirmishers to the brow of the hill, two squares were formed by his infantry, supported by his cavalry, the whole force being obnoxious to the fire of the Affghans, who were covered by crags and mounds of stones artificially raised. The conduct of the British troops was dastardly in the extreme. The men had not the smallest confidence in General Shelton's dispositions, and could not be brought to hope for any success under either his command, or that of General Elphinstone. The British skirmishers could only be kept to their duty by the dauntless exposure of the officers, and their encouragements, remonstrances, and even taunts. They could no more be induced to advance against the enemy than in the Crimean war the soldiers of General Windham could be brought to follow him in the Redan, and for the same reason, want of confidence in their leaders. In the case taken for illustration, however, the men fought heroically, so far as depended upon their individual action, but Brigadier Shelton's troops showed a craven spirit in every form. The skirmishers fell back upon the main body, and the Affghan skirmishers advanced; as soon as they approached the squares, the latter gave way. The officers did everything that men could do to rally them, offering immense pecuniary rewards to capture the enemy's flag, which met with no response. The despicable cowardice of the 44th regiment was the main cause of all this disgrace; for the sepoy regiments had repeatedly proved themselves brave and well disciplined, but sepoys seldom fight well if they see want of courage in the European soldiers, to whom they look for courage in the

field. Many of the British officers advanced and threw stones at the Affghans, the base men of the 44th looking on without being moved by the heroic example. Captains Mackintosh and Mackenzie, Lieutenants Troup, Leighton, and Laing, were among the foremost in thus acting. Mackintosh and Laing fell. The enemy rushed to seize the only gun which the English had with them. The cavalry were ordered to charge to prevent such a result: they refused to obey. Captains Bolt and Collier, and Lieutenant Wallace, charged the enemy, followed by a number of native officers; the remaining officers, European and native, made every possible exertion to induce the men to charge, but they would not. The cavalry were all natives. Had there been another infantry regiment of Europeans, and a single squadron of European cavalry, the disgrace and ruin entailed by the cowardice of the 44th regiment might have been retrieved. The cavalry looked on, while the artillerymen, fighting with dauntless courage—alone brave amidst a demoralized army—struggled to retain the gun: all were cut down, two killed. The first square of the British infantry was running away, the second preserved its formation, and the fugitives were rallied in its rear, but only after incredible labour on the part of their gallant officers. This display of order and animation awed the enemy, who abandoned the gun. The English opened fire, which was maintained at some distance, but on the enemy again advancing, the infantry ran away. The officers once more displayed boundless heroism, but in vain; not even self-preservation could rally these cowards, who were cut down by the Affghans with great slaughter. The pursuers gave no quarter, and mercilessly hacked the wounded. Some of the shah's own infantry, Affghans, rallied and fired; at the same moment Lieutenant Hardyman arrived with a fresh troop of horse, who, not partaking of the general demoralization, charged with effect. One of the Affghan chiefs, whether from this display of spirit, or from a treacherous loyalty to the shah, halted his men. Colonel Oliver, Captain Mackintosh, and Lieutenants Laing and Walker were left dead upon the field.

When Shelton advanced against the height occupied by the Affghans, he left on the range of knolls which his own troops had occupied, three companies of the 37th Bengal native infantry, under Major Kershaw. This small force covered the retreat with distinguished courage, such as had always characterised that corps. They fought with such courage, and preserved such order, that to them must be attributed the safety of those who escaped. One of these companies was entirely destroyed,

except a corporal and two men. These representatives of their company retired, preserving their coolness and discipline to the last. This was not the first time in the history of Indian wars that the sepoy soldiers showed a fortitude superior to the European. Shelton had proved himself utterly incapable of any command whatever. He had the folly and stupidity afterwards to boast of the conduct of his regiment, the 44th, and blame the sepoys for the loss of the battle, although the Europeans set an example of cowardice, and would, probably, have been all cut off had not their flight been covered by the reserve companies of the 37th Bengal native infantry.

The military leaders urged Sir W. Mac Naghten to negotiate for a retreat, the safety of which might be guaranteed. It was obvious that the soldiers would not fight under the leadership of such men, and so Mac Naghten, sorely against his own disposition, yielded to their importunities. It was, after much diplomatic trick, arranged that Shah Sujah should descend from his throne, and the English abandon Afghanistan. The shah, after much prevarication, refused to abandon the musnid, gathered his partizans around him, defended his position, and showed far more spirit than his protectors. The English, no longer able to dictate terms to the shah, were compelled to make terms for themselves. The soldiers were starving, and were very anxious to see the war concluded in any way. It was finally agreed that the English should give up Afghanistan, and retire under the protection of the chiefs, who were to provide them with beasts of burden and food. The animals were never provided, and what little food the English did procure was purchased at a most extravagant price. It was at last demanded that the English should surrender their guns and artillery ammunition. Some demur was made to this, but it was substantially conceded. Meanwhile the attacks of the Affghans upon the garrison of Cabul continued. Mohammed Shureef's fort was the chief point of contest. The Affghans tried to blow open the gate with powder, as the English had done, but not understanding the process, the explosion only did harm to themselves. They then laid a mine, but Lieutenant Sturt, the engineer, the heroic son-in-law of Sir Robert Sale, entered the mine in the night, and destroyed it. The cowardice of the 44th regiment, however, betrayed the fort to the enemy. The garrison consisted of one company of that regiment, and one company of the gallant 37th. Lieutenant Gray, who commanded the company of the 44th, was wounded, and while getting his wound dressed, the whole of his men ran away, climbing

the walls of the fort to escape, not having had a man killed in the defence. The company of the 37th, which had behaved well, and lost two men, was anxious to defend the place, but being abandoned by their European fellow soldiers, they also fled, and the Affghans, unopposed, walked into the fort. Sturt had been carried about in a litter, suffering from his wounds; yet he was the life and soul of the garrison, directing everything and animating all. Sir Robert Sale and his noble-hearted wife might well be proud of such a son-in-law. A company of the 44th had garrisoned the bazaar, who endeavoured to run away, after the example of their comrades in the fort, but their officers by desperate exertions prevented them. A guard of sepoys had to be placed at the entrance to *prevent the Europeans from deserting*. Lieutenant Eyre says that this regiment "had been for a long time previous to these occurrences in a state of woeful deterioration." The fact is, the regiment was composed of men who had no sympathy with British chivalry, and cared nothing for defeat to England, or dishonour to the British name. At last discipline began to fail in cantonments as in the field, and here also the 44th set the example.

The winter began now to set in severely, and the English became urgent for the performance of those stipulations which the Affghan chiefs had made with Sir W. Mac Naghten. The troops quartered in the Balla-Hissar, left it for the cantonments, preparatory to the retirement of the whole body from Cabul. Akbar Khan, at this juncture, made a proposal that the English should occupy the cantonments and the Balla-Hissar a few months longer, that Shah Sujah should be confirmed on the throne, that Akbar Khan should be his vizier, and that the English should pay a large sum of money for the arrangement. Akbar also offered to decapitate Ameen Oolah Khan, the most sturdy opponent of the English, if they would pay for it. Sir William replied that England paid no blood money. Whether this offended Akbar, or that the whole scheme was a pretence to detain the English until the passes were so obstructed by the winter, that the troops might be more easily sacrificed, it is difficult to determine.

Sir William accepted all the other propositions: an interview was proposed by Akbar and acceded to by Sir William. At the appointed time, Sir William proceeded to the rendezvous accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie. He requested General Elphinstone to have two guns ready for secret service, to keep the garrison on the alert, and have the walls strongly manned. He suspected treachery. His wishes were so

imperfectly attended to, as to draw from him severest reproaches upon the military authorities; whom, indeed, no disasters could warn and no experience teach. The general had even the incredible folly to write a letter to the envoy, remonstrating against this demand for employing his troops in such a manner. Neither Elphinstone nor Shelton were capable of transacting any business of importance, or of comprehending military measures which required thought, foresight, or combination. The spot selected for the interview was nearly screened from view from the cantonments by a range of knolls. Sir William left the small escort allowed him by the military chiefs at some distance; he, and the three officers who had accompanied him, advanced to the appointed place. Akbar Khan arrived soon after, attended by several other chiefs, among them the brother of the man whom he had proposed to decapitate. A carpet was spread and the conference was opened. Soon after, a number of armed men drew near, and formed a circle at some distance. Captain Lawrence remarked, that as the conference was secret, these men should be ordered away. Akbar replied that it was of no consequence, as all were in the secret. He then cried aloud, "Seize!" and the envoy and his three companions were disarmed and pinioned, and borne away prisoners. Sir William had just before presented Akbar with a pair of pistols; with one of these he shot the envoy, with the other Captain Trevor. The other two were spared, and the mangled remains of their companions and seniors were paraded before them. The hands of Sir William Mac Naghten were cut off, carried about, and thrown in at the window where the surviving officers were imprisoned. As soon as the officers were seized, the escort ran away, excepting one man, who was almost cut to pieces by Akbar's adherents. Sir William had ordered the body-guard to follow him; they did so for some distance, but fled at the commencement of danger. Sir William has been blamed for trusting to Akbar, but he had no other course open to him. He had no confidence in the generals, who were little better than fools. He had no confidence in the soldiers, for, although the sepoy were disposed to stand firm, the 44th, the only European regiment, were cowards, or at all events indisposed to fight when only British honour was concerned, without any prospective advantage to themselves.

When tidings of this terrible treachery arrived at the cantonments, no call of honour was made upon the army, no generous effort of devotion made to rescue the living, or save the slain from insult; nothing chivalrous,

brave, wise, or noble was attempted; the stolid generals listened and wondered. While they were pondering over the events of disaster and humiliation of which they were themselves the occasion, Akbar Khan sent in a new treaty, or, rather that which had already been agreed to, with three new articles:—1st. That the British officers should leave all their guns behind, except six.* 2nd. That they should give up all their treasure. 3rd. That the hostages already held by the Affghans should be exchanged for married men with their wives and children. The council met to consider these propositions. Major Eldred Pottinger (who, as Lieutenant E. Pottinger, had so gallantly defended Herat) acted as political agent. He urged the council to refuse such disgraceful terms, to hold their ground, and act with spirit, or to attempt a retreat to Jellalabad. The council determined to accept Akbar's terms, in spite of Major Pottinger's warnings that he only intended to betray them. Bribes were offered by the council to married officers to entrust themselves and their wives and their families in the hands of the Affghans. Some were found to acquiesce, but only some. This part, therefore, of Akbar's demand could not be complied with! The council consisted of General Elphinstone, Brigadier-general Shelton, Brigadier Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, Captain Bellew, and Captain Grant. General Elphinstone wrote to Akbar that it was contrary to the honour of his country to surrender ladies as hostages. Akbar obtaining the bills for fourteen lacs, and the concession of all his other demands, accepted married hostages, without their families. Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Skinner, were therefore sent into the cantonments. Captains Drummond, Walsh, Warburton, Webb, Connolly, and Airey, were to remain as married hostages. Akbar undertook to take charge of the sick and wounded that might be left in Cabul after the English troops should depart. On the 6th of January the British set out upon their march.

Before giving an account of this march, it is necessary to refer to the events which were taking place in other parts of Affghanistan, while humiliation exhausted itself upon the army at Cabul.

The revolt against Shah Sujah appeared simultaneously in every part of his unexpectedly acquired dominions. In the middle of November, 1841, Major Pottinger, political agent in Kohistan, accompanied by Lieutenant Houghton, adjutant of the Goorkha

* A previous proposal to abandon all their cannon and artillery ammunition had at first been conceded, but ultimately was not agreed upon.

regiment in the shah's service, attended by a single soldier of his corps, entered Cabul, having been obliged to abandon his post, and make his way through incredible difficulties, hardships, and dangers to head-quarters. Lieutenant Rattray, Major Pottinger's assistant, had been murdered. In defending Chareker, the major was wounded, and the chief military officer, Captain Codrington, killed. During the defence, so scarce was water that for a considerable time only half a wine glass was allowed to each man, and at last even that could not be dispensed. The native troops began to desert from the garrison, and finally mutinied. The Affghans, assisted by the Mohammedans in the pay of the British, attempted to murder Lieutenant Houghton. Finally, Pottinger and Houghton retreated, leading out the dispirited garrison, who one by one dropped away by desertion or death, until only the soldier who entered Cabul with them remained.

There was a remarkable sameness exhibited in the retreats accomplished or attempted by the English in remote garrisons or outposts. Nearly all those places were imperfectly garrisoned, a fault common to the English in India. Captain White, in his political paper on the cause of another war—that with Birmah—made this pertinent remark:—"A very injudicious practice prevailed in India of posting small detachments to impede the movements of formidable armies, so far in advance from the head-quarters of the division as to preclude the possibility of their receiving timely reinforcement if attacked; a practice that from the train of evil consequences it has produced, loudly calls for the intervention of authority, as heedlessly and unnecessarily exposing the lives of the troops, and injurious to the interest of the service, by cutting up their forces in detail, damping the spirit of their men, and encouraging an enemy to advance from the prospect of an easy triumph." The habit of establishing weak, unconnected, and

unsupported outposts and garrisons, was exemplified by many instances from the war with Nepaul, by the same officer.

Dr. Grant fell a victim on the retreat of Major Pottinger from Kohistan. Lieutenants Maule and Whelan tried to maintain themselves in a fort, but were deserted by the sepoy and Affghans in the shah's service, and then barbarously murdered. Captain Woodburn proceeded with a detachment from Ghizni, hoping to reach Cabul. He was surprised, and the whole detachment cut off. It appears as if the very imminency of the danger, instead of inciting to vigilance, prevented it. When Sir Robert Sale made good his march from Cabul to Jellalabad, he left a considerable force at Gundamuck. The majority of the men deserted to the enemy, the remainder refused to hold the place, but consented to retire upon Jellalabad, whither their commander, Captain Burnes, succeeded in conducting them. He lost all his baggage and two guns, which the sepoy refused to defend. Another detachment of Sale's brigade was left at Pesh Boolak, to hold that post as long as possible, and when no longer able to do so, they were to retreat upon Jellalabad. This party consisted of Affghans and Hindoos in the shah's service, who refused to hold the position. The Hindoos began to desert, but the enemy put them to death, which circumstance prevented the desertion of the remainder. Captain Ferris cut his way through the enemy and arrived at Jellalabad, having lost all his stores and treasure, to the value of thirty-eight thousand rupees. His loss in personal property was also heavy. These instances of the dangers and heroism of the officers, and the dastardly conduct of the shah's forces, and of the natives in the British service, are specimens of the general aspect of affairs, while yet the Hon. General Elphinstone and his *alter ego*, Colonel Shelton, were conducting affairs at Cabul from one degree of shame and disaster to another.

CHAPTER CXIII.

RETREAT OF THE BRITISH FROM CABUL.—DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMY.

On the 6th of January the army of General Elphinstone departed from Cabul. The plains were deep in snow, and the magnificent mountain range presented to the eye vast piles of dazzling white, a scene the most singular and striking to Europeans. So penetrating was the cold that no clothing could

resist it. The Asiatics in the British army of course suffered most, more even than the women, wives and daughters of officers and soldiers, by whom the dispirited troops were accompanied. "The crowd," as Lieutenant Eyre calls this army, amounted to 4500 fighting men, 12,000 camp followers, and

many women and children. The author just quoted enumerates the strictly military portion of the retreating body as follows:—"One troop of horse artillery, 90; her majesty's 44th foot, 600; = 690 Europeans. 5th regiment of light cavalry, two squadrons, 260; 5th shah's irregular ditto (Anderson's), 500; Skinner's horse, one *ressala*, 70; 4th irregular ditto, one ditto, 70; mission escort, or body-guard, 70; = 970 cavalry. 5th native infantry, 700; 37th ditto, 600; 54th ditto, 650; 6th shah's infantry, 600; sappers and miners, 20; shah's ditto, 240; half the mountain-train, 30; = 2840. Total, 4500. Six horse-artillery guns; three mountain-train ditto."

At nine o'clock in the morning the advance left the cantonments, and until evening the throng continued to issue from their gates. The Affghans, like all Mohammedan peoples, faithless, fired upon the retiring force, killing Lieutenant Hardyman of the 5th light cavalry, and about fifty troopers, who endeavoured to cover the march. As soon as the British cleared the cantonments all order was lost; the incapacity of the commanders became more conspicuous than ever. The body they commanded ceased at once to be an army, and the whole became one confused mass of fugitives. The confusion could hardly be increased when night closed around the weary way of the dispirited host. The darkness was lessened by the glare from the cantonments and the British residency, whence arose a sheet of flame; the fanatics having set fire to the buildings. Many of the spoys and camp followers dropped down dead before the generals ordered a halt; many more perished before the morning's dawn.

The Affghan chiefs had calculated upon such results, and therefore delayed the execution of the convention which was supposed to ensure the British a safe retreat, until winter, so stern in those elevated regions, had thoroughly set in. When General Elphinstone halted his miserable followers, he had no plan for their encampment, and disorder intensified misery. The second day's march was more confused than the first, although even Generals Elphinstone and Shelton must have felt that upon the preservation of order rested safety. Sir Charles Napier's well known words of severe and just censure upon the management of British Indian armies on the march, were fatally exemplified in the manner in which the British general conducted his troops. One of the shah's regiments disappeared in the night, having either gone over to the enemy, or returned to Cabul in the hope of aiding Shah Sujah. Numerous small detachments of Affghans hung upon the flanks of the dejected corps. These were supposed to be the escort promised by the

chiefs, who had obtained the bills for fourteen lacs of rupees. This delusion was soon dispelled, for before the second day's disastrous march terminated, the rear-guard, almost the only semblance of order maintained by the generals, was attacked. The British force, upon which the duty of guarding the rear devolved, was composed of the 44th regiment, the mountain-guns, and a squadron of irregular horse. The guns were captured in the sudden and unexpected onset. The 44th regiment was ordered to retake them, but showing their usual cowardice, of which they betrayed no shame, they refused to advance. Lieutenant White, at the head of his brave artillerymen, advanced and spiked the guns in defiance of the efforts of the Affghans to prevent them. Lady Sale, in her Journal, describes this achievement as most heroically performed. Lieutenant Eyre has been accused of partiality in describing the bravery of the European artillerymen in contrast to the despicable conduct of the 44th; but Lady Sale, the wife of an infantry officer, could have no such motive, and her language is still stronger than that of the indignant artillery officer. The snow now became so heavy that the horses could not drag the guns through it, so that it was necessary to spike ten more.

It was discovered that Akbar Khan was with the enemy. Communications were opened with him, and an appeal made to the honour of that traitor and murderer to fulfil his engagement to escort the British safely. He replied that he had been sent from Cabul for that purpose; that the English, having marched before permission had been given, had occasioned the attack; that Sir Robert Sale had refused to deliver up Jellalabad according to the treaty between General Elphinstone and the chiefs of Cabul; that hostilities must be renewed unless that treaty were fulfilled, and six hostages surrendered to him to ensure the abandonment of Jellalabad by Sir Robert; and finally, that the British must not march beyond Tezeen, until Sir Robert Sale marched out of Jellalabad. It was agreed that the British should halt at Boothank until the following morning. Day had scarcely dawned when, without any attempt to continue the negotiation begun the previous evening, a fierce onslaught was made upon the rear-guard. Whether animated by despair, or that some unaccountable fit of bravery came upon them, the 44th, led by Major Thain, gallantly repulsed the attack.

The British entered the Pass of Boothank on the third day. This pass is five miles long, narrow, and the sides precipitous and very elevated. A stream poured through it, which fell from its lofty source with such extraor-

dinary rapidity that it was not frozen except at the edges, and where it had overflowed its banks sheets of smooth, clear ice rendered the passage of man and beast most difficult. So winding was this river, that travellers must cross it twenty-eight times in going through the pass. At the entrance from Cabul the defile was much wider than at any place between it and the opposite entrance, where the width of the ravine was narrowest. The heights were covered with fanatics. It is scarcely possible to conceive perils more imminent and a situation more afflicting than that which fell to the lot of those who had had so many opportunities of gaining victory and renown at Cabul; and when it was too late to obtain those advantages, had opportunities of dying nobly the soldier's death upon fields of not altogether hopeless combat. Onward marched the forlorn multitude. For a time the 44th royal regiment and the 54th native infantry maintained the duties of rear-guard, but when they began to suffer severely, they abandoned military order and ran towards the front, forcing their way forward as they could. How it was that the enemy did not fall sword in hand upon the whole host is scarcely conceivable; probably the fitful displays of animation on the part of the 44th may have deterred such a result. Three thousand of the fugitives were slain in the dreadful passage, and the survivors emerged from it wounded and woe-struck.

Horrible as were these disasters, worse awaited the forlorn host. When they reached Khoord-Cabul the cold became more intense, the country being more elevated; to this misery was added a fall of snow, rendering progress slower. There were no tents; no wood could be gathered to light fires, and the supply of food was already nearly exhausted. The camp remained that night unassailed. In the morning no efforts were made by the generals to restore order. Two hours before the time fixed for marching, the greater portion of the troops and nearly all the camp followers went on, setting the general orders at defiance. They were induced to halt by information that Akbar Khan had promised provisions, and requested General Elphinstone to halt, that arrangements might be made by the chief to draw off the Affghans from the line of march, except a force of his own to form an escort. The real object was to bring up his men, as they could not march so quickly through the hills as the fugitive British through the defiles. The whole of the British were against delay; they did not trust Akbar's promises; they had preferred flight to battle, and knew that the only remaining chance of safety was in making

that flight rapid. One more march would have brought them to a lower level of country, and free them from the snow. Yet the generals did halt. To adopt any course requiring promptitude or energy, even when it afforded the only hope of safety, was impossible to them. While the English halted, Akbar proposed that the ladies, children, and married officers should be surrendered to his protection, he promising faithfully that they should be escorted a day's march behind the retreating army. The generals complied with this demand, notwithstanding the astonishment expressed by the inferior officers. The surrender was made, and two wounded officers were added to the number of hostages, for such they really became. The provisions which he promised to send never came. Famishing with cold and hunger, the British again began their perilous march, until another night, with all its horrors, fell upon the footsore, bleeding, and beaten crowd. It was a terrible night, numbers dying from exhaustion, cold, hunger, and wounds. There had been experience, such as might have profited all, of the necessity of discipline, and the danger of disorder; but the soldiery and camp followers were not taught the lesson. The next morning saw the tumult and disorganization of former days, if possible, increased. All were terror struck; nearly all the Hindostanee soldiers and camp followers were frost-bitten. Akbar Khan's success in causing General Elphinstone to halt was fatal. This day's march brought the crisis. In a narrow gorge, between two precipitous hills, the enfeebled fugitives were attacked from the heights above with a destructive fire, until the gorge was nearly choked with the dying and the dead. The native infantry were here either slain, left wounded in the pass to be afterwards murdered or perish of cold, or throwing away their arms and accoutrements they fled, willing to serve the enemy, or hoping to find a hiding-place. When resistance seemed no longer possible, the enemy, bounding down the declivities, attacked the British, sword in hand; the whole of the baggage was captured, and with it the public treasure. Part of the advanced guard, or what might more appropriately be called the advanced portion of the crowd, emerged from the pass, and the officers with it succeeded in inducing a halt to cover the progress of the remainder. Stragglers reached them, some frightfully wounded, the remainder of the main body of the force had been cut to pieces. The force now mustered seventy men and officers of the 44th, a hundred and fifty native cavalry, fifty horse artillerymen, with one 12-pound howitzer: the camp followers still amounted to several hun-

dreds, exclusive of the wounded, and disabled by frost-bite. Akbar Khan proposed that the whole force should be disarmed and placed under his protection. For once General Elphinstone refused the insidious overtures of the murderer of Sir W. Mac Naghten. The progress of the force was resumed with somewhat more of order. Again a narrow pass lay in its line of march, and again the heights were covered with the marksmen of the enemy. Brigadier Shelton displayed some of his old brave spirit; he threw out skirmishers, made dispositions which were sensible, and such a demonstration of decision as deterred the Affghans from falling upon the British with the sword, and the force arrived, after some further casualties, in the Tezeen valley. Lieutenant Eyre describes these Affghan rifles as "the best marksmen in the world:" one can hardly credit such an opinion, when such a force as that commanded by General Elphinstone could march through a series of passes, of such a nature that a single British regiment, unless formed of men like the 44th, might have defended any of them against the march of fifty thousand men. In some places those passes were a mere gorge, in others the turns were sharp and sudden, so angular that before they were attained the towering rock appeared right before the advancing army, and on these crags the Affghans were perched or crouching with more or less cover, their long-range firearms pointed to the passage below. Were they marksmen of the ability for which Lieutenant Eyre gives them credit, not a man of General Elphinstone's army would have emerged from the first pass. The opinion here given of Lieutenant Eyre's estimate of the Affghan sharp-shooters is not unsupported. One who had abundant opportunity of observing them, says of similar attempts against the passage of General England's forces between Candahar and Ghizni, that they failed from deficient aim as well as deficient courage of the assailants:—"The enemy made no stand, rapidly retreating from hill to hill, and keeping so far out of range that with all their fire they but slightly wounded two of our people."* The same observer thus expresses himself on another occasion:—"It is difficult to credit all that one hears of the superior marksmanship of these people. I can imagine that well screened behind a rock with a rest for their piece and a fixed mark, they may hit at considerable distances; but when compelled to move as in following an enemy, or retreating from height to height, they appear to do very little execution, with a great expenditure of ammunition."

* Rev. J. N. Allen.

Had the British maintained order and military discipline on the march from Cabul to Tezeen, and had General Elphinstone distrusted Akbar Khan and shown any tolerable skill and spirit, the loss would not have been one-third what it was.

In the valley of Tezeen, Akbar again sought to induce the British to delay, or to surrender their arms and trust to his protection. The general this time refused all parley, and ordered the troops to move upon Jugdulluck, twenty-two miles distant. It was thought just possible that Sale might send or bring some succour thither. The wounded, those unable to walk, and the remaining gun, were abandoned in the valley, and the men went on more hopefully than hitherto on their desperate march. At seven o'clock in the evening they began to move, hoping to reach the proposed destination before day. It was morning when the advance reached Kuterrung, little more than half the distance. The camp followers, who formed a column between the advance and rear-guard, hesitated to go on when the fire of the Affghans was at all active, who were guided in the discharge of their pieces by the noise made by the retreat, as the darkness was too dense to admit of deliberate aim. Shelton, who brought up the rear-guard, was unable to get his men forward from the obstruction presented by the swaying to and fro of the centre column. The brigadier displayed great activity during this night, but all his exertions were fruitless as to quickening the march of the native "followers." Jugdulluck was reached in the evening, and Akbar Khan opened his usual negotiations, inducing a halt, and at the same time encircling the British by the fire of his infantry. Cowardice only prevented the Affghans from closing in upon their victims. Captain Bygrove, at the head of fifteen Europeans, crept up the acclivity of a hill which was crowned with ten times their number of enemies, who fled with craven speed. The issue of the conference was that Akbar Khan protested that the hostile attacks of the Affghans arose from the violation of the convention of Cabul by the British. Sir Robert Sale felt it to be his duty to disregard that treaty, especially as one of its articles was the surrender of Jellalabad. Akbar Khan considered that hostilities were justifiable so long as the stipulation that the British would evacuate Affghanistan remained unfulfilled. He now demanded that Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson should be surrendered as hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty of Cabul, so far as Jellalabad was concerned. *General Elphinstone accepted these terms!* The general was also invited to a conference to

settle the matter finally. The commander-in-chief gave the command, *pro tem.* to Brigadier Anquetil, and attended the proposed interview with the officers designated by Akbar for hostages. They were received with courtesy and hospitality, and were accommodated with tents for the night. The next morning conferences began between the British officers and a number of Affghan chiefs; Akbar Khan playing the part of mediator. Nothing decided was accomplished, and as the day advanced General Elphinstone prepared to return. He, however, soon found that his own despicable folly had made him, his second in command, and an intelligent and gallant officer, Captain Johnson, prisoners. The mode in which he placed himself in the power of an enemy whom he knew was likely just to act as he did, might give rise to the suspicion that he desired such a result to secure his own safety. Such an imputation has never been cast upon him, and it is fair to presume was never deserved, but the absolute absurdity of his conduct on any other supposition might well lead to such a surmise.

The British looked anxiously for the return of their generals, and the tidings of their negotiations. Major Thain and Captain Skinner rode some distance in the direction of Akbar's camp, in their anxiety to observe if any messenger were on the way; they were attacked, and Captain Skinner wounded mortally. It would surprise the reader that these officers should expose themselves to be waylaid and cut-off, when they saw that the Affghans observed no truce,—if any occurrence, however irrational, in connection with that army could create surprise, after its conduct on the morning of the first revolt at Cabul. Akbar gained fresh delay by these proceedings. Hunger, thirst, and cold, and the assassin fire of the foe, made an additional number of victims. Another day and night were wasted, and at last the little force moved on, in the hope that it might reach Jellalabad. After a short march, which the enemy had not anticipated, it was pursued by overwhelming numbers, every part of the country sending its tribe to participate in the slaughter of the infidels. The enemy still kept up a murderous fire, fearing, with all their numbers, a close combat with the British, or supposing that with less loss to themselves they might pick off the whole by a distant fire. A night made mournful by the expectation that it would prove their last, gave place to a day destined to prove the gloomy anticipation well-founded. Twelve officers, with what was left of the cavalry, rode on, as their delay could have afforded no protection to the infantry. There were a few other small parties

of mounted men. The infantry followed, but as they approached Gundamuck the smallness of their numbers was exposed by daylight. The enemy refused to negotiate; an appetite for the blood of the infidels raged in the bigoted Mussulmans. About twenty men and a few officers took up a position on a height. The Affghans ranged themselves on an opposite height, pouring matchlock volleys upon the crags where the few English were posted. These men, determined to sell their lives dearly, maintained a steady fire, beneath which most of the foremost Affghans fell. Several times the enemy charged these few British soldiers sword in hand, but were repulsed with signal slaughter. At last, one charge in overwhelming numbers completed the destruction of the British infantry. Some few, desperately wounded, escaped. Captain Souther was one of these. He tied the colours of his regiment round his waist, and thus preserved it. The enemy, however, preferred blood to banners—they were Mohammedans. The cavalry was on ahead, but the Affghans lined the way, and six fell dead under "the slugs" of the Affghan pieces on the way to Futtelabad, where the survivors arrived. The inhabitants received them with warm expressions of sympathy, and hospitably entertained them. Had these officers among the poor fugitives been taught in their youth the genius and spirit of the Mohammedan religion, they would have distrusted such manifestations of kindness. While the wanderers were partaking of the refreshments they so much required, their hosts armed themselves, rushed upon them, killed two of their number; the rest, with difficulty, and by dint of hard fighting, were enabled to remount and ride away. Their entertainers also took horse and pursued and cut down the whole party, except Dr. Brydon, who alone reached Jellalabad, like the last of Job's servants, escaping to tell the story of destruction.

While the events which have been described occurred at Cabul, at Jellalabad, and in the passes between those two places, very similar transactions were occurring in other parts of Shah Sujah's dominions. At Ghizni, Colonel Palmer, the British officer in command there, found himself in a situation quite desperate, from the pressure of the enemy on every side. Colonel Palmer wrote to General Elphinstone, at Cabul, and to Sir William Mac Naghten, for orders and counsel, but could obtain neither. Time was in this way consumed which could not be afterwards redeemed. Colonel Palmer relied upon the fidelity of the inhabitants, who, with Mohammedan falsehood and hypocrisy, pretended loyalty to Shah Sujah, and friendship to the

English. All the while they were in correspondence with their co-religionists outside, and suggesting a plan for gaining the latter admission to the city. This plot was successful; the British, taken by surprise, fought desperately, and after twenty-four hours of sanguinary struggle, were obliged to give up the city, and retire to the citadel, where they continued to bid defiance to the foe until the 1st of March, 1842, ten weeks after the town was lost. During that period the British endured, with uncommon hardihood, cold, hunger, and privations of every kind. Water at last failed. This decided the necessity of surrender. A command had also arrived from General Elphinstone to give up the place, in virtue of the treaty of Herat. It was arranged that the garrison should march out of the citadel in six days, that a certain portion of the city should be set apart for their residence until they were prepared to march, when they were to leave for India, with all their baggage, colours flying, and an escort of Affghan cavalry. The Affghan chiefs bound themselves, by an oath upon the Koran, to abide by these stipulations. The oath was of course violated the moment an opportunity presented itself; the blood of the infidel, more than possession of city or citadel, was desired by these fanatics. On the 6th of March the British left the citadel, and took up the quarters in the city assigned to them; on the 7th, when off their guard, they were attacked, not only by the multitude but by the guns of the citadel, under the direction of the chiefs. The commander of the citadel, Shumsodeen, a nephew of Dost Mohammed, offered to spare the officers on condition of their surrender to him, and giving up the sepoy to massacre. This was indignantly refused, and the attack continued till many officers and men fell. The sepoy, perceiving that all must eventually perish, resolved to steal away, and attempt to march upon Peshawur. They informed their officers of their intention, and wished them to accompany them, but expressed their resolution, with or without their officers, to attempt an escape. The officers in vain dissuaded the men, and as they knew the attempt must end in the destruction of all, they surrendered themselves to Shumsodeen Khan. The sepoy cleverly made their way through a hole in the outer wall of the town. They had not gone far when a heavy fall of snow puzzled them as to their route. The Affghans were soon in pursuit, and the unfortunate fugitives were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. It is not likely that had their officers accompanied them, better fortune would have attended the retreat. Whether their officers were bound in honour to have

gone with them, is a point in military casuistry not so easily decided. If the officers believed, as appears to have been the case, that whatever hope existed was in connection with a defence of the quarter of the town they occupied, and that to retire from it was to incur certain destruction, which the sepoy were resolved to risk, then it is evident that the gentlemen in command of the force adopted the only course open to them. The captive officers were treated with barbarity, and barely escaped being murdered.

The fall of Ghizni produced a moral effect to the disadvantage of the British, which was felt all over Affghanistan. Colonel Palmer behaved with skill and spirit when obliged to stand on his defence, but he did not possess the general intellectual qualities necessary for the post he occupied, however, as a military man, he was worthy of confidence, and in the hour of emergency acquitted himself with honour and discretion. He was outwitted as easily as Elphinstone and his coadjutors, and reposed trust in the Mohammedan chiefs and people, which an acquaintance with the history of the Mohammedan imposture, and its effects upon the minds of men, would have forbidden.

Candahar, like Jellalabad, held out. General Nott commanded the garrison, and he was a man of the Sir Robert Sale type. There were some follies perpetrated at Candahar, but they were political, not military. When the insurrection broke out, an attempt was made to bribe the chiefs. They took a lac of rupees among them, and continued quiet as long as they received money. As soon as the instalments of the stipulated amount were exhausted, they commenced hostilities. Among the men who so acted, was a nephew of the reigning monarch, for whom the English had expended and suffered so much. Part of the troops ordered to return to India by Lord Auckland, belonged to the garrison of Candahar, and consisted of Colonel Maclaren's brigade. This body was proceeding on its homeward route, when it heard of the destruction of Captain Woodburn and his troops on their way from Ghizni to Cabul. This led them to halt; and they were soon after ordered to return to Candahar. Had they proceeded, they must in great part have perished, and the residuary garrison of Candahar could not have been saved by even the genius of Nott. General Elphinstone ordered Nott to send him assistance. This order came too late; the way was covered with snow. Nott, however, ordered Maclaren to conduct his brigade thither if possible. Fortunately for the garrison of Candahar, and, perhaps, unfortunately for that of Cabul, he did not succeed. The physical

obstacles were insurmountable. When Akbar Khan had destroyed the garrison of Cabul on their dreary and bloody march, he collected an immense force, with the object of accomplishing the same success at Candahar. As has been already shown, he received from the indomitable Sir Robert Sale signal defeat at Jellalabad. Akbar, with indefatigable activity and diligence, appeared with his forces before Candahar, and selected a position near to the town, protected by a morass along his front. Nott determined to lose no time in giving him battle, and, on the 12th of January, marched out with all his army, except the troops left to guard the cantonments. The enemy delivered a rapid and heavy matchlock fire, and fled as the British prepared to charge, without encountering a single bayonet. The flight was so eager that pursuit was ineffectual. The moral effect of that battle, like that of the battles fought by Sale, was to deter the Affghans from a near approach to the place, and to awe the inhabitants of the whole district.

In the midst of these triumphs and reverses of the British arms, the man whose unfaithful selection of a general led to the disasters endured, left India for England, where he incurred the censures of the British public, and severe attacks from the parliamentary party opposed to his own; but partizan support brought him through, and he was loaded with panegyric by the Whigs, as if he had proved himself a public benefactor, and a dispenser of patronage on principles of the sternest justice.

The successor of Lord Auckland was Lord

Ellenborough, who arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February, 1842, when the government there was in consternation, and the British throughout all India filled with shame and grief for the ruin which the Auckland policy had inflicted. Whatever the merits of Lord Ellenborough, as ultimately proved, he was not selected to his high post on account of them, but just as his predecessor was selected, to answer a party object at home. Lord Auckland was a mere aristocratic whig nominee; Lord Ellenborough a mere tory nominee. Lord Ellenborough arrived, however, in the midst of appalling difficulties, and set about the discharge of his onerous and trying duties with zeal, courage, activity, and great energy. His appointment excited intense popular dissatisfaction in England, but he displayed qualities for which the English public had given him no credit; although mingled with a certain rashness his supposed possession of which had caused anxiety on his account amongst his friends and his party, and anxiety for the welfare of India and the empire among the English public.

Lord Auckland remained until the 12th of March, to offer (it was said) his counsel in the great emergency, and to assist in completing those arrangements which he and his friends hoped would redeem the faults and misfortunes of the Affghan war. Lord Ellenborough pressed forward, with characteristic vigour, the means taken to restore British authority, and wipe away the stain from the escutcheon of England which Lord Auckland's policy caused it to receive.

CHAPTER CXIV.

SECOND INVASION OF AFFGHANISTAN BY THE BRITISH—GENERAL POLLOCK ADVANCES FROM JELLALABAD TO CABUL—GENERAL ENGLAND MARCHES FROM QUETTAH TO CANDAHAR.

As soon as the real situation of affairs in Affghanistan was known in India, efforts were made to bring back safely the troops that yet remained. Two separate armies were organized. One of these was placed under General Lumley, of which General Pollock afterwards took the command. This was destined to march from Peshawur to Jellalabad, and thence, having formed a junction with the brigade of Sir Robert Sale, to return to Peshawur, possibly to march upon Cabul. The other force was collected in Scinde under General England, and ordered to advance as far beyond Quettah as would ensnare to General Nott a safe retreat from Candahar. These arrangements were

made by Lord Auckland. His appointments were severely criticised, Major-general Lumley was known to be in ill health. It was reported that Major-general Pollock was far from well. Murmurs were heard that men of merit, and entitled by their military position to confidence and a command, were overlooked, and that favouritism ruled as certainly if not as disastrously as when General Elphinstone was sent on his abortive errand to Cabul.

The season was severe, and the difficulty of marching a large force through the passes and to the relief of isolated posts was immense. The enemy had command of all the communications, and it was likely that what-

ever the troops consumed, would have to be brought with them from India. As soon as General Elphinstone's distress at Cabul was known, a brigade consisting of four regiments of native infantry was collected at Peshawur, and placed under the command of Colonel Wylde. A Sikh infantry brigade was attached to this, with a considerable force of Sikh artillery. Colonel Wylde, placing himself at the head of this division, marched from Peshawur, and attempted to force the celebrated Khyber Pass. The Sikhs refused to go forward as soon as any obstacle arose; the sepoys only required an example to fail in their duty. The camp followers and camel drivers deserted or were cut down by the enemy. Neither Sikhs nor sepoys would defend the baggage, which was to a great extent plundered by the enemy, and finally Colonel Wylde was obliged to make an inglorious retreat. It was the fashion at that time in India to laud the sepoys to the skies; hence a proper proportion of European troops was not attached to divisions and separate commands. The good conduct of the sepoys on some occasions, and, as in the case of the 44th, the indifferent conduct occasionally of European troops, conduced to hold up the delusion. Such a force as Colonel Wylde commanded was utterly unfit to cope with the real dangers and superstitious fears connected with the Khyber Pass. An attempt was made to relieve the isolated fort of Ali Musjid, but it failed, and the place was abandoned.

Soon after these occurrences fresh troops were sent forward. Colonel Wylde's failure occurred at the beginning of January, 1842. "Early in that month a reinforcement, consisting of her majesty's 9th foot and 10th light cavalry, a regiment of native infantry, and a detachment from another, together with details of artillery and irregular cavalry, crossed the Sulej on its way to Peshawur. Subsequently the force assembled there was strengthened by the dispatch of her majesty's 3rd dragoons and 31st foot, the 1st regiment of light cavalry, two regiments of native infantry, some recruits for her majesty's 13th, and some details of irregular cavalry artillery." General Pollock, on his arrival at Peshawur, found the whole of Wylde's division utterly demoralised. Many of the men were in hospital from an epidemic contracted during their late campaign. Neither sepoy nor Sikh concealed his unwillingness to advance into the Khyber Pass. The general, under these circumstances, resolved to wait for reinforcements, and succeeded in opening communications with Sale. The plan which had failed everywhere else was tried at Peshawur, that of buying over the chiefs. They accepted

the money, swore upon the Koran eternal fidelity, and immediately broke their oaths. They kept no faith with "Feringhies." General Pollock does not appear to have had much confidence in the native portion of his troops, nor did he show himself eager to risk his force in order to ensure the relief of Sale, who, although he had beaten off his enemies, was suffering from want of food. It was not until the 5th of April that Pollock moved, and then it was at the head of a force so large that no doubt as to the issue could exist, and no peril was incurred. On approaching the Khyber Pass, the general found that a far larger force of Affghans had been collected than had before disputed the passage. The painfully protracted delay had also emboldened them. They had raised some rude works in situations advantageously selected, and breast-works, roughly but not unskilfully formed, had been constructed in commanding positions. Pollock's dispositions were such as might be expected under the circumstances. He sent out two flanking columns to scale the heights and dispossess them of the enemy, while his main column advanced to the mouth of the pass. Each of the flanking columns was separated into two detachments. The right, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Taylor, 9th foot, and Major Anderson, 64th native infantry; the left, under Lieutenant-colonel Mosley of the 64th native infantry, and Major Heriet of the 26th native infantry. As soon as these operations had begun, a large body of the enemy moved to the rear of the British, supposing that the baggage would be left imperfectly protected, and intending to make a swoop upon it, and possibly succeed in also carrying off treasure. Brigadier McCaskill, who commanded the rear-guard, had, however, made such dispositions of his force that not a package was lost nor a pack animal wounded.

The flanking columns cleared the heights gallantly, the enemy maintaining a desultory and distant fire. Many men and officers suffered from fatigue, few from the fire of the Affghans; our sepoys delivered theirs with better effect when in motion, or when halting only while firing, than the Affghans, who, notwithstanding their celerity of movement among rocks, were not quick enough to escape the bullets of their pursuers. General Pollock received little opposition after so decisively forcing the entrance to the pass, and in ten days he arrived at Jellalabad.* Parties of Affghans kept hovering in observation along the route, and, trusting to their swiftness of foot, often approached and delivered a fire from their matchlocks, or waited behind rocks

* Blue-books.

until a detachment passed, and then fired and fled. Great numbers paid for their temerity in thus acting; the European skirmishers brought them down as they fled, and the light pieces of the horse artillery showered grape amongst the rocks. It was not until long afterwards that the English learned how sure and deadly their fire thus proved; they supposed that as that of the enemy proved so innoxious, the inequalities of the ground, and the novel description of practice, caused their own to be nearly as harmless.

When General Pollock arrived at Jellalabad, great was the joy of the garrison, and of the illustrious officers who had achieved such heroic exploits. The question then arose what course General Pollock should take; whether he should return with Sale's brigade to Peshawur and remain there, his troops acting as an army of observation, as Lord Auckland had in the first instance directed, or adopt the bolder policy of Lord Ellenborough, with which the general's own views agreed. Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief, had concurred in the views of Lord Auckland; he now supported the more vigorous ideas of Lord Ellenborough.

On the 15th of March the governor-general, in council, thus addressed Sir Jasper Nicolls:—"The commander of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the government of India. They will in the first instance endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief in any case without reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the government they serve. To effect the relief of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can probably only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in or may come into our possession; and with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghizni,* it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-general Pollock effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul. We are fully sensible of

* The fall of this place was not then known.

the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabul, the scene of our great disaster, and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds on which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance, and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-general Pollock, unless that general should be satisfied that he can—without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed—feel assured that he can by his own strength overawe and overcome all who dispute the pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus."

The opinion of General Pollock as to the policy of his advance from Peshawur was thus expressed:—"If I were to advance with the intention of merely withdrawing the garrison of Jellalabad, my success in advancing must chiefly depend on concealing my intentions; for, although (if I succeed in any negotiation to open the pass) every precaution will be taken by me to secure a retreat, I must expect that every man will rise to molest our return, as they would be left to the mercy of the Affghan rulers; and I must confess I sincerely believe that our return here, unless I have first an opportunity of inflicting some signal punishment on the enemy, would have a very bad effect both far and near.*"

On the 29th of April, Sir Jasper Nicolls, by the direction of the governor-general, forwarded instructions to General Pollock to withdraw from his advanced position to Peshawur. The views of the government of India were materially modified as to the necessity and importance of this second expedition to Affghanistan, by the death of the sovereign, Shah Sujah, who was murdered at Cabul by fanatics. Matters now assumed this aspect in the councils of the English. Lord Ellenborough, at first vigorous and lofty in his ideas of the necessity of redeeming British honour, gradually lowered his tone until it sunk to the level of that of Lord Auckland.

* Letter to Lieutenant-colonel Laard, February 27th, 1842.

He, and the council of India, were for the rapid withdrawal of Nott and Pollock, the former to Scinde, the latter to Peshawur. Some misgiving as to the propriety of a retrograde movement while so many English officers, and especially so many English ladies, were captives in the hands of Akbar Khan, pervades the correspondence of the governor-general with the commander-in-chief in India, and the secret committee in London; yet the ease with which the safety of these individuals seems to be given up in view of the general interest is not encouraging to the spirit of self-sacrifice on the part of individual Englishmen for their country. Sir Jasper Nicolls, Generals Pollock, Nott, and England, all showed a more manly and generous feeling, as well as a nobler jealousy for their country's honour. Both General Pollock and General Nott urged remonstrance after remonstrance, and, for a time, in vain. "A craven spirit," as General Nott called it, seemed to take possession of the civil authorities. In a letter to Mr. Maddock, at the end of March, 1842, General Nott urged upon that official that the government would review its whole position in Afghanistan before a retrograde movement should be irrecoverably made, and "the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have upon the whole of Beloochistan, and even in the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to ensure; and in what other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?" In a subsequent letter, General Nott says, "Perhaps it is not within my province to observe, that, in my humble opinion, an unnecessary alarm has been created regarding the position of our troops in this country, and of the strength and power of the enemy we have to contend with. This enemy cannot face our troops in the field with any chance of success, however superior they may be in numbers, provided those precautions are strictly observed which war between a small body of disciplined soldiers and a vast crowd of untrained, unorganized, and half-civilized people constantly renders necessary. True, the British troops suffered a dreadful disaster at Cabul; and it is not for me to presume to point out why this happened,

however evident I may conceive the reasons, and the long train of military events which led to the sad catastrophe."*

On the 14th of May, Lord Ellenborough, in a despatch to Sir Jasper Nicolls, yields to the wish of the generals so far as to direct that the posts of Jellalabad and Candahar should be held by Pollock and Nott for some time. This temporising on the part of the Indian government caused much precious time to be squandered which the generals were eager profitably to employ. In India Lord Ellenborough received the credit of leaning to the decisive policy of the generals, and the more timid policy was attributed to the civilians of the supreme council. Sir Jasper Nicolls, at last, in a more decisive tone, declared that neither Pollock nor Nott could with propriety or convenience withdraw until the autumn was very far advanced. The reasons given by Sir Jasper for this opinion were not so solid as the opinion itself. At all events, the governor-general allowed the decision of the officer who held the chief military responsibility to stand, and he immediately proceeded to collect an army of reserve in such a position that it could either reinforce Pollock or Nott, as might be required, and at the same time by its movements deceive the Affghans as to the general intentions of the government. The Affghan chiefs, although not very well served by their spies, were not altogether ignorant of the councils which prevailed at Calcutta. His excellency knew this, and was less in expectation of misleading the Affghans than of "overawing the states of India." This was necessary, as the military prestige of England was lowered over all Asia. The Sikhs openly expressed their contempt, and hinted that a Sikh and Affghan alliance could expel the English from India. The plans of General Pollock and General Nott were clear, precise, bold, and consistent: Lord Ellenborough wavered as a tree shaken by the wind. At the end of May he was once more in favour of General Pollock retiring from Jellalabad, fixing his head-quarters at Peshawur, and keeping open the Khyber Pass. Nott was also to give up Candahar. On the first of June his excellency sent a despatch to General Pollock, which recommended both retirement and action. His lordship's mind was tossed to and fro like a ship upon an agitated sea. He wrote so many despatches so little consistent with others of nearly the same date, or reiterating almost in the same terms directions previously given, that he seemed to be moved by an intense propensity for rash and inconsiderate letter-writing. His

* Letter to Mr. Maddock, April 18, 1842.

despatches were those of a restless mind, anxious to direct and govern, but with little judgment.* Had his political opponents in England made themselves familiar with his excellency's epistolary efforts at that period, they would have had abundant material for attack, both upon him and those who nominated him to the high and onerous office he held.

General Pollock continued to entreat permission to advance upon Cabul, declaring that he did not believe there was a single soul to obstruct his march between that place and his camp. The governor-general's letters continued embarrassing, and fruitless delay was created. The British nation suffered bitterly from the incapacity of those to whom affairs were entrusted by her governments. Men arose who had the capacity to redeem her honour, but they arose unexpectedly, by the force of circumstances, and, in a great measure, in spite of a system which repressed genius and fostered patronage, connection, and routine. General Pollock had upon his staff one officer who even then had the attainments and capacity of a great general. It has been related how Captain Havelock was transferred from the staff of the Hon. General Elphinstone to that of Sir Robert Sale. The latter general strongly recommended General Pollock to accept the services of that officer, bearing a strong testimony to his invaluable aid during the march to Jellalabad, the defence of that place, and in the pitched battles with Akbar Khan. General Pollock yielded to this suggestion. Havelock, breveted to a majority, and made a Companion of the Bath, was transferred to the personal staff of General Pollock. The opinions of the general were much influenced by the decision and experience of Havelock, who considered the advance upon Cabul as the only true line of policy. "General Pollock † marched from Jellalabad on the 20th of August, 1842. Lord Ellenborough, ‡ on the 4th of July, 1842, wrote to Major-general Nott, as well as to General Pollock, granting permission to the advance upon Cabul; General Pollock from Jellalabad, by the passes, up to the capital; and General Nott, proceeding from Candahar, *via* Ghizni, to Cabul. General Pollock reached Gundamuck § on the 23rd of August, and hearing of the enemy being at Mammockhail, two miles distant, attacked them next morning."

Brigadiers M'Caskil and Tulloch, Lieutenant-colonel Taylor of the 9th foot, and

Captain Broadfoot, here distinguished themselves. The enemy gave way as fast as attacked, but their strong position enabled them to inflict some loss. Four officers were wounded, and fifty men put *hors de combat*. General Pollock marched from Gundamuck on the 7th of September,* after a halt of a fortnight, during which arrangements were made to keep open his communications and establish depots of supplies. Next day † the general moved through the Pass of Jugdul-luck. Here opposition was offered from good positions on the heights. The enemy were quickly dislodged, and with loss; the British had only one man slain, an officer, and sixty-five wounded, among whom was an officer. The British officers on this occasion, as during the whole route of the advance, showed a too forward valour. Indeed, throughout the whole Affghan war, the regimental officers covered themselves with unfading glory; more than Roman virtue shone in their daring and devotion.

On the 11th of September General Pollock reached Tezeen valley, memorable in the retreat of Elphinstone's army from Cabul. While resting his army on the 12th, his pickets were attacked with boldness in the evening; Lieutenant-colonel Taylor showed personal valour and good officership in repulsing the enemy. Nevertheless such was their audacity, that through the night successive although unsuccessful attacks were kept up against the whole line of pickets, especially those on the extreme left. It was evident from these bold measures that the Tezeen Pass would be disputed. On entering it next day its heights were observed to be crowned by sixteen thousand men, under the command of Akbar Khan. His force, however, did not offer a resistance in proportion to its numbers; the English marched through the pass and encamped at Khoord-Cabul, having incurred a loss of 162 men killed and wounded, exclusive of four wounded officers. The enemy disheartened did not fire another shot, and on the 16th of September General Pollock arrived in triumph at Cabul. Great was the consternation of the people of the city and province as the fine army, under the command of General Pollock, advanced upon the capital, and the general expectation was that all Affghans caught by the troops would be put to death. On the morning of the 16th Pollock entered the Balla-Hissar, and planted there the English standard, the bands playing the British national anthem, the guns firing a salute, and the cheers of the soldiery rising

* See Blue-book.

† Blue-book, p. 372.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 327, 329. Letters, 404, 405.

§ Blue-book, p. 374.

* Blue-book, p. 383.

† *Ibid.*, p. 385.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

with triumphant vehemence, as if they would rend the heavens.

Having thus traced the progress of the army from Peshawur, it is necessary to turn to that at Candahar, and to the army of General England, which was ordered to march to its relief; but the further relation of events connected with Upper Afghanistan, where General Nott and his officers continued to maintain their ground, must form a separate chapter.

General England was ordered to proceed from Scinde to cover Nott's retreat, at the head of a body of troops far too small for the performance of such a duty. When the General reached Quetta, and was reinforced, his whole division did not reach three thousand men, and with these his task was to proceed through the most formidable passes, crowned with numerous enemies acquainted with every rock and ravine. General England has always been acknowledged, by those competent to judge, as one of the most skilful officers in the service. He was not a flashy and showy general, but active, energetic, brave, and vigilant; he possessed the qualities which fit a man to have the charge of soldiers. Reckless of his own safety, this general carried to the verge of excess his care and concern for the safety of his men. During the Crimean war he rendered very important services. At the battle of the Alma he not only sent up the guns of his division to assist the 2nd division, under the intrepid Sir De Lacy Evans, but he accompanied them, exposing himself in the thickest of the fire when his own division, which was in support, was not then brought into action. At Inkerman he contributed much to the success of the day by the prudent movement of a portion of his division from their own post to that against which the enemy was directing its attack. He personally joined that part of his division, having made skilful provision for the defence of his own particular post.

The situation in which General England was placed at Quetta was one of intense difficulty and deep anxiety; reinforcements were promised, but they arrived too slowly to enable the general to accomplish his purpose as opportunely as he desired. While awaiting his reinforcements at the place last named, finding forage scarce, he determined to proceed to Killa-ab-Doolah, in the valley of Peshawur, where it was plentiful. He set out on the 24th of March, 1842, and soon found that he was watched by the enemy's horse. The 3rd light cavalry cleared the country of these scouts, killing, wounding, and capturing some. On entering the defile leading to the village of Hykulzie, a powerful Afghan force,

under Mohammed Sadiz, was strongly posted. General England had obtained no information of the strength of the enemy. The officer whose duty it was to afford it, as a political agent, could obtain none, the people on the line of march concealing all knowledge of that kind, although making every demonstration of friendship. The general naturally believed that the force opposed to him was small; it was however very numerous, but hidden by a series of breastworks, a ditch, and abattis. General England ordered the advance, consisting of four light companies under Major Apthorp, to clear the lower hill. This party was opposed by overwhelming numbers; Captain May, who commanded the light company of the 41st regiment of the royal line, was shot through the heart while gallantly leading on his men. Major Apthorp was mortally wounded. While the advanced companies were maintaining an unequal contest it was impossible to support them, as the main column was charged by crowds of cavalry, who were bravely repulsed, leaving numerous men and horses dead. General England with great skill brought off the whole of his baggage without losing any portion. On the return to Quetta, Major Apthorp died. Besides the two officers who fell, there were twenty-six men killed; the wounded were sixty-nine. General England, perceiving that the enemy was in such strength in his neighbourhood, concentrated the small body of men at his command in Quetta and its cantonments; defences were thrown up, and the place was judiciously strengthened. The general in this position awaited the promised reinforcements. The narrow space which the division occupied tended to create sickness, but the arrangements of the general showed much sanitary skill, and preserved the health of the troops. Instances, however, occurred with increasing rapidity and virulence of fever and dysentery; erysipelas set in where wounds had been received in a considerable proportion of cases.

On the 23rd of April, an order was received by General England to join General Nott, at Candahar. The proceedings of the former officer since the commencement of the troubles may be thus briefly summed up:—The news of the Cabul tragedy reached General England, then in command of the Scinde field force, at Dadur (the lower end of the Kojuck), about the end of November or beginning of December, 1841. Towards the middle of January the news of the murder of Mac Naghten, by Akbar Khan, and other distressing intelligence, arrived. It was reported that the insurrection had spread towards Candahar, and that some local levies had deserted from

the service, killing their English officers, and that Affghan chiefs were gathering round the city, and placing it in a state of blockade. In March, General England, anxiously pressing on in the direction of General Nott (who was beleaguered at Candahar), reached Quettah at the upper extremity of the Bolan. On the 25th of March he marched forward from thence, and on the 28th unsuccessfully attacked the strong position at Hykulzie, and, retreating from thence, re-entered Quettah. General Nott had been previous to this, very importunate for assistance, and made various requisitions to General England, with which the latter had no means of complying. Thus, on the 14th of February he sent for cavalry, but at that time there was only half a regiment of Bombay horse and some irregulars in all Scinde, hardly sufficient to keep open communications. The government contemplated merely the falling back of Nott from Candahar, and the advance of General England to the Quettah side of the Kojuck Pass, to create a diversion in his favour, and form a point of support upon which General Nott might retire. On the 11th of March Major Rawlinson, who was then with Nott at Candahar, wrote, "I rather think he will recommend that Brigadier England should come on *with his half force* to Killabola *at once*, and wait there until the whole force has concentrated, when he can push over the Kojuck, and advance to Candahar." If such were the expectations of General Nott, they were at least as rash as they were bold, and much more rash than reasonable. The condition of General Nott naturally induced expectations that he would not have cherished had he known the means at General England's disposal, and the opinions of the government. On April 2nd, General Nott wrote to General England:—"I know not what the intentions of government are, but this I know and feel, that it is now four or five months since the outbreak of Cabul, and in all that time no aid whatever has been given to me." "I have continually called for cavalry, for ammunition, treasure, stores, and medicine for the sick. I have called loudly, but I have called in vain."*

It has been shown on preceding pages, that neither Lord Auckland, Lord Ellenborough, nor the council at Calcutta, were favourable to any advance from Jellalabad or Candahar to Cabul, and that at last Lord Ellenborough tolerated it, moved by the advice of Sir Jasper Nicolls, and the remonstrances of Nott and Pollock. Nott, however, had not the same opportunities as Pollock had of knowing the tone of feeling at Calcutta. General England

was well aware that the government was adverse to any attempt at a march from Candahar to Cabul, although the political agents at Candahar and in Scinde showed the desire felt by Nott for advancing.

The passage of General England on the 28th, triumphantly, through the scene of his former reverse, was a great gratification to the army. On both occasions he was encumbered with an enormous mass of baggage, containing every requisite for Nott's army. The advance of General England was not, as it has generally been regarded, the march of an army, but of a vast convoy, which the whole of his force was not more than sufficient to protect, for the Affghans were determined if possible to capture his baggage. On approaching the place of his former unsuccessful contest, General England found the enemy occupying similar positions, which he gallantly stormed. Sir Charles Napier, commenting upon both attempts on this pass, says: "England beat the same enemy with the same troops."* He also records in his journal this censure: "General England has again fought on the same ground. Taking due precautions, he won the heights—a clear proof of former negligence."† It was not correct of the eccentric and dashing Sir Charles Napier thus to write. England *did not* "beat the same enemy with the same troops." He was reinforced. Sir Charles was a thousand miles off, and, as he admits himself, recorded his opinions on hearsay evidence. A comparison of the force of General England on each occasion reproves the rash assertions of Sir Charles. On the 25th of March, England moved forward from Quettah, having 2,500 animals, &c., and a guard consisting of about thirty Bombay cavalry, five weak companies of her majesty's 41st regiment, four six-pounders of Bombay horse-artillery, and six small companies of sepoy, with perhaps fifty Poonah horse, in all about a thousand men. Sir Charles represented General England as having attacked the enemy in March with half his force, leaving the other half with the baggage. This also was an error. The troops which England did not bring up in support and into action, consisted of about four hundred sepoy, who protected the rich and vast convoy which it was now evident the Affghans watched and reckoned on with avidity; and when Sir Charles Napier disapprovingly says, "he did not bring the whole into action, and that if he had done so he would have won," Sir Charles was not aware how slender Sir Richard England's resources

* *Memoir of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Napier.*
By Lieutenant-general Sir William Napier, vol. ii. p. 222.

† *Memoir*, vol. ii. p. 172.

* *Storqueler's Life of General Nott*, vol. ii. p. 14.

were, for it is perfectly evident that Napier thought that England had with him *the very same troops on this first and unsuccessful occasion*, which were triumphant upon the *second* occasion at Hykulzie. The reinforcements received by England enabled him to make the following arrangement for the attack (a disposition impossible on the former occasion, owing to his then slender resources): viz., three columns were formed, each having Europeans at their head, and a reserve under the command of Major Brown, of her majesty's 41st regiment; the troops that were to threaten the right of the enemy marched first, having the greater space of ground to traverse; the rest were kept back till this flank attack had actually begun under Major Simmons, his musketry being the signal for the two other columns to branch off towards the enemy. The casual practice of Leslie's light guns covered these movements. A position was taken up by two small squadrons of the 3rd Bombay cavalry, ready to take the earliest account of the enemy, if he should condescend to fly. The enemy held his ground for awhile, but, finding his rear in danger, by the attack on his right flank, he gave way. Bold and vigorous in a direct resistance, he now quailed and became instantly alarmed, by this sidelong movement, and saved himself, with the loss of sixty or seventy men, by a precipitate flight to the inaccessible recesses of the mountains. This is one of the operations which, in the December following, Sir Charles Napier declares "place the major-general in a high position." To pass the Kojuck with troops and a baggage-train, was not an easy operation under any circumstances. General Lord Keane thus writes to General England relative to this passage:—"Buslan Lodge, Hants. July 17th, 1842. Most heartily do I congratulate you on walking over the heights of Hykulzie and through the Kojuck Pass. I know the ground well, and found it a difficult job to pass the army of the Indus, even without an enemy to defend it." On the 2nd of December following, Sir Charles Napier emphatically endorses the opinions of the highest authorities in India, *that this identical affair at Hykulzie*, as well as various other military operations, "place the major-general (England) in a position in which he may treat with just disregard and contempt all reflections thrown upon his military character." Concerning the ability of General England on this occasion, and generally, Sir Charles happily did justice in his private letters and official communications, but the publication by Sir William Napier of the notes in the journal of Sir Charles, just as they were entered, causes that eminent man to appear

harsh in his judgments of General England. The latest opinions of Sir Charles furnish the best evidence of his matured judgment; and on the 6th of October, 1842, he wrote to General England thus:—"You have your troops well in hand, and the interference of a superior officer (alluding to himself) would be injurious to the public service," &c. In another letter of Sir Charles to General England, he says, "I am so pressed for time that I must delay writing on one or two points upon which *I wanted your advice.*"

General England's passage through Kojuck Pass was with little loss. At Hykulzie, Lieutenant Ashbourne, of the 3rd light cavalry, was severely wounded; six natives also received wounds, some of which were dangerous. General Nott, in order to facilitate the advance of England, sent Brigadier-general Wymer to the entrance of the Kojuck Pass, on the Candahar side. Of this General England received intelligence on the 1st of May, while the army was encamped in attendance upon divine worship. This intelligence inspired a sense of security among the troops, for it was generally apprehended that the pass would be disputed before the army emerged from it. These apprehensions had received confirmation from the appearance of cavalry on some points where that description of force could be collected, and from the dropping shots taken by the Affghans from their long-range rifles, to which our muskets could not reply, not carrying so far. Flanking parties had to be thrown out during the march, which inflicted little mischief upon the enemy, who fled from hill to hill as the flashes approached. The British suffered from a few shots only, but many fell from fatigue each day, and could only be brought on afterwards in the "dhoolies."

A clergyman, who accompanied General England's army, gives the following picture of the pass, and relation of the meeting of England and Wymer:—"The pass was exceedingly pretty, having a great deal more verdure on the hills than I had seen anywhere in Scinde. There were many fine trees, and their fresh green foliage, with the bold forms of the rocky heights beyond, and the green turf in the foreground, strongly reminded me of some parts of the north of England, though on a much larger scale. As we proceeded, the hills approached each other, and the path narrowed, until the camels began to get jammed into a dense mass, and seeing little prospect of a passage for some time, I sat down under the cool shade of a high rock, and made a very comfortable breakfast on cold beef and hard-boiled eggs. I then contrived to wind my way through strings and strings

of camels, till I came in sight of the steep ascent of the pass. Here I saw the heights in front crowned by troops, which, from the distance, could not be ours. I soon ascertained that they were a part of Brigadier Wymer's force, which had been sent to meet us from Candahar, and in securing those heights in the morning, their work had been much sharper than ours. They had two men killed and some wounded, and had killed about twenty-five of the enemy."

General England from thence advanced, and, on the 10th of May, encamped under the walls of Candahar, and delivered within its gate money, horses, equipments, &c., of which that garrison had long stood in need. The train of baggage included upwards of 3,000 camels, besides pack bullocks, donkeys, ponies, horses, &c. On arriving at Canhahar, General England's army found quarters prepared for them, General Nott having prudently expelled all the armed inhabitants. The following description of the scenes which followed the junction of the two armies is interesting:— "Our arrival was hailed with great delight, as we brought with us several camel loads of letters and newspapers, the garrison having been entirely cut off from communication during the whole winter up to the period of our arrival, an accumulation of all their letters during that period having taken place at Quettah, between which and Candahar only the smallest notes could pass, conveyed by Cossids at the hazard of their lives, many of whom were sacrificed. The garrison had been subjected to great privations; the expense of feeding their cattle was enormous; and the price of every article that could be procured

for money extravagant. They had been again and again employed in the field, and that without tents, in the depth of winter. I am persuaded that their privations and exploits were by no means fully appreciated, for owing to the exceeding brevity of General Nott's despatches, they had not the advantage of having them made known to the world." General Nott, although a good officer and a good general, was stern, not affluent in bestowing generous praise on others, not sparing in censure upon those who differed from him in opinion, or thwarted his views. Stocqueler, who in his life of this eminent soldier, disparages those who in any way came into comparison with him, so passes over his faults as to appear guilty of the *suppressio veri*, and is so eager to arrogate all merit to his hero, as scarcely to escape the *suggestio falsi*. Between Nott and England their sprung up a coolness. Nott had, in his bold soldierhood and jealousy for the military honour of his country, resolved from the beginning not to retreat from Candahar, and he blamed England for not sooner bringing him succour, whereas the orders of the latter general were to strengthen Quettah, and so to dispose himself as to cover Nott's retreat from Candahar, which the government of Calcutta expected, and taught England to believe that General Nott would execute.

Both armies were now placed under the command of General Nott, and thus strengthened, by men, munitions, and provisions, he determined upon advancing to Cabul. Before he could effect that purpose, other tasks remained to be performed, and other scenes of interest to occur.

CHAPTER CXV.

EVENTS IN UPPER AFFGHANISTAN—GENERAL NOTT MARCHES TO SCINDE—CAPTURE OF GHIZNI—GENERALS NOTT AND POLLOCK ADVANCE TO CABUL—RESCUE OF THE ENGLISH PRISONERS—DESTRUCTION AND EVACUATION OF CABUL.

On the 19th of May Brigadier Wymer was ordered to release the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje. He departed from Candahar for this purpose with her majesty's 40th, Captain Leslie's troop of horse-artillery, Captain Blood's battery, 3rd Bombay light cavalry, the shah's irregular horse, and the 16th and 38th Bengal native infantry, constituting a very formidable force. The Affghans, having good information, saw that their only chance of conquering the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje, was while Wymer's force was *en route*

to relieve them. Accordingly an attack was made, but Captain Craigie with his small band inflicted terrible loss upon the Affghans, completely repulsing them.

The enemy believed that Candahar might also be attacked with advantage while the large force of Wymer was absent. On the 22nd the enemy appeared in force. Her majesty's 41st was ordered out to repel the threatened assault. The enemy withdrew. They were commanded by a son of Shah Sujah, for whom the English had done and

suffered so much—a fair specimen of Moham-medan gratitude. For some days the garrison of Candahar had peace, anxiously looking forward to intelligence of Wymer's brigade, and the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghilje.

The chaplain of her majesty's 40th regiment records a singularly striking and picturesque incident of which he was a witness.* His relation of it will introduce the reader to some of the personages who occupied a prominent place in the interest of Affghan and Indian politics at that time:—"On the 27th I accompanied General England and his staff on a visit to Prince Timour Shah, the eldest son of Shah Sujah-ool-Moolk, and now, by hereditary right, the king of the Doorannee empire. We were introduced by Major Rawlinson, political agent, who acted as an interpreter. The prince's apartments were in the palace, the greater part of which was built by Ahmed Shah. We were shown into a large quadrangle, more completely oriental than anything I had previously seen. One side was occupied by a building three stories high, with a flat roof and balustrade; it had embayed projecting windows, with richly carved lattices, and a style of architecture of Moorish character, something like the drawings of the Alhambra. The court was completely surrounded by a drapery, forming a cloister; a light framework ran all round, the stems of the vines were planted at regular distances, and the branches and tendrils mantled over the framework in rich festoons. At the end opposite the buildings was a thick shrubbery, with many fruit-trees and walks; the walks were broad, paved, and planted at the angles with cypresses. The centre was occupied by an oblong piece of water, with a stone edging, perfectly clear and full to the brim, in which various sorts of fowl were sporting. Nothing could exceed the coolness, tranquillity, and repose of the whole scene, softened by the mild light of sunset. At the farther end of this piece of water carpets were spread, some of which, I was told, were from Herat, and of considerable value, though their appearance was much the same as ordinary nummud, but softer. Here sat his royal highness in a chair, I suppose out of compliment to us. After our salaam, chairs were placed for us, and conversation commenced. The prince is a man of about forty, rather stout, his countenance heavy, yet not unpleasant, and improving much when animated in conversation; he had a fine black beard and

eyebrows. Those who have seen them both say that he strikingly resembles his father, the late shah. His dress was of white silk and gold interwoven, with a loose outer vest of dark blue cloth edged with gold. His manner was serious and dignified, without hauteur. I looked with melancholy interest upon this representative of the Doorannee monarchs—a king without a kingdom. He is said to have the best moral character of the family, to be a man of peace, and despised on that account by the Affghans, as is natural among a people nurtured in blood and turbulence. He inclines much to the British, and professed his intention of accompanying the force should it evacuate the country. We complimented him on the beauty of his residence, and when he spoke of Candahar as compared with Cabul, and other topics, expressed our regret that we could not converse otherwise than by an interpreter. He replied that it had always been a cause of regret to him that he had not been taught English when young, that he had made some attempts to acquire it, but it was uphill work. He was determined, however, that his sons should not labour under the same disadvantage; they were learning English, but he was sorry to say they were very idle, and loved their swords, guns, and horses better than study. We consoled him by the assurance that such failings were not confined to princes, or to his countrymen, and requested to see the culprits. They were accordingly sent for. The group, as they advanced—the rich dresses of the two boys, the black servant following in a long white dress, the buildings and scenery around—would have formed a beautiful subject for Daniel's *Oriental Annual*. Chairs were placed for them, at the right of their father, but rather behind. After the customary salaams, we assailed them with a multitude of questions as to the sharpness of their swords, the swiftness of their steeds, &c. They were very fine boys—I suppose of about twelve and nine years of age; the elder rather heavy-featured, and much resembling his father; the younger a very handsome child, and full of animation. The elder had, at his own earnest request, been sent out on one occasion with one of the brigades, but to his disappointment they returned without fighting. On the 22nd, when the alarm of the enemy's approach was given, he had ordered his horse to be saddled, and told the prince he was going out with the troops, which, much to his disgust, was not permitted. The prince told us that when they were riding with him, they often wanted to discharge their fire-arms; but as he did not admire that kind of amusement, he was accustomed on such occasions to send them to

* *Diary of a March through Scinde and Affghanistan with the Troops under the command of General Sir William Nott, K.C.B.* By the Rev. J. N. Allen, B.A., Assistant Chaplain to the Hon. East India Company's Bombay Establishment.

the rear to amuse themselves. I fear the youngsters will hardly prove such quiet people as their papa. After a time we made our salaam, and retired."

The same author gives an equally graphic account of an action fought at Candahar, on Sunday, May 29th:—"In the course of the morning her majesty's 41st, two regiments of Bengal native infantry, and what cavalry we had, were ordered out on an alarm similar to that of Sunday last, but with more serious results. After they were gone, hearing rather a heavy discharge of artillery, and my people telling me that they could see the enemy from the top of the house, I ordered my horse and went to the Herat Gate. From the top of this I soon descried three dense bodies of the enemy's cavalry, on some low hills about a mile and a half to the north-west. They were keeping up a rapid and well-sustained discharge of matchlocks, which was loudly responded to by the shah's artillery. The bulk of our troops were hidden from view by a long belt of gardens between them and the town; but I saw some of the movements of the artillery as they crossed the plain. After the fire of the artillery had continued for some time, it was succeeded by a heavy discharge of musketry behind the gardens, which I immediately concluded to be from our infantry advancing on the enemy. After a time I saw a large body of horse, which had been the object of this fire, making off towards the left at great speed. On the right they collected and came down upon a village, of which they possessed themselves, but were soon driven out by a well-directed fire of shrapnel. They were now flying in all directions, and by about three p. m. all were gone. Their numbers were computed at about five thousand, principally cavalry. It was stated, upon information subsequently obtained from some among them who came in, that they had about two hundred killed, and about the same number wounded. The number of our wounded was about twenty, and two or three sepoy were killed. Lieutenant Mainwaring, of the 42nd Bengal native infantry, was wounded; and Lieutenant Chamberlayne, commanding a detachment of the shah's irregular horse, here received one of those many scars which are the honourable testimonials of his gallantry throughout this campaign. His cavalry, and the Poonah horse under Lieutenant Tait, did good service this day, as did about two hundred Persian horse, under Aga Mohammed Khan, who was in our pay. This man is of the royal family of Persia, and an exile on account of some attempt to raise rebellion in that country. He is said to be

the head of the Assassins, the lineal representative of the Old Man of the Mountains, and to derive a considerable income from the offerings of his sect. Sufter Jung and Achtur Khan were present at this action, and the mother of Akram Khan, who was blown from a gun in October, 1841, at Candahar. This lady pretended to a vision of the prophet, and was playing Joan of Arc among the Affghans. It happened unfortunately that on two successive Sundays we had been thus disturbed; but it was most providential that the loss was so small. The enemy expected to have been joined by a large number from the villages around, and were much deceived in the strength of the garrison. Their ill success completely broke their party, which dispersed with mutual recriminations. Prince Sufter Jung surrendered himself shortly after to General Nott, and was received and treated with greater leniency than he deserved; for whatever cause of offence the Affghans in general had against us, from him and his family we were certainly entitled to expect gratitude."

At the beginning of August a portion of the army was ordered to proceed down the Bolan Pass into Scinde, under the command of General England; the other part of the force was to march under General Nott for Cabul. General Nott at that time knew nothing of Pollock's success, nor indeed until he learned the fact at Ghizni.

MARCH OF GENERAL ENGLAND FROM CANDAHAR TO SCINDE.

The task of imposed upon General England was even more hazardous than that which General Nott took upon himself. It was a brave resolution to march upon Ghizni; but the general who accomplished it reserved to himself the whole European force at Candahar, and assigned to General England to convey the sick, wounded, women, children, a vast mass of material, and the chief part of the camp followers, through the passes of Jugdulluck and the Bolan to Scinde, his only fighting men being sepoy, who, unsupported by Europeans, had a terror of the Affghans. General England effected his task, harassed the whole way by clouds of Affghan cavalry, matchlock-men, and robber hordes. Nothing achieved in the Affghan war, unless it were the march of Sir Robert Sale from Cabul to Jellalabad, and his defence of that place, displayed generalship equal to that shown by General England in his retirement from Candahar. He conducted a vast multitude of helpless human beings, with mere sepoy guards, in the face of an enemy who had no fear of sepoy unsupported by Europeans,

through passes which a handful of brave men might defend against an army.

The ability of General England in connection with this extraordinary performance, has been lately called in question by Sir William Napier, in the memoir published by him of his brother, Sir Charles. It appears that at the time Sir Charles entered in his private journal some severe strictures upon this exploit. These Sir William Napier has republished in the memoir, but has not given the opinions of Sir Charles afterwards expressed in a calm review of these transactions. As Sir William is well known to be as honourable as he is brave and talented, it is to be presumed that he overlooked those latter opinions of his brother, and also of other distinguished men, as competent as either Sir Charles or Sir William Napier to form an opinion on the matter. Our readers may require at our hands some notice of this controversy, and historical truth demands that the conduct of these gifted men should be placed in its true light.

On the 6th of August General England commenced his long retreat from Candahar. His force was, in fact, an immense and ill-assorted baggage-guard, nearly ineffective for all purposes of offensive warfare, the really combatant or protecting force did not exceed 3,500 men, all sepoys, there not being a single European soldier in the whole corps. The number of human beings in some parts of the march amounted to nearly forty thousand, and there were twelve thousand animals to guard. On the 31st of October General England, with his retreating force, reached the Indus, and encamped under General Sir C. Napier, who had arrived from Bombay, and thus ended the retreat from Candahar of 460 miles, which was then—in 1842—pronounced by Sir Charles Napier himself to be a most “difficult retreat;” and in 1849 he declared “this long retreat of General England was, in every sense of the word, one of great danger.” Upon this achievement of General England, the journal of Sir Charles Napier contains the following entry in 1842:—“October 21st.—In a rage. The poor wounded soldiers coming down with England’s second column, were thrown down like dogs.”*

Again, Sir Charles has entered in his journal:—“A letter from England says the thieves were close to his rear-guard. I met his second column in March. We saw how contemptible the thieves must be. With a single troop of hussars opposed to the second column, I would have taken the whole convoy. Had England been attacked, nothing could have saved him.”

* *Memoir, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 225.

Sir W. Napier, commenting upon entries in Sir Charles’s journal concerning this march, says:—“Subsequent information convinced Sir Charles Napier that the march was a mere procession, and conducted without order, skill, or danger, or difficulty.”*

The answer to these items of the private journal, and the mistaken and ungenerous comments of Sir William Napier, is beyond refutation. Sir Charles entered these items in moments of irritation, with imperfect information, and without reflection. That Sir Charles was likely to act in a manner so rash is, unhappily, well known to all who have studied his character, or known anything of him as a public man. His panegyrics and his censures, written and *vivâ voce*, were so intemperate as often to deprive either of the weight the opinion of so great a man would naturally possess. This peculiarity of his temper has been noticed by nearly every independent reviewer, either in the pages of our reviews or the columns of our leading journals, both in India and the British Isles. The march of General England did not deserve the censures recorded, but really did deserve the laudations which the same pen bestowed upon it. The following letter from Sir Charles to General England himself, is a striking confirmation of the entries in the journal:—

Sukkur, Upper Scinde, Oct. 6th, 1842.

Allow me to congratulate you on your successful progress in a most difficult retreat, for your convoy is like Falstaff’s bill for sack, and your troops something like the item for bread in the same account, no proportion between them, and I really did not expect that you would have passed the Kojuck without immense loss. Your having done so, I must say, does you great honour, encumbered as you were, not only with your baggage, but with all the riddances of General Nott’s force besides. I rejoice at General Nott’s success with all my heart, but no military man can deny that, of the two operations, that allotted to you was by far the most difficult one, whether the composition of your troops or the ground to go over be considered. His compact force of picked troops for active service, with only the baggage that was absolutely necessary, and no sick, besides cavalry and a powerful artillery, and no passes to force; yours the refuse of his force, no cavalry, few guns, the hospitals of both forces, and the baggage of both, with perhaps the greatest passes in the world to traverse, and the enemy the same in both cases! and last, assuredly not least, the one force animated by the pride of an advance, the other acting under the depressing influence of a retreat. Hoping you may receive the praise you have so well earned,

Believe me to remain, &c.,

C. NAPIER.

On the 2nd of December following, when Sir C. Napier received from the governor-general a despatch, in which he commended the skill of General England in this arduous march, Sir Charles sent it to the officer in question, endorsed, “*The governor-general is quite right.*” Seven years later, in a letter to the

* *Memoir, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 213.

board of control, Sir Charles stated—"His (General England's) march from Candahar to Sukkur was a very difficult march, in which every one who was left a few yards behind the rear-guard was murdered." The opinions of all the authorities, civil and military, were the same. Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote on the 27th of October, 1842, and expressed his concurrence in the eulogy bestowed on this great march by the civil authorities at Calcutta. On the 15th November, Sir George Arthur, governor of Bombay, a man of truth and integrity, officially communicated his approbation, in which he says, "Nothing could be more satisfactory than the retreat of your force." "I could not resist assuring you how much gratified I am at your having made so successful a march from Candahar to the Indus." The following testimony from the highest authority in India, officially given, may complete this evidence:—"The governor-general has much satisfaction in announcing the successful termination of the arduous and difficult operations confided to Major-general England; this operation, however less brilliant in its circumstances than that entrusted to Generals Nott and Pollock, yet called into exercise many of the higher qualities which most contribute to form the character of an accomplished general." He "communicates his thanks to Major Outram, and the other political officers, for the zeal and ability they have manifested!"* &c.

The confusion which Sir Charles Napier witnessed, was among the soldiers of the second column of the retiring force. When the convoy arrived at Quettah, and the danger was over, General England divided it into three columns. General England himself remained in the situation where danger would be found, if any existed—in the rear of the third column. When Sir Charles, who knew little at that time of Indian armies and Indian convoys, saw the second column, England was two hundred miles behind up the country. The division of the great convoy of forty thousand human beings and twelve thousand animals into three columns, when that could be safely done, no enemy to molest, was judicious, and even necessary for their more convenient and expeditious descent. That the convoy system of Indian armies was itself bad, there can be no doubt, but that was beyond General England's cure; he deserves the more praise, for obviating, so far as that was possible, the mischiefs which that system entailed. The dangers which beset General England before reaching Scinde, and the order and spirit with which he encountered them, the reader may infer from the following

* General Orders, dated Simla, Oct. 20th, 1842.

passages from his despatches, in which names are quoted, some of which must be an ample guarantee for the truth:—"On the morning of the 3rd, I found the Kahees posted in some numbers on the steep ground which commands the upper extremity of the narrow zigzag near the Bolan. These insurgents had, however, only time to deliver a few rounds, when their attention was fully engaged by the flanking parties which covered our left, and which I now reinforced with," &c. "I have every reason to be satisfied with the handsome manner in which our troops ascended these stupendous heights, and cleared them. Major Woodhouse speaks very highly of them." "On this occasion Major Outram gave me his able assistance, as well as in flanking the lower extremity of the Bolan Pass, near Kundie, where I had good reason to expect to meet hostile tribes; but the total disappointment of the Kakurs on the 3rd, and the effectual flanking arrangement," &c. It is thus evident that General England acted with the strictest military precaution, while on the enemy's territory, but arranged this vast and helpless body of men and beasts, whom he had protected, in columns of march, when on British territory the same active protection was no longer needed, and more rapid progress was important on grounds economical and sanitary.

MARCH OF GENERAL NOTT TO GHIZNI AND CABUL.

Having followed the march of General England, we shall now trace the progress of General Nott to Ghizni and Cabul. Timour Shah revisited India with General England, while the brother of Timour, at his own request, was permitted to remain in Candahar, to hold it if possible. This resolution, on the part of the prince was against the wish of the English, who expected their departure to be the signal of an attack, ending in massacre. As the British left, many "civilians" among the Affghan population watched opportunity for assassination.

General Nott's army moved off for Ghizni on the 7th of August. The number of fighting men did not exceed seven thousand. The cavalry consisted of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, Skinner's horse, the shah's horse; in all, I think, not much exceeding one thousand. The artillery—the 1st troop of Bombay horse artillery, the 3rd company 1st battalion Bombay foot artillery, 3rd company 2nd battalion Bengal foot artillery, 1st troop shah's horse artillery (native), with a party of Bengal, and another of Madras sappers and miners. The guns were—four 18-pounders, two 24lb. how-

itzers, four 9-pounders, twelve 6-pounders; total twenty-two. The infantry—her majesty's 40th and 41st regiments, and the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd, 43rd Bengal native infantry. The army carried provisions for forty days, which, with ammunition, &c., loaded ten thousand public and private camels, besides bullocks, asses, mules, and tattoos. The followers it is impossible to estimate, but they must have been at least double the number of fighting men.* The enumeration of the force given by Major Huish adds to the infantry the 3rd, or Captain Craigie's Bengal irregular infantry; and to the cavalry, five *ressalates* of Christie's irregular horse.

The march of this army lay through wild and magnificent scenery, and through vales of soft and radiant beauty. It was itself a magnificent spectacle, and gave to many a picturesque valley through which it passed an aspect of romantic effect, such as only could be produced by the winding way of an oriental host. Seen from many elevated positions, the country, the camp, the moving squadrons and battalions of war, presented a panoramic picture of the most impressive and attractive kind. The hills at certain hours seemed bathed in purple light, the plain vividly green, from the camel-thorn, and from the abounding southern-wood, which filled the air with its perfume. The red columns of the English infantry, crested with the sheen of their bayonets, the many-costumed cavalry, the dark rolling guns, and behind all, except the rear-guard, camels, camel-drivers, and camp followers, with many-hued apparels, presented an exciting and strange array. Whatever the pleasurable emotions created by such scenes to English eyes, the painful feeling could not be dismissed, that each day's march was tracked in blood. Skirmishes were not frequent, but were sometimes sharp, and fool-hardy or lazy camp followers were every day cut off by the enemy. Besides, every spot told some tale of previous conflict and slaughter, which had occurred in the desultory struggle of the previous year. On the 27th the enemy increased in the rear, infantry and cavalry, in considerable force, pressing upon the rear-guard. Skinner's and the shah's horse were ordered to fall back, and engage the enemy, which they did, cutting down some twelve troopers, and more than fifty footmen, with a loss of only five or six wounded. On the 28th, the Affghans, by showing a small force, seduced the English cavalry to follow them, when, as the latter rounded the spur of a hill, an immense force, composed of five thousand men, horse and foot, attacked them. The

* Rev. Mr. Allen.

British succeeded in covering the retreat of a foraging party, but with a loss in killed and wounded of one-seventh of their number. The officers having displayed much more daring than their troops, suffered severely. Captain Bury was cut down after slaying with his sabre four of his opponents; Captain Reves was shot dead; Lieutenant Mackenzie received several most desperate sword cuts. When the cavalry arrived, they were reinforced, and again sent out to recover the bodies of their slain officers. The infantry, with Captain Blood's nine-pounders, and Captain Anderson's six-pounders, were directed against a fort whence it was alleged the assailants issued. As the British approached it, the villagers came out with supplicating gestures declaring that they and their people had no part in the attack. The general directed them to remain quiet, and ordered Captain F. White, with the light company of her majesty's 40th regiment, to examine the place. The general might have spared himself the trouble; falsehood and perfidy were ever upon Affghan lips—they were true disciples of Islam. As the small party approached, the people who protested such innocence opened a fire of matchlocks, from which Major Leech, political agent and interpreter, narrowly escaped.

The British then rushed forward, followed by the light company of the 41st and a battalion company of the 40th, under Captain Neil. The fort was full of armed men, who fought furiously. The British, maddened by the treachery they had experienced, put all to the bayonet. The Affghans defended every courtyard, every house, every apartment, pressed by the infuriated English. Women and children were of course spared, but some were hurt in the conflict. In one house in which there were many, those within refused to surrender; a shot from a six-pounder drove in the door, scattering ruin upon those within. The red torrent of avenging soldiers followed; every man in the place perished, and some women and children fell victims in the struggle.

The camels and fodder taken from the grass-cutters were found in the inclosures, and recaptured. The English soldiers plundered the place, and then set fire to it. The bodies of the soldiers and officers who had fallen in the attack made by the enemy were recovered, all brutally mangled. The dead bodies had been hacked with vengeful ferocity by those who so soon paid the penalty due to such deeds.

The next day, after a short march, the army halted and were attacked on their camping ground by the enemy. The troops were ordered out. A fort called Goyain, gave

confidence to the enemy. It was filled with matchlock-men, who, as the English approached, shouted defiance and cursed them. They considered the building impregnable; besides, there was a large force of their brethren hovering about upon the flanks of the British. The first discharge of the English nine-pounders carried away the battlements of the right bastion, killing a number of its defiant occupants, and alarming the rest. The succeeding fire of the English cannon was not so effectual, and the enemy resumed courage. Lieutenant Terry, of the Bombay artillery, proposed to blow open the gate by approaching a gun very near, under cover of a heavy fire from the English infantry. The gate, however, was built up with mud, and this material was so thick as to resist the fire of the gun, which was withdrawn. The Affghan army meantime reached a neighbouring hill, and opened a fire of artillery, to which the English promptly replied. This artillery battle was waged for an hour. While this action went on upon the British left, a strong Affghan force attempted to turn the British right. The supporting regiments prevented that, by advancing against the enemy. The recklessness of the English was on this occasion remarkable. When the play of the artillery of the enemy was really severe, "there was an almost entire absence of any sense of danger. Jokes and laughter resounded on all sides, and the general feeling appeared to be more that of a set of schoolboys at a game of snowballs, than of men whose lives were in instant peril." Some poor fellows perished in the midst of this jocundity. The battle was won by the superior fire of the English cannon. The enemy retired, bearing away their guns leisurely. In the despatches the force drawn up against General Nott was reported as twelve thousand men. The Rev. Mr. Allen, who was in the action and near General Nott's person, computes it at half that amount. The British pursued, but the enemy retreated in perfect order, maintaining a well directed fire of artillery and matchlocks, causing the British considerable loss. Nott pressed them closely, captured two guns, their baggage, and a large stock of ammunition which had belonged to the English garrison at Ghizni. By far the most formidable of the enemy's troops were Mohammedan deserters from the Bengal sepoys. In the night the Affghans deserted the fort, and a number of minor forts in the vicinity, leaving behind some ammunition and vast stores of grain and other food. The camp followers and a tribe of Affghans, rivals to those who had held the forts, set on fire whatever was inflammable in the forts and villages. Much dis-

content was afterwards created in the army by the omission of all mention of the 41st regiment, as if it had taken no part in the action; and by omitting to name the captors of the guns, and others who had distinguished themselves.

The British reached Ghizni on the 5th of September, and prepared to breach its walls. An Affghan army occupied the heights behind the town, but were driven off, and abandoned all further attempts to save Ghizni. The garrison evacuated the place in the night. It is remarkable how frequently in Indian warfare the British have allowed the enemy to play them this trick. On entering the place many relics of the garrison left by Lord Keane were found. On one of the windows there was scratched by an officer an account of the sufferings of himself and his brother officers. From this it was learned that the Affghan chiefs had violated two treaties, and had twice put Colonel Palmer to the torture. The names of the cruel and treacherous chiefs were also given. The work of destruction soon began; the great gun, Zuber Jung, which threw balls of fifty-pound weight, and a number of other pieces of cannon and gingsals were burst. The fortifications were ruined, the wood-work of the citadel and town torn down for fuel, and the citadel itself shaken into ruins by mines. An ingenious inscription in English words and Greek characters was found upon one of the walls, directing attention to a particular beam where copies of the treaties made with Colonel Palmer were deposited. They were found and preserved. The army was much refreshed by the great abundance of delicious fruit and vegetables obtained in the neighbourhood of Ghizni. The weather was genial and balmy; the climate resembling that of England, but steadier and finer, the days being warmer, the nights, early mornings, and evenings about the same temperature as that of the neighbourhood of London. The celebrated sandal-wood gates, taken from Somnauth by Mohammed of Ghizni, and which adorned his tomb, were removed from that place on the 9th of September, preparatory to their being carried to Hindostan. This was a great triumph, as the Mohammedans, especially the Fakeers, esteemed them as trophies of victory over the infidel. The tomb was otherwise carefully respected.

On the 10th of September, General Nott marched for Cabul. On the march, during the 12th, the army came upon the fort of Sidabad, where a sanguinary conflict had taken place, November 3rd, 1841. Captain Woodburn was promised protection by certain Affghan chiefs, and was received, with one

hundred and fifty sepoy, into a small walled yard beneath the fort. As in every other case, the chiefs violated their pledges, and fired down upon the party, pent up in a narrow compass. They made their way out and defeated the enemy, but Woodburn was killed by a shot from the bastion. The fort was found empty, and barricaded by General Nott, who forced it, and found there poor Woodburn's will, a letter of commendation to him from Sir W. Mac Naghten, and other relics of the party who had well, but vainly, fought. This scene of perfidy was blotted out from the face of the earth by the English engineers. During the remainder of the march there was much skirmishing, and some hard fighting, the Affghans always incurring defeat. On the 17th, the army reached Cabul. On the 18th, Generals Pollock and Nott met. News arrived the same evening that Sir Richmond Shakespear had found the English prisoners safe. A brigade was sent out to his support. It is here necessary to direct attention to the fortunes of those who had been so long in captivity with the enemy. During the reverses incurred by the Affghan chiefs, they had been placed under charge of Saleh Mohammed Khan, who was proceeding with them, by order of Akbar Khan, to Turkistan. One of the captives ingeniously tampered with Mohammed, offering him a large sum of money, and a pension for life, if he would allow them their liberty. Sir Richmond Shakespear volunteered, with a small party of cavalry, to go to Mohammed Khan, and undertake their escort. The perils he encountered were numerous, and it was by a strange coincidence, while Pollock and Nott were congratulating one another upon the current of events, that the communication reached the former that Sir R. Shakespear had the captives, but was in hourly danger of a force from the enemy overtaking them and effecting a recapture. Sir R. Sale, at the head of a brigade, was sent out to secure their safety; and the brigade, with their charge, entered camp on the 21st. The list of restored captives comprised, according to Major Hough:—"Ladies, seven; women, three; children, eleven; officers, thirty-one; non-commissioned officers and privates, forty-nine; clerks, two; boys, two; total, one hundred and five. Including the officers from Ghizni. Captain Bygrave was given up on the 27th of September." The Rev. Mr. Allen, who witnessed their arrival, makes a different statement:—"The number of prisoners liberated, including those left in Cabul, was as follows:—ladies and European women, twelve; officers, thirty-four; children, seventeen; non-commissioned officers, privates, and

clerks, fifty-four; total, one hundred and seventeen."

The joy of the garrison of Cabul over their countrywomen and countrymen, thus raised from the dead, may be conceived but cannot be described. Eager groups pressed around each, greetings and thanksgivings were heard, and tears were seen on every side. The European soldiers were deeply excited, and even the sepoy caught the generous infection. Lady Sale, and her daughter, Mrs. Sturt, were especially objects of interest. The latter lady had lost her gallant husband, a young engineer officer of extraordinary promise, who died of the fatigue he experienced in defending Cabul, after having been desperately wounded by assassins. Lady Sale, in her journal, describes him as carried about in a litter, animating all by his example who were not paralyzed by the stolidity and irresolution of the commander-in-chief.

While yet the British occupied Cabul, it was deemed expedient to subdue Istaliff, a town of great strength, covering ground difficult of access, and inhabited by a people accustomed to bear arms. It was twenty miles distant to the north-west of Cabul, in Koh-i-daman. The houses and fortifications occupied the slope of, a mountain, behind which loftier eminences rose, shutting in a pass which formed the road leading to Turkistan. The fugitives from Cabul had taken refuge at Istaliff, and so confident were the people in its strength, that the families of all who were exposed to danger from a great distance had fled thither. The task of subduing this place was committed to Major-general M'Caskill. The force placed at his disposal, was—"Two eighteen pounders, and a detail of artillery (Bombay), Captain Blood's light field-battery, Captain Backhouse's mountain train, headquarters and two squadrons of her majesty's 3rd dragoons, one squadron of the 1st light cavalry, Christie's horse (irregular), her majesty's 9th and 41st foot, the 26th, 42nd, and 43rd native infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's sappers and miners."

The action at Istaliff is thus recorded by Mr. Kaye:—"M'Caskill was completely successful. He made a rapid march upon Istaliff, and took the enemy by surprise. The Affghan chiefs had collected in this place their treasure and their women. They had looked to it as a place of refuge, secure from the assaults of the invading Feringhees. They had relied greatly on the strength of the place, and scarcely any defensive measures had been taken to repel the assaults of the enemy. When M'Caskill entered the gardens which surround the town, a panic

* Kaye's *Affghan War*, p. 634.

seemed to have seized the people, they thought no longer of defence. Their first thought was to save their property and their women. Ameenoollah Khan himself fled at the first onset. As our troops entered the town, the face of the mountain beyond was covered with laden baggage-cattle, whilst long lines of white-veiled women, striving to reach a place of safety, streamed along the hill side. What our troops had to do they did rapidly and well; but the fire of the enemy's jezails soon slackened when the 9th foot, with Broad-foot's sappers, and the 26th native infantry, dashed into the gardens, where the Affghan marksmen had been posted. And as their gallantry, so their forbearance is to be commended. M'Caskill, respecting the honour of the women, would not suffer a pursuit; but many fell into the hands of our people in the town, and were safely delivered over to the keeping of the Kuzzilbashes. Two guns and much booty were taken; the town was fired, and then M'Caskill went on towards the hills, meeting no opposition on the way, destroyed Charckur, where the Goorkha regiment had been annihilated, and some other fortified places, which had been among the strongholds of the enemy, and then returned triumphantly to Cabul." Referring to this action, Mr. Marshman says:—"General M'Caskill, who commanded the division, left all the arrangements of the attack to Havelock's skill; and he dwells with delight in his letters to his relatives on the opportunity he now enjoyed, for the first time after twenty-seven years of soldiering, of organizing a great military movement, as he said, out of his own brain. The town was carried with little loss, through the admirable combinations of Havelock's strategy, and the affair at Istaliff was considered one of the most brilliant of the campaign; but it is only at the present time that Havelock's share in it can be prudently recorded."

If these statements of Mr. Marshman be correct, the facts they record are an invaluable contribution to the fame of Havelock. He was then only a major on the staff of General Pollock, and accompanied M'Caskill by the courtesy of the former.

After this expedition, the commander-in-chief, in pursuance of his orders, prepared to return to India. He destroyed the great bazaar, so famous in history, built in the time of Aurungzebe. In this place the body of the British envoy, when murdered by Affghan assassins at the command of Affghan chiefs, had been exposed to insult, and General Pollock resolved that the retribution should be the destruction of the place itself. A mosque at the end of the bazaar, and another

near the cantonments, ornamented with European materials during the interval between the exit of the Hon. General Elphinstone and the entrance of General Pollock, in order to commemorate the slaughter of the Feringhees, were also destroyed.

On the 12th of October, General Pollock began the retirement of his army, by sending forward Sir Robert Sale, with the 1st and 2nd brigades, the 1st light cavalry, 3rd irregular cavalry, and Christie's horse, over the Gospund Darrah Pass, with the object of turning the Khoord-Cabul. The result of this movement was, that the main pass was penetrated without so much as an exchange of shots. General Nott's division followed, but was attacked in the Huft Khatul Pass, on the 14th of October. General Pollock considered that this, and some petty attacks upon his rear-guard, were made by brigands. It is surprising that the general should think so, for there was as much appearance of military order among the assailants as in any Affghan force which he had encountered.

On the 17th of December, 1842, the army crossed the Sutelej. There were great rejoicings and festivities in Ferozepore; yet there were many causes for regret. England had been placed in mourning for the loss of a multitude of her brave and noble children. British honour was, indeed, vindicated by the destruction of Cabul, Istaliff, Ghizni, Candahar, and Jellalabad. The Affghans had been everywhere defeated, the ladies and officers so treacherously made captives had been rescued, but the conquering armies had scarcely accomplished their ultimate victory, when they began to retire; and, although General Pollock declared in his despatches that no organized resistance was made to the return of his army, yet an angry enemy who had made no submission hung upon their flanks and rear, and made victims of soldiers and camp followers until the English flag was lost to view from the territory of Afghanistan. To this day the Affghans hold themselves to have been the conquerors in that war, and the same feeling, kept alive by Russia, pervades Persia and Central Asia. There is, however, an awe of English power remaining in Afghanistan as a result of the advance of England, Nott, and Pollock, which has deterred the Affghans since then from entering into any important combinations against the power of Great Britain.

Thus ended the terrible Affghan war, one of the most destructive to the life of English soldiers, and by far the most injurious to British reputation in which the empire had ever been engaged. This justifies the length at which its affecting details have been given.

CHAPTER CXVI.

THE WAR IN SCINDE—ADVANCE TOWARDS HYDERABAD—THE AMEERS COERCED INTO A TREATY WITH THE ENGLISH—ATTACK UPON THE ENGLISH RESIDENCY AT HYDERABAD—EXPEDITION OF SIR CHARLES NAPIER IN THE DESERT—BATTLE OF MEANNEE—BATTLE OF DUBBA—VICTORIES OF COLONEL ROBERTS AND CAPTAIN JACOBS—SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S GOVERNMENT OF SCINDE.

In a previous chapter an account was given of the proceedings of the British in Scinde previous to the Affghan war, and more especially during the period when the army of General England was ordered to prepare for protecting the retreat of General Nott. On the 4th of November, 1842,* a year and two days after the outbreak at Cabul, a draft of a treaty with the ameers of Scinde was prepared, several of the articles of which became important at the close of the Affghan war. By article 2, the company's rupee was to become the only coin legally current in the dominions of the ameers, after the 1st of January, 1845.† By article 5, the ameers renounced the privilege of coining money.‡ The 6th article relates to the cutting of wood for the steamers navigating the Indus. By article 7, Kurrachee and Tatta were to be ceded to the British government, and a free passage between Kurrachee and Tatta. By article 8, Subsulkhote,§ and the territory between the present frontier of Bhawulpore and the town of Rohree, are ceded to his Highness of Bhawulpore, "the ever faithful ally and friend of the British government."

Sir W. Napier says,|| the Scindian princes "were again excited by Nott's advance upon Candahar; they judged it a forced abandonment of that important city; and though he afterwards destroyed Ghizni, and, in conjunction with Pollock, ruined Istaliff and Cabul, the apparently hurried retreat from Affghanistan which followed, bore, for the misjudging people, the character of a flight. It was viewed as a proof of weakness, and Belochis and Brahooes became more hopeful and more confident than before. The ameers of Upper and Lower Scinde consulted together, how best to league against the Feringhees; Sikh vakeels were at Khyrpore, ready to start for Lahore, loaded with presents for the Maharajah; and at the same time, letters came from

* *Affghan War.* By Major Hough.

† The date of the coinage of the company's rupee throughout our Indian possessions.

‡ The act of coining is the right of the sovereign of a country.

§ Which had been taken from the nawab by the ameers.

|| *Conquest of Scinde*, parti., p. 111.

the victorious Affghans, reminding the ameers that they were feudatories of the Doonaree empire, and exhorting them to act boldly in the common cause. These things led to the ameers' final destruction; they were the fore-runners of the battle by which they fell; but their primary cause, it has been shown, was deeper seated. The Scindian war was no isolated event. 'It was the tail of the Affghan storm.'" The ameers swore upon the Koran their determination to unite with Affghans, Sikhs, or whatever other allies might be procurable, to make war upon the English. Fortunately for the interests of the British empire, the late Sir Charles Napier was in command of the troops in Scinde, while General England was at Candahar, and after the celebrated retreat of that officer in charge of the great convoy. Sir Charles Napier did not regard the war which was about to be launched against Scinde as just. His opinion was well founded; the ameers had never committed any aggression upon the English. They had preserved a cold and studied distance as long as they were able, and were influenced in so doing by the conviction that any alliance with the government of Calcutta would ultimately be subversive of their own independence. Various treaties had been forced upon them which were intolerably overbearing, and the English agents domineered over the country as if it were a province won in war. When the draft treaty, already referred to, was laid before the ameers, by Lieutenant Eastwick, on behalf of the Bombay government, Noor Mohammed, one of the principal ameers, took from a box all the treaties which were in force, and sarcastically asked, "What is to become of all these?" Before receiving a reply, he calmly, but with indignant remonstrance, added, "Here is another annoyance. Since the days that Scinde has been connected with the English, there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted. We have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain." The death of Noor Mohammed facilitated the designs of the English, which were carried out with as little

scruple as justice. The ameers had borne the injustice of Lord Auckland's government, but when Lord Ellenborough arrived, a puerile and hot-headed policy was pursued, calculated to drive them to madness or despair. Yet, as in the case of Afghanistan, his hot vigour was followed by reaction, and he hesitated as to the expediency of forcing certain cessions of territory which he had ordered Colonel Outram, the resident, to demand. A month afterwards one of his fits of vigour returned, and Sir Charles Napier was placed in the chief civil and military authority. On the 5th of October Sir Charles reported to the governor-general that the ameers took tolls upon the river; which was contrary to the treaty forced upon the ameers by the government of Calcutta, which it had no more right to dictate, than any Scinde or Beloochee robber would have to levy blackmail within the Indian territory. Sir Charles Napier, although he admitted that the ameers had been aggrieved, and had committed no aggression, did not resign his political or military functions, but carried out the governor-general's unjust policy with an earnest will. The general instituted a series of intrigues between certain of the ameers, which were neither very clever nor very cunning, and eventually did more to embarrass affairs and drive the ameers to resistance than any of the articles of the oppressive and insolent treaty forced upon them.* By one of the intrigues in which Sir Charles engaged himself, a certain ameer, named Meer Proostum, fled to another, his near kinsman, named Ali Moorad upon whose head he placed the turban, an act which betokened the surrender of power. Out of this transaction arose the necessity, or the supposed necessity on the part of Sir Charles Napier, of taking a fort in the desert called Emanm Ghur. This exploit was one of great peril and difficulty, and was accomplished by Sir Charles with singular vigour and audacity. The fort was so situated that to reach it at all with an armed force was all but impossible. The march to it was long, the way a perfect waste; everything to be brought by the troops must be carried, even water. The quantity of that commodity necessary for men pursuing military enterprises in such a climate, and especially while marching over a desert, would be very great. Sir Charles was deterred by no difficulties, he determined to carry his point, and soon, and effectually. He selected two hundred irregular cavalry, one hundred and fifty of whom had ultimately to be sent back from want of forage. His artillery consisted of two howitzers, 24-pounders. He

placed 350 men of her majesty's 22nd regiment on 175 camels, loaded 10 camels with provisions, and 80 with water, and marched forth against the stronghold, the number of the defenders of which he could not have known. The fort was actually defended by considerably more than 2000 men, and the skirts of the desert were crowded with fanatical Beloochee horsemen. He went forth early in January, 1843, brought his force thither in safety, captured the place, blew it up, and returned with a rapidity which dazzled and astonished friends and foes.

This occurred when the East India company was at peace with all the known authorities of Scinde; so that it became obvious to the ameers, and their friends the Beloochees, that the English were determined upon plundering the territory of Scinde from its possessors.

As to the exploit itself, the Duke of Wellington, in his place in the house of lords, gave the following opinion:—"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emanm Ghur, is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions."

The treaty proposed to the ameers, November the 4th, 1842, was sealed by the ameers, most reluctantly, the 14th February, 1843. The expedition in the desert terrified the ameers, although it intensified their desire to drive the English from their country. The Beloochee people were not so readily alarmed. Their patriotism and fanaticism were thoroughly roused. They regarded the English as robbers, tyrants, and truce-breakers, and determined to rid their country of them or perish. Three days after the treaty, was fought the ever-memorable battle of Meannee! When the treaty was signed, the ameers warned Major (holding the local rank of colonel) Outram, that if Sir Charles Napier continued to advance, the result must be, a revolt by the people and troops against the execution of the treaty. Sir Charles did advance, and without justification on any ground. The predicted consequence took place. On the 15th of February, the people rose, and the first object of attack was the British residency. The enclosure in which the mansion was situated was swept by the river, where a British steamer was placed, armed with cannon. Numerous bodies of

* Parliamentary Papers relating to Scinde; Supplementary Papers; Correspondence of Sir Charles Napier.

Seinde horse and foot environed the enclosure in every other direction. For four hours the enemy maintained a heavy fire, to which a small party of British replied, under Captain Conway; Lieutenant Harding and Ensign Pennefather distinguished themselves by their activity, skill, and courage. Two gentlemen, Captain Green, of the 21st native infantry, and Captain Wells, of the 15th, volunteered, and rendered important services. Captain Brown, Bengal engineers, went on board the steamer, and acted as an artillery officer, with good effect. The British were too few to continue the defence, and retired with order to the steamer, leaving behind most of their baggage, and all the property of the residency. They subsequently joined the force of Sir Charles Napier.

BATTLE OF MEANNEE.

The ameers now determined to resist the advance of the English troops, the commander of these troops was furnished with a conclusive reason for continuing his march by the storming of the residency. On the 17th he reached Meannee, about six miles from Hyderabad. The ameers awaited him there in a strong position, flanked with woods, and behind the dry bed of the river Fullaillee. Before the extreme right of, the enemy's position lay a village, affording a good cover. Two British officers volunteered to reconnoitre, which was done with great boldness and coolness, the officers riding along the whole line exposed to a perilous fire. The result was, however, the supply of accurate information. The number of the enemy was seven times that of the British, but Sir Charles considered that any delay for reinforcements would strengthen the confidence of the ameers and produce a moral effect upon the country dangerous to the success and even the existence of his little army, not stronger than a brigade; he therefore determined to attack. It was a daring resolution; with less than three thousand men of all arms to assail a strong position defended by more than twenty thousand men, of reputed courage! But Sir Charles was a man of bold conclusions.

The ameers did not wait to be assailed. As soon as the British came within range of their guns, a heavy fire was opened, but happily it was not well directed. The reply of the British cannon was most effective, and undoubtedly prepared the way for closer attack. The British guns were placed on the right. Infantry skirmishers with the Seinde irregular cavalry were thrown far in front, merely to make the enemy show his strength. The British infantry then moved from the

right in *echelon* of battalions, refusing the left to save it from the fire of the village, which, as before noticed, covered the enemy's right. The major-general commanding compared the movement to a review over a plain swept by an enemy's cannon. The artillery and her majesty's 22nd regiment, in line, formed the leading *echelon*; the 25th native infantry, the second; the 12th infantry, the third; and the 1st grenadier native infantry, the fourth. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve, in rear of the left wing. The Poonah horse with four companies of infantry guarded the baggage. The British line opened a fire of musketry within one hundred yards of the bank of the river. The Beloochees charged their advancing enemies, firing their matchlocks and discharging their pistols as they came to close quarters. From neither fire did the English receive much harm. The Beloochees, with sword and shield, then threw themselves upon the British line, the men of which advancing, shoulder to shoulder, delivered a volley, so simultaneously that it was as if given from a single machine of destruction, and directed so low that every shot told. The first line of the Beloochees went down under this surely directed fire, the second line was pierced by the bayonets of the British line, which as a wall of pointed steel received the desperate charge. Nevertheless these brave adversaries came on, scimitar in hand, as if eager for death, and so severe was the onset that the fate of the battle was for some time in suspense. The peril to the British was now so great that Colonel Pattle, at the suggestion of Captain A. Tucker, moved his cavalry, with the view of turning the enemy's right flank, and charging their rear, so as to check the force of their terrible onslaught upon the line of the British infantry. While Colonel Pattle and Captain Tucker were thus initiating an important movement, the responsibility of which the colonel was reluctant to incur, orders came from the commander-in-chief to "force the right of the enemy's line." The 9th Bengal cavalry had the honour of executing this movement, supported by the Seinde horse. The former regiment took a standard and several guns, the latter captured the camp, from which the cavalry of the Beloochees retired slowly, firing as they retreated, and taking deliberate aim. Lieutenant Fitzgerald pursued them several miles with a small body of cavalry, and himself slew three of their horsemen in single combat. This charge of cavalry decided the battle. The 22nd forced the bank of the river, as the appearance of the English cavalry in the rear of the Beloochees confused their infantry. The 25th



Ch. Jones

W. A. Smith

THE BATTLE OF MEENATIE.

and 12th native infantry crossed the dry bed of the river nearly as soon as the 22nd; the 12th, scrambling up the opposite bank, captured some guns in position there. The whole of the enemy's artillery was taken, with their camp equipage, stores, ammunition and treasures. Several standards were also taken. Sir Charles in his despatches stated that all were captured, which his own account of the retreat of the Beloochee cavalry shows could not be correct.

Seldom did British arms gain a harder fought battle, and seldom were the numbers engaged on each side so disproportionate. Not more than 1900 men were actually in action on the side of the British. The ameers brought their whole force into battle, except the cavalry, which came into combat when Colonel Pattle charged round their right flank and fell upon the rear of the infantry. Some accounts rate the force of the ameers at 25,000, but certainly more than 20,000 men gave battle to the little British band opposed to them. The loss of the English was 56 soldiers killed and 177 wounded, and 95 horses.* Six officers were killed and 22 wounded.

The plan of the battle is intelligible to civilians: the mode of going into action was beautiful, but the execution was confused, and but for the cavalry charge round the right upon the rear—a movement which never occurred to the enemy as possible until it was accomplished, and therefore bewildered them,—the probabilities were great that the battle would have been lost.

The Duke of Wellington had a very high opinion of the genius of Sir Charles Napier as a soldier, and was notoriously partial to the Napier family. This latter circumstance must qualify the reception given to any opinions pronounced by his grace upon the actions of Sir Charles. The duke's opinion of the battle of Meanee, and of the conduct of the victor, consequent upon it, has been very generally received; it was in the following terms:—"He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up a reinforcement and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations in war."

Immediately after the battle, three ameers of Hyderabad, and three of Khyrpore, came

* Blue-book.

in and surrendered themselves. They were sent prisoners to Bombay. Lord Ellenborough declared Scinde "annexed" to the company's dominions.

BATTLE OF DUBBA.

Shere Mohammed was still in arms, at the head of twenty-five thousand men; and so confident was he of success, that he boasted he would "Cabul the English." The use of this phrase, which became current among the Scindians, showed how extensively the weakness of the Hon. General Elphinstone, and the incapacity for large operations of Brigadier Shelton, had deprived the English of military prestige among the nations contiguous to British India. Mohammed took up a position at Dubba, about eight miles north-west of Hyderabad. He had eleven guns in battery, and four field-pieces. His infantry were drawn up in two intrenched lines, and his cavalry in masses in the rear. The right flank rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which was at that spot deep, and retained a large quantity of mud and muddy water, sufficient to prevent the position from being turned. There was another nullah* to the rear of the former, forming an obtuse angle to the front line, and there the left of the enemy's army was posted. Thus the true front of battle extended from the right for one mile perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting, what may be termed, the right wing and centre to an attack; but the left wing behind the second nullah, was refused. All the cavalry were behind the left. In the rear of the right wing stood the village of Dubba.† Between the first line of the right and centre and the village of Dubba there was another nullah. Each had what in military technicality is called a ramp for advancing and retreating. The enemy's second line was placed near the second and larger nullah, in the rear of which he posted his cannon. His pioneers cleared away the low jungle which had occupied the land in front, so that the fire of his guns might not be impeded.

Such was the position of the Beloochee army, described with as few technicalities as possible, so that the popular reader may comprehend the vast strength of such a post. With such intrenchments and nullahs, protecting his lines in every part, a native commander would naturally consider his lines unassailable.

The army of Sir Charles Napier did not number one-fifth of that of his opponent. He had 1100 horse, and nineteen guns; five

* The dry bed of a river, or of a canal, or other cut for containing water, is called a nullah.

† This village was also called Narajah.

of these belonged to the horse artillery. Two pieces of cannon, and a few hundred troops were left to guard the camp before Hyderabad. The rest of the little army, numbering less than five thousand men, and seventeen cannons, proceeded to attack the foe.* Arriving before the intrenched position of Mohammed, the English general instantly formed; in doing which, he adopted the plan taken at Meannee, advancing by *echelon* of battalions. The left of his line was too near that of the enemy, and had to be thrown back. The guns were placed in the intervals between the battalions of infantry; the cavalry covered the flanks. The right was somewhat "refused," because a wood towards that flank at once impeded the formation, and might cover the enemy's sharpshooters. The infantry of the enemy's left extended half a mile beyond that of the extreme right of the cavalry flankers of Sir Charles. This portion of the enemy's line was exposed to the general's view; not so their centre and right, which were hidden by the nullahs. The village of Dubba appeared to be unoccupied. Three British officers—Major Waddington of the engineers, and Lieutenants Brown and Hill, rode close up to the right centre of the position, and afterwards proceeded along the centre to its junction with the right, for the purpose of causing the enemy to show his force. This object was attained. Unable to conceive what these officers were about, the enemy stood on the defence, their first line starting up eagerly and firing. So close did these gallant officers ride to the line, that the ramps for leaving or entering the nullah was distinctly seen, and the precise position noted by Major Waddington. Sir Charles having thus cleverly reconnoitered, put his whole force in motion for the attack. His first object was, by rapidity, to gain the junction of the nullah with the Fullaillee, and, passing it, to seize the village before the enemy could penetrate his design.

The attack was led here, as at Meannee, by her majesty's 22nd regiment, and with equal, if not even surpassing, heroism. A cross fire from the British artillery so galled the enemy's centre, that his troops showed symptoms of unsteadiness, and moved towards the left as if to be out of range. On perceiving this, Major Stack, with the 3rd cavalry, under Captain Delamain, and the Scinde horse, under Captain Jacobs, charged the flank, towards which the bodies of infantry, detaching themselves from the centre, were tending. The major dashed across the nullah, cleared all obstacles, cut into the infantry, and pursued them for miles. This charge was exe-

* *Conquest of Scinde.*

cuted without orders, and, like most feats of the kind, however fortunate, entailed imminent peril to the army it was bravely intended to serve. Sir William Napier says:—"He thus exposed the flank of the line of battle, and exposed the whole army to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the selected division of Beloochees."

The 22nd regiment, under Captain George, was directed by Major Poole, who commanded the brigade to storm the nullah on the enemy's left, which was accomplished in the most daring manner. The enemy's right flank was turned by Captain Tait, with the Poonah horse, and by Major Story, with the 9th Bengal cavalry, pursuing the enemy as Major Stack did on the left, and cutting down the fugitives over several miles of their flight. Thus both flanks of the enemy were actually turned and defeated, the centre alone being able any longer to resist, which it did not do with any persistence, the remainder of the infantry and cavalry advancing with the regularity of a review, and the guns of the British from the right and left pouring in a terrible cross fire. Thus ended the battle of Dubba. The opinion of the great Duke of Wellington concerning it is on record:—"A brilliant victory, in which he (Sir Charles) showed all the qualities of a general officer, and in which the army displayed all the best qualities of the bravest troops." The British lost two hundred and seventy officers and men. More than half the number of casualties occurred in the 22nd regiment.

After this victory the spirit of the Scindians was broken, although Shere Mohammed still hoped to retrieve his disasters. From the field of battle Sir Charles marched to the south, entering Meerpore in triumph; and on the 4th of April the fortress of Omercote opened its gates. Sir Charles determined to surround, if possible, the fugitive Shere Mohammed. To accomplish this, he divided his army into three parts, holding himself the command of one, and giving the charge of the two others to Colonel Roberts and Captain Jacobs. Upon those two officers devolved the chief duties connected with the active prosecution of the plan. On the 8th of June, Colonel Roberts met the Ameer Shah Mohammed, and Captain Jacobs encountered Shere Mohammed six days after, the British in each case gaining a signal victory. Roberts, with a small force, defeated two thousand men, and captured the shah; Jacobs, with a very disproportionate force, vanquished about four thousand Beloochees, the shere flying to the desert, attended only by his personal retinue. These events gave great satisfaction in England and at Calcutta, and Lord Ellenborough

nominated Sir Charles to the government of Scinde. During his government no opportunity occurred for the display of his military genius. During the Sikh campaign, more than two years afterwards, Sir Charles marched by Mooltan from Scinde with a small force; and proceeding in advance, reached the grand army shortly after the sanguinary victory of Soobraon. If, however, the government of Sir Charles was not to be distinguished by any achievements of a military nature, it was very remarkable for its civil administration. The great Napoleon and his great rival both expressed (without either borrowing from the other) the opinion that civil qualities entered into the competency of a superior commander, even more than military. This seems to have been borne out by the management of armies, and by the administration in Scinde of Sir Charles Napier. He ruled Scinde arbitrarily, but justly; sternly, yet mercifully; in the interest of his country, yet for the welfare of the people. He held down with an iron hand all disposition to insubordination or revolt, nevertheless, so attached the people to him, that when he departed, they followed him with tears and lamentations. In war they gave him the formidable *soubriquet* of "Shatan;" in peace they almost adored him as a deity. Scinde was afflicted with many calamities during his reign, as one might very appropriately call his government; but his administration of its affairs created order, cherished industry, brought wide regions, previously unproductive, into cultivation, and preserved innumerable lives when famine and disease ravaged the whole realm.

The following statement of the difficulties with which Sir Charles had to contend was drawn up in an *expose* made to government, and suppressed by the Bombay council, or some of its officials. It is headed, "Sir Charles Napier to the Governor in Council. Bombay, Oct. 21, 1846." An extract only is made from the document:—"Plundering grain was rife all over the land while war lasted. People stole grain and concealed it, especially government grain; for the conquerors were strangers in the land, and fear pervaded all hearts, none knowing what the victorious foreigners would do; quantities of grain were therefore buried, and cultivation neglected. We at first had no knowledge of the proper men to employ as *kardars* and *umbardars*, nor did we know the amount of the collections which ought to be made; consequently, the government was robbed to an immense extent; an evil which still exists, though it gradually decreases. These *kardars*, therefore, took no pains with cultivation; they

were occupied with pillage. The canals could not be properly cleaned till the country was fairly settled; and without this clearing there could be neither health nor crops in Scinde. When we conquered Scinde the canals were choked up, for the ameer having resolved on war, everything relative to agriculture appears to have been abandoned for some time before the battle of Meanee; men were preparing for war. A plague of locusts fell upon Scinde. This was a heavy and extensive affliction; it not only consumed this country, but, I am told, ravaged whole provinces in Upper India, so that very small collections could be made there. Be that as it may, these locusts nearly destroyed the Scinde crop in 1844. The locusts were preceded by a dreadful epidemic, which raged from the end of August, 1843, to January, 1844, destroying thousands, and leaving those who survived unable to work. The troops suffered less than the people of the country; yet, out of seventeen thousand fighting men, thirteen thousand were helpless in the hospitals; and of the remaining four thousand, not above two thousand could have made a day's march. Cultivation was abandoned, for no man had strength to work. To close this catalogue of ills which fell upon the cultivation and people of Scinde in 1843 and 1844, the Indus suddenly fell, while the few crops which that year had been raised, were yet on the ground, and a vast portion thus perished from want of water, for the river did not again rise."

A powerful opposition was raised against Sir Charles among the Bombay officials, and a minute was recorded by the council, censuring the way in which Sir Charles supported the revenue of Scinde, which, it was alleged, was done by causing an artificially high price for grain after the revenue paid in that commodity was received by the governor. This minute was absolutely false, and gave rise to discussions in parliament when the disgraceful fact came to light, that, although the Bombay government produced a copy of the faithless minute, no minute could be found of the complete confutation of the calumny. It was a curious circumstance, that Sir Charles himself predicted that such would be the case after his death. The falsehood was, as he foretold, revived; the refutation was suppressed. Those officials, in their communications with the supreme government, represented Scinde as under "a pressure of financial difficulties," in consequence of the mal-administration of the governor, and the people as groaning under the excessive weight of taxation caused by his arbitrary, incompetent, and selfish government. Sir Charles

replied to these animadversions, showing their utter falsehood, in a brief despatch to the governor-general, Dec. 15, 1845, the following extracts from which will at once vindicate the aspersed hero, and disclose to the reader the lengths to which officials can go in injuring even men of the highest name who resist their interference, or refuse them homage:—

December 15th, 1845.

RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR,—In answer to the extract from a letter of the Secret Committee, I have to say:—

1. That transit duties were abolished in Scinde by Lord Ellenborough's orders in 1843. I am here to obey the orders which I receive. I cannot imagine why the "Secret Committee" should suppose I disobey those orders. The transit duties have not been reimposed upon the people of Scinde, nor any new tax.

2. There is no "pressure of financial difficulty" in Scinde: its revenues increase, and a surplus of about £250,000 sterling has already been placed to the credit of the Honourable Company, after defraying the cost of the civil government and 2,400 armed and disciplined police.

3. The supreme government, at my recommendation, sanctioned the adoption of the Bombay customs code, and desired me to substitute this code for the destructively severe system of the amcers in Scinde, and I have done so gradually. Like all changes having for object to diminish the receipt of taxation, it will probably reduce the revenue in a slight degree next year, but add to it afterwards. It is well understood by, and agreeable to the merchants and people, whose present burthens will be relieved. After the 1st of January, 1846, the heavy and, what is worse, the vexatious duties levied hitherto under

the old system of the amcers will cease, and be replaced by light import and export duties levied on the frontier, except on goods in transit through Scinde. In fine, the Bombay regulations are adopted.

4. I have the honour to enclose herewith a lithograph plan of the positions of the "Chokies," or custom-house ports which I am establishing at the entrances to Scinde; and I have been induced to hasten the establishment of these ports, for the purpose of preventing the entrance of opium not covered by passes.

5. Though I regret that my conduct should have failed to obtain for me what I think it deserves, the confidence of the home authorities in a sufficient degree to overturn the baseness of *secret* information, which I have reason to suppose was sent from Bombay, I have, nevertheless, the satisfaction of believing that I possess the confidence of your Excellency.

C. J. NAPIER.

Sir Charles left Scinde on the 1st of Oct., 1847. Mr. Pringle, a civilian, an officer of the company, succeeded him. That officer, in a report the last day of 1847, praises the clemency, wisdom, moderation, and firmness of his predecessor. These good opinions were repeated by Mr. Pringle's successor, Mr. Frere, occasion having occurred for notice on his part of the principles of administration adopted by Sir Charles Napier. The successors of the military chief were men very competent to the duties imposed on them. They nurtured the prosperity which Sir Charles initiated, and which he left as a happy legacy to Scinde.

CHAPTER CXVII.

WAR WITH CHINA—NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS—TREATY OF PEACE—OPENING OF FIVE PORTS TO EUROPEAN COMMERCE.

THE history of English interests in China, after the date with which the last chapter on this subject closed, continued for a number of years to be monotonous, disclosing no occurrences of a kind to interest the readers of a work on the general concerns of the British empire in the East. Only for short intervals did concord prevail at Canton between the Chinese authorities and the English, or indeed any foreign traders. The trade of most European nations declined, except that of the English. The American commerce fluctuated, and on the whole made no observable progress. Edicts of the viceroy were continually issuing against some practice or other of the English. At one time the presence of English ladies gave offence; at another, some assault was committed by some drunken sailor on a Chinese subject; then, questions were raised so frivolous and vexatious as greatly to

try the temper of the British merchants, who petitioned their government to insist on a redress of grievances, and the admittance of a resident at Peking. Remonstrances were made to the Chinese officials, in language respectful and proper; to which replies were given almost always to the same effect, that if the English did not like the terms upon which they were permitted to trade, there was no occasion for them to come so far, and by staying at home collisions with the subjects of his celestial majesty would be avoided. There was no answering this logic, however unsatisfactory the English might have considered it.

In the years 1830-31 the insults and aggressions offered by the Chinese authorities were intolerable, and it became necessary for the committee, to which the concerns of the East India Company were committed, to adopt measures of public remonstrance, addressed to

the Chinese people as well as to the officials. An appeal was made also to the Governor-general of India to interfere, first by negotiation, and, failing in that, by force. The English did not act with promptitude and spirit, such as alone the Chinese could understand. Forbearance and petitions only brought fresh indignities. It was only when the officers of his celestial majesty felt that the course pursued was one involving danger and inconvenience to themselves, that they were open to conviction. The bad feeling which at this period arrived at such a height, was aggravated by the clandestine opium traffic, and the affrays which arose out of it. As the year 1831 advanced, and at the beginning of 1832, the officers of the viceroy entered the foreign factories when they pleased, treated their inmates with violence and abuse, tortured servants and interpreters, and, finally, set about breaking up the landing-place opposite the factories. There appeared to be no motive for these outrages, but the wanton exercise of power, contempt and hatred of foreigners, and a desire on occasions to extort money.

In February, 1832, Mr. Lindsay and the Rev. Mr. Gutzloff were dispatched to the north-east coast of China: their instructions were rather indefinite, and their voyage abortive, except so far as the acquisition of useful information was concerned. Some ships had, however, disposed of valuable cargoes of opium, woollens, and calicoes on the northern coasts.

By an act of parliament, passed in the fourth year of his majesty's reign, entitled "An Act to regulate the Trade to China," it was, amongst other things, enacted that it might be lawful for his majesty, by any such order or orders as to his majesty in council might seem expedient and salutary, to give to the superintendents mentioned in the act, or any of them, power and authority over the trade and commerce of his majesty's subjects within any part of the dominions of the Emperor of China; and to impose penalties, forfeitures, or imprisonments for the breach of any regulations, to be enforced in such manner as should be specified in the orders in council. This act came into operation April 21st, 1834. At the court at Brighton, on the 9th day of December, 1833, an order in council was issued investing in the superintendents of trade appointed in virtue of that act, all the powers invested in the supercargoes of "the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies." On the same day, another order in council was issued, instituting, in virtue of the said act, a court of justice, with criminal and admiralty jurisdiction, for the trial of offences committed

by British subjects in the ports and harbours of China and within a hundred miles of its coasts. One of the superintendents mentioned in the act, was nominated to hold such court. The practice and proceedings of such court were to be conformable to those of the courts of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery in England. A third order in council was issued the same day, in virtue of the act already named, empowering the superintendents to levy and collect tolls from English ships entering any port where these superintendents might reside. It was also ordered that within forty-eight hours of the arrival in a Chinese port of any British ships, a manifesto in writing, upon oath, specifying the particulars of the cargo, should be sent by the master or supercargo to the superintendent. Lord Napier was dispatched as the chief superintendent of British trade, from Plymouth, in his majesty's ship *Andromache*. Matters had now arrived at an interesting epoch in the commercial connection between China and Great Britain. John Francis Davis, who succeeded Lord Napier as chief superintendent, observed of the juncture of affairs when Lord Napier was nominated to that office:—"On the 22nd April, 1834, the trade of the East India Company with China, after having lasted just two hundred years, terminated according to the provisions of the new act, and several private ships soon afterwards quitted Canton with cargoes of tea for the British Islands. One vessel had, previously to that date, sailed direct for England, under a special licence from the authorities of the East India Company. A most important national experiment was now to be tried, the results of which alone could set at rest the grand question of the expediency of free trade against the *Chinese monopoly*; or prove how individual traders were likely to succeed against the union of mandarins and mandarin merchants."

The number of superintendents which the new bill authorized was three, two others with Lord Napier were immediately nominated. The East India company now stood in a new relation to China. Instead of having the exclusive possession of the tea trade, and all but the exclusive trade in other commodities, the bill of 1833 deprived the company of the power of trading between China and Great Britain, and threw the whole of the Chinese commerce open to the enterprise of individual merchants. One consequence of this was, that as the operation of the act began a few months after it was passed, the company had to sell their fine ships, and other trading property, at heavy loss. These great changes by the British government were carried out

without any notice to the Chinese authorities, notwithstanding that the danger of such a course was pointed out by persons well acquainted with the temper of the Chinese government and people.

On the 15th of July, 1834, Lord Napier arrived at Macao. Mr. Davis and Sir George Robinson accepted the offices of superintendents with his lordship. According to the instructions given to Lord Napier, by the foreign secretary, he was immediately upon his arrival to announce his mission in a communication to the viceroy. That functionary refused to receive it, on the ground that Great Britain had no right to send a resident representative to Canton, without first obtaining the permission of the court of Peking. His lordship had no means of communication with the viceroy but through the Hong merchants, which he properly refused. His hands were tied up by such minute instructions from home, that no discretion was left to him in the midst of difficulties of which the home authorities could be no judges, and which could only be met by promptitude and address, as the exigencies arose. The Chinese meanwhile beset his lordship's house with soldiers, beat his servants, and continued to evince a feeling of rancorous hostility. His lordship was placed in a false position by the ignorance and wilfulness of the government at home, in spite of the warnings and protests of the Duke of Wellington, whose sagacious mind and oriental experience enabled him to foresee the issue of the pragmatism and conceited plans of Lord Grey. At last matters assumed so formidable an aspect of hostility, that Lord Napier was obliged to send for a guard of marines, and order the *Imogene* and *Andromache* frigates to the anchorage at Whampoa. As this order was executed, the guns of the Bocca Tigris fort opened fire upon the British, cutting away some ropes and spars, and wounding a sailor. The broadsides of the English frigates soon silenced these demonstrations of anger. As Tiger Island was approached, a still heavier fire was directed against the English, and a still more formidable reply was made to it. Each British ship had a man killed; the fortifications of the Chinese were much damaged, and the destruction of life among those who manned them was considerable. The men-of-war triumphantly sailed up to the anchorage. The Chinese now stopped the trade, demanding the withdrawal of the frigates, and the retirement of Lord Napier from China. The East India company had warned the government of the consequences of its precipitate and high-handed legislation, and the fruits were now borne. As was usual, the English, after for-

midable demonstrations of resolution, gave way the moment their trade sustained injury. The Chinese by their obstinacy and persistence gained a complete victory. The selection of Lord Napier for the important office committed to him might well have been questioned, as indeed it was both in England and China. His rank and party connections, not his fitness, determined the appointment. His lordship possessed excellent qualities, intellectual and moral, and was a useful public man; but no especial fitness was possessed by him for what might be called a Chinese embassy, or for a post which was even more difficult to fill than that of an ambassador. A few weeks after arriving at Macao, having abandoned the attempt to establish a residence at Canton, his lordship died, from the effects of the climate and the mortification which he felt at the failure of his mission, and the humiliation to which his country and himself were exposed by the incapacity of his government. This incapacity was the more to be regretted as the government of the day comprised men of great reputation, and Lord Palmerston was the secretary-of-state upon whom the execution of the orders in council devolved. Great as his lordship's talents were for the discharge of any duties which might be imposed upon him in connection with the relations between the United Kingdom and other parts of the world, his knowledge of oriental affairs and of commerce was small, and his capacity to deal with them, in common with that of the rest of the cabinet, insufficient. It was, however, a cabinet which would not be taught, but was carried away by popular applause, and pride of newly acquired power.

On the death of Lord Napier, the second superintendent assumed the chief direction of affairs. That gentleman was of opinion that an appeal to the government of Peking should be prosecuted, but this had been *forbidden* by the instructions delivered to Lord Napier in case of any dispute, without first communicating with the British foreign secretary. At this juncture the great Congregational missionary, Dr. Morrison, the Chinese interpreter to the superintendents, died. His loss was much felt because of his superior knowledge of the Chinese language and people. His son and the Rev. Mr. Gutzloff were nominated in his stead. The viceroy issued edicts commanding the English to elect or obtain from England a merchant, not a royal officer, to manage the trade. Of these edicts Mr. Davis took no notice, believing that the Chinese would find it necessary themselves to open communications with him. In January, 1855, Mr. Davis returned home;

Captain Elliot, who had acted as secretary to the commission, became second, and Sir George Robinson first superintendent.

The opening of the Chinese trade the previous year facilitated smuggling, and this was more especially carried on in connection with opium. The edicts of the imperial government against the admission of the drug had been as numerous as inoperative, but so prodigious was the increase of smuggling when the East India Company was deprived of the Chinese trade, that it became incumbent upon the imperial government to adopt vigorous measures to put a stop to it, or at once abandon all pretension to control contraband commerce upon its coasts. The increase of the importation of opium tended to weaken physically the Chinese population; to create poverty, idleness, and recklessness; to drain the country of silver, and to weaken the bands of authority; the imperial government was therefore roused to exertion to check or stop the injurious import.

Captain Elliot succeeded Sir George Robinson as chief superintendent. He foresaw that the open and daring conduct of the crowds of opium smugglers who mingled with those who pursued legitimate commerce would bring on a war, or the expulsion of European traders. He earnestly importuned the British government to invest him, or a successor, with power to interpose and to punish English subjects engaging in such unlawful dealings. The government refused to do this, substantially on the ground that it was not the province of foreign governments to act as revenue police or coast-guards for countries on whose shores their subjects smuggled. The government, however, declared that any smuggler resorting to force in case of attempts to arrest him by the Chinese authorities, should be considered as a pirate. This was more generous to China than just to the smugglers, whose dishonourable calling was no ground for acting towards them illegitimately. It was clearly the business of the mandarins to deal with the smugglers, Chinese or foreign, as best they could; and of the English authorities to discountenance the traffic by moral means, and to afford no protection to English subjects embarked in it.

The year 1838 opened at Canton unfavourably to commerce and to the prospects of peace. The Hong merchants had incurred enormous debts to the new traders under the free system. They refused to pay except by instalments, extending over a great number of years. The Chinese laws afforded to the barbarians no redress, there was only the old answer, "If you do not like the country, its laws, maxims, and customs, why don't you go

away? we do not wish you to stay." The Hong merchants had in this way cheated the English out of three millions of dollars. The amount of opium seized by the Chinese authorities amounted to two millions sterling. This opium was in many cases seized by mandarins who had connived at the illicit traffic, taking bribes to admit it, and seizing the contraband as well. The conduct of the Chinese officials was immoral and corrupt in these transactions.

On the 12th of July, 1838, Sir Frederick Maitland arrived in the ship of war *Wellesley*, and in consort with the war-brig *Algerine*, and was joined by the superintendent. The ships anchored in Tong-boo Bay, seven leagues south of the Bocca Tigris. The Canton government communicated in the old way through the Hong merchants; the superintendent sent back the despatches unopened, informing the bearer that the orders of the British government were peremptory to correspond only with the officers of his imperial majesty.

Captain Elliot then proceeded to Canton, and sent an unsealed letter by a mandarin to be communicated to the government. Mr. Davis thus relates what occurred:—"The paper was left open with a view to obviate the difficulty about the use of the character *pin*—a petition. It was conveyed to the viceroy, but the merchants returned it with a remark from his excellency that he could not take it unless it bore the character *pin*. Captain Elliot then declared that he had formally offered to set forth the peaceful purposes of the admiral's visit, and if the viceroy did not think fit to accept these explanations, his business at Canton was concluded, and he should forthwith retire. A British boat, meanwhile, passing the Bocca Tigris was fired upon by the forts; and when boarded by a mandarin, was required to state whether the admiral or any person belonging to him was there, as they should not be permitted to pass up. Sir Frederick, on being informed of this insult, remarked that he had come to China with a determination to avoid the least violation of customs or prejudices; but that he was nevertheless resolved to bear no indignity to the flag. He accordingly proceeded forthwith to the Bocca Tigris with the vessels under his command, to demand a formal disavowal of these unprovoked attacks. A civil letter was soon received from the Chinese admiral Kwan (afterwards discomfited in action with the *Volage* and *Hyacinth*), asking the reason of Admiral Maitland's visit; and in reply to this, a demand was made for reparation on account of the late insult. The result was the mission of a mandarin captain of war-

junks to wait upon the British admiral, accompanied by one of less rank; and the expressions of disavowal of any intention to insult were written at the dictation of the higher officer by the hand of the other on board the *Wellesley* in the presence of the several parties. Sir Frederick Maitland signified his satisfaction with this declaration, and after the exchange of some civilities, returned to his former anchorage, and soon afterwards sailed away."

Only two months after this transaction the Chinese functionaries, irritated by the persistence of the smugglers, prepared to execute a native smuggler in the front of the factory; the remonstrances of the Europeans upon so gross an outrage being treated with disdain, they boldly armed and drove the executioners and the attendant guards away. The people approved of the dispersion of the party. Some of the Europeans, in the insolence and hardihood of their pride, contemptuously struck with sticks the lookers on; these immediately resented, and at last a mob of thousands, armed with such missiles as could be obtained, attacked the factories. The Chinese troops drove back the mob.

Captain Elliot offered to co-operate with the government in suppressing the river smuggling, and obtained a direct communication from the viceroy, thus gaining a precedent for carrying on official correspondence without the intervention of the "Hong."

For some time matters wore a more tranquil aspect, and the smuggling was much repressed. Early in 1839, a high commission of his imperial majesty arrived at Canton, and at once proceeded to adopt measures of extraordinary severity and injustice to terrify the Europeans and stop the traffic. His first act was to execute a native opium dealer in the square in front of the factories. This operation was attended by so powerful a force that the merchants could only haul down their flags and protest against the barbarous outrage. The despatches of Captain Elliot describe the demands of Commissioner Lin as extraordinary even from an oriental tyrant. He issued an edict directly to the foreigners, demanding that every particle of opium on board the ships should be delivered to the government, in order to its being burned and destroyed. At the same time a bond was required, in the foreign and Chinese languages, that "the ships should hereafter never again dare to bring opium; and that, should any be brought, the goods should be forfeited, and the parties suffer death; moreover, that such punishment would be willingly submitted to." He plainly threatened that if his requisitions were not complied with, the

foreigners would be overwhelmed by numbers and sacrificed; but at the same time made some vague promises of reward to such as obeyed.

Mr. Davis describes the events which followed with a brevity and completeness which will in a short compass place the reader in possession of the facts which led to what is popularly known in England as "the opium war."—"On first hearing of the proceedings at Canton the British superintendent, always present where danger or difficulty called him, hurried up in the gig of her majesty's ship *Larne*, and made his way to the factories on the evening of the 24th March, notwithstanding the efforts made to stop him. The state of intense distress in which he found the whole foreign community may be estimated by stating that the actual pressing difficulty was the obstinate demand that Mr. Dent, one of the most respectable English merchants, should proceed into the city and attend the commissioner's tribunal. Captain Elliot's first step was to proceed to Mr. Dent's house, and convey him in person to the hall of the superintendents. He immediately signified to the Chinese his readiness to let Mr. Dent go into the city with himself, and upon the distinct stipulation, under the commissioner's seal, that he was never to be moved out of his sight. The whole foreign community were then assembled, and exhorted to be moderate and calm. On the same night the native servants were taken away and the supplies cut off, the reason given being the opposition to the commissioner's summons. An arc of boats was formed, filled with armed men, the extremes of which touched the east and west banks of the river in front of the factories. The square between and the rear were occupied in considerable force; and before the gate of the hall the whole body of Hong merchants and a large guard were posted day and night, the latter with their swords constantly drawn. So close an imprisonment is not recorded in the history of our previous intercourse. Under these circumstances the British superintendent issued a most momentous circular to his countrymen, requiring the surrender into his hands of all the English opium actually on the coast of China at that date. In undertaking this immense responsibility, he had no doubt that the safety of a great mass of human life hung upon his determination. Had he commenced with the denial of any control on the occasion, the Chinese commissioner would have seized the pretext for reverting to his measures of intimidation against individual merchants, obviously his original purpose, but which Captain Elliot's sudden appearance had disturbed.

He would have forced the whole into submission by the protracted confinement of the persons he had determined to seize, and, judging from his proclamation and general conduct, by the sacrifice of their lives. On the 3rd of April it was agreed that the deputy superintendent should proceed down the river with the mandarins and Hong merchants, and deliver over to the commissioner 20,283 chests of opium from the ships which were assembled for that purpose below the Bocea Tigris. The imprisonment and blockade in the meanwhile remained undiminished at Canton, and attempts were made to extort from the foreigners the bond, by which their lives and property would be at the mercy of the Chinese government. This was evaded."

On the 4th of May, when all the opium was delivered, the imprisonment of the English ceased, with the exception of sixteen persons, who were retained until the 25th; they were liberated under an edict never to return to China. The commission restricted the trade of all other foreigners, when all English subjects had withdrawn. The conduct of Captain Elliot throughout these transactions was marvellously prudent and firm. The Duke Wellington described his concluding act as one "of courage and self-devotion such as few men had an opportunity of showing, and, probably, still fewer would have shown." His grace characterized the conduct of the Chinese commissioner and government with equal terseness. He "had never known a person filling a high station in another country treated in such a manner as Captain Elliot had been treated by the authorities of Canton."

The English took refuge at Macao, but were driven thence by a military demonstration on the part of Lin. An unarmed schooner was attacked by mandarin boats, and the crew murdered. Other aggressions followed. The English remained in their ships. The commissioner demanded that all their vessels should enter the river, and that a man should be delivered up for execution to atone for the life of a Chinese lost in a drunken broil with some sailors, English and American. Provisions were not allowed to be sold to the English ships, which were supplied indirectly through Macao, and by various hazardous boat enterprises. An English ship of war, the *Volage*, arrived most opportunely for the protection and supply of the English. Soon after an action was fought between the English vessels and the war-junks of the enemy, which was conducted by the British naval officers in a manner highly to their credit. This conflict arose and was conducted in the

following manner. On the 3rd of October the Chinese admiral left his anchorage, and stood out towards the English ships, which were got under weigh and moved towards the enemy. The war-junks then anchored in order of battle, and the British ships were "hove to." The English opened negotiations; the admiral replied that an Englishman must be given up to suffer death in atonement for the life of the Chinaman (previously referred to), killed in a drunken brawl. Captain Smith, the senior officer, considered that the safety of the ships demanded that he should repel this hostile demonstration. "At noon, therefore, the signal was made to engage, and the ships, then lying hove to at the extreme end of the Chinese line, bore away ahead in close order, having the wind on the starboard beam. In this way, and under easy sail, they ran down the Chinese line, pouring in a destructive fire. The lateral direction of the wind enabled the ships to perform the same evolution from the other extreme of the line, running up again with their larboard broadsides bearing. The Chinese answered with much spirit, but the terrible effect of the English fire was soon manifest. One war-junk blew up at pistol-shot distance from the *Volage*, three were sunk, and several others water-logged. The admiral's conduct is said to have been worthy of his station. His junk was evidently better manned and armed than any of the others; and after having weighed, or perhaps cut or slipped his cable, he bore up and engaged her majesty's ships in handsome style. In less than three quarters of an hour, however, he and the remainder of his squadron were retiring in great distress to their former anchorage, and, as Captain Smith was not disposed to protract destructive hostilities, he offered no obstruction to their retreat. It is to be feared, however, that this clemency was thrown away upon the Chinese, who have no conception of the true principles of such forbearance, and subsequent facts show that they actually claimed the victory. This they perhaps founded on the circumstance of her majesty's ships making sail for Macao, for the purpose of covering the embarkation of the English who might see fit to retire from that place, and of providing for the safety of the merchant ships. On the 4th of November, the *Volage* joined the fleet at Hong-Kong, and the *Hyacinth* was left at Macao to watch events in that quarter. It was time that the Chinese should receive such a lesson as the foregoing, for not long prior to it they had robbed and burned a Spanish brig, the *Bilbaino*, utterly unconnected with opium, under the plea that she was an Eng-

lish vessel, though her proper flag was flying."* The treatment which the unfortunate crew of this Spanish ship received was cruel, barbarous, and unrelenting, affording no pretence of justification.

There was still some trade carried on by the English through the intervention of the Americans, who were the only foreigners that submitted to the requisitions of the Chinese authorities. They carried out Chinese commodities in their boats to the English ships, and received goods in return, driving for some time a profitable trade. This, however, was not permitted to last. The Chinese on discovering what took place, effectually put a stop to all commercial intercourse with the English. Captain Elliot could now do nothing until instructions from his government arrived.

The view taken by the British government was that a declaration of war could alone adjust matters. War was accordingly declared, and a powerful force sent to compel compliance with English demands. This war was unpopular in England. The view taken of it by the mass of the people was, that it was declared for the purpose of enforcing sales of opium, and that this was done to enrich the East India Company as the growers of that commodity. The narrative already given proves that the company had nothing to do with the transactions which led to the struggle. These transactions began when the company was no longer permitted to trade with China, and were a consequence of throwing open the trade, which the Duke of Wellington, and other eminent persons well acquainted with the East, foresaw and foretold. Had the trade been continued in the hands of the company, such a war could not have broken out; although on other grounds a rupture with China might have arisen. Whatever the advantages of giving freedom to the trade with China, the disadvantage at that particular juncture of opening a door for the smuggling of opium was attendant upon that event. Her majesty's government gave no countenance to the opium smugglers, but rather passed beyond its proper province in denouncing and thwarting it. Captain Elliot was willing to co-operate with the Chinese officials to suppress it, even by giving an extreme interpretation to his powers as chief superintendent, but the Chinese authorities treated his overtures contemptuously and arrogantly, although unable to put a stop to it themselves. Yet all these facts were suppressed by the parties who carried on the agitation against

the government of Calcutta and of London, in connection with the war. Apart from those who were actuated by party opposition against the section of English politicians then in power, the denouncers of the government consisted mainly of the members of the Peace Society, and of the Society of Friends, the former being chiefly composed of the latter. Lecturers were hired, men of clever debating powers, and eloquent, who convened meetings all over England, denouncing the war as neither forced upon us by necessity nor demanded by justice. The Chinese were represented by these lecturers as an amiable and honest race, whose government was highly moral, and being virtuously intent upon protecting its people from the enervating and dissipating effect of opium, adopted police and revenue regulations full of wisdom, which the English superintendants and Captain Elliot, the English merchant of trade, infringed in violation of international law, of natural right, and of the law of God. All these statements were false, except so far as that Englishmen were among the opium smugglers, as adventurous English seafaring men will be found amongst smugglers off the coasts of every country whose revenue system allows a contraband trade to become profitable. These allegations were, however, pretexts. The real motive with the Peace Society, and the religious body called Quakers, was to make an efficient and popular protest against war, which they believed, under any circumstances, to be contrary to the law of God, inexpedient, and in the long run injurious to the cause it was employed to promote. The occurrence of every war in which their country happens to be engaged brings out this party in a similar mode of action. The same or other orators are hired to preach down the policy of the existing government which has entered upon the war, and because it has done so, and to arraign and denounce the Englishmen who may, however unjustly treated, have been the victims, and thereby the occasion of the hostilities. These agents of the Peace Society invariably represent their own countrymen as cruel and sanguinary, actuated by unjust views and selfish aims, and inflicting undeserved injury upon harmless and well-intentioned nations, who by British brutality are forced into efforts of self-defence. The policy of such representations is to rouse the English people to put a stop to the war itself, and so secure a victory to the peace principle. Probably no public body, no society, no party, ever adopted a line of procedure more dishonest than this. If all war be unjustifiable on Christian principles in the opinion of the Society of Friends, the church of the Mora-

* *The Chinese.* By John Francis Davis, Esq., F.R.S., and Governor of Hong-Kong: London, Cox, King William Street, Strand.

vians, or any other religious association or church, it is the duty of such to put forth that opinion as a theological or social question to be discussed, and to extend it by a zealous and honourable propagandism; but to pervert facts, to extenuate, deny, or conceal the crimes and injuries of races or nations that have made war upon England, and to cover with obloquy by scandalous falsehoods the character and conduct of all English statesmen and men of the profession of arms, who assert what they believe to be the rights of Englishmen by military force, is worse than war itself, less reputable than even an unjust appeal to arms, and is an exemplification of bigotry, tyranny, and aggression on the part of those who profess liberality, benevolence, and peace, demoralising to the public, and dishonouring to the cause of free discussion.

The British government was extremely unwilling to go to war with China, and even at the last hour adopted all means to avert it. This fact was kept out of sight by the agitators of the Peace Society, and of the Society of Friends, when common justice required that it should have its fair representation in the estimate which they invited the English people to form of their rulers and of the causes of the war. The government of her majesty felt it to be intolerable that in order to put down smuggling and smugglers, even if Englishmen had been exclusively the offenders, which was not the case, the Chinese officials should seize nonoffending merchants, and the representative of her majesty, hold them for many weeks in durance, and menace their lives, unless others of their countrymen, the real offenders, should surrender the prohibited commodity. The English representative could only by the force of his character, by promises of indemnity, and by an appeal to the patriotism of his offending countrymen, on the ground of the danger to which he and the inoffensive merchants seized by the Chinese were exposed, obtain the surrender of the opium. The English government could not with justice refuse to make good the promise of indemnity, and it was right and just that the Chinese should be compelled to refund the money, to apologise for the outrage offered to English subjects and the English representative, and to give guarantees for future rectitude towards her majesty's subjects, who might carry on legitimate trade in their country.

To the demands of the British government the Chinese especial commissioner and plenipotentiary replied by a proclamation, couched in terms of vindictive violence and supercilious scorn, offering a reward for the heads of Englishmen, and to all who might succeed in

setting fire to their ships. So bloody and truculent was this imperial manifesto, that when copies reached England, accustomed although Englishmen were to oriental bloodthirstiness in so many various Indian wars, all classes were filled with horror, except the members of the Peace Society, who rather availed themselves of such documents as proving the lengths to which the amiable, sensible, quiet, industrious, virtuous Chinese might be driven by the injustice of Englishmen and their government.

All efforts to avert war on the part of the British officials having failed, it was at length commenced with a resolution and spirit worthy of the object proposed. The British government, however, began with the errors in which English ministers usually begin hostilities. The military force was much too small. The naval department of the expedition was sufficient, but so few were the troops, that throughout the campaign they were exposed to great hardships; no reliefs could be obtained, when humanity, economy, and military science all conspired to demand such arrangements as would have ensured them. The comforts of the men were shamefully neglected. Their food was of the worst quality; many of the soldiers died from the badness of their provisions. There was an almost total neglect of sanitary arrangements for the troops both on board ships and on shore. The men were nearly as badly off for air, water, and the means of cleanliness, as those on board the plague-stricken transports which were used in the Crimean war at a later period. The provision for medical requirements was disgracefully inadequate. The soldiers clothing was not regulated by the climate in which they were sent to make war: during the fierce summer of southern China the men wore the flaming red jacket buttoned over the chest, and the hard stock buckled tight round the throat; men fell dead both in action and on other duty from these causes, yet even the commanding officers were averse from any relaxation of "the regulation dress." The officers were well taken care of, and just as it occurred in the war around Sebastopol, the proportion of officers who fell in battle was considerable, while few died from disease; whereas of the men a large portion of the whole army perished from sickness, induced by causes over which the government and commanding officers had control. The men, nobly brave, generously devoted to their duty, loyal to their sovereign, and faithful to their officers, were treated with a contemptuous indifference by the chief authorities, civil and military, which cannot be too sternly denounced upon the page of history.

The expedition against China set out from Calcutta in April, 1840. The 17th of that month the last transport left the Hoogly.

CAPTURE OF CHUSAN.

The first operations of a formidable nature were directed against Chusan. It was made an easy conquest on the 5th of July, 1840. It was garrisoned by a considerable body of troops, amounting to 3650. In little more than three months only 2036 men were fit for duty; the rest were in hospital or in the grave. Men conversant with the condition of these brave fellows have written as follows:—"Between three and four hundred had been interred, and about fifteen hundred were sick. The gallant Cameronians were reduced to a perfect skeleton, and the brave 49th were scarcely in a better condition. No doubt this was mainly to be attributed to the want of fresh and wholesome provisions, predisposing the constitution of the men to the agues and fevers epidemical in this place; for we find the sickness comparatively mild amongst the officers, who had means of living on a more generous diet; and that much sickness, it was said, prevailed among the Chinese. The seamen and officers on board the ships were not sickly.* Dr. D. McPherson says,† 'So great was the dread of exciting a bad feeling, and causing discontent among the natives, that our men were obliged to live in their tents when there were thousands of houses available for that purpose; and without regard to the health of the men, or consulting medical authorities on the subject, positions were laid out for the encampment of the troops. Parades and guard-mounting in full dress, with a thermometer ranging from ninety degrees to one hundred degrees, made the scenes resemble the route of garrison duty in India.' 'Men were placed in tents‡ pitched on low paddy-fields, surrounded by stagnant water, putrid and stinking from quantities of dead animal and vegetable matter. Under a sun hotter than that ever experienced in India, the men on duty were buckled up to the throat in their full dress coatees; and in consequence of there being so few camp followers, fatigue parties of Europeans were daily detailed to carry provisions and stores from the ships to the tents, and to perform all menial employments, which experience has long taught us they cannot stand in a tropical climate. The poor men, working like slaves, began to sink under the exposure and fatigue. Bad provisions, low spirits, and

despondency drove them to drink.* This increased their liability to disease, and in the month of November there were barely five hundred effective men in the force.† 'Medical men, as is often the case, were put down as croakers, they were not listened to.'

It is horrible to relate of Englishmen and of British officials, that when the men were literally rotting away, the officers scarcely suffering anything, and it was proposed by the medical men to receive them on board-ship, where they might be preserved in health, the cold-blooded reply was, that "the authorities would not be justified in incurring the expense!" Such is the testimony of Dr. McPherson, who was a spectator of this hardened sacrifice of human life to save something about £100 a day.

On the 6th of November, 1840, a truce was concluded between the imperial commissioner and Rear-admiral Elliot. Subsequently orders arrived for the evacuation of the island, which took place on the 22nd of February, 1841, when the troops and ships of war proceeded to the Canton river. Before they arrived there, other events had transpired. It became plain that the Chinese made the truce available to gain time, and had no intention of negotiating for peace. It was supposed by the emperor and his mandarins, that China was invincible, and that the barbarians would lose patience, hope, and courage, and leave her coasts. The time of the cessation of hostilities having transpired without the hostile officers coming to terms, the clash of arms was again renewed.

BATTLES OF CHEUMPEE AND TYCOCTOW.

A force was disembarked on the 7th of January, 1841, upon the island of Cheumpee. The command of this detachment was confided to Major Pratt, of the 26th, or Cameronian regiment. Major Hough gives the following brief account of the action there and at Tycoctow:—"The force under the gallant major consisted of men of the royal artillery, and marines, and seamen, six hundred and seventy-four; 37th Madras native infantry, six hundred and seven; and Bengal volunteers, seventy-six. Also one hundred invalids, who had arrived from Chusan. Her majesty's ships *Calliope*, *Larne*, and *Hyacinth*, under Captain Herbert, proceeded to bombard the lower fort, while the steamers *Nemesis* and *Queen*, threw shells into the hill forts and intrenchments on the inner side,—the *Wellesley* and other large ships moving up into mid-channel, in case they might be required. The

* Statement of a Bengal assistant-surgeon, recorded by Major Hough.

† Madras army. *Two Years in China*, 1842, p. 12.

‡ *Two Years in China*, p. 21.

* Shamsoo—no arrak to be had.

† Out of 3650 men, landed in July, 1840.



W. B. Wood

[W. C. Wood]

THE BOMBARDMENT OF CANTON.

Chinese kept up a fire for an hour. Had the enemy's guns been a little more depressed, much mischief would have been done. When their firing had slackened a little, the infantry advanced. All the enemy's positions were carried, and their loss was great. In the forts there were eighty-two guns, and as many in the war-junks. Their force was about two thousand men, of whom six hundred must have been killed, and as many wounded. The fort of Tycoetow was carried by the division under Captain Scott, consisting of the *Druid*, *Samarang*, *Modeste*, and *Columbine*. The next day the signal of a flag of truce was exhibited on board the *Wellesley*."

The truce lasted for three days. On the fourth day, when the troops were in expectation of renewing hostilities, a proclamation from Captain Elliot, announced that preliminaries of peace between the high commissioner and himself had been agreed upon. It was in virtue of this agreement that orders had been sent for the evacuation of Chusan.

OPERATIONS IN THE CANTON RIVER.

These preliminary arrangements for peace were a blind for the prosecution of warlike projects and a new effort to wear out the English by procrastination. This was soon made apparent. Hong-Kong was taken possession of by the English; the Chinese began hostilities in the Canton river by firing upon the English boats; which resulted in a successful attack by the British upon the Chinese forts. In these operations her majesty's ships *Wellesley*, *Calliope*, *Samarang*, *Druid*, *Herald*, and *Modeste* were engaged with the batteries, and Major Pratt mastered the defences on the island of Wantong, taking 1,300 prisoners. The troops led by the major were detachments of his own gallant Cameronians, of her majesty's 49th regiment, the 37th Madras native infantry, volunteers from the Bengal infantry, and a few of the royal marines. The *Blenheim*, *Melville*, and *Queen* silenced, by their broadsides, the batteries of Arunghoy. Sir H. F. Senhouse, at the head of the marines, landed and drove the Chinese from the works which they had constructed at such prodigious labour and expense, and defended with so much hope. The Chinese Admiral Kwan, who had on a former occasion behaved with so much spirit, perished, his junk having been blown up. The light squadron of the navy advanced farther up the river, under Captain Herbert, of the *Calliope*, as its commodore. At "the first bar" the enemy was found strongly posted on the left bank, close to Whampoa Reach; vessels were sunk to block the passage, and a fleet of forty war-junks was drawn across in order of battle.

The *Madagascar* and *Nemesis* soon dispersed the flotilla, and after some hours' firing, silenced the batteries. The marines then, as usual, landed, driving before them, almost without opposition, ten times their number. A captured Chinese, upon being interrogated as to the little resolution displayed in defending the batteries, replied, "If you must come in, we must go out," and seemed to think this a conclusive explanation of the facility of retreat displayed by his countrymen. Sir Gordon Bremer quickly joined Captain Herbert, and the advanced squadron, a portion of which soon arrived within sight of the walls of Canton. This several writers represent as the first time English ships of war were seen from Canton.*

At the end of March, Sir Gordon Bremer left for Calcutta, in order to bring up reinforcements. A convention was soon after entered into, by virtue of which the trade was partially reopened. This convention, like all other temporising expedients, only tended to prolong the war. Heavier metal than protocols and agreements was necessary to impress China with the conviction of barbarian superiority, and the imperative claims of justice.

ATTACK ON CANTON.

On the 2nd of May Major-general Sir Hugh Gough took the command of the forces. On the 24th, operations were commenced against Canton. Its "braves" were very boastful, and its officials still wrapped up in fancied security and unyielding pride. The plan of action was as follows:—The right column, in tow of the *Atalanta*, to attack and keep the factories. This force consisted of 309 men and officers of the Cameronians, an officer of artillery and 20 men, and an officer of engineers, the whole under command of Major Pratt. The left column, towed by the *Nemesis*, in four brigades, to move left in front, under Lieutenant-colonel Morris. His majesty's 49th (Major Stephens), 28 officers and 273 men; 37th Madras native infantry, Captain Duff, 11 officers and 219 men; one company Bengal volunteers, Captain Mee, 1 officer and 114 men; artillery (royal), under Captain Knowles, 3 officers, 33 men; Madras artillery, Captain Anstruther, 10 officers, 231 men; sappers and miners, Captain Cotton, 4 officers, 137 men. Ordnance—four 12-pounder howitzers, four 9-pounder field-pieces, two 6-pounders, three $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch mortars, and one hundred and fifty-two 32-pounder

* Continuation of Hume and Smollett's *History of England*: Virtue & Co., City Road and Ivy Lane, London. Major Gough's account of the campaign in China. *Annual Register* for 1841.

rockets. Navalbrigade, under Captain Bouchier (*Blonde*)—1st naval battalion, Captain Maitland (*Wellesley*), 11 officers, 172 men; 2nd naval battalion, Commander Barlow (*Nimrod*), 16 officers, 231 men. Reserve, under Major-general Burrell—Royal marines, Captain Ellis, 9 officers, 372 men; 18th Royal Irish, Lieutenant-colonel Adams, 25 officers, 495 men. The right column took possession of the factories before five o'clock, p.m. The left column reached near the village of Tsing-hae, the point of debarkation, about five miles, by the river line, above the factories.

Sir Hugh's despatch contained the following passage:—"The heights to the north of Canton, crowned by four strong forts, and the city walls, which run over the southern extremity of these heights, including one elevated point, appeared to be about three and a-half miles distant; the intermediate ground undulating much, and intersected by hollows, under wet, paddy cultivation, enabled me to take up successive positions, until we approached within range of the forts on the heights, and the northern face of the city walls. I had to wait here some time, placing the men under cover, to bring up the rocket battery and artillery." A strongly intrenched camp, of considerable extent, which lay to the north-east of the city, was taken and burnt.

On the 26th, Sir Hugh Gough hoisted a flag of truce, and gave the Tartar general two hours to consider the necessity of a capitulation, or for the commissioner to decide upon yielding to the demands of the plenipotentiaries. No notice was taken of Sir Hugh by either official, and he was preparing to storm the place, when Captain Elliot stayed his sword, by announcing another agreement upon preliminaries.

Sir Hugh Gough attacked the vast city with less than three thousand men, and captured the factories and the forts on the heights with a loss of only fourteen killed and ninety-one wounded. The naval commander reported an additional loss of six killed and forty-two wounded. The Chinese admitted a loss of two thousand killed and wounded. A Chinese army of forty-five thousand men had been collected for the defence of the city. This army was obliged, by the convention with Captain Elliot, to evacuate the city. The military force at the disposal of the plenipotentiaries was absurdly small; it might have burned or plundered Canton, but it could not conquer and hold it. The English consented to spare the place upon the payment of a ransom. The troops were brought from Canton, upon the execution of the convention, to Hong-Kong, where they suffered decimation by sickness, arising from the unhealthy-

ness of the place and the want of sanitary care on the part of those in charge of them.

The conduct of Captain Elliot and Sir G. Bremer did not give satisfaction to the authorities at Calcutta, nor London; their measures were deemed too temporising. A more firm policy and active course of procedure were held by those in power to have more befitted the occasion. Accordingly, soon after, Sir G. Bremer returned to China from Calcutta, and he and Captain Elliot went home. Rear-admiral Sir W. Parker, and Major-general Sir Henry Pottinger arrived as plenipotentiaries. It was at once determined by these high personages, that the war was not likely to be brought to an issue on the Canton river, that a blow must be struck nearer to the metropolis of the empire. The time lost up to this period was most injurious to the cause for which the English fought, and to the men by whom these victories were obtained.

CONQUEST OF AMOY.

The first enterprise of the new plenipotentiaries was the subjugation of Amoy, off the harbour of which the fleet found a rendezvous, on the 25th of August. The defences of the harbour were very strong, consisting of a continued battery of granite a mile in extent. This granite wall was faced by mud and turf several feet thick, so as to conceal the fortification. The embrasures were roofed, and thickly covered with turf, so as to protect the gunners. This battery terminated at either end in a high wall, connected with rocks which were of great elevation and parallel to the beach. A channel six hundred yards in width between Amoy and the island of Ko-long-soo, was the entrance to the harbour. The fleet opened fire upon these fortifications in all their extent, and a dreadful cannonade was sustained for four hours by these works, without sensible injury. At last the troops landed, and assailed by escalade the flanking wall. The task seemed almost impossible, but the grenadier and light companies of the Royal Irish forced their way through every difficulty, and drove the enemy back. These gallant fellows were alone within the enemy's enclosure, with the whole host opposed to them. They acted as skilfully as bravely; having driven the enemy back with the bayonet, killing more men than had fallen from the fire of the whole fleet, they opened a gate, through which the rest of the army entered and took possession of the place. Ko-long-soo was an easier conquest, and contemporaneous with that of the great battery. The British acquired much provisions and stores useful in such a campaign. The quantity of corn, powder, and Chinese weapons captured was

enormous. The engineers blew up the magazines, broke up and inundated the arsenals, set fire to the war-junks and timber collected for building more, spiked five hundred cannon, and left the dockyards and fortifications in desolation. A force of five hundred and fifty men were placed in Ko-long-soo, and the ships *Pylades*, *Druid*, and *Algerine* were left in the neighbourhood; the rest of the armament moved on.

RECAPTURE OF CHUSAN.

This place had been newly fortified, on the same plan as Amoy. The embrasures for guns were 270, but not half of these were supplied with cannon, nor were the remainder efficient in half their number. Other works had been raised on heights commanding the approaches. The attack was made on the 1st of October, Sir Hugh Gough in person taking a very active part in the most dangerous portion of the enterprise. Two columns were landed, of 1,500 and 1,100 men respectively. The storm lasted for two hours, and was completely successful. The enemy lost 1,500 men. Many mandarins were among the slain. The British left a garrison of four hundred men, and proceeded to Chinhae.

CAPTURE OF CHINHAË.

This place was strongly fortified, after the Chinese fashion, and being the key to the great and rich city of Ningpo, its defence and capture were regarded as very important by those upon whom these different duties devolved. The city is built on the left bank of the Ta-hæ, and was defended by a strong citadel. The ships took up their positions so as to shell the citadel, and enfilade the batteries. Sir Hugh adopted the same method of attack which had been successful in the assaults elsewhere; he landed separate columns, who escaladed the flanking walls, and took the batteries in reverse. Captain Sir T. Herbert, R.N., Lieutenant-colonel Craigie, and Lieutenant-colonel Morris commanded separate columns of attack. The bombardment was most destructive. The flight of shells and rockets rushed from the ships in a continual stream. The city was in some places a heap of ruins, and thousands of its defenders lay dead or dying, while only nineteen of the assailants were killed or wounded. A garrison of five hundred men was left at Chinhae. The troops left in occupation of the conquered places caused such a deduction from the numerical force of the British as to tell seriously upon it, and there yet remained much work to perform before concession was likely to be wrung from so obstinate an enemy.

CAPTURE OF NINGPO.

The Chinese had expended all their precaution on Chinhae, and, believing it to be unassailable, took little thought about Ningpo. The Tartar troops had been so severely handled at the former place, that they were unwilling again to be brought into collision with British troops. The English force which landed for the purpose of storming this great city, did not exceed one thousand men. The gates were barricaded, but no one had the courage to defend the walls, which were escaladed; the Chinese assisted the escaladers to open the gates from within. The capture was made on the 13th of October, 1841. The English held possession, but so small was their force that the Chinese army in the field gained heart, and ventured to attack both Ningpo and Chinhae on the 10th of March, 1842. The disproportion of numbers was very great, but the enemy after some fighting, and after succeeding in penetrating to the interior of the city of Ningpo, were repulsed with slaughter. They made a bold attack upon the ships with fire-rafts, which was skilfully averted.

Intelligence reached the English commander that two intrenched camps were constructed at Tsekee, near the Segoon hills.* It was determined to disperse the army collected there. On the 15th of March the troops were embarked on board the steamers *Queen*, *Nemesis*, and *Phlegethon*, and early in the afternoon landed within four miles of the camps. The British plan of attack was the same as had been adopted at the other captured places. The enemy made a feeble resistance. The English had only three killed and twenty-two wounded; all the killed and most of the wounded belonged to the sailors and marines; her majesty's 49th regiment numbered the remaining wounded, which were four rank and file and three officers, Captain T. S. Reignolds, and Lieutenants Montgomerie and Lane.

Early in May the city of Ningpo was evacuated, and the expedition advanced up the Yang-tse-kiang; two hundred men were, however, left in garrison upon the Pagoda Hill at Chinhae.

On the 18th the expedition arrived at Chapoo, about fifty-five miles from Chinhae;† the enemy was numerous, and made formidable preparations for resistance. The assailing force was small. The British, as usual, under Sir Hugh Gough, attacked in three columns. The usual result followed—the enemy fled. In their flight a body of less than three hundred Tartars had their retreat

* Bingham says, *on the hills*, vol. ii. p. 297.

† *Ibid.*

cut off by the Cameronians. They threw themselves into a joss-house, and supposing that they would receive no quarter, defended it with great resolution: it was loop-holed, situated in a defile, and altogether difficult to assail; cannon made no impression upon it, and the musketry fire upon the loop-holes did not effect much. Attempts to break open the door were futile, so strong was it, and those who made the attempt suffered from the cool fire of the Tartars; amongst these that fine officer Lieutenant-colonel Tomlinson of the Royal Irish. Major Hough gives a different version, and perhaps the correct one, of his fall. There was, according to that officer's account, a wicket into which the soldiers might enter by single file; Tomlinson bravely set the example, and as he entered was either shot or cut down.* Several of the officers and soldiery of the Royal Irish persevered in entering one by one, and suffered a similar fate. The gate was breached by bags of gunpowder, and the place previously fired by rockets; the troops entered, putting the defenders to the bayonet or making them prisoners. The loss of the British in killed and wounded was sixty. The total loss of the Chinese was about sixteen hundred, but many wounded had been carried away while the Irish were storming the joss-house. The city was nearly destroyed by the fire of the British guns and rockets. The proportion of officers who were killed or wounded in our force, especially of superior officers, made this affair one of the most serious during the war.

The expedition still advanced, effecting minor objects in its course, until the 16th of June, when her majesty's ship *Dido*, with eight transports containing troops sent from India, joined the fleet.

At Woo-sung, where that river forms a junction with the embouchure of the Yang-tse-kiang, and at Paoushan, bodies of Chinese troops had been dispersed, and collections of war material of various sorts destroyed, while the squadron waited for the arrival of reinforcements. On the accession of force the armament proceeded to attack Shanghai.† The capture of Shanghai was effected with exceedingly little battle, although considerable trouble and fatigue to both the maritime and military forces. The Admiral Sir W. Parker, the General Sir Hugh Gough, and Lieutenant-colonel Montgomerie especially exerted themselves.

Immediately after this success still further

* *The War with China.* By Major Hough.

† In the geographical portion of this work the reader will find a fuller account of the Chinese cities, and of China generally, than is to be found in any work not exclusively occupied by information concerning that empire.

reinforcements arrived. The *Belleisle*, from England, and a fleet of transports from India, brought the means of a still more vigorous prosecution of the war. Company's troops from both the Bengal and Madras settlements, and her majesty's 98th regiment, with Lord Saltoun and other officers of distinction, joined the expedition.

On the 6th of July seventy-three ships of war, including small craft, and attended by transports, proceeded up the Yang-tse-kiang. On the 17th Captain Bonchier, in the *Blonde*, was ordered to blockade the entrance to the grand canal. A fine squadron was placed at his disposal, composed of the *Modeste*, *Dido*, *Calliope*, *Childers*, *Plover*, *Starling*, and *Queen* and *Nemesis* steamers. Bonchier executed the task committed to him in an admirable manner, cutting off the whole junk trade with Peking, one of the severest blows that could be inflicted upon his celestial majesty. On the 19th the *Cornwallis* took up a position off the city of Tchang-kiang, at the entrance of the south grand canal, while her marines occupied the Island of Kinshan. On the 21st the rest of the ships destined to operate against that city were at their berths, and the troops were landed, divided in the old way and attacking upon the old plan. The 1st column was under the command of Lord Saltoun, an officer who had seen much war, and had always acquitted himself well. He served in Sicily, 1806-7; Corunna, 1808-9; Walcheren, 1809; Cadiz, 1811; Peninsula; Quatre Bras and Waterloo. Sir Hugh Gough in person superintended the operations of the 2nd column. The 3rd column was placed under Major-general Bartley. The Tartar garrison was not very large, but very superior numerically to their assailants. The troops which composed it were picked men, most of them of gigantic stature and proved strength. They fought with desperate courage, under the impression, which the mandarins had inculcated, that the English would give no quarter. The guns at the embrasures were well served, the walls were high, and the gates strong. The engineers blew open the gates with bags of powder, and on other points escalades were effected. It was not until a large portion of the city lay in ruins under shell, and shot, and rockets, or was in conflagration, and the Tartar troops were nearly all put to the bayonet, that the English were masters of the place. When all opposition ceased, the sights that were disclosed filled the British with horror. Many of the citizens, and especially persons of rank, had cut the throats of their wives and children, and hung themselves in their houses, rather than fall into the hands of an enemy whom



SIR H. POTTINGER.

they were taught to believe neither spared man nor woman in their fury. Heaps of corpses were found lying in some of the houses to which the spreading flames had communicated themselves, and the odours of burning flesh told too truly what was taking place in others. Sir W. Parker, at the head of his marines, was frequently engaged in hand to hand conflicts with men who resisted with the wildest desperation. Lieutenant Crouch, R.N., and the crews in the boats of the *Blonde* suffered severely while operating on the Grand Canal, and the boats were with difficulty saved. The list of casualties after this day's conflict was very heavy. Bingham relates that the "arms and arsenals were destroyed, and the walls breached in many places." He also states that "the cholera broke out among our troops, and destroyed many men." The commanders-in-chief, to avert from Nankin the calamities that had befallen Tehang-kiang, dispatched the Tartar secretary with a summons and terms of capitulation to New-kién, viceroy of the two Kiang provinces. Keying and Elepoo again attempted to open communications, but had not full power to negotiate.

On the 11th of August the fleet and 4,500 soldiers were assembled before Nankin, the old southern capital of the empire. The regular troops of the garrison did not amount to more than three times the number of their assailants, but an immense host of irregulars were within the walls. The Tartar general sued for an armistice of two days, as mandarins of the highest rank were on their way from Peking to treat for peace. This was conceded, but with some misgivings that the only object of the enemy was to gain time.

On the 17th of August a treaty of peace was signed between the Chinese commissioners and Sir Henry Pottinger, the British plenipotentiary. The following are its terms:

1. Lasting peace and friendship between the two empires.

2. China to pay twenty-one million dollars,* in the course of the present and three succeeding years.

3. The ports of Canton, Amoy, Foo-choo-foo, Ningpo, and Shanghai, to be thrown open to British merchants; consular officers to be appointed to reside at them; and regular and just tariff of impost and export (as well as inland transit) duties to be established and published.

4. The island of Hong-Koog to be ceded in perpetuity to her Britannic majesty, her heirs and successors.

5. All subjects of her Britannic majesty (whether natives of Europe or India), who may be confined in any part of the Chinese empire, to be unconditionally released.

* Four million two hundred thousand pounds, at two shillings per dollar.

6. An act of full and entire amnesty to be published by the emperor, under his imperial sign manual and seal, to all Chinese subjects, on account of their having held service, or intercourse with, or resided under, the British government or its officers.

7. Correspondence to be conducted on terms of perfect equality amongst the officers of both governments.

8. On the emperor's assent being received to this treaty, and the payment of the first instalment, six million dollars, her Britannic majesty's forces to retire from Nankin and the Grand Canal, and the military posts at Chin-hae to be withdrawn; but the islands of Chusan and Koolong-soo are to be held until the money payments, and the arrangements for opening the ports, be concluded.

An imperial edict announced the ratification of the treaty on the 29th.

The loss to the Chinese in this war was very great, independent of the humiliation, and the damage done to the prestige of the Peking government in the estimation of the people. Three thousand pieces of cannon were taken, many very serviceable,—the majority only fit to sell for old metal. The Chinese war-junks were nearly all destroyed, but it is impossible to compute their number. Vast stores of arms, gingals, matchlocks, swords, spears, &c., were captured; which, although of no use to the British, were a heavy loss to the Chinese. Independent of the indemnity for the war, the ransom paid for Canton was 6,669,615 dollars, nearly 200,000 dollars were found in the treasuries of the different places captured. Two hundred tons of copper was taken at Chin-hae. The total loss to China, in dollars, was about six millions sterling; the destruction of material for both war and peace was enormous. The lesson taught to China was severe, but it did not produce the effect which the friends of peace would wish to find among the fruits of war to the vanquished. The Chinese did not profit by the experience derived for any very long time, they relapsed again into the arrogance and oppressiveness which brought on the war.

The conduct of the navy and army of England was in every way laudable throughout the war. The rewards which they received were not very munificent, but were on a much more liberal scale than was generally the case in the British service. A batta of six, twelve, and eighteen months, according to the time served in the expedition, was dispensed to the officers. Some promotions and brevet honours were given.

Lord Saltoun remained in command of the army in China until the indemnity was secured according to the terms of the treaty. Sir Hugh Gough passed to other scenes of warfare, with which his name will be coupled in British history.

CHAPTER CXVIII.

WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS OF GWALIOR—BATTLES OF MAHARAJPORE AND PUNNIAR—DANGERS ON THE SIKH FRONTIER—LORD ELLENBOROUGH RECALLED—MR. BIRD GOVERNOR-GENERAL, *pro. tem.*—SIR HENRY HARDINGE ARRIVES AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

AFTER his operations in China, Lieutenant-general Sir Hugh Gough was nominated to the command of the forces in India, and his services were soon demanded in a short, decisive, but sanguinary war.

The treaty of Berhampore, in 1804, bound the English to maintain a force to act upon the requisition of the Maharajah of Gwalior to protect his person, his government, and the persons and government of his heirs and their successors. The maharajah of that date was Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That chief died June 18th, 1827. When on his death bed he sent for Major Stewart, the company's political agent, and informed him that he desired him, as acting for the company, to do as he thought best for the welfare of the state. The heir was Jhunkogee Rao Scindiah, who maintained faithfully his relations to the company's government. At his decease, the heir was Tyagee Rao Scindiah, he was moreover adopted by the Maharanee Bazeo Bae, the widow of his highness. The maharajah was a minor. The regency was, at the desire of the maharanee and the chiefs, placed in the hands of Mama Sahib, a competent person. The company's government did not interfere, but acquiesced in the arrangements peaceably made by those most interested. The maharanee, with the fickleness of persons in her situation in India, expelled the sahib, and one Dada Khajee Walla, became her confidant, against the will of the chiefs, and without consulting the British government. The new functionary suppressed the correspondence of the English officials, which their government denounced as the assumption of an act of sovereignty, and rendering it impossible any longer for the government of Calcutta to correspond with or through the usurping regent. Efforts to adjust these disputes by quiet means having failed, the governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, issued a proclamation, December 20th, 1843, setting forth the facts, and declaring the necessity of enforcing by arms the rights of the young maharajah in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1804.

An army assembled at Hingonah, under the command of Sir Hugh Gough. The governor-general attended the army. Vakeels, from certain of the Mahratta chiefs, sought to negotiate. This, however, was a scheme of

the usurping regent to gain time, for he had resolved to appeal to force to assert the absolute character of his regency. The governor-general did not see through his wiles, and in consequence of the inactivity of the English army for five days, in the very crisis of the occasion for which it appeared in the field, much loss of life occurred that otherwise might have been spared. It at last became obvious that battle must decide the questions at issue. The combinations of the commander-in-chief were such as to gain the marked approbation of the governor-general. The army was divided into two separate corps, or as Lord Ellenborough's *post facto* proclamation calls them, two wings. Sir Hugh Gough in person took the command of one, which was directed against Maharajpore; and Major-general Grey was nominated to the command of the other, which was directed against Punniar. At each of these places a battle was fought contemporaneously, and, after victory decided both fields in favour of the British, the two corps formed a junction and united under the walls of Gwalior.*

BATTLE OF MAHARAJPORE.

On the 29th of December, 1843, the *corps d'armée* under the command of Sir Hugh Gough, crossed the Kohuree river at dawn. The enemy had acquired great strength during the night, and was drawn up in front of the village, from which the battle took its name. Their position was strongly intrenched, and with considerable ability. Eighteen thousand men, of whom one-sixth were cavalry, and one hundred cannon, defended the intrenchments. The cannon were too numerous for the number of troops they were intended to strengthen; some of them were very large; the artillerymen were well instructed, especially the one gunner to each piece. Up to this point the management of the English had been at once tardy and precipitate; there was haste without speed, there was talent without prudence and precaution; the mind of Lord Ellenborough himself impressed the whole proceedings, and Sir Hugh Gough did not display that independence of thought necessary, however difficult, when the governor-general was in camp. A reconnoissance

* For description of this place see descriptive and geographical portion of the work.

took place, upon which the plan of action was formed to direct the chief attack upon the Chonda intrenchment, where the guns and the enemy were supposed to be, as the village of Maharajpore was not then occupied. Brigadier-general Valliant's brigade was to lead the action, and Major-general Littler was to support the movement. The delay, want of vigilance and of effective reconnaissance, rendered the plan of battle abortive, and the rear became the column of attack, when the enemy suddenly opened fire from the village of Maharajpore. The grand elements of success, by Sir Charles Napier, in the two terrible battles of the Scinde campaign, especially in that of Meannee, was the effective reconnaissance, and the previous calculation of every supposable contingency. So imperfect was the reconnaissance in the battle now related, that the British hardly knew the precise position of the enemy they were about to attack, and were themselves surprised by the unexpected opening of a deadly fire upon troops who expected to be engaged in another part of the field. The governor-general, Lady Gough, and other ladies and civilians, were, in consequence of this want of management and foresight, in the most imminent danger, and for a short time exposed to the fury of a cannonade within easy range. The attacking army was not greatly inferior in number to that of the enemy. Perhaps never had an action been fought with any native power where so large a proportion of men to those of the enemy were ranged on the side of the English. The Mahrattas were, however, much stronger in artillery, the English having only forty guns, a proportion of which were not ready for immediate use. When Sir Hugh Gough had been ordered to march from Agra, he was to have taken fifty battering guns. Only ten were taken, the governor-general and commander-in-chief having been misled by the pacific assurances of such of the Mahratta chiefs as were in the interest of the maharance and the regent. Everything was to be carried with a high hand, and this lofty and magniloquent spirit characterised the direction of affairs throughout. Major-general Littler, instead of having to support Valliant, had to begin the action. A terrific cannonade was opened upon these soldiers, many of whom perished, who, by proper management, might have been saved. In the despatch of Sir Hugh the severity of this cannonade is referred to, as awakening the valour of the soldiers, and the usual phraseology of despatches about nothing being "able to withstand the rush of British soldiers," celebrates the success of the attack; but there is nothing said to extenuate the faults which exposed

these men unexpectedly to the havoc of a terrible artillery, which no means had been taken previously to silence or subdue. The 39th foot, bearing upon their banners, since the battle of Plassey, "*Primus in Indis*," supported by the 56th native infantry, according to Sir Hugh Gough, "drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts." How they could be driven from their guns into the village, and bayoneted at their posts at the same time, passes the comprehension of a civilian. Probably the general meant, that the infantry ranged behind the guns were so "driven," while the artillerymen remained "at their posts" and died. Even this would not express the fact,—many, both infantry and artillery, perished in defence of the guns, and the mass were driven in upon the village. In the despatch the commander-in-chief wrote that the 39th and 56th "drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts," and immediately adds, "Here a most sanguinary conflict ensued," &c. It is difficult from this passage to gather where the sanguinary conflict took place,—whether at "their posts," the place immediately referred to, or at the village into which the great body of the defenders were driven. According to the facts, however, the village was hotly contested, the Mahrattas throwing away their musketry or matchlocks, and using only their more congenial weapon the sword. The conflict was not of long duration: British skill and valour decided it with deadly promptitude. Sir Hugh's favourite and feasible practice in China he found available here also: General Valliant's brigade was ordered to take *in reverse* the village so fiercely assailed in front; this confused the gallant defenders, who ran wildly about, striking loosely at everything, and then falling before musket-ball and bayonet. Most of the men who defended the village perished, and the capture of twenty-eight cannon rewarded the exploit of the victors. On the extreme left of the British, Brigadier-general Scott was engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and, with disproportionate numbers, kept them all occupied. He and Captain Grant, with his horse-artillery, even menaced the right flank of the foe. Valliant's brigade, in conformity with instructions given before the battle, had suddenly assumed a form not contemplated, moved against the Mahratta right, already threatened by Scott. His object of attack was Chonda, but on the way he had in succession to storm three intrenchments. The Mahrattas clung to their cannon, unwilling to leave them in even the last extremity, causing heavy loss to the British, especially in officers

of forward valour. The 40th regiment lost two officers in command, Major Stopford and Captain Codrington, but happily they survived; these gallant soldiers fell wounded under the muzzles of the guns, and bearing the flags which they chivalrously captured. While Valliant was thus impeded by obstacles of so formidable a nature, Littler, dashing through the enemy's line at the right of the captured village of Maharajpore, pursued his way over broken ground upon Chondar, where the 39th British regiment, led by Major Bray, and the 56th native infantry, led by Major Dick, gained the main position at the point of the bayonet. The battle was now over. It might have been easier won by good arrangements, but could not have been better fought by the gallant soldiers who conquered. The Mahrattas lost nearly one-fourth of their whole number. The British incurred a loss of 797 men, of whom 106 were killed, including seven officers, who were either slain on the field or died of their wounds.

BATTLE OF PUNNIAR.

While Gough was fighting the confused but successful battle of Maharajpore, General Grey was winning the battle of Punniar. That officer acted with promptitude and vigilance; the enemy were attacked without allowing them any time to strengthen their position, and with a small force a comparatively easy conquest was made of a very strong position occupied by twelve thousand men, more determined in war than the natives of India usually are. The British loss was 215 killed and wounded. The casualties would have been fewer had not the troops been fatigued by a long and sultry march.

The junction of the two *corps d'armée*, each having won a decisive battle, under the walls of Gwalior, awed the durbar into submission. The Mahratta troops of his highness were disbanded; a British contingent, consisting of four companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and seven of infantry, was formed, the expense of supporting which was to be borne by the maharajah. This contingent soon became as much a native army as that which was disbanded, and figured seditiously when the mutinies of 1857 gave opportunity to the disaffected in every Indian state to betray their real feeling. The expenses of the war were paid by the state of Gwalior.

The governor-general issued a proclamation, in which he panegyrized the dauntless courage of the British officers and men. He exaggerated grossly the importance of the war, declaring what was obviously absurd,

that "it gave new security to the British empire in India."

It is difficult to imagine that by good statesmanship this war might not have been avoided, and by better generalship decided with little loss in a single action. The policy however was sound. The English fulfilled a treaty which the usurping regent compelled them to enforce; and the relations of the English to the Sikhs were at the time most critical. Lord Ellenborough, in his despatches, justified his policy on that ground. He observed that under ordinary circumstances the different parties in Gwalior might be left to fight out amongst themselves all questions of the ascendancy of ministers or rance, who should be regent, and what chiefs ought to have most influence, but with a magnificent Sikh army menacing the British frontier, it was necessary to bring the affairs of Gwalior to a speedy termination. The policy of letting them alone would be the wisest in a time of peace, but should war break out with the Sikh army, then the Gwalior force would occupy a position of hostile watchfulness, ready to deepen defeat into ruin, or embarrass successful enterprise. Not knowing how affairs with the maharane of Lahore might issue, Lord Ellenborough thought it high time to settle matters with the maharane of Gwalior. Still, when the whole case is impartially and comprehensively viewed, it is reasonable to think that prudent and skilful statesmanship might have averted a conflict, and even secured the goodwill and aid of the government and army of the Gwalior Mahrattas in any collision with the Sikhs. As the policy adopted towards Gwalior confessedly turned upon the threatening aspect of the Punjaub, it is necessary to show what our relations were at that time with the strangely blended military and ecclesiastical power which occupied that country, and over which the young and amiable Maharajah Dhuleep Singh then nominally reigned. It is the more necessary to review these relations, as in a short time the most sanguinary wars India ever saw arose out of them, the account of which must be reserved for another chapter.

From the period of the campaign from Peshawur in favour of Shah Sujah, our relations with the Sikhs beyond the Sutlej became exceedingly disturbed. Notice has been incidentally given of the progress of that people, and in the descriptive and geographical portions of this work the country which they occupy has been depicted.

In 1805, when Holkar resisted English arms so stubbornly, and sought the aid of the Sikhs, we entered into treaty with them.

Runjeet Singh was the monarch of the Punjab. That remarkable man was born in 1780, and twelve years after, upon the death of his father, was proclaimed head of the Sikh nation. Runjeet obtained Lahore from the Afghans, and had already a position of influence and power in northern India. In 1824, Cashmere, Peshawur, and Mooltan became his conquests. He then also reigned over the whole of the Punjab proper. He always showed a decided friendship for the English, whether from partiality or policy never could be determined.* He died on the 27th of June, 1839. At that juncture he was allied with England, for the restoration to the throne of Cabul of the expatriated monarch Shah Sujah.

After the death of Runjeet the affairs of the Sikh nation became perturbed, and the old friendship to the English was displaced by feelings of suspicion and dislike. The Mohammedans of the Punjab always hated the British, and their hatred found vent when the expedition to Cabul by way of Peshawur was undertaken. This animosity and rooted jealousy extended until the chiefs were with difficulty restrained from attacking the army of General Pollock on his return from Cabul. Various revolutions delayed any attack upon the English, but the Sikh people being ambitious of obtaining Scinde and Delhi within their empire, the English were regarded as impediments to the expansion of Sikh power. Apprehensions of encroachment were also entertained, but the common soldiery and all members of the Sikh nation who were not politicians, believed that the power which suffered such reverses in Afghanistan was not invulnerable. These reverses had caused the resistance to our aggressive policy in Scinde, and had also left the legacy, as the reader will learn, of long and sanguinary conflicts with the Sikhs. The victories of Sir Charles Napier in Scinde had somewhat restored British prestige, but the same effect did not follow the conquest of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Gough. The Mahrattas were not greatly superior numerically to the British, and yet they maintained in two pitched battles a regular and arduous fight. The fame of this Mahratta resistance spread all over India, and led the Sikh soldiery to believe that as they were, at all events in their own opinion, better troops than the Mahrattas, the ascendancy of the British in India might be disputed. An aggressive war at last became supremely popular in the Punjab.

Dhuleep Singh, a boy ten years of age,

* *History of the Sikhs*. By Captain J. D. Cunningham, Bengal Engineers.

reputed to be the son of Runjeet Singh, ascended the throne, and Heera Singh became vizier. The minister found it impossible to control the soldiery. The army which Runjeet had so well organized for conquest, and which he had so well controlled, now ruled the state. The vizier and various other eminent courtiers were put to death by the paramount power, the army. The maharajah had a favourite named Lall Singh. Her influence was great, and she used it with skill to promote him to the viziership.

It soon became a settled policy with the more serious and reflecting chiefs to desire a war with the English, not for the sake of conquering them, which they believed to be impossible, but in the expectation of first getting the army away from the vicinity of Lahore, and then in the hope that they would be slain or dispersed by collision with the English. In such case it was supposed that the English would come to terms, and approve even of the policy. It was not calculated how the English might feel to the Sikh nation after losing thousands of brave men in a war for defence of their Indian dominions against a sort of military imperial republic, nor was it considered by these Lahore politicians how the expense of a war with the English would ultimately fall upon the Punjab and upon the crown of Dhuleep Singh, the unoffending victim of such a conflict. Such was the state of the relations between the English and the Sikhs when war broke out. It was no doubt hastened by the knowledge on the part of the Sikh soldiery, that the government of Calcutta was bound to assist the maharajah against all enemies. Should the military faction carry its spirit of revolt further, and the court of Lahore call for English aid, as was expected, it would probably be rendered. Some of the chiefs were favourable to such a course; this was known throughout the Sikh army, and caused the murder of several eminent persons. It led the majority of the troops to the decision that a sudden attack with their whole force upon the English would break their power, at least compel the cession of rich territory, perhaps issue in the establishment of a Sikh empire all over India. The wildest dreams of ambition were cherished, the fiercest religious fanaticism fostered, and exultation spread through all ranks of the army; and many classes of the people at the prospect of a grand war for empire, in which the banner of the Khalsa would float from Calcutta to Kohistan.

The war which followed was not conducted under the auspices of him whose Indian administration did so much to stimulate and increase if not to create the feeling which

caused it. Lord Ellenborough was recalled. His passion for military glory offended the East India Company. Ever since the system sprung up of nominating a peer to the general government of India, huge military enterprises had been carried on at a ruinous expense to the company. The English cabinet had a strong temptation to countenance Indian wars; they entailed no expense upon the English exchequer, gave immense patronage to the crown through the board of control, and the governor-general afforded support to a large portion of the royal army, and increased the prestige of English power in Europe. Great was the indignation of the holders of Indian stock with the wars of Lord Ellenborough, all of which were rashly waged, and that in Scinde aggressively, rapaciously, and unrighteously to a degree revolting to the minds of peaceable and just English citizens. The company determined to recall Lord Ellenborough. They did so without the consent of the cabinet, and in spite of its protests. The order of recall arrived in Calcutta on the 15th of June, 1844. The government immediately devolved upon W. W. Bird, Esq., the senior member of the Bengal council. Lord Ellenborough was *fêted* in Calcutta, but the homage paid to him was chiefly by the military. On the first of August he set sail for Europe. The Duke of Wellington manifested great indignation at his recall and the mode of it, and the party leaders in both houses intimated all sorts of threats against the East India Company for

exercising its undoubted prerogative, and for doing so in the interest, as it believed, not only of the holders of East Indian stock, but of India and of England. The noble viscount was created an earl by the government as some consolation for the attacks made upon him in the press both at home and in the East, and the general indignation which his policy excited in England. His political opponents generally made a very unfair and unscrupulous use of the unpopularity excited by the conduct of his wars.

The vacant governor-generalship was given to Sir Henry Hardinge, who was an able general, and who as an administrator had given great satisfaction to Sir Robert Peel. The directors gave the new governor-general a grand entertainment, and in a long speech impressed upon him the necessity for peace, in order that economy might be possible, without which the welfare of the populations of India could not be promoted, as their condition depended upon social improvement, and the development of roads, railways, river navigation, educational institutions, &c. These things could not be afforded to them by the company, unless peace allowed of that financial prosperity always impossible where a war policy prevailed. Sir Henry Hardinge arrived in India at Calcutta, on the 23rd of July, and preserved indefatigably and wisely the policy assigned to him by the directors. The Sikh war, however, interrupted these dreams of progress, and darkened for a time the financial condition of India.

CHAPTER CXIX.

THE SIKH WAR—BATTLES OF MOODKEE, FEROSHAH, ALIWAL, AND SOBRAON—ADVANCE UPON LAHORE—PEACE.

On the 17th of November, 1844, the Sikh soldiery began the war. On that day the determination to invade Hindostan was taken at Lahore, and in a few days the troops moved upon the Sutlej. On the 11th of December the invasion began. The Sutlej was crossed between Hurrakce and Russoor. On the 14th, a corps of the army took up a position near Ferozepore. The new governor-general was as much taken by surprise as Lord Ellenborough and his guard were at Maharajpore. Sir H. Hardinge assured the secret committee, in his correspondence with London, that there was no probability of the Sikh troops attempting to cross the Sutlej. This opinion was excusable in Sir Henry, as being inexperienced in Indian affairs and the

habits of Indian races. He was, however, warned by persons better competent to pronounce an opinion on the subject than he could be, that the Sikhs were about to pass the river. It was the fashion, at government-house, especially in Lord Ellenborough's time, to sneer at the civil service, particularly when civilians, however experienced, offered opinions which touched at all upon military matters. Sir Henry had, however, been warned by military men, as well as civilians, whose opinions should have received attention, that the Sikhs would burst across the confines of their empire like a flooded river suddenly rising and overflowing its banks. Sir Henry and the commander-in-chief (Sir Hugh Gough) were slow in believing the



THE RIGHT HONORABLE VISCOUNT HARDINGE, G.C.B. &c.

result, and as slow in preparing against a contingency which had been probable for so long a time. Captain Nicholson and Major Broadfoot, however, watched the movements of the enemy, and furnished the government with all necessary information. The garrison of Ferozepore was the first threatened by the approach of the enemy. It consisted of seven thousand men, commanded by Sir John Littler. They marched out, and boldly offered battle, which the Sikh leaders, Lall Singh, and the vizier, and Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, declined. They, in fact, gave Captain Nicholson to understand that they had no desire for success, and would not attack an isolated division of the British army, as their object was to bring their own army into collision against the grand army of the British, that the latter might be broken up by defeat resulting from its presumption. The subsequent conduct of these chiefs hardly corresponded with these professions. The advance of the main army of the British, under Sir Hugh Gough, brought on the battle of Moodkee, the first of the war.

When the troops arrived at that village, they were exhausted with fatigue and thirst. The general moved them on in quest of the enemy, whom it was known was in the neighbourhood, and likely to attack. Sir Hugh has been criticised for not drawing up his men in front of the encampment, and awaiting the arrival of the Sikhs. He advanced, however, and about two miles distant found them in order of battle. The scene of battle was a flat country, covered in part with a low shrubby jungle, and dotted with hillocks, some of which were covered with verdure, but most of them bare and sandy. The jungle and the undulated inequalities of the ground enabled the Sikhs to cover their infantry and artillery, presenting a good position, which was occupied by troops giving every indication of having confidence in themselves.

The British force consisted of the Umballah and Loodiana divisions of the British army, which had just formed a junction. The number under Lord Gough's command did not exceed eleven thousand men, while that under Lall Singh and Tej Singh amounted to thirty thousand. The enemy had forty guns, the British a small proportion of artillery. The quality of the British force was well adapted to the undertaking. It consisted of the division under Major-general Sir H. Smith, a brigade of that under Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-general Gilbert, with five troops of horse artillery, and two light field-batteries, under Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, of the horse artillery (brigadier in command of the artil-

lery force), and the cavalry division, consisting of her majesty's 3rd light dragoons, the body-guard, 4th and 5th light cavalry, and 9th irreguar cavalry. The artillery of the enemy opened with formidable effect upon the twelve British battalions of infantry as they formed from echelon of brigade into line. The battery of horse artillery, under Brigadier Brooke, for a time replied to so severe a fire without silencing it, but being reinforced by two light field-pieces, that object was accomplished. In order to complete the formation of his infantry without advancing his artillery too near the jungle, Sir Hugh Gough made a flank movement with his cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, upon the left of the Sikh line. This was a brilliantly executed and effective movement. The dragoons turned the enemy's left, and swept along the whole rear of their line of infantry and cannon. Perceiving the admirable execution of these orders, Sir Hugh directed Brigadier M'Tier to make a similar movement with the remainder of the cavalry upon the enemy's right. Had not the position of the Sikhs been so well chosen, these manœuvres would have probably filled their ranks with consternation. As it was, little more was effected than to surprise the enemy, distract his attention, and enable the English infantry to form and advance with less loss than otherwise would have been the case. The enemy was far advanced when the British line of infantry charged, and the battle was fought in the dusk of evening and by starlight. The English attacked in echelon of lines. Amidst clouds of dust and smoke, deepened by the shadows of closing day, the English rolled their heavy musketry fire into the jungles, still approaching: sometimes the enemy fell back under this fire, or the close discharges of the horse artillery, which galloped up to the jungle; in other instances the sand hills and the brushwood were contested amidst the dash of bayonets and the grapple of desperate conflict, when man meets man in a struggle of victory or death. To the bayonet of the English infantry Sir H. Gough attributed the success of his charge. The enemy was compelled to withdraw, leaving seventeen guns in the hands of the British. The army returned to camp about midnight, and rested on the 19th and 20th of December, to collect the wounded, bring in the guns, and refresh the exhausted troops. Major-general Sir R. Sale died of his wound; Sir J. M'Caskill was shot through the chest and killed. The number of killed were two hundred and fifteen, wounded six hundred and fifty-seven; total, eight hundred and seventy-two. The enemy killed and wounded many officers

by firing from trees. This was a heavy loss to the small army of Sir Hugh Gough. The death of Sale and M'Caskill, two of the best officers in India, was regretted by all the officers of the army, and by the gallant soldiers who had so often followed them to victory.

BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH.

On the 21st the army marched to within three or four miles of Ferozeshah. Sir John Littler had been ordered to form a junction with the grand army, with as large a portion of the garrison of Ferozepore as could safely be withdrawn from it. The governor-general afterwards wrote a narrative of the junction of these forces, and the operations they were called upon to perform. Anything from the pen of Sir Henry Hardinge (afterwards Lord Hardinge) on a military subject will be eagerly read; his account is therefore given of the complicated transactions which ensued:—

“At half-past one o'clock the Umballah force, having marched across the country disencumbered of every description of baggage, except the reserve ammunition, formed its junction with Sir John Littler's force, who had moved out of Ferozepore with five thousand men, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field-guns. This combined operation having been effected, the commander-in-chief, with my entire concurrence, made his arrangements for the attack of the enemy's position at Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united. The British force consisted of sixteen thousand seven hundred men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse artillery. The Sikh forces varied from forty-eight thousand to sixty thousand men, with one hundred and eight pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries. The camp of the enemy was in the form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah; the shorter sides looking towards the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Ferozepore and the open country. The British troops moved against the last-named place, and the ground in front of which was, like the Sikh position in Moodkee, covered with low jungle. The divisions of Major-general Sir J. Littler, Brigadier Wallace (who had succeeded Major-general Sir J. M'Caskill), and Major-general Gilbert, deployed into line, having in the centre our whole force of artillery, with the exception of three troops of horse artillery, one on either flank, and one in support to be moved as occasion required. Major-general Sir H. Smith's division, and our small cavalry force, moved in a second line, having a brigade in reserve to cover each wing. A

very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of which were of battering calibre; these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous artillery of much lighter metal checked in some degree, but could not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced and carried these formidable intrenchments; they threw themselves upon the guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy; but when the batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiery had to face such a fire of musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that, in spite of their most heroic efforts, a portion only of the intrenchment could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging.”

Sir Hugh Gough thus narrates the events of that terrible night, and of the succeeding day:—“Although I now brought up Major-general Sir H. Smith's division, and he captured and long retained another point of the position, and her majesty's 3rd light dragoons charged and took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouaced upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In this state of things the long night wore away. During the whole night, however, they continued to harass our troops by the fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered our position. But, with daylight of the 22nd, came retribution. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse artillery, whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played with great effect upon this point, dismounting our pieces, and blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir H. Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. Our line advanced, and, unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then, changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manœuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along its front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards



C. H. R.

THE BATTLE OF MOODKEE.

H. J. B. 1857

of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field.

“In the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Singh, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozepore fresh battalions and a large field of artillery, supported by thirty thousand Ghorechurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position at Ferozeshah. This attempt was defeated, but its failure had scarcely become manifest, when the sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank, and when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village, as compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns during this manœuvre maintained an incessant fire, whilst our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats, we were unable to answer him with a single shot. I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which, apparently, caused him suddenly to cease his fire, and to abandon the field.” The enemy’s camp “is the scene of the most awful carnage, and they have abandoned large stores of grain, camp equipage, and ammunition.”

The conduct and issue of this battle are given in the language of Sir H. Hardinge’s narrative, and of Sir Hugh Gough’s despatch, contrary to the plan generally observed in this work, because the mode in which this battle was fought, and the conduct of the whole campaign, especially up to this point, have been so much criticised in India and in England, and by military men in Europe and America. As to the battle itself, it has been observed, that the British artillery did not display the superiority usual in Indian warfare. The Sikhs are said to have fired three times for every two shots from the British guns. The position taken up by the British has been condemned. As before the battle of Moodkee, there was inadequate information. The intelligence department of the army failed to prove itself effective. It has been even stated by military men that the British army marched along the rear of the Sikh position on which “face” of the intrenchments there were no guns, and took post in front of the lines from which the Sikh cannon were directed, and generally so fixed, that they could not have been turned to the reverse, had the attack been directed upon it. The proportion of numbers to those of the well-equipped and well-disciplined enemy, was unjust to the British soldier. No adequate conception had

been formed by the governor-general or the commander-in-chief of the task undertaken. The foe was underrated. The defective information at Calcutta, and want of judgment among those who had the chief control of the campaign, and the responsibility of providing for it, cost fearful loss of valuable soldiers. So badly was the army provided, that, although only the second conflict of the campaign, and upon the confines of British territory, the battle was all but lost for want of ammunition. As subsequently at Inkerman, and previously on so many hard-fought fields in India and elsewhere, the English soldier was left without ammunition at a most critical juncture. The commissariat, and carriage, were in a condition which caused the soldier much suffering. The intrenchments were undoubtedly stormed, but they were not generally formidable, not being more than eighteen inches high; but the new force brought up by Tej Singh would probably have retaken the ground, had not an accident led him to withdraw. The English cavalry left the field, and marched to Ferozepore. This order the officers declared was given by official authority. If so, either a shameful blunder was committed, or a retreat was contemplated. The fact is, however, that the cavalry, or a large portion of it, left the field, and exposed the whole army to the most imminent peril. This blundering episode was, however, mistaken by Tej Singh for a grand measure to attack him in the rear; and supposing that the English must have obtained reinforcements to attempt the like, deemed it prudent to withdraw his army. Thus an accident, such an accident as it was disgraceful should occur in any European army, actually relieved the British of the presence of the enemy at a juncture when the men and their ammunition were nearly exhausted. It was natural that the British public should be dissatisfied with a battle where so many fell before a native force, and where at last an accident, itself discreditably to an army, caused the foe to retire at a juncture when, from another circumstance also disgraceful to the management of the force, there was an inadequate supply of ammunition. Neither Sir Henry Hardinge nor Sir Hugh Gough showed the foresight, comprehensiveness, nor faculty of detail necessary to great commanders, or great statesmen. Both showed great ability in handling small numbers in action, and probably never on any field, by any commanders, was more dauntless bravery shown. During the nights of suspense, when the wearied British soldiery lay down under the incessant fire of the enemy’s artillery, which ploughed up the ground in various directions,

Sir Henry Hardinge went among the soldiers, lay down among the groups, chatted with them in a tone of confidence, talked of "chastising the Sikhs next morning if they were insolent," and thoroughly sounded the temper of the soldiers as to what reliance might be placed upon them in the dreadful conflict which awaited them. Sir Henry, with sleepless energy was everywhere, and everywhere the soldiers received him with a heroic confidence in him, and reliance on themselves, displaying a surprising heroism.

During the series of battles—for the conflict was a series of struggles, not a single action—Sir Henry Hardinge exposed his person with romantic gallantry. Several members of his family were by his side in every peril. On one occasion a cannon-ball passed between him and his aid-de-camp, to whom at a short distance he was addressing some words. How Sir Henry, or any of his staff escaped, is astonishing. Sir Hugh Gough was also in the front of battle on his right, by word and gesture animating his men, and first in daring wherever danger invited. Both these heroic men, whatever their errors as commanders, displayed the highest chivalry; and each also in the action, whatever their deficiency of foresight previously, displayed experience and competency to command in battle. They were first-rate generals of division—they were more; but whatever their subsequent successes or display of military skill, the conduct of the campaign, reviewed as a whole, was not marked by enlarged ability for the conduct of armies.

The Sikhs retired to the neighbourhood of Sohraon, on the right bank of the Sutlej. Thither Sir Hugh Gough and the governor-general pursued, taking up a position from which they might observe the enemy in all directions. The following were the dispositions made from this centre by both armies. The Sikhs manœuvred from Sohraon, along the right bank of the Sutlej. The British army executed an oblique movement to its right and front. Major-general Sir H. Smith, supported by a cavalry brigade, under Brigadier Cureton, was in this new allinment, still on the right, opposite to Hurreckee Puttun; Major-general Gilbert in the centre; and Major-general Sir R. Dick on the left, covered again by cavalry. Major-general Sir J. Grey, at Attaree, watched the Nuggur ford. The troops of Major-general Sir J. Littler occupied the cantonment and intrenchment of Ferozepore. There was no doubt that Sirdar Runjoor Singh Mujethea had crossed from Philour, and, not only threatened the safety of the rich and populous town of Loodiana, but would have

turned the right flank, and have intersected the line of our communication at Busseean and Raekote, and have endangered the junction of our convoys from Delhi. Brigadier Godby commanded three battalions of native infantry at Loodiana. Major-General Sir H. Smith, with his brigade at Dhurmokote, and Brigadier Cureton's cavalry, were directed to advance by Jugraon towards Loodiana; and his second brigade, under Brigadier Wheeler, moved on to support him.* Brigadier-general Godby was ordered to reinforce Major-general Smith. The march was a disastrous one. General Smith was thrown out of communication with General Wheeler, a matter of serious strategical importance. The enemy hung upon Sir Harry's flank and rear with courage and pertinacity, executing difficult evolutions with skill and rapidity. According to Sir Harry's despatch, "a portion of the baggage fell into the hands of the enemy." The fact, however, was, a great deal was lost. It was placed, in the different manœuvres which the constancy and activity of the enemy compelled, between the two forces, and was captured.

The sirdar took post in an intrenched camp at Budhowal, fifteen miles lower down than Loodiana.

THE BATTLE OF ALIWAL.

On the 28th of January, 1846, the battle so designated was fought by Sir Harry Smith. The cavalry, under the command of Brigadier Cureton, and horse artillery, under Major Lawrenson, formed two brigades under Brigadier MacDowell, 16th lancers, and the other under Brigadier Stedman, 7th light cavalry. The first division as it stood consisted of two brigades: her majesty's 53rd and 30th native infantry, under Brigadier Wilson, of the latter corps; the 36th native infantry and Nusserec battalion, under Brigadier Godby, 36th native infantry; and the Shekawatte brigade, under Major Foster. The Sirmoor battalion was attached to Brigadier Wheeler's brigade of the first division, the 42nd native infantry had been left at head-quarters.

The regiments of cavalry headed the advance of the British. As they approached they opened and wheeled to either flank, and the infantry and artillery formed line and approached. The scene was grand and imposing. The glittering lines of the Sikhs flashed like silver in the sun, while their dark looming guns were pointed with well-judged range against the approaching ranks.

The form of battle was peculiar; the left of the British line and the right of the Sikhs were remote, while the British right was very

* Major Hough.



LIEUT GEN: SIR HARRY G.W. SMITH, BART G.C.B.

From a Photograph lent expressly for this Work

near to the enemy, whose line as it approached the British, stretched far beyond. The disadvantage of this outflanking extension of the enemy's left was counterbalanced by the judicious arrangements of Sir Harry Smith's cavalry on his extreme right. The grand object of the British was to secure the village of Aliwal. He directed the infantry of his right wing against that post. It was occupied by hill men, who made a feeble resistance, but the Sikh artillerymen died at their guns. The British cavalry on the right charged through the enemy's left, dividing his line, and breaking up a large portion of the army. At the same time the Sikhs opposed to the British left, consisting of their best troops, outflanked the English line. Here a charge of British cavalry also turned the fortunes of the day. The British lancers were received by well-formed Sikh squares. The British rode through them; but as they did so, the Sikhs closed behind, as some of the British squares did when partially penetrated at Waterloo. The Sikh infantry received the English lances on their shields, breaking many of those weapons. Again the British charged through, and, by a happy manœuvre, changed the lance from the lance hand. The Sikhs not being prepared for this, caught on their persons instead of on their shields the thrusts of their foes. A third time the British cavalry rode through the squares before they were effectually broken and dispersed. It was a battle in which British cavalry effected wonders against infantry.

The enemy endeavoured to rally behind Boondree; but the hot pursuit of the British deprived them of this last resource of despair. Numbers were driven into the river, and shot down by musketry and discharges of grape as they struggled across. Fifty pieces of cannon were captured. On this occasion the superior skill of the British artillery was made apparent. Major Lawrenson, early in the action, on his own responsibility, galloped up within close range of the most destructive of the enemy's cannon and swept the gunners from their posts. In the pursuit, the play of two eight-inch howitzers made fearful havoc upon the dense and disordered masses of the fugitives.

The loss of the enemy was extremely heavy, but could not be computed. When the dead bodies floated down the Sutlej to Sobraon, both British and Sikhs then first learned that a great battle had been fought, and these silent and appalling witnesses bore evidence, striking and conclusive, on which side victory lay.

Among the officers who had distinguished themselves at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, none

was more signally useful, or dauntlessly intrepid, than Lieutenant-colonel Havelock, afterwards the saviour of British India. At Moodkee two horses were shot under him, but he escaped without a bruise. At Ferozeshah his heroic conduct attracted the admiration of all who had opportunity to observe it. The calm resoluteness of the man may be conceived from a single incident. During the bivouac on the first sad night at that place, Lord Hardinge, in his glorious efforts to encourage the men, came upon Havelock lying asleep from excessive fatigue, *he had chosen a bag of gunpowder for his pillow.* To the exclamations of Lord Hardinge's astonishment the hero quietly replied, "I was so tired."

BATTLE OF SOBRAON.

On the left bank of the Sutlej, at Sobraon, the Khalsa army had collected its strength, and it was resolved by the British leaders to attack that post as soon as General Smith and the victors of Aliwal should form a junction with the army, and when siege artillery and other heavy ordnance should arrive from Delhi. The strange want of proper preparation which had hitherto characterised the councils and operations of the British authorities still prevailed. The English were allowed, with a very small force of artillery, consisting of field-pieces, light guns, and howitzers, to march against intrenchments covered with guns of the heaviest calibre, worked by the most skilful artillerymen that any native power in India had ever possessed. Now, it was absolutely necessary to wait for a supply from the arsenal at Delhi, before the strong position of Sobraon could be attempted. It was well that Tej Singh, instead of recommencing the battle of Ferozeshah, did not march to Delhi and make an easy capture of the stores, upon which the British now relied to complete the war.

Sixty-seven pieces of artillery were in battery upon the trenches which the enemy had constructed, and the greater part of the infantry were within the defences. The cavalry, under Lall Singh, were dispersed along the river, observed by the British cavalry, under the gallant and skilful Generals Thackwell and Cureton. Lord Gough estimated the number of the enemy at 35,000 men. Major Hough says, that 20,000 men would exceed the actual number. The Sikhs themselves afterwards stated their number to have been 37,000. The defences were not constructed on scientific principles, yet excessive labour had made them strong. Hurbon, a Spanish officer, and Mouton, a Frenchman, aided the defence, but the haughty pride of

the Sikhs persisted in measures which these officers opposed. There were several other French and Spanish officers of professional reputation in junior positions.

Early in February, 1846, part of the siege train and stores arrived. Sir Harry Smith joined on the 8th. Some of the stores and heavy guns did not arrive until after the action was over. The battle commenced on the 10th of February. Before dawn a surprise was made on a post called Roode Wallah, or the post of observation. That post the British had allowed, from sheer negligence on the part of the superior officers, to fall into the hands of the enemy, just as they had allowed the defences of Sobraon to become formidable without any efforts to retard or molest the foe, still waiting for guna and stores which should have been with the army from the beginning, as there had been ample time to prepare against an inroad which every one seems to have foreseen but the chief civil and military authorities.

The surprise of Roode Wallah was successful, and soon after the possession of that position the battle began. It was an action exceedingly complicated, and the generalship of both sides was regarded as exceedingly defective. There was a want of scheme on the part of the Sikhs, and of concentrated authority and guidance; and similar deficiencies existed on the English side. There was also an impatience and impetuosity which sacrificed many lives, although the means of a more scientific attack were at hand. After all the delay, guns of a sufficient calibre were wanting in the hour of action, and the infantry were precipitated upon the formidable batteries without having been silenced by those of the British. The English infantry were formed into line for the attack as if the whole face of the trenches had been equally assailable, the result was the whole line was exposed to the enemy's cannon, and the devouring grape swept numbers away that by a more scientific arrangement would have been saved. After all, the men were obliged to crowd together in wedges or columns, and penetrate the gaps made in the intrenchments by the English artillery. The difficulty of entering the trenches was great; the Sikhs disputed every battery and every defence with fierce courage, giving and receiving no quarter, cutting down and hacking mercilessly the wounded who fell into their hands. It is probable that the infantry might have failed to accomplish their arduous task, had not the cavalry aided them in an unusual but not altogether unprecedented way. The sappers and miners broke down portions of the intrenchment, and let in the 3rd light

dragoons, and afterwards the irregular native cavalry, in single file. There was room, when once in, for these cavalry to form to a certain extent, and charge the infantry; while others with desultory impetuosity rode at the guns, sabreing the gunners and capturing the cannon. Long and furious was the conflict, and never did men fight and fall more bravely than the Khalsa soldiery. At last, after the repeated ebb and flow of battle, the Sikhs were pushed back from all their defences, rallying and fighting as they slowly retired. It became necessary to cross the river, and they had not taken proper pains to maintain the communications in their rear. An excellent bridge of boats had been constructed, but Tej Singh, who ran away at the beginning of the assault, broke the centre boat of the chain, either from treachery or from accident; accordingly, when the retreating force came to that point they were stopped, or threw themselves into the river, and endeavoured to escape by swimming. As the fugitives retired to the bridge of boats they were cut down in great numbers by the pursuing troopers, and on the bridge were exposed to volleys of musketry, flights of fiery rockets, and showers of vertical grape—it was a carnage most horrible for human arm to inflict, or human eye to witness; multitudes perished in the river, piles lay dead upon the bridge, round-shot crashed, and bursting shells rent the bridge itself, and masses of the dead and dying sank together into the flood, which ran red with human gore. The Sutlej had risen that day seven inches, thus rendering the efforts of the fugitives to ford the river much more perilous than they could have supposed. Some fought their way along the banks and reached fordable spots well known to them, and in this way many thousands escaped to the opposite bank. They reassembled and took post on a distant elevation, but some dispersed, and others continued their flight to Lahore. The words of the poet were literally applicable when the rays of the setting sun fell upon the swollen Sutlej, the shattered batteries of Sobraon, and the exulting host of the British as they buried their dead, and tended the wounded:—

“Night closed around the conquerors' way,
And lightning showed the distant hill,
Where those who lost that bloody day
Stood few and faint, hut fearless still.”

It would be difficult to award the meed of praise to any particular corps of the British army in this dreadful battle. The artillerymen throughout the Sikh war displayed undaunted bravery, officers and men of the horse artillery galloping up close to heavy batteries, and, by their rapid discharges of

grape, sweeping away the Sikh gunners from their guns. The 10th regiment of infantry, newly arrived, were exceedingly forward in the conflict, and the 3rd light dragoons merited the eulogy of the commander-in-chief, when he said, "they seem capable of effecting anything possible to cavalry, and of going anywhere that cavalry can go." The Goorkha regiments were exceedingly efficient. Sir Hugh Gough, in his despatch, said of them, "I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Goorkhas, the Sirmoor and Nusseree, met the Sikhs, wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of small stature, but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation, and armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat."

The Sikhs acknowledged that their loss was nearly fourteen thousand men. The English suffered heavily; many were ill after the battle from excessive fatigue and fever, arising from their exertions. Under the cannonade and in the storm the loss was heavy. Major-general Sir R. Dick died of a wound received in the intrenchments. He was a gallant old Waterloo officer. Major-general Gilbert was slightly wounded; and of the officers, killed and wounded, most suffered through the extraordinary courage they displayed. Lieutenant-colonel Havelock (the future hero of Lucknow) had a miraculous escape,—a ball entered the saddle-cloth, killing his horse, without so much as a bruise occurring to himself.

Immediately upon the battle of Sobraon, Sir John Littler, who was posted with a very powerful division at Ferozepore, crossed the river, and the main army prepared to follow. The cavalry dispositions were excellent, under the skilful arrangements of Generals Cureton and Thackwell.

The intelligence of the battle of Sobraon did not create so much exultation as might be expected in England or British India. It was indeed a great relief, as was also that of the battle of Aliwal; but there existed much dissatisfaction with the conduct of the whole campaign, and there was a disposition to throw more than his share of the blame upon Sir Hugh Gough, while Sir Robert Peel and his government were assiduous in screening from censure Sir Henry Hardinge. Both were favourites of the Duke of Wellington, for he knew the noble gallantry of the men, and their very great efficiency in serving in the highest commands, not actually supreme. The public were not, however, satisfied by

even the military testimony of his grace, much more than by the special pleading of the plausible baronet. It was obvious that a great deal had been left unthought of by both the heroes of the war. Some of the most efficient soldiers and officers in the British service had perished, who, in all probability, would have been preserved had the campaign, in all its aspects, civil, political and military, been conducted as it ought to have been. Guns, ammunition, supplies, were all wanting; Delhi had been left exposed to a *coup*, if Tej Singh had been a skilful enemy, or loyal; egregious blunders had been committed, vast quantities of baggage was lost to an inferior enemy; infantry attacked a wide area of trenches in line, although these trenches bristled with the heaviest ordnance, and when every officer and soldier knew that attack in column would not only have spared the men, but more easily have conducted to success. The management of the campaign did not even improve as blunders and their consequences were developed. The enemy was allowed to seize an important post just before the battle of Sobraon; that place was permitted to assume strength, which had a Wellington, a Napoleon, or a Havelock commanded, would, by skilful manœuvres, have been prevented; and at last infantry was compelled to storm intrenchments with the bayonet, the guns of which were far from being disabled, because there was no longer an adequate supply either of artillery or musketry ammunition. Had the fire of the cannon and musketry upon the retreating force on the bridge of boats, on the fords, and on the fordless river, been as full and continuous as it was well directed, and as it would have been had the ammunition been adequate, nearly the whole Sikh army would have been destroyed. These things were discussed not only by military men, but among the middle classes of England, who had become more capable than formerly to canvass the conduct of military affairs.

Having crossed the Sutlej, Sir John Littler pressed vigorously forward, and Kusoor fell to the British without a blow. The Sikhs re-collected at Umritsir, individually as brave as ever, but, collectively, enfeebled and depressed. Gholab Singh, of Jummo, opened negotiations with Sir Henry Hardinge in the name of the infant sovereign, Dhuleep Singh. The English representative demanded a million and a half sterling as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and the cession of all the country between the Beear and the Sutlej, as security against further aggression. The Sikhs were reluctant to concede so much, but Sir Charles Napier had marched up with

reinforcements from Scinde, which decided them. The English were unwilling to accept the concessions which they ultimately obtained, but the season was, in Sir Henry Hardinge's opinion, too far advanced to justify any demands which might lead to renewed hostilities. Generally the reasoning of his excellency did not appear sound on this matter to the officers of the Indian army, and the members of the civil service; but Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, the government and parliament, approved of the policy Sir Henry adopted.

The young maharajah tendered his submission in person to the representative of the Queen of England, and on the 20th of February the British army arrived at Lahore, as the allies of Dhuleep Singh. The public entry of the maharajah with his new allies was a pageant at once gorgeous and impressive, occidental and oriental pomp strangely blending in the scene. The ensigns of civil authority and military power dazzled the eyes together. The insignia of Eastern royalty, and of that anomalous power, the great Company Sahib, were, to the disciples of Govind, marvellously mixed. The population gazed at the great sight as if it were a scene of magic. Only a short time before the mighty army of the Khalsa (or Church) of the Sikh prophet marched forth from the gates of the capital: since then the Sutlej had ran red with their blood, their unburied corpses lay along its banks, the prey of the Indian kite, the vulture, and the other savage creatures which infest the ground where battle had raged. The ponderous cannon—the pride of the Sikh soldiery, and which they knew so well how to direct—swelled the train of the conqueror, or lay in broken fragments upon the shattered trenches, which the valour of Sikh, sepoy, and Briton

had stained with the blood of the brave. It was more like the relation of some Indian tale of gods and spirits creating strange phantasies among the abodes of men, than a reality. The Sikh could not realize it. The beaten soldier stalked forth and viewed the anomaly with scowling brow, but unarmed hand—bewildered, baffled, wonder-struck, but not cowed. The Lahore citizen sulked, and gazed with an interest and listlessness as incompatible as they were obvious. The women, not so reserved or secluded as in India proper, were pleased with the pageant; they uttered no joy nor grief, but shared with their husbands, sons, and brothers, in hatred to the conquering stranger, who, carrying his machines and arts of slaughter from afar, over western and eastern seas and shores, now humbled the sacred Khalsa under the shadow of its citadel.

The pageant passed away, English regiments garrisoned the metropolis of the Sikhs, General Littler held its military resources in his grasp, and a treaty professed to secure perpetual friendship and alliance between the East India Company and the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh. Gholab Singh managed to serve his sovereign and himself. He became the chief of the beautiful region of Cashmere. This was ceded instead of money, Gholab Singh purchasing it from the British. The new Maharajah of Cashmere, by the 3rd article of a treaty signed March 10th, gave the British three quarters of a million sterling for the territory. On the 15th of March, 1846, he assumed his title and his sovereignty. Thus ended the first Sikh war, as glorious as it was fatal to the valour of the Sikhs; as unfortunate for the reputation of English prudence and military skill, as it was glorious to the heroism of the English soldier.

CHAPTER CXX.

THE SECOND SIKH WAR.—REVOLT OF CHUTTUR SINGH.—MURDER OF ENGLISH ENVOYS AT MOOLTAN—GALLANT CONDUCT OF LIEUTENANT EDWARDES—GENERAL WILKINSON'S BOMBARDS AND CAPTURES MOOLTAN—SENTENCE ON MOOLRAJ—ADVANCE OF LORD GOUGH—BATTLE OF RUMNUGGUR.

THE second Sikh war commenced almost immediately after the first had concluded; at least the elements began to work which burst forth in an irruption of desolation and carnage once more.

As soon as the treaty had been concluded referred to in the last chapter, the British

government of India settled down into the conviction that, in the eyes of the Sikhs, the English were irresistible; and that however the Sikhs might murmur or create partial disturbances, a revolt against the last treaty, or the predominant influence of the English at Lahore, was highly improbable. Sir Henry



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Hardinge's mind was filled with the delusion. He was utterly unacquainted with India, its people, its modes of thought, its political ethics. Circumstances had never directed his mind to the subject. He was not sent from England, any more than his predecessors, because he knew anything about India, or possessed any peculiar fitness. He was a political *protégé* of Sir Robert Peel; had answered the baronet's party and political purposes well in certain situations at home, and was rewarded with the honourable, lucrative, and, therefore, coveted post of governor-general of India. In Ireland he had made an expert, red tape, parliamentary partizan secretary. He held himself on polite and good terms with Irish politicians and Irish gentlemen, and was admired by that gallant people for his chivalrous soldierhood. He had no qualifications which fitted him for the governor-generalship of India. There were hundreds of the company's servants, and scores of servants of the crown, better adapted to the office. The old principle was maintained of making the office a reward for political partizanship or service in parliament, and with the old results. A second Sikh war broke out, finding the English as little prepared as for the first, simply because they had exercised no foresight to prevent it, or to provide against its occurrence.

On the 5th of April, 1847, Sir Henry, then Viscount, Hardinge, wrote to the secret committee in London that the Sikh chiefs, comprising the durbar of Lahore, were carrying on the government with a loyal desire to execute the treaty. At that time the majority of the durbar were plotting the destruction of the English. At the end of May (the 27th), he again addressed the secret committee, holding forth the same assurances that all was well. In that letter he quotes the opinions of the British resident, no less gifted a person than Lieutenant-colonel H. M. Lawrence, that as usual all sorts of reports were raised of intentions on the part of the Sikhs, and even of the chiefs, against us, which were greatly exaggerated, and many obviously false. These "reports" seem to have been utterly rejected at government-house; yet no man who had studied the religion, disposition, and antecedents of the Sikhs could doubt that those rumours had a basis in the wide-spread disaffection of chiefs and people to the alliance of Dhuleep Singh with the stranger, and the presence of the latter in any part of the Punjabee empire.

The first symptoms of opposition appeared in a resistance to the possession by Gholab Singh of the territory for which he had paid the English. It was necessary to have recourse to arms in order to put down, and keep

down, a pretender who disputed the new maharajah's claim. Soon after, Chuttur Singh, an influential chief, raised the standard of revolt.

The next indication of opposition was made by Moolraj, the khan or chief of Mooltan. That chief had in various ways given offence to the durbar of Lahore, or at all events to the English influence in that durbar. Remonstrances having proved ineffectual, Moolraj was addressed in terms which plainly intimated, that unless his conduct was shaped in conformity with the behests of the durbar, force, in the name of the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, would be employed. Moolraj responded by resigning his government of Mooltan, and expressing his intention to resign it into the hands of any authorized person or persons sent to receive the trust. Whether this was a pre-arranged manœuvre between Moolraj and the opponents of the English in the durbar it is difficult to determine; it is probable, however, that had native officers only been sent to receive the surrender, it might have been made *bonâ fide*. The English resident ordered Mr. Agnew, of the civil service, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay army, to accompany Sirdar Khan Singh, who was nominated to the dewan of Mooltan. Five hundred and thirty irregulars were sent as an escort. Moolraj made a show of surrendering his dewanee, but made pretenses of delay.

Meantime, insurrections began in the city, and the two Englishmen were slain. Moolraj affected to be no party to this crime, but averred that he had no power to punish the perpetrators, who were popularly upheld. It was a foul and treacherous murder, in which Moolraj had complicity. If he were not the original plotter of it, he undoubtedly abetted the murderers after the deed. The mode in which the transaction took place has been recorded by the author of this history in another work, just issuing from the press, *Nolan's Continuation of Hume and Smollett's History of England*. The way in which it is there related, and the consequences which followed, are placed with brevity before the reader.

On the 17th of April, the authority was surrendered in due form by Moolraj, and the object of the British officers seemed to be accomplished. On the 18th they were attacked and desperately wounded; it was at first supposed from a sudden impulse on the part of the soldiery of Moolraj, but it was afterwards known to be the result of treachery. The officers, accompanied by the new governor, were carried to a small fort outside the town. A fire was opened upon the place from Mooltan, but it was ineffectual. A few days afterwards, however, the fort was attacked by

the soldiers of Moolraj; the Sikhs who garrisoned the place, and among whom were the escort, treacherously opened the gates, and the assailants entered, foaming with rage, and demanding vengeance upon the infidel officers. Lieutenant Anderson was in a dying state; but Mr. Agnew, although so badly wounded, defended himself with resolution to the last: both officers were murdered. Intelligence of these barbarities reached Lahore with the speed so peculiar to the East; and a force of three thousand cavalry and some infantry was dispatched, under Sirdar Shere Singh, against the refractory city. There happened to be upon the Indus, at the head of a small force, a young and gallant officer who had served with distinction upon the staff of Lord Gough, and who was favourably known by his clever contributions to the India press on the state of the company's territory, civil and military: this officer was Lieutenant Edwardes. He was engaged in settling a disturbed district of country, and in collecting the land-tax due to Moolraj, as Sikh governor of Mooltan. At the same time, Colonel Van Cortlandt, a native of India, and a distinguished officer in the service of the company, occupied Dhera Ismael Khan, also in the neighbourhood. Lieutenant Edwardes crossed the river into the Deerajat, whence he wrote to the Khan of Bhawalpore, requesting him to make such a movement of troops as would prevent Moolraj from falling upon either Edwardes or Cortlandt. The khan's territories were so situated as to enable him to effect a military disposition to accomplish this object. The khan made the required demonstration. When Edwardes crossed the Indus, he left a detachment of three hundred horse to protect the collection at Leiah, where, on the 18th of May, they were attacked by a body of cavalry exceeding their own in number, sent against them from Mooltan, with ten light field-guns (zumbooruks). The British force so manœuvred as to attain a good position, although under the fire of the zumbooruks, and then charged brilliantly, dispersing the Mooltanese, and capturing their guns.

Colonel Cortlandt was as prompt as Edwardes in the measures taken by him. He left the fort of Dhera Ismael Khan, and proceeded by the base of the hills southward. On his route he was joined by a Beloochee chief, with one hundred of his wild followers. Cortlandt detached these, with a portion of his own troops, against the fortress of Sunghur, westward of the Indus. The commander of the fort refused the summons of surrender, and for six hours maintained a gallant resistance; he then brought off the garrison by a skilful manœuvre, reaching Mooltan in safety.

Lieutenant Edwardes and Colonel Cortlandt effected a junction of their small forces, and on the 20th of May were attacked by a division of the Mooltan army. The united forces of Cortlandt and Edwardes were so disposed that not more than one thousand five hundred men could be brought into action, while the enemy numbered three thousand. The artillery force of each was about equal. Edwardes was, however, joined by a body of irregular cavalry, and a party of Beloochees, which brought up the British force more nearly to an equality of numbers. The Sikhs in British pay happily showed no disposition to fraternise with the Mooltan army, although the calculations of Moolraj were based upon such an expectation. The enemy suffered a signal defeat and great slaughter. The Beloochees behaved remarkably well. The skill of British officers turned the balance in favour of the native army under their command.

After this engagement, Edwardes, acting upon the authority which he possessed as a civil officer of the company, demanded a reinforcement from the Khan of Bhawalpore, and in the meantime, recruited his force by Sikhs, Beloochees, Affghans, and men from the hills of various tribes. The faculty of organization, the ceaseless activity, and the courage of this young officer were surprising. Colonel Cortlandt was also equal to the part assigned him; but, although senior in military rank, the civil functions of the former gave him an especial, and, in some respects, superior authority. The Khan of Bhawalpore responded to the demands of Edwardes, and a plan was laid for a junction of their troops. In pursuance of this, the British crossed the Indus on the 10th and 11th of June. Moolraj was informed by his spies of every movement, and the intelligence was conveyed to him with astonishing rapidity. He accordingly marched a large force to intercept either army, and beat both in detail. On the 14th he crossed the Chenab, leaving a considerable force on the other bank. This detachment marched to Khan Ghur, but on the following day crossed the river, being surprised at that place by the advance of Edwardes's irregulars. The Mooltanese had barely time to cross the Chenab, when the scouts of the English galloped into Khan Ghur. The Sikhs, instead of receiving Edwardes's force at that place, and practically attempting the scheme of Moolraj, encamped on the opposite side of the river, in observation of the British officer and his little army. This delay and timidity was fatal; for the lieutenant was soon joined by the infantry and a portion of the artillery of Cortlandt, whose cavalry were scouring the country. The situation of affairs became now interest-

ing and important, for the Bhawulpore forces had arrived on the enemy's side of the Chenab, within twelve miles. Edwardes made a retrograde movement, so as to place himself opposite the Bhawulpore encampment. The enemy advanced to within four miles of that position. In the course of the night, the raw levies of Edwardes contrived to cross the river in a very irregular manner, and within dangerous proximity to the enemy's patrols, but were unmolested. On the 18th, early in the morning, the lieutenant crossed with the remainder of his men, except the horses and artillery, which remained with Cortlandt on the opposite side, for a more slow and safe transport across the river. Scarcely had the lieutenant gained the opposite bank than he was attacked by the Sikh army, which had been moving up from Bugurarah while he was gaining the passage. This was a terrible engagement. The sun had hardly risen upon river, and swamp, and undulating plains, when the Mooltanese forces fell upon the motley crowd of the British levies, and in such superior numbers that victory seemed certain. For nine hours the English officer resisted the onslaught, and by his valour, activity, presence of mind, and moral influence, kept his undisciplined forces in firm front to the foe. At last Cortlandt's guns were brought over, and made the contest somewhat equal. Later in the day, two regular regiments belonging to the colonel's division arrived, with six guns, and the enemy panic-struck fled, leaving a large proportion of their troops upon the field, slain, wounded, and prisoners, with six guns, and their entire baggage and munitions of war. The conduct of Edwardes throughout the day was splendid, and laid for him a deeper foundation still than had already existed for his military reputation.

Moolraj retreated to Mooltan, followed by the British, and the Khan of Bhawulpore, who had rendered hitherto but little assistance, and whose movements led to the suspicion that he had more sympathy with Moolraj than he dared to avow.

On the 28th of June, a Sikh brigade under the command of Sheik Emaum-ood-deen, which had been dispatched by the government of Lahore, arrived to reinforce the English. The whole army appeared before Mooltan, consisting of eighteen thousand men.

Emaum-ood-deen retired; the bulk of his force remained, and was ultimately placed under the command of Shere Singh, who professed to be on the side of the maharajah and the English, but was in reality organizing a most perilous plot of treachery and treason. While, however, the shere maintained this profession of loyalty, he was rapidly joined

by other sirdars with troops, under the same pretence, but also with the same aim.

The Nawab of Bhawulpore, General Cortlandt, and Lieutenant Edwardes remained before Mooltan, constantly skirmishing with the enemy, their force being inadequate for the reduction of the place, but too strong to be easily beaten off. Sir John Littler was of opinion that the forces under the British officers and their allies, should be left as an army of observation, and no offensive operations undertaken against Mooltan until the general plans of the enemy became developed, and the English had gathered a main army sufficiently strong for the complete suppression of revolt throughout the Sikh territories. The commander-in-chief had formed the same opinion, independent of Sir John Littler's communications.

On the 13th of July, 1848, Lieutenant Edwardes warned his superiors that Shere Singh was a traitor, and was collecting forces to aid the revolt, under cover of co-operation with the English. Either the higher officials did not credit the sagacious judgment of Lieutenant Edwardes, or they neglected to act upon it. Shere Singh had ample scope for maturing his plans.

On the 22nd of July, a proclamation was issued against Moolraj, charging him with rebellion and murder.

On the 18th of August, Major-general Whish, a distinguished artillery officer, arrived with a force of seven thousand men, and took command of the whole investing army. On the 12th of September the place was bombarded, and other operations undertaken, which prepared for the finale of the struggle. On the 14th Shere Singh marched from Mooltan with his division, consisting of the finest soldiers of the Sikh army. Moolraj was anxious for the withdrawal of the sirdar; had he remained, it is probable that the forces sent by the English government against Mooltan would have failed. Lieutenant Edwardes had contrived to ferment disputes between these chiefs by letters fabricated for the purpose of deceiving them. Each chief came into the possession of a supposed correspondence between the other and the English, which the spies of Edwardes placed in their hands, pretending to betray him for sake of the Khalsa cause. The departure of Shere Singh involved operations elsewhere on the part of General, then Lord Gough, himself, as commander-in-chief of the grand army of the Punjab, which had been collected for the suppression of the revolt. For nearly four months the operations before Mooltan were discontinued from want of reinforcements. The arrival in December of Brigadier-general the Hon. D. Dundas,

with a division of Bombay troops, enabled General Whish to decide the contest. The enemy's intrenchments were attacked on the 27th of December. A chance shell from one of the mortars blew up the magazine, causing extraordinary loss of life, and destruction of material. The grand "musjid" and many of the principal houses were laid in ruins. The granaries also were totally destroyed.

Whish was now at the head of a very large army, amounting to fifteen thousand British, European and native, and seventeen thousand of the troops of the Rajah of Bhawalpore, and other allies; he had also one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. On the 2nd of January, 1849, Mooltan, after a terrible cannonade, was stormed. The resistance was desperate, the Sikhs fighting as at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon, with the tenacity of men, and the ferocity of wild beasts. Old Runjeet Singh and his soldiers were well named, when called "the Lions of the Punjab." It was not until the 21st that the citadel was surrendered. Moolraj demanded terms of capitulation. General Whish would hear of nothing but an unconditional surrender. This was at last made, and the sirdar, with firmness and dignity, delivered himself a prisoner. He made no manifestations of grief, nor allowed depression to cloud his brow. He bore himself with uncommon fortitude until he learned that banishment from his country, not death, was to be his doom; he then gave way to violent expressions of grief and despair, and begged to be executed in the country of his birth and of his love, rather than be sent away to drag out life miserably, as must be his fate when an exile. He was a murderer, and deserved a murderer's death. Such was pronounced upon him by a court-martial commissioned to try him, but he obtained the respite, which he would not accept as an act of clemency, but denounced as a refinement of cruelty.

Seldom did a conquered city display so terrible a scene as that witnessed in Mooltan. The dead and dying lay everywhere, and notwithstanding the cold season, the odour arising from putrescent corpses was intolerable. One of the first duties which the conquerors felt bound to impose upon themselves was the discovery of the bodies of their murdered countrymen, and their burial, or re-sepulture. The bodies were discovered east into an obscure place, and covered with earth. They were exhumed and publicly interred, with military honours. Poor Anderson's own regiment was among the troops who effected the conquest, and their band played the dead march as they followed the remains of their brave and talented comrade in arms. The

coffins were deposited in a grave at the highest part of the fort, with every demonstration of respect, and much manifestation of sorrow for their loss, and the cruel end which they had experienced.

The army of General Whish, which was set at liberty by this conquest, prepared to join the grand army under General Gough. Whish was a brave, prudent, and skilful artillerist, but rapidity of action was not among his soldierly qualifications. Dundas was even more tardy than Whish, and the progress made to join the commander-in-chief was so slow, as to baffle his lordship's calculations, and the operations of the campaign.

Before the junction of the two armies took place, various events befell that which Lord Gough commanded. He had been ordered to collect an army at Ferozepore. This duty was slowly and most imperfectly executed. The experience of the previous war was thrown away upon governor-general, commander-in-chief, and the executive of the army generally. All the defects of commissariat and transport remained as they were when their deficiency nearly destroyed the British army in the previous Punjab war. This is the testimony of every writer, and every officer acquainted with the affairs of British India at that time. On the 21st of November, 1848, Lord Gough joined the grand army at Saharun, a position from which he could march with nearly equal advantage upon any point of the territory where decisive events were likely to take place.

The Punjab takes its name from the five rivers which water it.* The Chenab is the central of these five rivers. The theatre of opening war was between the Chenab and the Indus, and bounded by the confluence of these rivers. The town of Ramnuggur lay upon the left bank of the Chenab, stretching to a distance of a mile and a half from the stream. That place was the point of support and headquarters of Shere Singh, who had, as before related, left the vicinity of Mooltan. He had now decided upon a separate line of operations. An island was situated in the middle of the Chenab, at a bend of the river opposite Ramnuggur. Shere Singh occupied the island by a brigade, and with batteries erected there commanded the ford, or nullah, as a ford at low water, or any water course, natural or artificial, is called in the vocabulary of the country. Besides the forces on the right bank of the river and on the island, the Sikhs had a strong body of troops on the left bank, which, in the first instance, it appeared to Lord Gough ought to be dislodged. The strength of the main position of Shere Singh at Ram-

* See geographical portion of this work, p. 32

nuggur was very great, it was flanked on one side by the land in the river, on the other by a grove. Between the right bank and the island the communication was maintained by boats, with which the enemy was well supplied; they were a peculiar description of craft, suitable especially for this purpose. The ford, or nullah, between the island and the left bank was not very difficult, but the descent to it was steep.

The whole of Shere Singh's arrangements were scientific. Lord Gough commenced his operations by directing the 8th light cavalry to advance along the left bank, supported by her majesty's light dragoons and the company's light horse. The 8th skirmished, the enemy receding as the supporting cavalry came up. The horse artillery, in their ever forward valour, pushed into the deep sand on the margin of the river, and brought the enemy's position at Ramnuggur within range. The guns in position there were very heavy, and opening with precision upon the light pieces of the English soon silenced them, and forced the men to retire, leaving one or two ammunition waggons behind. The 14th light dragoons were directed to charge them, supported by a regiment of native cavalry.* The 14th dragoons was commanded by Colonel William Havelock, brother to the hero who afterwards won in India a renown immortal. Colonel William Havelock was one of the most intrepid officers in the service. During the "Peninsular war" in Spain, when a mere boy, he had signalised himself by extraordinary feats of daring worthy the old Norse sea-kings, from whom he is said to have been descended. Such enthusiasm did he inspire among the Spaniards, that although seldom willing to stand before the French, they would follow young Havelock anywhere. Generally when he led them a cry would go forth, "Follow the fair boy!" and with a shout they would rush with him into dangers other officers could not induce them to encounter. This was the hero upon whom the task devolved of charging with the 14th light dragoons into the nullah. The author having described this action in the work referred to in the note, will here quote the description of the heroic General Thackwell, who was an eye-witness. That officer having noticed the events already recorded on this page, goes on to say:—"It was while the enemy were thus apparently setting us at defiance, that Lieu-

tenant-colonel Havelock, of the 14th dragoons, requested permission to charge, and drive them from the bank. No sooner had the equivocal assent been accorded, than the flaxen-haired boy of the Peninsular, on whose deed of valour the military historian has proudly dwelt, entering into a hand gallop, at the head of his men, soon threw himself on the crowd of Sikhs who lined the high bank. The 5th light cavalry, under Lieutenant-colonel Alexander, ably supported the gallant 14th. So impetuous was the onset of these determined warriors, and so energetically and effectually did Havelock and his troopers ply their swords, that the bank was swept in a few minutes of all its swarthy occupants, who, running hastily down the bank, across the sand, threw away their standards in their flight. Not contented with having driven the enemy from this position, Havelock, animated by that fiery spirit which glowed within him, instantly resolved to exceed the limits of his mission, and renew the offensive, contrary to the real wishes of the commander-in-chief, by continuing the charge on the discomfited enemy, and driving them back across the river. Yielding to his insatiable love of glory, he brandished his sword above his head, and calling on the squadron of the 14th, in reserve under Lieutenant-colonel King, to come and support him, dashed furiously down the steep declivity into the tract of sand in which, it will be remembered, the gun had been immovably fixed, and over which Captain Onvry had charged. The British cavalry becoming now fully exposed to view, the Sikh batteries opened a rapid and destructive fire upon them. The Khalsa infantry also, summoning fresh courage, began to stand and open matchlock fire on their pursuers. The horses of the dragoons soon became exhausted in this difficult ground, their feet every moment sinking into deep sand or mud. Our cavalry were not only exposed to the fire of the batteries across the river, but some guns, which had been dragged to the left bank, had taken up a position near the green island above alluded to, and the presence of this artillery inspired the enemy with fresh courage. The deportment of Havelock was more that of a mortal confiding in the protection of the ægis of some divinity, than that of an ordinary human being. In the last charge, always in advance, he suddenly disappeared, and the latest glimpse of that daring soldier, disclosed him in the midst of the savage enemy, his left arm half severed from his body, and dealing frantic blows with his sword, so soon doomed to droop from his trusty right hand. His last words were—"Follow me!" Some days after the action,

* In the author's *Continuation of Hume and Smollett's History of England* he described, upon what appeared to be adequate authority, this regiment as the 3rd; General Thackwell says it was the 5th. See *Nolan's Hume and Smollett*, chap. lv. p. 729, and *Thackwell's Sikh War*, p. 40.

a mutilated corpse was discovered, which the chaplain of the army, Mr. Whiting, recognised by the hair on the body to be that of this gallant but ill-fated sabreur. Such a death was worthy of William Havelock."

The slaughter of the brigade commanded by Havelock was not the only misfortune which befell the army in the rash attempt upon the nullah. Major-general Cureton rode up with an order of retreat from Lord Gough. The moment he delivered the order he received two balls simultaneously, and fell dead from his horse. Thus two of the finest cavalry officers in the British, or in any other army, perished in this ill-fated charge. The troops retired discomfited and dispirited.

On the 30th of November, Captain Nicholson, whose services had so often proved available in the civil department, discovered a small ford higher up the river; he had also the address to provide some boats. At this point Major-general Thackwell was ordered to cross, and take the enemy on that flank, while Lord Gough remained in front watching for any opportunity for striking a deadly blow, which the movement of Thackwell might create. It was not an easy task for the general to cross by the imperfect ford, and scanty supply of boats. His dispositions were skilful, but his difficulties were formidable. On the 3rd of December he effected the passage. Shere Singh did not, however, allow him to surprise his flank, nor to pass to his rear. He moved out an adequate force to check the movement of the English general. On the 4th of December Thackwell was himself menaced on his flank by guns and cavalry. His orders fettered him. Nothing was left to his discretion, although he was quite as competent as the commander-in-chief to conduct difficult operations in the face of an enemy. Thackwell's orders barely allowed of his replying to the enemy's cannonade, but he made such able dispositions as deceived the enemy both as to the amount of his force and his intentions, and the Sikh force retired upon its main body. The action, chiefly an artillery battle, which arose from the flank movement of General Thackwell, takes the name of the battle of Sodalapore, although it was more a series of demonstrations and a duel of artillery than a battle. General Thackwell, having been a good historian of war as well as a distinguished actor, in his own words shall relate the course of a conflict which was better known to him than to any one who has told the tale of his success:—"After a cannonade of about two hours the fire of the enemy slackened, and I sent Lieutenant Patton to desire the cavalry on the right to charge and take the enemy's guns, if possible, intending

to support them by moving the brigades in echelon, from the right at intervals, according to circumstances; but as no opportunity offered for the cavalry to charge, and so little of daylight remained, I deemed it safer to remain in my position than attempt to drive back an enemy so strongly posted on their right and centre, with prospect of having to attack their entrenched position afterwards. From this position the Sikhs began to retire at about twelve o'clock at night, as was afterwards ascertained, and as was conjectured by the barking of dogs in their rear. I have every reason to believe that Shere Singh attacked with twenty guns; and nearly the whole of the Sikh army were employed against my position, which was by no means what I could have wished it; but the fire of our artillery was so effective that he did not dare to bring his masses to the front, and my brave, steady, and ardent infantry, whom I had caused to lie down to avoid the heavy fire, had no chance of firing a shot, except a few companies on the left of the line. The enemy's loss has been severe; ours, comparatively, very small."* The force which had passed over with General Thackwell, and which followed afterwards, was a small one:—Three troops of horse artillery, two light field-batteries,† her majesty's 3rd light dragoons, two regiments of light cavalry, one irregular cavalry, her majesty's 24th and 61st regiments of infantry, five regiments of native infantry, and two companies of pioneers. The two 18-pounders and the pontoon train were sent back.

Shere Singh was partly influenced in drawing in that body of troops by the cannonade with which Lord Gough played upon the island, and the batteries of Ramnuggur. Thackwell advanced from Wurzerabad, along the river until he arrived within a short distance of Ramnuggur, where there was another ford. This enabled him to protect the passage across of a brigade of infantry, under General Godby. These plans led the enemy to abandon his position. General Gilbert, with a brigade of cavalry, was moved across, which caused Shere Singh to quicken his retreat. The proceedings of Lord Gough were so leisurely, that the Sikh general had no difficulty in moving away with impunity, and finding a strong position suitable to his projects. It was not until the 28th of December that Lord Gough and the rest of the army crossed the river. The subsequent movements and struggles of both armies must be reserved for another chapter.

* Seventy-three men and forty-eight horses killed and wounded.

† Thirty guns sent, two were sent away, leaving only twenty-eight guns.

CHAPTER CXXI.

SHERE SINGH RETREATS FROM RAMNUGGUR TO RUSSOOL—BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLAH—OPERATIONS AGAINST RAM SINGH IN THE RAREE DOAB—STORMING OF THE DULLAH HEIGHTS—BATTLE OF GOOJERAT—DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF THE SIKH ARMY—ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.

THE slow movements of the English enabled Shere Singh to acquire new strength. His troops accumulated to the number of forty thousand men, all, or nearly all, in a high state of discipline, into which French and British officers had brought them during the latter years of Runjeet Singh's life, and for some time after his death. A powerful artillery of the heaviest calibre perhaps ever exercised in field operations, swelled the magnitude and strength of that army. This force of guns has been variously estimated from sixty-two to ninety.* Shere Singh marched to the Jhelum, where he took post near the village of Russool. The position which he had abandoned was very strong, but the movement of Thackwell led him to despair of holding it, and in choosing Russool he perhaps made a selection still more eligible for a grand contest. It also more easily led him to combine with Chuttur Singh, and other chiefs, and concentrate the whole. Chuttur had reduced the fort of Attock, after it had been well defended by Major Herbert. That officer contrived to send intelligence of its fall to the commander-in-chief, and to warn him that Chuttur Singh intended to form a junction with Shere Singh. The slow movements of Lord Gough were quickened by this information, and he resolved, if possible, to bring the Sikhs to battle before the grand junction of their forces had taken place. This was a resolution which his lordship should have taken sooner, and the officials at Calcutta should have better provided him with means for the onerous task which thus devolved upon him in the re-subjugation of the Punjaub. Lord Gough formed an erroneous opinion as to the strength of the ground taken up by Shere Singh, and as to its peculiarities, circumstances which considerably influenced the remainder of the campaign. When the commander-in-chief arrived before the village of Russool, he reconnoitred the enemy's lines, the right of which rested on the village of Luckneewallah, and Futteh-Shah-le-Chuck, the left on the village of Russool by the Jhelum, and the centre, where the main strength of the enemy was gathered,

* Nolan's Continuation of *Hume and Smollett*; Hugh Murray; Major Hough; Thornton, *The Three Presidencies*.

lay around the village of Chillianwallah. The position chosen was upon the southern extremity of a low line of hills. That part of the range was more especially cut up by nullahs, intersected by ravines, and obstructed by craggy eminences, obstacles to the approach of an assailing force which had been keenly observed, and skilfully discriminated by the artful and vigilant officer by whom the Sikhs were commanded. Lord Gough determined to bring the enemy to a general action, and prepared his measures accordingly. The author of this history may venture to say, that no description which has appeared of the battle that ensued has so particularized its changing fortunes, without encumbering the narrative by tedious or technical details, as the account which he published in his Continuation of *Hume and Smollett's England*,* which he therefore here transcribes.

The advance to the ground chosen by the sirdar was impeded by a jungle, to avoid which, and to distract the enemy's attention, Lord Gough took a considerable *détour* to the right. He succeeded in avoiding the intricacies of the jungle, but not in distracting the attention of Shere Singh. That general moved from his encampment, and took ground in advance, a manœuvre calculated to hide the strength of his position, and to disconcert any previous arrangements of the British commander.

About noon on the 13th, Lord Gough was before the village of Russool, and finding a very strong picket of the enemy on a mound close to that place, his lordship, after some fighting, dislodged it. Ascending the mound, the general and his staff beheld the Khalsa army arranged along the furrowed hills in all the majestic array of war. The British officers gazed with admiration and professional ardour upon the long lines of compact infantry, and the well-marshalled cavalry, mustered in their relative proportions and positions with scientific exactness. The sirdar's batteries were chiefly masked by jungle. The scene was striking in its aspect, the magnitude of the events associated with it, and the excitement it stirred up within the hearts of the brave. Alas, how many noble hearts were necessarily

* This work is now publishing by J. S. Virtue, Ivy Lane and City Road.

to bleed before victory crowned the arms of England, and that fine Khalsa army followed the destinies of England's Asiatic foes! Lord Gough found that he could not turn the flanks of the sirdar's army, they were so protected by jungle, unless he detached a portion of his army to a considerable distance, which he deemed unsafe. The day was too far advanced to begin any operations. The engineer officers were ordered to examine the country in front, and the quarter-master-general was about to take up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse artillery, and opened a fire upon the skirmishers in front of Russool. Lord Gough ordered his heavy guns to open upon the enemy's artillery, and for this purpose they were advanced to an open space in front of the village. Shere Singh did not act with his usual good strategy in exposing the positions of so many of his cannon which the jungle had concealed, and which might have remained hidden until an attack upon his line would have afforded him opportunity to use them with sudden and terrible advantage, as he afterwards was enabled to do with those on his right. As it was, he replied to the British cannonade with such a force of his field-artillery as constrained Lord Gough to draw up in order of battle, lest in the night the sirdar's guns should be moved still more forward, and open on his camp. His lordship, keeping his heavy guns on the centre, placed Sir Walter Gilbert's division on his right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, strengthened by her majesty's 14th light dragoons, and three troops of horse artillery, under Colonel Grant. This arrangement was necessitated by the large force of cavalry observed upon the enemy's left. On the left of the British line, Brigadier-general Campbell's division was formed, flanked by Brigadier White's cavalry, and three troops of horse artillery under Colonel Brind. The demonstrations of the enemy were such that, late as was the hour, and weary as the troops were with marching, Lord Gough determined to attack at once. His lordship's critics, influenced by the events which followed, have severely censured him for attacking under such circumstances, more especially as the ground was unknown to his lordship. It was true that sufficient time had not been obtained to reconnoitre the enemy's positions, but it was not correct to allege that Lord Gough was entirely unacquainted with the ground, as he had previously known it, especially the country to the left of the enemy. It was generally supposed by his lordship's censors that the attack was a wanton waste of life, and arose from the brave, rash, and unreflect-

ing temperament of the general, and the irritation caused by the sudden and severe artillery fire opened upon him. On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington declared that he would, in Lord Gough's place, have acted as he had done; and so full of confidence were the Sikhs in their numbers and resolution, that had not the general given battle, he would have been obliged to defend himself from a desperate night attack under circumstances far less favourable. There can be no doubt, on the part of any who know the noble old soldier, that he acted from his sense of duty to his army and his country, and not from personal irritation.

The battle began, or, it may be said, was resumed, by a heavy cannonade, which lasted for more than an hour, when Lord Gough ordered his left to advance, making a flank movement. In executing this manoeuvre, the troops exposed their own flank to a galling fire from heavy guns, the positions of which had remained covered by jungle, and the Sikh batteries were so placed as to pour a cross-fire, the most destructive, upon the British. When the 3rd and 4th brigades reached the enemy's guns, they were received by a cannonade so awful that they were obliged to retire. As soon as it was known that these two brigades were engaged, the 5th, under Brigadier Mountain, was ordered to storm the centre. They were received with round-shot the moment they moved, with grape and canister as they advanced through the jungle, and, finally, with musketry within close and deadly range. Many of the Sikh soldiers, at the cost of their own life, advanced and shot down the British officers. Brigadier Mountain had distinguished himself in China, and had the entire confidence of Lord Gough, under whom he had served there. Under his able guidance, the British stormed the batteries and spiked the guns, under a flank fire from other guns, which they also spiked; while the enemy, without giving way, poured upon them musket-balls thick as hail. Detachments of musketeers took them on each flank; and some getting to their rear among the jungle, fired upon them with deadly aim. The British were thus compelled to cut their way back to their own lines through hosts of encircling foes. While this was going on upon the centre, Sir Walter Gilbert advanced against the enemy's left. That general occupied the extreme right of his division, and Brigadier Godby the extreme left. They marched through a dense jungle almost unmolested, and then were confronted by infantry. Had the British at once charged with the bayonet, the result might for them have been less sanguinary; they, however, opened

fire, and the Sikhs, more numerous, returned the fire, and outflanked them. Two companies of the 2nd (or Queen's) British regiment charged with the bayonet, but were surrounded. These gallant and skilful soldiers immediately faced about, and after some file-firing, charged, rear-rank in front. At this critical moment a field battery arrived, and drove back the enemy by the precision of their fire. Several guns were here captured by the British. The heroism and losses of the 2nd regiment were very great. While the infantry had thus been engaged in close and deadly battle, the cavalry also were occupied both on the left and right. On the former flank of the British, Brigadier White's brigade charged the enemy, covering the retreat of the infantry. On the extreme right, Brigadier Pope's brigade, strengthened, as has been already shown, by the temporary attachment of the 14th light dragoons of the queen's army, were ordered to charge a body of the enemy's cavalry, the number of which was much superior. Instead of obeying the orders given, they wheeled right about, and galloped off the field, breaking through the artillery, upsetting artillerymen, drivers, and waggons in their course, until they reached the field-hospital. According to some narrations of this transaction, the men galloped away under a mistake of orders; other accounts represent this to have been impossible, because their own officers, and officers of the artillery, endeavoured to stop and rally them without success, except so far as a portion of the 9th lancers was concerned. The enemy was not slow to take advantage of this extraordinary flight; they pursued—dashed in among the horse artillery—cut down seventy-five gunners, and took six guns. The arrival of artillery reserves, the rallying of a portion of the 9th lancers, the steadiness of the infantry, prevented the destruction of the whole right wing. The fresh artillery which came up opened upon the Sikh cavalry with grape and canister with such precision and fury that they retreated. Two of the captured guns were recovered in the retreat. The Sikhs gradually withdrew, leaving the field of battle in possession of the British, who, on this account, claimed the victory. The enemy, in the night, carried away all the guns which the British had spiked during the action, the four pieces of horse artillery which they took on the British right, and five stand of colours, and on these grounds also claimed the victory; and a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of the triumph was, as the English thought, most impudently fired. This was also done at Attock, in the capital of Chuttur Singh, and wherever the Sikh troops held a

position. The Sikhs also claimed the victory for the same reason as the English did, being left in possession of the field. It was, in truth, a drawn battle. The Sikhs having began the engagement, and the English having retained the ground on which they fought, while the former withdrew their line, the battle may more correctly be said to have been won by the British; but the advantages gained were altogether on the part of the Sikhs, who continued to occupy for a month positions from which the British did not attempt to dislodge them. During that time Lord Gough waited for reinforcements, and felt the tardy arrival of some of the troops whose presence had been detained before Mooltan, as has already been shown.

The loss sustained by the Sikhs it is impossible to calculate; according to themselves it was much less than that of the English; and this is credible, when the strength of their position is considered, and the losses to which the unaccountable flight of Pope's brigade exposed the British right. The English loss, according to the official returns, was three thousand men in killed and wounded, nearly one-third of whom belonged to the former class; this, however, did not comprehend all the slain, for many were so horribly wounded by the close discharge of artillery that they died in a few days. The proportion of the wounded who were hit mortally was beyond that which usually occurs in battle. There were also many desertions of sepoy soldiers to Shere Singh, but more especially of Sikh soldiery under Lord Gough's command.

The flight of the large body of cavalry under Brigadier Pope was the subject of much investigation and criticism. The brigadier was too old for the duties imposed upon him; he had no experience in war, and was placed in the command from seniority. This gave occasion in England to denounce the substitution of seniority for fitness, so common in the British army. Unhappily, the officer himself, who was so much concerned in the responsibility of the event, and who had been much respected by his brother officers and his commander, was placed beyond all human accountability, for he fell in front of his fugitive soldiers. Colonel King, of the 14th light dragoons, who succeeded Colonel Havelock, who fell at Ramnuggur, was also much censured. His defence was, that he did his utmost to rally his men in vain; that they were generally light small men, mounted upon light small horses; whereas the cavalry immediately opposed to them were not only much more numerous, but cuirassiers, powerful heavy men, with

long and superior swords, and admirably mounted. The colonel complained of the bad manufacture of the English weapons, which bent against the swords or cuirasses of the Sikh cavalry. When Sir Charles Napier arrived to command the forces in India late in the spring, he inspected the 14th, and addressed them, referring to the allegations of their colonel, and telling them that they were fine, stalwart, broad-chested fellows, that would follow anywhere that they were led. Colonel King took this so much to heart that he retired from the field of inspection and shot himself. Sir William Napier (brother to Sir Charles) afterwards denied in the London newspapers that his brother intended to cast any reflection upon Colonel King. It was, however, generally believed in the army, that Sir Charles levelled a censure at the unfortunate officer, whose sensitive honour could not endure such a reflection from so high an authority. His fate excited deep commiseration, and the address of Sir Charles was disapproved of indignantly by the whole army.

The generalship of Lord Gough became the subject of anonymous criticism in India, and open attack in England; but the brave and skilful general proved, at the subsequent battle of Gujerat, that he knew how to gain victory at as little cost of blood as it was possible for military knowledge to ensure. The late drawn battle—if such it may be called—was designated the battle of Chillianwallah, after a village in the immediate neighbourhood of which the British had encamped. The Sikhs know it as the battle of Russool, the more appropriate name to give it, as it was in its vicinity the chief strength of the Sikh position was found:

The results of this battle were important; the Sikhs became encouraged, and the Sikh generals felt that the superiority of the English in natural talent or military science, was not such as to destroy the hopes of the sirdars to shake off the English yoke, and perhaps assert an ascendancy of the Khalsa over India. In England the shame and the alarm were great. Lord John Russell announced in parliament that Sir Charles Napier should be appointed to the command of the forces, and this was received with loud cheers. His lordship knew very well that the war would be over before Sir Charles could arrive to conduct it, but the announcement answered the end for which it was intended—it was mere parliamentary “clap-trap.” His lordship did not announce a reform in the military administration, by means of which campaigns would be conducted by competent generals, whether successful or unsuccessful, with honour to themselves and their country. It is scarcely

necessary to say that before Sir Charles Napier arrived, Lord Gough had retrieved his own renown and the credit of English arms. That Lord John Russell only made one of his customary plausible pretexts in this matter became pretty evident, from the fact that no dispatch was shown in sending out Sir Charles. That gallant man had no wish to go. Lord Dalhousie had now assumed the government of India, and with him it was not likely that the mercurial and open-mouthed Sir Charles would ever agree. Before that could be brought to the test, the second Sikh war was over.

The battle of Chillianwallah almost paralysed Lord Gough. He ordered General Wheeler with a force to join him, and a reserve under Sir Dudley Hill. Gholab Singh, the Maharajah of Cashmere, had sent ten thousand men to the sphere of action, but they behaved pretty much as the Spaniards did in the “Peninsular war,”—they left the English and their opponents to fight, reserving to themselves the opportunity to take such advantage as an armed neutrality might offer.

Dost Mohammed of Cabul, our professed ally, caused considerable apprehension after the battle of Chillianwallah. He assisted the Sikhs with an army of twelve thousand men, and it was feared that a large army of Affghans would pour upon India, with the energy and force of the Dooranee empire. The Affghan auxiliaries were chiefly cavalry, undisciplined, tardy in their movements, and not zealous in the war. The Affghans were Mohammedans, and regarded the true Sikhs as heretics or infidels, and therefore did not deem it desirable to risk much to serve one class of infidels against another, although on the whole they preferred the Sikhs.

When the government published, which they did ostentatiously, the list of guns, &c., captured at Chillianwallah, confidence was in a great measure restored to the army throughout India, for it was supposed that after all the rumours of failure there must have been a victory if cannon were left in the hands of the British; for it was well-known that the Sikh soldier patted his gun as he did his horse, and regarded it with similar affection.

Lord Gough was obliged to remain inactive, expecting reinforcements, which were under the command of Wheeler in one direction, and Whish in another. The progress of the latter was discreditably slow, especially of the Bombay column, under the command of the Hon. General Dundas. Wheeler's force had hard and useful work to do, before they could join the grand army. This was the conquest of Ram Singh, chief of the Raree Doab. This



ਗੁਲਾਬ ਸਿੰਘ

GHOLAB SINGH.

From a Drawing by an Indian Artist.

LONDON JAMES S VIRTUE





DOST MOHAMED KHAN.

From a Drawing by an Indian Artist



THE BATTLE OF COJERAT.





VISCOUNT GOUGH, G. C. B. &c.

leader occupied a formidable post in his territory, called the Dullah heights.

In the middle of January Wheeler attacked this position, but so inaccessible was the fastness that the most he could do, and that with considerable loss, was to drive out Ram Singh and his followers, whereas the gallant general hoped to accomplish either his capture or destruction. On the 11th, Wheeler ordered the 4th native infantry to take up a position to the northward of the enemy's post, so as to intercept him in case he should be obliged to evacuate the fort, and retreat in that direction; the main force tarried at Shorpore, where they had been in quarters, until the 13th, the sappers, pioneers, and labourers being engaged in making a practicable road through an exceedingly difficult country, consisting of defiles and "ghauts." This road was laid for about seven miles, as far as the village of Cote on the course of the Ravee, about three miles distant from Ram Singh's position. On the 14th, the little army of General Wheeler took up ground under the Dullah heights. That day and the next was occupied in cutting roads, transporting guns and mortars upon elephants, and making arrangements for storming the fort. On the morning of the latter day, Captain Hicks, of the 3rd native infantry, was dispatched with four companies of that regiment, and Mr. Hodgson, with two companies of the Guide corps, to take post west of the Dullah heights, on the opposite bank of the Ravee. The precautions taken by detaching these bodies of men were necessary from the topographical character of the neighbourhood. The Ravee, debouching from the mountainous region in which it has its birth, flows through a beautiful valley, where a series of hills lying from east to west presented an unequal ridge; on this ridge, overlooking the river, the little village of Dullah was situated, in which Ram Singh had so cleverly fortified himself. In every direction from the village the rock dipped almost perpendicularly, beside being protected by the river, which wound partly around it. Access was by paths, partly lying in hollows formed by former streams, and partly cut through the rock. These paths were circuitous, and nearly covered with brushwood, admitting only by single file of an approach to the platform on which the village rested. On either side of the path were precipices from twenty to eighty feet deep, and huge boulders lay profusely across the way. Very few men might defend this position against very many. The 4th native regiment was to advance against the face of this defence, from the direction where it had taken post some days, and the signal was to

be the firing of a gun from the British camp. The 3rd and the Guides were at the same moment ordered, by the same signal, to advance against the west of the ridge, and crown a height visible from head-quarters. As soon as the success of this detachment was ascertained, the remainder of the 3rd regiment, and two hundred men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, who, with Lieutenant Swinton, had volunteered to serve on foot, were to advance upon another face of the ridge, from the little village of Chulbarah, where they had been posted; this party, ascending a spur of the hill on its left, was to co-operate opportunely with the advance of the other detachments. Major Fisher, at the head of a body of regular native infantry and irregular cavalry, with guns mounted upon elephants, were in support, and to ascend (the cavalry, of course, dismounting) when the various detachments had come well into action. There was yet another point upon which an ascent was to be attempted—that which was in front of the camp of the British. Major Davidson, with a few hundred Sikh auxiliaries, regular and irregular, supported by two companies of the 1st Sikh light infantry, under Lieutenant Peel, was ordered to make this attempt. At the moment for action, the signal gun was fired, but no one appeared to take any notice of it—no men were seen to make their way along the ridge. There was a long pause on the side of the British, the guns of the enemy at the same time firing. None of the detachments appearing on the ridge, Major Butler was ordered to attempt to storm it, in conjunction with the other party already appointed to ascend in front: this was happily accomplished, after a very sharp conflict. Major Davidson was shot through the hand, Lieutenant Peel was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Christie killed. The detached parties, trusting to native guides, were purposely misled, and thus could not come into action. Ram Singh had by this means the way kept open for his retreat when resistance was no longer possible, and all the skilful arrangements that had been made to catch the eagle in his eyrie were disappointed by the treachery of the natives, who had been, unfortunately, too implicitly trusted in an important service.

BATTLE OF GUJERAT.

Shere Singh maintained his post in the neighbourhood of Russool until the 12th of February, when he retired with coolness and deliberation. Lord Gough instituted a pursuit, but the Sikh cavalry covered the retreat of the army effectually. The approach, at last, of General Whish, greatly embarrassed the move-

ments of the Sikh chief. He was obliged, by the combinations which General Whish and Lord Gough were able to effect, to take post at Gujerat, where he requested Chuttur Singh to join him with his whole force, for he was too sagacious not to perceive that the war was approaching its crisis. Chuttur accomplished the junction, and then the most formidable army the English had ever encountered in the East were drawn up in the lines of Gujerat. The number of men was scarcely less than eighty thousand;* the pieces of ordnance were fifty-nine. The whole force of Lord Gough, after the junction of Whish, did not much exceed twenty-five thousand men, but his artillery was superior to that of the enemy; for, although Shere Singh's pieces were heavy metal, and his artillerymen practised in battle, as well as thoroughly drilled on the French system, Whish had brought with him heavy guns, and the artillerymen, officers, and privates of Lord Gough's army were excellent. The calibre of the British guns was, for the first time during the two campaigns, superior to that of the Sikhs; Major-general Whish was especially competent to direct that arm of the service.

The troops under the command of Lord Gough were: Cavalry—Her majesty's 3rd, 9th, and 14th light dragoons; Bengal 1st, 5th, 6th, and 8th light cavalry; 3rd and 9th irregular cavalry; detachments of 11th and 14th irregular cavalry, Scinde horse. Artillery—Nine troops horse artillery, and four light field-batteries (one each of the Bombay army). Infantry—Her majesty's 10th, 29th, and 32nd foot; Bengal 2nd European regiment; 8th, 13th, 15th, 25th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 36th, 45th, 46th, 51st, 52nd, 56th, 69th, 70th, and 72nd. In addition to these was a strong brigade, under the Hon. Major-general Dundas, of Bombay infantry, consisting of the 1st Bombay European Fusiliers, and several native regiments. Shere Singh made the village of Gujerat his head-quarters. It was curiously, and for military purposes, strongly situated between the Jhelum and the Chenab, but nearer to the Jhelum. It was nearly surrounded by a brook, which ran rather among than over the pebbles which lay in its bed, although in a few places pools of water were collected to some considerable depth. Between that brook and the town the main position of Shere Singh lay. Lord Gough resolved not to despise his enemy on this occasion, or by any act of precipitancy give him advantage. He also resolved to contest this battle upon the strictest principles of military science, so that no unfavourable critiques should be made upon his generalship at home. He began the

* Lord Gough's estimate was 61,500.

action by employing his superior force of artillery, and contrived to use it to the utmost, causing great havoc in the ranks of the enemy, and smashing guns and tumbrils along his lines.

Shere Singh strove to bring into efficient play that arm of war in which he was more particularly superior to his enemy—the cavalry. With his numerous horse he endeavoured to outflank Lord Gough. Vast bodies of cavalry were thrown on either flank, and the skill, energy, and courage of the British horsemen were taxed to the uttermost to prevent this design. Shere Singh did not, however, display his usual generalship on this occasion; all his movements showed a mind perturbed and anxious. He did not conceal the position of his batteries as he had so cleverly done at Chillianwallah, but opening fire at long range betrayed the arrangement of his cannon before he could make the weapons seriously injurious to his foe. This fault, considering the superiority of artillery power on the part of the English, was irredeemable. Lord Gough, having nearly silenced the Sikh guns, and out-mancœuvred their cavalry upon his flanks, attacked with his infantry, throwing his right against the left centre, and the right of the enemy's left. The difficulty was in passing the deep empty brook, or nullah, in doing which the guns of the enemy could be brought to bear, as the English cannon would necessarily cease their fire. This impediment was found formidable; some valuable lives were lost in passing that "Rubicon;" but success attended the attempt, in spite of the grape and canister of the field-pieces, and the rolling volleys of musketry. The English ascended the banks of the nullah, brought the bayonet to the charge, dashed forward, penetrated the line, and separated the enemy's left and centre. Although that successful attack did not end the struggle, it virtually decided the battle. Shere Singh indeed must have seen, after his flank operations had failed, that if the British infantry passed the nullah his guns would be lost, as well as the battle. Scarcely had the British right accomplished the purpose for which they were directed against the enemy's line, than the left also cleared the nullah, and turned his right wing, huddling together his flanks in a confused mass upon his centre. Even then the gallant Sikhs hoped for victory. Their cavalry charged the flanks of the victorious infantry, but were in their turn brought down by successive close rounds from the horse artillery, and then their broken squadrons were charged by the English cavalry. Thus left free to follow their course of conquest, the English infantry of both flanks wheeled round

the village of Gujerat, pouring continuous volleys of musketry into the packed masses of the divided Sikh infantry, and inflicting horrible slaughter. The battle was won. Campbell and Dundas with their infantry, Gilbert, with cavalry and artillery, relentlessly pursued, exacting a fearful vengeance for the losses at the nullah of Ramuggur, and the hill-sides of Russool. The Sikh army was broken. Lord Gough rested the main body of his army, entrusting to General Gilbert, with the cavalry, horse artillery, and light infantry, the further prosecution of pursuit. Thus, so far as active fighting was concerned, ended the second Sikh war.

Sir Walter Gilbert pursued the enemy unremittingly, until at last a surrender was compelled. The Affghans deserted the fallen fortunes of their confederates, and fled through the Khoree Pass. The Affghans lost half their number in the field, and a large portion of the remainder in retreat. Dost Mohammed Khan submitted to entreaties for peace, and as the English had no desire for another Affghan war, they accepted his offers, and extended forgiveness. The Sikh army surrendered, forty-one guns were captured, and the whole Khalsa force remaining after so many fields of slaughter gave up their arms, and, obtaining a gratuity of a rupee each, dispersed to their homes. During the war the Sikhs lost one hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, and twenty thousand stand of infantry arms. The British guns taken at Chillianwallah were all restored. The consequences of the Sikh war were the annexation of the Punjaub, and the entire destruction of the Khalsa army. The expense of treasure, by which the result was purchased, was very great. The cost of human life was also great. The policy of the British government, and the grounds of it, were made public in the following proclamation, issued on the 29th of March, by the governor-general:—

For many years, in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation and the Sikhs. When Runjeet Singh was dead, and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the state, the sirdar's and the Khalsa army, without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated. They were driven, with slaughter and in shame, from the country they had invaded, and at the gates of Lahore the Maharajah Duleep Singh tendered to the governor-general the submission of himself and his chiefs, and solicited the clemency of the British government. The governor-general extended his clemency to the state of Lahore; he generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the maharajah having been replaced on the throne, treaties of friendship were formed between the states.

The British have faithfully kept their word, and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them. But the Sikh people and their chiefs

have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound. Of their annual tribute, no portion whatever has at any time been paid, and large sums advanced by the government of India have never been repaid. The control of the British government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, has been resisted by arms. Peace has been east aside. British officers have been murdered when acting for the state; others engaged in the like employment have been treacherously thrown into prison. Finally, the army of the state and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the sirdars of the Panjaub who signed the treaties, and led by a member of the regency itself, have risen in arms against us, and have waged a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.

The government of India formerly declared that it desired no farther conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now—but it is bound, in its duty, to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge. To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the state from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the governor-general is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore, the governor-general of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the kingdom of the Panjaub is at an end; and that all the territories of Maharajah Duleep Singh are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India.

His Highness the Maharajah shall be treated with consideration and with honour. The few chiefs who have not engaged in hostilities against the British shall retain their property and their rank. The British government will leave to all the people, whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religions; but it will not permit any man to interfere with others in the observance of such forms as their respective religions may either enjoin or permit. The jagheers, and all the property of sirdars and others who have been in arms against the British, shall be confiscated to the state. The defences of every fortified place in the Panjaub, which is not occupied by British troops, shall be totally destroyed, and effectual measures shall be taken to deprive the people of the means of renewing either tumult or war.

The governor-general calls upon all the inhabitants of the Panjaub, sirdars and people, to submit themselves peaceably to the authority of the British government, which has hereby been proclaimed. Over those who shall live as obedient and peaceful subjects of the state, the British government will rule with mildness and beneficence. But if resistance to constituted authority shall again be attempted—if violence and turbulence be renewed, the governor-general warns the people of the Panjaub that the time for leniency with them has passed away, and that their offence will be punished with prompt and most rigorous severity.

The decisive measures which this proclamation indicated, had the desired effect. The Panjaub gradually settled down, its administration was committed to able men, and the people were taught to rely on their own peaceable industry and a just government for prosperity. A new era dawned upon that rich but distracted realm, which became the glory of English government in India, so that when some years later the native army of Bengal, by which its subjugation was chiefly

effected, mutinied, the Sikhs remained loyal. Among the officers who so nobly fought and conquered in that formidable war, none held a more useful and honourable position than Major-general Thackwell. It was the last campaign in which the gifted veteran ever fought. He returned to his country, and enjoyed the respect of all classes. Some notice of his career as a whole is desirable, as he has lately (April, 1859) paid "the debt of nature," and is numbered with the long line of departed heroes who have made the name of Great Britain illustrious. He entered the army in April, 1800, and during his career of nearly sixty years had gained the highest distinction in the service, particularly in the East Indies. Sir Joseph's services in the Peninsula are thus recorded by Hart:—"Served the campaign in Galicia and Leon under Sir John Moore, and was engaged in several skirmishes, and present at the battle of Corunna; served the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in the Peninsula, including the battle of Vittoria, the Pyrenees in front of Pampeluna, the 27th, 28th, 29th, and 30th July; blockade of Pampeluna from the 18th to the 31st of October, when it surrendered; battle of Orthes, affair of Tarbes, and battle of Toulouse, besides many affairs of advanced guards, outposts, &c. Served also the campaign of 1815, including the action at Quatre Bras, the retreat on the following day, and battle of Waterloo. Commanded the cavalry division of the army of the Indus during the Affganistan campaign; was present at the storm and capture of Ghizni, and commanded the 2d column of the army on its march from Cabul to Bengal." He commanded the cavalry division of the army of Gwalior throughout the Mahratta war in 1843, and commanded the cavalry division at the action of Maharajpore, on the 29th December of that year. Sir Joseph greatly distinguished himself in the operations against the Sikhs in the campaigns of 1846 and 1849, for which eminent services he received the thanks of parliament and of the East India Company, and was rewarded in the last mentioned year by her majesty nominating him a Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, the gallant general having formerly for his military services been made a Companion and Knight of that Order. During his honourable career in the service he had been several times wounded. At Vittoria he was severely contused on the right shoulder, and at Waterloo he was so badly wounded that he had to have his left arm amputated, and had two horses shot under him. On his return to England from the East Indies he was appointed Inspector-General of Cavalry in succession to his Royal Highness the Duke

of Cambridge. In 1834 he was made a knight of the Hanoverian Order, had received the silver war medal and three clasps for his services in the Peninsula, a medal for Sobraon, where he commanded the cavalry, and a medal and clasps for the last Punjaub campaign, also the empty honour of the Dooranee Order for services in Afghanistan. In November, 1849, he was appointed colonel of the 16th (the Queen's) regiment of light dragoons (Lancers). He was an intimate friend of the late General Havelock, and of Lord Clyde, Sir Harry Smith, Lord Gough, and other noble and gallant veterans of the army. His commissions bore date as follows:—Cornet, 22nd of April, 1800; lieutenant, 13th of June, 1801; captain, 9th of April, 1807; major, 18th of June, 1815; lieutenant-colonel, 21st of June, 1817; colonel, 10th of January, 1837; major-general, 9th of November, 1846; and lieutenant-general, 20th of June, 1854.

The *United Service Gazette*, for May, 1859 gives the following interesting account of the last act of homage which his country paid to his gallantry, and long and efficient services:—"Lieutenant-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., was buried in Corkbeg churchyard, which is distant about a mile from Aghada House, and twenty miles from Cork, on the 15th instant. The coffin was borne to the grave on the shoulders of his sorrow-stricken tenantry. The peasantry, who had swarmed to the spot from the neighbouring districts, lined the road from Aghada House to the church, as a last tribute of respect to one whose noble deeds of daring occupy an important place in history's pages. The Irish naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Talbot, with many other naval and military officers in full uniform, formed part of the funeral procession. The coast-guard from all the stations in the vicinity preserved order along the line of route. The badge and collar of a Grand Cross of the Bath, the insignia of a Knight of Hanover, and of the Dooranee Order, and the medals for the Peninsular, Waterloo, Affghan, Mahratta, and Sikh campaigns, so well earned by the lamented deceased, were tastefully arranged on a cushion, which was carried before the coffin by four officers. Notwithstanding all this glittering display, it was not a military funeral, there not being sufficient artillery, cavalry, and infantry at Cork to pay the honours due to a lieutenant-general. The gallant *sabreur's* remains lie near the mausoleum of the Roche family, with which he was connected by marriage, a family of which Lord Fermoy, the lord-lieutenant of Cork, is the present head. No cavalry officer ever saw more service."

CHAPTER CXXII.

GENERAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF SIR HENRY (LORD) HARDINGE—
HIS DEPARTURE—ARRIVAL OF LORD DALHOUSIE—HIS GENERAL POLICY.

It was necessary in previous chapters, in order to maintain consecutive relation, to narrate the progress of hostilities in the Punjaub to their termination, passing over all notice of civil affairs, and changes of government. This chapter will supply the omission. Very few governor-generals so much disappointed previous expectations as Sir Henry Hardinge. His nomination to the post commanded the general suffrage of his countrymen. Belonging to the Peel party, it was supposed that he would be the advocate of peace, yet immediately upon his arrival he had to wage a most dangerous war. He began that war most reluctantly, as he knew that the peace policy of Sir Robert Peel was popular in England. It is probable that had he made a warlike demonstration, such as became the empire he governed, and the real exigencies of the case, war might have been averted.

His appointment to the high office was regarded in England with great favour, from the supposition that he would, by his military prestige, probably prevent war. This was an absurd expectation, for the Sikhs or the sepoys knew nothing of his European renown. It was also believed in England that his military skill would enable him to take such measures as would deter any Asiatic people from aggression or disturbance, and that if war broke out his capacity for military arrangement would bring it to a speedy termination, by the use of those means which modern military science supplied, and the grand organization to which he was supposed equal. All these expectations were falsified. Very few civilians in the government of India allowed the country to "drift into war" so easily as did Sir Henry Hardinge. He acted in all respects similar to the Peelite cabinet of Lord Aberdeen subsequently, when its weakness, temporising, and vacillation, not only allowed but invited Russian aggression. Lord Aberdeen's demonstration of ten thousand men, unprovided with any of the means necessary for a campaign, in order to deter the Czar Nicholas from launching his hosts against Turkey, was a policy anticipated by Sir Henry Hardinge, when he allowed the Sikhs, which he knew, or ought to have known, to constitute the most formidable native army which had ever appeared in India, to cross the frontiers and invade India. So far from fulfilling the hopes of his countrymen, when war did break

out, by the efficiency of his military administration, want and confusion harassed the army at every step, and in consequence our ascendancy in India was placed in the greatest jeopardy. Sir Henry was regarded as a man of a frank and direct mind, but his policy in India was indirect, and his relation of public transactions uncandid. While, for instance, he was praising the native army for its heroism and loyalty in his orders of the day, proclamations, and despatches, he believed that army to be dangerously disloyal, and was by no means satisfied with either its zeal or courage in action. It has been alleged in extenuation of this, that he praised the native troops from policy. If so, he might have consulted truth as well as policy, in some degree, by moderating the praise his conscience permitted him to bestow, and not mislead his own countrymen, who trusted that his panegyrics of native loyalty and valour issued from his convictions. It was supposed that Sir Henry was capable of ruling India with a comprehensive policy, and that he would treat liberally, and with enlarged thought, all great public questions connected with our Asiatic empire. He did not display these qualities, but he put forth surprising vigour and activity in detail. He performed all routine duties with alacrity and dispatch, and transacted public business with readiness, clearness, and perfect order. He neglected no duty which he imposed upon himself, or thought was incumbent upon him officially; but he interfered as little as possible with the routine of the offices even in military matters, and when he must have clearly seen that it was injurious to the public interests. His views were narrow, and he not only tolerated but fostered the spirit of clique and partizan patronage, and this at a time when his government should from necessity have rested on the broad basis of justice and principle.

Immediately upon his assumption of office, Sir Henry had to settle various disputes, in different directions, while the Sikh war was pending. In all these he showed an intense anxiety to conciliate and secure peace at all costs. There were disagreements between the Bombay government and the Rajah of Kalapore. The late prince had been a great robber, and a great devotee; he died while making preparations for plunder and a pilgrimage. His death relieved the Bombay

presidential government of some trouble for a time; but out of his decess differences among his ministers and tributaries arose, which remained as a legacy for Sir Henry Hardinge's administration. A rebellion broke out. British troops were sent to uphold a cruel and unjust government against a people driven to revolt. The troops sent were inefficient. They were, as was customary when British troops took the field, unprovided with proper commissariat or material of war, and commanded by men in virtue of their seniority or connexions, not because they were possessed of the talent for command. Shame and defeat were the consequences. It was necessary to attack the fort of Samnanghur, which rested on the summit of a scarpd rock. There were only three hundred men in its garrison, wretchedly equipped, yet they kept a large British force at bay for several weeks. Heavy guns were ordered up from Belgaum, thirty miles off, which were moved at less than a mile and a half per day. Colonel Outram and Mr. Reeves, arriving as civil commissioners, offered an amnesty, which the brave garrison refused, in consequence of their determination never again to submit to the oppressions which the rajah had inflicted upon them. After gross mismanagement in almost every form, and the commission of military errors utterly creditable to the English arms, and the loss of many good soldiers, the Kalaporean and Sawunt Warree rebels were subdued. With that extraordinary good fortune which the English almost always have in some form, a man was found equal to the emergency. Colonel Ovens, who knew well the Indian character, a brave soldier, a good officer, and adroit political, brought order out of the chaos. The miserable failures, civil and military, where Colonel Ovens was not present, strikingly illustrated the system. The governor-general and the commander-in-chief were too far away to be responsible for the disgraces inflicted upon the British name in Kalapore and Sawunt Warree, but they repeated the errors on their own ground; they were, in fact, themselves part of "the system," and among its most prominent abettors.

During Sir Henry's government there were active operations on the Scinde frontier, in one of the most difficult countries in the world. These were conducted as fortunately and gloriously as military operations in other directions were the reverse. The mountain robber tribes of Scinde were put down by that great military heretic, Sir Charles Napier. He did not belong to "the system," and incurred the anger of all its orthodox upholders, who load his memory with opprobrium to this day, and hate it, because he put an end to cliquesism, row-

dyism, gambling, military routine, and jobbery, in the army he commanded. Sir Charles, who bore the euphonious but not very complimentary soubriquet of Shitanka Chai, or the Devil's brother, politely imparted, for his activity and daring, by the Beloochees, swept the mountains of the robber hordes, making good soldiers of some, good agriculturists of others, and killing or compelling into exile all who persisted in resistance. Fortunately the responsibility of the Scinde exploits did not rest in Calcutta, or there would, in all likelihood, be disasters such as occurred wherever "the system" had its full scope. When in 1847 there appeared, at all events in the eyes of the governor-general, tokens of settled quietude in the Punjaub, and Sir Henry became Viscount Hardinge, he carried out the policy in favour at home, by reducing the army to a peace establishment. This he did so eagerly, and with so little discrimination, that it would have required the ingenuity of Lord Aberdeen, or Mr. Gladstone, or the conscientious peace principles of Mr. Cobden or Mr. Bright, to have rivalled him in the rapidity and success with which he disarmed, while a treacherous and powerful enemy, whose habits and purposes it was his business to study, was preparing for another and more formidable struggle. The state of the revenue afforded some justification to Lord Hardinge. The treasury was empty, war had swallowed up its resources. Unnecessary and unjust war left no funds for just and necessary war, such as that with the Sikhs was. The English government had pursued the same policy in India which it protested against in Europe, when carried out by Austria. As that power guaranteed the thrones of all the despots in Italy, and was ever ready to interpose to uphold absolute monarchy against the people, no matter how aggrieved the latter, and thus created, encouraged, and perpetuated tyranny and cruelty, so the English guaranteed the despots of India against their subjects, however cruel and horrid the oppressions which the people endured. Rajahs and maharajahs, nizams, subhadars, and kings robbed and murdered with the prospect of keeping down all revolt in their dominions by the aid of the British sepoys. This policy exhausted the treasury of India, and compelled the reduction of armaments when they ought to have been increased and strengthened. These reductions of Lord Hardinge were not skilfully effected. He left this too much to the civilians, and hence when the drum again beat to arms, it was difficult to find the material of war. The more skilled part of the army, such as cannot be easily recruited, was disbanded in a manner dispro-



GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

From a Photograph by F. Kilburn

portionate, rash, and dangerous. From the cool retreats of Simla, to which he retired like a philosopher, he reduced the expenses of the army one million sterling per annum; while the rancee at Lahore was disconsolate for the loss of her favourite Lall Singh, whom Lord Hardinge had banished, and while she and he were gaining the whole Sikh army to their cause, Lord Hardinge, with that business capacity with which he was endowed, set about many useful but costly works, all desirable and honourable, had the army been cared for first, and the Punjaub watched or garrisoned by a perfect force, provided with munitions, and all the appliances of an army even if small numerically. His lordship completed the grand trunk road from Calcutta to Benares, over which fifty-four bridges were erected. The Ganges canal, the formation of which had been begun under Lord Auckland's government, but stopped by Lord Ellenborough, was recommenced by Lord Hardinge. His lordship's good works were not confined to British India. He induced twenty-three of the petty princes to abolish infanticide, sutteeism, and slavery in their dominions. This course he adopted as the result of directions from home, but he entered into the spirit of his instructions, and pursued these objects *con amore*. He also raised Bengal to a separate government.

His lordship pared down the military expenditure on the eve of war, and increased the civil expenditure in the midst of commercial panic, and with a revenue deficit of two millions. His arrangements for improvement of the revenue were, however, admitted to be judicious, and had he remained and no war ensued, it was confidently affirmed by his friends that he would have seen a surplus in the treasury. He left India January 18th, 1848, six days after the arrival of his successor, the Earl (afterwards Marquis) of Dalhousie.

The Whigs were in office when Lord Dalhousie was nominated to the grandest viceroyency in the wide realms of the queen. He was not of their number, but of the influential followers of Sir Robert Peel, who bore a relation to the party like that which the bat bears to the bird and the mouse. His lordship had obtained among the *juste milieu* politicians, who claimed him as one of their circle, a reputation for extraordinary administrative ability. It does not appear, however meritorious his past services in that respect, that he deserved the laudations bestowed upon his genius for government which his friends and party asserted he possessed. He was, however, young and vigorous, and very ambitious to distinguish himself. His confidence in his

own powers at least equalled that reposed in them by his friends. Immediately upon his arrival, commercial bankruptcy spread disaster over Calcutta and over India. Under the name of commerce and banking, vast swindling speculations were carried on by persons holding the highest places in society. It is not related that his lordship showed any remarkable tact or ability in dealing with such a condition of affairs. Perhaps it was too widespread, too pervading, too terrible in the ruin scattered, too complicated in the fraud and villany developed, for the powers entrusted to him to mitigate or control, whatever his capacity to employ them.

The policy pursued by Lord Dalhousie in the settlement of the Punjaub in 1849-50, was to endow the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, who would not come of age until 1854,* with a magnificent pension, and to treat the Sikhs, not as conquered enemies, but as free English subjects, enjoying the protection of the government in the same way as her majesty's European subjects. This policy has been crowned with success. He also acquired for her majesty the Koh-i-noor, or Mountain of Light, which is represented as the most precious diamond in the world. At the Great Exhibition in London, in 1851, this gem was exhibited, and is therefore well known to multitudes of Englishmen. It was presented to the queen, at a levee, on the 3rd of July, 1850, by the chairman and deputy-chairman of the East India Company.

On May 6, 1849, Sir Charles Napier landed in Calcutta, as commander-in-chief. He immediately set about a reform of the army, in which he of course encountered the most decided opposition from all the patrons of routine. In the first six months of his command he had to decide forty-six cases of courts-martial; the crimes imputed to officers being drunkenness, gambling, and dishonourable actions arising out of these causes. While at Lahore, the eccentric but wise commander issued the following general order, certainly the most remarkable ever issued in the British army, but one much required. Men like Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough

* This young prince is now resident in England, and, under the guidance of Dr. Sir W. Logan, conducts himself with a dignity and prudence which has gained the esteem of statesmen and citizens. He is a frequent visitor of the court, is often invited by her majesty to select dinner parties, and is regarded by her with sympathy and respect. He is a pious Christian, fond of retirement, and benevolent. When he appears on public occasions he is invested with elegant oriental costume, and wears the richest gems. The author, who has had opportunity of observing the manners of his highness, has been struck with his intimate acquaintance with the language, customs, and observances of the country in which he has made his honourable exile.

winked at these things, rather than disturb "the system," or make themselves unpopular; Sir Charles only regarded his country, his duty, and the honour of his profession:—"At a late review of the troops on the plain of Meean Meer the following egregious deficiencies were evident to all: 1st. That some commanders of regiments were unable to bring their regiments properly into general line. 2ndly. One commanding officer of a regiment attempted to wheel his whole regiment as he would a company. 3rdly. Several officers commanding companies were seen disordering their companies by attempting to dress them from the wrong flanks. 4thly. When the line was ordered to be formed on the left column, some commanders deployed too soon, and ordered their lines thus improperly formed to 'double quick' in order to regain their position. This was all bad; but it was worse to see the regiments on receiving the word to 'double quick' at once charge, with loud shouts, no such order to charge having been given by any one, nor the words 'prepare to charge;' nor did anything occur to give a pretext for such a disgraceful scene, exhibiting both want of drill and want of discipline. 5thly. Bad as this was, it was not the worst. When these regiments chose to 'charge,' the commander-in-chief, to his astonishment, beheld the men discharging their firelocks straight up into the air; and he saw some men of the rear rank actually firing off their muskets to the rear over their shoulders as their bearers (he will not call them soldiers) were running to the front. He feels assured that no such scene could have occurred in any other regiments in the army. If ever such again happen, he will expose the commanding officer of any regiment that so disgraces itself, in public orders, to the whole Indian army. In the course of his service he never before witnessed such a scene. No commander could go into action with a regiment capable of such conduct without feeling certain that it would behave ill. The commander-in-chief will, therefore, hold commanding officers responsible (for they alone are to blame), that any soldier, who shouts or charges, or fires without orders, be instantly seized, tried at once by a drumhead court-martial, and the sentence executed on the spot."

This order was but a foretaste of the discipline enforced by Sir Charles. Yet he was no martinet. All his regulations were based upon sound military principles. The general custom of patching up and expediency he loathed, and, whenever opportunity afforded, exposed. Sir Charles held the command of the army for a very short time. The opposition he encountered in every attempt to

establish reform led him to the conclusion that he could effect nothing serviceable to his country in his command. It was a high and honourable post, and most lucrative, such as Sir Charles would find not only suitable to his talents, but valuable, for he was comparatively poor; but as he took upon him the office with an honourable desire to do something useful in the public service, so he resigned it when he found there was no longer any hope of accomplishing his object. He gave his motives in brief, in a speech delivered at Kurrachee, where he was presented with a costly sword by the native chiefs:—"Lord Ellenborough treated me as a general officer, and the brave Bombay army seconded me nobly; not, as is the custom now-a-days, for a general officer entrusted with the command to be told by a colonel and a captain that this thing is right and that thing is wrong. If general officers are unfit for command, in God's name do not appoint them to command—and I must say, there are nine out of ten who ought not to be appointed; but I hold that when once a general officer is appointed to command, he ought to be treated as such; he ought to know what is best for the army under his command, and should not be dictated to by boy-politicals, who do not belong to the army, and who know nothing whatever of military science. It is this that has caused me to resign the command."

Dr. Taylor says: "During the eighteen months that Sir C. Napier held that office, forty-five officers of the Bengal army were tried by courts-martial, of whom fourteen were cashiered, six dismissed, seven lost rank, five were suspended, ten reprimanded, and but two honourably acquitted, one simply found not guilty, and four had their sentences commuted, or were pardoned."

On the 6th of December, 1850, Sir W. Gomm arrived to succeed Sir Charles. Things soon went on in the old way; "the system" was too sacred to be disturbed by heterodox reformers like Sir Charles. The Marquis Dalhousie displayed great activity. He had the vigour and ardour of youth, and really possessed administrative tastes, with a fair show of capacity for government. He determined to see for himself the condition of the provinces. He passed into the upper provinces, travelled all through the Punjaub, Peshawar, and Cashmere. He adopted measures both civil and military, calculated to secure these provinces. He then came by the rivers, examining their courses, and the countries on their banks to the capital of Scinde. From Hyderabad he passed to Bombay. He there embarked in a steamer for Goa, Colombo, Galle, in the island of Ceylon, Singapore, on

the Malacca Peninsula, Malabar, and then steaming through the bay of Bengal arrived at Calcutta.

During Lord Dalhousie's early administration the spirit of revolt among the Bengal sepoys displayed itself. It began in the Punjab. The 66th regiment at Umritsir revolted; the plea was, the denial of batta (extra allowance). The ringleaders were arrested and punished, and the regiment disbanded. Lord Dalhousie favoured railways, and had the honour of initiating railway enterprise in India. Whatever the administrative care of Lord Dalhousie, there was a dash of the despotic in his measures, and this the English, in some cases, bitterly felt. The introduction of measures to deprive Europeans of their right of trial by jury, excited much antipathy, personally, to his lordship, and a violent opposition. The Europeans in the Mofussil were to be placed at the mercy of the magistrates. The measures intended to effect these objects were nicknamed by the English residents "the black acts." Lieutenant Waghorn died during this year; a poor pension only was awarded to his widow, although he had rendered, by his postal enterprises, great service to the company and to India, to the crown and to England.

In the year 1851, symptoms of disturbance manifested themselves in various directions. The mountain tribes on the Affghan borders showed a determination to plunder, as they had from time immemorial been accustomed to do. A force was collected at Peshawur, under the eyes of the ubiquitous governor-general, before whose energy time and space seemed to vanish. The Lawrences, and their political disciples, Major Edwardes, the hero of Mooltan, suppressed these disturbances, and like Sir Charles Napier on the Scinde frontier, turned robbers and marauders into loyal soldiers or peaceful agriculturists. These men, rude as they were, were amenable to a policy of consistent firmness and manly generosity, justifying the saying of Horace, *Argilla quidvis imitaberis uda*. These wild mountaineers had been previously deemed incorrigible plunderers, like those described by Virgil, *Convectare juvat prædas et vivere rapto*. In the seaports a system of incendiarism sprung up, by which ships were set on fire, often when laden with a rich cargo for Europe.

In January, 1851, the ex-peishwa, Bajee Rao, died at Benares; his pension of £90,000 per annum fell to the company. Meetings of Hindoos were held in Calcutta to protest against the government patronage of the Christian religion, and the proselyting character of the government schools. It was sufficiently evident that the government was

using the public wealth of India to propagate religious opinions opposed to those held by the masses, from whom that wealth was extracted. It was also obvious that heathen and Mohammedan religious institutions were supported from the public treasury. The feeling which pervaded the native gathering at Calcutta was intensely, almost savagely bigoted. It had been well that no occasion had been given for such a spirit. Means were adopted to disconnect the government with the support of Mohammedanism and idolatry, but a large number of the civil and of the military were in favour of the state endowment of idolatry, as "expedient" and good in "policy." The minds of the natives throughout Bengal were much unsettled by an infamous transaction, on the part of the government, calculated to destroy all faith in public men in India, and to uproot all confidence in the English from the native mind. Deficiencies in various public accounts had been discovered, and the governor-general ordered a strict investigation. In order to divert public attention from delinquencies by Europeans, a plan seems to have been formed among the officials to incriminate wealthy natives transacting business with the government. As a class, these natives are dishonest, but the disclosures of 1848-49 enabled the worst of the native usurers to address a European accuser with the *tu quoque*. The progress of these proceedings has been related by McKenna,* who presents the whole narrative of this great scandal with a brevity which cannot be improved, and the clearness and point of the relation be maintained. It is as follows:—

Jotee Pearsaud, a wealthy native and banker, being accustomed to engage in extensive transactions, and with great means and perfect organization at his disposal, undertook to subsidize the Anglo-Indian armies during the wars in Afghanistan and Gwalior, by native agency, and at a distance from any effective system of check and supervision. Irregularities in detail occurred, and at the close of the war, all his accounts were not clear, distinct, or well vouched for. When the war was over, Jotee Pearsaud claimed a balance of half a million sterling from the Indian government. It was disputed, and of course not paid. Years of discussion and debate followed, the Indian authorities wearying out the pertinacious Hindoo. When hostilities in the Punjab broke out, the military authorities applied to him to maintain the armies. Pearsaud at once declined to do so; he refused to be again connected with their commissariat. Every effort was made to induce him to yield, and at last he did give way, but upon two

* Continuation of Dr. Taylor's *History of India*.

conditions, that his past arrears should be adjusted as soon as the new war was over, and that a title of honour should be conferred on him. He accepted the new contract, and maintained the armies in the Punjab campaign.

Having fulfilled his part of the undertaking, he asked the Indian government to fulfil the stipulations, but was again disappointed. Instead of the old balances being discharged, the new accounts were subjected to criticism, and to a more severe examination. One of the natives employed in the commissariat came forward on the 30th of March, 1849, and made a deposition against Jotee Persaud, accusing him of corruption, embezzlement, and forgery. The government ordered an investigation, which was referred to Major Ramsay. He declared the accused to be blameless, and sent in his report to the military board. Two of the members agreed with him, and were about to quash the case, when a third recommended it for the consideration of the governor-general and his council. Jotee Persaud had threatened an action for his demand, but while at Agra he was required to give bail to abide a trial for the charges brought against him by the government. Mr. Lang, of Meerut, became responsible. Jotee Persaud was allowed his liberty, and went to Loodiana, from whence he fled to Calcutta, thinking that within the jurisdiction of the supreme court, he would be safe from the Agra judge. But the warrant was executed in Calcutta, and Jotee Persaud was taken to be tried at Agra. In the meantime his bail was estreated, and treated roughly. Mr. Lang, a barrister of courage and talents, defended Jotee Persaud with spirit. Although the court was composed of a judge, a jury, and a prosecutor nominated by the government, the defendant was acquitted.

The trial lasted twelve days, in March, 1851, and excited an interest unparalleled in the district. India was searched for witnesses wherewith to procure a conviction; but not even then could a case be made out. In his defence, Mr. Lang called forward many high government *employés* to speak of Jotee Persaud's services and character. After the trial the enthusiasm of the natives broke forth, and the people offered to carry Jotee Persaud in triumph from the court-house. The Indian authorities sought to clear themselves from the blame which these proceedings afforded for imputing to them—1st, injustice in not settling their creditor's just claims; 2nd, ingratitude for not dealing liberally with one whose services were confessedly great; 3rd, breach of faith for not fulfilling the engagements they had entered into with Jotee Persaud as an inducement to undertake the supply of the

army; and 4th, above all, a vindictive interference with his proceedings against them in the Queen's Court, by concocting unsustainable criminal charges against him in their own courts, by showing, 1st, that they could not be expected to pay a debt which was not admitted or proved to be justly due; 2nd, that here was no ingratitude in their acts, which were founded on justice; 3rd, that the delays in payment arose from the difficulties of having satisfactory proofs; and 4th, by stating that the investigation had been ordered, and bail had been required from Jotee Persaud months before he had commenced any action, and previous to his flight to Calcutta. It is impossible to come to any conclusion favourable to the authorities in this affair. It is more than probable that Jotee was not more honest than European commissaries are reputed to be. That he had his own way of making a profit, both by the government and the unfortunate soldiers, and that way not commendable, is also very likely; but he was acquitted of fraud by the very persons which the government appointed to investigate the charges which they brought against him. Before the matter came before a court of law his accusers appointed his judges on the tribunal of investigation, and they declared him innocent. A large debt was due to the man, and the officials who had the honour of their country in keeping endeavoured to confiscate his claim. They, resolutely bent on this course, nevertheless made fresh bargains with him when their own official helplessness made him indispensable. They then openly violate their new compact, and to uphold the iniquity of their proceedings, endeavour to ruin the man by resorting to subornation of perjury. There is nothing in the worst annals of the days of Clive, Vansittart, and Hastings—when these governors endeavoured to control the cupidity and tyranny of their countrymen—which surpasses the infamy thus openly incurred in 1851. Lord Dalhousie won no renown by his own conduct. Accustomed as he was to look personally into everything, why did he not investigate this affair, and stop the abomination before the judges of the land acquitted the man, whom his officials, by such desperate and flagrant violation of honour and honesty, sought to ruin. When faith is so often violated in contracts by the government at home, in sight of the English public, and under the lash of parliament and the press, we cannot wonder that the like should occur in India, were it not for the destruction to the interests of the nation which is created there by destroying confidence in English honour in the native mind.

In 1850 and 1851, Lord Dalhousie did

what he could to forward public works. The Ganges canal was in the former year continued on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. The proceedings of the governor-general during these years, in the Punjaub, have been already referred to elsewhere. The year 1850 was signalised by another great improvement in India, that of abolishing all punishment inflicted by Hindoos or Mohammedans, under the sanction of the law, upon persons changing their religion. This measure was violently opposed by all ranks and conditions of the natives, who hold the principle of coercion in religion. One of the provocations to the sepoy revolt a few years after, was this great and salutary reform: would that other provocations to that crime had been as much to our honour! During these two years, police and educational improvements were carried on under the auspices of Lord Dalhousie, the Lawrences, Montgomerie, and Edwardes, with some success, in Bengal, the upper provinces, and the Punjaub.

In the civil administration of Madras during the general government of Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie, there was much to trouble the presidency. Attempts to restrict the liberties of the English residents, on the part of the government, caused opposition from them during the governor-generalship of Lord Hardinge, and the presidential government of the Marquis of Tweeddale. The noble marquis personally favoured liberty and religious freedom, and in his general administration deserved well of his country. Still, another measure of that nobleman produced much discussion in India, and much discontent among the natives. In 1847, a minute of council, introduced by him, made the Bible a class-book in the government schools. The disturbance of feeling on the part of the natives was, in the same year, increased by a decision made by the law courts on a question of religious liberty. A young girl educated by the missionaries became a Christian. Her mother demanded that she should be delivered up to her, with the avowed object of coercing, in matters of conscience, her Christian daughter. The woman's co-religionists made a fierce hubbub, and treating the matter as a question of creed and right, brought it into the supreme court. The girl being of sufficient age, was by the decree of the court allowed to do as she pleased. This gave great offence to the natives, who insisted that she should be compelled to resume her former religion. They hated liberty, civil and religious, as the genius of Brahminism and Mohammedanism alike taught them to do. The minds of the people throughout the Madras presidency became more and more agitated by religious intoler-

ance and fanaticism. There was an arrogant tone in the mind of the natives on all religious questions; they spoke, wrote, and acted as if they had the right and the power to compel the government to set at nought the scruples and rights of Christians, and to concede everything to their prejudices. The Mohammedan and the Brahmin were as intolerably fierce to one another as each was to Christians. At Gunsoor human sacrifices were attempted, and the whole district became disturbed, so that military interposition became necessary. An extension of greater religious liberty to the army further marked the era of progress in Madras. The baptism of five native girls at Madras, increased the ferment which previous events produced. The Marquis of Tweeddale left in 1847, having completed many reforms, removed vexatious taxation, improved Madras, put down cruel native practices, and opened the gate wider for the free labours of the missionaries. On the question of religious liberty, however, in Madras, as elsewhere in India, *adhuc sub judice lis est*.

Henry Dickenson, Esq., the senior councillor, took the government, *ad interim*, until the arrival of Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart. He landed April 7th, 1848. That year was remarkable for an insurrection of the Moplahs at Calicut, who were only put down after terrific slaughter. These men were Mohammedan fanatics—

“Men of the murderous saintly brood,
To carnage and the Koran given.”

Their custom was to commit some furious and sanguinary outrage upon Christians and Brahmins, more especially the latter, then, exulting in having gained “the surest way to heaven” by a passage of blood, shut themselves up in some mosque or temple, and defend it with a determination to sell life as dearly as possible, and pass to paradise and the prophet from the sword or shot of their adversaries. Many conversions were made to Christianity among the natives after the arrival of that functionary, who regarded them with no favourable feeling. In 1850, a young native embraced Christianity; his friends and his wife's friends forcibly withheld her from joining him. He appealed to the supreme court on a writ of *habeas corpus*. She was by the interposition of the judges restored to him. The natives treated this act of justice and righteous law—which was as much in their favour as in that of the Christian—as an invasion of their rights, their right to persecute. It is curious that in the vocabulary of Anglo-Indians, Madras is called “the benighted presidency,” whereas there are more native Christians and more schools in it, in proportion to population, than in either of the other

presidencies. In the early part of Lord Hardinge's government, Bombay was under the presidential sway of the amiable and enlightened Sir George Arthur, a good man, a good soldier, and a good governor. After his retirement in 1846, Sestock Robert Reed, Esq., senior councillor, assumed, *pro tempore*, the reins of power. In 1847, Sir George Russell Clerk arrived as governor of that presidency. Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, the celebrated Parsee merchant, much honoured by the previous governor, received additional honour from Sir George. Scinde was that year placed on the same footing with other British provinces, thus completing the act of unprincipled invasion and spoliation with which, in the history of that interesting region, the English name has been dishonoured.

In 1849, Lord Falkland arrived as governor, in the room of Sir George Clerk. Then arose the discussion about the rajalik of Sattara, of which so much was heard in England. The rajah died without heirs. The government refused to recognise the principle of adoption sacred to native law all over Asia. The rajah's territories were annexed. His legal successor (legal in view of native law) claimed the throne, and hired advocates of eloquence and popular acceptance in England to urge his claims upon the justice of the English people, parliament, and court. Those claims were urged in vain; a spoil was to be gathered by the Indian government, and when that was the case, the voice of Asiatic custom, or Mohammedan law, however formally recognised, was unheard. During Lord Falkland's government of Bombay, education, especially in English, made rapid progress. In 1850 many discoveries were made of the corruption and cruelty of the native officials; many of

them were dismissed from their offices. In 1851 disputes arose between the British government and the Nizam of the Deccan, which were not creditable to the governor-general, or to England. An account of these must be reserved for another chapter.

It became obvious that the leading feature of the policy of Lord Dalhousie was "annexation." He had annexed the Punjaub, confiscated the dominion of the Rajah of Sattara, minor states had been quietly disposed of, and now demands were made upon the Nizam of the Deccan, incompatible with his rights and dignity to grant, and to British honour to demand. The policy of his excellency appeared to be an exemplification of

"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power;
That they should keep who can."

The temper of India at the time was not favourable to such a policy. His excellency was warned of this. The certainty that as state after state was "brought within the company's red line" (as old Runjeet Singh would say), native gentlemen of ability, civil and military, would be debarred of all hope of rising to eminence; and as no scope would be left for ambition, their disloyalty would increase, and sedition and revolt employ their energies. Events would of themselves, in their own time, have brought these countries under British sway, but Lord Dalhousie, like men who make haste to be rich, and pierce themselves through with many sorrows, provided a heritage of grief, and blood, and shame for his country, by the haste of his ambition. It may be, it probably was, an ambition for her glory and aggrandizement, not his own; but the principle, and its operations, worked all the same against her.

CHAPTER CXXIII.

GOVERNMENT OF THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE FROM 1851 (*continued*)—CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO THE NIZAM, AND ITS RESULTS—AFFAIRS OF OUDE—THE SECOND BIRMESE WAR—TREATY WITH DOST MOHAMMED.

GIBBON, the celebrated historian, remarks, "Darkness is favourable to cruelty, but it is also favourable to calumny and fiction." This remark applies to the negotiations and diplomacy of our Indian empire. Deeds of annexation like that of Scinde and the rajalik of Sattara were contrived, and executed, after a tortuous diplomacy of pretences, before the English public could hear anything about it. Even the court of directors, almost always unfavourable to annexation, were helpless in

the hands of the board of control and governor-generals, who did for a long series of years pretty much as they pleased, in spite of the protests of the company. It is true that the directors, in a fit of unwonted spirit, might recall a governor-general, as they did Lord Ellenborough, but this exercise of their acknowledged right would be talked down in the clubs, wrote down in the organs of government, disapproved of in parliament by the members of the ministry, and denounced



by Stodart

THE MOST NOBLE THE MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE, K.T.

From a Painting by Sir John W. Gordon, P.A.

LONDON JAMES B. VIRTUE

by the ministerial hacks in both houses. The real power of the company had been gone from the days of Pitt—their virtual power from 1833.

In 1851 Lord Dalhousie demanded from the Nizam of the Deccan that he should give up to the British resident at Hyderabad* a portion of his territories of the annual value of £370,000, until his debt due to the company was fully liquidated. The resident was empowered to occupy with troops the country demanded, in case his highness refused compliance.

The relations of the nizam at that time to the British government of India were extremely delicate, and much dissatisfaction, real or feigned, was expressed at Calcutta with the way in which his highness governed his dominions. His state was, in fact, tributary, and he was held responsible for its good government according to an English standard, to which neither he nor his subjects had any desire to conform themselves. He was unable to cultivate any independent external relations. He dare not make treaties or alliances, except under the direction or control of the governor-general of British India. He was indebted heavily to the English government for the pay of troops ostensibly used in his service, really employed to overawe him and his subjects. He was, by treaty, to maintain an army in alliance with the British, to be placed at their disposal whenever they might require such assistance. This treaty he probably never intended to observe; at all events he acted without seeming to feel its obligation, as was customary with all the native princes. One of the advocates of annexation† wrote at the period to which reference is here made, in terms which so accorded with the policy of Lord Dalhousie, that it would seem as if the policy of annexation had been deliberately adopted, and its application determined upon in reference to all the native states, and that the word had gone out to all concerned in the East India interest to hold it up. At all events the number of books and pamphlets insisting upon the annexation policy which were published in 1850-52, was very remarkable. The work referred to contains the following bold assertion of the policy in reference to the Deccan, Oude, the states of Central India, and all the territories governed by princes born there. Concerning the nizam, the writer observes:—

“A population of nearly eleven millions is ground under his sway; his finances are in irremediable confusion; his ministers prey on him, he preys on the people, and daily the process of disorganization and decay is going on, while the prince sits on a throne which would not last one year without the assistance of the East India Company. Anarchy and oppression consume the resources and desolate the face of a beautiful province, with an area of nearly a hundred thousand square miles.

“This is an organized crime against humanity. It is for the British government to redeem the state of Hyderabad from the demoralization and poverty with which it is afflicted, and to spare its reputation the reproach of conserving an authority exercised only for the vilest of purposes. Corruption, profligacy, oppression, practised in all the departments of the nizam's administration, enfeeble and impoverish the country, and it is a shame that the English nation should lend itself to the support of a government so irretrievably weak and immoral, or to the further injury of a people already debased, degraded, and undone. Charity may ascribe to the nizam the virtue of good intentions, but it is scarcely wise to adopt the Jesuit principle of dividing his motives from his acts, and judging him by the philosophy of Escobar. When a sovereign is set up by British authority, one question alone is to be answered—Is he fit or able to reign? If he is, then there is no need of a contingent force to uphold him on his throne. If he is not, every aid extended to him is an offence against the people he oppresses. The nizam's dominions, however, will inevitably, sooner or later be absorbed in our own, and humanity will bless the occasion which rescues a fine country and a large population from the double curse of a tyranny at once feeble and destructive.”

Concerning the other states Mr. St. John says:—

“With still more justice may these criticisms be applied to the principle of upholding the King of Oude. He is, as his predecessors have ever been, a feeble, cruel, faithless despot, and we are the janissaries of his sanguinary power. We have lately been assured by an Indian official, high in the estimation of the company, that he has seen the tax-gatherers in the territories of Lucknow, lighting their way through the country with the flames of forty villages at one time, set on fire because the wretched inhabitants were unable to satisfy those vampires—the agents of an oriental exchequer. It would be difficult, with the utmost license of style,

* The reader will remember that this is the name of the metropolitan city of Scinde, as well as of the Deccan. See the geographical and descriptive portion of this work.

† Horace St. John; *History of the British Conquests in India*. Colburn, London, 1852.

to draw an exaggerated picture of the anarchy and impoverishment which prevail in Oude, under a prince whose imbecility renders his subjects equally contemptible with himself—*fraco Re fa forte gente fraca*. Whenever the British government determines, therefore, to be consistent in its justice, it will do, what the king's want of faith gives it authority at any moment to resolve. It will withdraw its support from him; he will assuredly fall; and it will remain for the company, instead of keeping up a standing army to defend a people which has been robbed of all that was worth protecting, to undertake the duty which attaches to an imperial power, and make late atonement to Oude for all the misery with which it has been afflicted under its native governors.

"In Nepal, there does not appear any present necessity for interference, or in Nagpore. But in the Gwalior state, the politics of Hydrabad seem to be continually repeated. A score of small states are dependant on this—the hereditary domain of Scindiah's family. The Guicowar's dominions, under the Baroda residency, present a picture of similar demoralization, which it is vain to cry out against, unless the whole territory is to be immediately annexed; for the subsidiary and the protective system is inseparably bound up with those evils. While the British states occupy an area of 677,000 square miles, with a population of ninety-nine millions, the subordinate native states occupy an area of 690,000 square miles, with a population of only fifty-three millions; and thus one-half of India, with a third of its inhabitants, is under an inefficient, if not a destructive government, upheld and protected by the British arms.

"The whole of these ought gradually to be annexed, and the fiction of native sovereignty abolished. Were it a harmless fiction, it might be allowed to continue; but it is essentially injurious to India; and if in characterising the company's administration of its own provinces, I employ terms of elevated panegyric, in dwelling on the system which upholds the coarse and savage tyranny of Oude, and the feeble and pernicious government of Hydrabad, I have no language to express conscientiously my views except that of unqualified reprobation. The English people have to be instructed that their representatives in India support, at Lucknow, a king whose atrocities are ferocious, even in comparison with the usual acts of oriental tyrants; that it protects in Cashmere a ruler who flays a man alive because he fails to pay his tax; and that in Hydrabad, a miserable creature, the victim of his ministers, as well of his own imbecility and vice, is maintained in power because the

British government, averse from conquest, desires to preserve its character for moderation.

"Every year, however, that these evils are permitted to exist, will increase the difficulty of removing them, as well as the necessity we shun. Infallibly the rotten state of Hydrabad will, sooner, or later, be incorporated as an integral province of our empire, and the longer this annexation is delayed, the more heavy and slow must be the labour of reclaiming it from barbarism to civilization. The ordinary question of history is thus reversed. It is not whether we have a right to conquer (for the conquest is already made), but whether, having conquered, we have a right to impose on the provinces we have subdued cruel and feeble princes, whose only ambition is to gratify their degrading lusts, and whose sole power is one of destruction. Guilt, under these despots, is insolent, and innocence only is not secure. There is no law imposed to curb their licentious will, which is enforced under a prerogative derived from us. Every principle of morals, and every political maxim is thus violated and defied. When an imperial government assumes the privilege to appoint viceroys, they should be charged to distribute justice and preserve peace, not to riot in the excesses of despotism, or give authority to pillage and assassination. The unhappiness of those populations is enhanced by contrast with the felicity of their neighbours. It is futile to muse over the pleasant vision of creating new Indian states, under kings of Indian blood, who may receive the lessons of civilization from us. We cannot proselytise these princes to humanity. They will not embrace our ethics; we must recognise their crimes. We may be gentle and caressing to them, but they will be *carnifices* to their people. We have dreamed too long over this idea. We have no moral authority to uphold them, and they have no claim to be upheld, for the prescriptive right to plunder and oppress any community is a vile and bloody fiction. The regeneration of such powers is impossible. It is time to relinquish the fancy. The more we delay, confiding in a better future, the further will the chance be driven. 'The hope is on our horizon, and it flies as we proceed.'"

These words are exponent of the Dalhousie policy, as thoroughly as if written by his lordship himself.

It is needless to trouble the reader with a long account of events, which in their detail offer no interest. It would be a recital of much the same story were we to show how one little state after another was swallowed up by great imperial England. The Deccan was a grand prize, and it was seized without

compunction. The English resident made his demands; the nizam was in no hurry to concede them. Troops were ordered into his territory.

Throughout the year 1849-50, much dissatisfaction existed at Calcutta with the government of Oude. It is believed that even so early as the close of the war in the Punjab, Lord Dalhousie had contemplated the annexation of that kingdom, the independence of which was held to be a sacred thing by both Mohammedan and heathen all over India. Lord Hardinge had visited that province, and remonstrated with the king upon the misgovernment of his dominions, in violation of his especial treaties with the English. One of the earliest acts of Lord Dalhousie was to send Colonel Sleeman thither to investigate the state of the country. That officer traversed the whole of the Oude dominions, and his report was most unfavourable. The country must have sadly deteriorated since the days of Bishop Heber, for no two accounts of any place could be more in contrast than that given by the divine and that by the colonel. Heber, however, took but a cursory view of the country; Sleeman investigated its actual condition. The enemies of Lord Dalhousie, and of the East India Company, affirmed that these accounts were got up by the colonel with a view to sustain Lord Dalhousie in following out his policy of annexation. When, at a later date, General Outram was sent with the ostensible object of reconciling matters, and of recalling the king to a sense of duty in reference to his people, and his treaty obligations with the English, similar allegations were made, and General Outram was criminated in a way such as his rectitude of character forbids those who know it to believe. The differences with Oude became more complicated and serious, until the final act of annexation by Lord Dalhousie set at work the elements of rebellion and mutiny, which lived, but slumbered, in the heart of India.

The year 1850 began in the serenest tranquillity. India was in perfect repose. The wars of Lords Auckland, Ellenborough, Hardinge, and Dalhousie, had added fourteen millions sterling to the public debt of India, and swallowed up besides six millions sterling of the current revenue. It was expected that Lord Dalhousie would prosecute peace by all means, and above all things avoid any attempts to enlarge the British territory, as it had been found by experience that the extension of British dominion lessened its security, and increased the debt, without any commensurate advantage. During 1850 and 1851 these pleasing expectations were realized, notwithstanding that in Oude, that realm of political

storms, Lord Dalhousie and his agents were playing with the lightning. On the north-west frontier the Afreedees gave some trouble, and Peshawur, the old cause of contention between Affghan and Sikh, was the cause of disputation and negotiation between Affghan and Englishmen. Sir Colin Campbell found occupation for the freebooters of the frontier, although his operations were not very successful, and his co-operation with Calcutta not very harmonious. Railways and electric telegraphs engaged the attention of the directors at home, and the councils in India. Laws favourable to religious liberty and education were also enacted, and improvements of various kinds devised and partly applied.

For many years the government of Ava had been on unfriendly terms with that of Calcutta, and early in the year 1852, the arrogance, ignorance, and folly of that state, led once more to an appeal to arms to settle permanently the differences which could not be otherwise adjusted.

SECOND BIRMESE WAR.

A new viceroy of the Emperor of Birmah took up his residence in Rangoon. He seemed animated by a keen hatred to the English, and a resolution to avenge the disasters of the former war. His conduct was at first insulting only, which was borne tamely by the English, who dreaded the expense of another Birmese war. This endurance of affront provoked its renewal and aggravation, until it became intolerable. The property of English subjects was injured or invaded in various ways, and it became necessary at last to demand redress. Peaceful means were tried in vain; Commodore Lambert was sent with a ship of the line and some war-steamers. The commodore was received with much haughtiness, and acts of violence still continuing, he was compelled to exceed his instructions, and make some active demonstrations of force. All Europeans whom the viceroy could seize were cast into prison, the rest found shelter on board the British ships. The dilatory policy of Lord Dalhousie throughout the contest enabled the Birmese to gain confidence, and organize resistance; prompt and decisive action, when an appeal to arms became inevitable, would have saved many valuable lives, and have prevented much expense and trouble.

On the 24th of February, six steamers were dispatched from Bombay to Madras to embark troops for a Birmese campaign, under the command of General Godwin, who, as colonel of a regiment, had served in the previous war with Birmah. The troops consisted of two European and four native regiments, with four corps of artillery, chiefly Europeans. It was

the 29th of March before the armament left the roads of Madras. A few days previous (the 25th) a force similar in all respects to that which left the roads of Madras, was dispatched from Calcutta. The total number of men, exclusive of the naval service, did not much exceed eight thousand. An ultimatum had been sent by the governor-general, which ran out on the 1st of April. An officer was sent to Rangoon to obtain a reply—he was fired upon. This act the Birmese knew well was contrary to European custom in war, was regarded as dishonourable and barbarous, and would excite strong resentment. Admiral Austin took command of the naval portion of the expedition. Both the naval and military commanders were advanced far in life, were inactive in their habits, and feeble from years. This circumstance excited much painful comment, to the effect, that notwithstanding all the nation had suffered from partizanship and routine in the selection of commanders, the system remained the same, as if incurable by any amount of calamity or experience.

On the 5th of April Martaban was attacked by the Bengal force, and easily carried. The Madras troops arriving on the 7th, were in time to participate in an attack upon Rangoon. The place was stockaded, and garrisoned by twenty-five thousand Birmese troops. The pagodas on the heights were fortified, and contributed much strength to the defence. The enemy fought in the way they had done in the previous war, and their defences were not much improved, but strong; their cannon were of heavier metal than in the former war. The stockades were cannonaded and bombarded, and some of them stormed; a marine force, consisting of eighteen hundred men, contributing prominently to the victory. The British lost seventeen men killed, one hundred and thirty-two wounded, and two officers from sun-stroke. The capture of Rangoon led to the immediate return of the inhabitants of Pegu, who hated the Birman yoke, and placed themselves willingly under the protection of the English. The British commander was one of those dilatory old generals, in which the civil authorities so frequently delight. He was desirous of doing nothing during the rainy season, from May to October, but the Birmese collected in such force at Bassein, a place of importance up the lesser Irriwaddy, a branch of the greater stream bearing that name, that it became necessary to dislodge them; at all events, so the general thought. He accordingly ordered four hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, with a corresponding complement of artillery, sappers, and miners, to accomplish that object. This force descended the Irriwaddy, and ascended the

minor branch to Bassein. The importance of steamers in expeditions of this nature was demonstrated. This was an arm of war of the power of which the enemy had formed no idea, and their surprise, confusion, and dismay at its development, were very great. About seven thousand men sheltered in stockades defended the approaches to Bassein. The English, joined by a detachment of marines, mustered about one thousand. They found behind the range of stockades, a mud fort, mounted with heavy guns. After an ineffectual fire on the part of the Birmese, and an impatient and gallant attack by the British, stockades and fort were stormed, and the enemy fled, leaving nearly one thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the hands of the conquerors. The Birmese infantry fought badly, except while under cover, but the artillerymen stood by their guns until they fell, pierced by the bayonets of their assailants. Major Errington, and a detachment of the 51st light infantry, behaved with distinguished gallantry. The British left about half their number as a garrison.

On the 3rd of June a small force was sent in a steamer to attack the city of Pegu, the old capital of the province called by that name. One hundred Europeans, as many sepoys, and a few sappers and miners, composed the detachment. As the English approached, the enemy ran away. The English retired from the place without leaving a garrison, when the Birmese came back, and perpetrated great cruelties upon the Peguans for their hospitable reception of the English. During the remainder of June the weather was inauspicious for active enterprises, and very trying to the health of the troops. General Godwin's previous experience of the climate was not thrown away, his sanitary arrangements were skilful and successful. He sent to Calcutta earnestly desiring reinforcements, which ought not to have been needed; a sufficient force for the objects of the expedition should have been sent in the first instance. The reinforcements he required were sent, consisting of a few squadrons of light cavalry, a few troops of horse artillery, a field battery, some sappers and miners, and a few battalions of infantry. The governor-general also visited the seat of war, and conferred with the commander-in-chief as to a plan of future operations.

In July an expedition was undertaken against Prome, which was opposed in its progress up river, but dispersing the enemy's parties, it arrived, without loss, upon the rear of the Birmese general's army. The reinforcements had not yet arrived, and some apprehensions were entertained that the enemy might be found in such overwhelming numbers

as to defy attack. A couple of volleys were exchanged, and then the Birmese took to flight, leaving behind them twenty-eight guns, their standards, camp equipage, and the general's barge. It was September before Prome was captured, which was accomplished without incurring any resistance that deserved the name. The British did not garrison it, and when reinforcements arrived the enemy were again in possession, and determined, if possible, to hold it. An obstinate conflict ensued, but the dispositions of General Godwin and Brigadier McNeil rendered the enemy's resistance productive only of destruction to his own troops. General Godwin's capturing and recapturing of places caused much fatigue to the troops, and the loss, especially by *coup de soleil*, of several officers. There was a want of consistent and comprehensive plan on the part of the general's expeditions, which made them exhausting to his army and expensive to his country. When Prome was the second time captured, there lay a force of six thousand Birmese near the place, who held the town in observation. Nothing could have been more easy than the dispersion of these men, which the general refused to attempt until more troops were placed at his disposal. It was rumoured in the army that his excellency had an objection to terminate the war too soon. Small detachments were ordered up by him from Rangoon with so little judgment that they were beaten in detail. It then became necessary to send from Rangoon a force of fourteen hundred men, including a newly arrived detachment of Sikh irregular horse. This brigade swept the country of the enemy. At Pegu, eight thousand men drew up in line and awaited a charge, by which they were broken and dispersed. The Sikh cavalry proved themselves most efficient, pursuing and cutting down the enemy's cavalry with zeal and courage.

On December 28th, 1852, the governor-general, by proclamation, declared Pegu annexed to the British dominions. He also declared that he contemplated no further conquests, but should the King of Ava refuse to hold friendly intercourse with the British government, he would conquer the whole Birmese empire. This proclamation produced an

important result—a revolution at Ava on the part of those who were opposed to the continuance of the war; the king was deposed, and his brother reigned in his stead. While these things were going on, hostilities were, as in the previous war, waged from Arracan. The British marched through the Aen Pass, taking the stockades in flank, by which it was blocked up, and slaying or dispersing their defenders. This circumstance also contributed to the revolution. Negotiations were opened with the new emperor, and by July, 1853, the Birmese troops had retired from the vicinity of Pegu, upon the dominions of Ava Proper. The feeling, however, was not amicable, and reason existed to doubt the sincerity of the new Birman court. The demonstrations made by the governor of Calcutta, of a firm intention to hold Pegu, had at last their due effect, and towards the close of 1854 relations were established as amicable as the Birmese will allow themselves to maintain with any foreign government. The year 1854 was not remarkable for any operations of a hostile kind in India, but affairs in Oude waxed worse and worse, and the policy of annexation by Lord Dalhousie, in reference to that country, was plainly developed, although not actually accomplished.

In 1855 amicable relations were established with Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Afghanistan, who had proved himself an acute politician. Hyder Khan (his son Akbar, the enemy of the English, had fallen a victim to the political jealousy of the other chiefs, and was poisoned) came down to Peshawur, and negotiated a treaty, by which Dost Mohammed, against whom we had made war in Afghanistan, was recognised by the British government. This chief had been governor of Ghizni when the British stormed that place. The treaty was negotiated with Mr. John Lawrence, brother to the Captain George Lawrence, who accompanied Sir W. MacNaghten to the quasi-friendly meeting with Akbar Khan, and who saw the brother of Hyder Khan murder the English minister. "*O tempora mutantur, et mutantur cum illos!*"

Both the years 1854 and 1855 were in India years of administrative improvement and material progress.

CHAPTER CXXIV.

HOME EVENTS—DISPUTES BETWEEN THE BOARD OF CONTROL AND THE COURT OF DIRECTORS DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE CHARTER OF 1833-4—VICIOUS PRINCIPLE OF APPOINTING GOVERNORS-GENERAL—RECALL OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—DISCUSSIONS UPON THE APPOINTMENT OF LORD DALHOUSIE—HIS POLICY OF ANNEXATION CAUSES UNEASINESS IN ENGLAND—NEW CHARTER 1853-4.

THE charter of 1833-4 placed the East India Company in a position to the board of control, to the cabinet, and to the country, so essentially different from its previous relations to any of these sources of power and authority, that its history up to 1854 merges in the general political history of the English government. A relation of what transpired in the board of directory would prove uninteresting, unless to readers connected with either the company or with India. During all that time, the directors were engaged in struggles with the board of control, to retain some fragment of the power which was all but entirely wrested from their hands. The board made use of the name of the company and of the directors to screen itself from responsibility. If the policy pursued by the English cabinet was unpopular, the orators and organs of the press, who served the former, placed all evils at the door of the latter; if occurrences in India pleased the English people, the cabinet took all the credit. In the one case the directors of the East India Company were represented as mischievous and incompetent, in the other they were treated as cyphers; it was the president of the board of control, or the governor-general, or both, by whom all the good was accomplished. The directors held their tongues,—some from timidity, some from party sympathy with the cabinet of the day, others to please the court; men of quiet and reserved dispositions among them said nothing, it was their habit to be silent; if they did make a demonstration, they were threatened with the abolition of their power, and some of the government faction would be instructed to ask some pointed and insulting question, or make a motion, which would at least afford an opportunity for conveying the impression that the company was no longer of any use to India or to England, that it was an obsolete existence, and the sooner it became defunct the better. The most shameless falsehood and effrontery were resorted to, by successive governments, to brow-beat the directors, undermine the influence of the company, and clutch the patronage which, by law and justice, belonged to the directors. The

directors were almost invariably for a policy of peace; the board of control and its nominees, the governors-general, were generally the abettors of aggrandizement and war.

Scarcely were the arrangements of 1833 made between the board of control and the directors, than the former resumed its officious, insolent, and domineering policy. Early in 1834 an application, on the part of the crown, was made to the King's Bench for a mandamus, to compel the court of directors, "under the act of 1793," to transmit certain despatches to the East Indies, they having been directed to do so by the board of commissioners for the affairs of India. These despatches related to claims made upon the King of Oude by certain unprincipled adventurers and money-lenders. The directors were unwilling to interfere, to embroil either the company or the government of India in a matter where they were not called upon by right or duty to take any part. The government might have waited a short time, as the act of 1833 would have come into operation on the 22nd of April, 1834. The board, however, would show its authority and dominate, and, therefore, insisted upon immediate compliance. Such was the general spirit in which business between the two boards was conducted. The cry raised against a double government was factitious, it meant simply, a demand upon the company to give up what *patronage* and authority remained with them, to the minister for India. Double government, properly speaking, there was none; for the board of commissioners or board of control, whichever way it might be called, generally enforced its views, and nearly always with a high hand, and in a spirit and mode unconstitutional and improper. The firmness of the directors in the case of the mandamus prevented its execution. They protested against the folly and wickedness of the whole affair, and the deputy chairman preferred any consequence rather than inflict upon his conscience the stain of signing such a despatch. The matter became known to the public, the newspapers took it up, public opinion was for once with the directors, the board of control became afraid of that public opinion it





T. W. Faught

THE RT HON^{BLE} LORD METCALFE.

From a Painting in the India House.

LONDON JAMES S. VIRTUE.

had so often, by scandalously faithless means, misled and prejudiced against the directors and the company. Lord Ellenborough gave notice of a motion in the lords, and this caused Earl Grey and his ministry to make a precipitate retreat. Throughout the whole of his political career, Earl Grey was a haughty and factious enemy of the company, and when in power betrayed a jealousy of the court of directors, and an eagerness to grasp their patronage, which, probably, no other minister had shown. Lord Ellenborough demanded the reasons why the board of control refused to proceed with the mandamus, Earl Grey replied that he *did not know*. On the 5th of May Lord Ellenborough brought forward his motion, and uttered a withering denunciation of the conduct of the ministry. The Duke of Wellington, in one of the most sensible and earnest speeches he ever delivered in parliament, followed in the same strain. The lords-chancellors of England and Ireland delivered eloquent harangues for the purpose of making the motion a party question, in which they did not succeed. Finally the house of lords voted against the government, who winced more under the exposure than the vote. It was a vote of censure by the house of lords of the immorality and injustice of Lord Grey's government in its Indian policy, and of its tyranny and unconstitutional treatment of the court of directors. On the 8th of May Mr. Herries moved in the commons for the same papers refused, but extorted, in the house of lords. The government, intimidated by their defeat in the upper house, made no resistance. Sir Robert Peel, and several of the most eloquent members denounced the conduct of the cabinet, the board of control, and of its chief, Mr. Grant. None of the members, on either side, espoused the cause of the ministry, except Mr. Joseph Hume. That gentleman, always so liberal in home affairs, so watchful of the public expenditure, and so useful generally, sympathised in colonial matters, especially in East and West Indian affairs, with selfish and class interests. His mind was habituated to partial and unjust views of colonial affairs by siding with West Indian slavery, of which he was the industrious and but little scrupulous champion. The defeat of the board of control, in the attempt to coerce the court of directors into an inequitable and impolitic line of action, rankled in the hearts of the ministry. The nature of the defeat, its *modus operandi*, the public exposure attending it, mortified; but did not do more than partially check Lord Grey's enmity to the company, which he communicated to the heads of his party. A short time, therefore, was only permitted to elapse before the

board of control renewed its aggressive policy towards the directors. Changes of ministry occurred at brief intervals, which established the Whigs in office for a time, more firmly, although with much diminished prestige. Sir John Cam Hobhouse became president of the board of commissioners for the affairs of India. He was a more courteous, but more insidious and less candid enemy of the company than Mr. Grant had been. Indeed, presidents of the board seemed to think that the real object for which they were appointed was not to co-operate with the directors for the better government of India, but to study and apply such tactics of opposition to the East India company as would soonest destroy it, and turn over to the coteries who constituted ministries that valuable patronage which the directors possessed, and for which the parliamentary and party politicians hungered. The chief offices in India were not conferred on the company's best servants, or on persons selected from any class of Englishmen peculiarly fitted for them, but upon political partizans. In proportion as India was ruled by the board of control it ceased to be governed for the people of India, or of England, and was governed for party purposes and party patronage. During the twenty years which elapsed between the act of 1833, and the act of 1853, for the regulation of the company's affairs, the directors showed an improvement in the spirit of their administration which no impartial person, acquainted with the history of the company, can deny.

In August, 1834, a new feud, as fiercely maintained as the last named, broke out between the two divisions of the "double government." On the resignation of Lord W. Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe, *ex officio*, assumed the vacated post *pro tempore*. The directors, in view of the high talents of Sir Charles, his great experience of India, and his moral influence, deemed it inexpedient to disturb his possession of office, and confirmed him in his charge. This, as a matter of course, enraged the board of control, and a long and painful controvery arose. That Sir Charles possessed all the qualifications for the high office to which he was designated was not denied by the board; the president placed his objections upon the narrow ground of patronage. Sir Charles was a servant of the company; the office, in the opinion of the cabinet, ought to be held by a servant of the crown. The grand question for the public, as to the fittest man, was left out of view by the ministry. A place was wanted for a ministerial party-man, and, therefore, the excellent and enlightened appointment made by the directors should be overturned. India and

Indian appointments had been, at last, thoroughly brought within the range of the disputes of home party factions,—an evil against which all statesmen, conversant with India and its peoples, had warned successive governments. This contest continued until January, 1835, when Sir Robert Peel came into power. That minister was as much bent as his predecessors upon despoiling the company of their patronage, but he did not proceed to do so in the high-handed, haughty, insolent manner displayed by Lord Grey, Lord J. Russell, and Mr. Grant. He thought it possible by sly and slow methods, not less surely to accomplish the same end. He began his ministerial career by conciliating the directors, in which he completely succeeded; and, acting in harmony, Lord Heytesbury was nominated to the office, Sir Charles Metcalfe being provisionally named as his successor. Sir Robert Peel failed to secure the support of the commons. The Whigs again came into power, and they resumed authority in the same arrogant spirit towards the company. They refused to recognise Lord Heytesbury, *although he had been sworn into office*. It was one of the most discreditable party moves of the age. The public disapprobation was strong, but the Whigs braved it. Discussions fierce and protracted were maintained in parliament, which seriously damaged the government, and displayed the party animosities which it cherished, in a most unfavourable light.

On the 6th of May, 1836, the chairman and deputy chairman of the company addressed a letter to the president of the board of control, an extract from which will show the just sentiments by which the court of directors was at that time animated:—"The court do not forget that the nomination of Lord Heytesbury was made, and his appointment completed, during the late administration. But this fact, connected with his removal by the present ministers, fills the court with apprehension and alarm, as respects both India and themselves. It has always been the court's endeavour in their public acts, and especially in their nominations to office, to divest themselves of political bias; and in the same spirit they now consider it to be their duty frankly and firmly to express their decided conviction that the vital interests of India will be sacrificed if the appointments of governors are made subservient to political objects in this country; and if the local authorities, and, through them all public servants, are led to feel that tenure of office abroad is dependant upon the duration of an administration at home; and, further, that the revocation of an appointment, such as that of Lord Heytesbury, for no other reason, so far as the

court can judge, than that the ministry has changed, must have the effect of lessening the authority of the court, and consequently impairing its usefulness and efficiency as a body entrusted with the government of India."

Whatever effect this letter may have had upon the convictions of the cabinet, it had none upon their policy. The general public had little opportunity of judging of the arguments and motives of the directors, for, unfortunately, they had such a repugnance to publicity, and so habitually neglected to throw themselves, however strongly in the right, upon the judgment of the country, that their battles with the board of control were fought in the dark. The board, however, through its agents in parliament, and by the press, stirred up the country by the reiteration of misrepresentations. From these causes the public had seldom an opportunity of judging except from *ex parte* statements. Fierce debates ensued in parliament; the ministry refused all papers and correspondence which might throw a light upon their motives and conduct. A motion was made to compel their production; Sir Robert Peel spoke with peculiar eloquence and effect in condemnation of the conduct of the ministry, but the vote was made a party one by the government, and the motion for the production of papers was successfully resisted. Sir Cam Hobhouse and Mr. Vernon Smith were especially remarkable in the debate for their party feeling and disingenuous arguments. The appointment of Lord Heytesbury was triumphantly resisted by his whig antagonists. Mr. Edward Thornton has justly observed upon the transaction—"It was one of the strongest instances on record, in which a power was exercised within the strict limits of the law, but in a manner altogether at variance with its spirit. It was one of those acts by which a political party loses far more in character than it can possibly gain in any other way." The nomination of a governor-general by the cabinet was an appropriate sequel to the previous conduct. After waiting until Lord William Bentinck arrived in England, during which time Sir C. Metcalfe conducted the government in a manner not at all in accordance with the policy of his successor, Lord Auckland was nominated. In a previous chapter this profligate and calamitous appointment has been made the subject of comment. It is only necessary to say here, that it was profligate, because it was a mere party nomination to the government of a great empire, and that it was made purely to confer a good office upon a confederate, irrespective of his merits. That it was a disastrous appointment, the history of Lord Auckland's incompetency as governor-

general of India, already given, has abundantly shown. In the years immediately following these transactions, the company and the board of commissioners were much occupied by the relations of England to Persia, and the gravest discussions took place as to the designs of Russia upon Hindostan by way of Persia. A sufficient account of the policy and proceedings of the company and the English government was given when relating the transactions preliminary to the Affghan war, so as to render unnecessary a further detail of them in connection with the discussions in the court of directors and the action taken by that body and the board of control.

For some years but few disputes occurred between the two boards. The disaster attendant on Lord Auckland's policy led to hot discussions in parliament. The Whigs defended their measure with very little regard to the justice of the defence. The press, however, teemed with severe articles, some of a sarcastic nature, turning into ridicule the claims of men to govern an empire whose judgment was so much at fault in nominating the lieutenant of a province; others of the "leaders" were severe, stern, written with dignity, and political knowledge. The wars in Afghanistan, Scinde, and in China, led to many discussions in parliament, and the thanks of both houses were voted to the officers by whom victories were achieved.

The appointment of Lord Ellenborough to the government of India was another instance in which the board of control exercised its authority to the disadvantage of India and of England, in spite of the company. In the nomination of Lord Ellenborough it is true no active opposition was offered by the court of directors, for it was well known how useless such opposition would have been. His appointment was, however, against the general opinion of that body, and of parliament, and of the country. His nomination was regarded as a fault on the part of the Tories, as culpable as the appointment of Lord Auckland by the Whigs. He was a man of more ability than Lord Auckland, capable of perceiving talent in others more readily, of appreciating and honouring it more; but he was as much of a partizan, and his attainment of so high an office was regarded as the result of mere party services. His career in India was so injudicious, involving so much danger and expense—so fitful, capricious, eccentric, and uncertain—that the directors were obliged at last to recall him, without the consent of the board of control. This decisive act caused long and angry discussions between the board and the court. Parliament took up the dispute. The Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel de-

fended Lord Ellenborough, justified his follies, and extenuated his errors with exceeding acrimony towards the company, and in a spirit as thoroughly the expression of mere party as the Whigs displayed in their dishonest apologies for Lord Auckland. The country had come very generally to the conclusion that appointments to office, in the public interest, was not to be expected from either of the great sections of the higher classes, who divided the influence of parliament, and alternately shared the favours of the court. The estimate formed of Lord Ellenborough, and of his career, by the English public, was that expressed in one of the most discriminating and eloquent passages in the *History of the British Empire in India*, by Edward Thornton:—"It is certain, however, that his Indian administration disappointed his friends; and if a judgment may be formed from his own declarations previously to his departure from Europe, it must have disappointed himself. He went to India the avowed champion of peace, and he was incessantly engaged in war. For the Affghan war he was not, indeed, accountable—he found it on his hands; and in the mode in which he proposed to conclude it, and in which he would have concluded it, but for the remonstrances of his military advisers, he certainly displayed no departure from the ultra-pacific policy which he had professed in England. The triumphs with which the perseverance of the generals commanding in Afghanistan graced his administration seem completely to have altered his views; and the desire of military glory thenceforward supplanted every other feeling in his breast. He would have shunned war in Afghanistan by a course which the majority of his countrymen would pronounce dishonourable. He might without dishonour have avoided war in Scinde, and possibly have averted hostilities at Gwalior, but he did not. For the internal improvement of India he did nothing. He had, indeed, little time to do anything. War, and preparation for war, absorbed most of his hours, and in a theatrical display of childish pomp many more were consumed. With an extravagant confidence in his own judgment, even on points which he had never studied, he united no portion of steadiness or constancy. His purposes were formed and abandoned with a levity which accorded little with the offensive tone which he manifested in their defence, so long as they were entertained. His administration was not an illustration of any marked and consistent course of policy; it was an aggregation of isolated facts. It resembled an ill-constructed drama, in which no one incident is the result of that by which it was preceded, nor a just and natural prepa-

ration for that which is to follow. Everything in it stands alone and unconnected. His influence shot across the Asiatic world like a meteor, and but for the indelible brand of shame indented in Scinde, like a meteor its memory would pass from the mind with its disappearance.* It is astonishingly strange that fourteen years after his recall, under circumstances so discreditable to himself, he should have been made minister for India, with a seat in the cabinet of the government of the Earl of Derby, again to be driven from office by the voice of public opinion, in consequence of his party spirit, and incompetency to deal with Indian affairs. It is if possible still more strange that his renewed errors found abettors among those to whom the responsibility of the government of this great empire were committed, and his conduct discussed in the spirit of faction, not of patriotism. His party had learned nothing during all these years, as his appointment to such an office proved, and the faithless defence of his conduct also proved, when public indignation left it impossible for the government to retain his services.

The decisive act of the directors in recalling Lord Ellenborough gave a fresh stimulus to the board of control to watch every opportunity for invading their independence. The double government worked badly, not because of its constitution, but because the higher classes represented by the government of the day were anxious to gain the entire patronage. It was impossible to govern India with a steady and consistent policy while this was the case. Professor Wilson was right when he wrote that some influential and independent body must always be maintained between the English cabinet and the people of India, if that country be governed with impartiality and a constant intelligible policy. The more power the board of control assumed, the less attention parliament paid to Indian affairs. If India, or an Indian governor, were to be the subject of a *party* debate, the parliamentary benches were well filled; if the interests of India, of England in India, of the relations of our oriental possessions to the empire, were to be discussed, the benches were empty of all or nearly all but those by whom the ministerial whip, or the member whose motion was to be debated, "made a house." Mr. Horace St. John, in his work entitled *British Conquests in India*, has truly observed:—"Whether the popular legislature is now so far educated to an acquaintance with the history, the religion and laws, manners, resources, industry, trade, arts, castes, classes, opinions, prejudices, traditions, local feelings,

* Vol. vi., close of the history.

actual condition, or wants of India, seems to admit of little doubt. Such knowledge is still peculiar to a few. The technicalities of the most abstruse sciences are not more unintelligible to the general body of persons in this country, than the very names of Zillah and Sudder courts. Some who possess this information in a greater or less degree, desire parliament to adopt the whole legislative control of India, because they imagine every member is equally well instructed with themselves; but from 1834 to 1852, small change in this respect is observable. Whenever Asiatic topics were then introduced, they were listened to impatiently, treated with indifference, and eagerly dismissed.* Such subjects are not only uninteresting, but obnoxious, to the general body of the house. This feeling is no more than natural in that senate. It is the prevailing tone of the country, which is undoubtedly very ill-acquainted with the social and political state of the East.

"Consequently, nothing can be more dangerous than to trust to parliament alone for a watchful and wise administration of the details of Indian affairs. It may, and generally does, decide justly in great controversies on imperial policy; but if ever the minute and subordinate points are forced on the daily and continual attention of parliament, it will assuredly resign their settlement into the hands of the ascendant statesman of the day.† It would give him, what a prime-minister has himself described as a dangerous and unconstitutional amount of power, a power which should excite the jealousy of all in this nation who are attached to our institutions.‡ That minister without a corrupt sentiment in his breast, or a corrupt practice in his own scheme of action, will assuredly, under the conditions of his political existence, employ the power and patronage thus confided to his will in obtaining the command of parliamentary supremacy."

From the recall of Lord Ellenborough to the appointment of Lord Dalhousie, various useful laws were passed for India by the imperial parliament—these could not be enumerated and described except in a history of the statutes regulating Indian affairs. Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough, it has been already observed in passing, were raised to the rank of peers, the former to that of a viscount, the latter to that of a baron; and subsequently Lord Gough was promoted a step in the peerage. Pensions were also conferred upon these noblemen, and their heirs male

* In an important debate in the commons (May, 1852), scarcely forty members would remain to hear the subject discussed.

† *Wilson*, ix., 563.

‡ Earl of Derby; Speech, April 2, 1852.

within two generations; various rewards were distributed to the naval and military officers who distinguished themselves in the Chinese war, and to the military officers who served in Gwalior and the two Punjab wars. Promotion was not bestowed on a liberal scale to officers of inferior rank, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. Thanks were given in parliament to the great actors, civil and military, who took the leading parts in the great transactions which passed in India up to the time when Lord Dalhousie resigned his government. He was himself promoted a step in the peerage. The appointment of that nobleman to the momentous responsibilities of governor-general of India, was due to the influence of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. The latter regarded him as "a promising young man," a description scarcely appropriate to the office of governor-general of India. Sir Robert considered him a disciple of his own; and was proud of that tact for administrative routine which Sir Robert succeeded in imparting to Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, his own son Frederick, and others of his pupils in parliamentary and official service. There was no difficulty, therefore, in gaining the assent of Sir Robert to the nomination, but Lord Dalhousie, like Lord Ellenborough, was essentially the Duke of Wellington's nominee. However just his grace in the administration of armies or peoples, he was never a warm advocate for promotion for merit. He held the principle of aristocratic patronage to be perfect. Those who were his own warm admirers had always good chance of high office, provided they possessed tact for business (a *sine quâ non* with the duke), were well born (another indispensable requisite), and were endowed with bold and active habits, or were presumed to be so. Hence Sir Henry Hardinge, the Napiers, the Somersets, Lord Raglan (as he afterwards became) especially, and Lord Dalhousie. All these men were *smart* in business, or exact and regular in routine, or bold and energetic. None of these men possessed genius, or even large capacity, except the Napiers. The duke himself had no confidence in the prudence of Sir Charles or Lord Ellenborough, but all these men were upheld and abetted by him, as were others, from the action of the causes just alleged. All were clever men, fit for high and important, but subordinate offices. Perhaps Sir Charles Napier, in spite of his overbearing temper and rashness, had ability for the office of governor-general of India; none of the rest had the qualities necessary for a post requiring such various and nicely balanced qualifications. Rumour ascribed motives for the appointment of Lord Dalhousie which did not increase

either the political or personal reputation of the duke. No doubt his grace believed that Hardinge, Ellenborough, and Dalhousie, were all competent for the office. He was conscientious in the support he gave them, but had they not been connected with himself, and had they not been idolaters of his genius and his glory, he would have judged them with a stern impartiality, which he did not exercise in reference to them. No governor-general that ever served England in that office had the ability for it that the duke himself possessed, who seemed to have an intuitive perception of the character of the peoples of India, and the way to deal with them. It is, however, indisputable that those whom he patronised in the office of governor-general, while they made a career brilliant and eventful, involved the empire in much alarm, occasioned vast bloodshed, perpetrated gross injustice, ruled the people arrogantly and tyrannically, although with administrative energy and ability.

In the year 1853 it became necessary to determine the new constitution of the East India Company, as the charter of 1833, which came into effect in 1834, was only to last twenty years. It would be tedious and uninteresting to place before our readers the discussions which occupied the attention of parliament on this subject. It is, however, necessary to give a succinct account of the important changes which then took place.

On June 3rd, 1853, Sir C. Wood introduced in the house of commons a bill for the government of India, which, with some slight modifications, became law. The principal features of this measure may be thus epitomized:—The relations of the board of control and the court of directors to remain as before. The thirty members of the court to be reduced to eighteen; twelve elected in the usual way, and six nominated by the crown from persons who have resided in India for ten years, either as servants of the company, or as merchants or barristers. One-third of the whole number to go out every second year, but to be again eligible. The directors to receive salaries of £500 a year, and the chairman and deputy-chairman £1000 a year. No change was made in the general control which the governor-general exercises over the Indian government; but a lieutenant-governor of Bengal was to be appointed; the lieutenant-governor of Agra to be continued; and a new presidency on the Indus to be created. A commission to be appointed in England to digest and put into shape the draughts and reports of the Indian law-commission appointed in 1833. It was also proposed to enlarge the legislative council; giving the governor-general power to select two councillors, the heads

of the presidencies one councillor each, and making the chief-justice of the Queen's Court and one other judge members, in all twelve; the governor-general to have a veto on their legislation. The privilege hitherto exercised by the court of directors of nominating all students to Haileybury and Addiscombe to cease, except in respect to the appointments to the military service, which were still to remain in their hands. The admission to the colleges, and consequently to the service, to be thrown open to public competition; properly qualified examiners being appointed by the board of control. The act to continue in force until parliament should otherwise determine.

On the 20th of August the act was passed. On the second Wednesday in April, 1854, it provided that the eighteen directors under the new constitution should be appointed. This provision was carried out according to law, and the authority of the old court ceased on that day. A more enlarged description of the act of 1853, which came into operation in 1854, would be unnecessary, as in a few years, in consequence of the mutiny and rebellion of 1857, the East India Company's control over the political affairs of India was abolished. The new act, together with the circumstances which led to it, will be noticed in future pages of this work.

CHAPTER CXXV.

ANNEXATION OF OUDE—LAWS AFFECTING THE TENURE OF LAND IN BENGAL.

It has been shown in previous chapters that in no part of India did the agents of the company hold terms less amicable with a native state than in Oude. Both the government of that country and the government of England violated their agreements. The King of Oude consented to govern his subjects in a certain way which accorded with the views of the company, which declared itself unable in conscience or equity to hold up the king's government unless his people were ruled in a just way, and so as not to endanger the peace of the contiguous British territory. His majesty never so governed his people. His court was infamous, and the country impoverished and distracted; nevertheless, the people were loyal from traditionary and fanatical feeling, and the independence of Oude was held to be a sacred thing all over India. The English government failed in its pecuniary stipulations. Sums were borrowed which were never repaid, and borrowed in such a manner, and the lender so treated, as would naturally leave the impression that the borrower never intended to pay. Whatever may have been the conduct of the kings of Oude to their own subjects during the nineteenth century, their assistance in money, more especially to the English government on occasions of emergency, was most valuable, and was not acknowledged with gratitude or generosity. The following is the language of the author of *How to Make and how to Break a Treaty*:—"It was during the residency of Mr. I. R. Davidson that the first Punjaub campaign was raging. All India was looking in terror at the fierce

and uncertain contest. The enemies of the East India government did not hesitate to scheme and make proposals for the overthrow of their government. Dinapore and Benares were rife with intrigue. Whispered messages to Nepaul were daily increasing the uncertain position of the East India Company. The government paper, that certain criterion of the state of public feeling, was at the lowest point ever known. There was then everything to induce the Oude government to assert their independence, or at any rate give themselves airs. One move in that direction, and the East India rule would have been thrown back one hundred years; and who shall say to what extent the loss might not have extended? But no; Oude was firm. In the East India government's peril was clearly seen Oude's constancy. Her men cheerfully given from her own army for the company. Her horses at the service of the irregular corps, then being raised in hot haste, and her minister directed to tender every and any aid that the East India company might require.* These are not wild, enthusiastic flatteries. These are the accounts of well-known realities. If Lord Hardinge has but an iota of the magnanimity for which we give him credit, he will not fail to bear witness to the gallant conduct of Oude on this occasion, and we look to him for it."

Lord Dalhousie, in his annexation policy, having fixed upon Oude as a rich province, determined to take it, after the fashion in which Lord Ellenborough took Scinde. The

* The minister Newab Ameenood Dowlah received a letter of thanks on this occasion.

agents of the noble marquis, well aware of his policy, made representations in harmony with it. During the whole period of Lord Dalhousie's government until the annexation took place, the British residents at the court of Oude interfered in every matter of government, and with an impertinence utterly humiliating to the king. In 1854, the king banished one Kurrum Uhmud, a Moonshee, for perjury and sedition. This man had been the spy of the British resident, who interfered on his behalf in terms of menace and insolence utterly subversive of the royal authority. The courts of law were interfered with, British troops were ordered out upon the sole authority of the resident to execute his decisions in cases where he had been imposed upon, and in which in no case should he have interfered. The result of such conduct was to create or increase the confusion and disorder in the king's dominions, on account of which the annexation was afterwards ostensibly effected. Whatever the weakness or wickedness of the court of Oude, the faults of its government have this 'extenuation, that it was impossible to preserve order while Lord Dalhousie's agents and the resident were dictating in every department. Colonel Sleeman, the English representative, ruled as a despot, and dictated as a conqueror.

On the 5th of December, 1854, General Outram arrived at Lucknow. His commission was to inquire if the reports of Colonel Sleeman concerning the condition of Oude were correct. The general confirmed the representations of the colonel, after a brief inquiry, over so extensive a field, of less than fifteen weeks. On the 18th of March, 1855, his report was made. The general, however, took care to guard himself from responsibility in thus bolstering up the annexation project, by declaring that he had no knowledge or experience of Oude, and only reported upon the basis of what he found in the records of the residency, and what he was told by the agents whom Colonel Sleeman employed. During the time the general was preparing his report, disturbances occurred between the Mohammedans and Hindoos, such as are common all over India. This was made a pretext by Lord Dalhousie for the use of armed force in the interest of the British government.

On the 18th of June, 1855, Lord Dalhousie made, what is called in Indian state vocabulary, "a minute," based upon the report of Outram, itself resting upon the general report of Colonel Sleeman, who had been sent to Oude to get up such a report. In this minute his excellency placed before the court of direc-

tors a review of the condition of Oude, and suggested "the measures which appeared incumbent to take regarding it." These amounted to the seizure of the revenues of Oude, and appropriating the surplus to the advantage of the company. The disposal of the king was a matter of difficulty; but, on the whole, Lord Dalhousie and the council of Calcutta were favourable to leaving him a nominal sovereignty. The directors and the board of control approved of the proposals in the main, and left the carrying out of the measure entirely to the governor-general's discretion. This was intimated in a despatch, dated the 21st of November, 1855. By the end of 1855, therefore, his excellency was invested with full power to do as he pleased; and he pleased to do that which no doubt every member of the council of India which now meets in Leadenhall Street will admit, set India in a flame, and was impolitic beyond any measure, however foolish or extravagant, perpetrated by any governor-general, from the day the board of control made the office a party one, and a reward for the members of a class. Military preparations were promptly made to carry out the plan purposed.

On the 30th of January, 1856, General Outram informed the prime-minister of Oude of the intention to take possession of the kingdom. To the remonstrances and arguments of his majesty there was but one answer, *sic volo, sic jubeo*. It was insisted that his majesty should accept and sign a treaty voluntarily surrendering his kingdom. This he refused to do. Three days of grace were allowed him for the acceptance of this bill. He still treated the proposal with indignation. "Accordingly, on the 7th of February, 1856, Major-general Outram issued a proclamation, previously prepared at Calcutta, wherein it was declared that 'the British government assumed to itself the exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude,' and that 'the government of the territories of Oude is hereafter vested exclusively and for ever in the honourable East India Company.' Having thus assumed the government of Oude, he proceeded to constitute its civil administration, in accordance with instructions previously addressed to him for his guidance by the supreme council at Calcutta, appointing numerous commissioners and other officers, at large, and in some cases excessive salaries, payable from the revenues of the kingdom of Oude, to administer the affairs of the country in various departments. As may fairly be presumed, to his disappointment, if not to his surprise, the officials of the Oude government all refused to enter the service of the

East India government. The disbanded Oude army declined to enter the regiments which were being raised. Every inducement by confronting them with armed regiments to prove their helpless position, by tempting them with payment of arrears, and with the offer of receiving young and old alike into the ranks, failed for a long period. They declared they had no arrears to claim from his majesty; and one gallant subhadar of one of the regiments stepped in front of his comrades, and stated, he had served his majesty and his forefathers for forty years, and would enter no other service. That active officer, Brigadier Gray, who was present on this occasion, is challenged, if he can, to deny the truth of these assertions. In virtue of the proclamation, these gallant men, by their conduct on this occasion, might be accounted rebels; but in spite of the risks they encountered, they thus manifested their devotion to the *régime* of their slandered rulers and princes.

“His Majesty the King of Oude having determined to repair to England to lay his case before the throne and parliament, applied to the resident for his sanction; but that functionary, not respecting the misfortunes even of a king, treated his majesty’s application in an imperious manner, and endeavoured to deter and prevent him from accomplishing his wishes. In order still more pointedly to mark his discourtesy, the resident, on frivolous pretexts, held to bail his majesty’s prime-minister, Syed Allie Nuque Khan, a nobleman of royal descent from the family of Delhi, and of distinguished rank, who, from the commencement to the end of his political career has uniformly proved himself a sincere and steadfast adherent of the British government, and who has received the commendation of the British authorities. At the same time, other high and distinguished officials were held to bail, and placed under surveillance at Lucknow by the British authorities. The records, public acts, official documents, and other papers of importance to his majesty to enable him to establish his claim for the restoration of his kingdom, were seized by the resident and his officials. The prime-minister, as we stated, was obliged to give security, and to the effect that he would not depart from Lucknow. The same plan was followed with the minister of finance, Rajah Balkishen, and also with the keeper of the government records, Baboo Poorun Chum; and the king was thus deprived of the services of these officers, and of their testimony, so indispensable to the maintenance of his rights in this country. An attempt was even made to prevent the king’s own departure by the arrest of twenty-two of his personal attendants,

and by the seizure of his carriage horses; but he came away with others, and his family have now preceded him to England, to seek redress for this spoliation, at the hands of the English parliament.

“That no claim might be wanting in this behalf, since the confiscation of the Oude territory, the royal palaces, parks, gardens, menageries, plate, jewellery, household furniture, stores, wardrobes, carriages, rarities, and articles of *vertu*, together with the royal museum and library, containing two hundred thousand volumes of rare books and manuscripts of immense value, have been sequestered. The king’s most valuable stud of Arabian, Persian, and English horses, his fighting, hunting, riding, and baggage elephants, his camels, dogs, and cattle, have all been sold by public auction, at nominal prices. His majesty’s armoury, including the most rare and beautiful worked arms of every description, has also been seized, and its contents disposed of by sale and otherwise. The queen mother, to whom General Outram descended to offer money* to induce her to persuade the king to sign the treaty, has also reason to declare that the ladies of the royal household have been treated in a harsh and unfeeling manner; that, despite their protest, and a most humble petition which they sent to the political commissioner, they were, on the 23rd of August, 1856, forcibly ejected from the royal palace of Chuttar Manzul by officers who neither respected their persons nor their property, and who threw their effects into the street; and that a sum of money which had been specially left by the king to be appropriated for their maintenance, was prevented by the British authorities from being so applied.” †

The annexation of Oude was effected without a war. The king believed that an appeal to the Queen of the United Kingdom and her parliament would reinstate him in his honours, and he discouraged all attempts on the part of his troops or people to defend his throne. General Outram was appointed the governor-general’s agent for the government of the province, and the plan of government was as nearly as possible identical with that established in the Punjab. The system of police was that established in Scinde by Sir Charles Napier, when governor of that province. Thus the year 1856 witnessed one

* “His lordship in council will have gathered from the translation of the conference which I held with the queen mother, that I promised that lady an annual stipend of one lakh of rupees, provided that the king would accept the treaty.”—*Oude Blue-book*, p. 291; and see pp. 285-6.

† “*Dacootee in excelsis.*”

of the most remarkable events which had occurred in the history of the British empire in India: one of the oldest states, and in alliance with the East India Company, was, by the simple will of the English government, annexed. It is scarcely necessary to say, that the agitation excited by the measure in India was very great; at first, the people were appalled, after a time they prepared for mutiny and revolt.

The condemnation of Lord Dalhousie and the government was very strong in England, and the severest criticisms were made in the public press upon the whole system of our Indian government. In India, the people of Oude maintained a sullen silence, but they prepared for insurrection; and, in order to make it more effectual, endeavoured too successfully to corrupt the Bengal native army, which was mainly recruited from Oude and the surrounding provinces of British India.* Unfortunately, the disposition of the talookdars and soldiery of Oude to revolt was shared in by the whole of the inhabitants, even by those who might be supposed likely to profit by a change of masters. The conduct of Lord Dalhousie, his ministers, and officials, was not calculated to soothe the irritation and indignation which his policy had created. The state of Oude between the annexation and the great revolt has been described in a petition to the house of commons, from the King of Oude; the following extract will suffice:—"Since the military occupation and annexation of the kingdom of Oude, the country has been thrown into a state of much confusion. That whereas during the reign of the sovereign of Oude,

* As the annexation of Oude was undoubtedly the main cause of the dreadful mutiny of 1857, the reader may wish to consult the voluminous documents extant on the subject. In doing so, the following may be perused with interest, in the order which follows:—

1. The treaties concluded between the East India Company and the rulers of Oude from 1765 to 1837, published in the collection of East India Treaties, laid before the House of Lords, 24th June, 1853.

2. The correspondence and minutes of the government of India amongst the "papers relating to Oude," presented to the houses of parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1856.

3. The notification from the Right Honourable the Earl of Aunkland, Governor-general of India, to His Majesty the King of Oude, 8th July, 1839, on the subject of the recent treaty under date 11th September, 1837, and His Majesty's reply thereto sent with the case.

4. The remonstrance on the part of the governor-general of India, Lord Hardinge, delivered to the King of Oude, 23rd November, 1847, sent with the case.

5. The letter of the Honourable Court of Directors to the Governor-general of India, 10th December, 1856, relative to the assumption of the government of Oude, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 5th February, 1857.

and whilst happiness prevailed within the kingdom, no emigration took place therefrom, but, on the contrary, the subjects of Great Britain in Hindostan evinced a disposition to immigrate thereto, and settle therein; since the annexation of the territory to the British dominion, numbers of persons have fled from the kingdom of Oude, and immigration has wholly ceased. That it is computed that not less than one hundred thousand persons, including civil servants of the government, and the disbanded troops who have refused to take the company's service, have been deprived of their means of subsistence; that the business of the country having been transferred from the natives to the British officers and forces, the retainers of the zemindars have been thrown out of their situations; that the natives holding office as writers, clerks, &c., have been turned away and replaced by company's servants; that all allowances and pensions being stopped, many of the recipients, including members or near connexions of the royal family, have been reduced to extreme poverty; that the conduct of the British to the natives of the lower class is complained of as harsh in the extreme; that justice cannot now be obtained at Lucknow; and that crime is committed with so much impunity, that even the royal palace itself has been broken into and pillaged of money and jewels to a large amount." Lord Dalhousie seems to have been aware of the danger, although unwilling to acknowledge the cause or redress the grievances he had inflicted. He urged upon the company and the government the necessity of preserving a sufficient force of European regiments. He argued, requested, entreated, remonstrated in vain. While danger was threatening on every hand, the authorities in England were withdrawing the European regiments, without sending out reliefs. This policy was suicidal, and was persisted in with an infatuated conceit of judgment by the board of control and the company, notwithstanding warnings the most clear and urgent from men of the highest authority on Indian affairs, as well as from the governor-general. At last the denouement came, the blow was struck, and all Oude burned in insurrection. It is barely just to Lord Dalhousie to show that whatever his ambition, or his errors in working it out, he was prescient of the necessity for keeping up the European branch of the army in India, not only after the annexation of Oude, but throughout his government. He saw soon after his arrival the danger of placing too much confidence in the native troops, and the absolute necessity of preserving in the army of India, in all its presidencies, a larger pro-

portion of the European element. Several of the leading journals of London attributed to Lord Dalhousie an opposite line of conduct, and blamed him for the small number of European troops in India when the mutiny of 1857 broke out. Nothing could be more opposed to truth than these allegations. Copies of certain despatches and minutes during the governorship of India by the Marquis of Dalhousie, received by the court of directors, or by the president of the board of control, from the government of India, for an increase of European troops subsequent to the acquisition of the Punjaub, Pegu, Nagpore, Sattara, Jhansi, Berar, or other districts, have been submitted to parliament and printed, on the motion of Mr. W. Vansittart, M.P. The Marquis of Dalhousie, so far back as September, 1848, earnestly requested the addition of at least three European regiments of infantry to the army in India, from which so large a number of British troops had been withdrawn, and this request was complied with by the India-house authorities. In March, 1849, two other regiments of infantry were ordered to be added to the queen's forces in India. On the 5th of February, 1853, a secret letter was written by the Indian government, considering the regular force which would be required for the permanent occupation of the newly-acquired province of Pegu, and recommending that one regiment should be added to the number of European infantry in each presidency. This increase was ordered, the total addition including 71 officers and 2,760 rank and file.

In September, 1854, a most important minute was issued by the governor-general in council, and transmitted to the directors of the India-house, in which, with reference to the then state of India and the war in Europe, the diminution of the British force then at the disposal of the government of India was most earnestly deprecated. The minute appears to have been elicited by an order for the recall of the 25th and 98th regiments from India without being relieved until the close of 1855. It illustrates most strikingly Lord Dalhousie's sagacity, and we recommend an attentive perusal of it to all persons in possession of the parliamentary paper in which it is included. "The imprudence and impolicy of weakening our force of European infantry at the present time," writes the marquis, "will be made evident, I think, by a brief review of the amount of [that force which we actually possess, of the position in which we stand, and of the contingencies and risks to which we are liable." He shows that the army had been very inconsiderably augmented during the past seven years, notwithstanding the

great changes which had occurred in the interval, and the vast mass of territory acquired by recent conquests. He warns the directors of the danger of countenancing the prevalent belief (in India), that we were (in 1854) grappling with an enemy (the Russians) whose strength would prove equal to overpower us, by withdrawing troops from India to Europe; and he reminds them that "India has to play her own part in this contest, that, unlike Canada and the colonies, she is in close proximity to some of those powers over which the influence of Russia is supposed to extend, and that she is already indirectly affected by the feelings to which the war has given rise;" he adds, "it is at least possible that those feelings may be quickened in the hostile action which she will be called upon to meet by force of arms." This spirited remonstrance of Lord Dalhousie against the weakening of our military force was unavailing, for the authorities at home, "looking to the exigencies of the war in Europe and the general tranquillity of India," confirmed the order for the return of the two regiments. Another long "minute" was issued by the governor-general on the 5th of February, 1856. In this state paper the marquis, following the principles and guidance of Lord Wellesley, endeavours to determine what are the wants of the government of India in respect of European infantry throughout the territories for which it is responsible, and to show how those wants may best be supplied. The various considerations adduced must lead, he thinks, to the conviction that the European infantry in Bengal ought to be reinforced, and he names nineteen battalions as the *minimum* force of the European infantry which ought to be maintained upon the Bengal establishment;—twenty, he adds, would be better, and even more not superfluous. Having reviewed the wants of the several presidencies in succession, and in minute detail, the governor-general concludes that the *minimum* force of European infantry which can be relied on as fully adequate for the defence of India and for the preservation of internal quiet is thirty-five battalions—nineteen for Bengal, nine for Madras, and seven for Bombay. Of these twenty-four were to be queen's and eleven company's regiments. The idea of permanency being essential to the usefulness of this force, it was proposed by the marquis that the twenty-four queen's regiments should be declared by the home government to be the establishment of royal infantry for India, and that a formal assurance should be given that no one of these regiments should at any time be withdrawn without relief, unless with full consent of the court

of directors. It was further proposed to add a fourth regiment of European infantry to each of the armies of Bengal and Madras by converting two regiments of native infantry into one of European infantry; in each, respectively, disbanding the native officers and sepoy, and transferring the European officers to the new European corps.

The result of these minutes does not appear from the returns, but the public know that Lord Dalhousie expostulated in vain.

While the events which issued in the annexation were passing in Oude, changes were being effected in the laws of land tenure in Bengal, which, although salutary in themselves, led to discontent, and prepared the talookdars and zemindars for rebellion. There existed great difficulties in the way of reform of any kind in India, of which persons in England could form no conception. The sympathy of the people was with despotism, and they preferred freedom to cheat, and the chances dependant upon a speculation in fraud, to law and justice. When the English put forth any enactment which protected the oppressed, but which also prevented the oppressed from defrauding or imposing upon their tyrants, they felt no gratitude for such interposition. They were of course very desirous to be released from any disability under which they lay, provided the power which rescued them left them still an opportunity of resorting to chicanery in their dealings with others; but on the whole they preferred the most grinding tyranny under which men could suffer, if it also admitted the precarious hope of winning back their own by deceit and intrigue. Just laws, dealing equally with all, were regarded with aversion, unless where some tradition of creed allied such a law to long maintained customs. Early in 1856 the legislative council took up a measure which was designated "the Sale law." It was an excellent remedy for some of the greatest impediments to the prosperity of Bengal. The measure was introduced to the council on the authority of no less important and competent a person than Mr. Grant, and was admirably devised for its purpose. It would be impossible to give the reader a correct notion of the subject without detailing the state of the land tenure at the time in Bengal, and the way in which that tenure worked against the progress of agriculture, the settlement of European planters, and the prosperity of the country. The following description of "the Sale law," and of the circumstances which called for it, was written by a gentleman then on the spot, and familiar with the project, and the discussions to which it gave rise:—"Under the perpetual settlement the whole of

Bengal has been divided into estates held by landlords on the tenure of a fixed quit rent to the company. While this rent is paid no act short of treason can deprive a proprietor of his estates. Should he not pay up to the hour, however, his estate goes to the hammer. In practice few estates are thus sold, and the tenure may be regarded as a free holding subject to a land tax. These estates, however, are often of vast size. The landlord, often an absentee, cannot manage them himself. Farming, in the English sense, he never dreams of, and the collection of rents from perhaps 100,000 cottiers—there are more than 2,000,000 on the Burdwan estate—is too heavy a task for an Asiatic. He sublets it for ever. The sub-tenant, whom we call a talookdar, holds of the zemindar, as the zemindar holds of government. In English phrase, he has a perpetual lease from the tenant of the crown. Two-thirds of the whole land of Bengal is thus held, including almost all the indigo factories, sugar plantations, and European farms. The tenure would seem to an English farmer rational enough. Unfortunately, Lord Cornwallis, when he established the perpetual settlement, in order to secure the government rental, arranged that, in the event of failure to pay the quit rent, the sale should vitiate all encumbrances whatsoever. Whenever, therefore, an estate goes to the hammer every lease upon it is *ipso facto* void. Because Stowe is sold, all the John Smiths on the property are deprived of the leases they have paid for. The zemindars, thoroughly aware of the law, use it in this fashion:—They lease the lands to wealthy tenants, suffer them to raise the value of the property, fail to pay the quit rent, and at the consequent sale buy in their own estates, under a false name, clear of all encumbrances. The threat of such a proceeding has actually been employed in one instance within my knowledge to extort money from the manager of a great indigo concern. Of course with such a tenure improvement became impossible. Men will not lay out capital in improving a property their right to which may be destroyed at any moment without any fault of their own. They considered themselves, with justice, as tenants-at-will instead of leaseholders. The evil has long been felt, but hitherto a reform has been considered impossible. It would be, it was alleged, a breach of the perpetual settlement. At last the evil became unendurable. Captain Craufurd, manager of the Indigo Company's affairs, agitated the question vigorously. He demonstrated that the present tenure prohibited advance. The press took up the subject, asserting that a radical change would involve no breach of faith. Officials seized upon the

question as soon as there appeared a gleam of hope, and at last it assumed a practical form. A proposition was brought forward, strongly supported by the government of Bengal, for keeping leases inviolate in the event of a sale. So long as the money bid for an estate would cover the government arrear, the leases were to be held intact. The new proprietor would buy land subject to the leases upon it. In the event, however, of the sum bid not being sufficient to pay that arrear the leases must be violated and the encumbrances cleared away. This proposal, it is evident, secured the leaseholder in every event but one. A reckless zemindar might grant away portions of his estate at peppercorn rents till nobody would buy the whole subject to such leases. This contingency would be of frequent occurrence, and Mr. Grant therefore has proposed a new scheme. It goes further than the former one, further than the boldest reformers have dared to hope. Mr. Grant proposes that every talookdar, or permanent leaseholder, shall have the right to call in a government surveyor. If this official on examination reports that the rent paid under the lease is sufficient to pay the government rent, he is secured for ever. Whatever becomes of the estate his lease cannot be touched or his rent raised. He is of course bound by his lease to pay the rent agreed on with his landlord to his landlord; but the zemindar can no longer by fraud annul his own agreements, nor can he by folly cause the ruin of every one under him. Two-thirds of the land *users*—not landowners—of Bengal thus exchange tenancy-at-will for a leasehold right. They have always contracted and paid for the latter form of tenure, but hitherto, from the defect of the law, have been unable to secure it. The advantage of this reform to the zemindar is scarcely less than to his tenant. It is insecurity which has kept down the price of land in Bengal. It is calculated that on the average almost all zemindari return a clear 25 per cent. upon the purchase-money; yet thousands prefer the government 5 per cent. simply for its security. In other words, the funds are held to be more secure than landed property in the proportion of five to one. Some other changes have been introduced, all tending to increase the security of land, of which the following is, perhaps, the most im-

portant:—Hitherto it has been dangerous for a great proprietor to quit his estate. His agent may want it for himself. In that case he fails to pay the government rent. No subsequent payment is of any avail. The estate is put up to auction, and bought by a bidder employed by the knavish agent. It is now proposed to permit the proprietor to deposit in the collector's hands any amount of company's paper he pleases. Up to the value of that paper he is safe. He may go to England for two years or ten, or, if he chooses, he may deposit so much paper that the interest shall be equal to the government rent. In that case he is secure for ever, happen what may. I have described this innovation at some length, but you will readily perceive that it alters not only the tenure of land, but the whole constitution of society in Bengal. It makes the leaseholder a free man. It deprives the landowner of a terrible instrument of coercion, ejection at will, the right to which he had formerly by his own lease abandoned. It creates a class of yeomanry of small free landholders, a class most urgently required." It could not be expected that changes so momentous would be unopposed; yet for some time the parties most interested, in a selfish sense, remained silent, and, in fact, no opposition was made such as would undoubtedly have been offered had it not been for the impression entertained throughout the Bengal provinces that "the Company's Raj" would soon come to an end. The feelings nurtured in Oude had communicated themselves all through these provinces, and there was not only a general expectation of successful disturbance, but a knowledge of the means by which success was to be secured. The native landholders were not in ignorance, as were the company's officers, civil and military, as to the military revolt then preparing. The rebellion prevented the application of "the Sale law" by the council in its original form, but, while some of the reforms then discussed in connection with it have not even yet been carried, much has been done. The agitation on "the Sale law" greatly increased the agitation of the classes venally interested, but they avoided demonstrations, hoping that the power that interfered with their customs would soon perish in a new and grand struggle.

CHAPTER CXXVI.

PERSIAN WAR—ITS CAUSES—INVASION OF HERAT—EXPEDITION TO THE PERSIAN GULF—CAPTURE OF BUSHIRE, MOHAMMERAH, AND AKWAZ—PEACE NEGOTIATED AT PARIS.

THE circumstances which originated the Persian war of 1856 were of the same nature as those which issued in the Affghan war. Minute details of the policy of Russia towards Persia, and, through Persia, towards British India, were given in the account of events preliminary to that war.

Although peace and, apparently, good relations were then established, a bad feeling lurked in the Persian court. The desire to invade Affghanistan was not abandoned, and the Russian government kept up the bad feeling without actually urging Persia to a war. Russia was anxious to keep open a cause of contention which she might one day turn to account, and yet afraid to provoke the power of England to any operations in the Persian Gulf which might increase her influence over the court of Teheran. When the war with Turkey, England, and France broke out, Russia was of course desirous to create a diversion by the instrumentality of Persia. Her instigations took effect only when a hostile movement of Persia could be no longer of use, peace between the European powers having been proclaimed.

The policy of Persia continued the same as when it occasioned the Affghan war. That policy was expressed with singular clearness by Hoossein Khan, a Persian ambassador, in a communication to Prince Metternich, in 1839. Prince Metternich observed upon this letter, that it was "expressed with a precision scarcely eastern," as the following extract will show:—

"The shah is sovereign of his country, and as such he desires to be independent. There are two great powers with whom Persia is in more or less direct contact—Russia and the English power in India. The first has more military means than the second. On the other hand, England has more money than Russia. The two powers can thus do Persia good and evil; and in order above all to avoid the evil, the shah is desirous of keeping himself, with respect to them, within the relations of good friendship and free from all contestation. If, on the contrary, he finds himself threatened on one side, he will betake himself to the other in search of the support which he shall stand in need of. That is not what he desires, but to what he may be driven, for he is not more the friend of one than of the other of those powers: he desires to be with them on a footing of equal friend-

ship. What he cherishes above all is his independence, and the maintenance of good relations with foreign powers."

This letter puts the shah's policy in the most favourable point of view. The idea of compensation on the side of Affghanistan, for territory lost on the frontier of Russia, pervaded the Persian court, and it was something like a point of honour to take Herat whenever opportunity might present itself. On the 21st of July, 1851, Colonel Shiel, then minister of England at the Persian court, informed his majesty that the views of England, as to the independence of Herat, remained unchanged.

During the latter part of 1851 Herat was much disturbed, and the khan asked for Persia's help to maintain his authority. The shah promised aid if required, and entered into negotiations which had for their object to extort certain oriental forms from the khan which would constitute recognition of the shah's sovereignty. On the other hand, Dost Mohammed of Cabul was jealous of Persian interference at Herat, and threatened to march an army from Candahar, to counteract the shah's policy.

In the spring of 1852, a Persian expedition advanced against Herat. The city was occupied; various oppressions were perpetrated; several Affghan khans were seized and sent to Persia. These acts followed assurances the most pacific, offered to the English minister. Falsehood the most scandalous was resorted to for the purpose of concealing intentions dishonest and aggressive. Herat was finally annexed to Persia. When the cabinet at London became aware of these transactions, Lord Malmesbury, the minister for foreign affairs, refused to hold intercourse with the Persian ambassador.

In consequence of the resistance offered by Colonel Shiel, and his menaces of the active displeasure of England, the shah at last became alarmed, and on the 25th of January, 1853, signed an engagement renouncing all sovereignty, and promising not to interfere by arms in the affairs of Herat, but reserving the right to march an army into its neighbourhood in case any other power did the like.

The Persian government, in making so satisfactory a settlement, threw the English off their guard, which was the only object the Persian court and ministers had in view.

having never intended to perform any of the stipulations. The firmness of the English minister constrained their observance.

The temper and spirit of the Persian court became intensely irritable towards the English ambassador and his suite. A circumstance arose which brought this out painfully. On the 15th of June, 1854, Mr. Thomson, the English minister, wrote to Lord Clarendon, then minister for foreign affairs, informing him that he had chosen one Meerza Hashem Khan as the Persian secretary to the British mission. This person was courtly, learned, and in every way suitable to the office assigned to him. Lord Clarendon confirmed the appointment. The Persian court immediately persecuted the favourite of the English mission. The Hon. C. A. Murray succeeded Mr. Thomson, and he also favoured Meerza Hashem. The Persian court continued its persecution, and finally seized and imprisoned the khan's wife. Mr. Murray demanded satisfaction for this outrage upon the staff of the British mission, and the release of the lady. His demands were treated with disdain, and Mr. Murray felt bound to maintain the dignity of the government he represented by striking his flag on the 20th of November, 1855.

The Persian prime-minister put a report into circulation that both Mr. Murray and his predecessor had intrigues with the khan's wife, and therefore employed him in the embassy. The Persian premier at last made the allegation to Mr. Murray himself, in a despatch. On the 5th of December, after having endured many insults, he left Teheran.

The Persian court then endeavoured to transact business with England through the English ambassador at the Porte. On the 2nd of January, 1856, the Persian *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople laid a long complaint before the English ambassador there against Mr. Murray, Mr. Thomson, Consul Stevens, and, in fact, all persons connected with the English mission at Teheran. The Persian court was as much opposed to the consul as to the ministers. The Persian ministers drew up a scandalous document for publication in Europe, incriminating the English ministers at their court of immorality. This document breathed a malignant hostility unusual between belligerent states, and utterly disgraceful in its conception and expression. Had all the English ministers been immoral, the fact would not have affected the merits of the dispute. The sacredness of the persons and property of all persons, Persians or others, engaged in the service of the English embassy, and of their families, had been violated spitefully and without provocation, and for this wrong redress was demanded.

It is probable that all these disturbances were got up by the Persian government to cover their policy towards Herat, for at the end of 1855, Prince Sultan Moorad Meerza was sent with a force of nine thousand men against that place.

The fall of Kars during the war with Russia was circulated all over Asia. The fall of Sebastopol was not known for long after. The Russians had the means of producing this double effect. The consequence was, the Persians were emboldened, as were also the Oudeans, and other enemies of England in India. The shah determined to accomplish the long-cherished purpose of his court, to annex Herat.

In July, 1856, Lord Clarendon caused the ultimatum of his government to be delivered to the Persian *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople. He about the same time instructed the governor-general of India to collect forces at Bombay for operations in the Persian Gulf.

The ultimatum of the British government was in the following terms:—"The sadr azim (prime-minister) to write in the shah's name a letter to Mr. Murray, expressing his regret at having uttered and given currency to the offensive imputation upon the honour of her majesty's minister, requesting to withdraw his own letter of the 19th of November, and the two letters of the minister for foreign affairs of the 26th of November, one of which contains a rescript from the shah respecting the imputation upon Mr. Murray, and declaring, in the same letter, that no such further rescript from the shah as that inclosed herewith in copy was communicated, directly or indirectly, to any of the foreign missions at Teheran. A copy of this letter to be communicated officially by the sadr azim to each of the foreign missions at Teheran, and the substance of it to be made public in that capital. The original letter to be conveyed to Mr. Murray, at Bagdad, by the hands of some high Persian officer, and to be accompanied by an invitation to Mr. Murray, in the shah's name, to return with the mission to Teheran, on his majesty's assurance that he shall be received with all the honours and consideration due to the representative of the British government; another person of suitable rank being sent to conduct him, as *mehmandar*, on his journey through Persia. Mr. Murray, on approaching the capital, to be received by persons of high rank deputed to escort him to his residence in the town. Immediately on his arrival there, the sadr azim to go in state to the British mission and renew friendly relations with Mr. Murray, leaving the secretary of state for foreign affairs to accompany him to the royal palace, the sadr azim re-



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G.C.B.

From a Photograph in the Possession of the Family

ceiving Mr. Murray, and conducting him to the presence of the shah. At noon on the following day, the British flag to be hoisted under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the *sadr azim* to visit the mission immediately afterwards, which visit Mr. Murray will return, at latest, on the following day before noon. Satisfaction being thus given, and friendly relations restored, the settlement of the questions of Herat, of Meerza Hashem and of his wife, remains to be stated. Should Herat be occupied by the shah's troops, his majesty to engage to withdraw them without delay. Should that city be in any way menaced, though not occupied by the shah's troops, his majesty to engage not to allow them to occupy it on any account. In either case, the engagement being solemnly given, the British mission to defer to his majesty's wish, if renewed, respecting Meerza Hashem, by not insisting on his appointment at Shiraz; the Meerza's wife, however, to be restored to him, and himself to enjoy the security, emoluments, and position offered by the Persian government in a former stage of the question. The whole of the correspondence respecting Meerza Hashem may then be mutually withdrawn and cancelled, it being to be understood that no objections will be made by the Persian government to the appointment, as heretofore, of a British correspondent at Shiraz till that and other matters can be arranged by a suitable convention."

The ultimatum failed to secure redress. A series of fresh outrages were offered at the embassy upon such servants of the British government as remained there. Tidings of the forces clustering at Bombay reached Teheran, but the Persian, undismayed, ordered more troops to be sent to garrison his menaced provinces. Orders were sent to Consul Stevens to quit Persia, and take the means usual in such cases to secure the liberty and property of British subjects.

On the 24th of September, the president of the board of control was requested to forward to India, by the next mail, orders for the expedition to move to the Persian Gulf. On the 17th of October, Feruk Khan arrived at Constantinople as minister plenipotentiary of the shah. He entered into negotiation with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and consented to terms of peace, but raised so many objections to them in detail afterwards, that no reliance could be placed in the sincerity of his negotiations.

On the 1st of November, the governor-general of India declared war against Persia. Three proclamations were issued by his excellency, which, when they arrived at Constantinople, caused the Persian plenipotentiary

to withdraw from all further negotiations, and to treat his former agreements as null and void. Major-general Outram, K.C.B., had returned to England from Oude, and while at home was in consultation with the British government concerning the Persian expedition. He was appointed to command it, and arrived in Bombay for that purpose. He took the command of "the second division of the army of Persia," and proceeded with it to the Persian Gulf. The 1st division, under Major-general Stalker, had already been dispatched. The brigadiers of this division were Wilson and Honner; Brigadier Tapp had charge of the cavalry, and Brigadier Trevelyan the artillery. When the second division arrived at the Gulf, Lieutenant-general Outram holding the command in chief, that of the second division was reserved for Brigadier Havelock, C.B., deputy adjutant-general of her majesty's forces in India, who arrived afterwards. Brigadiers Hamilton and Hale commanded the brigades of that division. The cavalry of both divisions was placed under Brigadier Farol, C.B. Colonel Stuart, of the 14th light dragoons, commanded the cavalry of the second division. Brigadier Hill commanded the whole of the artillery force.

In the geographical portions of this work descriptions are given of the Persian Gulf and its shores, and Bushire is particularly described. A reference to these descriptions will enable the reader to follow with some ease the proceedings of the troops during this expedition.

The arrival of Sir James Outram was followed by active operations. The army marched round the head of the Bushire Creek, a heavy road, for the most part of loose sand. The army was drawn up in the following order:—Two lines of contiguous quarter-distance columns. First line: first brigade, first division—her majesty's 64th regiment, and 20th regiment native infantry. First brigade, second division—78th Highlanders, and 26th regiment native infantry. Second brigade, first division—2nd European light infantry, and 4th Bombay rifle regiment, native infantry. Second line: 3rd light cavalry (two squadrons); 3rd (Blake's) troop horse artillery; Nos. 3 and 5 field-batteries; one *risalakh* of Poonah horse. An advance guard was formed seven hundred yards on the right of all under Colonel Tapp, of the Poonah irregular horse, composed of one troop 3rd light cavalry, two guns horse artillery, two companies of her majesty's 64th regiment, and two companies of 20th regiment native infantry; the rearguard, under Major Hough, consisting of his own, the 2nd Beloochee bat-

talion, and one troop of Poonah horse, was drawn up on the left. The first night's bivouac was one of terrible storm; hail and rain with bitter blasts swept over the crouching host. Early in the morning, the march was directed against Brasjoon. Before one o'clock, the Persian videttes were seen reconnoitering. They fell back as the British approached, and the main army was soon after seen in rapid retreat. The advance guard of the British came up with the enemy's rear, and skirmished. The Persians behaved with spirit. One officer and several men were wounded, and Brigadier Honner had a narrow escape from a bullet which pierced his saddle. The enemy's intrenched camp fell into the hands of the English, and large stores of ammunition, food, and fodder which it contained. For two days the army rested, so far as marching or fighting was concerned, but was busily occupied in searching for grain, guns, and treasure, said to have been buried by the foe. Some quantities of corn and treasure were found, and some guns discovered in the wells. The military governor of Brasjoon was taken prisoner.

On the 7th the army retraced their steps to Bushire, bringing with them much of the booty they had acquired. The march was conducted leisurely. After midnight, the army was astonished to hear a volley of musketry in the rear, followed by the cannonade of two pieces of horse artillery. The shots gradually increased for half an hour, when the whole force became enveloped in a skirmishing fire. The Persian cavalry rode up, making every possible noise, shouting and blowing trumpets. The bugle-calls of the British army were familiar to the enemy, from the circumstance of British officers having been engaged in drilling his army a few years previously. This knowledge was used to create disorder in the British lines. Some of the buglers, riding close up in the dark to the 78th Highlanders, sounded the "cease fire," and afterwards, "incline to the left." The Highlanders remained steady. The yelling, shouting, and bugle-calls at last ceased, and the British lay by their arms, waiting in silence for the meeting. Before dawn five heavy guns were opened by the enemy with accurate range, wounding several officers, killing and wounding soldiers and camp-followers, and baggage animals. In the morning the enemy was seen with his force in order of battle.

There is but little information extant of the contest which ensued, and of its results, except what is contained in Sir James Outram's own account, which is as follows:—

To his Excellency Lieutenant-general Sir H. Somerset, Commander-in-chief, Bombay.

Camp near Bushire, Feb. 10th.

SIR,—I have the honour to report for your excellency's information that the Persian Expeditionary Force obtained a signal victory over the Persiau army, commanded by Shooja-ool-Mookh in person, on the 8th inst.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded must have been very great. It is impossible to compute the amount, but from the number of bodies which strewed the ground of contest, extending several miles, I should say that full 700 must have fallen. Two brass 9-pounder guns, with their carriages and horses, eight mules, laden with ammunition, and several hundred stand of arms, were taken; and the Persian commander-in-chief, with the remainder of his army, only escaped annihilation owing to the numerical weakness of our cavalry.

The loss on our side is, I am happy to say, comparatively small, attributable, I am inclined to believe, to the rapid advance of our artillery and cavalry, and the well-directed fire of the former, which almost paralyzed the Persians from the commencement. I have, however, to regret the loss of Lieutenant Frankland, 2nd European regiment, who was acting as brigade-major of cavalry, and was killed in the first cavalry charge; Captain Forbca, also, who commanded and most gallantly led the 3rd cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, 64th foot, were severely wounded.

Returns of the killed and wounded, and also of the ordnance stores taken, are annexed.

I myself had very little to do with the action, being stunned by my horse falling with me at the commencement of the contest, and recovering only in time to resume my place at the head of the army shortly before the close of this action.

To Major-general Stalker and Colonel Lugard, chief of the staff, is the credit due for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion.

At daybreak the Persian force,* amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men, with some guns, was discovered on our rear left (north-east of our line of march) in order of battle.

Our artillery and cavalry at once moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution; the cavalry brigade twice charged with great gallantry and success; a standard of the Kashkai regular infantry regiment was captured by the Poonah horse, and the 3rd light cavalry charged a square, and killed nearly the whole regiment; indeed, upon the cavalry and artillery fell the whole brunt of the action, as the enemy moved away too rapidly for the infantry to overtake them. By ten o'clock the defeat of the Persians was complete. Two guns were captured, the gun ammunition, laden upon mules, fell into our hands, and at least 700 men lay dead upon the field. The number of wounded could not be ascertained, but it must have been very large. The remainder fled in a disorganized state, generally throwing away their arms, which strewed the field in vast numbers, and nothing but the paucity of our cavalry prevented their total destruction and the capture of the remaining guns.

The troops bivouaced for the day close to the battle-field, and at night accomplished a march of twenty miles (by another route) over a country rendered almost impassable by the heavy rain which fell incessantly. After a rest of six hours, the greater portion of the infantry continued

* Guards, 900; two Karragoozloo regiments, 1,500; Shiraz regiment, 200; four regiments of Sabriz, 800; Arab regiment, 900; Kashkai, 800—5,100; Sufengchees, 1,000. Cavalry of Shiraz, 300; Elkhanee, 500—500. Total, 6,900; guns (said to be), 18.

their march to Bushire, which they reached before midnight, thus performing another most arduous march of forty-four miles under incessant rain, besides fighting and defeating the enemy during its progress within the short period of fifty hours. The cavalry and artillery reached camp this morning.

The result is most satisfactory, and will, I trust, have a very beneficial effect upon our future operations.

The greatest praise is due to the troops of all arms for their steadiness and gallantry in the field, their extraordinary exertions on the march, and their cheerful endurance of fatigue and privation under circumstances rendered doubly severe by the inclemency of the weather, to which they were exposed without shelter of any kind; and I cannot too strongly express the obligation I feel to all under my command for the almost incredible exertions they have undergone and the gallantry they have displayed on this occasion.

To Major-general Stalker and to Colonel Lugard my especial thanks are due.

To the heads of the several departments, as well as to every officer belonging to those departments, and to my personal staff (including Lieutenant-colonel Lord Dunkelina, who volunteered his services as aide-de-camp), I am much indebted. From all I received every possible assistance, and, although I do not now specify by name the department and personal staff, and other officers alluded to, I shall hereafter take an opportunity of bringing them individually to your excellency's notice. Indeed, when all have behaved so nobly, it is difficult to specify individuals.

The rapid retreat of the enemy afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry. I have already alluded to the successful charges made by the 3rd cavalry and Poonah horse, under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant-colonel Tapp, and to the very efficient service performed by the artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Trevelyan. The brigadiers commanding the infantry brigades—Wilson, Stisted, and Honner—with the several commanding officers of the regiments, and indeed every officer and soldier of the force, earned my warmest approbation.

To the medical officers of the force I am under great obligation for their untiring exertions throughout these arduous operations.

I cannot conclude without alluding in strong terms to the valuable assistance I have received from Major Taylor, whose services were placed at my disposal by the Hon. C. A. Murray, C.B.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. OUTRAM,

Lieutenant-general commanding Expeditionary Force.

Total killed.—Europeans, 3; natives, 7.

Total wounded.—Europeans, 31; natives, 31.

Grand total.—Killed, 10; wounded, 62—72.

Diad of wounds since the action—3 Europeans and 3 natives.

M. STOVELL, *Superintending Surgeon.*

1st. Division Persian Expeditionary Field Force.

The following is the return of ordnance captured on the morning of the 8th inst., at Bivonac Khoosh-ab:—

One brass gun, Persian inscription, vent good, 9-pounder, length 6 feet, bore 4.2, of Persian manufacture.

One ditto, ditto, spiked, 9-pounder, length 6 feet, bore 4.2, of Persian manufacture.

These guns are in good travelling order, mounted on travelling field carriages, each limber fitted with a limber box to contain about thirty rounds of ammunition. One gun was taken with three horses, harness, &c., complete.

The carriages are of block trail constructions; the cheeks of one require to be replaced.

Eighteen rounds of ammunition and some food were in the limber boxes.

Besides the above were 262 rounds of gun ammunition,

which I destroyed before leaving the bivouac on Sunday evening. The mules, eight in number, which carried it, I have brought into camp. I have 350 stand of arms, and I think fully treble that number must have been taken by camp followers and others.

One gun was spiked by our horse artillery, as they had to leave it when following on in pursuit. I have since removed the spike.

B. K. FINNIMORE,

Captain, Field Commissary of Ordnance, P.E.F.F.

The precise force under Sir James Outram's command on this occasion was as follows:—3rd cavalry, 243; Poonah horse, 176—419 sabres; 64th foot, 780; 2nd Europeans, 693; 78th Highlanders, 739—2,212 European infantry; sappers, 118; 20th native infantry, 442; 4th rifles, 523; 26th native infantry, 479; Beloochees, 460—2,022 native infantry. Total, 4,653. 3rd troop horse artillery, 6; 3rd light field battery, 6; 5th light field battery, 6—Total, 18 guns. Camp.—376 Europeans; 1,466 native infantry; 1 company of European artillery; and 14 guns.

The troops rested on the field of battle, and refreshed themselves; but in a few hours after, they took up their old position; on the line of march heavy rain fell, and their sufferings were great: no army ever displayed more patience, unless indeed the men whose heroic fortitude endured, without murmuring, the horrors of the Crimean war. The cold to which the heroes of the Persian expedition were exposed was intense, the season was especially severe, although the winter of that part of Persia is generally cold and wet, with heavy hail-storms. Almost every kind of bad weather common to that climate at that season fell upon the little army of General Outram, which without a murmur encountered every task imposed upon it, and every difficulty that impeded. On the night of the battle, men and officers literally lay in mire, and when the march was resumed, it is no exaggeration to describe it as made knee-deep in mud. Rain continued to fall, accompanied by a sharp, biting wind throughout the remainder of the way to Bushire, where the force arrived without another combat, or losing a straggler. So perfect were General Outram's arrangements, that even the dead were carried with the army, that they might be buried in the English lines with military honours. This had an excellent effect upon the soldiery, for it caused them to feel that they were commanded by men who sympathised with them. There had been but one officer slain, so that the cavalcade of death, with that exception, was made up of private soldiers, and one or two non-commissioned officers. This concern to show respect to the men in humblest rank was attributable to General Outram, but all the officers caught the generous infection.

They participated in the toil and sufferings of their brave followers, and identified themselves with them in manly and soldierly sympathy.

On the morning of the 11th of February, Lieutenant Frankland, and the brave soldiers who died, received sepulture together, with all the honours which could be paid to their remains. On the previous morning, the 10th, the force marched into the lines of Bushire, amidst the cheers of those who had remained in camp, and of the sailors and marines from the ships. On the same morning the lieutenant-general in command issued a judicious order of the day, not resembling those frigid orders which issued from Lord Raglan, Sir James Simpson, and Sir E. Codrington, in the Crimea, but one warm with admiration of the noble qualities which the soldiers had displayed, and which indirectly appealed to their patriotism.

The rain descended in torrents for several days following that on which the force returned to Bushire. A few fine mornings enabled the troops to take exercise. During the interval Brigadier-generals Havelock and Hamilton arrived from India, and assumed the commands to which they had previously been appointed: Havelock commanding the second division, and Hamilton the first brigade of that division. From the 14th of February the weather again assumed its former character, and the lines were deluged with rain; nevertheless, so excellent were General Outram's arrangements, that the army was in vigorous health and excellent spirits. Reinforcements gradually arrived, but the heavy surf on the sea-shore prevented troops from landing, and also the dispatch of supplies for men and cattle. The good management of the commissariat—a rare piece of fortune in English armies—prevented any inconvenience. General Outram saw personally to everything; like the great Duke and Sir Charles Napier, he entered into all the detail of his army, while he never suffered a mere routine to formalise the service, and prevent the exercise of foresight, and of capacity for judging of events as they arose.

On the night of the 22nd of February the enemy's camp fires were seen upon the hills, of which there was a prospect from the lines. The enemy's patrols avoided all demonstrations by day; at night they watched opportunity to cut off camp-followers. The English fortified their lines, erecting fine strong redoubts, and mounting them with heavy 68-pounders. Thus matters proceeded until the 4th of March, when a change of weather enabled the general to embark forces for an expedition against Mohammerah.*

* For description see geographical portion of this work.

EXPEDITION TO MOHAMMERAH.

The circumstances attending the embarkation and the arrival before Mohammerah have been described by an eye-witness and participator in the events of the war, Captain G. H. Hunt, of the 78th Highlanders. The description is at once condensed and graphic, and has all the lifelike force of that which a competent witness relates:—"It was now known that General Outram's arrangements were to be as follows,—viz., General Stalker to remain in command at Bushire, with Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Tapp; the troops to remain being two field-batteries and the mountain trains, the entire cavalry of the first division, three companies each from her majesty's 64th, and the Highlanders, the 4th rifles, 20th native infantry, and the Belooch battalion; Sir James proceeding himself with the remainder, to the number, of all arms, of about four thousand men—those left for the defence of Bushire counting about three thousand. The different accounts of Mohammerah stated it to be held by from ten to thirteen thousand men, with numerous cavalry in its neighbourhood, and seven of the shah's best regular regiments among its garrison. The works of the fort or batteries were described as very formidable earthen parapets, eighteen or twenty feet thick, with heavy guns on the river face. To encounter these, until the troops should land and carry the batteries, were the broadsides of the *Clive* and *Falkland* sloops, and *Ajdaha*, *Feroze*, *Semiramis*, *Victoria*, and *Assaye* frigate steamers; which must, however, face the enemy's fire at the distance of about one hundred yards. The difficulty of the enterprise, however, seemed only the more to determine the general to accomplish it; and camp gossip affirmed that an ill-timed remonstrance from the Turkish government against our attacking a place so near their own (a neutral) territory, had materially hastened our chief's movements, and that the arrival of any portion of the expected cavalry and artillery would be the signal for an immediate advance.

"On the 6th of March, before the transport *Kingston* put to sea, the *Falkland* sloop sailed for the Euphrates; and about the same time her majesty's 64th regiment embarked in the *Bride of the Sea* transport; and, even while these events were occurring, the *Feroze*, *Pottinger*, and *Pioneer* steamers entered the roads, bringing a troop of horse artillery and some of the long-looked-for Scinde horse; so the departure of the entire expedition now became imminent. Intelligence was also brought in this day, stating so confidently that the new Persian commander-in-chief, with considerable reinforcements, had joined

the army recently beaten by us, and intended an advance, that strong hopes, if not actual expectations, were entertained that he might be induced, when the departure of so large a portion of our force became known, to attack the camp and try the strength of our new redoubts, and thus give the troops remaining behind an equal opportunity of honour and distinction with ourselves. On the afternoon of the 6th, the *Kingston*, with four other transports, got clear of the Bushire roads, and were off the island of Karraek early next morning. This formed no exception in desolate rocky appearance to its sister islands in the gulf. A detachment of the 4th rifles held it as a coaling-station for the Indian navy. The mouth of the Euphrates was made by daylight on the 8th, with the *Falkland* sloop under all sail leading into it; and after being aground on the bar for about an hour, the *Kingston* anchored by noon among the eight or ten ships that had then arrived; others continuing to reach the anchorage in the course of the day. A considerable portion of the expedition had assembled in the river, and the cavalry patrols of the enemy evinced great curiosity at our movements, coming down close to the water's edge to make their observations within easy gun-range, but no shot was fired at them. A day or so previously to our arrival, one of their superior officers held an inspection of about three thousand of their infantry abreast of the shipping, and evidently intended for observation." A considerable body of their irregulars, both horse and infantry, still occupied the village of Mahamur, opposite to the anchorage, and had pickets established in some ruined buildings within rifle-range. The Persian horsemen came within easy range, performing feats of horsemanship such as equestrian showmen might display in England. They flourished their swords, poised their lances, and seemed very desirous to impress the English with the idea that the horsemen of Persia were dangerously active and expert in encounter.

While the troops were impatiently waiting to be led against Mohammerah, General Stalker committed suicide at Bushire. That officer, finding that he was to be left in command on the departure of Sir James Outram against Mohammerah, was overwhelmed by a sense of responsibility. In important commands, under the chief direction of some other officer, he was very efficient; and in the public and private communications of the commander-in-chief was much honoured. When, however, he believed that a superior force would attack the lines which it would be his duty to defend, he shrunk from a responsibility to

which he was unequal, and deprived himself of life. In the war with Russia, two British admirals acted in the same way from a similar cause; and soon after the death of General Stalker, Captain Ettenscy, the naval chief of the expedition, also perished from his own hand, from the consciousness of his incompetency for the great task devolved upon him.

The promotion of officers in the British service by routine, purchase, and favouritism, is often as irksome to the victims of such unsuitable honour, as it is unjust to the country which is injured, and to meritorious officers who are neglected.

Until the 23rd of March the fleet, with troops on board, remained at anchor. The enemy, during the interval, worked hard at the defences. Captain Maisonneuve, of the *Sibylle*, a French ship of war, then observing matters in the Persian Gulf, under the pretence of a display of alliance, made energetic representations to the British of the strength of the enemy's positions and the incompetency of the English, with such means as they had at their disposal, to attack it successfully. The French captain professed a warm alliance, although not actually intending to unite his fire to that of the British fleet against the foe; but it is not at all improbable that the polite captain would have preferred that the English did not try to take Mohammerah, but, yielding to his opinion, have abandoned the enterprise, and incurred the disgrace of doing so. Active preparations continued until the dawn of the 26th, when the attack began. During these preparations, the sailors of the Indian navy showed an intelligence, order, and activity which the royal navy might well admire, and could not surpass, perhaps not equal.

On the night of the 25th, and before dawn of the 26th, a most gallant as well as useful manœuvre was performed. A raft, with two eight-inch and two five-inch mortars, was moored behind a low island in the middle of the river, and fronting the most powerful battery which the enemy possessed. "The cool daring of the men who placed, and the little band of artillery who remained on this raft for several hours of darkness in the middle of a rapid river without means of retreat, and certain destruction staring them in the face, should the enemy, within but a few hundred yards, be aroused to the fact of their presence, requires no commendation. The simple narrative of the event as it occurred is sufficient." Happily, the enemy was not "aroused to the fact of their presence" until at day-dawn the first shell sent from the raft fell into the centre of the battery, slaying eleven of the enemy. The Persian soldiers

were engaged at prayer when the shell fell among them; so sudden was the explosion, and so terrible the effect, that those who were not themselves among the victims were filled with wonder and consternation. "The attacking ships got under weigh as the first shot was fired, and proceeded to engage the batteries, going into action as follows:—The *Semiramis*, with the commodore's pendant flying of Captain Young, Indian navy, and towing the *Clive* sloop, led the squadron, followed by the steam-frigates *Ajdaha*, *Feroze*, *Assaye*, *Victoria*, the latter towing the *Falkland* sloop, which she cast off when in position. The leading ships passing the lower batteries, and opening their guns as they could be brought to bear, were soon at their respective posts, followed in quick succession by the rear division; and but few minutes had elapsed after the *Semiramis* had fired her first gun before the action became general, the Persian artillery replying with spirit. The morning being very clear, with just sufficient breeze to prevent the smoke from collecting, a more beautiful scene than was then presented can scarcely be imagined. The ships, with ensigns flying from every mast-head, seemed decked for a holiday; the river glittering in the early sun-light, its dark, date-fringed banks contrasting most effectively with the white canvas of the *Falkland*, which had loosened sails to get into closer action: the sulky-looking batteries just visible through the grey fleecy cloud which enveloped them; and groups of brightly-dressed horsemen flitting at intervals between the trees where they had their encampment, formed altogether a picture from which even the excitement of the heavy cannonade around could not divert attention."*

The *Berenice*, with General Havelock and the Highlanders on board, led the column for disembarkation. So crowded were the decks of the *Berenice*, that had a single shot plunged into the mass, the havoc must have been dreadful. Providentially, that peril was escaped. The conduct of the Indian navy in covering the landing was beyond praise. They kept up so terrible a fire of broadsides at the critical moment, as to prevent the enemy from being able to give sufficient attention to the transports and their precious freights. Those vessels were all armed, some with only one gun, others with several guns or mortars, and the fire from these was directed most skilfully. The reckless exposure of the sailors of the Indian navy must have filled the enemy with surprise, as it did the British army with admiration. The enthu-

siasm of these gallant tars equalled their audacity; in the midst of the furious cannonade they cheered vociferously each detachment of the troops as they passed between the ships on their way to what appeared still greater dangers, and more formidable encounters. The infantry and some field artillery were landed by two o'clock, but the creeks of the river were filled by the rising of the tide, so as to intercept the passage of the horse artillery, and the 14th light dragoons. The general ordered the troops he had with him to advance; the grenadier company of the gallant 64th keeping up a fire upon the enemy's matchlock-men while the troops passed. The troops arrived at the extremity of the date-grove which covered the line of advance, and hid the enemy's position. At once the lines of the Persians broke into view as the troops emerged beyond the intercepting wood. By this time the loud duel between the ships and batteries had nearly ceased; an explosion in the chief magazine of the defences had silenced many of the guns, and created alarm among the Persian troops.

The position of the enemy as presented to General Outram from the verge of the date-grove consisted of the town and batteries, flanked by intrenched encampments, which were thrown back to the rear of the place. In front of these lines large bodies of troops were massed. Upon these lines the British marched. The formation was as follows:—a line of contiguous quarter-distance columns; a field-battery on the right. Next came the 78th Highlanders; next the 25th native infantry, (one wing), her majesty's 64th regiment, the light battalion, and 23rd Bengal light infantry, the whole covered by a cloud of skirmishers. The point of attack was the camp to the left rear of the town of Mohammerah, where the shah-zada had evidently pitched his cavalry and guns, and had been with them in person. His infantry had occupied the other encampment, about five hundred yards to the right of this, and had also been quartered in considerable numbers in the batteries and date-groves adjacent. Up to the moment of our advance, these troops were drawn up in order of battle, outside the boundary of the shah-zada's camp, the right of their line far outflanking our left, which had actually no protection when it had once advanced into the open plain, beyond the 23rd native light infantry being slightly thrown back. This great risk, however, caused no hesitation. The scene which followed was singular. The British advanced in compact order of battle, with bold bearing and confident step, when, to their astonishment, as if the hosts of the

* *Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign*. By George Townsend, pp. 249, 250.

enemy were a dissolving view, they melted away. The Persian soldiery refused to fight, battalion after battalion vanished, and with such rapidity, that before the English could recover from their astonishment, the grand army of the shah had disappeared. Every tent remained standing, and the ground was covered with arms and ammunition, accoutrements and garments, shot and shell which had fallen in the camp from the British guns and mortars. No wounded men were seen, but the dead were scattered around in bloody profusion. Some of the wounded had in part been sent into the interior, others were hidden by the townspeople. The inefficiency of the British shells was proved by the numbers which lay among the enemy's tents without having burst. Before retreating the Persians had destroyed their grand magazine. As the cowardly Persian army glided away, crowds of bolder Arab robbers approached to plunder the camp. These were driven off by a few of the advance men of the 14th light dragoons, and the rearguard, while Sir James Outram pursued the fugitive army. The Scinde horse made desperate exertions to overtake them, but could only come upon unfortunate stragglers who were wounded. The English were powerless to pursue from the old cause of inefficiency in this respect—an inadequate force of cavalry. Indeed, so small was the number of the English army, that it is astonishing the enemy did not try the ordeal of battle. The Arabs fell upon the wounded fugitives, murdering them partly from love of plunder and partly from animosity.

Eighteen beautiful brass guns and mortars were found in the camp, amongst them a Russian 12-pounder, cast in 1828, bearing an inscription which stated that it was a present from the Emperor Nicholas of Russia to the shah. The total loss of men slain by the enemy was probably about five hundred, they acknowledged a loss of three hundred. The wounded who died on the retreat, and those murdered by the Arabs, would increase the numbers by several hundreds. Their total loss could not be less than one thousand men. The British loss was ten men killed and thirty-one wounded, including Lieutenant Harriss of the Indian navy. The fire of the Persians was good, hulling the ships, and cutting up the rigging; several boats were much injured, and one sunk, the mortar raft was also damaged, and in great danger of being sunk. Many lives were saved on board ship through the protection afforded by trusses of hay placed round the sides of the vessels.

When the British had time to examine the position which they had conquered, they were much amazed at its strength, and the skill

shown in constructing and mounting the batteries. The scene was thus described by an officer on the staff of the army, who examined the works and witnessed the havoc made by the fire from our ships:—"The strength of the batteries was found to have been by no means exaggerated, and considerable skill was displayed both in their position and construction. Nothing but stout hearts within them was required to have made their capture matter of bloody price to the victors: happily for us these were wanting. Solid earthworks, open in rear, with parapets eighteen feet thick and twenty-five in height—the embrasures casemated, and revetted with date-stumps (which the heaviest shot will not splinter), and the whole interior thickly studded with pits full of water to catch our shells—had been the work cut out for us. The north battery had embrasures for eighteen guns, and stood on the right bank of the Karoon, at its junction with the Euphrates, and looked across and down the stream of that river. The south battery had eleven guns, and was on the opposite bank of the Karoon, commanding in the same direction. A small fort between the north battery and the town, and connected with the former by a long intrenchment, with embrasures for guns, mounted eight or ten guns. This intrenchment, crowded with infantry, had kept up a heavy musketry fire during the whole action; and from the broken pieces of arms and appointments lying about, as well as patches of blood-stains in all directions, our shot must have told fearfully among its occupants. Several minor batteries of from two to four guns each were on either bank, and just outside the west face of the town, on the right bank, was a very carefully made and strong work for ten guns. The whole of the works bore the marks of very rough treatment from our shot, though they were far from being ruined. Outside the small fort connected with the north battery was a capsized brass 12-pounder, with the carriage smashed, and three dead horses harnessed to it, all evidently killed at the same moment, if not by the same shot. A captain of their artillery and three gunners were also lying dead beside it. A letter found on the officer stated his expectation of a great battle on the morrow, and foreboded his own fate—committing his wife and children to the care of his brother at Teheran. This letter was subsequently forwarded to the address it bore by the British political agent at Bagdad.

"Two other handsome field guns and a large brass mortar were found deserted near the brass 12-pounder, the accident to which had prevented the enemy carrying them off; and they must have had some frightful casualties

in their ranks while their men were delayed in the attempt. Some few corpses remaining on the spot presented horrible spectacles: a huge African, in particular, struck on the back of the head by a round-shot, which had carried away all the bones of the skull and face, lay across another dead soldier, with the hideous, eyeless black mask that had once been a countenance, still as it were mowing and grinning at the beholder. The scene of the explosion of their grand magazine also afforded some ghastly objects, and the damage it had occasioned was frightful—legs, arms, and heads—wretched mutilated remains of humanity—protruding among the blackened, blasted ruins. The effect of the 68-pounder shot upon the date-trees was most extraordinary, a single one sufficing to snap the largest. The immense size and range of these missiles had occasioned the greatest terror and astonishment among the Persian troops, and doubtless was their excuse for their subsequent dastardly misconduct. Much discouragement was also said to have been created in their ranks by the loss of Agha Jhan Khan, surteep, or general of division, and their most able chief, who fell desperately wounded very early in the day, while showing a most gallant example in the north battery.

“The 27th and 28th of March were occupied in removing the guns, collecting the stores, &c., and in landing supplies and our own tentage for the troops, who, with the exception of those to whom the Persian tents had fallen prize on occupying their camps, had up to this time been living entirely in the open air.”

EXPEDITION TO AKWAZ.

While the British were encamped at Mohammerah, Sir James Outram ascertained that the enemy had retreated, with the intention of reaching Akwâz, about one hundred miles distant, on the river Karoon. It was the grand depot of provisions of war of all kinds for these provinces. The British commander-in-chief conceived the idea of sending up some steamers, with a small detachment of troops, and of damaging or destroying the place before the retreating force could reach it. The steam squadron consisted of the *Comet*, *Planet*, and *Assyria*, under Commander Rennie, of the Indian navy, whose experience in river warfare in Birmah and China had been considerable.

“The troops told off for the service were, one hundred and fifty men from the flank companies of the 64th regiment, and a like number furnished by the light and Captain McAndrew's companies of the Highlanders. Each steamer took one hundred men, the light companies of the Highlanders going on

the *Comet*; Captain Goode's grenadiers, of the 64th, on the *Planet*; and Captain McAndrew, with part of his own Highlanders and part of the light company of the 64th, on the *Assyria*. The expedition was accompanied by the following officers, irrespective of the troops:—Captain Wray, deputy quartermaster-general of the army; Captain Green, military secretary to Sir James; Captain Kembal, political agent and consul at Bagdad; and several other officers. The steamers left Mohammerah about ten o'clock on the morning of 29th March, the *Comet* leading and lending a tow-ropo to the *Assyria*, she being of lesser power; the *Planet* brought up the rear. A gunboat, carrying two 24-pounder howitzers, was also in tow of each steamer.” After sunset of the first day's sail, a party of officers landed, and discovered the ground upon which the enemy had bivouaced in their retreat, and the wheel-marks of five guns were made out, besides those of a carriage of narrow axle. Getting under weigh again at daylight the next morning, the ruined mosque of Imaum Subbeh was reached early in the afternoon; and the steamer running alongside the bank, a few officers landed to explore, again finding the marks of the enemy's halting-ground. The five guns had been parked near the ruin, which stood close to the waterside, and the shah-zada himself had evidently occupied the little shelter afforded by the few date-trees in its immediate neighbourhood. The wheel-marks of the small carriage were again made out, and, judging from the freshness of the impressions in the clay and other appearances, not more than twenty-four hours could have elapsed since the retreating army had passed. Several fresh-made graves also gave evidence that they had buried their dead by the way; and, from the absence of the usual scraps of food around the bivouac fires, and similar indications at the picketing-places, they were evidently pressed for both provisions and forage. Again the little squadron got under weigh, and on arriving at the Arab village of Ismaili, it was learned that the enemy had passed the previous day; the force consisting of seven regiments, two thousand horse, and four guns; and another gun, with a broken carriage, towed in a boat along the river close by their line of march. On the 31st, at dawn, the brisk little *Comet* cast off the *Assyria*, and putting on full power, made up river, expecting to capture the boat on board of which was the gun. Soon after nine in the morning, a straggler from the rearguard was captured. He was so exhausted with fatigue, hunger, and fear, that no information could be extracted from him. From the Arabs it was soon after ascertained that the enemy's army had reached

their destination, towing their boat with the gun safely up to the city. The remainder of the little squadron joined in the evening, and a position was taken up for the night. Early on the morning of the 1st of April, the squadron steamed up towards Akwáz. The Persian army was descried on the right bank of the river, the town was situated on the left. "They had a most formidable cavalry force, certainly over two thousand; four large masses of infantry were partly screened by a low range of sand-hills, which ran along their front; and three guns were distinctly seen in position near a small mosque in their centre, a fourth being on a slope below and to the left of it. Their line fronted down the river, and at a slight angle to it, their left resting immediately upon its bank. Our small fleet steamed slowly up to within three thousand yards of the position, all busied either in surveying the river, reconnoitering the force in front, or observing the patrols of cavalry which were now riding within rifle-shot abreast of us, and watching our movements. A boat beneath the left bank for some minutes escaped with very casual notice; but suspicions being roused, it was determined to examine her. A cutter from the *Comet*, taking two officers of the party and a corporal's guard of the Highlanders, accordingly boarded her (the crew jumping overboard as the cutter approached), when she proved to be the much-coveted prize, a splendid 12-pounder brass gun being found in her. While hoisting this on board the *Comet*, a couple of horsemen approaching closer to see what we were doing, a shot was fired at them from one of Colonel Jacob's new rifles. The effect of this was most ridiculous: though not striking either. They both turned at once, galloping back at speed to the picket of some thirty cavalry which they had come from, and which also withdrew to a more respectful distance. Some Arabs next hailed us from the shore, one was brought on board, and it was ascertained that the garrison of Akwáz did not exceed five hundred infantry and thirty horse, left to protect the stores, which had scarcely been touched by the enemy before our approach. The information appearing reliable, it was determined at once to attempt reaching the town by landing on the left bank, and circling clear of cannon-range to its east face; when, should it be found defended in much greater force, a simple reconnaissance was to be made, and an orderly return to the boats; but if practicable, the town was to be carried, and the stores burnt. A gunboat was ordered to go up the river as far as possible without rashness, and open fire with two howitzers. There were only two

small boats on the side of the river where the Persian army lay, so that men could not be sent over in any great numbers to assist the garrison of the city. The gunboat performed its mission admirably; Mr. Hewett, mate of the Indian navy, directed the fire with great coolness and skill, although a very young man. Dispositions were made of a most ingenious nature to make the enemy believe that the British force opposed to them was only the advance guard of a great flotilla, and of the whole army of Sir James Outram. A high jungle, screening the formation of the troops, enabled this happy imposition to be practised, rendering it impossible for the enemy to form any correct estimate of the numbers. "A single line of skirmishers, each man ten or twelve paces apart, first issued from the bushes on the plain, in view of the enemy; the supports followed these, at about one hundred yards' interval, also in single rank, and with files very much loosened. At another interval of about one hundred yards, the three main detachments advanced, about two hundred yards apart, each in columns of threes, and opened out to very wide intervals. The light company of the Highlanders was on the left, and on entering the town had to turn to the left, and, getting under cover at the water's edge, to endeavour to keep down the fire. Captain Goode's grenadiers of the 64th were in the centre, and were to move on the body of the town, and at once begin destroying the stores. Captain McAndrew's detachment on the right, composed partly of Highlanders and partly of men of the 64th, was to turn to the right on entering, and, watching any troops that might attempt the upper face of the town, also destroy whatever magazines or stores fell in his way."

The garrison of the town ran away, and crossing far up the river, joined the main army. The sheik, with a long retinue of religious persons, came out to solicit protection, which was afforded, on condition that he would disclose the position of the magazines, and aid in their destruction. He was assured that private property would be spared and the inhabitants treated with respect.

The Persian army remained still in position, and it was necessary for the troops to act with the greatest circumspection. A lucky cast from one of the howitzers pitched a shell into the shah-zada's quarters, nearly destroying a mosque. His excellency became so alarmed that he gave orders for the army to retreat upon Shustu, his nearest depot, but a long distance for an army without provisions, as all their stores lay in the city which they were unable to save. Ten thousand men thus fled before three hundred, surren-

dering a city and extensive magazines of food and ammunition. One who witnessed the retreat of the Persians thus described it:—"Their infantry, keeping in four distinct masses, went off first, marching very rapidly on a course parallel to the river, taking the four guns seen in position with them; and they were also said to have had three others of lighter metal. A small green palanquin carriage, with glass windows, and a 'takh-teraidan,' or mule-litter, in which Persian women of rank usually travel, were conspicuous in the midst of a strong escort. This was the carriage, the tracks of which had been found at their several bivouacs. The cavalry brought up the rear, and a magnificent appearance this great body of horse presented. They certainly exceeded two thousand in number, appeared well mounted, and were dressed in long blue frocks, with trousers of lighter colour, a white belt, and the high black lambskin cap peculiar to the Persians. A sabre and long matchlock slung across their backs appeared to be their only arms, as (unusual with Asiatics) no lances were visible among them. The pick of the Bactdyari tribes, reputed the shah's best cavalry, were present among the number. They carried three standards with them, but in crimson cases, not flying. One of these horsemen remained concealed behind a wall until their whole army had proceeded about a mile, then suddenly starting from his hiding-place, he fired his matchlock at the town, as if in defiance, and galloped off at speed after his comrades. This was the last man seen of the Persian army.

"Before their rearguard had advanced many hundred yards out of their lines, the gunboat crossed, taking Captain Wray, Lord Schomberg Kerr, and Captain Green, with twenty of the Highlanders, and with utter impunity exploded a quantity of ammunition deserted by them; although—a few minutes after this took place, and when the party might easily have been cut off from the boat, had a few of their horsemen possessed the courage to dash back—they unlimbered a light gun and sent a shot at some Arab marauders who had swam the river and commenced plundering the lines they had abandoned. The town had been entered about half an hour before midday, and it was about two o'clock when the last of the enemy was seen. During the whole of this time the work of destroying the stores had been going on, Major Kemball first compelling the Arabs to carry down to the steamers as much of the flour and wheat as stowage could be found for them, and, as payment for their labour, threw open to them the remainder.

"Besides the immense quantity of grain thus carried off and scattered by us, fifteen cases of perfectly new firelocks and bayonets were taken, fifty-six fine mules in capital condition, a handsome horse of the shah-zada's, a number of new pack-saddles, with their appointments, and a great many new intrenching tools of different descriptions. The whole of these were brought away in the boats. The firelocks captured were of English manufacture, and had the Tower mark upon them. A large flock of sheep was also among the prizes. Of these, as many were brought off as the boats could hold, and the troops and seamen consumed many more during the stay which it was now decided to make at Akwâz, both for the moral effect and for political reasons; the remainder of the flock was presented to the sheik of the town on the departure of the expedition."

Captain Selby, noticed elsewhere in this work as so useful an officer in his marine surveys, was of great service in this expedition. He commanded the *Comet*, and his surveys of the river and of the Persian Gulf on former occasions enabled him to guide the little squadron in safety.

During the 2nd and 3rd of April, the political agent who accompanied the expedition remained at Akwâz, receiving the submission of the sheiks of the surrounding districts. While these events were occurring, negotiations for peace were going on at Paris, which, on the 4th of March, was concluded. This intelligence arrived at Mohammerah on the same day that the expeditionary force arrived at that place on its return from Akwâz. Sir James Ontram put himself into communication with the nearest Persian authorities in reference to the fulfilment of the treaty. He arranged that a small garrison should remain in Bushire, and the rest of the troops return to India. Great dissatisfaction was created among the army of Persia by the easy terms which the Persian ambassadors obtained at Paris. The general impressions were, that the French emperor, or his foreign minister, were more anxious, by the interposition of France, to prevent the acquisition of renown and influence by the English in Persia, than to secure a tried and faithful ally such terms as honour and justice might demand. It was thought that Lord Clarendon showed too little firmness, and that he and Lord Palmerston displayed more eagerness to please the French emperor than comported with the dignity of England. These noblemen did not expect that the operations in the Persian Gulf would be so successful. They, no doubt, calculated upon the expedition being conducted with the usual blunders of an English

campaign. They did not recollect, or did not know, that Outram and Havelock were men who rose by their merit, and were not the creatures of a pragmatist governor-general, or a servile commander-in-chief. Had there been a just conception in the English cabinet of the capacity and resources of the majority of the officers who led the army of Persia, better terms would have been insisted on. The troops engaged in the Persian expedition became a useful reinforcement to the army in India struggling against the mutineers and rebels of the Bengal provinces and Central India. From that circumstance the reader will be interested in the destination of the troops which left Persia in May, 1858. In a field-force order, made at the camp, Mohammerah, 9th of May, 1857, the following dispositions were made as to the places to which the troops then departing should be sent:—

1st. "The third troop of horse-artillery to Kurrachee; first company second battalion of artillery to Kurrachee; reserve companies to Bombay; her majesty's 64th regiment to Vingorra; her majesty's 78th Highlanders to Bombay; light battalion to Bombay; Madras sappers and miners to Bombay.

2nd. "The 23rd native light infantry and the 26th native infantry are transferred to the first division, and will proceed to Bushire, with the detachment of Scinde horse and land transport corps now at Mohammerah.

3rd. "The staff of the second division will return to Bombay, with the exception of the engineers, ordnance, and commissariat departments, which will proceed to Bushire and await further instructions.

4th. "Brigadier-general Jacob, C.B., will command the troops stationed at Bushire, which will be organized as follows:—cavalry brigade: 3rd regiment light cavalry, Scinde horse, Poonah horse, Aden troop, 14th king's light dragoons—Brigadier Stewart. Artillery brigade: 4th troop horse artillery, 3rd light field-battery, 5th light field-battery, 8th light field-battery, three companies of the second battalion artillery, four companies of the fourth battalion artillery—Lieutenant-colonel Trevelyan. Infantry: 20th regiment native infantry, 26th regiment native infantry—first brigade, Colonel Macan. Fourth Bengal native infantry, 23rd regiment native light infantry, Beloochee battalion—second brigade, Colonel Heuner.*

5th. "The Lieutenant-general avails himself of this opportunity to return his warmest thanks to the whole of the troops placed under his command for service in Persia, for their very exemplary conduct since their arrival

in this country, evinced by the fact of scarcely one instance of misconduct on the part of any individual having been brought to his notice. This entire absence of crime amongst so large a body of troops assembled in camp redounds to the credit of both officers and men, and is the strongest possible proof of the high state of discipline of the force; whilst their conduct throughout the expedition to Brasjoon, and in the engagement at Khoosh-ah, bore ample testimony to the gallantry of all ranks before an enemy, and to their cheerful and patient endurance of fatigue and hardship under most trying circumstances."

In the remainder of "the order," his excellency thanked the officers of his force for their signal skill and gallantry, selecting Brigadier-general Havelock, C.B., and Brigadier-general Wilson, K.H., as especially worthy of honour.

On the 15th of May, Brigadier-general Havelock, with the staff of his late division, embarked on board the *Berenice*, the vessel on board of which he had been, and which so providentially escaped when under fire of the batteries of Mohammerah. The *Berenice* arrived on the 23rd of May at Bombay, where the unwelcome intelligence of the mutiny smote every ear and every heart. The Highlanders and the 64th regiment were immediately, without landing, dispatched for debarkation nearer to the scene of action. How little did the authorities of Bombay suspect that the experience and hardihood acquired in Persia had qualified those troops for sublime services in India! As little was it supposed at Bombay or anywhere else in India, that Havelock was to be the saviour of our Asiatic possessions, and that in him Britain would find a genius equal to the terrible emergency Providence permitted to arise.

Havelock, and most of his officers, had disembarked at Bombay, although the men still "kept the ships." He did not again embark in the *Berenice*, but in the *Erin*, on the 1st of June, following the troops which had been sent forward. A storm arose, and the *Erin* struck upon a reef off the Island of Ceylon, near a small civil station called Caltura, between Galle and Colombo. The loss of all on board was imminent, and had that precious freight of genius and devoted loyalty perished, India, humanly speaking, would have been lost to England. The cowardly Lascars (native sailors) refused to go aloft and ease the ship, or make any exertion whatever below. They huddled together in craven fear and fanatical apathy, while the English officers performed their work for them. To the firmness, coolness, and genius

* This force subsequently went to India, in time to render service in the suppression of the mutiny.

of Havelock it was mainly due that every soul on board did not perish.

On the 8th of June Havelock and his officers embarked on board the *Fire Queen*. On the 12th the ship entered the roads of Madras. She arrived at Calcutta the 17th of June, bringing also Sir Patrick Grant, the

new commander-in-chief of the army of the Bengal presidency. The arrival of those officers at Calcutta, especially Havelock, caused joy and hope in the midst of the depression and gloom which then predominated. The causes of this despondency will be related in another chapter.

CHAPTER CXXVII.

DEPARTURE OF LORD DALHOUSIE—ARRIVAL OF LORD CANNING AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL—BREAKING OUT OF A SEPOY MUTINY—WANT OF FORESIGHT AND DECISION ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT—DISBANDING OF REGIMENTS AND PUNISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS—PROOFS OF A MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACY.

EARLY in March, 1856, Lord Dalhousie retired from the government of India. His successor, Lord Canning, arrived previous to that event. These two men met at Government House, amidst festivities and splendour.* The most eventful incidents of British Indian history had occurred during the government of Lord Dalhousie, but even these were destined to be surpassed in magnitude and importance by those which afterwards taxed the powers and experience of Lord Canning. Lord Canning's difficulties were in the main created by Lord Dalhousie. To deal with this legacy of difficulties Lord Canning did not possess any extraordinary abilities. He had been considered an apt man of public business, with the family talent for diplomacy; he had been as good a postmaster-general as his predecessors in that office, which is not a very high commendation. He inherited a great name, and was a favourite of Lord Palmerston, under whose auspices he went to India. Much more could not be said for him. His reception at Calcutta was described in the chapter which treated of the social condition of India. His government, previous to the breaking out of the mutiny, was not in any way remarkable. That event surpassed all others in Anglo-Indian history, in its importance and its danger, and brought out a heroism and talent on the part of the British in India—of all ranks—such as excited the admiration of their countrymen and of the world. The causes of the mutiny, and even the immediate occasion of it, have been referred to so frequently in the course of this history, that it is unnecessary further to discuss them. In the chapters which treat of the social condition of India, and of the Indian army, and in the introduction, sufficient has

been written on this subject to render it only requisite to make incidental reference to it as the narrative of facts proceeds.

MUTINY OF THE BENGAL ARMY, AND INSURRECTION IN THE BENGAL PROVINCES.

The annexation of Oude had disgusted and enraged the sepoys of the Bengal army, who were generally recruited from that country, or from the contiguous province of Upper Bengal. Independent of that circumstance, while the government pampered the Brahmins and high-caste Mussulmans, it became less careful of offending the religious prejudices of the soldiers. Instances had occurred of these prejudices having been invaded in various ways without creating revolt, but the government did not know that in every such case bad feeling was created, which was quietly but actively diffused. Cases of military revolt had, however, occurred so often in Indian history in consequence of the superstition of the sepoys taking offence, that the government and its officials had lessons of prudence so plainly given, that none but persons judicially blinded, or utterly incompetent, could have been heedless. All such monitions proved in vain; the government and the officials acted like men governed by some irresistible fate. *Quod Deus vult perdere prius dementat*, might be pronounced in every department of the Bengal government, without impiety, so blindly did each proceed in precipitating the awful catastrophe which impended. Various indications were afforded before Lord Dalhousie left India, and immediately after the arrival of his successor, that the native army was in an unsettled state; that the troops were not respectful to their officers, not loyal; and that they brooded over some real or supposed grievances, not simply with discontent, but with vindictive feeling. These indications

* The reader will find an account of their meeting in chapter xxvii., under the head of "The social condition of India."

of the temper of the troops were noticed all over Bengal and the annexed provinces. A sense of alarm was felt by loyal natives and independent English settlers. In Calcutta, it was impossible to visit the bazaar without perceiving that the natives of all classes expected some serious and important event, and that society was perturbed. All these portents of a coming storm were pointed out to the government, but its officials, civil and military, refused to hear the rustling of the leaves, and only awoke from their stupidity when the trees themselves were snapped by the tempest. When at last the hurricane of sedition burst forth, the government was utterly unprepared for such a calamity, and were stunned by the tidings of disaster and devastation.

The first decisive indication of a state of distrust on the part of the sepoy occurred at Dum-Dum, where a school of musketry was established. The feeling was first shown there at the close of 1856. On the 22nd of January, 1857, Captain Wright, of the 70th native infantry, brought under notice of Major Bonteim, the commandant, the existence of dissatisfaction among the men. His report stated that "a very unpleasant feeling existed among the native soldiers who were at the depot for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges, some evil-disposed person having spread a report that it consisted of a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows." Captain Wright added, "The belief in this respect has been strengthened by the behaviour of a classic attached to the magazine, who, I am told, asked a sepoy of the 2nd grenadiers to supply him with water from his lotah; the sepoy refused, observing he was not aware of what caste the man was; the classic immediately rejoined, 'You will soon lose your caste, as ere long you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows,' or words to that effect. Some of the depot men, in conversing with me on the subject last night, said that the report had spread throughout India, and when they go to their homes their friends will refuse to eat with them. I assured them (believing it to be the case) that the grease used is composed of mutton fat and wax; to which they replied, 'It may be so, but our friends will not believe it: let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow soldiers that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste.'" After some delays, such as may well surprise any person acquainted with the importance of allowing the native troops to take up a religious or caste prejudice, the men were paraded, and asked if they had any grievances or complaints. About two-thirds of the men, and all

the native commissioned officers, stepped to the front and respectfully stated that a suspicion had gone abroad that the fat of kine and swine was used in the preparation of the cartridges for the Enfield rifles. It was well known that the Mohammedan regarded swine's flesh as abominable, while those of the Brahminical religion holding kine to be sacred, would have their religious prejudices shocked by the use of fat from the animal in the making up of their cartridges. The men prayed that wax and oil should be used. General Harsey, commanding at Barrackpore, acquainted the deputant adjutant-general of the forces with the true state of affairs, of which the general formed an accurate estimate. He recommended that the men should be allowed to obtain from the bazaar whatever ingredients for preparing the cartridges would answer that end, and satisfy the religious scruples of the sepoy.

The deputy adjutant-general took three days to "con over" the affair, and then sent the correspondence to the military secretary, who answered, on the 27th January, that the governor-general in council had adopted General Harsey's suggestion, which might be carried out as well at Umballah and Sealkote, if the men wished it. The inspector-general of ordnance was applied to for information as to what the composition used in the arsenal for greasing the cartridges of the rifle muskets consisted of, "whether mutton fat was or is used, and if there are any means adopted for ensuring the fat of sheep and goats only being used; also, whether it is possible that the fat of bullocks and pigs may have been employed in preparing the ammunition for the new rifled muskets which has been recently made up in the arsenal." The reply was, that the grease used was a mixture of tallow and beeswax, in accordance with the instructions of the court of directors; that the tallow was supplied by a contractor; but that "no extraordinary precaution appears to have been taken to ensure the absence of any objectionable fat." The first ammunition made in the arsenal was intended for the 60th rifles, and it was probable that some of this was issued to the depot at Dum-Dum. The inspector-general regretted that "ammunition was not prepared expressly for the practice depot, without any grease at all," but the subject did not "occur to him." He recommended that the home government should be requested not to send out any more made ammunition for the Enfield rifles.*

On the 28th of January, General Harsey again informed the government that the idea was deeply seated in the minds of the soldiers, that the government intended to deprive them

* *The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences.* By Henry Mead.

of caste by a deceitful trick, and then by force to make them Christians. The general assured his superiors, that so completely had this idea taken possession of the sepoys, that "it would be idle and unwise to attempt its removal." He also stated that incendiary fires had taken place, which were the work of the disaffected soldiers, and perpetrated with the object of disturbing the country, exasperating the natives, and thus creating a sympathy with their own sedition. It seems almost incredible that the government, in the face of this and other evidence, wrote home making light of the whole affair, and informing the court of directors that the explanations offered to the sepoys had satisfied them. The directors have been blamed for not foreseeing the magnitude and peril of the crisis when its first indications gave them warning. It is not wonderful that they should accept the assurances of Lord Canning and his council that all was well, more especially as the president of the board of control (Mr. Vernon Smith), and the premier, Lord Palmerston, were satisfied with the competency of Lord Canning to determine all matters on the spot, and with the accuracy of his advices. While the English government and the Indian government were crying "peace, peace, here was no peace." Had all the officials at Calcutta been blind, or had the dispatches which were received from the provinces been addressed to men without reason, they could not have acted with less forethought, or shown less judgment. Viscount Canning had evidently taken up the government in the spirit in which Lord Dalhousie had laid it down—that India might be regarded as secure and prosperous. In the last "minute" of the government of the Marquis Dalhousie, he thus recorded his conviction, while reviewing the history of his own eight years of office:—"I enter on the review with the single hope that the honourable court of directors may derive from the retrospect some degree of satisfaction with the past, and a still larger measure of encouragement for the future." This minute was perused by Viscount Canning with confidence in his predecessor and himself, and hence the false security in which he wrapped himself, and the dulness of all around him to the real signs of the time.

On the 11th of February, General Hearnsey wrote to the government declaring that they "dwelt on a mine ready for explosion." He pointed out the peculiar facts connected with several fresh instances of incendiarism, as proving that they had been perpetrated by the soldiery. The general declared that depositions had been made before him and other authorities that the soldiers had conspired throughout the Bengal army to prevent the

government from forcing them to abandon their religion by compelling them to break caste in biting cartridges greased with the fat of forbidden animals. The general showed how he had paraded the men, and dissuaded them from their dangerous proceedings, and added these ominous words:—"You will perceive in all this business the native officers were of no use; in fact, they are afraid of their men, and dare not act; all they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by so doing they will escape censure as not actively implicated. This has always occurred on such occasions, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. Well might Sir C. Metcalfe say, 'that he expected to awake some fine morning, and find that India had been lost to the English crown.'" The procedure of the government, on the receipt of new and most alarming communications from various parts, was slow, uncertain, and, at last, when action of a determined kind was taken, it was haughtily confident, severe, and impolitic.

The sepoys at Barrackpore took measures to corrupt those of the 19th regiment at Berhampore. That regiment, on the night of the 19th of February, suddenly assembled, and made demonstrations of revolt. Colonel Mitchel, who commanded the garrison, immediately ordered out other troops at the station, which were a squadron of irregular cavalry, consisting of one hundred and eighty men; there were also two pieces of cannon, manned by six native gunners each. He there addressed the 19th, demanding the reason of their parading without orders; they alleged that it arose from a report that European troops had been ordered up to the station to murder them unless they consented to violate their religion by biting the greased cartridges. Colonel Mitchel addressed them in terms which blended firmness and prudence. The cavalry and artillery remained loyal, and the infantry, at last, consented to lay down their arms and submit to their duty. They were invited to test the cartridges. This the native officers did in the presence of the men, and pronounced the greater number free from grease of any kind, but that grease had been used in preparing the more highly glazed paper of one set of the cartridges. The men were informed that a plan would be adopted of loading without biting the cartridge, but although this satisfied the majority for the time, the good faith of government, as to the maintenance of its promises not to interfere with their religion, was not trusted. The regiment, however, continued to perform its duties. It will be observed that the irregular cavalry and artillerymen remained loyal, and that their loyalty saved the station, for there was not a

European quartered there. This furnishes proof of the sincerity of the infantry in the allegations they made as to the causes of disaffection. The artillery and cavalry had nothing to do with such cartridges, and therefore not only made no complaints, but were ready to fire on their mutinous co-religionists had they continued in revolt. The artillery and cavalry, however, sympathised with the grievances of the infantry, but not being themselves involved in them, were easily satisfied as to the remedies proposed. The 19th had been seduced by the men of the 34th, stationed at Barrackpore, who promised co-operation, but failed to render it in the hour of trial.

When Lord Canning heard of the transactions at Berhampore, he determined upon making an example of the 19th regiment, although the corps had returned to its duty, and had evidently misconducted itself, not from a mutinous disposition, but from a sincere conviction that the government had violated its engagements never to enforce observances or practices upon its native soldiery at variance with their religion. Lord Canning ordered the *Oriental* steamship to Rangoon, to convey the 84th regiment of the royal line, quartered there, to Barrackpore; to which place also a wing of the 53rd regiment, stationed at Fort William, was ordered; and some artillery was to accompany these detachments. The mutinous native regiment was, at the same time, ordered to march from Berhampore to Barrackpore. This last order was, that the regiment might be disbanded in the presence of the garrison, and of various detachments called in from a certain distance. It might be supposed that a measure of such importance would be kept secret by the select few whom it was necessary should co-operate in carrying it out—this, however, was not the case; scarcely had the resolve been taken when it was known and discussed among the sepoy at Barrackpore. The 34th regiment of Bengal native infantry quartered there was one of the most fanatical and disloyal of the service. This corps, which, as already shown, had caused the uneasy feeling in the 19th at Berhampore, immediately laid a plan for frustrating the intentions of the government. The authorities had no information of the exact state of feeling in the 34th. They were dull of understanding to observe the indications of things at Barrackpore, as well as everywhere else. The order to march to Barrackpore was given to the 19th, and the 34th was commanded to relieve that corps. The latter advised the former to mutiny on the road, assuring it that European troops had been sent for to massacre it; a particular part of the road was specified for the revolt; the officers were, according to the

plan of the 34th, to be at once murdered, a signal was to be given, and the 34th would march out and join the mutineers. This correspondence fell into the hands of Colonel Mitchell, who acted with undaunted courage and perfect skill. When he reached a particular part of the road he suddenly halted the regiment, so that at the appointed time for the revolt the corps was not at the appointed place. Before the hour arrived he held a durbar of the native officers, whom he engaged in acts of courtesy and well-assumed confidence. The men *could* not act according to the concocted plan, the expected signal, of course, never reached the 34th at Barrackpore; and thus, by the presence of mind, good sense, and cool resolution of Colonel Mitchell, the scheme of the mutineers was frustrated, and scenes of blood and horror averted, similar to those which soon afterwards took place in so many parts of India. The 19th was marched to its destination, and the arrangements of the government were completed for breaking up the corps. It is but justice to say, that at the core the battalion was loyal, that the men had no disposition to mutinous acts; it was as brave and well-disciplined a body of native infantry as any in the service, as might be expected from its having so efficient a commander. It was only under the suspicion, not at all unreasonable, that the government, either from design or carelessness, had endangered its caste, that it was disposed to any hostile action. The men had been informed by natives actually engaged in the manufacture of the obnoxious cartridges, that their caste was gone; this information had been accompanied with sneers and insults which goaded the men almost to madness, loyal although they were. The reports which reached them from the 34th, about disbanding and massacre, left them, in their own opinion, no alternative but revolt.

While these transactions were taking place, others of a still more formidable nature occurred in the 34th regiment. That corps was cowardly, but still more truculent. One of its number, a desperate fanatic, in a state of intoxication, rushed on the parade-ground on Sunday, the 29th of March, shouting "deen, deen," ("religion, religion,") and taunted his comrades to come forth and fight for their faith against the Feringhees. The serjeant-major arrived at the moment, the fanatic fired at him, but was too drunk with bhlang to hit the mark. This was immediately in front of the quarter-guard, numbering nineteen men, who turned out and enjoyed the sight, crowding around the serjeant-major, and preventing him from taking any decided action against the mutineer, who reloaded his piece, and shot

the horse of the adjutant, who just then rode up to see what was the matter. As the adjutant fell, the mutineer attacked him with his side arms, and the quarter-guard struck the serjeant-major and the fallen officer with the butt-ends of their muskets. Both men would have been murdered in a few moments if General Hearsey had not galloped up, fearing that a revolt was beginning: he ordered the guard to rescue the adjutant and serjeant-major; they refused—their pieces were not loaded. He presented a revolver, declaring that he would shoot the first man who refused to move forward; they obeyed, and rescued the intended victims of assassination. The jemadar gave orders in opposition to those of the general; but the resolution and authority of the latter prevailed. The jemadar and guard were subsequently arrested. The name of the fanatical sepoy was Mungul Pandey, and he has received an unenviable notoriety in India, not only by being the first man who struck a blow for the cause of the mutineers, but from the fact of his name having, from that circumstance, been given to the mutineers and to all sepoy who excite the hostility or contempt of the English.

The evening after this affair with the 34th, the 19th entered from Barrackpore, and the next day they were drawn up on parade to hear the decision of the governor-general and commander-in-chief. It was an imposing sight when the four thousand sepoy of the garrison, the offending regiment, the European artillery and infantry which had arrived for the occasion, and various detachments from other stations, assembled to hear the order of the day. The first part of the document recapitulated the events which led to the situation, the order then declared:—

The regiment has been guilty of open and defiant mutiny.

It is no excuse for this offence to say, as had been said in the before-mentioned petition of the native officers and men of the regiment, that they were afraid for their religion, and that they apprehended violence to themselves.

It is no atonement of it to declare, as they have therein declared, that they are ready to fight for their government in the field, when they have disobeyed and insulted that government in the persons of its officers, and have expressed no contrition for their heavy offences.

Neither the 19th regiment, nor any regiment in the service of the government of India, nor any sepoy, Hindoo, or Mussulman, has reason to pretend that the government has shown, directly or indirectly, a desire to interfere with the religion of its troops.

It has been the unvarying rule of the government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful respect; and to representations or complaints put forward in a dutiful and becoming spirit, whether upon this, or upon any other subject, it has never turned a deaf ear.

But the government of India expects to receive, in

return for this treatment, the confidence of those who serve it.

From its soldiers of every rank and race it will, at all times and in all circumstances, enforce unhesitating obedience. They have sworn to give it, and the governor-general in council will never cease to exact it. To no men who prefer complaints with arms in their hands will he ever listen.

Had the sepoy of the 19th regiment confided in their government, and believed their commanding officer, instead of crediting the idle stories with which false and evil-minded men have deceived them, their religious scruples would still have remained inviolate, and themselves would still be, as they have hitherto been, faithful soldiers, trusted by the state, and laying up for future years all the rewards of a long and honourable service.

But the governor-general in council can no longer have any confidence in this regiment, which has disgraced its name, and has lost all claim to consideration and indulgence.

It is therefore the order of the governor-general in council, that the 19th regiment N. I. be now disbanded; that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates be discharged from the army of Bengal; that this be done at the head-quarters of the presidency division in the presence of every available corps within two days' march of the station; that the regiment be paraded for the purpose; and that each man, after being deprived of his arms, shall receive his arrears of pay and be required to withdraw from the cantonment.

The European officers of the regiment will remain at Barrackpore until orders for their disposal shall be received from his excellency the commander-in-chief.

This order is to be read at the head of every regiment, troop, and company in the service.

The arms were piled, the colours deposited, and the 19th native infantry was erased from the army list.

The men of the 19th received the sentence with regret. They begged to be enlisted in other corps, offered their services anywhere to be led against the enemies of the company, and, finally, besought that if they must be dismissed the service, they would be allowed to attack the 34th regiment, the cause of their disgrace, and punish it at once for its treachery to them, and disloyalty to the government. Some of these requests could not be granted, and all were refused. They dispersed in various directions, some perished of cholera on the road, some were employed as gate-keepers, and retainers of rich natives; none were at any time afterwards found in arms against the government, and several fought bravely, and as volunteers, against the mutineers. The wisdom of disbanding this regiment is open to question. The motives for doing so were, however, stated at length in the sentence already quoted, and which assumes importance as a public document, because it declares the policy of Viscount Canning's government towards the refractory sepoy at the beginning of the revolt. That policy was not, however, consistently carried out, for the conduct of the government towards the 34th regiment was slow and vacillating,

although to it the mischief connected with the 19th was attributable, and the men had attacked and nearly murdered several of their officers. The commander-in-chief remained in the cool sanatorium of the Himalayas; the government at Calcutta had time for all the usual frivolities of a court, but for five weeks it remained undecided what was to be done with the 34th regiment. These rebels and murderers remained all that time unpunished, Lord Canning advocating palliatives, his council urging decision. Meanwhile, Mungul Pandey and the jemadar, who was a high caste Brahmin, were hanged. These men feared the loss of caste more than death. They died in the spirit of martyrs, Pandey exulting in the opportunity afforded him of suffering for his faith, shouting "religion, religion," and urging his brethren to revolt, to the last. The conduct of these men evinced that there was a sincere belief among the sepoya that the government intended to persecute their creed.

Two sepoya of the 70th regiment were transported for conspiring to attack the fort, and one of their officers was dismissed the service for treason. It is obvious that however allowable it might be, taking a merciful view of the subject, to dismiss an officer for neglect of duty, or incapacity, such leniency was inapplicable to high-treason. It encouraged the revolt when they saw that, after all, in case of failure, it might be no worse than dismissal. Lord Canning had imbibed the idea that the honour and advantage of serving the English were so great, that for a sepoy to be deprived of the opportunity was the heaviest punishment that could be inflicted upon him short of death. There were other penalties which the sepoy dreaded much more than either.

With great difficulty, and not until numerous reports of fresh proofs of extensive disaffection had reached them, the government at Calcutta were brought to believe that something decisive must be done. Had not events thwarted the purposes of Lord Canning, the 84th British regiment would have been sent back to Birmah, and the capital of India been left for protection to a wing of the 53rd royal regiment and the doubtful body-guards. All the while the rebellious sepoya were in receipt of their pay, an expense to the empire as well as a danger. The system of disbanding without any punishment, was better than supporting disaffected regiments and paying royal troops to watch them.

On the 6th of May, nearly six weeks after the attempt of the 34th to murder some of their officers, the troops in and around Calcutta were concentrated at Barrackpore, to witness the disbanding of the guilty portion

of the 34th. The crime committed was concerted mutiny and attempted murder, the punishment inflicted was as follows: in the presence of the assembled troops, seven companies of the 34th were paraded and ordered to pile their arms, and to strip off their uniforms; having no means of resistance, they obeyed. Means were taken to prevent any outrage or disorder by the disarmed sepoya. An order of the day, or proclamation (it is difficult to give a precise designation to so anomalous a document), was issued by the government, explaining the necessity the government was under to inflict punishment, and threatening certain and speedy penalties upon all military insubordination. The public felt that it was an absurdity to give the name of punishment to the disbanding of a regiment that wished to serve no longer, and the soldiers of which were deserting. A painful impression was left on the minds of all loyal natives as well as Europeans, that the document was rather an excuse for leniency and weakness, than a proclamation intended to vindicate justice. Confidence in the vigour of the governor-general was impaired. The continued absence of the commander-in-chief from the head-quarters of the army was the subject of universal animadversion. Time was consumed in consulting him at so vast a distance, and his counsels were neither very enlightened nor decisive. With the disbanding of the seven companies of the 34th, the government was satisfied that the mutiny was at an end. There had been abundant evidence to the contrary, but the government thought proper to ignore it. The authorities might have known that altogether, irrespective of the discontent of the sepoya, means had been taken to sow disaffection throughout India, more especially throughout Bengal and its non-regulation provinces. These efforts originated in Oude, but a bad state of feeling existed in Mohammedan India for some years preparatory to such an attempt. When the war with Russia broke out, much excitement was created in the minds of the Mohammedan populations of all India, from Cabul to Calcutta and Cape Comorin. When the western allies insisted on reforms in Turkey, an opinion gained ground in India that the allies merely aided Turkey to betray her, and that by a treacherous alliance, the ascendancy of the religion of Mohammed, and of the grand Padisha, was destroyed. Thus the war in Turkey prepared the way for a Mahomedan struggle in India, in Persia, —everywhere. The peoples of these nations were excited by the events in Constantinople, which were told in innumerable tales of exaggeration all over Asia. And when to this excitement was added the persuasion that the time had arrived for a Mohammedan holy

war, the followers of the prophet became frantic with fanaticism. There was also a general feeling that the English sway would only last one hundred years in Bengal. In 1757 Clive completed its conquest; in 1857 it was believed that it would be restored to the followers of the true faith. The Mohammedans found no difficulty in inducing the Brahmins to join them against English power. It had for many years interfered with Brahminical rites and customs, such as suttee, thugism, infanticide, &c., as well as with the operation of Mohammedan law in some respects. A prophecy was circulated, which was to the effect that in 1857 the English would be destroyed. The government seems to have had no intelligence of this state of feeling, although evidence of it was abundant. Tokens of conspiracy and combination, for some purpose or purposes, were visible, but no steps were taken to unravel their meaning. Soon after the annexation of Oude, chappietees were sent all over eastern and north-eastern India, in a manner which excited great surprise, but no adequate means to penetrate the mystery were adopted. From some place, probably in Oude, six cakes of unleavened bread were sent to some other place, and were delivered to the head man of the village, or the chief religious authority of the place, with the intention to distribute them, and to invite each recipient of a cake to repeat the process, and so on. This proceeded until the chappietees were conveyed everywhere, with significant but enigmatical expressions, only to be comprehended by the faithful of either of the creeds allied for the destruction of the foreigner. The agents of this conspiracy corrupted the sepoys, whose minds were prepared by the causes already detailed. It was evident that some communications, secret from the government, were passing among the natives of India, which an active and intelligent government would have risked much to discover. Had the like occurred in the dominions of the Russian czar, the French emperor, or the Austrian kaiser, means would soon have been adopted to check the progress of the mysterious cakes, and find some clue to their meaning. The English government in India is as absolute as that of any of the despotisms named, but was not so vigilant or systematic, and its chief officers were not so responsible. The following very remarkable words were used by Mr. Disraeli, in a speech in the house of commons, made with the design of showing that the government of India had not proved itself vigilant or competent:—"Suppose the Emperor of Russia, whose territory, in extent and character, has more resemblance to our Eastern possessions than the territory of any other

power—suppose the Emperor of Russia were told—"Sire, there is a very remarkable circumstance going on in your territory; from village to village, men are passing who leave the tail of an ermine or a pot of caviare, with a message to some one to perform the same ceremony. Strange to say, this has been going on in some ten thousand villages, and we cannot make head or tail of it." I think the Emperor of Russia would say: "I do not know whether you can make head or tail of it, but I am quite certain there is something wrong, and that we must take some precautions; because, where the people are not usually indiscreet and troublesome, they do not make a secret communication unless it is opposed to the government. This is a secret communication, and, therefore, a communication dangerous to the government."

Many Irish and Scottish officers interpreted the cakes as a token to prepare for war, but they were bantered, or laughed at. In olden Celtic times, the clans of Scotland sent round signals of war in a similar way, and with the words often repeated in India when the cakes were left, "To be kept until called for." The very same language and the very same plan of procedure has been adopted in Ireland in the case of insurrection or agrarian disturbance in the memory of living men: "the holy straws," and "the holy turf," sent round during agitations of comparatively recent occurrence, exemplify this. Many in India who expressed a sense of insecurity, were censured by their superiors, civil and religious, until men were too much discouraged to express their minds; a false security, having its birth in pride and arrogance of race, stultified the chief officials, and led them to "pooh-pooh" all efforts to call attention to the real condition of India. In England, among the chief persons in the houses of legislature, in the cabinet, and in a lesser degree among the directors of the East India Company, a similar state of mind existed. India was supposed to be completely at the feet of England, incapable of making a hostile effort. When tidings of the mutiny reached England, even at a later period than that of the disbanding of the 34th native infantry, and when at Meerut a far more serious revolt occurred, and even when Delhi was in arms, and the effete king used his property and influence against the company, the government, parliament, and to some extent the press, of England, refused to believe that the people of India had any sympathy with the revolt. It was supposed that they were too contented and happy under English rule to desire to escape from it. The rebellion in India was called "a mutiny," a "sepy re-

volt," a "disturbance created by pampered sepoy, and some of the vagabond population of the cities;" but a great rebellion of native princes and peoples, over a large portion of India, as well as a revolt of the Bengal native army, few would allow it to be considered. Even when the native contingents in the service of certain allied or tributary princes deserted, and made war against the company, and when the whole people of the kingdom of Oude were in arms, officials and newspapers, and the people of England generally, persisted in regarding it as a sepoy revolt. There was an extraordinary disposition among men, both in India and in Great Britain, to shut their eyes to the real facts of the case.

Such was the state of affairs in the military condition of Bengal, and as to the state of mind in reference to it among the English in India and at home, when the next episode in the sad history of the revolt occurred. Before relating it, some account of the forces in India at that moment will be acceptable to the reader. In the chapter on the military affairs of the East India Company very full information is given concerning the numbers, equipments, and character of its army. Captain Rafter furnishes the following statement of the force when the revolt broke out:—

Bengal presidency.—Queen's troops: Two regiments of light cavalry, fifteen regiments of infantry, one battalion of 60th rifles. Company's regular troops: Three brigades of horse artillery, European and native, six battalions of European foot artillery, three battalions of native foot artillery, corps of royal engineers, ten regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European fusiliers, seventy-four regiments of native infantry, one regiment of sappers and miners. Irregular and contingent troops: Twenty-three regiments of irregular native cavalry, twelve regiments of irregular native infantry, one corps of guides, one regiment of camel corps, sixteen regiments of local militia, Shekhawntie brigade, contingents of Gwalior, Joudpore, Malwa, Bhopal, and Kotah.

The European troops here mentioned in the company's regular army were those who were enlisted in England or elsewhere by the company's agents, quite irrespective of the royal or queen's army. The above forces, altogether, amounted to somewhat over 150,000.

Madras presidency.—Queen's troops: One regiment of light cavalry, five regiments of infantry. Company's regular troops: One brigade of horse artillery, European and native, four battalions of European foot artillery, one battalion of native foot artillery, corps of

royal engineers, eight regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European infantry, fifty-two regiments of native infantry.

No irregular or contingent troops appear in this entry.

Bombay presidency.—Queen's troops: One regiment of light cavalry, five regiments of infantry. Company's regular troops: One brigade of horse artillery, European and native, two battalions of European foot artillery, two battalions of native foot artillery, corps of royal engineers, three regiments of native light cavalry, two regiments of European infantry, twenty-nine regiments of native infantry. Irregular and contingent troops: Fifteen regiments of irregular native troops.

The European and native troops in the service of the company are not marked with sufficient distinctness by Captain Rafter.

"The European element in the armies has been regularly augmenting. In 1837 there were 28,000 European troops in India; in 1850 the number was 44,000, comprising 28,000 queen's troops, and 16,000 belonging to the company; while the new charter of 1854 allowed the company to raise 24,000, of whom 4000 were to be in training in England, and the rest on service in India. What was the number in 1857 becomes part of the history of the mutiny. In the whole Indian army, a year or two before this catastrophe, there were about 5000 European officers, governing the native as well as the European regiments; but of this number so many were absent on furlough, or leave, so many more on staff appointments, and so many of the remainder in local corps and on civil duties, that there was an insufficiency of regimental control—leading, as some authorities think, in great part to the scenes of insubordination; for the native officers were regarded in a very subordinate light."

Such was the condition of the Anglo-Indian army when the suppression of revolt at Dum-Dum, Berampore, and Barrackpore, led the government to believe that India was safe from her own sepoy. It is the more surprising that the suppression of open revolt near Calcutta should have inspired such security, because all the while the government was receiving intelligence, and even official reports, of evidences of sedition among the troops of the distant garrisons. During the whole period from the revolt of the 19th to the disbanding of the 34th, incendiary fires occurred in the military cantonments of the Punjaub, occupied by Bengal troops; and in the Cis-Sutlej territories they were as open and daring as the conduct of the government was unaccountably inert and time-serving. It is impossible to acquit the government of

the charge of not having taken proper precautions on the ground of being unable to obtain information as to the state of feeling of the troops, or the cause of that state of feeling, after the perusal of the following report made by Captain Howard, magistrate of the Umballah cantonment, when, at the close of April, an appalling list of incendiary acts alarmed that officer, and caused him to address the government with marked earnestness on the subject:—"The emanating cause of the arson at this cantonment I conceive originated with regard to the newly introduced cartridges, to which the native sepoy shows his decided objection; it being obnoxious to him from a false idea—which, now that it has entered the mind of the sepoy, is difficult to eradicate—that the innovation of this cartridge is derogatory both to his caste and his religion. . . . That this has led to the fires at this cantonment, in my own private mind I am perfectly convinced. Were it the act of only one or two, or even a few persons, the well-disposed sepoys would at once have come forward and forthwith informed, but that there is an organised, leagued conspiracy existing, I feel confident. Though all and every individual composing a regiment may not form part of the combination, still I am of opinion that such a league in each corps is known to exist; and such being upheld by the majority, or rather connived at, therefore it is that no single man dared to come forward and expose it."

An investigation was instituted early in May as to whether any efforts were making to create sedition among the soldiery or people by native princes or ecclesiastics, or by foreign influence. The last source of evil influence was suspected, but could not be proved. The native press had been extremely anti-British and bigoted. Many of its conductors were notorious atheists, and these were amongst the most violent in calling upon the people to defend their religion. It was discovered that the largest influence in unsettling the minds of the people was that of wandering Brahmins and fakeers, both having united to stir up the people against English power. That most of the native princes and rich native landholders knew this, and sympathised with it, could not then be discovered, but was soon made plain by their appearing with arms in their hands wherever there was a chance of success. At all times the English had to contend in India with the use of the wandering and mendicant religious classes by disaffected or deposed princes, to stir up fanaticism against British authority. More than thirty years since, Sir John Malcolm described a state of things in his day identical

with that which, with larger influence and more decided energy, operated in 1857. Sir John then wrote:—"My attention has been during the last twenty-five years particularly directed to this dangerous species of secret war against our authority, which is always carrying on by numerous though unseen hands. The spirit is kept up by letters, by exaggerated reports, and by pretended prophecies. When the time appears favourable, from the occurrence of misfortune to our arms, from rebellion in our provinces, or from mutiny in our troops, circular-letters and proclamations are dispersed over the country with a celerity almost incredible. Such documents are read with avidity. The contents in most cases are the same. The English are depicted as usurpers of low caste, and as tyrants who have sought India with no other view but that of degrading the inhabitants and of robbing them of their wealth, while they seek to subvert their usages and their religion. The native soldiery are always appealed to, and the advice to them is, in all instances I have met with, the same—'Your European tyrants are few in number—kill them!'"

That the native princes and landholders throughout the Bengal provinces and Central India were in concert with the religious incendiaries of 1857, many documents showed, when, during the conflict, such papers fell into the hands of the conquerors; among these, none was so remarkable as that which was addressed to the Rajah of Nepal by the King of Oude while the insurrection was raging. Jung Bahadoor showed the letter to the British resident, to whom also he furnished a copy of his reply. Lord Canning expressed to the maharajah his cordial thanks for the proof of his loyalty and good faith thus evinced.

Abstract translation of a letter from Ramzan Alee Khan Mirza Birjees Kudder Bahadoor to his highness the Maharajah of Nepaul, dated 7th of Jeth Sumrut, 1915, corresponding with 19th May, 1858.

After compliments—It is known to every one that my ancestors brought the British into Hindostan, but Bulvunt Sing, the Rajah of Benares, was a cause of much annoyance to them, and therefore the province of Benares was given to them. A treaty was then signed by the British, in which they wrote that they would never act treacherously as long as the sun and moon should exist. But they have broken that treaty; and, dethroning my father, Wajid Alee Shah, have sequestered his state palaces, and everything he had. Every one is acquainted with this event as it took place only in Sumvut, 1912.

After taking Lucknow they intended to make war with you, for which purpose they collected a large force and magazine at Colonelgunj, which is situated below the Illis; perhaps you are aware of this event.

In former years great intimacy existed between our houses, insomuch that your forefathers built a bungalow

for my ancestors, for shooting and hunting purposes, in Bootwal.

The British some time ago attempted to interfere with the faith of both the Hindoos and Mohammedans, by preparing cartridges with cows' grease for the Hindoo, and that of pigs for the Mohammedans, and ordering them to bite them with their teeth. The sepoy refused, and were ordered by the British to be blown away from guns on the parade ground. This is the cause of the war breaking out, and probably you are acquainted with it.

But I am ignorant as to how they managed to get your troops, which they brought here, and began to commit every sort of violence, and to pull down temples, mosques, imambaras, and the sacred places.

You are well aware of the treachery of the British, and it is proper you should preserve the standard of religion, and make the tree of friendship between you and me fresh.

Translation of a letter from his excellency the maharajah Jung Bahadoor to Birjees Kudder Bahadoor, of Lucknow.

Your letter of the 7th, Jeth Soode, Wednesaday, corresponding to the 19th of May, 1858, to the address of his highness the maharajah of Nepal, and that of 13th Jeth Vudee of the present year, Tuesday, corresponding to the 11th May, 1858, to my address, have reached their respective destinations, and their contents are fully understood. In it is written that the British are bent on the destruction of the society, religion, and faith of both Hindoos and Mohammedans.

Be it known that for upwards of a century the British have reigned in Hindostan, but up to the present moment neither the Hindoos nor the Mohammedans have ever complained that their religion has been interfered with.

As the Hindoos and Mohammedans have been guilty of ingratitude and perfidy, neither the Nepal government nor I can side with them.

Since the star of faith and integrity, sincerity in words, as well as in acts, and the wisdom and comprehension of the British, are shining as bright as the sun in every

quarter of the globe, be assured that my government will never disunite itself from the friendship of the exalted British government, or to be instigated to join with any monarch against it, be he as high as heaven; what grounds can we have for connecting ourselves with the Hindoos and Mohammedans of Hindostan?

Be it also known, that had I in any way been inclined to cultivate the friendship and intimacy of the Hindoo and Mohammedan tribes, should I have massacred five or six thousand of them in my way to Lucknow?

Now, as you have sent me a friendly letter, let me persuade you, that if any person, Hindoo or Mohammedan, who has not murdered a British lady or child, goes immediately to Mr. Montgomery, the chief commissioner of Lucknow, and surrender his arms, and make submission, he will be permitted to retain his honour, and his crime will be pardoned.

If you still be inclined to make war on the British, no rajah or king in the world will give you an asylum, and death will be the end of it.

I have written whatever has come into my plain mind, and it will be proper and better for you to act in accordance with what I have said.

When General Anson, the commander-in-chief of the forces in India, heard of the state of excitement in which the Bengal troops in the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej territories, more especially the former, had continued, and the alarming fires which had spread around the cantonments, he hastened to Umballah, and issued an order of the day, intended to appease the discontent of the soldiery, but its effect was to encourage them to feel their importance, and believe that the government of India was afraid of them. The decisive step on the part of the sepoy, that which set all the Bengal provinces in a flame of revolt, was the mutiny at Meerut.

CHAPTER CXXVIII.

REVOLT OF THE SEPOYS AT MEERUT—MASSACRE OF OFFICERS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN—FLIGHT OF THE MUTINEERS TO DELHI—REVOLT OF THE GARRISON THERE, AND INSURRECTION OF THE PEOPLE—MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT PREPARATORY TO AN ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH FORCES UPON DELHI.

DURING the latter weeks of April the sepoy at Meerut showed much excitement, and incendiary fires, such as have been noticed in the last chapter as occurring elsewhere, were frequent; no room was left for doubt that they were the work of the soldiery. It so happened that the European force at that station was very powerful in proportion to the native troops. This was the more remarkable, as at most of the stations in the Bengal provinces there were scarcely any European soldiers. The English regiments were chiefly in the Punjab upon the Afghan frontier, and in a few other places, where, as in Meerut, they were in comparatively considerable number. This arrangement was

singularly inappropriate to the normal condition of India, as well as to its especial requirements at that time. The Punjab and Pegu were supposed, as newly annexed provinces, to require European garrisons; yet Oude, the most recently annexed, the annexation of which excited so much ill-will amongst the natives not only of Oude itself, but of all Bengal and of the Bengal sepoy, was guarded chiefly by troops discontented by the annexation. At Meerut, the English force consisted of the 6th dragoon guards (carbineers), 600 strong. These troopers were only in part provided with horses, and these were of a very inferior description; a battalion of the 60th rifle regiment, 1000 strong; a troop of

horse artillery, and 500 artillery recruits; the whole numbering about 2200, exclusive of staff officers, and the officers and other Europeans connected with the sepoy regiments. The force of natives, which only outnumbered the Europeans by a few hundreds, consisted of the 3rd Bengal cavalry, and the 11th and 20th Bengal infantry.

Under such circumstances no apprehension of revolt was entertained, and it is nearly certain that none would have taken place had the sepoys been engaged in a dynastic or political conspiracy merely, or were they discontented about batta, severity of discipline, or any of the ordinary causes of complaint with Indian soldiers. The conviction had seized their minds, beyond all hope of eradication, that the cartridges were ceremonially unclean to both Hindoo and Mussulmans. Some of them undoubtedly were; the general suspicion rested upon a partial fact, sufficient to justify resistance. The prejudices of the sepoy and the good faith of the government had not been kept in view by the officials charged with the duty of preparing the ammunition; and when the sepoy discovered that in any instance he had been trifled with on the all-important subject of religion, his faith was gone for ever. Had not this been the reality of the case the native soldiers would not, as in many cases, have precipitated themselves upon certain death as the alternative of using the hated cartridge. It has been alleged that the plea of caste must have been only a pretence, as the same cartridges were used against the English, which they refused to use in their service. Those who use this argument overlook the casuistry which in false religions justifies to the consciences of their professors the most contradictory conduct. In using the cartridges against the English the end sanctified the deed in the opinion of those men; and many, believing that they had already lost caste, in sheer despair and vengeance resorted to them.

On the 23rd of April it was determined by the English officers at Meerut, to put an end to all uncertainty by testing the spirit of the sepoys. Colonel Smyth, of the 3rd Bengal native cavalry, ordered out a portion of his regiment for parade on that day, to teach them the mode of loading adopted under general orders in deference to the prejudices of the troops against biting cartridges which might be glazed with forbidden substances. The previous evening he instructed the havildar-major and his orderly in the new system, and the latter having fired off a carbine, the colonel believed that the regiment would entertain no objection upon the following morning. That night, however, the

orderly's tent was set on fire, and also a veterinary hospital close to a magazine. These circumstances caused uneasiness as to the issue of the next day's experiment. When that day arrived, the appointed parade was held, and the havildar-major fired off a carbine without biting the cartridge. The men refused to receive the cartridges. It was pointed out to them that they were not new cartridges, but the old ones, to which they had been accustomed; still they refused. This was a new phase of the spirit of mutiny, more dangerous than had been displayed elsewhere, for if the troopers would neither use cartridges new nor old, upon a plan which did not require them to be pressed with the teeth, how was it possible for them to serve as soldiers? On the 25th an investigation took place before the deputy judge-advocate, and the men admitted that there was no evidence of any impure substance being in the cartridges, but they were told that they were unclean, and they believed their informants, and refused to accept the declarations of their officers. The judge assured them that the cartridges were such as had always been in use, and his assurances appeared to satisfy their scruples, for they expressed contrition, and promised to use the cartridges whenever called upon.

On the 6th of May the general in command of the station, Major-general Hewitt, deemed it necessary to prove the sincerity of the men. He ordered a parade for the 6th of May. On the 5th cartridges were distributed; eighty-five of the sowars, as the native cavalry of Bengal are called, refused to receive them. The general ordered their arrest. They were tried by court-martial, found guilty of mutiny, and sentenced to imprisonment and hard labour for different periods varying from six to ten years. In presence of the whole of the troops in cantonment, they were stripped of their uniforms, ironed, and marched away to the common jail two miles distant, in the village of Meerut. The native troops looked on in silence upon these proceedings, but with scowling countenances.

Then began a series of blunders on the part of the chief military authorities, but for which the terrible results which followed could not have happened. The convicted "sowars" were handed over to the civil authorities, and guarded only by police. This would of course have been quite proper under ordinary circumstances, but the occasion demanded peculiar precautions. These events occurred on the 9th of May. When the native soldiers were dismissed from parade, they went to their lines in a state of

intense excitement and resentment. The punishment inflicted on them had deprived the sufferers of caste,—they were manacled as felons, and degraded. Measures were instantly taken by the whole native force to mutiny; their plans were well laid, and were executed with fatal facility. Notwithstanding the menacing behaviour of the men as they left the parade ground, the general took no precautions against outbreak, not even to have their conduct kept under observation. The regimental officers were as incautions as the staff. They retired to their bungalows in different directions near the lines. The native officers alone held intercourse with the men, and they also were disaffected. It is probable that the mutineers opened communications immediately with the native troops in Delhi, inciting them to revolt, and informing them of their own intention to march thither when they had executed the work of vengeance at Meerut.

On Sunday, the 10th of May, between five and six o'clock in the evening, when the European portion of the garrison were proceeding to church, or preparing to do so, open revolt began. In choosing the hour of religious service, the mutineers selected a time when the chance of resistance to themselves, or escape by their intended victims, was less than at any other time, even than at night, when sentinels might give alarm, and persons would in its silence be more likely to catch the first sounds of the movement. Throughout the day indications of great restlessness were shown by the sepoy; it was noticed by the Europeans, even by ladies and children, but no precautions were taken; the officers remained confident in their comparatively strong force of Europeans, and boldly careless of what the sepoy thought or did. It was strange that he upon whom the chief responsibility devolved, should not have proved more vigilant than others.

Suddenly the native troops turned out and set fire to their cantonments, attacking first the bungalow of Mr. Greathead, the civil commissioner, who and whose lady, by concealing themselves upon the roof, found means to elude their pursuers, and ultimately escape. As soon as the disturbance burst forth, Colonel Finnis, of the 11th native infantry, rode to meet his men, and recall them to a sense of their duty. He was shot down. He was the first who fell in resisting the great sepoy revolt—the first murdered Englishman of the many who thus perished. Various officers were shot as they attempted to curb the violence of their men; officers, ladies, and even children, were shot or bayoneted, as they returned from worship. While the

infantry were engaged in firing the cantonments, the 3rd cavalry hastened to the jail, where they were joined by the police, and released the eighty-five sowars, and with them one thousand two hundred criminals, the vilest refuse of a truculent and dishonest population. Troopers, police, and convicts, all fraternised, and hastening to the lines, joined the revolted infantry in the work of destruction; the villagers of Meerut, and the populace generally, abetted the work. Then commenced the worst horrors of the occasion. Deeds of infamy were perpetrated too vile to describe; the victims of assassination were hacked with swords, perforated with bayonets, or riddled with balls; every indignity was offered to the dead, every cruelty to the dying. To particularise instances of suffering on the part of Europeans, and deeds of desperate atrocity on the part of the revolters, would be impossible within the limits of any work not exclusively devoted to a history of the mutiny. During two hours this havoc raged, and throughout that time no opposition was offered by the European portion of the troops. The general seems to have been paralysed by surprise; for until the work of destruction and massacre was accomplished, the European troops did not arrive in the cantonments of the sepoy. The rifles did arrive in time to open a fire upon the retreating enemy, who returned it; a few sepoy fell under the shots of the rifles. The carbineers were sent several miles on a wrong road; went astray; came back when it was too dark to see what was to be done, or how to do it. A civilian might well suppose that troops quartered a couple of miles from other troops of the same army would know the way to their lines. The sepoy marched to Delhi. The road was good, the moon soon rose; but no pursuit was instituted. The general pleaded, in excuse for this omission, that it was necessary to protect the European cantonments from the vagabonds who had escaped from prison. There were men enough for both objects; a few hundred infantry would have kept off the marauders, while the carbineers, rifles, and horse-artillery might have pursued the fugitives. Some of the carbineers only had lances; these did follow a few miles on the Delhi road, and cut down some stragglers. The open mutiny of the Bengal army began with a great success. The mutineers burned down a camp, and murdered officers, ladies, and children, literally in the presence of a superior force of European soldiers. When tidings of the scandalous incompetency which marked the management of the whole transaction reached Calcutta and London, the council and the cabinet, the Europeans of the

Indian capital and the people of England were indignant and astonished. The governor-general of India seems to have thought that his first duty was conciliation. He put forth a proclamation, in which the reader will see that all was done in the way of reconciliation that could be done, after the revolt at Meerut. Whatever were the errors there—whatever the want of vigour at Calcutta, the following proclamation shows that his excellency did not evince a vindictive spirit, but one of great forbearance and clemency.

Caste Proclamation.

Fort William, Home Department.
May 16, 1857.

The governor-general of India in council has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is meditated by the government of India are malicious falsehoods.

The governor-general in council has learnt that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but among other classes of the people.

He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Mussulmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened, secretly as well as openly, by the acts of government, and that the government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own.

Some have been already deceived and led astray by these tales.

Once more, then, the governor-general in council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them.

The government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The governor-general in council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been, or will be, done by the government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people.

The government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the governor-general in council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditious lies.

This notice is addressed to those who hitherto, by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct, have shown their attachment to the government and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice.

The governor-general in council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors, who would lead them into danger and disgrace.

By order of the governor-general of India in council,
CECIL BEADON,

Secretary to the government of India.

After the terrible havoc at Meerut, the first idea of the general of the cantonments was to march at once and attack Delhi, but news arrived thence that the whole city was in arms, that the garrison had revolted, placed the king at the head of the insurrection, and that armed men in numbers had flocked at once to his standard from the surrounding country. Efforts to obtain advice or aid from the commander-in-chief had been unavailing. Notwithstanding the disorderly state of the Ben-

gal army for so long a time, his excellency had gone on a shooting party in the Himalayas, and could not be found: he was at last heard of at Umballah. No adequate means of obtaining information of what was passing in and around Delhi, were put forth—time was lost, the commander-in-chief was dilatory, the counsels of Calcutta were confused. There were no proper means for moving an army, there was no commissariat, there were no camels, no elephants, no draft horses, not horses sufficient for the European cavalry; there were no depots of provisions for troops in the field, no medicine chests. The commander-in-chief was as helpless as if he had been suddenly set down in the middle of Africa. He had been appointed to his high office, not for his fitness, but on account of his connexions. He was old, took no thought of the state of India, was not a man capable, intellectually, of comprehending a large subject; physically, he was ill and enervated, utterly unfit for any command whatever. He lingered, unable to do anything, although his courage, which was well known, urged him to advance, and he desired to do so without guns or provisions; but so disorderly and distracted was the whole commissariat system, that he was unable to march at all. He remained at Kurnaul until the 27th of May, when he died of cholera.

During all that period the rebels and mutineers were strengthening themselves at Delhi, having first massacred every man, woman, and child upon whom they could lay their hands. News of these terrible excesses, and of the formidable preparations for resistance made in Delhi, continued to arrive at Meerut, Agra, and Calcutta, during the period of inactivity. From day to day tidings more and more dark and sanguinary reached Meerut and Agra, borne by fugitives who had escaped the slaughter, and wandered wounded and exhausted, hiding in the jungle by day, and travelling through by-ways at night. Very little information could be gained from the natives, who were in league with the mutineers, and the whole police of the province went over to them. Delhi, and the province of which it was the capital, were in revolution, and the descendant of the Moguls, bearing the title of King of Delhi—a pensioner of the English government—had been proclaimed king, emperor, and padishaw. At Meerut, executions took place, by hanging or blowing away from guns, of the miscreants who had perpetrated outrages at that station. A few of the fugitive sepoy, who had dropped behind wounded on the night of the 10th of May, were found in the neighbourhood, convicted, and executed.

On the 11th of May, Mr. Colvin, the lieu-

tenant-governor of the upper provinces of Bengal, received at the capital of these provinces, Agra, correct intelligence of the events which had taken place at Meerut. He immediately telegraphed to Calcutta. On the 12th, the lieutenant-governor sent a telegram announcing that emissaries from Delhi were passing to the other stations to excite revolt. On the 13th he used the telegraph to inform the government that all passengers between Meerut and Agra were molested and robbed by the inhabitants, and recommended that the troops employed in Persia should be sent up the country to Agra. Mr. Colvin was obliged to collect information without any assistance from the general at Meerut during the first three days after the mutiny. On the 14th Mr. Colvin sent a telegram to the governor-general that he had received a letter from the King of Delhi, informing him that the mutineers had taken possession of his person, court, and palace; that he had received news of a probability of revolt at Muttra, the sepoy having been persuaded that the government had mixed ground bones with their flour; and that Scindiah had offered the services of a battery and of his body-guard. The communication of the lieutenant-governor contained intelligence of the murder of the English commissioner, and of Miss Jennings and Mr. Cohen. In this telegram, Mr. Colvin, notwithstanding his former appeal for the help of the army of Persia, stated that he had no need of troops. The next day he sent a telegram to Lord Canning, announcing the slaughter of thirty persons at Delhi, the proclamation of the heir-apparent as king, the plunder of the Delhi treasury, containing half a million sterling, the loyalty of Bhurtpore and Gwalior, the satisfactory condition of affairs at Agra,—and the lieutenant-governor's conviction that proclamations and assurances from the governor-general and himself, would prevent the extension of the mutiny! The conduct of Lord Canning and his council was supine, and the assurances of Mr. Colvin rendered it more so than it otherwise would have been. Lord Elphinstone informed his lordship, from Bombay, that he had means of at once communicating to London the state of affairs. It had been well if the governor of Bombay had done so on his own responsibility. Lord Canning saw no occasion for any unusual effort to send home any communication. On the 19th of May he wrote to the directors, at which date he had information from Lucknow of the threatening aspect of affairs there. The despatch to the company showed that the governor-general had no real appreciation of the state of India, or of what was requisite for the suppression of sedition. It seems utterly

incredible that any educated man in the position of Lord Canning should have sent home so ordinary a despatch in a crisis so terrible, after the destruction of the cantonments of Meerut, the massacres there and at Delhi, and while the capital of Hindostan, with its treasures and munitions of war, were in the hands of a rebel people, and a revolted army.

“The necessity for an increase of the substantial strength of the army on the Bengal establishment, that is to say, of the European troops on this establishment, has been long apparent to us; but the necessity of refraining from any material increase to the charges of the military department, in the present state of our finances, has prevented us hitherto from moving your honourable court in this matter. The late untoward occurrences at Berhampore, Fort William, Barrackpore, and Lucknow, crowned by the shocking and alarming events of the past week at Meerut and Delhi, and taken in connection with the knowledge we have lately acquired of the dangerous state of feeling in the Bengal native army generally, strange, and, at present, unaccountable as it is, have convinced us of the urgent necessity of not merely a positive increase of our European strength, but of a material increase in the proportion which our European troops bear to the native regular troops on the establishment. We are of opinion that the latter is now the more pressing necessity of the two.

“We believe that all these objects, political, military, and financial, will be immediately attained in a very material degree by taking advantage of the present opportunity in the manner we have now the honour respectfully to propose; and we see no other way in which all the same objects can be attained in any degree, now or prospectively. We recommend that the six native regiments, which are in effect no longer in existence, should not be replaced, whereby the establishment of regular native infantry would be reduced to sixty-eight regiments; and that the European officers of these late regiments should be used to officer three regiments of Europeans to be added to your establishment at this presidency.

“We confidently affirm that the government will be much stronger, in respect of all important internal and external purposes, with three additional European regiments of the established strength, than it would be by embodying six native regiments of the established strength; and we anticipate no inconvenience in respect of minor objects, in time of peace and tranquillity, from the consequent numerical reduction of regular troops. Indeed, the financial result of the measure, if carried out as we propose, will leave a con-

siderable surplus available, if it should be thought fit so to employ it, for an augmentation of irregulars, who, for all such minor objects, are much better, as well as much cheaper, than regulars of any description."

The policy of the government at Calcutta was adopted in London. The "outbreak" was treated by the board of control as of no great consequence, in fact, as a means of effecting a pecuniary saving in the military department. The more experienced members of the India-house knew better, but their opinions were overruled by official personages, and Mr. Mangles "ran a race" with Mr. Vernon Smith in confidential assurances to parliament and the public, that the thing was of no moment at all. Lord Palmerston seems to have taken up the views communicated to him by the president of the board of control and the chairman of the court of directors; but the more sage men in Leadenhall Street shook their heads and uttered words, few but ominous, which found their way into society, and caused uneasiness among the English public. The London press generally, especially the *Times* newspaper, treated the matter in the light Lord Canning placed it. The *Sunday Times*, the *Morning Advertiser*, and a few other journals, sounded alarm, and so far influenced public opinion, as to prevent the government from altogether ignoring the idea of danger.

At Calcutta, Lord Canning concealed the information which he received from Agra and other quarters from the European public. Whatever was gleaned by it was from the native merchants, who were early informed of everything, and informed their European friends that the statements of the government press were efforts official and semi-official to conceal disaster and massacre. The Europeans at Calcutta and the independent press became hostile to Lord Canning and his policy of concealment, and of taking things easy, and from that moment his lordship became the enemy of a free press. When Lord Canning wrote the despatch last quoted, there was not a single European soldier, except the officers attached to the native regiments, at Cawnpore or Allahabad; and the same state of things existed at a great number of inferior stations. When the mutineers marched from Meerut to Delhi, there was not a European soldier there, although it contained the chief treasures and munitions of war for northern India. On the 18th of May, the day before Lord Canning wrote, the general at Meerut reported that the reinforcements for an advance upon Delhi were unable to move for want of carriage. Benares, the great native capital of Bengal, had no fortifications, and no cannon except "half a

bullock battery." Barrackpore had no artillerymen, and but six guns, to man which sailors had been sent from Calcutta. Matters continued to remain in this state for a long time, from the incompetency of those in high office, and the confusion which prevailed in the direction and arrangement of the army *materiel*. On the 16th of May, three days before Lord Canning's despatch, Sir Henry Lawrence telegraphed from Lucknow—"All is quiet here, but affairs are critical; get every European you can from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere; also, all the Goorkhas from the hills; time is everything." Lord Canning, to his credit, acted upon the advice of Mr. Colvin, concerning the troops in the Persian Gulf, and that given by Sir Henry Lawrence was also followed. Lord Elphinstone offered aid from Bombay on the 17th, which was accepted. At the same date, Sir John Lawrence suggested that he could raise five thousand from the police and guides in the Punjab, to be followed by one thousand more: this proposal was accepted. From every quarter offers of timely aid and wise counsel were given to the governor-general, all of which he accepted, on the grounds upon which they were offered—the imminence of the danger and seriousness of the crisis. Yet, *after all*, he wrote a despatch to the directors underrating the danger, suppressing the worst features of the revolt, and suggesting weak palliatives!

When his lordship recommended a few European regiments, on a plan of cheap substitution for the usual forces, there were at Calcutta, at Barrackpore, and Dum-Dum, in its neighbourhood, at Dinapore, and in all Bengal, from Fort William to Agra, not three thousand European soldiers! The following statement of forces, native and European, appeared in an official source of information:—"At the outbreak of the mutiny there were in Calcutta, and the adjoining stations of Dum-Dum and Barrackpore, two regiments of European infantry, the 53rd and 84th, mustering about 1,700 effective men. These, with the 10th at Dinapore, and a company of artillery at Fort William, comprised the whole English force between the capital and Agra, nine hundred miles distant. The native corps consisted of the 2nd grenadiers, 43rd and 70th native infantry, the Calcutta militia, and the remnant of the 34th, in all 4,000 men, stationed within the limits of the presidency division. At Berhampore there was the 63rd native infantry; at Dinapore, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, together with a regiment of irregular cavalry. Benares was occupied by the 37th and the Loodianah regiment of Sikhs. The 6th were at Allahabad; the 65th at Ghazepore; the 2nd cavalry, 1st and 53rd

native infantry, at Cawnpore. The total available force of Europeans throughout this great extent of country was not more than 2,500, against 14,000 native troops. A thousand English volunteer infantry, 400 cavalry, and 1,500 sailors, were at the disposal of government a week after the revolt became known."

In reference to the volunteers, the editor of the *Friend of India* observed:—"It only needed the utterance of a few words of ordinary sympathy and encouragement to draw out the entire available European population: no great price to pay for such service as they were able and willing to perform; but small as was the estimated cost, Lord Canning grudging it. It was not until the 12th of June that he consented to the enrolment of a volunteer corps; and only then, after much misgiving as to the propriety of showing special favour to any particular class of the population. The use that might have been made of such auxiliaries was pointed out at the time with sufficient clearness; but at this moment we can see that it would have been literally invaluable." As troops arrived from the sister presidencies, from the outlying provinces on the Bay of Bengal, &c., there was no proper provision made for them. They suffered hunger and thirst, inconvenience the most oppressive from unsuitable clothing, improper, and even unhealthy quarters, and contemptuous neglect. Instead of assembling the troops, as Clive, Hastings, Wellesley, or Napier would have done, addressing to them words of encouragement, and showing them how their courage and constancy were the hope of England, they were sent up the country without notice, or any stimulus or hope, save what rested in their own brave hearts and noble sense of duty. Never were British soldiers treated more contumeliously, accustomed as they are to such treatment from men of rank, than the heroes who landed at Calcutta for the salvation of India were by Lord Canning and the members of his government. The author of *Young America Abroad*, who was in Calcutta when Lord Canning arrived there, was justified in the severe comments he made upon the cold, haughty, and insolently imperious bearing which he attributed to him. The sneer of Jung Bahadoor of Nepal, when subsequently blunders provoked it, was well earned already, "How do the English hope to keep India with such rulers?"

DELHI MUTINY AND MASSACRE.

Having shown how the events of Meerut were regarded by the government of India, it is desirable to leave it in the midst of its preparations to avenge the disaster, and to

return to the mutineers. In fourteen hours the rebel force reached Delhi, the gates of which were opened to them by their comrades. On the road they met several Europeans travelling by "dák," who were murdered. On entering, the work of slaughter began: the 3rd cavalry rode about through the city searching for British officers, into whose faces they discharged their pistols. The other mutineers, joined by the Delhi garrison, were less discriminate, revelling in promiscuous slaughter. The 3rd cavalry entertained a peculiar vengeance against the European officers, because of the court-martial at Meerut. It must not be supposed that the officer in command at Delhi, Brigadier Graves, had taken no precautions. He had received information of the events at Meerut before the arrival of the mutineers at the gates of Delhi. He paraded his men, and appealed to their loyalty; they responded with cheers, but all the while had resolved to betray and murder him. The regiments which composed the garrison were the 38th, 54th, and 74th infantry of the Bengal army, and a battery of Bengal artillery, manned by natives. There were besides many native artillerymen to serve the guns of position in the city, especially at the magazine and arsenal. The 54th and 74th had shown no disposition to revolt; the 38th was a notoriously insolent and stubborn corps since 1852, when it succeeded in resisting the authority of Lord Dalhousie when he ordered it to Pegu. The whole force occupied cantonments two miles north of the city. Critics have given the opinion that had these troops been marched out against the mutineers when tidings of the mutiny arrived, and had the Meerut European force pursued, that the former would have remained loyal, and the revolters have been killed, captured, or dispersed. Brigadier Graves resolved upon a defensive policy, and selected the Flagstaff tower as a refuge for the women and children. That building was circular in form, built of brick burnt in the sun, and strong; it was situated on the heights near the cantonments, about a mile and a half north of the Cashmere gate of the city, which was the nearest to it. The resources of Delhi, in ammunition and material of war, were enormous, and had five hundred men remained faithful, including a proportion of artillery, the city might have been defended against twice the number of the Meerut mutineers.

The events which transpired within the city on the arrival of the Meerut battalions, have never appeared in a connected form, and never can be presented in consecutive order, so terrible was the massacre, and so little did those who escaped know of anything which

did not appear before their own eyes. Major Abbot was the senior officer among those who escaped to Meerut, and his account of what occurred was substantially as follows:—He described a few troopers of the 3rd as having first entered by the bridge of boats. Colonel Ripley of the 54th confronted them with a wing of his regiment, but the men refused to fire, alleging that their muskets were not loaded. The guard of the 38th also declared that they had no ammunition. Scarcely had the mutineers made good their entrance, when the troops of the Delhi garrison turned upon their officers; six officers of the 54th immediately fell under the bullets and bayonets of their own men—Colonel Ripley, Captains Smith and Burrows, Lieutenants Edwards, Waterhill, and Butler. Major Abbot addressed the men of the 74th, telling them that the time had arrived to prove their fidelity to him, and calling upon volunteers to follow him to the Cashmere gate, he marched forth attended by a considerable number. On arriving at the gate the men took possession, and seemed disposed to resist any attack. They remained in this state until three o'clock, when they were startled by a heavy firing of guns, followed by a terrific explosion. Lieutenant Willoughby had fired the magazine, to prevent its stores from falling into the hands of the rebels. There were two magazines at Delhi, one at the cantonments to supply the troops there quartered, and one in the city which was the depot of ammunition for northern India. It was situated between the Selingush Fort, and the Cashmere gate, so that the explosion shook the earth under the feet of Major Abbot's party. The magazine contained 300 guns and mortars, 20,000 stand of small arms, 200,000 shot and shell, and large stores of *materiel* of war corresponding with such munitions. When the explosion of the vast mass of powder and shot and shell took place, the men at the Cashmere gate became intensely excited, and showed symptoms of sympathy with their co-religionists, whom they supposed engaged in a fierce and dangerous struggle, the nature of which they could not at the moment comprehend. The native officers stepped forward and advised the major to fly from the city. Shots were whizzing around him, and piercing cries broke upon his ear, the soldiers of the 38th were shooting their officers. Major Abbot begged his men to follow him to attempt their rescue, but they replied, "It is of no use, they are all killed now, we can save no one; we have saved you and are happy, you shall not perish." The men formed a circle around him, and hurried him away towards the cantonments. At that moment several

carriages drove up on the road to Kurnaul; the major inquired who they were. The men replied, "They are our officers flying for their lives; follow their example, we can protect you or them only for a little longer—fly!" Major Abbot asked them for the colours, which they gave him, and placing him and Captain Hawkey on one horse, they followed the carriages and escaped. The major's first impulse was, with the captain, to stay and endeavour to the last to check the mutiny, but his regiment declared, "You can do nothing, you can save no one; it is time to fly!" and they urged him forward with every demonstration of affectionate interest in his safety. Those portions of the 74th with which the major was not present, mutinied when the magazine blew up, and shot some of their officers. In this way Captain Gordon and Lieutenant Revley fell, Ensign Elton, Captain Tytler, Captain Nicoll, Captain Wallace, Lieutenant Aislabie, and Farrier-sergeant Law made their escape through extraordinary dangers, and arrived at Meerut after thirty-six hours of perilous wandering. Major Abbot attributed the insurrection to the King of Delhi and his family. His opinion is of importance from his knowledge of the proceedings of the court, and the judgment he displayed in his efforts to check the progress of the mutiny. He thus wrote upon the subject in his report to the government, as the senior surviving officer of the garrison:—"The insurrection was organised and matured in the palace of the King of Delhi with his full knowledge and sanction, in the mad attempt to establish himself in the sovereignty of this country. It is well known that he has called on the neighbouring states to co-operate with him in thus trying to subvert the existing government. The method he adopted appears to have been to gain the sympathy of the 38th light infantry, by spreading the lying reports now going through the country, of the government having it in contemplation to upset their religion and have them all forcibly inducted to Christianity. The 38th, by insidious and false arguments, quietly gained over the 54th and 74th native infantry, each being unacquainted with the other's real sentiments. I am perfectly persuaded that the 54th and 74th were forced to join the combination by threats that the 38th and 54th would annihilate the 74th if they refused; or, *vice versa*, that the 38th and 74th would annihilate the 54th. I am almost convinced that had the 38th not been on guard at the Cashmere gate, the results would have been very different; the men of the 74th would have shot down every man who had the temerity to assail the post."

While Major Abbot was so gallantly preserving the loyalty of a portion of his regiment, and with them using his best efforts to check the progress of the insurgents, other events were taking place elsewhere, as at the magazine, to which reference has already been made. The palace of the king was, however, the great centre of action. A portion of the 3rd cavalry from Meerut proceeded thither, while the others were galloping about to shoot the officers of the garrison. When they arrived at the palace, they were received by the king and his court as friends and subjects. Had he ordered the gates to be shut, and made his palace the sanctuary of such English as were within it, or might have found their way thither, the insurrection would have been suppressed, or at all events the lives of the English seeking asylum within the walls of the building would have been safe. No mutineers would have dared to violate that sanctuary; every true Mussulman would have defended the person and palace of the king, and all within it at his orders. The excuses made by him of being under constraint were not only not accordant with facts, but were absurd. When Mr. Fraser, the British commissioner, perceived the approach of the mutineers, he, with his assistant, Captain Douglas, hastened to the palace that he might observe the conduct of the king at a moment that would test his loyalty. Mr. Fraser and the captain were attended by several other persons. The moment they entered the palatial precincts they were shot. Soon after, the Rev. Mr. Jennings, the chaplain, was murdered; his daughter and another lady shared his fate, after having been treated with every indignity which a Mohammedan would consider the worst and vilest his own wife or daughter could suffer. Several Europeans who hid in the palace gardens were

found tied to trees, and shot or sabred. All the robbers of the neighbourhood were encouraged by the mutineers, as at Meerut, to help themselves. The banks and rich shops were plundered; women were treated with indignity, and tortured to death or hacked to pieces; babies were lifted up and ripped open or hewn by the ferocious troopers in the presence of their parents. The cruelties to women and children were generally inflicted in the presence of husbands and fathers, who were then put to death. No mercy was shown; the troopers pointing to the marks of the irons on their wrists, which had been caused by their punishment at Meerut, thus justified their murder of women and babies. Numbers of European traders, civilians, clerks, half-caste natives, and any natives supposed to be Christians, were butchered. To possess European blood, or be suspected of being a Christian, was sufficient cause for a merciless death to be inflicted.

While these events transpired at the palace and in the streets, the magazine was the scene of a heroic defence, as recorded while noticing the conduct of the 74th at the Cashmere gate. Lieutenant Willoughby, in order to prevent the sepoys from possessing themselves of the military stores and ammunition, blew up a large portion of the magazine, and escaped to Meerut, where he died of his wounds. The success of the mutineers was complete. All the Europeans in Delhi at the beginning of the revolt were slain or fugitives. What happened within the city before the siege cannot be related upon European testimony. The king and the heir-apparent assumed regal power and dignity. The British treasury, of more than half a million sterling, was guarded by the king's relatives for his own use, the city acknowledged his government, and the Mussulmans everywhere proclaimed the Delhi Raj.

CHAPTER CXXIX.

MUTINY AT BENARES—ITS SUPPRESSION BY COLONEL NEILL—MUTINY AT ALLAHABAD, ALSO SUPPRESSED BY COLONEL NEILL—MUTINY AT CAWNPORE—TREACHERY OF NANA SAHIB—GALLANT DEFENCE BY GENERAL WHEELER—CAPITULATION OF THE BRITISH, AND THEIR MASSACRE—MURDER OF FUGITIVES FROM PUTTYGHUR—MUTINY AT THAT PLACE—ASSUMPTION OF THE MAHRATTA SOVEREIGNTY BY NANA SAHIB.

It has been already shown that the outbreak at Meerut was preceded by many ominous symptoms of deep-rooted disaffection and contemplated revolt on the part of the sepoys of the Bengal army. Before narrating the siege of Delhi, it is desirable to trace the progress of revolt in other directions. These were un-

doubtedly encouraged and stimulated by the events at Meerut and Delhi. Towards the latter place the hopes and wishes of the whole native army of Bengal turned. It would require a volume to disclose all the separate incidents of disobedience, mutiny, and open revolt. In a work which comprises the

history of the British empire in India and the East, such minute details would be out of keeping. It will suffice to direct the reader's attention to the grand theatres of mutiny: the outbreaks of discontent beyond these regions were like the effects produced by a storm which has burst in fury over a certain area, and scatters some of its force upon the outskirts of the territory over which it has passed. Before noticing any other of the scenes of action, it is desirable to relate the condition of things at Benares. That city, the grand capital of Indian heathenism, is so situated as to form a great central position, from which the forces of the government could radiate as it were to Oude, to Agra, and the north-west. Lord Canning, although deficient in his plans to push up reinforcements from Calcutta, had shown considerable activity and energy in bringing such reinforcements as were available from the shores of the Bay of Bengal, and his correspondence, by telegrams, with the Madras and Bombay governments was maintained constantly. Lord Harris in the one government, and Lord Elphinstone in the other, seconded the views of the governor-general, and exerted themselves to the utmost. By the end of May the 1st Madras fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Neill, landed at Calcutta. Upon their arrival, the railway train to Raneegunge was about to start: the distance was one hundred and twenty miles, and it was of the utmost importance that the men should be conveyed up the country as quickly as possible, as information arrived from every quarter that the native troops were mutinous—Delhi and the restoration of the Moguls filling every mind. The cartridge question, although still the ostensible occasion of dispute, was in reality lost in questions of nationality, and race, and (in a larger sense than a debate about caste) of creed. Colonel Neill was pertly told by a railway official, that unless he had his men in the train in a few minutes it would proceed without them. His reply was characteristic, he ordered a file of soldiers to arrest the agent; the other officials were secured in like manner. They of course protested, but the colonel wasted no words with them; he was a man of action. He seized the train, placed his men in it, ordered engineers and stokers to steam on, and arrived in due and rapid course at the destination to which the train conducted. Colonel Neill, and a portion of his fusiliers, arrived at Benares just at the crisis of affairs there. The native regiments then stationed at that great city were the 37th Bengal infantry, the Loodianah foot, the 13th Bengal irregular cavalry. The Europeans were the artillery of Major Oliphant's battery, a detachment of the 1st

Madras fusiliers, one hundred and fifty men of "the brave Irish of the 10th" (as Colonel Herbert Edwardes described them). Information of a certain nature had been given to the authorities that the 37th native infantry was about to mutiny, that the cavalry would follow their example, and that the Sikhs were doubtful, the Mussulmans and the Hindoes among them being ready to join the mutineers, the pure Sikhs being overawed and afraid for their own safety. The night of the 4th of June was the expected period of the revolt. A parade, without arms, of the native regiments was ordered for that evening. Some companies of the 37th assembled as ordered, other companies piled their arms, and while in the act some of the men turned and fired upon their officers. This example was followed by the rest. The Sikhs, supposing that there was no safety on the side of the government, discharged a volley upon the Europeans. The three guns poured grape into the Sikhs, who charged them, but were repulsed from the very muzzles of the cannon, by devouring discharges of grape. Thrice the gallant Sikhs came up with the bayonet, thrice were they swept away by the close fire of the guns. Lieutenant-colonel Spottiswood, of the 37th, took some port-fires and ignited the inflammable material in the sepoy lines; the flames spread, and threw up such a light as to expose to view the sepoys, who from cover were firing upon the Europeans. In a few minutes one hundred of the mutineers lay dead, and twice as many were wounded; they fled in confusion. Some of the irregular cavalry and Sikhs remained loyal, some neutral; the resolution of the Europeans decided them. Major Guire, of the cavalry, was murdered at the beginning of the mutiny; two ensigns were wounded, and eight men. The Sikhs submitted, and some of the cavalry returned craving pardon, and declaring that they acted under alarm created by the threats of the sepoys. Colonel Neill acted with terrible promptitude and decision, executing the ringleaders, pardoning the seduced, scouring the country and bringing in prisoners, who were at once dealt with as their cases really required. While the colonel was reducing the chaos to order, he was commanded by the governor-general to march to Allahabad. The curt reply of the colonel was—"Can't do it—wanted here."

The most guilty sowars and sepoys were confined in the fort, and when their guilt was made clear, were blown away from guns,—a punishment which they more dreaded than any other.

At Jaunpore the Sikh detachment murdered some of their officers and, joined by the 37th, plundered the treasury.



GENERAL NEILL.

From a Photograph by Hillburn

MUTINY AT ALLAHABAD.

Allahabad, upon which Neill at first refused to march when directed, was in a state of great danger, and was a most important station. There was a large arsenal there, ammunition and arms for forty thousand men, a very large fort; and, situated on the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna, it held a most influential military relation to the lower provinces. The number of cannon at this place was great, of gunners there was not one! The population were all desperate fanatics, and amounted to seventy-five thousand. The condition of the arsenal was such as no discreet government would have allowed. The place was garrisoned by a battalion of Sikhs, and some companies of the 6th native infantry quartered in the fort, and a wing of the 6th in cantonments. Except those working at the magazine, there was not a single European soldier in the garrison. Thus everywhere in the Bengal provinces the strong places were left in the custody of mercenaries, while the Europeans were scattered in remote stations. The treasury was a temptation to the disaffected, as were also the great military stores. On the evening of the 6th of June, a parade of the 6th native infantry was ordered. These men had volunteered to march against Delhi. They were assembled to hear Lord Canning's thanks for their loyalty and devotion. When the paper was read the men gave three cheers, after the fashion of British soldiers. In four hours afterwards they had murdered seventeen of their officers, all the women and children upon whom they could lay their hands, and marched off in a body to Delhi, the band playing "God save the Queen." Scenes of plunder and devastation now occurred at Allahabad, and throughout the whole neighbourhood, which beggar description. The loyal Sikhs were especially dextrous in their work, plundering alike friend and foe. Private as well as public property fell under the hands of the devastators. The houses of Europeans around Allahabad were given to the flames; the railway-stations shared a similar fate, the lines of rails were torn up for twenty miles, the telegraph lines were cut down, the sepoy considering that the "lightning dak" (or post) was magical, and opposed to true religion. The steam-engines were for some time left uninjured, the sepoy fearing to approach them lest they should go off like a gun and blow them away; they fired into them from a distance, riddling them with balls. Robbery, ruin, and violence continued until the 11th of June, when Colonel Neill, and a detachment of his fusiliers arrived. The colonel's reputation for vigour had preceded him, and the

poor Europeans, bereft of everything, felt that while he was near life at least would be safe. The colonel's first care was the sanitary state of the fort—fifty died of cholera the day he arrived, and despair brooded over every living heart. He at once adopted measures so skilful, and inspired such confidence, activity, courage, and hope, that the disease abated as if by a miracle, and almost disappeared. He came as a saviour to the suffering Europeans at Allahabad. He at once adopted towards the mutineers and insurgents, the course he took at Benares—rigour before clemency. No time-serving, useless talking, pompous promises, trick, or humbug of any kind marked his proceeding. To all these things the general government trusted, although constant evidence was afforded that the sepoy saw through them. Having, through the mercy of God, by the use of enlightened means, saved the garrison from pestilence, his next care was for the property of the town, and the preservation of order. He put an end to the drunkenness and riot of the soldiery of all classes by simple and efficacious means. He published a proclamation, giving a few hours for the restoration of public property, and declaring that all persons found in possession of the like after the time had expired should be hung. Everybody knew that he said what he meant; property was restored with marvellous rapidity, and some who could not make up their mind to restitution paid the penalty. There was a portion of the town of Allahabad occupied by Brahmins, who were lazy, dishonest, and treasonable. These men, wrapt up in the pride of caste, paid no attention to the colonel's proclamations, and did their best to keep up the general disquietude. He did not send deputations to them, nor tell them he relied upon their loyalty, as the Calcutta officials would have done; he shelled their quarter of the town, and a few hours sufficed to make those whose lives were not sacrificed abject in their submission. He then formed a little movable column of fifty of his fusiliers, a few of the sowars who had remained obedient, the railway officials, volunteers, and three companies of Sikhs. Not far from the town, a fanatical moulvie, and two thousand rebels, had intrenched themselves. Seeing so small a body of opponents, they boldly left their trenches and advanced. Neill delivered a fire of Enfield rifles at five hundred yards, which brought down so many of them that their ranks became disordered, and but for the fanatical exertions of their leader, they would have turned: he, with desperate exertions, led them on, and on approaching to half the distance another volley of Enfield rifles spread

destruction and terror among them; they ran in confusion to their intrenchments, there, well covered, they relied on their guns, which were so numerous and well served that Neill, careful for his troops, held back. Their ammunition having been expended, they cut the electric wire into slugs, and used pieces of the railway and of the engines—these proved to be more formidable than the regulation “charges.” Neill burnt down all the houses of the disaffected, capturing or dispersing the inmates; he harassed the moulvie, picking off with his rifles the most forward of his adherents, until he at last fled with his followers from the neighbourhood. His nephew was captured, and, while a prisoner, attempted to murder an officer of the Sikhs; the soldiers trampled the wretch until life was extinct. Neill and his men scoured the country, slaying, dispersing, or capturing predatory bands. The sepoy captives he shot, the non-sepoy rebels he hung. The terror of his name spread through all the Bengal provinces, and fabulous accounts of his bravery formed the staple of the stories at the bivouacs of the rebels. Allahabad was saved, and its neighbourhood cleared of insurgents.

MUTINY AT CAWNPORE.

Throughout the month of May the regiments in the garrison of Cawnpore showed symptoms of disaffection. The officer who commanded was one of the most skilful and gallant in the company's service, Major-general Sir Hugh Wheeler. Many Europeans whose bungalows were burned, or who were insulted in the bazaar, left the station. The place was crowded with the families of officers and civilians serving in Lucknow and other stations in the upper provinces. General Wheeler did not fail to communicate to his government the precise state of things; he received advice which was worth nothing, but the supplies which competent management might have provided, did not arrive. The general moved to intrenchments the public records, and such portions of his garrison and people as his wisdom deemed best. He was anxious for the safe keeping of the public treasury, which the sepoys guarded and refused to leave, making the usual protestations of loyalty. Wheeler knew well the value of such professions, but it was prudent to give an apparent acquiescence for the moment. He, however, immediately took measures which he felt certain would secure the safety of the treasure. He applied to the Rajah of Bithoor to send him a guard; the rajah being a warm friend of the English, as they universally thought, the expedient seemed discreet. His highness sent two hun-

dred Nujeeb, armed with matchlocks, and two pieces of cannon. The residence of the rajah was within a few miles of Cawnpore, and he was strong in influence, wealth, and armed retainers. This person was the infamous Nana Sahib, whose protestations of sympathy were lavishly bestowed, while he watched the opportunity for vengeance. He was naturally a brutal voluptuary, and blood-thirsty; his relations to the English were such as made him utterly vindictive to them. When the Mahratta empire was dissolved, and the Peishwa was dispossessed of his last remnant of power, he was allowed to live at Bithoor, and take the title of rajah from that place. Having no legitimate children, he adopted Nana Sahib, and left him property amounting to four millions sterling. A pension, allowed to the Peishwa by the English government, lapsed, according to English usage, from failure of heirs male. Nana Sahib pleaded oriental usage and law, and, as the adopted son of the Peishwa, claimed the pension, which the English refused to grant. From that hour he became their deadly enemy. He, however, concealed this enmity under the mask of an admiration for European civilization, and a taste for English manners. He accordingly entertained, *à la Anglais*, English civil and military officers at his palace at Bithoor. It appeared to be his ambition to be regarded as an English gentleman: he spoke the English language, filled his palace with English furniture and pictures, used horses and carriages caparisoned and equipped in English fashion, but professed withal to be a profound Hindoo devotee. In the chapters on the social condition of India, the habits of life of this chief were described in illustration of the manners and customs of a high-bred native of the Anglo-Indian type.

Sir Hugh Wheeler's force for the defence of Cawnpore consisted of two companies of Europeans, and eight guns. The supply of provisions was short. The sepoys in garrison were numerous. On the morning of the 5th of June, the whole of the native troops mutinied. They first set fire to their lines, then marched on the treasury, where they were joined by the guards lent by the Nana. £170,000 was packed on elephants and carts, and the whole force marched out with the intention of proceeding to Delhi. The Nana, however, placed himself at the head of the mutineers, and brought up six hundred retainers, with four guns, from Bithoor, and the force halted. On the afternoon and night of the 5th, he was irresolute what course to take, but early on the morning of the 6th, he made hostile demonstrations against Cawn-

porc. He sent a body of sowars (irregular native cavalry) into the town to kill all the Europeans, Eurasians, and native converts, whom they could reach, without attacking Sir Hugh Wheeler's intrenchments. The work was done *con amore*. They had also been ordered to set fire to the town, which they performed most effectually. "The wind was blowing furiously at the time, and when the houses were fired, a few moments sufficed to set the whole in a blaze. The noise of the wind, the roaring of the fire, the wild cries of the mutineers, maddened with excitement and raging for blood, these, mingled with oaths, and prayers, and shrieks of anguish, formed an atmosphere of devilry which few of our countrymen would wish to breathe again. A few of the residents fought with the fury of despair; but they were a handful against many thousands of enemies, and silence gradually settled over the place which a few hours previously was fair and flourishing."*

The Nana's next step was to declare himself, by beat of drum, sovereign of the Mahrattas; he planted two standards, one of which was proclaimed as the standard of Mohammed, the other of Huneyman, the monkey god. Around the former the Mohammedans, to the number of several thousands, crowded; around the latter only a few Budmashes and robbers gathered. Thus the two great sovereignties of India were set up again in the persons of the King of Delhi as the Great Mogul, and of Nana Sahib as the Peishwa of the Mahrattas. A position was taken up by the mutineers in front of the intrenchments, which Sir Hugh Wheeler and his little band defended with romantic gallantry, hourly expecting help whence no help came. Various assaults were repelled at great cost to the mutineers, who, at last, cannonaded the intrenchments almost with impunity, as Sir Hugh could only direct against their position, during a portion of the attack, a single gun. Meanwhile, Europeans—men, women, and children—were daily dragged from their hiding-places in the town and surrounding country, and put to death. Before slaying them, torture was resorted to, and every form of indignity. Barbarities at once puerile and disgusting afforded the Nana infinite delight. In some instances he caused the noses and ears of his victims to be cut off and hung round their necks as necklaces. "An English lady, with her children, had been captured by his bloodhounds, and was led into his presence. Her husband had been murdered on the road, and she implored the Nana for life; but the ruffian ordered them

all to be taken to the maidan and killed. On the way the children complained of the sun, and the lady requested they might be taken under the shade of some trees; but no attention was paid to her, and after a time she and her children were tied together and shot, with the exception of the youngest, who was crawling over the bodies, and feeling them, and asking them why they had fallen down in the sun. The poor infant was at last killed by a trooper."

One hundred and twenty-six persons escaping from Puttyghur, arrived opposite Cawnpore during the investment of the intrenched position of the English. The Nana brought guns and musketry to bear upon these unfortunate and helpless persons, and gave them the alternative of landing under his protection, or of having the boats sunk. Some got away, refusing to trust him; others accepted his promises of security as their safest chance. He violated his solemn protestations. "When they were collected together, he ordered his men to commence the work of slaughter. The women and children were dispatched with swords and spears; the men were ranged in line, with a bamboo running along the whole extent and passing through each man's arms, which were tied behind his back. The troopers then rode round them and taunted their victims, reviling them with the grossest abuse, and gloating over the tortures they were about to inflict. When weary of vituperation, one of them would discharge a pistol in the face of a captive, whose shattered head would droop to the right or left, the body meanwhile being kept upright, and the blood and brains bespattering his living neighbours. The next person selected for slaughter would, perhaps, be four or five paces distant; and in this way the fiends contrived to prolong for several hours the horrible contact of the dead and the living. Not a soul escaped; and the Nana Sahib thanked the gods of the Hindoos for the sign of favour bestowed upon him by the opportunity vouchsafed thus to torment and slay the Christians." For twenty-two days the garrison held out, hoping against hope. They could not persuade themselves that neither from Lucknow, Allahabad, nor Calcutta, would help arrive. What actually occurred at last can only be gathered from desultory sources of information. These crept out little by little, and the public mind of India, of England, and of all the world, not inhabited by heathen or Mussulmans, was filled with horror at the recital. Lord Canning published the following as the first authentic intelligence given to the natives of India of the event:—

* *The Sepoy Revolt; its Causes and its Consequences.* By Henry Mead. London: G. Routledge & Co.

Allahabad, July 5th.

Colonel Neill reports that he had received a note, dated night of the 4th, from Major Renaud, of the Madras Fusiliers, commanding the advance column sent towards Cawnpore, that he had sent men into that place, who reported on their return that, in consequence of Sir Hugh Wheeler being shot through the leg, and afterwards mortally, the force had accepted the proffer of safety made by the Nana Sahib and the mutineers. The Nana allowed them to get into boats, with all they had, and three and a half lacs of rupees; that after getting them into boats fire was opened on them from the bank, and all were destroyed. One boat got away ten miles down the river, was pursued, brought back, and all in her taken back into barracks and shot. One old lady was alive on the 3rd, at Fatehpore.

The rumours which were spread in connection with the treatment of the victims of Cawnpore were innumerable, but rivalling one another in the pictures they gave of the atrocities of Nana Sahib and his followers. Reports that all the women murdered at Lucknow had been first violated, under circumstances of cruelty savage and appalling, influenced the Europeans in India with a desire for vengeance which it was difficult to slake. The floating tales of this nature which circulated so extensively, greatly exaggerated the facts, but enough of the horrible remained true to justify the English community in India in demanding that English honour should be vindicated, and punishment inflicted upon the criminals with a stern hand. When the numbers destroyed by the rebels became more clearly ascertained, the distress of relations and friends, and of the whole English community in India, was beyond the power of pen to describe. The following were certainly known to be in the intrenchments on the 6th of June; of these many fell in dreadful battle, the rest by a more cruel destiny:—First company, 6th battalion, artillery, 61; her majesty's 32nd foot, 84; her majesty's 84th foot, 50; 1st European fusiliers, 15; English officers, mostly of mutinied regiments, 100; merchants, writers, clerks, &c., 100; English drummers of mutinied regiments, 40; wives and children of English officers, 50; wives and children of English soldiers, 160; wives and children of civilians, 120; sick, native officers and sepoy, 100; native servants, cooks, &c., 100.

A few of those who had served within these intrenchments escaped almost by miracle. Mr. Shepherd, a gentleman connected with the commissary department, left the trenches, disguised as a native cook, and was imprisoned by Nana Sahib, remaining in captivity while the murders were perpetrated, and, finally, escaping when the rebels retreated. The others who were saved were British officers. They were with the garrison, who, according to the stipulation made with the Nana, were permitted to go down

the river in boats. One of these gentlemen published an account of his escape. After describing the embarkation, and the progress of the treacherous attack, Lieutenant Delafosse continues:—"We had now one boat, crowded with wounded, and having on board more than she could carry. Two guns followed us the whole of that day, the infantry firing on us the whole of that night. On the second day, 28th June, a gun was seen on the Cawnpore side, which opened on us at Nujulgurh, the infantry still following us on both sides. On the morning of the third day, the boat was no longer serviceable; we were aground on a sandbank, and had not strength sufficient to move her. Directly any of us got into the water, we were fired upon by thirty or forty men at a time. There was nothing left for us but to charge and drive the villains away; and fourteen of us were told off to do what we could. Directly we got on shore the insurgents retired, but having followed them up too far, we were cut off from the river, and had to retire ourselves, as we were being surrounded. We could not make for the river; we had to go down parallel, and came to the river again a mile lower down, where we saw a large force of men right in front waiting for us, and another lot on the opposite bank, should we attempt to cross the river. On the bank of the river, just by the force in front, was a temple. We fired a volley, and made for the temple, in which we took shelter, having one man killed and one wounded. From the door of the temple we fired on every insurgent that happened to show himself. Finding that they could do nothing against us whilst we remained inside, they heaped wood all round and set it on fire. When we could no longer remain inside on account of the smoke and heat, we threw off what clothes we had, and, each taking a musket, charged through the fire. Seven of us out of the twelve got into the water, but before we had gone far, two poor fellows were shot. There were only five of us left now, and we had to swim whilst the insurgents followed us along both banks, wading and firing as fast as they could. After we had gone three miles down the stream [probably swimming and wading by turns], one of our party, an artilleryman, to rest himself, began swimming on his back, and not knowing in what direction he was swimming, got on shore, and was killed. When we had had got down about six miles, firing from both sides [of the river] ceased, and soon after we were hailed by some natives, on the Oude side, who asked us to come on shore, and said they would take us to their rajah, who was friendly to the English." The friendly

rajah sheltered Lieutenant Delafosse, Mowbray, and Thompson, with some others, who sought his protection, throughout the month of July, until they exchanged his hospitality for the ranks of their countrymen.

It is difficult to give any correct relation of the fate of the Englishwomen dragged from the boats, not only because the narratives of survivors is so different, but because the scenes in which the relaters substantially agree are too indelicate to place before our readers in their atrocious details.

The first demand of the Nana was that they should all enter his harem; they replied that they preferred death. Amongst these ladies the daughter of Sir Hugh Wheeler has been represented by all narrators as displaying extraordinary courage. Before her capture she is represented as having shot down five sepoy with a revolver. Mr. Shepherd relates that she was taken away by a sowar (trooper), as his particular prize, who conveyed her to his hut, that she then seized his sword, cut off his head, and threw herself into a well to escape outrage. An ayah (native nurse) of a European family says that it was in the hut, after cutting off the trooper's head, that she shot down four other sowars. Another account represents her as having been taken away by the trooper in the retreat of the mutineers. This story has two versions: one describes the conduct of the sowar as generous, the other represents him as carrying her about as his victim.

THE MUTINY AT FUTTYGHUR.

Futtyghur was a military cantonment higher up on the banks of the Ganges than Cawnpore, and not far from Feroakabad.

At the end of May the troops in those cantonments were the 10th regiment of native infantry (Bengal is always understood, unless especial mention is made of a corps as belonging to Bombay or Madras), and small detachments of other regiments. Unmistakable indications were made of an intended mutiny, so that it was deemed desirable to send the women, children, and non-combatants on to Cawnpore. The communications between these places had been so intercepted that the officers at either station were ignorant of the situation of their comrades at the other.

On the 4th of June boats were freighted with this precious charge, and they were sent down the Ganges.

After a short voyage, the demonstrations of hostility offered by the natives, caused the

wanderers to separate into two parties. One of these, headed by Mr. Probyn, the collector, sought refuge with a zemindar, named Herden Buksh, living twelve miles from Futtyghur. The other party persisted in the voyage to Cawnpore. The first party numbered forty persons; the second, one hundred and twenty. It is impossible to judge when these parties separated, or how many of both were slain before the one reached Cawnpore and the other found refuge with the zemindar. Few survived to tell the tale, and their talents for narrative have not been very eminent. Some of them found their way back to Futtyghur, others were arrested and slain at Bithoor.

On the 18th of June, the 10th infantry mutinied, and set fire to the cantonments at Futtyghur: the 41st, from the opposite shore of the Ganges, joined them, the treasure was seized, and the officers menaced. The river by that date had fallen so low that flight by boat was deemed unsafe, and the Europeans resolved to defend a post, which they selected as the most tenable which they could make available. One hundred persons took up this position; thirty were European gentlemen, the rest women and children. They defended this place until the 4th of July, when, several military officers of rank having fallen, and most of the rest being wounded, longer defence became impossible. They took to their boats, under a terrible fire from their enemies. The boats were pursued, with a persistent thirst for blood. Some of the ladies jumped overboard, to avoid capture. Some were shot in their boats. One of the boats stranded; those on board leapt into the water, some were shot down, some drowned, others swam to land, and were captured and mutilated; a few found shelter from compassionate persons while wandering along the shore. One boat only reached Bithoor; Nana Sahib murdered all on board.

The fate of the first arrivals from Futtyghur has been already related.

The monster of Bithoor was not contented with the cruelties he had inflicted, but hearing that a British force was advancing, which he could hardly hope to resist, he resolved to cut off the noses and right hands of all the Bengalee clerks in the pay of commercial firms, or of the civil service, and of all persons who were known to be able to read or write or speak English. Such was the state of things at Cawnpore, when the tramp of British soldiery was heard, and the hour of retribution was nigh.

CHAPTER CXXX.

THE MUTINY IN OUDE—DEFENCE OF LUCKNOW BY SIR HENRY LAWRENCE—HIS DEATH—MUTINY IN ROHILCUND AND THE DOAB—MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA—MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, AND ITS SUPPRESSION—UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AT MUTINY IN SCINDE.

THROUGHOUT the month of May the sepoy displayed a mutinous spirit all over Oude; but it was met with sufficient skill and address to keep it under, so far as open revolt and massacre were concerned. In time the spirit of disaffection increased, and Sir Henry Lawrence, who conducted the government of the province, suffered inconceivable anxiety, and displayed an ability and courage which render his name immortal. About the middle of June, Colonel Neill, then at Allahabad, as seen in the last chapter, received a letter from Sir Henry, announcing that Seetapore and Shahjehanpore, Baraitch, and Fyzabad, were taken by the mutineers, and that the revolvers from these places, from Jeypore, and from Benares (where Neill had driven them), were advancing against Lucknow. On the 19th the government of Calcutta learned that cholera had broken out in Lucknow, and that Sir Henry had no hope of reinforcements unless by chance from Dinapore. In Benares, it was learned a few days later that Sir Henry had got rid of all his sepoy by a dextrous piece of policy, and that he was himself ill, and had appointed a provisional council in case of his death, or incapacity by sickness. He held the residency, the cantonments, and commanded the city. He also occupied a fort called Muehee Bhouchan, which he garrisoned by 225 Europeans. This place was three quarters of a mile from the residency, and was strong. The residency and the fort were his chief reliance in case he should be pressed by the enemy. Before the end of June his communications were cut off, and Lucknow surrounded by an immense host, not merely of mutineers, but of rebels, well accustomed to the use of arms, and raging with hatred against the English government.

On the 27th of June he had supplies for two months, during which time he had no fear that the enemy could capture his positions. At the end of June the whole province of Oude was in arms, and the royal family active in the insurrection. There were now three royalties set up in hostility to the English, that of Delhi, Oude, and the Mahratta. On the 30th of June Sir Henry resolved to attack a force of eight thousand rebels, encamped on the Fyzabad road, near the Koobra canal. His force was as follows:—Artillery—Four guns, horse light field battery; six guns, Oude field

battery; and one 8-inch howitzer. Cavalry—one hundred and twenty troopers of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Oude irregular cavalry; and forty volunteer cavalry, under Captain Radcliffe. Infantry—three hundred of her majesty's 32nd foot; one hundred and fifty of 13th native infantry; sixty of the 48th native infantry; and twenty of the 71st. The enemy skilfully planned an ambush, their success in doing so was the more easily achieved as Lawrence bore himself far too confidently. He did not show as signal a military capacity on this occasion as he had always shown capacity for government. The rebels attacked him at Chinhut. The Oude artillerymen in his service cut the traces of the horses, overturned the guns in a nullah, and deserted to the enemy during the first moment of surprise; they were probably aware of the ambush. To this misfortune was added the want of an adequate supply of ammunition, of which he should have assured himself before he set out. He was beaten. It was not a retreat, but a confused flight. The officers and men fell in great numbers, and so wretchedly arranged was the retreat, as well as the advance, that it is wonderful how a single man of the party reached Lucknow. This shameful defeat caused all the subsequent disasters. The enemy gained courage, their enthusiasm rose to the highest pitch, while the English became depressed. Lawrence resolved to abandon the cantonments, the fort, and another strong post, to fortify himself in the residency, and await succour. At midnight on the 1st of July he blew up the fort, containing two hundred and forty barrels of powder, and three millions of ball cartridges. This resolution on the part of Sir Henry has been much lauded, but the fact was obvious to the humblest soldier that it was the only thing that could be done to afford the defence the slightest prospect of success. By his marvellous faculty of administration he collected six months' provision in the residency. His courage equalled his industry. On the night of the 1st of July, a shell was thrown by the enemy, which exploded in the room he occupied, but he declined taking up his quarters in a more secure place. On the 2nd of July a shell also burst in the same place, inflicting upon him a wound which eventually proved fatal. He immediately appointed Brigadier Inglis his military, and Major



SIR HENRY LAWRENCE.

From a Photograph in the Possession of the Family

Banks his civil successor; and on the 10th of July died. The defence of the residency now devolved upon the gallant Inglis.

It is necessary before returning to the defence of Lucknow, to glance at some of the other stations in Oude and elsewhere. Fyzabad was the scene of incipient mutiny on the 3rd of June. On the 8th it became open and decided. After the most solemn professions of loyalty and devotion on the part of the sepoy garrison, they suddenly rose and made prisoners of their officers. Next morning Dhuleep Singh, the chief of the insurgents, announced that the officers might go away, taking their private property.

The troops quartered at Fyzabad, were—the 22nd regiment native infantry; the 6th regiment irregular Oude infantry; the 5th troop of the 15th regiment irregular cavalry; No. 5 company of the 7th battalion of artillery; and No. 13 horse battery. The chief officers were Colonels Lennox and O'Brien; Major Mill, Captain Morgan, Lieutenants Fowle, English, Bright, Lindesay, Thomas, Ouseley, Cautley, Gordon, Parsons, Percival, and Currie; and Ensigns Anderson and Ritchie. Colonel Goldney held a civil appointment as commissioner. The Europeans were placed in boats and directed to make their way to Dinapore. It was intended to murder them on the river. Some of the fugitives took to the land, leaving all their property behind, and made for Goruckpore. They were attacked by mutineers, and would have been killed, had not Meer Mohammed Hossein Khan rescued them, sheltered them in a zemindar fort, disigned and hid them, and, by a succession of stratagems preserved them until the collector of Goruckpore, at the head of a party, came to conduct them away in safety; they thence reached Calcutta without losing an individual of their number. Of those who went by river, some reached Dinapore, others were slain or drowned. A portion left the boats and perished on land of privation or fatigue. The whole population was against them. One woman was delivered of a baby on the route. A lady, with two children, seven and three years of age, and a baby eight months old, after suffering considerable privations, and losing her infant by death, escaped. A sergeant-major was captured and dragged from village to village as an exhibition, subjected to unheard of cruelties and indignities. He at last escaped.

The mutinies at the other garrisons were similar—slaughter and rapine followed revolt everywhere. Neither Lawrence nor Inglis could obtain any assistance except from Nepaul. Jung Bahadoor was not only willing to render it, but he sent troops. Lord

Canning requested him to withdraw them, still labouring under the fatal hallucination that the army was in the main loyal, and that, at all events, the people were so. The Nepaulese chief marched back his troops at a season most trying, many of them perishing on the way by cholera. When his army had reached the capital, a message from Lord Canning arrived, requiring the assistance of ten thousand men. Jung Bahadoor afforded the aid required, but neither he nor his troops entered so heartily into the cause as at first. He expressed his astonishment how the English, with such rulers, could expect to hold India. The Goorkha chief also extended refuge and assistance to such fugitives as reached the confines of his country.

MUTINY IN ROHILCUND.

All the districts of this province were rebellious, and the Bengal troops stationed in it still more so. Bareilly was one of the most important places of Rohilcund, and it was like other such places, garrisoned wholly by native troops. Two regiments of infantry, the 68th and 18th, one of cavalry, the 8th, and a battery of native artillery, were stationed there. The officers were the only English soldiers in the place. The usual staff of civilians was to be found there, and many women and children. The native population was one hundred thousand. The chief officers displayed the infatuation by which the military authorities were characterized elsewhere: the sepoys were implicitly trusted; the officers did not know them. Early in May, symptoms of insurgency led to the adoption of some precautionary measures; the ladies and children were sent to the sanitary stations in the hills: Nynce Fal received many of them, where they were comparatively safe. On the 31st of May the sepoys revolted; the too confiding general of the station was one of the first men shot by the mutineers; others were murdered, some escaped, the cantonments were fired, and rapine ruled in Bareilly. Nineteen native troopers remained faithful, and escorted a number of their officers to Nynce Fal. The rebels, headed by a very old chief, Khan Bahadoor Khan, were completely successful. The khan, like others of the rebel chiefs, had been in receipt of a pension from the company, a mode of securing their loyalty, which always failed, as the pension was regarded as a right, and a sense of injury experienced, whatever its amount, because it was not more. This man, like Nana Sahib, was the associate of the English, assuming their manners, and affecting their tastes. These men everywhere were the

bitterest enemies of the British. Intimate intercourse, and close knowledge of us, seemed to exasperate the educated natives against both our race and rule. This old chief of the Bareilly mutineers imitated our manners so closely, that he had the captive Europeans arraigned as rebels against the King of Delhi, tried by law, found guilty, and hanged.

Moorshedabad is half way between Bareilly and Meerut, and was, as to the insurrection, a place of importance from that circumstance. Here, as elsewhere, the treasury was captured in June, but the European population were enabled to make a timely escape to Meerut.

At Shahjehanpore the mutiny was marked by a peculiar activity. The troops rose on the 31st of May, a day on which so generally the sepoys revolted. It was the Sabbath. The mutineers, as elsewhere, selected the hours of worship. They surrounded the church, and put nearly the whole of the congregation, and the Rev. Mr. M'Collum, to death within the building. Those who escaped were hunted through the country, shot at, and sabred, until only one or two remained of all who had joined in Christian worship on that last Sabbath in May at Shahjehanpore. All Rohilcund, like Oude, fell to the rebels. One by one, and in small parties, fugitives reached Nynee Fal, where the neighbourhood of the Goorkhas deterred the enemy from pursuing, although the prize was much desired. The slaughter of such a large number of women and children as the most vindictive visitation to the whites, was eagerly expected. Bands of mutineers watched in the neighbouring jungle for many a day in the hope of accomplishing this exploit. All around Rohilcund and Oude the insurrection grew and spread. In the Doab blood and fire marked the rebel track in every direction. From Allahabad, where Neill was victorious, to Ferokebad, and far beyond it to the upper country, all was desolation and vengeance. Futtyghur and Muttra obtained notoriety among the places in these districts where rebellion signalized itself. Allyghur was held by a few faithful native soldiers, under the command of a gallant young officer, named Coekburn; and by this means the road between Meerut and Agra was kept tolerably open. Agra itself, however, was doomed to experience the force of the wide-sweeping storm. The garrison there consisted of two regiments of native infantry and the 3rd Europeans, with a small detachment of artillery. On the 1st of June there was a disarmament of the natives. This was timely, for a conspiracy to murder all the officers was afterwards discovered. Most of the disarmed

sepoys escaped and made their way to Delhi, or into Oude; the remainder were a source of anxiety and alarm, although deprived of their weapons. The police and jail-guard deserted, and the population showed deadly hatred to the Europeans of every class. Mr. Colvin held Agra well, and threw out parties in every direction, who chastised rebel bands.

THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA.


Nagpore had a strong garrison of native troops. Mr. Plowden, the commissioner, by address and courage, succeeded in inducing them to surrender their arms, in which he was aided by the loyalty of the Madras native cavalry. By the end of June he had quieted every symptom of disturbance.

Further north, in Central India Proper, Major Erskine showed similar qualities to those employed by Mr. Plowden at Nagpore. The Saugor and Nerbuddah districts were intensely agitated, but skilful management, civil and military, averted many disasters.

The Bundelcund territory suffered much, and Jansi was the capital of revolt and outrage. The native troops mutinied on the 4th of June, seized the Star Fort, and massacred many of the officers in the cantonments, the rest escaping to the Town Fort, where they barricaded themselves, and offered resolute resistance. After a long and desperate fight, the garrison, no longer able to hold out, surrendered, on condition of having life spared, to which the mutineers, by the most sacred oaths known to their religions, pledged themselves. Those oaths were violated at Jansi, as everywhere else. The perjured horde bound the captive men in one row, and the women and children in another. The men were first slaughtered, and then the women and children; the children being first hewn in pieces before their mothers' eyes. In this case the women were neither tortured nor violated; a speedy death accomplished the bigoted vengeance of their persecutors. Nineteen ladies, twenty-three children, twenty-four civil servants and non-commissioned officers, and eight officers, were the victims of the massacre. It was afterwards proved that the inciter to this deed of blood was the Rancee of Bundelcund, a chieftainess ambitious of ruling that province.

Lieutenant Osborne, at Rewah, hearing of these things, had the address to induce the maharajah to place his troops at the disposal of the company. With indomitable energy and ceaseless activity he provided for the security of a vast district, surrounded by others in which mutiny and rebellion waved their red hands triumphant.

In various places besides these noticed, the





T. W. Knight

SIR JOHN LAWRENCE, BART. &c.

From a Photograph by Mayall

same scenes occurred—successful insurrection, murder, and the flight of such as escaped, under all the circumstances of privation and suffering which might be supposed endurable by human beings.

At Nusserabad there were a few squadrons of Bombay lancers, who charged the Bengal artillery when in mutiny, and stood by their officers to the last, but the station was lost. At different periods of the mutiny symptoms of disaffection were shown in the Bombay army, but as a whole it remained stanch.

At Neemuch the insurgents were also successful, but most of the garrison escaped. The wife and three little children of a sergeant remained behind, and, although alone amidst soldiers, they were murdered.

The dominions of Holkar caught the infection. The maharajah himself remained the ally of the company. His troops revolted. The loss of life to Europeans was great at Mhow and Indore, as elsewhere. In July all the dominions of Holkar were filled with revolt. Mhow was held by a handful of Europeans, until the arrival of troops from Bombay quelled the insurrection in Central India.

The conduct of Scindiah, the old rival of Holkar among the Mahratta chieftains, from generation to generation, was also faithful. In Holkar's dominions the revolt did not begin until July. In Scindiah's it commenced in the middle of June. The whole of the Gwalior contingent mutinied, comprising several thousand choice native soldiers. Finding that they could not induce their chief to lead them against the English, they marched forth to join the insurgents on other fields of enterprise.

MUTINY IN THE PUNJAUB.

During the revolt in other directions the preservation of order in the territory of the Punjaub was of the utmost importance. It was the government of Sir John Lawrence that found the means of reducing Delhi. Lord Stanley, in his place in the house of commons, when minister for Indian affairs, declared that had the mutiny been successful in the Punjaub, India would have been lost.

When the mutiny at Meerut was heard of at Lahore, the excitement among the sepoy regiments was intense, and every evidence that could be afforded of a determination to revolt was supplied. Sir John Lawrence was not at the seat of government, he was at a place called Rawul Pindce, partly for the purpose of recruiting his health. When tidings of the events at Meerut reached the other authorities, they took prompt methods to avert similar catastrophes in the Punjaub, and more especially in the neighbourhood of Lahore, Umritsir, and Umballah. The gentlemen in autho-

rity at and near Lahore were Mr. Montgomery, Mr. McLeod, Mr. Roberts, Colonel Macpherson, Colonel Lawrence (a member of Sir John's family), Major Ommancy, and Captain Hutchinson. These officials formed a council, and deliberated upon the plans best to be adopted to preserve the Punjaub from mutiny and massacre. Apprehensions were chiefly entertained concerning the station of Meean Meer. It was resolved by the council to disarm the sepoys, and introduce additional troops, Europeans, within the fort. On the 13th of May a parade was ordered, when, after some skilful manœuvres, the native corps were brought into a position by which the European infantry and artillery could, in case of a conflict, act with great advantage. The native regiments were the 16th, 26th, and 49th Bengal infantry, and the 8th Bengal cavalry. When the moment arrived for giving such a command, with the least prospect of enforcing its obedience, the order to pile arms was given to the infantry, and the order to unbuckle swords (the troopers were dismounted) given to the cavalry. The command was obeyed with the greatest reluctance, and not until the European artillery and infantry were about to open fire. Arrangements were then made as to the discipline and quarters of the disarmed sepoys, which were effectual in preserving order. The capital of the Punjaub was in this manner secured. Umritsir was the next important place in the territory administered by Sir John Lawrence. Immediately after the disarming at Lahore, a detachment of the 81st regiment was sent thither. The fort of Govindgurh and certain cantonments contained the garrison by which the second city of the Punjaub was defended. The troops stationed there were the 59th native infantry of the Bengal army, a company of native artillery, a company of European artillery, and a light field battery. The native troops offered no opposition to any arrangements made concerning them, and the opposition on the part of the Sikh population to the Mohammedan population and sepoys was so strong that security was assured in Umritsir. Next to Umritsir, Ferozepore became the object of consideration. That place is situated in the Cis-Sutlej provinces of the empire of old Runjeet Singh. It was important only for its garrison, and its position near the west bank of the Sutlej. At the time of the mutiny the cantonments of Ferozepore contained the 45th and 47th Bengal native infantry, the 10th Bengal native cavalry, her majesty's 61st regiment, 150 European artillerymen, one light field battery of horse artillery, and six field guns besides. When the news of the mutiny at Meerut was received, the men of the native regiments mani-

fested uncasiness, but when tidings arrived that Delhi was in their hands, an enthusiastic sympathy for the cause of the king was manifested in every way short of open revolt in his name. Brigadier-general Innes, commanding the station, endeavoured to effect a different arrangement of the troops in quarters, but was resisted, and scenes arose similar to those recorded elsewhere. The two native infantry regiments and the chief part of the sowars escaped from the cantonments with their arms, after having fired the bungalows of their officers, the church, and other buildings: but for the heroism of a few Europeans their attempt to seize and ignite the magazine would have been successful. The 61st European regiment remained all the while in forced inaction, the position which they occupied in reference to the native regiments not affording, in the general's estimation, the prospect of a successful attack. Thus in consequence of mal-arrangements on the part of the superior officers, the native corps were allowed, almost with impunity, to plunder and burn an important station. The consequence of this mismanagement was that the stations of Jullundur, Jhelum, and Sealkote became at once disturbed. At Jullundur were stationed the 6th Bengal native cavalry, the 36th and 61st native infantry, a troop of horse artillery, and the 8th or Queen's own Irish. As soon as the first symptoms of disturbance were manifested, arrangements of an effective character were made, and the Rajah of Jullundur, who exercised the suzerainty of a small territory in the neighbourhood, remained loyal and gave the aid of his troops. The result was that the native regiments were overawed, and overt acts of riot and shouting ceased, although a brooding gloom hung upon the faces of the sepoys, and foreboded that if an opportunity for insurrection arose, it would not be lost.

In the eastern portion of the Punjab the town of Phillour was regarded as important. It was intended by the sepoy garrison to rise on the 15th and secure its vast magazines, but succour arising from Jullundur, by a detachment of the Queen's Irish, the place was saved. It was afterwards discovered that all the sepoy garrisons in the Punjab, especially in the Eastern Punjab, had agreed to rise on the 15th, murder their officers, and the families of married officers, to kill all Europeans, civil and military, and to make Phillour their rendezvous and depot, calculating upon the possession of its large military stores. The premature outbreak at Meerut, on the 10th, baffled all the plans of the mutineers, put the English on the *qui vive*, and laid a train of consequences which prevented the success of the mutiny, not only in the Punjab, but over

all the provinces of Bengal. At Jhelum, on the right bank of the river bearing the same name, about six companies of the 24th native infantry were stationed. They showed some symptoms of sedition, and it was deemed necessary to disarm them. For this purpose, three companies of her majesty's 24th were sent from the hill station of Rawul Pindee, accompanied by a detachment of horse artillery. The 14th native infantry received the Europeans, on parade, with a volley of musketry, to which the latter replied, but the sepoys maintained a well-directed fire, beneath which many Europeans fell. Had the 24th been ordered to charge with the bayonet, many British lives would have been spared, for the sepoys seldom awaited the charge of the English. The 14th were, however, allowed to get under the cover of their cantonments, where they had loopholed their huts and walls, firing from which they kept the 24th at bay. It was not until three pieces of cannon opened upon their position, that they abandoned it and fled. The 24th were not in a condition to pursue, so the mutineers succeeded in effecting their escape to Delhi. At Sealkote, the sepoys professed loyalty up to the very moment of revolt. The officers trusted to their professions—as they did generally. On the 9th of July, the 46th native infantry, and a wing of the 9th native cavalry, rose, set fire to the cantonments, and made open revolt; they were joined by the 14th, driven from Jhelum. After murdering many persons, and blowing up the magazine, they marched for Delhi. A flying column was organized at Jhelum to pursue them. Brigadier Nicholson, at the head of another column, made arrangements for intercepting them. The fugitives were hemmed in between both forces, and, fording the Ravee, took up a position on an island, where nearly all perished under the fire and steel of their pursuers.

There were various risings of the disarmed regiments in the Punjab, some so desperate that they would be utterly unaccountable except that fanaticism drives men to madness. The most remarkable of these outbreaks was one which excited excessive attention in Europe, and engaged the press of England in fierce discussions. The British parliament was also made the scene of debate in connection with it, by a motion introduced to the house by Mr. Gilpin, in March, 1859, a year and seven months after the event. The revolt and destruction of the 26th native infantry caused these prolonged discussions. Mr. Cooper, a civil officer in the service of the Honourable East India Company, was the person chiefly concerned in suppressing the

revolt and punishing the revoltors. His own account of the transaction, although of some length, is given, because no abstract or abridgement of an event which caused such angry controversy in society and in the senate at home, could do justice to all the parties concerned. Mr. F. Cooper, deputy-commissioner of Umritsir, published a work entitled *The Crisis in the Punjab*, in which he set forth his own doings, and laid the ground for the attacks which were made upon himself personally, and upon the severe policy of the English civil and military officers to whom the government of the Punjab was committed. "The 26th native infantry, stationed under surveillance at Meean Meer, was disarmed on the 13th of May, 1857. Whether there had been any preconcerted scheme among the disarmed regiments to escape is not known, although it is generally understood that lots had been drawn, and that had the 26th succeeded, the 16th (grenadiers) had engaged to follow in their wake. Some say that the noonday gun was to be the signal of a general rise. Society was shocked, however, on the 30th of July, to hear of another foul murder of a commanding officer, Major Spenser, and the rise of the 26th regiment. Lieutenant Montagu White narrowly escaped. He was enticed into the lines by some sepoy, who affected sorrow at the murder, and was about to dismount, when a warning voice in his ear told him to beware. He galloped off; but not before some hand had aimed a felon stroke at him, and wounded his horse. The sergeant-major was also killed, and the regiment precipitately fled; a dust storm (as was the case at Jullundur when the mutiny arose) raging at the time, favouring their immediate escape, and concealing its exact direction. They were not, however, unmolested; and it is feared that the ardour of the Sikh levies, in firing when the first outbreak occurred, precipitated the murders and frightened all, good, bad, or indifferently disposed, to flight. From subsequent statements, since taken down, it is concurrently admitted that a fanatic of the name of Prakash Singh, *alias* Prakash Pandey, rushed out of his hut brandishing a sword, and bawling out to his comrades to rise and kill the Feringees, selected as his own victim the kind-hearted major.

"Another panic arose at Anarknlee, and the thundering of cannon at Meean Meer into the then empty lines of the fugitives spread the utmost alarm. It was taken for granted that the fugitives must flee southwards, and accordingly Captain Blagrove proceeded with a strong party from Lahore to the Hurriki ghat (near to which Sobraon was fought); and from Umritsir, was detached in the same

direction, a force (one hundred and fifty Punjab infantry and some Tawana horse) under Lieutenant Boswell, a rough and ready soldier, who was superior to all hardships. They had to march in a drenching rain, the country nearly flooded. Sangnine hopes warmed their hearts amid the wretched weather. But, alas for their hopes! intelligence reached the deputy commissioner that the mutineers had made almost due north; perhaps in hopes of getting to Cashmere, perhaps to try their luck and by preconcerted plan to run the gauntlet of those districts in which Hindostanee regiments, some with arms, some without arms, still existed. Suffice it to say, that it was reported at midday, on the 31st of July, that they were trying to skirt the left bank of the Ravee, but had met with unexpected and determined opposition from the telseeldar, with a posse of police, aided by a swarm of sturdy villagers, at a ghat twenty-six miles from the station. A rapid pursuit was at once organized. At four o'clock, when the district officer arrived with some eighty or ninety horsemen, he found a great struggle had taken place; the gore, the marks of the trampling of hundreds of feet, and the broken banks of the river, which, augmented with the late rains, was sweeping a vast volume, all testified to it. Some hundred and fifty had been shot, mobbed back into the river and drowned inevitably, too weakened and famished as they must have been after their forty miles' flight to battle with the flood. The main body had fled upwards and swam over on pieces of wood, or floated on to an island about a mile from the shore, where they might be descried crouching like a brood of wild fowl. It remained to capture this body, and having done so, to execute condign punishment at once.

"There were but two boats, both rickety, and the boatmen unskilled. The presence of a good number of Hindostanees among the sowars might lead to embarrassment and accidental escapes. The point was first how to cross this large body to the main land, if they allowed themselves to be captured at all (after the model of the fox, the geese, and the peck of oats). This was not to be done under two or three trips, without leaving two-thirds of the mutineers on the island, under too scanty a protection, and able to escape, while the first batch was being conveyed to the main bank; nor also without launching the first batch when they did arrive, into the jaws of the Hindostanee party, who in the first trip were to be left ostensibly 'to take care of the horses' on the main land. From the desperate conflict which had already taken place, a considerable struggle was anticipated before these plans could be brought into operation. The trans-

lation of the above fable to the aged Sikh sirdar, who accompanied, and to the other heads of the pursuing party, caused intense mirth, and the plan of operations after this formula elicited general approval. So the boats put off with about thirty sowars (dis-mounted of course) in high spirits; most of the Hindostanee sowars being left on the bank. The boats straggled a little, but managed to reach the island in about twenty minutes. It was a long inhospitable patch, with tall grass; a most undesirable place to bivouac on for the night, with a rising tide; especially if wet, dispirited, hungry, without food, fire, or dry clothing. The sun was setting in golden splendour, and as the doomed men with joined palms crowded down to the shore on the approach of the boats, one side of which bristled with about sixty muskets, besides sundry revolvers and pistols, their long shadows were flung far athwart the gleaming waters. In utter despair forty or fifty dashed into the stream and disappeared, rose at a distance, and were borne away into the increasing gloom. Some thirty or forty sowars with matchlocks (subsequently discovered to be of very precarious value) jumped into the shallow water, and invested the lower side of the island, and being seen on the point of taking pot-shots at the heads of the swimmers, orders were given 'not to fire.' This accidental instruction produced an instantaneous effect on the mutineers. They evidently were possessed of a sudden and insane idea that they were going to be tried by court-martial, after some luxurious refreshment. In consequence of which sixty-six stalwart sepoys submitted to be bound by a single man deputed for the purpose from the boats, and stacked like slaves in a hold into one of the two boats emptied for the purpose. Leaving some forty armed sowars on the island, and feeling certain that after the peaceful submission of the first batch (or peck of oats) the rest would follow suit and suit, orders were given to push off. On reaching the shore, one by one, as they stepped out of the boats, all were tightly bound; their decorations and necklaces ignominiously cut off; and, under a guard of a posse of villagers, who had begun to assemble, and some Sikh horse, they were ordered to proceed slowly on their journey back, six miles to the police-station at Ujnalla. Meanwhile the Hindostanees (the geese) had been dispatched to the island back in the boats with an overawing number of Tawana sowars; and it was gratifying to see the next detachment put off safely, though at one time the escorting boat got at a great distance from the escorted, and fears were entertained that escape had been premeditated. However, by

dint of hallooing, with threats of a volley of musketry, the next invoice came safely to land, and were subjected to the same process of spoliation, disrobement, and pinioning. At any moment, had they made an attempt to escape, a bloody struggle must have ensued. But Providence ordered otherwise, and nothing on the side of the pursuing party seemed to go wrong. Some begged that their women and children might be spared, and were informed that the British government did not condescend to war with women and children. The last batch having arrived, the long, straggling party were safely, but slowly, escorted back to the police-station, almost all the road being knee-deep in water. Even this accident, by making the ground so heavy—not to mention the gracious moon, which came out through the clouds and reflected herself in myriad pools and streams, as if to light the prisoners to their fate—aided in preventing a single escape. It was near midnight before all were safely lodged in the police-station. A drizzling rain coming on prevented the commencement of the execution; so a rest until daybreak was announced. Before dawn another batch of sixty-six was brought in, and as the police-station was then nearly full, they were ushered into a large round tower or bastion. Previously to his departure with the pursuing party from Unritsir, the deputy commissioner had ordered out a large supply of rope, in case the numbers captured were few enough for hanging, (trees being scarce), and also a reserve of fifty Sikh levies for a firing party, in case of the numbers demanding wholesale execution, as also to be of use as a reserve in case of a fight on the island. So eager were the Sikhs that they marched straight on end, and he met them half way, twenty-three miles between the river and the police-station, on his journey back in charge of the prisoners, the total number of which when the execution commenced amounted to two hundred and eighty-two of all ranks, besides numbers of camp followers, who were left to be taken care of by the villagers. As fortune would have it, again favouring audacity, a deep dry well was discovered within one hundred yards of the police-station, and its presence furnished a convenient solution as to the one remaining difficulty, which was of a sanitary consideration—the disposal of the corpses of the dishonoured soldiers. The climax of fortunate coincidences seemed to have arrived when it was remembered that the 1st of August was the anniversary of the great Mohammedan sacrificial festival of the Buckra Eed. A capital excuse was thus afforded to permit the Hindostanee Mussulman horsemen

to return to celebrate it at Umritsir, while the single Christian, unembarrassed by their presence, and aided by the faithful Sikhs, might perform a ceremonial sacrifice of a different nature (and the nature of which they had not been made aware of) on the same morrow. When that morrow dawned sentries were placed round the town to prevent the egress of sight seers. The officials were called; and they were made aware of the character of the spectacle they were about to witness.

"Ten by ten the sepoy were called forth. Their names having been taken down in succession, they were pinioned, linked together, and marched to execution; a firing party being in readiness. Every phase of deportment was manifested by the doomed men, after the sullen firing of volleys of distant musketry forced the conviction of inevitable death; astonishment, rage, frantic despair, the most stoic calmness. One detachment, as they passed, yelled to the solitary Anglo-Saxon magistrate, as he sat under the shade of the police-station performing his solemn duty, with his native officials around him, that he, the Christian, would meet the same fate; then, as they passed the reserve of young Sikh soldiery who were to relieve the executioners after a certain period, they danced, though pinioned, insulted the Sikh religion, and called on Gungajee to aid them; but they only in one instance provoked a reply, which was instantaneously checked. Others again petitioned to be allowed to make one last 'salaam' to the sahib. About 150 having been thus executed, one of the executioners swooned away (he was the oldest of the firing-party), and a little respite was allowed. Then proceeding, the number had arrived at 237, when the district officer was informed that the remainder refused to come out of the bastion, where they had been imprisoned temporarily a few hours before. Expecting a rush and resistance, preparations were made against escape; but little expectation was entertained of the real and awful fate which had fallen on the remainder of the mutineers; they had anticipated, by a few short hours, their doom. The doors were opened, and, behold! they were nearly all dead! Unconsciously, the tragedy of Holwell's Black-hole had been re-enacted. No cries had been heard during the night, in consequence of the hubbub, tumult, and shooting of the crowds of horsemen, police, tehsael guards, and excited villagers. Forty-five bodies, dead from fright, exhaustion, fatigue, heat, and partial suffocation, were dragged into light, and consigned, in common with all other bodies, into one common pit, by the hands of the village sweepers. One sepoy only was too much wounded in the

conflict to suffer the agony of being taken to the scene of execution. He was accordingly reprieved for queen's evidence, and forwarded to Lahore, with some forty-one subsequent captures from Umritsir. There, in full parade before the other mutinously-disposed regiments at Meean Meer, they all suffered death by being blown away from the cannon's mouth. The execution at Ujnalla commenced at daybreak, and the stern spectacle was over in a few hours. Thus, within forty-eight hours from the date of the crime, there fell by the law nearly five hundred men."

The reader of these terrible details will not be surprised that indignation was felt by many in England, and regret and grief by all who perused them. Letters were read in the house of commons by Mr. Gilpin, written by Mr. Montgomery and Sir John Lawrence, approving of the conduct of Mr. Cooper, in terms which were not qualified by any reference to the sanguinary vengeance put forth. General Thompson, in a fierce and withering denunciation of all the commissioners, branded the act of Mr. Cooper as one of the most cruel and vindictive recorded in history. The judgment of these events, and of the chief actors in them, pronounced by Lord Stanley, in the debate brought on by Mr. Gilpin in the house of commons, influenced public opinion in England, and brought the controversy to a termination. His lordship thus pronounced his own verdict, as the minister of the crown, officially connected with India:—"It is impossible to deny that these transactions to which reference has been made, are such as cannot be heard or read, even at this distance of time, without great pain or regret. And I will go further, and say that that pain is greatly increased by the tone and the spirit in which these transactions have been described, both in the despatch written at the time, and in the book subsequently published by the gentleman who gave instructions to the Sikhs engaged in these transactions. There is a tone of flippancy, and an appearance of exultation at that great sacrifice of human life—a sacrifice of life made not in the heat of action, nor after a judicial process—which is utterly at variance with good taste and good feeling. Making all allowances—and we were bound to make the very largest allowances for the circumstances of time and place—it was impossible not to condemn the language in which Mr. Cooper has written of these transactions. What the house has to consider is, not the tone in which Mr. Cooper has written, but of the circumstances which took place at Meean Meer. Now, what were the circumstances? The regiment in question, the 26th native infantry, being strongly suspected of an inten-

tion to join in the mutiny, was placed under restraint. It remained under restraint for a period of about six weeks. I think it was on the 28th of July that the attempt to revolt was made. It has been said, in vindication of that attempt, that it was merely an effort on the part of these troops to escape, and that that effort was made because they were to be sent in small parties among a population that was hostile to them, which was tantamount to committing them to inevitable destruction. Now, I apprehend that this is simply a mistake in fact. It is quite true that at a later period regiments were disarmed and discharged in small parties, but no general disarmament of troops had taken place when this outbreak arose. Escape, then, is not the word to apply to such a transaction; and even if it had been a movement of escape on the part of the troops, though a single fugitive may possibly escape in this way, when a large body of men attempt to escape they must be prepared to resist force by force, and the attempt, therefore, on the part of a regiment under these circumstances to escape from the place where they were kept under surveillance would, in fact, on their part, lead to the inference that they were prepared to meet any force that might resist them. It is said that at the time of this outbreak these troops were not in arms. That is undoubtedly the case; but every one who knows India knows that arms are not difficult to be obtained there. They probably would not have succeeded in making their way any very great distance, but it is impossible to describe them as any other than insurgents. When did they make the attempt? the time that Delhi was taken. Every man of them, if they had escaped, would have gone to swell the ranks of the insurgents. At the time of the attempt there was already arrayed against the imperial forces an enormously disproportionate force of sepoys. I say, then, that whatever may have been their motive at the moment of this outbreak, it is impossible to treat it as anything but mutiny and insurrection. Then, it is said that the Sikhs fired upon these troops before the murders were committed. Now, we have not, and probably we never shall have, full and circumstantial evidence of what occurred at the time. But we know this,—we know that an outbreak was expected for some days before. We know that an outbreak actually took place upon that day,—the 30th of July,—and it is only reasonable to suppose that as English officers were present, or, at least, at no great distance, any attack made upon them by the Sikhs was owing to a previous outbreak on their part. But was this outbreak a mere panic, and was it merely by way of self-defence? If that was the case, how came

those two European officers to be murdered as they were? It may be said that those murders were the work of an individual only. We do not find that any attempt was made upon that individual by these sepoys, or that they endeavoured to disconnect themselves in any way from the crime which he had committed. But, admitting that the first murder was the work of an individual only, what was the case as regards the murder of the second officer? A plan was laid to entice him within the lines, and when they had brought him there an attempt was made on his life, with which he narrowly escaped. The object in this case could not be to get rid of an inconvenient witness, for the facts must have been public and notorious; nor was it any immediate danger to which the regiment was exposed. It appears to have been, as far as we can judge, a premeditated murder, and this must be borne in mind in coming to any decision on the facts. It is unfortunately true that out of seven hundred men nearly five hundred suffered death, some by execution. These facts were known, and are referred to in a despatch addressed by Lord Canning to Sir John Lawrence, in which the governor-general states that 'great credit is due to Mr. Cooper for his exertions.' We have evidence that every authority in India regarded this punishment as necessary. Two officers had been murdered by these men without any purpose; the result of the escape of the regiment would have been, that it would have joined the insurgent forces; and a severe example appears to have been necessary, to prevent similar risings elsewhere. Reference has been made to a note addressed to Mr. Cooper by Mr. Montgomery. This note is couched in hasty language; it could not have been deliberately employed. In that note it appears there was a large force in the neighbourhood; they were troops of the same garrison; they were similarly disarmed, but under the same temptation to rise, and not unlikely to yield to it. Probably Sir John Lawrence and those in command thought, if a severe punishment were inflicted on the first body, as an example, it might prevent a similar mutiny by other regiments, and, in the end, be the saving of many lives. I have now stated what I apprehend may fairly be stated in vindication or palliation of the course pursued, but in stating my sincere conviction on the subject, I cannot but wish that an indiscriminate execution of these men had not taken place, that some selection had been made, that there had been some previous investigation. But it is one thing to wish that an act of this kind had not been done, and another thing to pass a formal censure upon it. Only

by great exertions—by the employment of force, by making striking examples, and inspiring terror—could Sir J. Lawrence save the Punjaub; and if the Punjaub had gone the whole of India would have been lost with it. Sir John Lawrence has declared this act was necessary; and the governor-general has confirmed the opinion. Taking all this into consideration, and remembering that we, at this distance of time and place, are hardly fair judges of the feelings of men engaged in such a conflict, I hope the house will pass over the transaction with that silence which is sometimes the most judicious comment."

By great determination and decision Sir John Lawrence and his coadjutors, whose co-operation was most efficient, saved the Punjaub, especially by the plans adopted of raising troops and disposing of them. This was more particularly exemplified in the western provinces of Sir John Lawrence's government. Peshawur, bordering on Affghanistan, was at first supposed to be in the greatest danger; but events proved otherwise, by bringing out the administrative talents of the officials, civil and military, in that region. There were fourteen thousand men in the British pay in military occupation of the western frontier province. Three thousand were Europeans, infantry and artillery. Eleven thousand were Bengal troops, of which three thousand were cavalry and artillery. There was also a small force of Sikhs, and of those mountaineers who are half Affghans and half Punjaubees. The hill tribes which inhabited the neighbourhood of the great passes were partly in the pay of Colonel Edwardes, and were ready at that officer's call to serve the government in the field. On the 13th of May, Major-general Reid, commanding at Peshawur, received a telegraphic communication concerning the mutiny at Meerut. He instantly called a council of war, in which he was assisted by Brigadiers Chamberlain and Cotton, and Colonels Edwardes and Nicholson. It was resolved that Major-general Reid should assume the command of all the troops in the Punjaub, that Brigadier Cotton should be placed in command of the forces in the province of Peshawur, and that a flying column should be formed at Jhelum, from which point expeditions were to be undertaken against any part of the territory of the Punjaub menaced by mutiny or insurrection. The troops composing this column it was agreed should be composed of as few sepoys as possible. Europeans, Sikhs, Affghans, borderers, &c., were, as far as procurable, to constitute the force. The following troops were its constituents:—Her majesty's 27th foot, from Nowsherah; her majesty's

24th foot, from Rawul Pindee; one troop European horse artillery, from Peshawur; one light field-battery, from Jhelum; the guide corps, from Murdan; the 16th irregular cavalry, from Rawul Pindee; the 1st Punjaub infantry, from Bunnoo; the Kumaon battalion, from Rawul Pindee; a wing of the 2nd Punjaub cavalry, from Kohat; a half company of sappers, from Attock.

At Peshawur, every military precaution was taken to secure treasury, ammunition, and stores from the hand of the incendiary and from sudden capture. Colonel Edwardes found enthusiastic support among the hill men, who flocked to his banners in great numbers, and supported the authorities, not only with zeal, but enthusiasm.

On the 21st of May, startling news reached Peshawur; the 55th native infantry had mutinied. The 27th (Enniskilliners) had been removed from Nowsherah, to form a portion of the movable column; this encouraged the 55th, stationed at Murdan, to hope that it might revolt with impunity. They placed their officers under arrest. The colonel, Spottiswoode, committed suicide from grief and mortification that his corps, of which he thought so highly, had become rebellious. Immediately on receiving this news, the authorities at Peshawur resolved to disarm the Bengal regiments on the morning of the 22nd. This was effected with great skill, military and political. Three native infantry regiments, the 24th, 27th, and 51st, and one cavalry regiment, the 5th, were compelled to lay down their arms. A subahdar major of the 51st was hanged for treason and mutiny. The disarmed sepoys were placed under guard of European and Sikh troops. This accomplished, relief was sent to Murdan; the 55th was attacked there, two hundred of them killed or taken, and the rest dispersed in flight. The fugitives sought the hills, where they expected help; but the tribes there, under the influence of Colonel Edwardes, seized such of them as escaped the sword and shot of the pursuing English. The captives were brought back to Murdan, and in parties of five and ten were blown away from guns. Four other regiments of Bengal soldiers were disarmed in the fort garrisons, originally placed at the foot of the hills, to keep in check the hill marauders, who had grown so loyal under the clever management of Edwardes. Some of the disarmed regiments were disbanded, and sent away in small parties. Several natives of influence, Brahmin or Mohammedan fanatics, were arrested, and upon proof of their treason from their own letters, hung.

Sir John Lawrence urged upon Viscount

Canning the adoption, east of the Sutlej, of the means of pacification which had been so successful in his own hands; but the governor-general did not approve of recommendations which were as triumphantly successful as they were obviously sensible. Sir John's plan of meeting the difficulty of a free press at such a season was as different from that of Lord Canning as were all his other measures. Sir John arranged to supply the papers with authentic political intelligence, so as to prevent useless alarms and dangerous speculations. The press co-operated with his government, and the advantage was signal. Had Lord Canning adopted measures as rational and liberal, he would not have incurred the hostility of the whole of the English press in India, and of a large portion of it in England.

While Sir John and his gallant and able coadjutors met all difficulties which arose in the Punjaub, they were harassed with care in relation to the regions beyond the frontiers of their own government. Oude and the Agra regions kept them in continual alarm. Delhi being, at first, the grand centre of rebellion, it became necessary to unite all the available forces in the north-west against it. From causes, over which Sir John Lawrence had no control, the reign of insurrection and disorder was permitted to prevail in the once gorgeous capital of Hindoostan for a period which made vengeance slow, and reflected dishonour upon the military management of a people whose courage, perseverance, and enterprise had made them masters of India. While supineness, fickleness, time-serving, and incompetency characterized the proceedings of the English authorities, civil and military, the Delhi raj was active and energetic. The roads were kept open by armed patrols to favour the approach of fresh mutineers, and of armed natives from every quarter, while the communications of the English were cut off. Had Havelock had the men in the cantonments at Meerut, or at Umballah, he would have marched upon Delhi, and swept the city of those hordes of ill-governed men who were without a single leader of military talent. While the English did nothing, and appeared not to know what to attempt, the new government of Delhi adopted bold and efficient means for spreading revolt in the British army, and disaffection in all the populations of Upper Bengal. The following proclamation, which was issued extensively, and by numerous copies, shows the spirit of the ministers of the Delhi ruler, and the earnestness with which his aims and those of his adherents were prosecuted. A Mohammedan native paper in Calcutta daringly pub-

lished it; wandering dervishes, Brahmins, and fakeers, spread copies of the document from Peshawur to Fort William with extraordinary rapidity, and, finally, circulated it all over India. Merchants, bankers, and men, whose calling and position might well be supposed to attach them to the company's rule, were suspected of multiplying copies of the proclamation, and of wishing at heart for the success of the revolution. This document had great effect among the Punjaubees of the Brahminical and Mohammedan religions, but had not any influence over those of the Sikh faith:—

Be it known to all the Hindoos and Mohammedans, the subjects and servants on the part of the officers of the English forces stationed at Delhi and Meerut, that all the Europeans are united in this point—first, to deprive the army of their religion; and then, by the force of strong measures, to Christianize all the subjects. In fact, it is the absolute orders of the governor-general to serve out cartridges made up with arvicoe and beef fat. If there be 10,000 who resist this, to blow them up; if 50,000, to disband them.

For this reason we have, merely for the sake of the faith, concerted with all the subjects, and have not left one infidel of this place alive; and have constituted the Emperor of Delhi upon this engagement, that whichever of the troops will slaughter all their European officers, and pledge allegiance to him, shall always receive double salary. Hundreds of cannon and immense treasure have come to hand; it is therefore requisite that all who find it difficult to become Christians, and all subjects, will unite cordially with the army, take courage, and not leave the seed of these devils in any place.

All the expenditure that may be incurred by the subjects in furnishing supplies to the army, they will take receipts for the same from the officers of the army, and retain them by themselves—they will receive double price from the emperor. Whoever will at this time give way to pusillanimity, and allow himself to be overreached by these deceivers, and depend upon their word, will experience the fruits of their submission, like the inhabitants of Lucknow. It is therefore necessary that all Hindoos and the Mohammedans should be of one mind in this struggle, and make arrangements for their preservation with the advice of some creditable persons. Wherever the arrangements shall be good, and with whomsoever the subjects shall be pleased, those individuals shall be placed in high offices in those places.

And to circulate copies of this proclamation in every place, as far as it may be possible, be not understood to be less than a stroke of the sword. That this proclamation be stuck up at a conspicuous place, in order that all Hindoos and Mohammedans may become apprised and be prepared.

If the infidels now become mild it is merely an expedient to save their lives. Whoever will be deluded with their frauds he will repent. Our reign continues. Thirty rupees to a mounted, and ten rupees to a foot soldier, will be the salary of the new servants of Delhi.

The intense bigotry of this production shows the grand motive-power of the rebellion. The allusion to the conduct of the British at Lucknow by the annexation of Oude, proved how thoroughly that event sank into the hearts, lived in the memories, and exasperated the fanaticism of the sepoys. This

missive produced much agitation in the Punjaub, and on the hill frontiers, but Edwardes kept his hill men loyal; and the Affghans had too recently tasted the danger of war with the English to try it so soon again. Sir John Lawrence, subduing every element of discontent in the Punjaub, devoted his energies to enable the army before Delhi to subdue that city. The army from Umballah, sent to besiege Delhi, had been augmented on its way by troops from the hill stations, British and Goorkhas, and by troops sent forward from the Punjaub. Among these reinforcements was the corps of guides. This was a local Punjaubec force, raised after the campaigns on the Sutlej, to act either as guides, or as regular troops, as occasion might require. They were recruited from all the tribes of Northern India and its frontiers, but more especially from all the tribes inhabiting the Punjaub, and from contiguous countries, British and independent. They were picked men in stature and appearance, and regard to their intellectual acquirements was also had in their selection. These were marched from the frontiers of Afghanistan to join the army of General Barnard. When Sir John Lawrence, and the other Punjaub commissioners, heard that the insurgents of Meerut marched upon Delhi, they rightly concluded that such a corps as the guides would be of great use, and Sir John so arranged as to send them with the utmost celerity. They marched to Umballah, sixty-eight miles in thirty-eight hours. After resting there until the staff of the army made arrangements for their further progress, they joined the army in the field, after another astonishing display of their marching capabilities by day and night, and under the burning sun of a climate and a season so trying to soldiers. And from that time forth until Delhi fell, Sir John never ceased to conduce to that catastrophe by all the supplies and reinforcements which care, foresight, enterprise, and activity could accomplish.

The Punjaub remained in peace during the further progress of the insurrection in other regions. Scinde, the neighbouring province to the Punjaub, also enjoyed undisturbed repose. The chief commissioner, Mr. Frere, displayed great ability, and General Jacobs preserved the loyalty of the army, more especially of the troopers of the Scinde horse, some sixteen hundred men, who were chiefly Mohammedans. One Bengal regiment in the province entered into a conspiracy to murder the few European officers of the Scinde horse. Captain Merewether, with the alacrity and courage for which he won reputation, seized the ringleaders, executed them, and quelled

at once all disposition to disturb the loyalty of the Scinde horse.

Such was the progress of the great Indian mutiny; it remains yet to show how it was extinguished. In the Punjaub and Scinde it will be seen that it was crushed as soon as it showed itself. In Allahabad, and a few other places, it met with a similar fate, as already related; but at Delhi, Cawnpore, and throughout Oude, it was triumphant, and stern conflicts and protracted campaigns were necessary to trample it out. In other chapters the siege and capture of Delhi, the re-conquest of Cawnpore, the defence of Lucknow, and the campaigns in Oude and Central India, will be related. Before approaching those subjects, it is desirable to present the reader with the most recent returns made by the India-house, and the board of control, as to the number and quality of the troops, distinguishing European from native, in India at the time the revolt broke out.

Bengal Army, May 10, 1857.

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Presidency	1,214	13,976	15,190
Dinapore	1,597	15,063	16,660
Cawnpore	277	5,725	6,002
Oude	993	11,319	12,312
Saugor	327	10,627	10,954
Meerut	3,096	13,357	21,453
Sirhind	4,790	11,049	15,839
Lahore	4,018	15,939	19,957
Peshawur	4,613	15,916	20,529
Pegu	1,763	692	2,455
	<u>22,698</u>	<u>118,663</u>	<u>141,361</u>

The above shows the number of men in the military divisions or districts named.

Several of the garrison towns gave name to a military division of territory, but itself contained only a moderate garrison. For instance, the military division or district of Dinapore is represented in the above list as containing 16,660 men, whereas the garrison town or cantonment of that name had only 4000 men. The stations which contained the largest numbers of Bengal troops were the following:—

Peshawur	9,500	Sealkote	3,500
Lahore	5,300	Benares	3,200
Meerut	5,000	Rawul Pindce	3,200
Lucknow	5,000	Bareilly	3,000
Jullundur	4,000	Mooltan	3,000
Dinapore	4,000	Sangor	2,800
Umballah	3,800	Agra	2,700
Cawnpore	3,700	Nowsherah	2,600
Delhi	3,600	Jhelum	2,400
Barraekpore	3,500	Allahabad	2,300

The number of soldiers in the Punjaub was 40,000. As to the whole of the Bengal provinces, the troops were stationed at 160 cantonments, garrisons, or other places. The Europeans comprised 2271 commissioned

officers, 1602 non-commissioned officers, and 18,815 rank and file; the natives comprised 2325 commissioned officers, 5821 non-commissioned officers, and 110,517 rank and file.

Madras Army, May 10, 1857.

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Centre	1,580	6,430	8,010
Mysore	1,088	4,504	5,592
Malabar	604	2,513	3,117
Northern	215	6,169	6,384
Southern	726	5,718	6,444
Ceded Districts	135	2,519	2,674
South Mahratta	16	375	391
Nagpoor	369	3,505	3,874
Nizam's	1,322	5,027	6,349
Penang and Malacca	49	2,113	2,162
Pegu	2,880	10,154	13,034
	<u>10,194</u>	<u>49,737</u>	<u>59,931</u>

These troops were dispersed in about forty stations. Pegu was a non-regulation province of Bengal, but it was, as the list shows, garrisoned by Madras troops. This arose from the convenience of sending them from Madras across the Bay of Bengal. Those sepoy remained loyal. There were 2000

Madras troops on service in Persia and China not enumerated in the above list.

Bombay Army, May 10, 1857.

Military Divisions.	Europeans.	Natives.	Total.
Bombay Garrison	695	3,394	4,089
Southern	283	5,108	5,391
Poonah	1,838	6,817	8,655
Northern	1,154	6,452	7,606
Aaseerghur Fortress	2	446	448
Scinde	1,087	6,072	7,159
Rajpootana	50	3,312	3,362
	<u>5,109</u>	<u>31,601</u>	<u>36,710</u>

About 5000 of the above numbers were Bengal or Madras sepoy. About 14,000 men belonging to the Bombay army were absent, garrisoning Aden or Bushire, in the Persian Gulf. In all India, on the 10th of May, when the sepoy rose in arms at Meerut, there were soldiers, 238,002 in the service of the company, of whom 38,001 were Europeans, and 200,001 natives; 19 Europeans to 100 natives. Such were the military elements amidst which the great struggle began.

CHAPTER CXXXI.

ADVANCE OF A BRITISH ARMY AGAINST DELHI—SIEGE OF THE CITY—EMBARRASMENTS OF THE BRITISH FROM DEFECTIVE MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND WANT OF INTELLIGENCE—THE SIEGE—BOMBARDMENT—STORM—CAPTURE OF THE KING OF DELHI, HIS BEGUM, AND HER SON, BY CAPTAIN HODSON—CAPTURE OF TWO OF THE KING'S SONS, AND GRANDSON—ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THEM—THEY ARE SHOT BY CAPTAIN HODSON—DEATH OF BRITISH OFFICERS OF TALENT AND DISTINCTION.

On the death of General Anson, the command in chief of the army devolved upon General Sir H. Barnard, K.O.B., who had served as chief of the staff with the army in the Crimea. He arrived before Delhi on the 8th of June. One of the native regiments deserted in a body, entered the city, aided in its defence, and headed a fierce assault upon the British almost immediately upon their arrival. When Sir H. Barnard arrived before Delhi, he found that his army was unable to effect anything for want of guns. When the guns arrived there were no gunners, and no other men who knew how to fire the cannon; a fresh delay took place in order to obtain a supply of artillerymen. Sir Henry was not permitted to take up a position before Delhi unopposed. When the army was within four miles of the city, it came upon a village called Bardulla Serai. The guides, and some other detachments, remained at different distances in the rear, the force which formed the

encampment consisted of—Head-quarters and six companies of her majesty's 60th rifles; ditto, and nine companies of her majesty's 75th foot; 1st Bengal European fusiliers; 2nd ditto, head-quarters and six companies; Sirmoor battalion (Goorkhas), a wing; head-quarters detachment sappers and miners; her majesty's 9th lancers; ditto 6th dragoon guards (carabiniers), two squadrons; horse artillery, one troop of 1st brigade; ditto, two troops of 3rd brigade; foot artillery, two companies; and No. 14 horse battery; artillery recruits, detachment. The British arrived near the place already named before dawn, and descried thence the lines of watch-fires where the sepoy outposts bivouaced. While the advance guard was feeling its way in the darkness, guns and mortars opened upon them; the sepoy had information of the advance, and did not wait to be attacked within the city or the lines, which they had resolved to defend. As dawn began to break the English reconnoitred,

and found the enemy intrenched, the intrenchments armed with heavy guns well manned. It became necessary to attack in force. The assailants were divided into three columns, under Brigadiers Showers, Graves, and Grant. The first was ordered to advance on the main trunk road; the second to take the left of the same road; the third to cross the canal, and stealthily gain the rear of the enemy's position, and upon a given signal to attack. The guns were placed on each side of the main trunk road, but in very exposed situations. The English advanced, and were met by a fire the most steady and well-directed; round-shot and shell, succeeded by grape and canister, caused considerable loss, and it soon became evident that the fire of the English guns was not sufficient to silence that of the intrenchments. The 75th and 1st regiments (Europeans) were ordered to charge the guns, and in doing so, passed at double quick over open ground swept by the cannonade. The guns were reached; such of the gunners as fled not were bayoneted or sabred. The combinations of the British general were carried out by his brigadiers effectively, and the enemy, out-generaled, fled utterly discomfited, leaving all the guns behind them. Colonels Chester and Welchman behaved very gallantly, the former, acting adjutant-general, was killed by a cannon-ball.

The sun was now pouring his rays upon the field so lately contested, and the heat began to be excessive, but Sir Henry believed that the only safe course was to follow up the first blow, and prevent the sepoys from rallying or returning to the ground they had occupied. He advanced his whole force at six o'clock in the morning, ordering Brigadier Showers and Archdale Wilson to proceed by the main road with two columns of the army, while he, with a brigade under General Graves, turned off through the old cantonments, the scene of revolt and massacre the previous month. Both divisions of the army had to fight their way step by step, so determined was the resistance of the mutineers. As the British approached they perceived that a rocky ridge in front of the northern face of the city was occupied by the rebels in great force, especially of artillery. The commander-in-chief resolved by a flank movement to turn the right of this ridge, and relied for success upon the capacity of his troops to accomplish this movement with rapidity, and a strict preservation of the order of advance. Sir Henry led on the 60th rifles, commanded by Captain Jones, the 2nd Europeans, under Captain Boyd, and a troop of horse artillery, under Captain Money. He accomplished the manœuvre in the most skilful and gallant style, ascending the ridge, turning

the enemy's flank, and sweeping the mutineers from the whole line of their position, which was strewn with guns, arms, and accoutrements, as the coasts of Southern India covered with wrecks and surf under the blasts of the monsoon. The enemy lost twenty-six guns, a fine camp equipage, which the military stores of Delhi had supplied, and a large stock of ammunition. Brigadiers Wilson and Showers, advancing along the main road, ascended the ridge when the conquest had been effected. Besides Colonel Chester, already named, the slain in both actions were:—Captains Delamain and Russell, and Lieutenant Harrison. The wounded comprised Colonel Herbert; Captains Dawson and Greville; Lieutenants Light, Hunter, Davidson, Hare, Fitzgerald, Barter, Rivers, and Ellis; and Ensign Pym. In all, officers and privates, there were fifty-one killed and one hundred and thirty-three wounded. Nearly fifty horses were either killed or wounded. Among the captured articles was found a cart, supposed by the captors to contain ammunition, but which when examined was found to be filled with the mangled limbs and trunks of Christians slaughtered during the insurrection within the city and cantonments.

During the conflict several Europeans were seen heading the mutineers. Various speculations were set afloat by this circumstance. A few believed them to be French, more generally they were thought to be Russians; some officers averred that both French and Russians were there, judging from their appearance and bearing—this was the general impression, although the idea that they were British deserters was also entertained. Vengeance was vowed against these men, all resolving to give them no quarter.

The British soon found that Delhi was not to be taken by a *coup*. That might have been done had General Hewett the skill and spirit to have followed the mutineers from Meerut; the massacre had then never taken place, some of the troops would not have revolted, and Delhi would not have become the stronghold of insurrection. On the 8th of June the place was made too strong to be conquered by storm. If the reader will consult Captain Lawrence's military plan of Delhi and its cantonments (the unpublished plans of the Honourable East India Company), the positions of the defences can be better understood than by letter-press description.

The position taken by Sir Henry Barnard's army was that of the former cantonments, not quite two miles from the northern wall of the city. A rocky ridge interposed between it and the city, and this was occupied by English outposts. On the extreme left of the line

of posts established on this range was the Flagstaff Tower; on the extreme right was a house with a square courtyard, and a baugh or garden. This was called Hindoo Rao's house; in the centre was an old mosque. The ridge of elevated ground did not maintain a parallel between the city and the cantonments, the right from the British lines being much nearer to the enemy. From the right extreme of the ridge the ground descended sharply, so that the post of Hindoo Rao's house and garden was regarded as very important, and three batteries were placed there, supported in successive positions by the rifles, guides, and Goorkhas. The house was very strong, the batteries were carefully placed, and the positions of the supporting infantry were well screened. As time wore on, the British were in a situation similar to that which they had occupied before Sebastopol—they were the besieged rather than the besiegers. The city was not invested, reinforcements of rebels constantly arrived, whilst those of the British came up slowly and in small detachments. Sorties were made on a grand scale; the English were obliged to stand on the defensive, and much time was consumed without anything being effected. The result of such a state of things all over India was disastrous. The universal belief of the natives was that the English could not take Delhi, and from all quarters accessions of force reached the Mogul capital, while insurrection was every where fomented in the name of the emperor.

Scarcely had the English taken up their new position when they were attacked. On the 9th a strong force advanced against the ridge, and was repulsed promptly and with little loss. Captain Quintin Battye of the guides, an officer of great promise, was mortally wounded. The guides distinguished themselves in driving the mutineers from a position on the ridge, which they attained by the celerity of their movements, and where alone they fought with any obstinacy. The 10th was spent in skirmishing.

On the 12th two columns moved out, one against each flank of the ridge. They were signally defeated, Major Jacobs especially distinguishing himself. Several hundreds of the enemy were put *hors de combat*. The mutineers were strengthened by two regiments, one of cavalry and one of infantry, from Rohilcund, who marched into the city with colours flying and bands playing, the European drummers and fifers having been compelled to play them in. This scene tended to discourage the native troops in the English lines. On the 13th, a place called Metcalfe House, near the British left, was occupied by the rebels, who immediately began to fortify it. They were

enabled to do so unmolested. On the 17th a fire was opened by the mutineer artillery against the English right, striking the house of Hindoo Rao, and killing and wounding some officers and men on duty. The enemy were also observed erecting a battery at a large building known as the Eedghal. The rifles and Goorkhas, supported by cavalry and horse artillery, drove out the enemy, but not until after a sharp combat. The 19th of June was a day of intense anxiety. The rear of the British lines was guarded by Brigadier Grant. Information fortunately reached him that two regiments of mutineers, lately arrived from Nusseerabad, had volunteered, supported by cavalry and artillery, to fall upon the rear of the English. Grant reconnoitred, and found the enemy still stronger than his information led him to believe, within half a mile of his position. He attacked them; they fought in the confidence of numbers, and seldom behaved so well when under British command. The contest ended in favour of the English, but not until many gallant men fell killed and wounded. Among the slain was Colonel Yule, of the 9th lancers; he had fallen wounded, and was found next morning with his throat cut, and stabs and gashes all over his person. Lieutenant Alexander was also killed. Captain Daly and six subalterns were wounded; nineteen privates were killed, and seventy-seven wounded. Several, both Europeans and natives, among the common soldiers behaved with signal valour. Sir Henry Barnard displayed remarkable care, caution, and vigilance. He brought in safety his convoys, reconnoitred every movement of the foe, and guarded his lines at every point.

The 23rd of June was a day of importance. It was the anniversary of the battle of Plassey, and the mutineers desired to mark the day, by some desperate effort, as one of humiliation to the English. It was also a Mohammedan and a Hindoo holiday; thus various motives combined to incite the enemy to a grand attack. The columns of the enemy maintained renewed assaults throughout the whole day, and the position of the English was at times critical. A plan had been laid to come upon the English rear, but the previous night the bridges over the canal had been broken down by the English sappers, which frustrated the attempt, and kept a considerable number of the enemy fruitlessly occupied. The heat was so great that many officers and men fell down exhausted, and some were the victims of *coup de soleil*. At one o'clock in the afternoon the mutineers made a fierce attack upon a position occupied by the guides, who were left without ammunition—a common occurrence in British armies. The delay which occurred in pro-

uring a supply for the gallant guides, would probably have proved fatal, but a Sikh regiment opportunely arriving from the Punjaub, advanced to the position, and routed a far superior force of the enemy.

The 1st European regiment was engaged in a desperate contest in the suburbs, where, from house to house, a sanguinary conflict raged. The total loss of the British was thirty-nine killed, and one hundred and twenty-one wounded; among the former were Lieutenant Jackson, among the latter Colonel Welchman, Captain Jones, and Lieutenant Money. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, and they appeared for several days to be discouraged, but their reinforcements were so large that they again gained heart; while the English, scarcely able to maintain their position, sick, exhausted with fatigue, inadequately supplied with the necessaries of an army, were disappointed. There is a tone of despondency in the despatches of Sir Henry, which shows that he was apprehensive of the destruction of his army unless speedy succour arrived. By the end of June, the mutineers had surrounded Delhi with batteries. The English had only fifteen siege guns and mortars, placed in batteries too distant to effect anything. The European troops were only three thousand; the Hindoo cavalry and infantry, few in number, were not trusted, and the guns were worked chiefly by men of that sort, who proved themselves inferior to the artillerymen among the mutineers. The guides, Sikhs, and Goorkhas, taken together, did not amount to five thousand men; but there was confidence in them, and they fought well.

When Sir John Lawrence had suppressed revolt in the Punjaub, he sent up the depots of the regiments before Delhi, and some flank companies, also fresh battalions of Punjaubees, guides, and Sikhs, and what Goorkha corps were in his province and available, also a wing of the 61st European regiment, which was followed by detachments of others; he kept the communications open, and thus provisions and medicines were obtainable. Food became plentiful, and the army was healthy when July began. Sir Henry and his troops felt that the Punjaub was a safe and sufficient base of support, and hope once more brightened the countenances of the besiegers. Notwithstanding that there were so many causes to cheer the English, there were still these two discouraging circumstances,—volunteers and mutineers flocked from all parts to augment the rebel garrison, and so great were the resources of the place, that the enemy had everything required for their defence. It became obvious that Lieutenant Willoughby had not destroyed so much ammunition as was sup-

posed; the explosion, however destructive to life among the marauders, left intact vast resources of guns and ammunition.

On the 1st of July an attack was made upon Hindoo Rao's house by about five thousand sepoy. The officer in command had but 150 men, guides; Major Reid, who commanded the pickets on the extreme right, sent him 150 of the rifles, and these three hundred men maintained for twenty-two hours a combat against nearly twenty times their number, and at last the enemy retired. Animadversions were made throughout the army, upon the arrangements which left a post so important to be defended for so long a time by so few men, against a whole division of the enemy, especially as Brigadier Chamberlain and some reinforcements had arrived that morning.

The next morning Rohileund regiments of mutineers, from Bareilly, Moorshedabad, and Shahjehanpore, amounting to five regiments, and a battery of artillery, marched into Delhi, with bands playing and flags flying. This reinforcement led the king and the mutineers to believe that they would be able to expel the English from the neighbourhood, and the Bareilly leader was named commander-in-chief. That night the Bareilly force undertook an expedition in the rear of the English, for the twofold object of cutting off their communications with the Punjaub, and capturing their depot at Alipore. Major Pope and a strong detachment attacked them, and drove them back to the city; the major's force with difficulty effected this end, for the rebels fought with confidence and obstinacy, and the English returned utterly exhausted, having suffered severely.

On the 4th of July Colonel Baird Smith arrived to take charge of the engineer staff. On the 5th General Barnard died, worn out with fatigue, and having proved himself a careful and a brave commander, and capable of handling a small force on the defensive against a more numerous enemy with judgment and patience. Major-general Reid assumed the command, to which, from ill-health, he was unequal.

In July the English were exposed to a new danger. There were two Hindoo regiments with the force, and in the Punjaub regiments there were many; suspicion fell upon them; a plot was detected, a Brahmin was hung for attempting to induce the soldiers to shoot their officers; a large portion of the Hindoos joined the enemy when skirmishing, the rest were *paid-up and dismissed the service, and thus allowed to go into Delhi, and swell the ranks of its garrison.*

The English established a picket in the

Sulzee Munde suburbs; on the 14th of July this was attacked, and the house of Hindoo Rao, in great force. The defenders had to maintain a long and unequal contest, and were left to do so without help for a great length of time; the help at last sent was inadequate, but by sheer dint of hard fighting, Brigadier Showers and his European and Punjaub infantry drove away the enemy. The killed and wounded of the English exceeded two hundred men.

The weather changed, and much rain fell, when sickness came upon the army, and it was found that the hot season was more healthy than the cooler but damp period by which it was followed. By the end of July the sick amounted to twelve hundred men, and the rest were kept perpetually on the alert, although Sir John Lawrence had sent nearly three thousand men during the last fortnight into the north, one third of whom were European fusiliers.

Major-general Reid despaired of the capture of Delhi, and his health no longer allowed of the exertion required from the commander of such an army. He resigned, and the chief command devolved upon Brigadier-general Wilson, who, as a good artilleryist and a plodding, painstaking, persevering man, was considered capable for the operation, although not regarded as an officer adapted to the conduct of a diversified campaign. One officer said of him, that "he was born to take Delhi, and for no other purpose." When General Wilson took the command, he and General Showers were the only generals in perfect health. One hundred and one officers had been killed and died of sun-stroke, cholera, wounds, or were then sick or wounded. Only 8000 men remained of the original army and reinforcements, half of whom were European. Of those called artillerymen, were many natives, of little use except for physical strength; and the Punjaub sappers and miners were merely unskilled labourers. The entire force, according to General Wilson's report to Mr. Colvin, was:—

<i>Infantry—</i>	<i>Officers and Men.</i>
H.M. 8th foot head-quarters	198
H.M. 61st foot "	296
H.M. 75th foot "	513
H.M. 60th Rifles "	299
1st European Bengal Fusiliers	520
2nd " " "	556
Guide Infantry	275
Sirmoor battalion, Goorkhas	296
1st Punjaub Infantry	725
4th Sikh Infantry	345
	—4023
<i>Cavalry—</i>	
H.M. Carabiniers	153
H.M. 9th Lancers	428
Guide Cavalry	338

1st Punjaub Cavalry	148
2nd " "	110
5th " " (at Alipore)	116
	—1293
<i>Artillery and Engineers—</i>	
Artillery, European and native	1129
Bengal Sappers and Miners	209
Punjaub " "	264
	—1602
	6918

Besides these effectives there were as non-effectives 765 sick, 351 wounded—1116.

General Wilson at once adopted means of discovering the numbers and quality of the troops opposed to him, which he thus reported:—Bengal native infantry—3rd, 9th, 11th, 12th, 15th, 20th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 36th, 38th, 44th, 45th, 54th, 57th, 60th, 61st, 67th, 68th, 72nd, 74th, 78th. Other native infantry—5th and 7th Gwalior contingent, Kotah contingent, Hurrianah battalion, together with 2600 miscellaneous infantry. Native cavalry—portions of five or six regiments, besides others of the Gwalior and Malwah contingents. There arrived in the city mutinous regiments from Meerut, Hansi, Muttra, Lucknow, Nusserabad, Jullundur, Ferozepore, Bareilly, Jhansi, Gwalior, Neemuch, Allygurh, Agra, Rohtuk, Jhuggur, and Allahabad. The numbers were estimated by General Wilson at 15,000 infantry, of whom 12,000 were sepoys, the remainder volunteers; 4000 cavalry, well horsed, and well disciplined. The artillery were numerous in proportion, and had every description of supply. The perpetual combats reduced the number of General Wilson's effective troops, notwithstanding the reinforcements which gradually arrived from the Punjaub through the indefatigable industry and good management of Sir John Lawrence and his colleagues. On the 8th of August, Brigadier-general Nicholson arrived with the advance guard of a brigade, organized under his command in the Punjaub, and which in that region had rendered most important services. On the 14th, the main body of the brigade arrived. It consisted of her majesty's 52nd (light infantry), the wing of her majesty's 61st, which had remained in the Punjaub when the other wing had been sent on to Delhi, the 2nd Punjaub infantry, two hundred horse from Mooltan, and some guns. The brigade numbered eleven hundred Europeans, and fourteen hundred Punjaubees. This accession of force was a great relief to the overworked soldiers, wearied with combat and exposure to the sun, but it was too small to enable General Wilson to make any attempt upon Delhi. General Nicholson, however, brought the welcome tidings that Sir John



GENERAL SIR ARCHDALE WILSON, BART. K.C.B.

From a Photograph lent expressly for this Work.

Lawrence had organized a new siege train at Ferozepore, which was on its way to enable General Wilson to subdue the fire of the city. The arrival of General Nicholson inspired new life in the English camp. He was an officer of extraordinary energy, and of the bravest courage.

On the night of the 14th of August, an occasion arose for putting his military excellence to the test. A detachment of the mutineers were observed by General Wilson to move along the Rohtuk road, with the object, as the general supposed, of reaching Sorreput, or of disturbing the Jheered rajah, who was faithful to the English, and procured them supplies. Hodson's horse, already a terror to the "pandies," went out after them, and turning aside, by a flank movement, got before their line of march, and after a desperate battle, dispersed them. The escape of a lady, the wife of a civil officer of the company, to the English lines on the 19th, caused great animation among the troops. She was probably the only European that had remained alive in the place up to that time.

BATTLE OF NUJUFFGHUR.

Soon after Nicholson's arrival, it was his fortune to have an opportunity of showing his ability to command. General Wilson received information that a strong force of mutineers was dispatched by night to Bahadoorghur, for the purpose of intercepting the siege-train from the Punjaub. This force was commanded by Bukhtor Singh, who had distinguished himself in promoting the revolt at Bareilly (to be related elsewhere). General Wilson committed to his newly-arrived and intrepid young brigadier the task of meeting Bukhtor Singh, dispersing his force, and clearing the way for the siege-train. The troops placed at Nicholson's disposal were—

H.M. 9th Lancers	(Captain Sarrell)	One squadron.
Guide cavalry	(Captain Saudford)	120 men.
2nd Panjaub cavalry		50 "
Mooltan horse		" "
H.M. 61st foot	(Colonel Renny)	420 "
1st Bengal Europeans	(Major Jacob)	380 "
1st Panjaub infantry	(Coke's)	400 "
2nd Panjaub infantry	(Greca's)	400 "
Sappers and Miners		30 "
Horse artillery	(Tomb's & Olphert's)	Sixteen guns.
Captain (now Major) Olphert being ill, the command of his troop was taken by Captain Remington.		

With these he sallied forth at dawn on the 25th of August, crossed two swamps, and effected a rapid march through other difficulties, until he reached a place half way between Delhi and the reported destination of the mutineers. Nicholson here learned that they had crossed the Nujuffghur Jheel, and would probably encamp at midday, during the heat,

near the town of Nujuffghur. He pursued, the way being covered three feet deep with water. After a harassing march of ten miles, he, at five o'clock in the evening, came in sight of the mutineers. They were astonished, but not daunted, at seeing a British force; for the division of Bukhtor Singh was composed of six regiments of mutineer infantry, three of irregular cavalry, and the pick of their field artillery, numbering thirteen guns; in all, seven thousand men. He immediately took up a good position, the key of which was an old serai on his left centre, where he put four guns in battery. The plan of Nicholson was partially to subdue the fire of the guns, and then storm the serai, and then sweep down their line of guns to the bridge. This he put into execution with extraordinary celerity, routing the mutineers, and capturing all their guns. The village of Nujuffghur was, however, desperately defended, when Lieutenant Saunders invested it, and left no possibility of escape. The gallant lieutenant fell in the successful execution of his duty, the mutineers were bayoneted, the village burned, and the bridge blown up. Lieutenant Gabbet was also killed, and twenty-five rank and file. Major Jacob, Lieutenant Elkington and seventy men were wounded. The mutineer horse were utterly inefficient, or the victory must have been longer contested and more hardily won.

While Nicholson was absent on this expedition, the fact was learned at Delhi, and an attack upon the mask battery was made in great force, in the hope that the weakened English lines would be unable materially to reinforce it. General Wilson repulsed the attack with little loss to himself, and great loss to the mutineers.

Early in September, the long-expected and much-desired siege-train arrived, and with it the 4th Panjaub infantry, the Patan irregular horse, and reinforcements to her majesty's 8th, 24th, 52nd, and 60th regiments. The same day a Beloochee regiment came from Kurrahee. After all these supplies, the army did not number more than nine thousand men, effective for all purposes, including grass cutters, sycc bearers, labourers, native infantry, recruits yet undisciplined, &c. More reinforcements were wanted, and they were on their way. The sick and wounded reached the enormous proportion of three thousand and seventy, and there was every likelihood that the number of the wounded would increase, as became actually the case, so that Wilson was still importunate for help.

On the 7th of September, the enemy first perceived the skillful and huge preparations made to cannonade the city. The works

proceeded until the 11th, each battery opening fire as it was formed. The enemy formed counter-works, and with skill and courage thwarted the English sappers and labourers, and killed and wounded a considerable number; they incessantly sent forth sorties, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, who showed skill and discipline. Still the work went on, and on the 11th the heavy siege-guns and mortars vomited forth their missiles of destruction. The English were deficient in foot artillerymen, but the gunners and men of the horse artillery volunteered to serve, as did also the officers and men of the infantry and cavalry. The Sikh battery was especially well served, and "won golden opinions from all sorts of men." During the 11th, 12th, 13th, and the morning of the 14th, the bombardment continued, and the mutineers behaved in the most gallant manner, skilfully meeting every emergency as it arose. On the evening of the 13th, breaches appeared to be made in the city wall near the Cashmere bastion, and the Water bastion. Lieutenants Greathed, Home, Medley, and Lang, were ordered to examine and report. This was a perilous undertaking, but was performed in the most intrepid manner; the reports were, that both breaches were practicable. The assault was ordered for the 14th. The assaulting army was thus organized:—

<i>First Column.</i>		
BRIGADIER-GENERAL NICHOLSON.		
H.M. 75th foot (Lieut.-colonel Herbert)	Men. 300	
1st Bengal Europeans (Major Jacob)	250	
2nd Punjab Infantry (Captain Green)	450	
<i>Second Column.</i>		
BRIGADIER JONES.		
H.M. 8th foot (Lieut.-colonel Greathed)	250	
2nd Bengal Europeans (Captain Boyd)	250	
4th Sikh Infantry (Captain Rothney)	350	
<i>Third Column.</i>		
COLONEL CAMPBELL.		
H.M. 52nd foot (Major Vigers)	200	
Kinnon Goorkhas (Captain Ramsay)	250	
1st Punjab Infantry (Lieut. Nicholson)	500	
<i>Fourth Column.</i>		
MAJOR REID.		
Sirmoor Goorkhas	}	Besides Cashmere Contingent, of which strength unknown 850
Guide Infantry		
European pickets		
Native pickets		

Reserve.

BRIGADIER LONGFIELD.	
H.M. 61st foot (Lieut.-colonel Deacon)	250
4th Punjab Infantry (Captain Wilde)	450
Belooch battalion (Lieut.-colonel Farghlar)	300
Jbeed auxiliaries (Lieut.-colonel Dunsford)	300

The following engineer officers were attached to the several columns.

To the 1st column, Lieuts. Medley, Lang, and Bingham.
" 2nd " " Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton.
" 3rd " " Home, Salkeld, and Tandy.
" 4th " " Mansell and Tennant.
" Reserve " " Ward and Thackeray.

The order of attack was as follows:—The first column to assault the main breach, and escalade the face of the Cashmere bastion. This column was to be covered by a detachment of the 60th. The second column to enter the breach at the Water bastion, having a similar detachment of rifles to cover their approach. The third column to attack the Cashmere gate, preceded by a party of engineers, under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, to blow open the gate with petards and powder. This attempt was to be covered by a party of the ubiquitous rifles. The fourth column to force an entrance at the Cabul gate. A rifle party also covered this approach. The reserves were further strengthened, as a *demier ressort*, by the remainder of the rifles. The cavalry, under Brigadier Grant, were disposed so as to guard the lines, the sick, and wounded, and prevent the enemy from making a sortie in any direction. At four o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the assault began. The rifles skirmished, and on dashed the columns at the double quick, Nicholson's first. The assailants suffered terribly from the well-directed and soldierly play of the mutineer artillery. The English officers and men, especially the former, covered themselves with glory; no danger daunted, no obstacle remained unsurmounted. The breaches were entered by the first and second columns almost simultaneously, Nicholson leading. The two columns wheeled to the right, and drove the desperate mutineers along the ramparts, captured successively the batteries, the tower between the Cashmere and Moree bastions, the Moree bastion, and the Cabul gate. The Bum bastion and Lahore gate defied every assault, the mutineers meeting the approaching victors with cool and resolute steadiness, and mowing down by volleys of musketry officers and men as they approached. Nicholson led his men along a narrow lane against the Lahore gate; the passage was swept by grape and musketry, and the noble young general fell desperately wounded. The grief and indignation of his soldiers was unbounded; their efforts were fierce, but the lane was swept by bullets, as a tunnel by a fierce wind, or a penetrating torrent. The troops made good their conquests to the Cabul gate, threw up sand-bags for shelter, and turned the vanquished guns against the city. While the first two columns were thus alike successful and baffled, that directed against the Cashmere gate dashed on enthusiastically, under a fire, near, precise, and deadly. The Cashmere gate was of prodigious strength, and a party of marksmen, stationed at a wicket, rendered all approach to it little short of certain death.

It was necessary that this gate should be forced by the engineers. Two parties of these were formed, led by Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, assisted by Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, attended by sappers carrying bags of powder, which they laid. Home was for a moment stunned, but speedily recovered; Carmichael was killed, and a native, named Madhoo, fell with him. How Lieutenant Home and his small party ever reached the gate is almost inconceivable; they had to clamber across a broken bridge in the light of a fine bright morning, under the eye and rifle-range of the mutineers. As soon as the bags were laid, the party slid down into the ditch to make way for the party by whom the powder was to be fired, which was headed by Lieutenant Salkeld. Colonel Baird Smith thus reported the exploit:—"Lieutenant Salkeld, while endeavouring to fire the charge, was shot through the arm and leg, and handed over the slow-match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded just as he had successfully accomplished the onerous duty. Havildar Tilluh Singh, of the Sikhs, was wounded, and Ramloll Sepoy, of the same corps, was killed during this part of the operation. The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily not wounded, caused the bugler (Hawthorne) to sound the regimental call of the 52nd, as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amidst the noise of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with complete success." Sergeant Smith, fearing that the match had not taken, rushed forward, but saw the train burning, and had barely time to cast himself into the ditch, when the ponderous mass of wood and stone blew into fragments. The third column rushed through the gate, when the bugle-call of Lieutenant Home broke upon their ear. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe guided this body through byways to the great thoroughfare, called the Chandnee Chowk, in hope of gaining the Jumma Musjid. The column was assailed with desperate bravery, and driven before the sepoy's for an English mile, near to the gate by which it entered, where, with difficulty, it took up positions of some strength. But for the supports, it would have been beaten out of the city, so determined were the sepoy's, and so great their numbers. The reserve pressed on to the support of the third column, and all their help was required. The reserve, as well as the third column, established itself within the gate. The attack under Major Reid on the western suburbs failed, arising from the inefficiency of the Cashmerian contingent, the bravery and num-

bers of the sepoy's, and their contempt for the native force under Captain Dwyer's command. After a fearful conflict for possession of the Eedghah, the whole attack on the western side was abandoned. The English held the posts there, even within the gates; the enemy showed unflinching resolution, and even threatened the English flanks and rear. Night closed over the sanguinary scene, the English having lost eight officers killed, and fifty-two wounded; one hundred and sixty-two English, and one hundred and three native soldiers killed, five hundred and twelve English, and three hundred and ten natives wounded. The first and second columns held all the towers, bastions, and ramparts, from the vicinity of the Cashmere gate to the Cabul gate; the third column and the reserve held the Cashmere gate, the English church, Skinner's house, the Water bastion, Ahmed Ali Khan's house, the college-gardens, and many buildings and open spots in that part of Delhi; while the fourth column, defeated in the western suburbs, had retreated to the camp or the ridge.

On the morning of the 15th, the British dragged fresh mortars into position between the gates of Cashmere and Cabul, so as to command the imperial palace. A battery was also raised in the college-gardens. When day dawned, the advanced posts skirmished, and the work of blood began again. The mutineers loopholed the houses and walls, and thence took patient and efficient aim. The 15th wore away, on the whole, in favour of the defenders. On the 16th, the college-garden batteries breached the magazine—part of which Lieutenant Willoughby had blown up on the 11th of May. It was stormed and taken by the Punjaubees and Beloochees, supported by a wing of the 61st. The loss was slight, and the advantage decisive. The enemy abandoned the western suburb, which was taken possession of by a native battalion, sent down from the house of Hindoo Rao. The 16th ended on the whole in favour of the British.

The 17th dawned upon both parties eager for slaughter, and each resolute to assert its superiority. On this day a series of combats began for the possession of the ramparts, which were continued into the next day. The struggle issued in the interest of the English. Drawing a line from the magazine to the Cabul gate, all north of that line was now in the hands of the English. On the 18th the English threw forth columns of attack against the south part of the city, capturing the great buildings successively. The magazine, now in the hands of the English, supplied mortars, with which they shelled the palace, and the

strong houses occupied by the mutineers. The women and children began to flee, carrying with them the wounded. General Wilson allowed them to escape. Many sepoys took advantage of this indulgence to get away from the city.

Early on the 19th the Bum bastion, before which so many men and officers fell, was taken by surprise, by a party from the Cabul gate. Captain Hodson reconnoitred with his horse along the northern and western face of the city, and took possession of a cavalry camp which the enemy had formed there.

An attack was made upon the palace; the gates were strong, but were blown open by gunpowder. The place was found deserted, except by the wounded, &c., and a body of Mohammedan fanatics, who fought to the last. The city was now conquered, at an expense of four thousand men killed, missing, and wounded, out of about double that number engaged in the actual conflict. The havoc among the sepoys was terrific. No quarter was given on either side. The sepoys in despair shot themselves, or rushed upon the bayonets of the assailants, and perished. Many of the inhabitants cut the throats of their wives and children, believing that the English had hearts like themselves, and would murder the helpless. Their astonishment was as great as their gratitude was feeble when they found that the English spared women, children, and wounded, and regarded every non-combatant enemy as under their protection. The English soldiers slew all the male inhabitants they encountered.

The English lost many men from sickness and fatigue, and nearly six hundred horses fell dead from over work, or were killed by the bullets of the enemy.

The sights which met the gaze of the English when, the enemy being completely vanquished, they had time to look around them, were horrible. Christian women had been crucified naked against the houses, and native women and children, butchered by the sepoys, to avert the same fate at the hands of the English, lay scattered in streets and houses. Shattered ruins, mangled limbs, dead bodies, slain and wounded horses, lay in profusion in every direction. The English found large sums of money on the persons of the dead and wounded. The Sikhs and Beloochees, and most especially the guides, were expert in these discoveries. The English soldiers, breaking the spirit depots, drank to excess; and in this state bayoneted numbers of the inhabitants, who had found temporary security in hiding-places.

The king, and his family and retainers, fled from the city with the multitude. Captain

(afterwards Major) Hodson was at that juncture assistant quartermaster-general, and intelligence-officer on General Wilson's staff. On the 21st this officer learned that the king and his retinue had left by the Ajmeer gate, and had gone to the Kootub, a palace nine miles distant. Hodson, ever energetic and enterprising, wished to go in pursuit. Wilson, ever careful and cautious, hesitated. Zeenat Mahal, a begum and great favourite of the emperor, came to the camp, offering terms to the English, as if the royal person was too sacred for the victorious English to molest, and as if majesty still belonged to the imperial fugitive. Sepoys and armed retainers were rapidly gathering round the king, and Wilson believed that he could not spare troops to attack them. Hodson, chafing under this timid policy, at a moment when everything was to be gained by daring, and much might be lost by timidity or time-serving, requested permission to go after the king with his horse, and offer him his life on condition of surrender. He started forth, with fifty troopers, to Hoornayoon's tomb, distant from the palace about three miles. He sent a message to the king, who replied that he would give himself up to the captain, if with his own lips he repeated the assurance of his safety from personal violence. To this Hodson assented. The king came forth with his retainers. Hodson met him at the gate of the splendid tomb. The captain was the only white man amidst several thousand natives, but fear for the consequence he had none.

The king, Zeenat Mahal, and her son Jumma Bukt, were brought to Delhi by Hodson, and delivered to the civil authorities.

The next morning Hodson, with his troopers, started again, before any fresh interdict could be laid upon his daring. He went in pursuit of three of the princes, who had been the inciters of the atrocities which had taken place in Delhi, and who had themselves perpetrated disgraceful scenes. These princes were concealed in the tomb of Hoornayoon. Hodson succeeded, by dint of dextrous manœuvre, in getting possession of these royal personages. The tomb was occupied by armed scoundrels from the city. He sternly ordered them to lay down their arms and depart,—they obeyed. He sent a carriage on to the city with the prisoners, and a small escort; he, having dispersed the vagabonds from the neighbourhood of the tomb, followed with his troopers. Overtaking the cavalcade, he found the equipage surrounded by a mob, who were bent upon rescuing the prisoners. An officer of the troop thus relates what followed:—"This was no time for hesitation or delay. Hodson dashed at once into the



GENERAL NICHOLSON.

From a Daguerreotype by Kilburn

midst—in few but energetic words explained 'that these were the men who had not only rebelled against the government, but had ordered and witnessed the massacre and shameful exposure of innocent women and children; and that thus therefore the government punished such traitors, taken in open resistance'—shooting them down at the word. The effect was instantaneous and wonderful. Not another hand was raised, not another weapon levelled, and the Mohammedans of the troop and some influential moulvies among the bystanders exclaimed, as if by simultaneous impulse, 'Well and rightly done! Their crime has met with its just penalty. These were they who gave the signal for the death of helpless women and children, and outraged decency by the exposure of their persons, and now a righteous judgment has fallen on them. God is great!' The remaining weapons were then laid down, and the crowd slowly and quietly dispersed. The bodies were carried into the city, and thrown out on the very spot where the blood of their innocent victims still stained the earth. They remained there till the 24th,

when, for sanitary reasons, they were removed from the Chibootra in front of the Kotwallee. The effect of this just retribution was as miraculous on the populace as it was deserved by the criminals."

General Nicholson died of the wounds he received in the capture of Delhi. The Honourable East India Company granted his widowed and bereaved mother the sum of £500 a year pension. Lieutenant Philip Salkeld was one of the best and bravest officers who fell in that memorable conflict. He survived until the 10th of October, when his wounds proved fatal. He was a native of Dorsetshire, and son of a clergyman. He, and his companion, Lieutenant Home, who survived the assault, received the Victoria Cross; but the latter did not live long to wear it, for on the 1st of October he was mortally wounded, while in pursuit of the fugitive rebels.

Having brought the siege of Delhi to a close, our readers must now be conducted to other scenes, partly contemporaneous with, and partly consequent upon, the physical and moral triumph achieved over the capital of the insurrection.

CHAPTER CXXXII.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELIEF OF CAWNPORE AND LUCKNOW—MARCH OF COLONEL NEILL'S COLUMN UPON CAWNPORE—ITS SUCCESS—MARCH OF OUTRAM AND HAVELOCK UPON LUCKNOW—RELIEF OF THE RESIDENCY—ADVANCE OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL TO LUCKNOW—REMOVAL OF THE GARRISON TO CAWNPORE.

ON the 1st of July Colonel Neill sent off a column of relief to rescue General Wheeler and his little garrison, who were then supposed to be living. The force dispatched by the gallant Neill consisted of two hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, two hundred of the 84th foot, three hundred Sikhs, and one hundred and twenty irregular cavalry. Major Renaud commanded the whole. It was intended to send another column forward as soon as possible. Before the second column could be prepared for its destination, and indeed only a few hours after the departure of the first, Brigadier-general Havelock arrived at Allahabad, and took the command of all the troops there, the government at Calcutta having given him the direction of the expeditionary forces designed to relieve both Cawnpore and Lucknow. In the chapter on the Persian war the arrival of General Havelock at Calcutta was noticed. Thence he pro-

ceeded, as quickly as possible, up country with such troops as he could take, after having dispatched others to strengthen Neill at Allahabad. Two days after Havelock's arrival, and before Neill's second column of relief was organized, Captain Spurgeon was sent forward towards Cawnpore, with one hundred Madras Europeans, armed with the Enfield rifles, twelve artillerymen, and two 6-pounder guns. Land conveyance being unattainable, this party went up the river by the steamer *Brahmapootra*. Its progress was opposed by a fire of musketry and a cannon from the Oude side of the river. The party landed, defeated the enemy, and captured the gun. Major Renaud had to skirmish with rebels day by day, for the whole population was hostile. On the 10th he learned what had occurred at Cawnpore, and the same day the sepoys and insurgents reached Futtehpore, to intercept the relieving troops. The force

of Major Renaud was eight hundred and twenty men and two guns; that of the rebels was three thousand five hundred men and twelve guns. Havelock was anxious to strengthen at once the major's party, but the forces at his disposal were extremely small, and reinforcements arrived only in dribbles. Havelock was of opinion that if he had "one thousand Europeans, one thousand Sikhs, and one thousand Goorkhas, he could thrash everything;" but, alas, he could only gather together about two thousand men of all arms.

It was on the 7th of July that Havelock mustered his little army at Allahabad; on the 12th he formed a junction with the advanced column, after a terrible march under the fierce sun of an Indian July. The main body of the enemy occupied strong posts at Futtehpore. The trunk road was alone available for the attacking party, the fields on each side being laid deep under water. The city of Futtehpore was only approachable through a fire directed under the cover of mango groves, enclosures, loopholed walls, and other defences. The British leader, having determined to give battle, sought to draw on the enemy to an imprudent onset against himself. He placed his eight guns across the road, protected by one hundred men of the 64th, armed with the Enfield rifles. The enemy paused; during the hesitation Havelock advanced, his infantry coming on at deploying distance, covered by rifle skirmishers, the few cavalry he possessed on the flanks. The 64th, his own regiment, formed his centre, the Highlanders his right, the 84th and the Sikhs his left. The enemy fled precipitately, aved by the range of the rifles, the rapidity of Captain Maude's guns, and the steady advance of the infantry. Their attempts to defend some hillocks, and high walls bounding garden enclosures, were defeated with the ease and skill characteristic of Havelock. He turned every defence with such celerity and prudence that he incurred hardly any loss in dispossessing the enemy of the strongest posts. Having driven them through the city, capturing their guns, Havelock hoped that the battle was won; but the enemy drew up beyond the city in a well-chosen position. The English were nearly exhausted, and the irregular native cavalry showed symptoms of going over to the foe. The moment was critical, but Havelock was the man for a crisis. He again advanced, using his men cautiously, and throwing forward the skirmishers and guns; the enemy was again routed. Havelock congratulated himself that seldom was a success so great achieved with a loss so small. He did not lose a single European; six native soldiers

were killed and three wounded. After alternate marching and repose, most skilfully and judiciously distributed, so as not to exhaust the men, and yet achieving celerity of advance, Havelock again came up with the foe on the 15th. They were posted at the village of Asang, some twenty miles from Cawnpore. The sepoy made little resistance, the fame of Havelock and his army of Persia had reached them, and the previous battle of Futtehpore dispirited them. They retreated precipitately before the advance guard, under Colonel Tytler, leaving guns and baggage as trophies of the easy triumph.

The captured position was within five miles of another intrenched position, at the head of a bridge crossing the Nuddee. This was carried by Havelock in the most gallant style. The action was fought on the same day as that at the village. In both battles Havelock had only twenty-six men wounded, chiefly of the Madras Fusiliers; among the wounded was Major Renaud. One man was killed. The enemy suffered severely. The moral effect of these triumphs was signal; the British became so confident, and regarded the enemy with such contempt, that they were willing to attack against any odds. The enemy was appalled by the celerity of the British, and the skill with which they were handled. The name of Havelock, although little known in England, was regarded with much respect by the sepoy who had fought in the various campaigns where the hero had distinguished himself. So bad had been the conduct of the sowars of the Oude and Bengal cavalry that it became necessary to dismount them.

The next task of General Havelock was to march upon Cawnpore itself. Nana Sahib resolved to confront him, but the sweeping victories of the British general alarmed him, and excited his vengeance to the uttermost. According to the generally received opinion, it was after the passage of the Nuddee by Havelock that the Sahib ordered the massacre of Cawnpore. Having perpetrated that sanguinary act, he advanced with his army to Akerwa, as at that place the road to the cantonments diverges from the road to the town. Five fortified villages, the approaches intrenched, and supporting one another, defended his position. The march from the Pandoo Nuddee to Akerwa was sixteen miles, which was accomplished during the night, but amidst clouds of dust; the night, too, was heavy and sultry, and the men were greatly tired by their exertions. On reconnoitring the position, Havelock saw that to attempt to storm it in front would be destruction; he therefore resolved to make a flank movement, coming upon the enemy's left. The baggage

remained three miles in the rear, at Malharajpore. On the 16th the troops were halted until the heat of the day had subsided, a friendly mango grove affording shade. Clumps of this wood extended along the left front of the enemy's position, and enabled Havelock to execute, unobserved, the flank movement which he had already resolved. When the enemy at last detected the attempt to turn their left, evident signs of astonishment and alarm were indicated; large bodies of cavalry and strong detachments of guns were thrown forward against the advancing British, in the hope even yet of frustrating the manœuvre. It was in vain; the resistless courage of the British, and of their wise and energetic chief, overbore all opposition. The villages were captured, seven guns fell to the victors, a force ten times their number was dispersed, the Nana was humbled on the field of battle in the presence of his retainers and the mutineers, who were discontented with his command. Havelock had only six men killed, but nearly one hundred wounded, among whom were several of his bravest officers. All fought well; if any surpassed, the general's own son, Lieutenant Henry Marsham Havelock, and Major Stirling, of the 64th, were the successful competitors for glory.

The little army of conquerors rested on the field of battle, and on the 17th entered Cawnpore. The battle of Akerwa had given the city to them as their prize: during the night the enemy blew up the arsenal and magazine, and abandoned the place. Havelock had marched one hundred and twenty-six miles, fought and gained four battles, and captured twenty-four guns in ten days. On entering the city, it was the bitter disappointment and grief of the conquerors to find that those whom they fought to rescue were beyond all help.

Havelock followed the enemy to Blitoor. Four thousand men, chiefly sepoy, defended the post the Nana had chosen. Two streams lay between the assailants and assailed, which could not be forded; there were bridges, but they were fortified. This obliged Havelock to storm the position in front, which was accomplished with chivalrous valour, and the enemy chased for miles, but the English being without cavalry, could not maintain pursuit.

The palace of the murderer was given to the flames, his guns were captured, and his intrenchments levelled.

Havelock sent to Allahabad, where Neill remained in command, urging that officer to come to his assistance with what troops he could collect. Neill hastened forward with less than three hundred soldiers, and was nominated to the command of Cawnpore. This gallant soldier immediately proceeded to secure the

place, and to bring to account all persons guilty of any participation in the late atrocities. He caused the high caste Brahmins to wash off the blood from the ensanguined floor where much of the slaughter had been perpetrated. Many he hung, and many more he blew away from guns.

Neill's work at Cawnpore was as effectual as it was in itself revolting to his gallant heart. He avenged the fallen by many a sacrifice, and with his small garrison awed rebellion into stillness. Havelock's task was to advance upon Lucknow, where the brave garrison, under Brigadier-general Inglis, were maintaining a wondrous defence. Havelock surmounted all the difficulties which impeded his passage into Oude. He had scarcely marched six miles from the Ganges when he was met by a messenger from Lucknow, who had made his way through the enemy, and after encountering various perils, reached the general. He brought a plan of the city, prepared by Major Anderson, and various details of an important nature from the pen of General Inglis. A man of less purpose and resource than Havelock must have shrunk from the undertaking before him. He had but fifteen hundred men, after the losses incurred by battles, sickness, and sun-stroke. The number of his guns was ten, and these badly mounted. He could easily have brought with him twice that number, if cattle had been procurable; but he would not have had a sufficient number of artillerymen to work them. He had received information from Lucknow that the enemy was strong in numbers, ordnance, and position. The Nana had again collected his forces, and with three thousand men was preparing to place himself between Havelock and the Ganges, so as to cut off the general's retreat upon Cawnpore. Seldom, if ever, was a commander placed in circumstances more trying and difficult—seldom, if ever, did one snatch victory and honour from fortune with so much glory.

On the 29th of July, at Oonao, the enemy intercepted his march. They occupied a fortified village, protected on each flank, so as to render it impossible to turn either. The position was stormed. The beaten enemy, as if reinforced, drew up in line upon the open plain. Havelock followed, and gained another decided victory, capturing the enemy's guns, and with his invincible infantry putting a host of sowars, as well as sepoy, to flight. During these desperate encounters, Jupah Singh, a lieutenant of Nana Sahib, hung upon the British flank, watching for the least symptom of disorder to fall upon it. Disease now broke out in the British ranks, and carried off numbers. Havelock advanced to Busherunt-

gunge, a fortified place, defended by a numerous and vindictive foe. He captured it before the sun set, thus gaining another victory on that day of glory.

Cholera, dysentery, fever, all now smote the little band. To proceed without reinforcements would be annihilation. His few soldiers were in great destitution of all the requisites of an army. The general gave the reluctant but absolutely necessary order to retire upon Mungulwar. On the 31st they reached that place in their retrograde movement. From his halting-ground he sent back the sick and wounded to Cawnpore. Neill sent forward every disposable man that he had, and swelled Havelock's little band to the number of fourteen hundred Europeans; no natives remained, desertion, battle, sickness, and disbanding had annihilated them. Havelock's volunteer cavalry reconnoitred the surrounding country, and as this corps consisted of officers belonging to disbanded or revolted corps, they were very efficient, and were able to bring in valuable intelligence of the enemy's movements. It was discovered that the Nana's people had blocked up the line of march, and also the line of retreat, and the rebels were full of hope that they would cut off Havelock's entire force. The English chief having learned that his sick and wounded had reached that place in safety, and having received the small reinforcement sent forward by Neill, again advanced, and a second time found the enemy in force at Buseruntgunge. The disparity of force was such that victory could only be obtained by superior generalship. The English chief threw his little force of cavalry in front, disposing of them so as to make their numbers appear much greater than they were, while he sent his guns and infantry to turn the enemy's flanks. The clever manner in which these dispositions were made, and the great celerity of movement characteristic of Havelock, led to signal success. The shells of the English created such havoc in the town that the enemy fled, and in their flight "ran the gauntlet" under a terrible fire of grape and rifle balls. Two guns were captured, and many of the rebels slain. The intelligence now received by Havelock left him no hope that with the force at his command he could force the road to Lucknow, far less conquer his way to the relief of the residency. He again retired upon Mungulwar, and thence telegraphed to the commander-in-chief, Sir Patrick Grant, informing him of the precise condition of affairs.

On the morning of the 11th of August, General Havelock's men numbered one thousand; sickness, sun-stroke, and the late battle, had reduced the force with which his second

advance was made by nearly one-third. Neill had only two hundred and fifty men at Cawnpore able to do duty, and death had reduced the invalids to about an equal number. The enemy between Mungulwar and Lucknow numbered thirty thousand; and there were at least three strongly-fortified positions on the road. At Bhitoor they had again collected in considerable numbers. All the zemindars and villagers had joined the sepoys. Such was the position of affairs when the English commander learned that four thousand rebels had advanced to the position of Buseruntgunge, from which the sepoys had been already twice driven by signal battle. It was necessary to dislodge these. During his march, the country people flocked armed to the enemy's lines, so as nearly to double the numbers in occupation of the strong defences which an abundant supply of labour had enabled them to throw up. Havelock found the obstacles greater on this occasion than on the two former instances of combat there. An advanced village, named Boursekce Chowkec, was defended by a strong redoubt. A party of the 78th Highlanders, without firing a shot, or uttering a shout, charged and captured this battery. Lieutenant Crowe was the first man to enter the redoubt, where, for a few moments, he remained unsupported, displaying the most heroic intrepidity. Havelock recommended him for the Victoria Cross, which high honour he obtained. The loss of the enemy was very heavy, that of Havelock slight; but every man by which the number of the British was diminished told terribly upon the little force, and rendered a successful advance against Lucknow more hopeless. Havelock determined to retire on Cawnpore, whither he arrived on the night of the 13th of August. It was well that this movement was executed, for Nana Sahib, with the accession of the greater part of three revolted or disbanded regiments of sepoys, a large body of sowars, and a crowd of Mahrattas, was preparing to attack the diminutive garrison of Cawnpore. Havelock and Neill concocted a plan for dispersing these forces. Neill, with a few hundred men, attacked the extreme left of the Nana's army which menaced Cawnpore, gained a victory, and drove the enemy from the immediate vicinity of the city. Havelock, mustering all the men which he and Neill had at their disposal, marched, on the 16th, to Bhitoor, and once more attacked that place. The Nana had about ten thousand men in a position before Bhitoor, which the experienced Havelock declared was one of the strongest he had ever seen. The brigadier had just thirteen hundred men. The plans laid for the attack were such as



MAJOR GENERAL SIR J. E. W. INGLIS, K.C.B.
DEFENDER OF THE GARRISON AT LUCKNOW

From a Photograph by Mayall.

only a man of genius could conceive; they were well calculated to effect great results with little cost of blood. The advance of the 78th Highlanders, and Madras European Fusiliers, upon the principal point of attack, was at once so rapid and orderly, so cautious, and yet fearless, that the enemy were struck with astonishment, yielded to panic, and were utterly defeated. Some of the mutineers fought with greater courage than had been anywhere displayed by them, except at Delhi. Neill now demanded that a body of troops which had been marching and fighting for six weeks without intermission should have rest, or they must sink by sheer exhaustion. Havelock yielded to the opinion of his glorious colleague, and awaited reinforcements. In vain, however, did he telegraph; the incompetency at Calcutta marred everything. Help from Allahabad was impossible; there, and at Benares, the English were in daily alarm of attack or insurrection. The condition of Havelock now became one of the most imminent peril. So far from hoping to reach Lucknow, he telegraphed that he must abandon Cawnpore, as he had only seven hundred men fit for duty, while thirty-seven thousand mutineers and rebels menaced him on every side. He sent his sick and wounded to Allahabad. He could bring into the field eight efficiently mounted guns. The enemy, he knew, had thirty field-guns, well manned, and with all necessary *materiel*. He declared his willingness to "fight anything, and against all odds," but reminded the Calcutta authorities that "the loss of a single battle would be the ruin of everything in that part of India."

On the 23rd of August, he heard from Lucknow that the garrison was suffering to extremity, that there were one hundred and twenty sick and wounded, two hundred and twenty women, and two hundred and thirty children. During the remainder of August, Havelock remained at Cawnpore, which place was almost invested by the rebels.

Major-general Sir James Outram was appointed to a local command, which placed him over Neill and Havelock. Sir James arrived at Dinapore August the 18th. Just then Sir Colin Campbell landed to take the command of the army in India. Outram was finally ordered to advance with such reinforcements as could be brought together from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and thence, with Havelock and Neill, to resume the march upon Lucknow. Outram found that seventeen hundred men had arrived at Allahabad; with about fourteen hundred of these he proceeded to Cawnpore. Outram, on his way, heard of a manoeuvre of the enemy to interrupt the com-

munications between Cawnpore and Allahabad. Committing a small body of troops to Major Vincent Eyre, that officer mounted some on elephants, some on horses, and by various expedients accomplished a forced march and a surprise, cutting up nearly the whole.

On the 15th of September Outram reached Cawnpore. He was Havelock's senior officer, and the command of the relieving force devolved upon him. He immediately issued an order of the day, declining to deprive Havelock of the command; that the noble deeds of that officer pointed him out as the general upon whom the honour of relieving Lucknow ought to devolve; that Brigadier-general Havelock was promoted to the rank of Major-general, and that he, Sir James Outram, would accompany the force in his civil capacity as commissioner of Oude, and as a volunteer. He actually assumed the command of the volunteer horse. This noble act on the part of the gallant Outram was appreciated by his country, which was proud of the chivalry and magnanimity he displayed.

On the 19th of September the British crossed the Ganges. On the 21st, they came up with the rebels at Mungulwar; a battle ensued, in which the English displayed perfect knowledge of the art of war, turned with ease the positions, and with little loss drove the enemy headlong, capturing four guns. The soldier whose personal valour on this occasion was most conspicuous was Sir James Outram, who, sword in hand, charged the guns, and set an example of dauntless bravery to the little army. This was the chief struggle on the march.

When the British arrived at Lucknow, they had to fight their way through lanes of streets, and by enclosures, every wall loopholed, and every defensible spot fortified. Through every obstacle the heroic soldiers forced their way, and arrived wearied, but victorious, at the residency. The joy of the garrison at Lucknow on the arrival of Havelock was such as they alone can feel who have escaped such great and terrible perils. From the death of Sir Henry Lawrence, already recorded, until Havelock forced his way to the residency, the little garrison was exposed to incessant attacks from enemies as cowardly as they were cruel. The state of excitement in which the beleaguered British were, upon the approach of the all-conquering Havelock, forms one of the most romantic and touching stories in a history so abounding in them. On the 22nd of September, spies made their way into the residency, and announced that Havelock was at hand. On the next day they heard a furious cannonade, but distant; the 24th, the cannonade nearer, but still

distant, was renewed, and every ear listened with breathless suspense; the bridge of boats across the river was covered with fugitive sepoys. Still hope was chequered with fear, for the spies had informed General Inglis that the relieving force was small, not much above two thousand men, while it was known that more than fifty thousand rebels were prepared to dispute their entrance to Lucknow. At last the British were heard fighting their way through the streets. One* of those who fought and suffered within the residency, a civilian, thus narrates the events of that exciting and all-important moment:—"The immense enthusiasm with which they were greeted defies description. As their hurrah and ours rang in my ears, I was nigh bursting with joy. The tears started involuntarily into my eyes, and I felt—no! it is impossible to describe in words that sudden sentiment of relief, that mingled feeling of hope and pleasure, that came over me. The criminal condemned to death, and, just when he is about to be launched into eternity, is reprieved and pardoned,—or, the shipwrecked sailor, whose hold on the wreck is relaxing, and is suddenly rescued, can alone form an adequate idea of our feelings. We felt not only happy, happy beyond imagination, and grateful to that God of mercy, who by our noble deliverers, Generals Havelock and Outram, and their gallant troops, had thus snatched us from imminent death; but we also felt proud of the defence we had made, and the success with which, with such fearful odds to contend against, we had preserved, not only our own lives, but the honour and lives of the women and children entrusted to our keeping. As our deliverers poured in, they continued to greet us with loud hurrahs; and, as each garrison heard it, we sent up one fearful shout to heaven—"Hurrah!"—it was not 'God help us'—it was the first rallying cry of a despairing host. Thank God, we then gazed upon new faces of our countrymen. We ran up to them—officers and men, without distinction—and shook them by the hand, how cordially who can describe? The shrill tones of the Highlanders' bagpipes now pierced our ears. Not the most beautiful music ever was more welcome, more joy-bringing. And these brave men themselves, many of them bloody and exhausted, forgot the pain of their wounds, the fatigue of overcoming the fearful obstacles they had combated for our sakes, in the pleasure of having accomplished our relief."

Immediately on joining the garrison at the residency Sir James Outram assumed the

supreme authority. Generals Havelock and Inglis, who had so nobly distinguished themselves in the responsibility of independent commanders, acted in obedience to the orders of his excellency the commissioner for Oude and commander of the British forces in that and neighbouring provinces. From the death of Sir Henry Lawrence to the arrival of Outram and Havelock, General Inglis defended the residency with indomitable fortitude, and with a skill which raised him to a high place amongst British generals. The defence of the residency of Lucknow by Inglis would require a whole volume to do it justice. Its details, chiefly military, or records of sufferings and faith on the part of the garrison, are alone suitable to an especial narrative of that separate episode of Indian war.

The relieving army did not possess sufficient strength to drive away the rebels. The whole force was hemmed in until a fresh relief, under the command of Sir Colin Campbell, arrived in November. During that interval fierce attacks were made upon the garrison, and much heroism was required for its defence. Provisions ran short, cholera was among the soldiers and civilians, so that brief as was the space of time which elapsed until the arrival of Sir Colin, it was spent arduously and anxiously. As soon as Sir James Outram perceived that he could not withdraw the garrison, he determined to enlarge the space occupied by his troops, both from military and sanitary considerations. Part of the newly-arrived force had maintained a position outside of the enclosure during the night after their arrival; means were taken to secure and even extend that position. It was deemed desirable to include within it the clock-tower, the jail, a mosque, the Taree Kattree, the palace called Fureed Buksh, the Pyne Bagh (or garden), and other buildings, gardens, and houses. The 26th was a day of conflict and toil to secure these objects, to collect the wounded without the residency, and bear them to a place of safety. When the palaces and other buildings were thus brought within the garrison enclosure they were regarded no longer with respect, but their contents were made a spoil by the conquerors, according to the usages of war in such cases. Mr. Rees (already quoted) gives a graphic description of what then occurred:—"Everywhere might be seen people helping themselves to whatever they pleased. Jewels, shawls, dresses, pieces of satin, silk, broadcloths, coverings, rich embroidered velvet saddles for horses and elephants, the most magnificent divan carpets studded with pearls, dresses of cloth of gold, turbans of the most costly brocade, the finest muslius, the most valuable swords

* Mr. L. E. Runtz Rees' *Personal Narrative*, p. 321.



T. M. Hunt

GEN. LORD CLYDE, G.C.B.

From a Photograph by Mayall.

LONDON. JAMES S VIRTUE.

and poniards, thousands of flint-guns, caps, muskets, ammunition, cash, books, pictures, European locks, English clothes, full-dress officers' uniforms, epaulettes, aiguillettes, manuscripts, charms; vehicles of the most grotesque forms, shaped like fish, dragons, and sea-horses; imauns, or representations of the prophet's hands; cups, saucers, cooking-utensils, china-ware sufficient to set up fifty merchants in Lombard Street, scientific instruments, ivory telescopes, pistols, and (what was better than all) tobacco, tea, rice, grain, spices, and vegetables."

Sir James organized a system by which some intelligence might be almost daily learned of the proceedings of friends and foes. His first information was that one of the royal princes, a child eight or nine years old, had been made King of Oude, or viceroy to the King of Delhi, and he was supported by a council of state. Sir James also learned that Sir Mountstuart Jackson, his sister, and other fugitives from Setapore, were prisoners in the city, and that the day of their execution was appointed.

Throughout the month of October there was much fighting; General Inglis commanded in the residency, General Havelock in the outer portion of the defence: his was undoubtedly the post of danger, labour, and anxiety, and the genius which characterized his advance from Cawnpore was displayed in his defence of the Lucknow residency. In order to facilitate the advance of Sir Colin Campbell, Havelock was incessantly engaged blowing up houses and clearing streets, so as to lessen the opposition which the commander-in-chief would receive. About four miles from the residency was a place called Alum Bagh, where Havelock had left a few hundred men on his advance, and with them his stores and baggage, sick, wounded, and camp followers. The enemy got between these two places, cut off the communication, and laid siege to both. The Alum Bagh garrison was enabled, however, to keep open a portion of the Cawnpore road, and the garrison there maintained communication, sending some reinforcements and considerable supplies to the Alum Bagh. Thus on the 3rd of October a convoy arrived of a valuable nature, which three hundred men were enabled to escort. On the 14th a second convoy was dispatched from Cawnpore, but was driven back by the enemy. A third convoy was successful. Colonel Wilson skillfully kept open the communication with such dribbles of troops as from time to time reached Cawnpore. The rebels left the Alum Bagh comparatively unmolested, nearly their whole energies being devoted to the subjugation of the residency.

ADVANCE OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL.

When Sir Colin arrived in India he found it necessary to remain some weeks at Calcutta to mature his plans, and organize reinforcements and supplies. Troops from various quarters were arriving at Calcutta. They were dispatched at the rate of about ninety a day. Detachments from China arrived, and two war steamers were placed at the service of the governor-general by Lord Elgin, the plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty for China. Captain Peel, R.N., was sent up the country with a body of five hundred seamen, and heavy cannon. The mercantile marines at Calcutta gallantly volunteered to serve with Captain Peel. That officer and his sailors, with Colonel Powel and a detachment of troops, were marching from Allahabad to Cawnpore, when they were attacked by two thousand sepoy and two thousand insurgents. A battle was fought, which was severe in its contest, and serious in its consequences. Colonel Powel was shot. Peel took the command, and fought with the skill of a general, defeating and utterly dispersing the enemy, but incurring heavy loss. He had to rest his men, regain fresh force, and then proceeded to Cawnpore. Various detachments made their way thither. The conquest of Delhi had set free a portion of the besieging army, which joined the other reinforcements.

At last Sir Colin reached Cawnpore, and on the 9th November began his march to Lucknow, with the following force: her majesty's 8th, 53rd, 75th, and 93rd foot; 2nd and 4th Punjaub infantry; her majesty's 9th lancers; detachments 1st, 2nd, and 5th Punjaub cavalry; detachment Hodson's Horse; detachments Bengal and Punjaub sappers and miners; naval brigade, 8 guns; Bengal horse artillery, 10 guns; Bengal horse field-battery, 6 guns; heavy field-battery. Total—about 700 cavalry, and 2,700 infantry, besides artillery. The general officers by whom he was assisted were General Mansfield, as chief of the staff; Brigadier-generals Hope Grant, Greathed, Russell, Adrian Hope, Little, and Crawford. Little commanded the cavalry, and Crawford the artillery. Captain Peel commanded the naval brigade; Lieutenant Lennox, the engineers.

Sir Colin arrived with little opposition at Lucknow. He was much aided in his advance and in the plans he formed, by intelligence from the garrison brought by Mr. Cavanagh, a civil servant of the company, who won the Victoria Cross by the heroism he displayed in this adventure. On Sir Colin's side the portion of the combined operation was performed with heavy loss, so desperately was

he resisted by the sepoys in their fortified positions. That loss would have been more heavy but for the extraordinary courage, skill, and adventure of Captain Peel, who laid his great guns "alongside" (as a sailor would say) the Shah Nuzeef, a fortified mosque, and with his heavy shot, at so close a range, swept destruction against everything opposed to them. But for the fire of the Enfields, borne by the Highlanders, Peel and his sailors must have perished before they could have dragged their big guns to so close a position. Campbell resolved not to force his way through the long narrow lanes where Havelock and Outram suffered so severely, but, profiting by their experience, and the information transmitted to him by them, he made his approach by the south-eastern suburb. In order to effect this, it was necessary that Havelock should co-operate in a bold and skilful manœuvre. Havelock's part in the transaction was performed with his usual skill and courage, and was the measure which insured Sir Colin's success. The operations of Sir Colin were a series of isolated sieges and bombardments of palaces, mosques, and huge public buildings. To spare his men he used his cannon deliberately and amply, and thus step by step, but still with heavy loss, conquered his way until he entered the residency. Ten officers were killed and thirty-three wounded; among the latter were Sir Colin himself and Captain Peel. Of the rank and file one hundred and twenty-two were killed, and three hundred and forty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was estimated at four thousand slain; the wounded and many of the dead were borne away. Once more the joy of the delivered resounded in the residency of Lucknow, and, as on the 25th of September, grateful hearts poured out their expressions of thanksgiving to their deliverers.

Sir Colin resolved to convey the garrison to Cawnpore, and abandon Lucknow, as untenable by so small a force, in the presence of an enemy which, notwithstanding all losses, was estimated at fifty thousand men, for after every defeat numbers still flocked to the standard of revolt. The orders given for departure were, that the wounded should first be removed to the Dil Koosha, four miles distant. The women and children were to proceed the next day to the same place, accompanied by the treasure and such stores as it was judicious to move. It was necessary that this work should be performed in silence and secrecy, to avoid the confusion and sacrifice of life which must ensue if the enemy should be on the alert. There were three places in which the helpless processions must come under the fire of the enemy, which was usually directed

upon the defences; some were wounded in passing, and some of the native attendants were killed. Lady Inglis distinguished herself by a fortitude and generosity worthy of her gallant husband. When the non-combatants were safely conducted beyond the perils of the residency, the military evacuation of the place was commenced. The conduct of it was under the guidance of Sir James Outram, and excited the admiration of Sir Colin Campbell and of the whole army. So effectually was the enemy deceived by the arrangements, that the whole force was brought quietly off before the movement was even suspected. One man only was left behind; Captain Waterman, from a mistake of orders, occupied a post when all besides had departed. When he discovered his real situation he sought safety, and reached the common rendezvous in a state of utter exhaustion. Not a soldier perished in this masterly manœuvre, and so well was it executed that, long after the whole army had left, the enemy continued to pour shot and shell into the intrenchments where the English were supposed to be. When the sepoys found that the English had brought off their women and wounded, the children, stores, and treasure, they were filled with fury, and blew away from guns the four Englishmen who had been prisoners in the city. One event threw a gloom over all the glory of this achievement: Havelock, by whom Outram was chiefly assisted in the great undertaking, died of over fatigue, exhaustion, and anxiety. The lamentations of the army were great, and those of his country not less so. He was buried in the Alum Bagh. England lost in him one of the greatest of her warriors and purest of her sons. She failed to recognise his greatness until life was waning, and rendered him posthumous honours.

Immediately after the sad event of Havelock's death, Sir Colin commenced his march for Cawnpore. He intended to rest his weary charge at the Alum Bagh, but on the 27th he heard heavy firing in the direction of Cawnpore, which, fearing some disaster, led him to hasten the march. On the 28th, leaving Outram in charge of a part of the force at the Alum Bagh, he hastened forward, messengers having arrived to assure him that General Windham, who had been left in Cawnpore, had been beaten by the Gwalior contingent, which, after it had mutinied, hung around that neighbourhood. The events at Cawnpore which led to these disastrous tidings, and which were subsequently connected with Sir Colin's advance, were described by Captain Monson as follows:—

"On the 26th November General Windham

left his camp near Dhuboulee with 1200 infantry, 100 sowars, and eight guns, and marched against the Gwalior mutineers approaching from Calpee. He met the advanced body of the enemy in a strong position, on the other side of the dry Pandoo Nuddee, carried it with a rush, and cleared the village (Bowsee), half a mile in rear. The appearance of the main body of the rebels, however, induced him to repair towards Cawnpore, and he encamped on the Jooee plain, in front of the town, with the copse and canal on his left flank.

"About noon, on the 27th, the enemy attacked his camp, and after a resistance of five hours, at length compelled him to retreat through the town. On the morning of the 28th, the enemy, having been reinforced from Sheorajpore and Shewlee, advanced, took possession of the town, and erected batteries. Colonel Walpole, on the south side of the canal, gained some advantage, and captured two 18-pounders; but our outposts, between the town and the Ganges, were driven back, the church and assembly rooms were occupied by the mutineers, and a battery erected between the two. A few of the enemy's guns were spiked in the course of the day; but this exploit entailed heavy loss.

"Sir Colin Campbell arrived at the intrenchment at dusk on the 28th, and his troops began to cross the Ganges at 10 A.M., on the 29th; the enemy's fire on the bridge being kept down by heavy guns placed on the left bank of the river, whilst the march of the troops was covered by a cross-fire from intrenchments. At 6 P.M., November 30th, the whole of the troops, baggage, families, and wounded, had crossed over, and the troops occupied a position encircling Sir H. Wheeler's intrenchment. An attack on our outposts, 1st December, was repulsed, and on the 3rd, Sir Colin Campbell, by judicious arrangements, had forced the enemy to slacken

their fire. An attempt, on the 4th, to destroy the bridge, by means of a fire-boat, failed; and another attack on our left picket was repulsed on the 5th.

"On the morning of the 6th, General Windham received orders to open a heavy bombardment from intrenchments, so as to deceive the enemy with respect to our intended attack. As soon as the fire began to slacken, Sir Colin concentrated his forces, threw forward his left, and proceeded to attack the enemy's right, crossing the canal thus:—Brigadier Walpole on the right, Brigadiers Hope and Inglis in the centre, and the cavalry and horse artillery, two miles further to the left, threatening the enemy's rear. Driving the enemy before them, our troops reached and captured his camp; the 23rd and 38th were left to guard it. Sir Colin Campbell, preceded by the cavalry and horse artillery, pursued the enemy to the fourteenth milestone on the Calpee road; whilst General Mansfield, with the Rifles, 93rd, and fourteen guns, turned to the right, and drove another body of the rebels, encamped between the town and the river, from their position at the Subadar Tank. The enemy, still in great force, but hemmed in between our intrenchment and the Subadar Tank, retreated towards Bhitoor; not, however, without making several unsuccessful attacks against our positions at the Subadar Tank, the captured camp, and the intrenchment."

Cawnpore was now safe. The non-combatants of Sir Colin's convoy were sent under safe guard to Allahabad, and thence to Calcutta, where they arrived amidst the most extraordinary demonstrations of joy, and amidst many grateful utterances to the heroic men by whom their rescue had been effected.

The further exploits of Sir Colin and his army will be related in another chapter.

CHAPTER CXXXIII.

OPERATIONS FROM CAWNPORE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL—
CONQUEST OF LUCKNOW, SHAHJEHANPORE, AND BAREILLY—SUPPRESSION OF THE
MUTINY IN OUDE, ROHILCUND, AND NEIGHBOURING DISTRICTS.

THE first operation of Sir Colin Campbell after the defeat of the Gwalior contingent at Cawnpore, and the escape of the liberated garrison of Lucknow to Calcutta, was to order Brigadier Walpole to take a column of troops to clear the western Doab near the Jumna,

of the rebels gathered there. This was an important preliminary to any advance upon Lucknow. On the 18th of December, Walpole left Cawnpore, and as he marched restored order, dispersing armed parties which had been formed by the Gwalior mutineers.

He then marched towards Etawah, for the purpose of sweeping the country around Agra of the rebel bands which infested it. After partially effecting this object, he was ordered to co-operate with Brigadier Seaton and with Sir Colin himself in the capture of Furruckabad. It was important to achieve the capture of that place, from its position being the key of the Doab, Rohilcund, and Oude. In January, 1858, the junction of these officers was formed, and Furruckabad and all the surrounding country subdued. The rebels, however, escaped with very little punishment, owing to their greater swiftness of march, and their being unencumbered with the vast baggage which always attends European troops in India. Other brigadiers, such as Rowcroft, Franks, and Hope Grant, were also engaged in moving by a concerted scheme upon the grand scene of future action.

Sir Colin was better enabled to mature his plans, as they were not likely to be interrupted by any new revolts in the Bengal provinces. The Bengal army was gone, the seditious chiefs were already in arms, the districts which could be affected by their means were already insurgent; whereas Delhi was conquered, the Punjaub was tranquil and loyal, the country between Delhi and the Punjaub was kept in order by the ability and courage of Van Cortlandt; the Bombay and Madras presidencies were able on their own frontiers to menace the mutineers, and also send some help to Calcutta; and troops were arriving fast from England, although in detachments numerically small, and showing that the government in London had formed notions of aid inadequate to the emergency. By the middle of January, 1858, however, the number of troops landed in India from England was estimated at 23,000 men. Some of these were landed at Madras and Bombay, and were necessary to supply the places of other troops already sent to Bengal, or sent up the country; others which had landed at Calcutta were necessary for that city, Barrackpore, Benares, Allahabad, Eastern Bengal, &c., which had all been nearly denuded of troops, that had already become invalided or fallen in battle. Portions of the reinforcements were landed in ill-health, and others immediately succumbed to the climate, consisting as they did of mere raw lads. So that after all, Sir Colin did not receive troops at all approaching the number requisite for the proper accomplishment of the great task before him.

During this period of the inactivity of the commander-in-chief, Jung Bahadoor and his Goorkhas were capturing rebel chiefs, and dispersing rebel hordes along the Oude frontier.

That leader, and Brigadiers Rowcroft and Franks, formed a *cordon* from Nepal to the Ganges, such as they supposed would hem in the rebels of Oude.

Although Sir Colin remained in Futtighur, his brigadiers were engaged in active operations, for the rebels boldly approached headquarters, and made dispositions as if to shut up the general there. On the 27th, Adrian Hope gained a splendid victory over a superior force. Soon after, he gained a second victory, which was more severely fought. In this, Major Hodson, the gallant cavalier who organized "Hodson's Horse," was fatally wounded.

These different operations had the effect of drawing away or clearing away the rebels from extensive districts beyond, and Agra became again free, and a centre of active operations against the mutineers, many of whom were brought in prisoners and executed. At this time so great was the leniency displayed at Calcutta, that mutineers are alleged to have appeared in its streets selling their uniforms.

On the 11th of February, Sir Colin at last began his march against Lucknow. It was a slow one, especially as the general brought with him 200 pieces of cannon. He was also checked by what might be called a rebel army of observation, which had assembled with remarkable celerity at Calpee.

Sir Colin was now approaching the Alum Bagh. Brigadier Franks had fought his way through the districts of Azinghur, Allahabad, and Juanpore, defeating the rebels at all points, and was approaching the grand army under Sir Colin. When this junction was formed, the "Juanpore field force" formed a fourth infantry division under Franks.

While this bold brigadier awaited on the frontier the orders of Sir Colin, he snatched a glorious victory from the rebels. He crossed into Oude near Sengramow. A rebel army sent from Lucknow, commanded by Nazim Mahomed Hossein, advanced in two divisions, hoping to surprise Franks. The brigadier surprised them, caught the divisions, and beat them in detail, utterly routing the whole force. He captured six guns, and slew 800 men. A desperate race was now run between the nazim and the brigadier as to which should obtain possession of the fort of Badshaignunge, commanding the pass and jungle so notoriously bearing the same name. The generalship of Franks gained the object. The nazim, joined by Bunda Hossein, another distinguished leader of the Oudeans, resolved to attack Franks. More than 6000 of their forces were revolted sepoys and sowars, the rest insurgents, but well accustomed to the

use of arms. Each party endeavoured to out-manceuvre the other, and at last the collision came, not at the fort, but near Sultanpore. The position of the enemy was good, the generalship of Franks better; he, by skilful and intricate manœuvres, such as our generals are not usually expert in employing, totally confused and discomfited the enemy, capturing twenty guns, and all their ammunition and baggage. About 1800 rebels were left killed or wounded on the field, among whom were several rebel chiefs. The day of vengeance had indeed come. The baffled sepoys and insurgents fled to Lucknow, leaving the road open to Franks if he should choose to join the commander-in-chief in that way. In the three battles, Franks lost two men killed, and sixteen wounded.

Jung Bahadoor approached the great centre of conflict more slowly than the commander-in-chief himself.

At the beginning of March, Brigadier Seaton captured, levelled, and burned a number of villages round Futtyghur, slaying and expelling bodies of rebels in every instance. One impediment to the advance of Sir Colin had been the neighbourhood of the Gwalior contingent, who were well equipped, well armed, and, it was believed, well commanded. Brigadier Maxwell encountered their force near Cawnpore, and routed it, having only a few men wounded. Brigadier Hope Grant had severe fighting in driving out the rebels from various small but strong forts and posts which they occupied between Cawnpore and Futtyghur. He slew about fifteen hundred rebels, and did not himself lose twenty men. His skilful combinations and fire saved his men, when every European was so precious. Still the rebels perpetually appeared where least expected, and the presence of the Nana Sahib, or of the Gwalior contingent, now here, then there, as if by magic, kept the English officers much harassed, and continually on the *qui vive*.

The hour was gradually arriving when Lucknow must resist the might of England or perish. The plans of Sir Colin were every day telling. The brigadiers on the frontiers, and the Goorkha chief, were closing in and making narrower the circle within which, apparently, the rebellion must assert its vitality. Sir Colin advanced to Lucknow. Along the right bank of the Goomtee, for five miles, palaces and public buildings stretched away; farther from the river lay a dense mass of narrow streets and lanes. Beyond the building called the Muchee Bhawan, there was a stone bridge over the river. Near the residency there was an iron bridge, and a bridge of boats near the building called the Motec

Mahal. The rebels, while in undisturbed possession, had fortified the place, and made it immensely strong. Ditches, earthworks, bastions, batteries, loopholed walls, fortified houses, gardens, enclosures, barricaded streets and lanes, guns mounted on domes and public buildings, piles of rubbish, and rude masonry of enormous thickness,—in fine, all resources which a great city could supply to mutinous soldiery were brought into requisition. The defenders were very numerous, comprising the whole population of three hundred thousand persons, Oude soldiery and retainers of various chiefs to the extent of fifty thousand, and sowars and sepoys, deserters from the army of Bengal, thirty thousand. A mouvie, a Mussulman fanatic, who perpetually incited the Mohammedans to acts of hostility, was supposed to aim at the throne himself.

On the 1st of March, Sir Colin, in his camp at Buntara, considered his plan of attack. He resolved to cannonade the city on each extremity, so as to enfilade the defences. His first preparation was for crossing the river. The enemy had removed the bridge of boats; the iron and stone bridges were commanded by batteries, and vigilantly watched. To invest the city was impossible, from its great extent. Attended by Generals Archdale Wilson, Little, Lugard, Adrian Hope, and Hope Grant, he advanced to the Dil Koosha palace and park on the eastern extremity of the city. This movement was for strategical purposes. The enemy's horse watched and menaced the approach. As the troopers retired, the guns of the defence opened with rapid and well-sustained fire. Sir Colin carried the Dil Koosha and the Mohennud Bagh, and occupied them as advanced pickets. Sir Colin perceived from the summits of the conquered parts that the defences could only be stormed at a terrible sacrifice of life, and success might be doubtful; that the conquest of the place must be effected by artillery. He sent for his siege-train, and other heavy guns, and placed them in position. His army lay with its right on the Goomtee, and its left extending towards the Alum Bagh, covering the ground to the south-east of the city. The Dil Koosha was head-quarters. On the 4th, the English lines were extended to Babiapore, a house and enclosure further down the right bank of the river. The inhabitants began to flee from the city, to the annoyance of the court and the mutineers, who calculated upon the townspeople making a desperate resistance. On the 5th, General Franks, after his splendid victories, joined the commander-in-chief. The army under Sir Colin was now about twenty-three thousand. He had cal-

culated upon having a force exceeding thirty thousand, as the least which afforded a prospect of complete success. The engineers had been preparing, since the 1st, the means of forming two bridges near the English advanced post of Babiapore, so as to operate upon the left as well as the right bank of the river. The bridges were completed in spite of the attempts of the enemy to obstruct them; and to Sir James Outram was entrusted the command of the forces destined to operate on the opposite bank of the river. A remarkable exemplification of the power of science and modern scientific discovery in war, was shown in the use of the electric wire. Lieutenant Stewart followed Sir Colin Campbell, in the novel capacity of chief of his electric staff, with his wires, galvanic batteries, poles, &c. These were laid along from Allahabad, where the governor-general was, to Cawnpore, thence to the Alum Bagh, thence to Sir Colin's head-quarters, and thence over the river to the head-quarters of Sir James Outram, when that officer and his *corps d'armée* crossed the newly-made bridges.

On the 6th, the first important combat commenced; previous conflicts were mere skirmishes. Sir James was then attacked in force, but with little loss repelled assaults which were continued all day. On the 7th, these assaults were renewed with still more energy, and yet less success.

On the 9th, Sir James opened his batteries upon the key of the enemy's position in that quarter, the Chukhur Walla Kathee. He drove the enemy from their positions by the resistless fire of his guns; they abandoned a strong post which might have been easily defended, and which Outram seized, advancing his infantry as that of the enemy receded. Crossing a bridge over a nullah, he advanced his right flank to the Fyzabad road. Some Mohammedan fanatics barricaded themselves in the Yellow House, and were with difficulty conquered; some fled, but most of them perished. Several villages were seized by the conqueror, and he advanced to the king's garden or Padishaw Bagh, opposite the Fureek Buksh palace. These conquests enabled him to open an enfilade fire on the defences of the Kaiser Bagh. When the Yellow House was captured by Outram, Campbell ordered a cannonade against the Martiniere. This was chiefly conducted by Sir William Peel and his sailors, and so skilfully did he cast ball, red-hot shot, shell, and rocket into the enclosures occupied by the sepoya, that great destruction of life was caused. Captain Peel received a musket-ball in the thigh, which was extracted immediately, and he insisted on returning to his

duty. Sir Edward Lugard, and a body of Highlanders and Sikhs, stormed the Martiniere without firing a shot; the loss was small. All these successes had been planned by Sir Colin himself, who issued his orders with minute particularisation.

On the 10th, Outram's heavy guns raked the enemy's outer line of defence, while vertical shot fell among the groups of infantry whenever collected near that line. He conquered by his fire the head of the iron bridge completely, and nearly subdued the defence at the head of the stone bridge. General Lugard captured Banks House, and mounted guns there—an important object to the attack.

The first or outer line of defence was now conquered. Outram on the 11th took possession of the iron bridge leading from the cantonment to the city, and drove the rebels out from all their positions between that bridge and the Padishaw Bagh on the left bank of the river. On Sir Colin's side, Brigadier Napier, using the blocks of buildings for approaches, sapped through them, bringing up guns and mortars as he advanced his works, and bombarded the palaces of the Begum Kotèe. When a breach was made, Lugard and Adrian Hope, with their Highlanders, Sikhs, and Goorkhas, stormed the place. The resistance was desperate, and the conflict sanguinary, but the British were victors. Napier continued to sap on through houses, garden walls, and enclosures, turning them all to account for cover, and again brought up the artillery to open its destructive charges upon the next interposing defence. While the attack on the Begum Kotèe was going on, Jung Bahadoor arrived. His force was directed to cover the left wing of the British as its allotted task. The capture of the Begum Kotèe was one of the most sanguinary scenes of war. The rooms of the palace were strewn with dead sepoya, while fragments of ladies' apparel, and other tokens of oriental grandeur, rent and blood-stained, lay around. Mr. Russell declared that the horrid scenes in the hospital of Sebastopol, were inferior in appalling aspect to the rooms of that gaudy palace filled with the festering dead, and slippery with gore. From this building the sapping was continued to the Eman Barra, in the same way as before, through buildings and enclosures. So intricate were the passages, that it was the 13th before the guns and mortars for battering and breaching the Eman Barra could be brought forward. On that day Jung Bahadoor and his Nepaulese seized many out-buildings, and circumscribed the limits of the enemy. On the 14th the Eman Barra was breached and taken. The Sikhs,

pursuing the enemy from the captured post, turned the third or inmost line of defence, entered the Kaiser Bagh, and, followed by supports from Franks' brigade, a number of the most important public buildings, loopholed and defended by cannon, were taken without a shot. Sir James Outram, from his side, with cannon and rifle aided the work of the 14th.

On the 15th Sir Colin perceived that the defences were untenable, and that final victory must soon crown his efforts. The enemy also perceived this; crowds of the people were fleeing from the city, and the sepoy were with difficulty kept in the defences. The plunder of the palaces followed their capture: costly garments, Indian jewellery, precious stones, gold and silver, lace and specie, were the prizes of the conquerors. Luxuriant viands also gratified the hungry and refreshed the weary.

On the night of the 14th and the morning of the 15th many of the sepoy fled towards Upper Oude and Rohilcund. Sir Colin does not appear to have been prepared for this, and in consequence many desperate characters got safely away to rob and murder elsewhere. On the 16th Outram crossed the engineers' bridge, and marched right through the city to intercept fugitives if possible. He then received a proposition from the begum, offering to compromise matters. Outram refused any terms but those of unconditional surrender, and conquered his way to the residency, of which he took possession. Hard fighting began near the iron and stone bridges, and a great slaughter of rebels ensued. Their ingenuity and local knowledge enabled many to escape by means which the English could not frustrate. On the 17th the British were completely masters of the city. The enemy gathered in force outside its precincts and fought a battle, but Outram and Jung Bahadour routed them with slaughter, capturing their guns. So bold were the rebels that in their retreat they attempted the Alum Bagh. Here Jung Bahadour fought several severe combats, defeating the assailants. During the final day of combat in the city Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson were rescued from an obscure house, where they had been imprisoned. After the city was subdued it was discovered that the moulvie and a strong body of followers were concealed in one of the palaces: the place was stormed, the prime-minister was slain, but the moulvie escaped; shot and sabre left few of this strange garrison to become fugitives. Sir Colin lost nineteen officers killed, and forty-eight wounded, and more than eleven hundred men. The loss of the enemy was many thousands, but the great

majority escaped from indifferent pursuit. An earlier flight than could have been expected, according to the rules of war, baffled the general. Lucknow was taken, but the rebel army was in the field.

CAMPAIGN OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AFTER THE FALL OF LUCKNOW.

When the Europeans in Calcutta, and when the people of England, heard that the rebels had been allowed to escape from Lucknow with impunity, there was severe criticism upon the strategy of the British chief, and much discontent. This was increased when it was learned that Sir Colin lingered at Lucknow until the hot season, in all its fury, fell upon the plains of India. It was certain that no prompt energetic action, no bold and enterprising undertakings, followed the conquest of Lucknow. Mr. Montgomery, the colleague of Sir John Lawrence, was appointed civil commissioner in the room of Sir James Outram, for whom other work and other honours were reserved. He was appointed military member of the council at Calcutta.

In Rohilcund the chiefs of rebellion were now congregated; Khan Bahadour Khan assuming the sovereignty. Among the chiefs collected around him was Nana Sahib, who fled to Bareilly with four hundred troopers. He took part in the defence of Lucknow, but did not distinguish himself by his courage. It was rumoured that, failing in Rohilcund, the rebels would try their fortunes in Central India. Sir Colin, acting upon this supposition, so disposed his forces as to guard as many as possible of the ghats on the Jumna and the Ganges, and so prevent the rebels accomplishing that object, and enclose the war within Rohilcund, leaving the actual disturbances in Central India to be dealt with by the presidencies of Bombay and Madras. Jung Bahadour and his Goorkhas returned home, feeling or affecting displeasure with the want of respect shown to them. Sir Edward Lugard was directed by the commander-in-chief to march to Arrah and attack Koer Singh, who, after many wandering depredations, was back again in his own district. Lord Marke Kerr, with a small force from Benares, had confronted this chief, and saved Azinghur, but his troops were too few to expel the rebels. Sir Edward Lugard made for Azinghur. A powerful force of the enemy got into his rear; Lugard returned and beat them. Lieutenant Charles Havelock, nephew of the hero of Lucknow, fell by an obscure enemy.

On the 15th of April, Lugard reached Azinghur, fought and gained a battle, and captured the place. The enemy, as in most

other instances, escaped. Brigadier Douglas, with a portion of the troops, was sent in pursuit. After five days' chase Douglas overtook, defeated, and wounded Koer Singh. On the 21st, Douglas again came up with him while crossing the Ganges; guns, treasure, and ammunition were captured, but Koer Singh succeeded in crossing the river. He retreated to his own dominion at Jugdespore. Captain Le Grande was then at Arrah, with one hundred and fifty men of H. M. 35th, fifty sailors, and one hundred and fifty Sikhs. He marched out to intercept Koer Singh, who, with two thousand dispirited men, without guns, took post on the skirt of a jungle. Le Grande attacked, but suddenly a bugle sounded retreat in the rear of the British. Le Grande hesitated, his men fell into confusion, and finally fled with dastardly precipitancy, followed by Koer Singh, who cut down and pursued them to Arrah. It was agreed on all hands that the cowardly and incompetent conduct of the men of the 35th caused this disaster. Le Grande and various other officers fell. Koer Singh's followers now became aggressors, and it required the skill of various British officers to maintain their positions. The insurgents fought better than the mutineers had fought. Douglas, after resting his troops, followed Koer Singh into his own region, and thoroughly swept it of rebellion, clearing the jungle, and suppressing the insurrection.

Sir Hope Grant had a column placed at his disposal to follow the rebels northward from Lucknow. He chased for some time the moulvie, and the begum and her paramour; but infamous as were this trio, the people everywhere sided with them, and they out-mancœuvred Grant. He was as unsuccessful in this pursuit as he had been in preventing the escape of the rebels from Lucknow, and returned to head-quarters utterly baffled. Rohilcund continued in arms; the great cities and towns, such as Bareilly, Shahjehanpore, and Moorshedabad, were in the hands of the rebels. Khan Bahadoor Khan ruled at Bareilly, and his force was not to be despised. It became apparent to everybody how serious the consequences of the bad generalship which allowed the rebels and mutineers to escape from Lucknow. The plan of the commander-in-chief now was to scour the borders of the province with two columns, which, setting out in opposite directions, should meet at Bareilly, the capital, where two of the Delhi princes had taken shelter with Bahadoor Khan. Brigadier Jones was ordered to advance from Roorkee with what was designated the Roorkee field-force, and to take a direction south-east. The other

column was to leave Lucknow, under Brigadier Walpole, and was called the Rohilcund field-force. This was to march north-westward. The Roorkee field-force at once began its operations, under the spirited management of Brigadier Jones. The formation of the Rohilcund force was delayed a little. Following the operations of these forces separately, the Roorkee field-force first requires notice, as first in action. It consisted of three thousand men, eight heavy, and six light guns. It was a perfect little brigade, comprising engineers, cavalry, &c., in due proportion. Having marched from Roorkee, they on the 15th of April prepared to cross the Ganges to the left bank. The enemy was intrenched on the opposite side at the most advantageous ghaut. Jones brought his light troops across elsewhere, surprised the enemy, took his intrenchments in flank, dispersed their defenders, and brought over the heavy guns and baggage at the ghaut. Jones marched on, sweeping all before him, until the 21st, when he was obstructed on the banks of a canal. He again took the enemy's position in flank, captured all his guns and elephants, and sent him away in mad flight, so that pursuit by regular troops was impossible. The loss of the brigadier's force in these transactions was one officer killed, and some men wounded. Moorshedabad was the next important place. The English had friends there among the natives, and the Rajah of Rampore was an ally. On the 21st of April, while Jones was beating the rebels, and capturing their elephants and cannon, the shah-zada (heir of the Delhi throne, or, at all events, one of the princes of that house), named Feroze Shah, marched to Moorshedabad to demand tribute and rations for his forces. He was refused, through the influence of the Rajah of Rampore, and a conflict was the consequence. The shah-zada pillaged the neighbourhood in order to obtain what he required. While his imperial highness was thus engaged, Jones, very much to his astonishment, arrived, attacked him, beat his forces, captured many of his chiefs, saved the town of Moorshedabad, and extended the authority of the Rampore rajah. Jones waited at that place further orders from Lucknow, in connection with the other column, with which he understood he was to co-operate against Bareilly. Walpole marched with six thousand men, and hearing that a body of rebels had sought the protection of one of the country forts situated at Roowah, he resolved to attack them. When he arrived, he, without any proper preparation, or even *reconnaissance*, and although possessing a powerful artillery, ordered his infantry at once to

attack it. The place was strong,—houses encircled by a wall, protected by bastions, every surface loopholed. The infantry were, of course, repulsed with slaughter, and the gallant Adrian Hope, one of the most talented officers in the service, perished. The impossible task had been committed to that officer, who saw the folly of the order assigned to him, but obeyed. The supports were so badly arranged as to be too late, the reserves were sent to a place remote from the attack, and all was confusion on the side of the British, and triumph on the side of the rebels, of whom there were only a few hundreds in the place. Walpole brought up his heavy guns to batter a breach, but the enemy stole away in the night, leaving the English general to batter his way in, or take some shorter method if he chose. The place was easy of investment, but was not invested; the enemy were permitted there, as everywhere else by Sir Colin Campbell and his officers, to make good their retreat with impunity, to unfurl the standard of resistance elsewhere. Walpole redeemed his honour at Sirsa, beating the enemy by the judicious use of his artillery and cavalry, driving them across the Ramgunga with heavy loss. The "Pandies" were too hotly pressed to destroy the bridge of boats, over which Walpole brought his army and equipage, and halted until joined by the commander-in-chief.

Sir Colin, at the head of the remainder of his army, marched towards Fnttyghur, where he arrived on the 25th of April, and thence sent for Brigadier Penny, who had commanded in Delhi, and had made various flying expeditions round that territory. He was ordered to bring such troops as he could collect into the combined operations by which Rohileund was to be conquered. He was to march towards Merumpore Muttra, between Shahjehanpore and Bareilly. The commander-in-chief marched direct into Rohileund. On the 27th, the junction with Walpole was effected at Zingree, near the Ramgunga. They at once marched to Jellalabad. The moulvie occupied Shahjehanpore with a strong force. Sir Colin's dispositions were made to shut him up there, which he might have done, had he been as active or acute as the moulvie, who completely out-generated the general, and departed with his troops to Oude, doubling upon the commander-in-chief. This was most disheartening to his excellency, and to the whole British army. Nana Sahib had been with the moulvie; before retreating, he unroofed all the buildings. He thus deprived the English of shade in the midst of the hot season. Sir Colin found a deserted town of dilapidated houses,

where he had hoped to pen up powerful enemies, and bring them to decisive battle, or immediate surrender. His plans so far were costly, cumbrous, slow, and abortive. The death of Sir W. Peel, of small-pox, at Caivapore, added to the disheartenment of the British army.

The month of April wore away: Bareilly was not captured, Rohileund was not conquered, although it had been invaded from all quarters by four different armies, numerous, and perfectly equipped. The rebellion proved itself possessed of a vitality for which neither the governor-general nor the commander-in-chief were prepared. In Rohileund, and all around it, people and chiefs were in arms, and no less than ten distinct columns of British were kept in harassing marches, beneath a burning sun, without being able to produce any decisive effect upon the insurrection. A successful exploit by Brigadier Seaton, at Kaubur, in which he cut up a large number of the enemy, and captured their baggage, and the papers of their leaders, threw light upon the plans of the insurgents generally, showing that they were acting in consort in Central India, Upper Bengal, Oude, and Rohileund.

On the 2nd of May, Sir Colin Campbell set out from Shahjehanpore to attack Bareilly. On the 3rd he was joined by the column of Brigadier Penny, which had moved thither from their sphere of operations to the west of Rohileund. *En route*, Penny, by carelessness, allowed his troops to fall into an ambush, and with difficulty his army was saved from destruction; by the dint of hard fighting they beat the enemy and resumed their march. General Penny, who seems to have been the least vigilant officer in his host, was slain, and many officers were wounded through his inadvertence. He was killed by a rush made upon him by a body of fanatics. The beaten rebels marched to Bareilly, and strengthened that garrison. Colonel Jones, of the carabinieri (not to be confounded with the brigadier commanding the Roorkee field-force), brought on the brigade to Sir Colin. Brigadier John Jones marched from Moorshedabad towards Bareilly, operating at the same time with Sir Colin from an opposite direction. Jones was resisted on his march, but drove the rebels headlong before him. Arriving at Bareilly, he won the bridge, which the rebels defended stoutly; and, at the same time, the cannon of Sir Colin thundered tidings of his approach from the opposite side of the place. This was followed by a sudden charge of rebel cavalry upon the baggage in the rear of Sir Colin's army, which created such confusion as to leave further hostile operations

that day impossible. Many had sunk on the march from fatigue, weakness, and sun-stroke. There were, however, plenty of troops fresh enough, and there was time enough to have entered the city and stormed it. Sir Colin, still preserving his dilatory tactics, halted on the plain, and so disposed his forces that, as usual, where either he or his brigadiers commanded, the enemy escaped with impunity. Even on the 6th, Sir Colin spent his time cannonading old houses. It was not until the 7th that he learned that General John Jones was at the opposite side of the city. Sir Colin *then* entered, ordering the brigadier to do the same. The rebels had fled, taking with them such portable things as were of most value.

Scarcely had Sir Colin Campbell left Shahjehanpore to march upon Bareilly, than the rebels, numbering eight thousand men, returned. Colonel Hall, and a few hundred men, had been left behind as a garrison. These for eight days defended themselves, a defence which would have proved utterly unavailing had not Hall, with more foresight than his general, laid up provision and ammunition behind a strong and intrenched position. After suffering suspense, and continually fighting for nine days, the little band was saved. Sir Colin hearing at Bareilly of Colonel Hall's situation, sent back Brigadier Jones, with a well-appointed force, who beat the rebels in a pitched battle and relieved the place.

Brigadier Jones soon found that he had not defeated the grand force of the enemy, and that future struggle was in store for him. The Moulvie of Fyzabad, the Begum of Oude, the Shah-zada of Delhi, and Nana Sahib, uniting their forces, attacked Shahjehanpore on May 15th. The English general fought for

very life throughout the day, so numerous, powerful, and persistent were his enemies. Of the four chiefs named, all displayed great courage, even the lady termed the begum, except the Nana, who kept out of range, being a notorious coward. When Sir Colin heard this news, he hastened back with a portion of his forces. On the morning of the 18th, he arrived at Shahjehanpore. He was attacked the same day by a force, chiefly consisting of newly-raised Rohilla cavalry, splendidly mounted, good riders, expert swordsmen, and exceedingly gallant. Their cannon were numerous and well appointed. Sir Colin with difficulty repulsed the enemy, his own troops, wearied with marching, and suffering from heat, having been the portion of the army engaged. Campbell ordered Brigadier Coke to join him. On the 24th, Sir Colin and Coke marched to the place (Mohumdee) which the chiefs had occupied as head-quarters, and whence they had issued to attack Shahjehanpore. They were gone. In the abandoned forts guns and treasure were found buried.

While the commander-in-chief was in Rohilcund, Sir H. Grant was engaged around Lucknow. Large bodies of rebels sprung up as if by magic. He gained battle after battle, but not until the hot season was over was any quiet ensured around the capital of Oude. Active operations by the brigadiers of the various movable columns in the north-western provinces also continued through the hot season. In the central region of the Ganges, Sir Edward Lugard maintained a career of heroic exploits until the provinces there were controlled, and insurrection quelled. Sir Colin broke up the Rohilcund field-force, and considered the rebellion in that province and Oude subdued.

CHAPTER CXXXIV.

VARIOUS MUTINIES AND INSURRECTIONS, AND THEIR SUPPRESSION—CAPTURE OF JHANSI AND CALPEE BY SIR HUGH ROSE—REVOLUTIONS IN GWALIOR—SURRENDER OF THE CITY TO TANTIA TOPEE—FLIGHT OF SCINDIAH—CAPTURE OF THE CITY AND FORTRESS BY SIR HUGH ROSE—RESTORATION OF SCINDIAH—DEATH OR CAPTURE OF THE CHIEF LEADERS OF THE REVOLT—DISPERSION OF THE REBEL BANDS—END OF THE MUTINY AND INSURRECTION.

DINAPORE was one of the most important stations in India. A vast district of country belonged to that military division. It is situated in the very populous province of Behar, between Oude and Bengal proper. The eastern portion of northern India would necessarily, at such a crisis, be much in-

fluenced by the loyalty or defection of the district of Dinapore. That district comprised the rich and populous city of Patna, which is within a short distance of the military station. The country around is fertile and cultivated, and remarkable for the number of rich indigo plantations. The chief civil au-

thority, Mr. Taylor, resided at Patna; the chief military authority was Major-general Lloyd, who resided at the cantonments. So feeble was he at the time of the mutiny, that he had to be lifted on his horse, and was incapable of using any exertion such as the superintendence of a large military station required. He had been a brave and efficient officer before his powers failed through age and exhaustion. The troops at the station were three regiments of Bengal native infantry—7th, 8th, and 40th. The European troops were a wing of her majesty's 10th foot, two companies of her majesty's 37th, and two troops of horse artillery. Evidence of the sedition of the native regiments was abundantly afforded through the months of May, June, and July. The officers declared that it would be easy for the European force to disarm the native regiments, but General Lloyd doubted their power to do so, and besides declared against the necessity of it, as *his* sepoys were loyal.

On the 24th of July, General Lloyd was at last convinced that some precautions should be adopted. He ordered the percussion-caps to be taken out of the magazine which the sepoys guarded. This was done amidst turbulence on the part of the 8th regiment, but only a feeble attempt was made to interrupt the proceeding. The general, instead of at once disarming this regiment, gave the sepoys until four o'clock to consider whether they would give up the magazine quietly, which contained a large store of ball-cartridges. He then went on board a steamer on the river, without empowering any one else to act. While the general was absent, the sepoys revolted; they filled their pouches with ammunition, removed their families, and set things in order for the march to Delhi. The 10th and 37th Europeans stood to their arms, but it was not known that the general was asleep on board a steamer, and the second in command lost much time in looking for him. The sepoys began to shoot at their officers, but none were killed. The sick European soldiers and their guard mounted on the hospital, and opened fire into the masses of the sepoys, who broke and fled. The European troops, without orders, attacked the mutineers, who fled at the first discharge, leaving apparel, cooking utensils, and numbers of their families behind them. A squadron of cavalry would have succeeded in dispersing or cutting them up. The mutineers proceeded to Arrah, fourteen miles off. Pursuit was possible, as there were elephants at Dinapore by means of which it could have been instituted. The rebels went along at leisure, burning and plundering as they pro-

ceeded. Intelligence of their devastations, and the leisurely way in which they were committed, reached Dinapore hour by hour, but the general would give no orders. He was entreated to save Arrah, but still issued no commands. *On the evening of the 27th*, one hundred and ninety men of the 37th were sent by steamer to relieve the few Europeans at Arrah, who were bravely defending themselves. The vessel soon grounded, and remained fast until the afternoon of the 29th, when another steamer was dispatched, which took them on board; it also bore seventy Sikhs, and one hundred and fifty men of the 10th. These troops disembarked twelve miles from Arrah, and marched towards it. Captain Dunbar, who commanded the party, believed native testimony as to the condition of things at Arrah: he was informed that the sepoys had abandoned the place; he therefore pushed on, although ignorant of the road, and in the darkness of rapidly-falling night, without throwing out an advanced guard, or making any dispositions to prevent surprise. When he arrived at a mango tope, through which the road passed, a fire of musketry was opened from both sides of the way. The sepoys were in ambush, having previously sent native emissaries for the purpose of deceiving the English captain. The British were thrown into confusion by the suddenness of the attack. Volley after volley swept down their numbers, and no orders were given to advance or retreat. Incredible as it may seem, this European force remained through the night exposed to this fire, from which darkness and the timidity of their enemies were the only protection. When morning dawned, half the force lay dead or wounded. Dunbar ordered a retreat; the wounded, remaining behind were shot or bayoneted by the sepoys, who followed closely, throwing themselves with great rapidity upon the British flanks, and firing wherever there was cover. Captain Dunbar, Lieutenant Sale, Ensign Erskine, Lieutenants Ingleby and Anderson, volunteers, the mate of the steamer, and railway-engineer, also volunteers, and one hundred and fifty soldiers, were killed; scarcely a man of the remainder escaped being wounded.

General Lloyd was now more helpless than ever—he neither performed nor attempted anything. Tidings of this disgrace filled all the surrounding country, and men everywhere prepared for revolt. Meerut, Delhi, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Dinapore, were words of encouragement and hope to all the disaffected. Every disaster was made known far and near, while news of English successes travelled with comparative tardiness.

Major Vincent Eyre was at Buxar, and rightly judged that General Lloyd was incapable; that the *prestige* of the English name would be ruined all over Behar and Bengal; and that the fatal news would penetrate to Oude, and to the upper provinces, and everywhere strengthen disaffection, unless speedy relief was given to Arrah. He left Buxar with one hundred and fifty of her majesty's 5th Fusiliers, and three guns. As soon as he arrived within range, he opened fire upon the besieging sepoys, who fled without resistance, and the little garrison was at once and with ease relieved. When Eyre arrived, the loyal residents were in great straits. They numbered fifteen Europeans and fifty Sikhs. The Europeans were chiefly composed of railway clerks and indigo-planters. Fifty of the mutineers had fallen under the fire of the garrison, but not one of the little band had been hit. The rebels were mining the defences, and would have succeeded in blowing them up had not Eyre arrived with his Northumbrian Fusiliers. All the property, private and public, in the neighbourhood had been destroyed by the rebels.

The danger of Patna being looted was now apparent. The opium godowns contained property to the amount of two millions sterling. Its defenders were Rattray's Sikhs, without guns. The defence proved sufficient to deter the fugitive mutineers.

In August, all Behar was disturbed, confusion and disorder reigned everywhere.

When Vincent Eyre relieved Arrah, two hundred Europeans of the 10th were sent to him from Dinapore upon his urgent demand, and that of Mr. Taylor, the civil commissioner at Patna. One hundred Sikhs arrived from Patna, so that the major had a force of five hundred men. With the greater portion of this body he set out for Jugdespore, where the Rajah Koer Singh, who had assisted the mutineers at Arrah, was in arms with his retainers, and a large body of sepoys. The fort at Jugdespore was strong, and the roads thither were cut up and flooded. Eyre arrived at the place through all difficulties. The 10th foot begged for leave to avenge the ambuscade on the Arrah road. Permission was given; led by Captain Patterson they rushed upon the enemy with a shout, and fell upon them with the bayonet in the utmost fury, slaying all who resisted, and driving the sepoys in panic before them. Jugdespore surrendered, Eyre killing three hundred of its defenders; of his own force six men were wounded. Koer Singh fled to the jungle, where he had a house tolerably fortified. Captain L'Estrange was dispatched thither;

he destroyed some of the houses of the Koer Singh family, and swept the country of its adherents.

All through the month of August the Dinapore mutineers wandered about looting. Koer Singh collected various bands of marauders and marched into Bundelcund, spreading devastation as they went. Isolated corps and detachments of sepoys mutinied and murdered their officers all along the course of the Ganges. Amidst so much weakness and confusion Mr. Money, the magistrate at Gayah, showed great activity and intelligence, tracing rebel sepoys to their villages, and arresting them suddenly, the reluctant police being awed by his firmness, boldness, and air of authority, as well as by surprise at his extraordinary intelligence. Some of the military officers, as Major Horne, assumed local authority, and by dash and decision kept all quiet in their neighbourhood, proclaiming military law.

In September all Behar and Lower Bengal were afflicted by roving bands of robbers and mutineers; thirty millions of people were agitated by the results of the revolt at Dinapore. In Eastern Bengal the agitation was intense. Complications arose in Assam. Native pretenders were disposed to call the people to arms. There were no troops to send eastward from Calcutta, but a body of sailors, by some severe fighting and hard toil, kept the rebellious in awe.

INSURRECTION IN AND AROUND AGRA.

Agra, as the seat of government for the north-western or upper provinces of Bengal, and the residence of a lieutenant-governor, was a place of prime importance. To this place fugitives from Central India, from Bareilly, from Oude, and other regions made their way, until two thousand children, and nearly four thousand adults, chiefly non-combatants, occupied the fort. The sepoys gradually revolted or deserted; even those who had previously assisted in disarming mutineers, or attacking insurgents, caught the prevailing epidemic of disaffection, and mutinied. Various actions took place in the neighbourhood; the garrison sallying out against hordes of rebels twenty times their number. Brigadiers Polliale and Cotton rendered good service, but the former officer, although efficient in the field, was not gifted with talents for organization, and was less enterprising than skilful in battle. The people of Agra, especially the Mohammedan rabble, aided by mutineers, destroyed the city, consuming the buildings and plundering all property, private and public. During the summer and autumn of 1857, the fort of Agra,

with its numerous refugees and children, held out unaided. The Kotah contingent, comprising seven hundred men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, upon which much reliance had been placed, mutinied, and added to the horrors that filled the once imperial city during three months of trial and suffering.

THE MUTINY BETWEEN DELHI AND FEROZEPUR DURING THE AUTUMN OF 1857.

In this vast district energy and ability were displayed by General Van Cortlandt, which entitled him to the gratitude of the British nation. The general was a native of India, and had been in the service of Runjeet Singh. He was received into the service of the company, and distinguished himself at Mooltan and elsewhere during the Sikh war. He assembled a small force of Sikh irregulars, and moved on Sirsah, where, as well as in the Hissar, Hansee, and Rohtuck districts, the rising had been universal. Within ten days these newly raised troops defeated vastly superior bodies of men in actions at Odhwala and Khyrakay, and retook Sirsah. Here he was reinforced by a large body of Bikaneer troops, and advanced on Hissar. The walled town of Hansee being attacked by the rebels in force, the general threw forward one thousand Rajpoots, who relieved the town, and held it till his arrival with the remainder of his forces. From Hansee he detached a large body of troops to Hissar to repel a threatened attack. Two thousand five hundred rebels advanced up to the very gates on the 19th of August, but were repulsed and completely routed, with a loss of upwards of three hundred men. At Mungalee, early in September, another action was fought with the rebels, in which they were completely routed. General Van Cortlandt then advanced with his whole force, and drove the enemy from Jumalpoore, where they had taken up a strong position, and cleared the whole country to Rohtuck, within a few miles of Delhi. The whole of the country from Sirsah to Delhi was utterly hostile; and massacres occurred at Sirsah, Hissar, and Hansee. Its importance, both politically and strategically, was immense, interposing between the Punjab and Delhi. Van Cortlandt, with a force entirely native, and composed of most heterogeneous materials, with but nine European officers, reconquered these districts, collected the revenue, retook the stations of Sirsah, Hissar, Hansee, and Rohtuck, re-established the custom's line, diverted from Delhi a considerable force under Shah-zada Mohammed Azeem, whom he afterwards compelled to evacuate the country, and, with his lieutenants, totally routed the rebels in four hardly-fought actions.

MADRAS AND BOMBAY.

In Madras the troops remained loyal, although for the most part Mohammedans. This arose from the peculiar system of the Madras army, from the remoteness of the presidency from Delhi and Oude, the great traditional centres of native power, and from the large population of native Christians scattered through the presidency and connected with some of the native corps. There were agitations, arrests made by the sowars and sepoy themselves when emissaries from Bengal tampered with them, and some few disturbances, but the presidency remained loyal, its troops served in Central India against the rebels, and supplies of men and munitions were spared from Madras for Calcutta and other portions of Bengal.

In Bombay also the army was in the main loyal, although it excited much apprehension. The irregular troops in the north-west of the presidency were disposed to revolt, some deserted, and were captured and hung. At Kolapore, however, mutiny displayed itself. The 27th Bombay native infantry, without the slightest indication of dissatisfaction, suddenly rose on the 1st of August, the festival of Buckree Eed. Three of their officers were instantly murdered. They plundered the treasury, murdered a native woman, the mother of their own jemadar, performed sundry acts of religious devotion, and left the station in a body; the native officers of the corps remained loyal. Immediately, as in other cases, the surrounding country for a vast distance became agitated and disturbed. Vigilance, circumspection, and activity characterised the proceedings of the English authorities, and a Mohammedan conspiracy was discovered which had its ramifications throughout the presidency, its chief strength being in Poonah, Sattara, Belgaum, Dharwar, Rectnagherry, and Sawunt Waree. The Rajah of Sattara and his family were implicated. Mr. Rose, the commissioner, arrested him and placed him and the ranee under surveillance at Poonah. The religious leaders of the Mohammedans at that place had drawn up a plan for the massacre, not only of the Europeans, but of the native Christians at Poonah, Sattara, and Belgaum, which would have been put into execution but for the detection of the scheme. The first step of the proposed measures of revolt, was the blowing up of the arsenal at Poonah. The native regiments were disarmed, the leading Mohammedan devotees arrested, and the disaffected awed by the display of vigour. Numbers of the captured 27th were blown away from guns at Kolapore and Rectnagherry. One of the chief conspirators at Belgaum was a moonshee, who

received one hundred and fifty rupees a month for teaching the officers Hindostanee.

The uneasiness at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, was very great as to how the Nizam of the Deccan would act at this juncture. He and his court happily remained faithful, as did also his troops. The populace of Hyderabad broke out into tumult; they were fanatical Mohammedans. Grape-shot from the guns of the horse artillery tamed their fanaticism, and there was no more insurrection. The irregular and some regular troops of the Bombay army in several instances refused to obey orders, and openly said that the King of Delhi was their rightful sovereign. Some deserted, but most were reduced to obedience.

ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS FROM ENGLAND AND NEPAUL—EXPEDITIONS OF THE CONQUERORS OF DELHI.

At last, in November and December, troops arrived at Calcutta from England in such numbers as to inspire hope. Had it not been for the aid derived from China, from the army returning from Persia, from Madras, Bombay, and the Cape of Good Hope, the troops arriving from England would have found all the Bengal provinces in the hands of the sepoys and insurgents. At the close of November, four thousand five hundred newly-arrived troops were collected at Calcutta, and eleven men-of-war were anchored in the Hoogly. As the forces arrived, they were sent up the country, especially to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief.

Jung Bahadoor, with nine thousand Gorkhas, descended from the hills, and in the month of December appeared upon the theatre of conflict. He drove the Oude rebels from Goruckpore and Azimghur back into Oude. This movement enabled various officers in Northern India to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in his plans for the reconquest of Oude. Sir James Outram, with about four thousand men, held post at the Alum Bagh, between which and Cawnpore the communications were kept open with difficulty. Colonel Seaton, at the head of a portion of the force which conquered Delhi, marched south-eastward between the Jumna and the Ganges. His first object was the subjugation of the Rajah of Minporee. On his way, Seaton had to fight several actions, in which Captain Hodson, and his Horse, performed prodigies of valour. He captured guns, cut up the enemy, dispersed rebel hordes, and slew in battle, or executed many zemindars, leaders of revolt. Brigadier Showers commanded another column of the conquerors of Delhi, and with it swept a circle of extensive radius over the disturbed

districts from Delhi to Agra, slaying and dispersing rebels; he then returned with his column to Delhi.

SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY IN CENTRAL INDIA, RAJPOOTANA, AND BUNDELCUND—CONQUEST OF JHANSI AND OF CALPEE.

Sir Hugh Rose was placed in command of a body of Bombay troops, called the Central India field-force, and with this, as a flying column, he proceeded to restore order in those provinces where, in a former chapter, mutiny was described as having gained ascendancy. He was ordered to fight his way northward to Jhansi, and subdue the rebel garrison of that place. His force was divided into two brigades, which sometimes acted far apart. The actions fought were generally in the open field, or in the vicinity of jungles and passes; and everywhere Sir Hugh rolled away, or cut through the living ramparts that obstructed his progress. The Rajah of Shagur, an independent district, joined the rebels. Rose and Sir Robert Hamilton, seized and confiscated his territory. Nana Sahib's brother, at the head of a vast mob of looters, was plundering various districts, and threatening the flanks of Sir Hugh's division. Brigadier Stuart, with one of Sir Hugh's brigades, operated to the south of Jhansi, and swept through Malwa, beating the rebels everywhere.

A body of troops, called the Rajpootana field-force, was collected in the Bombay presidency. It was strong in European cavalry, infantry, and artillery, as well as in good native troops. General Roberts commanded it, and Brigadier General Lawrence attended it as political agent. On the 10th of March, this force marched from Nusserabad against Kotah. The rajah was faithful; the contingent had mutinied. The rajah held a portion of the city, and co-operated with General Roberts, who, by skilful generalship, captured the place without the loss of an officer, and losing only a few men; fifty guns were captured. The rebels, as usual, got away with no loss after that which they suffered in the bombardment and advance.

General Whitlock, in a direction east of Jhansi, pursued wandering bands of rebels with such celerity as to leave them no rest, cutting up and dispersing them in every direction.

Sir Hugh Rose, having laid siege to Jhansi, maintained it with vigour. On the 1st of April, an attempt was made to raise the siege by a rebel army, under a Mahratta chief, named Tantia Topee, a relative of Nana Sahib. This chief proved to be a braver man and better general than his kinsman, the Nana. He fought with courage,

manœuvred with skill, and was very expert in choosing his field of battle. In his efforts to raise the siege of Jhansi, or make his way into the fortress, Tantia fought a pitched battle with Sir Hugh Rose. Victory rested, as usual, with the arms of the British general. He pursued Tantia two miles beyond the river Betwa, taking eighteen guns, and slaying fifteen hundred of his followers. Two of the mutineer regiments of the Gwalior contingent were in the ranks of Tantia; these fought with fury and obstinacy, and suffered severely.

The result of this battle was of great importance. The Ranees of Jhansi saw from the walls the defeat of her confederates. She effected her escape that night with a chosen band of her followers. The city was taken by storm. The garrison endeavoured to escape when they saw that the English had made secure their entrance, but Rose had taken measures to prevent this, and the slaughter of the enemy was signal. As the town people had aided the garrison they were made partakers of the vengeance.

Possessed of Jhansi Sir Hugh found his difficulties great. The Kotah rebel contingent infested the roads, the country people were in arms, and Tantia Topee was recruiting his forces at Calpee. The number of sick and wounded was great. While he remained at Jhansi settling affairs in that city, and reorganizing, he threw out parties in every direction, which scoured the country, dispersing bands, chastising rebel rajahs, razing forts, and defeating mutineers. Major Gall in one of these excursions captured a fort belonging to the Rajah of Sumpter.

While Sir Hugh Rose and Whitlock were leading their troops to victory, more than a thousand faithful sepoys of the Bengal army, with an equal number of Madras thrown into it by Whitlock, maintained the safety of Saugor, and kept at bay a country swarming with rebels.

Scindiah cut up the Kotah mutineers who sought shelter in his territory from the sword of General Roberts, and captured or destroyed ten guns. This band was accompanied by a large number of fugitive women and children, who now in their turn suffered the hardships and perils of flight, which had been in so many cases imposed upon the families of the English.

The Rajpootana field-force performed numerous desultory exploits, and dispersed many bands of Rajpoot and Mahratta rebels. The Gujerat field-force disarmed the country, and hung or blew away from guns rajahs and native officers of the Bombay army detected in treasonable correspondence with Tantia Topee, Nana Sahib, and other rebel leaders.

While these events were occurring under General Rose, General Whitlock with his Madras troops was engaged successfully in the troubled district of Bundelcund. On the 19th of April he defeated seven thousand rebels, under the command of the Nawab of Banda. He captured the Nawab, and his guns, slew five hundred of his retainers, and dispersed his whole force.

The rebels now became exceedingly anxious for Calpee. Ram Rao Gohind, a Mahratta, had collected three thousand men of his race, and three guns. Tantia Topee had made up his force to ten thousand men, composed of mutinous sepoys and sowars, about one thousand Mahratta horse, and not much less than seven thousand Ghazees, or fanatics. Calpee is on the right bank of the Jumna, and derived importance from being a place of support for the insurrection, and from being on the main road from Jhansi to Cawnpore.

On the 9th of May Sir Hugh Rose, on his way to Calpee, had arrived at Kooneh, where Tantia Topee and the Ranees of Jhansi intercepted his march. The enemy was intrenched; Rose beat them out of their intrenchments, captured the town and several guns, and made much havoc, especially in the pursuit. The British, and the general himself, principally suffered from exposure to the sun. His advance to Calpee was resisted perpetually, but in vain: as the torrent bears away the branch which falls across its course, so the forces of the rebels were swept away in his progress. Maxwell, from Cawnpore, Whitlock, from the south, Riddell, from Etawah, were all acting in a combined system of operation with Sir Hugh Rose. As he approached Calpee, skirmishes were frequent, occurring daily, almost hourly. A nephew of Nana Sahib was the most active chief in obstructing Sir Hugh's approach. On the 18th Rose shelled the earthworks which had been constructed by Nana Sahib some time before. On the opposite bank of the Jumna Maxwell opened fire next day, which was a surprise to the rebel chiefs, who believed him to be at Cawnpore. On the 20th a sortie was made in force and with skill; the enemy after fighting with energy were beaten in. On the 22nd the rebels, galled by the fire of Maxwell's heavy guns, attacked Sir Hugh Rose's position. Rose drove back a force of fifteen thousand men. The enemy evacuated Calpee in the night with silence, caution, and celerity. It was difficult, perhaps impossible, to prevent this, as long nullahs and scattered topes favoured a concealed flight. They left all their guns behind. Rose found a well-stocked arsenal, foundries, and material of all kinds, vast in quantity, and of great value.

The enemy had retreated chiefly by the road to Gwalior, which Rose had least guarded. Sir Hugh sent a flying column in pursuit, but the fugitives were too nimble, and far outstripped their pursuers.

REVOLUTION IN GWALIOR.

Sir Hugh Rose having captured Calpee, like Sir Colin Campbell when he had captured Bareilly, believed that the rebellion in that part of India was subdued. He did not even yet know the people among whom he was, nor the troops he had so often conquered. Like Sir Colin Campbell he issued a glowing address to his troops, congratulating them on the end of their labours, and, again like Sir Colin, he had scarcely done so when new and great alarms called him to the field. On the day Sir Hugh addressed his soldiers the fugitives from Calpee entered Gwalior, drove Scindiah from his throne, and convulsed all Central India by their success. This was on the 1st of June.

When Tantia Topee encamped near Gwalior, Scindiah sent to Agra for succour, but none could be given; he himself fled thither, after having in vain appealed to his troops to meet the enemy. Three thousand cavalry, six thousand infantry, and artillery, with eight guns, went over to Rao Sahib, nephew to Nana Sahib. The body-guard fought until nearly cut to pieces; their remnant, with persistent bravery, escorted their sovereign off the field.

Nana Sahib was proclaimed as Peishwa of the Mahrattas, a title which he had proclaimed for himself at Cawnpore. Rao Sahib was made chief or sovereign of Gwalior. Scindiah had immense treasures which were seized, all the royal property was confiscated, and the rich citizens plundered. The escape from Calpee was the ruin of Gwalior. The surrounding rajahs flocked to the capital, bringing their retainers. A large army was thus organized, and with ample resources in money and stores to supply it.

Sir Hugh Rose was ill when he conquered Calpee. Probably to that circumstance it was owing that the rebels escaped thence. When the tidings reached him of the fall of Gwalior, he hastened to repair the disaster. Collecting all the forces he could bring together from every quarter, he marched upon the place. On the 16th of June, he arrived near the old cantonments. Rose reconnoitred the place, and immediately resolved to attack the cantonments. The attempt was successful: the slaughter of the fugitives frightful,—some of the trenches formed beyond the cantonments were nearly choked with the dead. Sir Hugh encamped within the vanquished lines.

The Ranee of Jhansi organized forces to intercept Rose's reinforcements, and in doing so fought a battle with Brigadier Smith, in which she fell. Tantia Topee assumed the direction of those operations which she had guided, and fought with skill and energy. Smith, however, was victorious. His contingent was joined by the general-in-chief, who effected a flank movement to that side of the city. The next day he stormed the chief of the fortified heights held by the enemy, who, finding that no obstacles impeded the English, became panic-struck, and fled out of the place. The British cavalry pursued the broken fugitives, cutting them down in vast numbers, until the plains were strewn with their dead.

All was conquered except the great rock fort, into which some of the rebels had retired. Two young officers, who were appointed with a small party to watch a police-station near the fort, resolved to surprise it in the night. Aided by a blacksmith, they, with their few soldiers, forced their way in, and, after desperate fighting, won the place. The attempt was planned by Lieutenant Rose, who perished in executing it. His companion, Lieutenant Waller, secured the prize. Soon after, Scindiah was reinstated upon his throne.

SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY.

The main body of the rebels had retreated to Kurawlee. Thither Rose sent light troops in pursuit. Brigadier Napier took the command. On arriving at Jowla Alipore, he observed the enemy in great force, with twenty-five guns. After all their signal defeats and losses, they had an ample command of *matériel* of war. Napier had not a thousand men; the enemy counted ten times that number. The gallant brigadier, worthy of his name, achieved a swift, glorious, and complete victory, capturing all their guns. After a vain pursuit of the nimble fugitives, the conqueror returned to Gwalior.

Tantia Topee, with another body of about eight thousand in number, directed his way to Geypore, the chief of the Rajpoot states. He carried with him the crown jewels, and the treasure of Scindiah. This daring and active chief now kept Central India in agitation.

Sir Hugh Rose, worn out with toil, retired from his command, and the Central India field-force was broken up. Sir Edward Lugard soon after also retired, worn out with fatigue and anxiety. In this way almost all the eminent men which the mutiny had called forth as able commanders dropped away gradually, and gave place to others who followed



C. Cousser.

THE FORT OF GWALIOR.

FROM THE NORTH WEST

L. N. & JAMES VINTAGE

up with success the work of pacification. The neck of the Indian rebellion was now broken. Proclamations of amnesty and pardon were issued by the government to all who would seek mercy—exceptions in cases of actual murder, and of the great ringleaders of insurrection, being of course made. These proclamations told upon vast numbers, but many remained contumacious to the last.

After the hot season of 1858, the rebellion became a guerilla war, and a pursuit of bandits. The great leaders were discomfited, the minor rajahs and chiefs were captured, hung, blown away from guns, or, submitting, were pardoned. The moulvie was killed in an encounter with one of the Rohileund rajahs, who deemed it his interest to side with the English. The moulvie was a sincere zealot, and was probably the man who devised the scheme of the revolt, and created the

rebellion. Nana Sahib's cowardice kept him from the path of danger, and he escaped capture. He ultimately fled into the Nepaul dominions, with a band of followers. The Nana's nephew fell in one of the combats in Central India, after the flight of the rebels from Gwalior. Tantia Topee for some time eluded pursuit, and wandered about, a wretched, but gallant fugitive, until at last he became a prisoner, and paid with his life the penalty of his misdeeds. With the removal of that remarkable man from the scene of so many horrors, so great struggles, and so much bloodshed, the last spark of rebellion expired.

In the summer of 1859, thanksgiving was offered for the entire suppression of the insurrection, but it was in fact subdued at the close of the campaign of 1858, with the exception of roving bands of marauders, for the suppression of which the police were adequate.

CHAPTER CXXXV.

PRINCIPAL HOME EVENTS CONNECTED WITH INDIA AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW OF 1854, TO THE ABOLITION OF THE COMPANY'S POLITICAL CONTROL, 1858.

THERE were few events occurring immediately after the new constitution of the company, in any way calling for notice in a general history of our empire in the East. The new act of 1854 came into operation on the day nominated, but some time elapsed before it worked with facility in the India-house. In 1855, the policy of Lord Dalhousie was much discussed by the English public, and from that time to the close of his career, the directors were constantly engaged with difficult subjects which he brought before them, or in discussions arising from his measures; and when the mutiny began, his annexation of Oude proved to be the grand difficulty of India.

Without any formal reversal of the policy of Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning was nominated as his successor. On other pages of this history his arrival in Calcutta, the spirit in which he assumed the government, and the policy which he pursued, have been brought before the reader. That policy was viewed in England from the standing-point of party politics.

When the news of the revolt arrived in England, with the opinion of Lord Canning as to its partial and temporary nature, the board of control and the court of directors discussed, in the usual tedious way, the propriety of sending out reinforcements. The fatal words of Lord Canning, making light of the mutiny,

checked the zeal of the English authorities upon whom the duty devolved of sending aid. The long sea route was preferred to the overland route; and heavy sailing-vessels, some of them the worst sailers in Europe, and hardly sea-worthy, were preferred to swift steamers: Lord Palmerston implicitly trusted to the opinions of Lord Canning, who was his nominee and friend.

A great conflict of parliamentary opinions, concerning the administration of Lord Canning, arose in connection with a proclamation intended to encourage the submission of such insurgents as were disposed to lay down their arms, and to deter the continuance of revolt on the part of the obstinate, by threatening consequences the most formidable which, in the opinion of the governor-general, he could hold out.

The government of Lord Palmerston having been displaced, and Lord Derby at the head of the tory party having assumed office, Lord Ellenborough was nominated to the presidency of the board of control, instead of Mr. Vernon Smith. Lord Ellenborough disapproved of the proclamation, or thought it a good occasion for a party move. He wrote a despatch which was almost vituperative, and caused it to be circulated amongst the adherents of government in parliament, some of whom published it. The document was so indiscreet, and the party motive of

the writer so obvious, that irrespective of the merits of the proclamation, a strong feeling arose in the country against the administration of Indian affairs by Lord Ellenborough. The house of commons were prepared to give an adverse vote, which would have compelled Lord Derby's government to retire, but the resignation of Lord Ellenborough at once relieved India of the danger of his further connection with it, and the cabinet from being displaced. The general opinion in England was that Lord Canning's proclamation was too severe to be politic, but those who raised the outcry against it, were the very men who had heaped upon him continued censure for his lenity. Lord Canning prudently gave discretion to those by whom the proclamation would have to be carried out. The opinions of Mr. Montgomery and Sir James Outram harmonised with those of the English public, and Lord Canning was influenced by such experienced councillors. Mr. Vernon Smith, the ex-president of the board of control, placed his party and Lord Canning in much disadvantage by concealing letters written by the governor-general to the board of control, which Mr. Smith ought, as a matter of public duty, to have handed to Lord Ellenborough. This circumstance much irritated the liberal party in parliament.

At last, public opinion seemed to demand that the government of the East India Company should cease. Bills to effect this were brought in by the great opposing parties. The views entertained by Lord Stanley and Lord Palmerston were more nearly allied than those of other members on opposite sides of the legislature. After long discussions, needlessly protracted, intolerably tedious, developing but little wisdom on the part of our legislators, a bill passed the legislature for the future government of India, depriving the East India Company of all political connection with the country, and governing it by a minister of the crown responsible to parliament, aided by a council. The Act, which passed the legislature August 2nd, 1858, was entitled, "An Act for the better Government of India."

With the abolition of the East India Company's political existence, this work appropriately closes. Perhaps the time had arrived when that political anomaly, brilliant as it was, should cease to exist; but the unpreju-

dicted historian cannot fail to admit that, as a governing power, it was the most unique and remarkable in the world. Granted that faults have been committed, and much left undone that ought to have been done, still what has been accomplished fairly deserves the admiration of posterity. That an association of merchants, almost unaided by the home government, should have established the basis of an Eastern empire fifteen thousand miles from home, is a remarkable phenomenon. Aided by a long roll of eminent servants, of their own rearing, they extended their dominions to their present dimensions, and gradually introduced the institutions of civilized communities.

Under the company's later auspices, private property was protected; barbarous customs restrained; justice equitably administered; native chiefs and princes compelled to observe the law; an efficient police established; toleration of religious opinions ensured; and industry protected.

It is to be hoped that with the gentle sovereignty of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, the country may enter on a new era of peace and prosperity. European colonization—much neglected by the company—should be zealously promoted. Wherever the experiment has been made, it has been successful; and a marked improvement has been observed in the neighbourhood.

The fallacies concerning the climate have vanished before practical experience. In the higher regions a European temperature can be found; while in the plains the inconveniences of the climate have been much exaggerated. The staple products of the country are valuable, and capable of increased development, offering an extensive field for agricultural enterprise.

To the ardent political economist India opens up a fruitful scene of action; while the no less hopeful Christian missionary sees a wide sphere for Gospel labours. The one hopes for the social regeneration of the country by introducing the advantages of civilization; the other believes in the possibility of advancing the cause of Christianity by the permanent residence of practical Christians. Should either, or both, of these aspirations be realized, the natives of India will have no cause to regret the transference of their allegiance to a foreign sovereign.

THE END.



RIGHT HON. LORD STANLEY.
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF INDIA.

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